

The Historical Marginalisation of Small-holder Cotton Farmers in the Cotton Value Chain in Western Cotton Growing Area, Tanzania, c. 1920 to 1960

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Abstract

This paper uses primary sources from Tanzania National Archives to examine four decades of cotton farming and marketing by local peasants in the Western Cotton Growing Area (WCGA) in British colonial Tanzania mainland. Cotton was essential for the colonial economy so it was promoted and developed through legislations and enforced by the colonial officials and local chiefs that compulsorily fixed peasants into the farming of the crop. Upon harvest, peasant producers sold the produce to Indian traders who had monopoly over most of the profitable sections of the industry such as ginning (processing) and export of the crop. Under such monopoly of the value chain, peasants were perpetually marginalised by traders when selling their cotton. The colonial intervention to address the situation failed or was undermined by some officials. At the end of the 1940s, peasants and other stakeholders in the production chain took initiatives against marginalisation and from 1953 they eventually wrestled merchants' monopoly through cooperatives and gained control over the lucrative cotton value chain. This paper discusses this struggle and the final cohesion that was

mobilised by the peasants to cement one historical fact that peasants throughout colonial times were not passive receivers of colonial orders. When necessary, such producers resisted exploitation through creative ways as witnessed by cotton producers in the WCGA.

Key words: Small-holders, Marginalisation, Cheating, Cotton, Value chain

1.0 Introduction

When Tanzania (then Tanganyika) became a British protectorate in 1919 cotton growing among small-scale growers in the Western Cotton Growing Area (WCGA) located in the southern part of Lake Victoria of the country became the main economic activity. The WCGA was a priority area due to availability of labourers, suitable soil and reliable rain to grow the crop.¹⁶³ Small-holders in the WCGA engaged in cotton farming since German era. Seemingly, by the time when the British took over, small-scale native growers had accumulated enormous knowledge and experience in the industry that was extensively utilised throughout British colonial rule in mainland Tanzania.

On the other hand, for many years the Asians (Indians) monopolised the cotton industry, particularly purchase, processing and export. Since the Asians (Indians) cotton buyers had a monopoly over cotton buying employed a wide range of

¹⁶³ Board of Trade of the Empire, "Cotton Growing Committee Report Presented to the Parliament", London, HMSO, 1920, p.33.

tricks to make 'profit' by employing manipulative tricks as underpaying growers, false weight for cotton delivered and incorrect payments for quality grading.¹⁶⁴ Under these tricks, growers were exploited and their labour was largely marginalised at the expense of buyers profit maximisation that lasted for three decades. Growers and local chiefs protested against such marginalisation; however, little was done to address the concern that prompted growers to organise themselves in informal groups referred to as *avapimi va magafu* and *mabebete* in Ukerewe and the rest of the WCGA respectively. These groups managed to minimise cheating that was finally ended when cooperative societies were established from 1953.

This paper therefore examines the marginalisation of small-scale cotton growers in the WCGA, which was executed by the merchants. It also focuses on the growers' protest against marginalisation from the 1920s to 1950s. The paper traces such development in association with engagement of growers in cotton farming when mainland Tanzania fell under British colonial rule.

The cotton farming proved successful in mainland Tanzania in two geographical areas popularly referred to as the Eastern Cotton Growing Area (ECGA) and Western Cotton Growing Area (WCGA). In these two locations, the Germans set up research centres to strengthen development of the cotton

¹⁶⁴ Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania: A political economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Hydén, Göran, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania. Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*, (London: Heinemann, 1980).

industry among small-scale farmers with technical expertise and funding facilitated by the German government through the *Koonialwirtschaftliches Komitee* (KWK).¹⁶⁵ All along, the KWK's experts favoured the WCGA most owing to suitable climate, soil as well as availability of labourers to facilitate development of the cotton industry. The same notion prevailed when the British took over Tanzania soon after the First World War following a study conducted in 1922 by the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation (ECGC).¹⁶⁶

Two British organisations with interest in cotton, the ECGC and British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) were heavily involved in development of the cotton industry in Tanzania. The ECGC facilitated the colonial authority in Tanzania with expertise to set up the Agricultural Department, trained agriculture extension staff also advised on staff employment and involved in breeding cotton seed research and the BCGA expertise was evident in ginning, quality advise and marketing of the crop.

The colonial authority government pushed small-scale growers to cultivate cotton. The growers, local chiefs as well as and village headmen, Agriculture Department, and both organisations, BCGA and ECGC contributed to the prosperity of

¹⁶⁵ Jennifer Ann Dawe, "A History of Cotton-Growing in East and Central Africa: British Demand, African Supply" (University of Edinburgh: PhD Thesis, 1993), p.341.

¹⁶⁶ ECGC, "The extension of cotton cultivation in Tanganyika Territory: report to the Committee on tour in Tanganyika territory Nov 1920 – July 1921", London the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, 1922.

the industry that was central to the WCGA economy¹⁶⁷ that Tambila termed it as the “cotton country.”¹⁶⁸

The Colonial Office (CO) was also involved in approving a range of the legislations, guidelines and policies drafted by the colonial authority to provide for production of cotton, exploitation of growers and extraction of the crop as raw material to feed textile mills in Britain. The colonial authority and native administrators were responsible for the enforcement of the approved legislation, guidelines and policies. The growers adhered to the prescribed cotton farming guidelines and exploitative policies, which facilitated the marginalization of the growers for three decades.

Cotton ginning required knowledge of machinery and an investment of capital, which, then, none of the natives possessed. Consequently, the ginning and the marketing of cotton were in the European and Indian hands who had capital to purchase cotton, machines to process cotton that qualified them for a license to carry out the business. To conduct the cotton buying, the BCGA as well as Indian cotton merchants signed cotton-buying contracts to purchase cotton produced by small-scale growers at prices annually arranged in advance by the Department of Agriculture. The purpose of this agreement

¹⁶⁷ J. Iliffe. *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

¹⁶⁸ K.I. Tambila. “Botanical Imperialism in Action Germany and Cotton in East Africa: 1886-1914.” *Tanzania Zamani: A Journal of Historical Research & Writing. Volume 2 No. 2* (January 1996).

was to guarantee market for the produce primarily to motivate growers to keep on producing.

The colonial authority had consideration in place to protect growers against unfair weighing, and assurance to be paid in cash.¹⁶⁹ In order to improve the quality and price of the produce, the Department of Agriculture established an auction system in districts across the WCGA. ¹⁷⁰ Most of the cotton growers believed that the winner of the bid profited at their expense of the producer when market prices later increased. Cotton buyers opposed the plan because it limited competition; hence, it was abandoned in the early 1930s. When the auction system was abandoned, a room for marginalisation and cheating of growers by cotton buyers was opened.

There was also consideration that ensured sufficient cotton supply to processors (ginners) of which ginneries had to be erected at about ten miles apart from each other that created a monopoly over cotton produced within the allocated area, popularly referred to as a zone (see Table 4). These zones were created for technical reasons, which was to protect mixing cotton varieties. All measures established monopoly over ginning and export of cotton by merchants that facilitated a platform for marginalisation of growers, for instance through underpricing of the growers' deliveries at the cotton buying centres that continued for three decades of which growers were not happy with.

¹⁶⁹ Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa, Volume I* (New York: Macmillan and Company Limited, 1928), p.475.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

The earliest attempts to challenge marginalisation were spontaneous and characterised by complaints from local chiefs, but were unsuccessful. The chiefs' failure to curb malpractice led to the emergence of the grassroots groups that concentrated on weighing growers' cotton deliveries at the buying centres. Hence, cheating was minimised, which helped curtail marginalisation. Later on, organised groups such as embryonic associations and co-operatives benefited from the strong foundation built by the grassroots movement.

Generally, there is plenty of literature on the cotton farming in the WCGA.¹⁷¹ There is consensus among these authors on the genesis and development of cotton among small-scale growers in the WCGA. In his work, Dawe examines cotton-farming practices among small-scale growers in the WCGA and its impact on soil fertility.¹⁷² Lebuscher has highlighted cotton

¹⁷¹ See, for example, T. Sunseri. "The Baumwollfrage: Cotton Colonialism in German East Africa." *Central European History*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2001), pp. 31-51; Tambila, *Botanical Imperialism*, op. cit.; Dawe, *A History of Cotton-Growing*, op. cit.; S. Neal, "A Colonial Dilemma: British Policy and the Colonial Economy of Tanganyika, 1918-1938" (Australian National University: M.A Thesis, 1981); G. Andrew Maguire. *Towards 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Ralph, Austen A. *Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1968); Hans Ruthernberg. *Agricultural Development in Tanganyika* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1964); N.R. Fuggles-Couchman. *Agriculture Change in Tanganyika: 1945 – 1960* (California: Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1964); Sheila Gorst. *Co-operative Organisation in Tropical Countries: A Study of Co-Operative Development in Non-Self-Governing Territories under the United Kingdom Administration*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959); C P. K. Norris, "Cotton Production in British East Africa", Washington, D. C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1937; A. F. Calvert. *German East Africa* (London: T. Werner Laurie, Ltd., 1917); Heinrich Brode. *British and German East Africa, Their Economic and Commercial Relations* (London: Edward and Arnold, 1911).

¹⁷² Dawe, *A History of Cotton-Growing*, op. cit.

marketing and its structure in the WCGA during the 1930s but marginalisation has not featured in her work.¹⁷³

Sunseri's examination of cotton production is dominated by personalities, the colonial production strategies, policies, political influences and gender aspects when Tanzania was under German colonial rule of which marginalisation of the WCGA's cotton small growers was not part of Sunseri's work. The same applies to Tambila¹⁷⁴, Calvert¹⁷⁵ and Neal ¹⁷⁶ who examine the history of the cotton industry during German and British colonial rule in Tanzania. Norris¹⁷⁷ studies the development of cotton industry in the East African British colonies, that is, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In general, he covered historical development in Tanzania from 1920s to 1937. While paying some attention to the WCGA, Norris failed to take into account policy issues associated with the engagement of natives in the industry and stakeholders involved in the exploitation of the industry on behalf of the colonial authority. He has also ignored the tasks undertaken by local chiefs.

However, there is only scanty documentation related to the marginalisation of the WCGA small-scale growers. Most scholars examine growers' attempt to combat marginalisation.¹⁷⁸ The marginalisation or exploitation of small-

¹⁷³ Charlotte Leubuscher. *Tanganyika Territory: A study of Economic Policy under Mandate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 51 – 53.

¹⁷⁴ Tambila, *Botanical Imperialism*, op. cit.

¹⁷⁵ Calvert, *German East Africa*, op. cit.

¹⁷⁶ Neal, *A Colonial Dilemma*, op. cit.

¹⁷⁷ Norris, *Cotton Production*, op. cit.

¹⁷⁸ See, for example, Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p.295; Fuggles-Couchman, *Agriculture Change in Tanganyika*, op. cit.; Dawe, *A History of Cotton-Growing*, op. cit.

scale crop growers is not unique to Tanzania as was a common feature in most African countries during the colonial era.

Several authors discuss the exploitation of small-scale growers by middlemen in African countries, including Tanzania.¹⁷⁹ Dharam Ghai and Yash Ghai¹⁸⁰ highlight the monopoly by Asian traders over cotton industry - processing and export - during colonial era in African countries. The two scholars admit that most of the Asian traders engaged in agricultural business were prosperous but have not mentioned malpractices especially exploitation of vulnerable small-scale growers.¹⁸¹ Leubuscher,¹⁸² also Ghai and Ghai agree that through such monopolisation, natives were marginalise in the key agricultural value chain and no effort was in place from the colonial authority to promote

¹⁷⁹ See, for example, Robert Ikweria and Ronald Twongyirwe. "Facilitating social enterprise development through collective marketing: insights from Bukonzo Joint Co-operative Union, Western Uganda." *Journal of Fair Trade* Vol. 1, No. 1 (February 2019), pp. 13-26; F. Onyiloa and A. Adong. "Agricultural Cooperative Marketing and Credit Policy Reform in Uganda: An Opportunity for Poverty Reduction." *African Journal of Food, Agriculture and Nutrition Development, Volume 19, No. 1* (2019), pp. :14156-14170; Dawe, A History of Cotton-Growing, op. cit.; K. R. Curtis. "Cooperation and Cooptation: The Struggle for Market Control in the Bukoba District of Colonial Tanganyika." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Volume 25 No. 3, (1992), pp. 505-538; G.P. Mpangala. 'The Impact of Colonial Trading Capital or the Transformation of Peasant Agriculture in Tanganyika, 1885-1961' (Karl Marx University: PhD Thesis, 1987); Hydén, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania*, op. cit.; Iliffe, *A Modern History*, op. cit.; B. C. Nindi. "A Historical Study of the Cooperative Movement in Tanzania." *Trans-African Journal of History* Vol. 6 No. 7 (1977-78) pp. 64-78; A. Coulson. *Tanzania: A Political Economy 2nd Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Dharam P. Ghai and Yash P. Ghai. "Asians in East Africa: Problems and Prospects." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Volume 3 No. 1 (May, 1965), pp. 35-51.

¹⁸¹ Ghai and Ghai, op. cit.

¹⁸² Charlotte Leubuscher. *Tanganyika Territory: A study of Economic Policy under Mandate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 78 -79.

natives to have space in purchase processing and export of agricultural produce. Moreover, Carl¹⁸³ suggests that opposition against cotton price prompted the emergence of co-operatives that this paper refutes and it provides a background to the rise of co-operatives in the WCGA. Carl has not examined pressure exerted to colonial authority by growers groups to have a stake in cotton handling does not feature in his dissertation.

Work by Fuggles-Couchman discusses the production and marketing of cashew nut, coffee, cotton marketing through private outlets and cooperatives in Tanzania.¹⁸⁴ But Fuggles-Couchman has not illuminated the early initiatives in developing mentioned crops and has not mentioned the engagement of small-scale growers in producing mentioned crops as well as guiding policies and he has not outlined at what stage small holders were involved in the value chain of what they produced.

Coulson has extensively examined the cotton informal weighing groups (independent weighers).¹⁸⁵ However, Coulson suggests that the emergence of the grassroots groups that fought against cheating of growers that were under leadership of Paul Bomani. This paper refutes Coulson's contention as these groups were first formed in Ukerewe Island where Bomani was unknown.

¹⁸³ Carl Josephs Norman. "Tanzania and the World Bank Group: socialism and self-reliance?" (Durham University: M.A. Dissertation, 1977), pp.139-140. <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9748/> Accessed on October 12th 2020.

¹⁸⁴ Fuggles-Couchman, *Agriculture Change in Tanganyika*, op. cit.

¹⁸⁵ Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy 2nd Edition*, p. 67.

Pim's work¹⁸⁶ discusses methods employed to engage the natives in cultivating the crop that chiefly entailed a system of compulsion in Belgian colonies such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. Pim however, neglected cotton farming among smallholders as well as involvement of Indian traders in Tanzania in cotton ginning and marketing. Dawe acknowledges prevalence of cheating of growers by Indian cotton buyers.¹⁸⁷

Ruthenberg discusses agricultural development during British colonial rule.¹⁸⁸ He examines various production and marketing policies in Tanzania by citing how they were applied to small-scale cash crop producers. Ruthenberg's work offers relevant and useful ideas on such policies. However, coverage of most policies is too general and lacks specificities particularly where and how cash crop production and marketing policies were applied and their impacts to growers. In his discussion over the cotton industry in the WCGA, Ruthenberg refutes prevalence of cheating of growers by Indian traders and maintains such allegations were nothing other than mere campaigns to tarnish their reputation. Ruthenberg based on the evidence from Ukerewe that he generalised as the practice and trend throughout the WCGA. This paper has shown that, Ruthenberg clearly misleads and downplays the magnitude of cheating by providing more evidence to prove the prevalence of cheating of growers by cotton buyers which corroborated by

¹⁸⁶ Pim, (1946), p.126.

¹⁸⁷ Dawe, A History of Cotton-Growing, op. cit.

¹⁸⁸ Ruthenberg, *Agricultural Development in Tanganyika*, op.cit.

Hyden¹⁸⁹ in his work. Additionally, Magotti¹⁹⁰ has examined small-scale growers' cotton industry in the WCGA with a narrow focus on Mara region. The region is part of the WCGA that had the smallest number of cooperative societies and its business volume was low.

Similarly, in his work, Maguire¹⁹¹ provides the analysis over the involvement of the natives in the cotton handling in the WCGA. Maguire discusses the rise of the informal cotton weighing groups (independent weighers) who challenged marginalisation of native cotton growers. However, Maguire has not traced the roots, development and the impact of the growers groups in addressing marginalisation that this paper is interested in. Again, key aspects related to marginalisation that prompted the rise of these groups have not been covered in the Maguire's work that this study attempts to fill such a gap. His narration largely revolves mainly around some personalities particularly Paul Bomani who termed as pivotal for the growth of co-operative movement in the WCGA.

The literature, however, does not show the extent and how marginalisation was pursued. Similarly, they have not enlightened why and how such marginalisation persisted and who facilitated persistence of the problem. Generally, there is limited documentation regarding how merchants exploited

¹⁸⁹ Göran Hydén. *Efficiency versus Distribution in East African Cooperatives: A Study in Organizational Conflicts* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973).

¹⁹⁰ John Machumu Jay Magotti. "A History of the Co-operative Movement in Mara Region 1945 – 1976" (University of Dar es Salaam: Unpublished Masters Dissertation, 1984).

¹⁹¹ Maguire, *Towards 'Uhuru' in Tanzania*, pp. 81-111.

small-scale growers and the roles of ‘grassroots organisations’ to combat such exploitation. Essentially, this paper provides the analysis on how the small-scale cotton growers mobilised themselves against exploitation. Secondary sources on the small-scale growers’ industry as well as marketing and processing in the WCGA are scarce and frequently struggle to illuminate issues related to marginalisation at the local level. Importantly, this paper shifts away from profiling a biographical approach, incorporation of other groups, events, policies that facilitated marginalisation. The decades of marginalization was intolerable that prompted cotton growers to challenge persistent cheating through informal/grassroots groups eventually gained a stake in the industry through cooperatives by utilizing the primary evidence for this paper are from the Tanzania National Archive (TNA) in Dar es Salaam.

2.0 Study Objective


This paper examines the marginalisation of small-scale cotton growers by the colonial authority and merchants through policies and legislation in Tanzania’s WCGA. It also focuses on the growers’ protest against marginalisation from the 1920s to 1950s. Specifically, the paper explores the following issues:

1. The impact of guiding policies and legislations that revamped the cotton industry;
2. The aspects that characterised marginalisation of growers;
3. The responses of the small-scale growers and other stakeholders against marginalisation.

3.0 Materials and methods

This study pays close attention to cotton produced by small-scale growers in the WCGA, formerly referred to as Lake Province. The area covered all districts in Geita, Mwanza, Shinyanga and Simiyu regions located in the Southern part of Lake Victoria in Tanzania as shown in two maps below.

Figure 1: Map Showing Western Growing Area



Source: Ukiriguru: Tanzania Agricultural Research Centre, 1982

This paper extensively used underutilised primary sources from Tanzania National Archive (TNA). Some of the primary materials used for this paper are Tanzania's Department of Agriculture, colonial officials (provincial and district levels), ECGC and BCGA reports and correspondences that provide evidence that supports issues raised in the paper. Other documents used here are marketing board's annual reports, reviews and meeting minutes as well as those from the Department of Co-operatives/Registrar of Co-operative societies and from the Native Authorities. Most of the mentioned sources were obtained from the TNA in Dar es Salaam. Before getting to the analysis itself, the study offers some basic background information about the situation in WCGA for in-depth examination of stakeholders or players and policies involved in the cotton industry.

4.0 Findings and Discussion

4.1.0 Cotton farming policies and legislations

The colonial agricultural policy in Tanzania did not preclude the development of small holder agriculture on the view that would generate effective economic integration beneficial to all parties (producers and the government). Arguably, by acquiring Tanzania after First World War, Britain got an additional land for cotton farming in the Eastern Cotton growing Area (ECGA) and WCGA; and by then, the WCGA has over 800,000 workforce¹⁹² According to Isaacman, from the onset, the British were involved in engagement of the local people in cotton

¹⁹² ECGC, The extension of cotton cultivation in Tanganyika Territory, op. cit.

farming as they provided cheap labor¹⁹³ and use of their own land as capital, which made the industry much cheaper.

A commitment to exploit land and labourers in the WCGA accompanied with a range of the exploitative policies and legislations primarily geared towards engaging natives to cultivate cotton were brought in place. This paper shows that growers were tied in producing cotton by the colonial government under the Government Notice No. 84, 1931 and No. 78, 1933 regulations.¹⁹⁴ Under these regulations, growers were compelled to farm and attend their farms from planting to harvest. Such measures were applied during implementation of 'Increase Production Campaign'. To achieve increased cotton production, the colonial authority utilised local chiefs and headmen to enforce measures on the minimum cotton acreage.¹⁹⁵ For example, in the WCGA's Ubinza chiefdom's small cotton growers were required to cultivate ½ acre in 1931.¹⁹⁶ Chiefs whose subjects failed to meet targets were removed from office.¹⁹⁷

Further compulsion measures were provided under the Native Administration (Extension Power) Cultivation of Cotton Order of 1935 and Government Notice No. 75 of 1935. Under this

¹⁹³ A.F. Isaacman. *Cotton Is the Mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work, and Rural Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938-1961* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1996), p.3.

¹⁹⁴ Government Notices Number 84, 1931, No. 78, 1933 also in 1936, TNA 23218.

¹⁹⁵ Government Notices Number 84, 1931, No. 78, 1933 also in 1936, TNA, 23218.

¹⁹⁶ Maswa District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, Ref. No. 402/3676 of May 16th 1933, TNA 215/665, Vol. I.

¹⁹⁷ Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province to Chief Secretary Ref. No.665/631, October 5th 1948, TNA 29121.

legislations, growers who failed to comply were punished by having them sent away to work in the sisal plantations in Tanga and Arusha provinces.¹⁹⁸ On return, the returnees conformed and abided with regulations on cultivation cotton.¹⁹⁹

Notably, compulsion measures were widely employed for cotton farming because Article 19 was silent on the matter. Of course, at a time, the public opinion was also against any compulsion approach as it was wrong and unethical. Compulsory cultivation in this case was treated as educational measure and as measure to stimulate Native Production of marketable crops.²⁰⁰ Moreover, during the Second World War, the colonial authority employed cotton compulsory cultivation with an approval of the Colonial Office under the war situation. As it was in the Emergency Power (Defence) Act, 1939, Supplies, and Services (Transitional) Power Act, 1945 set out in Section 8, Cap. 47, which translated it as community service. The compulsory cotton farming applied during the 1940s and 1950s, under the 1942 Government Notice No. 177,²⁰¹ and further reinforced under Ordinance No. 57 of 1951.²⁰²

In the WCGA (Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora regions) the production amounted to 1,750,000 lb. The production in the

¹⁹⁸ Maswa District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, Ref. No. 402/3676, May 16th 1933, TNA 215/665, Vol. I.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, Maswa District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province.


²⁰⁰ Lord Harley, *An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of Sahara*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 630 - 631.

²⁰¹ Provincial Commissioner Lake Province to CS, Confidential, Ref. No 665/631, October 5th 1948, TNA 28259/21.

²⁰² Provincial Commissioner Lake Province to Lake Province Member of Local Government, Confidential, Ref. No 29121/41, December 10th 1951, TNA 28259/21.

ECGA for Morogoro was 448,000 lb, Lindi was 248,000 lb and Rufiji was 238,000 lb.²⁰³ Cotton production in the WCGA during the 1930s was encouraging (see Table 3) despite some production fluctuations. Despite some production fluctuations, such measures were a success as far as colonial authority was concerned (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Cotton production in the WCGA during 1930s



Source: TNA 19496/19, 3, Memorandum by Director of Agriculture regarding the assistance given by the Empire Cotton Growers Committee (later Empire Cotton Growing Corporation) for promotion of cotton in Tanganyika.

²⁰³ East African Commission Report of the East African Commission Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament, (London: HMSO, April, 1925), p.117

In 1930s and 1940s, there was a remarkable increase of cotton production (see Table 2) with some fluctuations due to the increase of the acreage under direct cultivation, and reliable rains, as well as the availability of high yield cotton variety.²⁰⁴ The highest export of cotton in the 1930s from the WCGA occurred in 1939 and 1948 (see Table 1). The removal of emphasis on cotton production, the absence of men in service, the high priority of food production and great demand on labour supply for sisal and rubber industries had a very severe effect on cotton planting and after 1941, the size of crop declined sharply.

Table 1: Cotton production in 1939 to 1948 in bales of 400 lb.

Location	1939	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948
WCGA	39,673	24,866	17,171	35,378	33,631	32,250	45,381
ECGA	14,615	8,053	5,135	4,835	6,326	6,642	7,205
Tanga	2,915	1,225	700	304	336	441	914
Northern	1,156	320	216	114	311	347	175
Southern	965	1,006	761	777	294	183	148
Total	59324	35470	23,983	41,408	40,898	39863	53823

Source: A. H. Savile, *African Agriculture in Tanganyika* in J. K. Matheson and E. W. Bovill, *East African Agriculture: A Short Survey of the Agriculture of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar, and of Its Principal Products* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 244

²⁰⁴ A Report on the Lake Province Cotton Committee, July 1954 to 1954, TNA 215/1423/A.

4.1.2 Cotton purchase and processing

On the other hand business friendly policies were also evident that motivated merchants to invest their capital in the cotton industry in Tanzania. The Colonial Office, colonial government (the Agricultural Department) formulated the policies associated with marketing and ginning.²⁰⁵ The colonial authority collaborated with Uganda's colonial government in arrangements, policies and legislations formulation regarding cotton marketing, transportation and processing (ginning) and export as provided under the 1933 Cotton Ordinance. The Cotton Ordinance provided the colonial government a mandate to grant permission to merchants to erect ginneries in selected zones in the WCGA.

Creation of cotton buying zones and ginning within allocated zone was meant to avoid mixture of varieties, maintain quality, and control of spread of diseases in compliance to the Cotton Rule No. 12 forbade the removal of seed cotton from one district to another unless authorized by the Director of Agriculture. Importantly, the Cotton Rule was envisaged to encourage the ginners, middlemen and merchants to take active interest marketing and processing cotton in allocated zone; also it led to monopolisation of marketing and ginning to a few Asian traders For example, Ladha Meghji erected ginneries at Luguru,²⁰⁶Uzinza and Mugango.²⁰⁷ The British East Africa Corporation erected a ginnery at Usogore in Shinyanga district

²⁰⁵ ECGC, The extension of cotton cultivation in Tanganyika Territory, op. cit.

²⁰⁶ Ladha Meghji to DA, March 15th 1935, TNA 215/772.

²⁰⁷ A. Willis on behalf of Ladha Meghji to DA, January 9th 1935, TNA 215/772.

but, in 1933 it transferred ownership to Ladha Meghji.²⁰⁸ Baghwaji Sundweji and Company had five ginneries and also erected a ginnery in Uzinza that became the biggest ginner in the WCGA.²⁰⁹

Each ginnery had a monopoly to process cotton produced in a given zone. A monopoly was granted to cotton merchants with consideration that they had the financial capital to handle the entire crop produced in the WCGA on annual basis. In this regard, Indian merchants had an opportunity to dictate their influence before the colonial government. Moreover, the 1933 and 1937 cotton Ordinance stipulated marketing aspects. It categorised cotton buying into four types which were pioneer buying posts that were operated by ginneries' agents and ginnery that operated buying posts.²¹⁰ The Ordinance allocated areas where crop exceeded 100 to 400 tons to ginneries and public cotton markets were allocated to both ginneries and agents who had the financial capital to handle specified tonnage. Notwithstanding, the smallholders were not considered because they were not financially capable and lacked knowledge and experience to conduct the business.

4.1.3 Cotton development responsibilities

The ECGC was charged with the development of the industry in the WCGA. Here the ECGC replicated Uganda cotton policies

²⁰⁸ Chairman (E.H.M Legget) British East Africa Corporation to DA, November 14th 1933.

²⁰⁹ Baghwaji Sundweji and Company to DO Mwanza District, March 13th 1935, TNA 215/772.

²¹⁰ District Commissioner, Geita to the Administrative Office, Sukumaland Ibanza, July 6th 1952, TNA 215/1423C.

and legislation.²¹¹ The ECGC trained agricultural extension staff that were employed across the WCGA. The ECGC deployed ten cotton experts from various countries to develop the industry aimed at strengthening the local Department of Agriculture.²¹² The District Commissioners in the WCGA were involved in supervision of the industry alongside the chiefs and village headmen.²¹³ The role of the ECGC, the Agricultural Department and instructors played their part in the increase of cotton cultivation by native small-scale growers during the 1923/24 season. The ECGC and the Agricultural Department as well as native authorities under which the local chiefs and village headmen were responsible for supply of cotton seeds to growers.²¹⁴ Some of the seed varieties as UK46, UK48, UK51, UK55 and UK58 that proved adaptable to the WCGA's climatic conditions were bred by the ECGC of which thousands of tons of these varieties were freely supplied to growers every season during 1940s and 1950s.²¹⁵

4.1.4 Cheating of growers by Indian merchants

The Indian cotton traders flocked in the WCGA to purchase cotton from growers and some installed ginneries. The local population in the WCGA was entirely responsible for cotton

²¹¹ Report to the Board of Trade of the Empire Cotton Growing Committee Presented to the Parliament by Command of His Majesty (London: HMSO, 1920), p.33, TNA 215/655 Vol. I.

²¹² Fuggles-Couchman, *Agriculture Change in Tanganyika*, p.17.

²¹³ Imperial Institute, Bulletin of the Imperial Institute, A Quarterly Record of Progress in Tropical Agriculture and Industries and the Commercial Utilisation of the Natural Resources of the Dominions, Colonies and India, Volume XX. 1922 (London: Hasell, Watson and Viney, Ltd., 1922), p.176.

²¹⁴ Ibid. Imperial Institute, Bulletin of the Imperial Institute.

²¹⁵ A Report on the Lake Province Cotton Committee, July 1954, TNA 215/1423/A.

farming whereas India buyers bought it. During 1920s, the cotton marketing was operated under the Native Authorities which were assigned control and quality assurance.²¹⁶ During the time, the cotton buyers were competing against each other for bigger volumes in which quality was compromised that the Native Authorities failed to control.²¹⁷

Generally, irregularities were common in cotton marketing, for example itinerant or unlicensed traders operated cotton purchase in the WCGA.²¹⁸ Also, cheating of growers by cotton buyers was widespread.²¹⁹ For example, barter trade was the order of the day, as growers were paid consumer goods like mirrors, beads, and piece of *kaniki* (a sheet of dyed black cloth) instead of cash in exchange for cotton loads.²²⁰ Leubuscher defended barter trade practices. She argues it arose owing to the shortage of currencies.²²¹ This paper is of the opinion that, barter trade dominated because cotton buyers had intention to 'serve' some cash for their personal use which implied nothing other than cheating. Cotton growers and local chiefs were not pleased with such exploitation.

As cheating intensified during 1920s and early 1930s, some chiefs in the WCGA took action. They protested against

²¹⁶ DA to CS, Ref. No. 6/5389, July 24th 1935, TNA 23218; DC Shinyanga to PC Lake Province, Ref. No. 62/38, February 1936, TNA 23218.

²¹⁷ Ibid. DA to CS; *ibid.* DC Shinyanga to PC Lake Province.

²¹⁸ Ibid. DA to CS; *ibid.* DC Shinyanga to PC Lake Province.

²¹⁹ Ibid. DA to CS; *ibid.* DC Shinyanga to PC Lake Province.

²²⁰ Ibid. DA to CS; *ibid.* DC Shinyanga to PC Lake Province.

²²¹ Leubuscher, Charlotte Tanganyika Territory: A study of Economic Policy under Mandate (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 51 – 53.

cheating practices. In their petition, they unanimously condemned cheating.²²² The chiefs of Kwimba, Igokelo, Mgerema, G. Massanja III, Ndalaha and Masanja K. M. claimed that:²²³

it is apparent that under the present system of marketing the clerks and village Headmen were responsible for conduct of the markets are inclined to favour the purchaser that is traders. They often give bribes in order that the merchant declared weight of produce as less than it really is. This sort of greedy haste brings trouble to the district in that the profits of the land flow into coffers of grasping tradesmen.

Cheating of growers by Indian cotton was widespread with limited colonial government's intervention.²²⁴ Hence, the initial attempt was made by the Native Authorities (NAs) but proved a failure.²²⁵ A failure by the NAs intervention by the colonial government in 1923 that led to the creation of zones to provide for closer monitoring and control of cotton marketing.²²⁶ However, no zone was created until 1930s, as provided under the 1931 Cotton Ordinance (with amendments made in 1933) for the control of cultivation, marketing, ginning licensing of

²²² Chiefs to the Provincial Commissioner, December 16th 1933, TNA, 23218.

²²³ Ibid. Chiefs to the Provincial Commissioner.

²²⁴ Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province to Director of Agriculture, Ref. No. 1302/150, August 24th 1935, TNA 23218.

²²⁵ Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, Ref. No. 6/5389, July 24th 1935, TNA 23218.

²²⁶ Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province to Director of Agriculture, Ref. No. 1302/150, August 24th 1935, TNA 23218.

which confined cotton buyer's operation within a specific farming zone.²²⁷ Understandably, such zones created a monopoly over cotton buying and ginning in a specific area (zone) that provided a room for an entrenched marginalisation of growers.

Additionally, following the outbreak of World War II, export of cotton was placed under emergency controls to ensure it was not diverted to British's enemies of which the Emergency Power Defense Acts of 1939 and 1940 provide for a control over the cotton purchase. Under this arrangement the Lake Province Exporters Group (formerly, Uganda Cotton Exporters Group), signed a three years contract in 1949 with the British Raw Cotton Commission for purchase of the entire cotton produced in Tanzania. It was through this arrangement that the Indian traders were provided with a monopoly and control over the WCGA cotton industry. Also, the scheme provided the cotton merchants with a room to exploit and widen a room to cheat cotton growers.

²²⁷ Government Notice No. 84 of 1931 which were amended in 1933 under the Government Notice No. 78.

Table 2: Companies allocated cotton-buying zones in the WCGA during 1948 to 1951

Zone	Company	Ginnery
Musoma	Messrs Musoma Industries Ltd	Mgango Ginnery
Pambani	Messrs Pambani Ltd	Pambani Ginnery
Nyambiti	Messrs Kwimba Ginnery Ltd	Kwimba Ginnery Ltd
Nassa	Messrs Sikh Ginners	Nassa Ginnery and Messrs Sikh Ginners Ltd (Mwamagili)
Ukerewe	White Fathers and Messrs Ladha Meghji & Sons Ltd	Murutunguru Ginnery
Bukumbi	Messrs Baghwaji Sundeji and Co Ltd	Mwabagoli Ginnery
Shinyanga	Messrs Baghwaji Sundeji and Co Ltd	Uzogole ginnery
Luguru	Messrs Baghwaji Sundeji and Co Ltd	Luguru ginnery
Malampaka	Messrs Baghwaji Sundeji and Co Ltd	
Buchosa	Buchosa Cotton Co Ltd	Buchosa ginnery (Nyakalilo)
Buchosa	Messrs Nakasero Commercial Corporation Ltd	Buchosa ginnery
Mwanza	Messrs Nakasero Commercial Corporation Ltd	Mwanza ginnery
Ihale	Messrs Mwanza Cotton Trading Co Ltd	Ihale ginnery

Source: Regional Assistant Director of Agriculture, Lake Province 1947 – 1949 Reports

After the Second World War, the colonial Agricultural Department increased a number of demarcated cotton buying zones (see Table 2). Under the zone scheme, prohibitions the movement of cotton seed from one to another primarily to maintain cotton quality and avoid mixing varieties which meant that growers were restricted to market their produce within the zone. In instituting zoning scheme, selected cotton merchants were granted a monopoly over cotton industry in the WCGA. The growers viewed this as inconvenient. They criticised it because it eliminated free competition, and it became more costly to travel in order to market their produce.

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Figure 2: Women carrying cotton loads to a buying post



Source: Carey Bryan Singleton, *The Agricultural Economy of Tanganyika*, (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Regional Analysis Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 1964) p.24

²²⁸ Ibid. District Commissioner, Geita to the Administrative Office, Sukumaland Ibanza.

4.1.5 Some of the cheating evidences

During and post-war years cheating of growers by cotton buyers increased. Evidence produced in 1940s by some whistleblowers like Popat Ranji brought out further revelations over the extent of cheating. According to him, the extent of deprivation and robbery of farmers amounted to over 25%, which was pocketed by buyers through manipulation of weighing scales parcel.²²⁹ In this regard, only 75% of the payment was handed to growers. According to the whistleblower, the percentage estimate was valued to be over 1,500,000 shillings.

Ranji's revelation mentioned Messrs Ladha Meghji and Sons Ltd as one of the merchants involved in cheating of growers in the zones that they had a monopoly and control. It has to be noted that, all cotton buying companies mentioned in Table 2 hired cotton buying clerks charged with responsibility to buy cotton either at buying centres or a ginnery. The buying clerks (cotton buyers) were deployed by companies across the WCGA.

All companies were obliged under the contract to purchase entire cotton produced in the zones allocated to them. This was of course a responsibility shouldered to cotton buyers to comply as per term of their employment. Cotton buyers were also supposed to buy the cotton from growers at fixed prices, and then ensure proper bagging, storage, and transport to the

²²⁹ Popat Ranji to Provincial Commissioner, June 20th 1947 and August 19th 1947, TNA 215/1423C; Popat Ranji to Bishop of Mwanza December 22nd 1947, TNA 215/1423C.

ginners. The terms of contract between cotton merchants and buying clerks were as follows:²³⁰

- (a) No salary and commission paid;
- (b) All expenses are to be met by the employee;
- (c) All cotton buying expenses and bagging costs are to be met by the employee;
- (d) As to weight of cotton, the employee has to accept the weight of cotton as will be imparted by the ginner weight; and
- (e) For every 100 lb purchased only 6 percent is given to employee in cash.

These terms fueled cheating to meet both personal and employers' goals. To achieve such terms clerks had to employ a wide range of tricks to enable them to survive and realise own 'profit' during cotton buying seasons. In a number of instances, the farmers received paid less-than-official prices, experienced false weighing, and incorrect payments for quality grading; so cheating for example short weight was widespread".²³¹ Furthermore, Ramji argued that, Indian clerks kept two different weighing scales which were the government-recommended scales, which were not regularly used, and one that was regularly used specifically for cheating purposes.²³² In a number of instances, farmers received less-than-official prices, experienced false weighing, and incorrect payments for quality grading.

²³⁰ Popat Ranji to Provincial Commissioner, June 20th 1947 and August 19th 1947, TNA 215/1423C; Popat Ranji to Bishop of Mwanza December 22nd 1947, TNA 215/1423C.

²³¹ Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy 2nd Edition*, p.290.

²³² Popat Ranji to Provincial Commissioner, June 20th 1947 and August 19th 1947, TNA 215/1423C.; Popat Ranji to Bishop of Mwanza Dec 22nd 1947, TNA 215/1423C.

In a separate incidence, concerns against cheating were also raised by the Uzinza Farmers Association under the leadership of Masanje Shija Mabenga and Luka Chimani who submitted their complaints to the Sukuma Federation Council of Sukuma Chiefs (Ibanza).²³³ They argued that, cotton-buying clerks in the Buchosa ginnery cheated local farmers.²³⁴ They also aired their concern to the Geita District Commissioner and provincial agricultural officers to whom they recommended termination of zones, which would have meant the end of cotton buyers' monopoly.²³⁵ Their proposal was acted upon by the colonial authority, which recruited 100 inspectors in 1950 to inspect weigh scales. The staff shortage was resolved by recruiting additional inspectors, but that was not a solution too because, the performance of newly recruited inspectors was inadequate and some were corrupt as they received bribes from Indian cotton buyers to ignore their own responsibility.²³⁶

4.1.6 Cheating control attempts and challenges faced

The colonial state did not turn a blind eye on such practices as it devised a number of measures to curb cheating of cotton growers. First, knowledge dissemination to growers about weighing their cotton that missionary were considered suitable for the exercise an ideal emulated from among the Igbo of Nigeria.²³⁷ Second, some district commissioners considered to

²³³ Uzinza Farmers Association to Ibanza (Council of Chiefs), October 2nd 1950, TNA, 215/1423/A.

²³⁴ Ibid. Uzinza Farmers Association to Ibanza (Council of Chiefs).

²³⁵ Ibid. Uzinza Farmers Association to Ibanza (Council of Chiefs).

²³⁶ Uzinza Farmers Association to Sukumaland Ibanza (Council of Chiefs) of October 2nd 1950 TNA, 215/1423/A

²³⁷ Extract from meeting minutes on improvement of cotton marketing, January 11th 1949, TNA 215/1423C.

commit resources for the same purpose for teachers to teach schoolchildren on weighing scales during their holidays.²³⁸

Third, the Department of Agriculture was charged with a responsibility to enforce regulations by having its staff conducting regular visits at buying posts and ginneries. Generally, government measures proved a failure. For example, the responsibility of officials from the Department of Agriculture was primarily to inspect scales and the visits could not be regular as envisioned because the department was very poorly staffed, as less than six (6) staff members were available who again could not reach all buying posts and ginneries. These officials had a responsibility to enforce Cotton Ordinance No. 4 of 1949²³⁹ to inspect weighing scales at cotton markets and ginneries. However, most of the appointed officials did not tackle cheating, as cotton buyers bribed them.²⁴⁰ Disappointingly, some officials viewed bribery as a right under of which one incidence at Bukindo in Geita district, the official confiscated weighing scale because cotton buyers refused to pay him 300.00.²⁴¹ Nonetheless, the growers were

²³⁸ Maswa district Commissioner to Lake Province Commissioner, Ref. No. 286/90, February 1949, TNA 215/1423C.

²³⁹ Department of Agriculture to the District's Department of Agriculture, June 14th 1950, Ref. No. 205/1/1828, TNA 215/1423/C.

²⁴⁰ Uzinza Farmers Association to Sukumaland Ibanza (Council of Chiefs) of October 2nd 1950 TNA 215/1423/A

²⁴¹ Extract from meeting minutes on improvement of cotton marketing, January 11th 1949, TNA 215/1423C.

disadvantaged as the existing regulations and restrictions were inadequate to curb the practices.²⁴²

Additionally, corruption by several officials from the Department of Agriculture undermined inspectors' role. In some cases, the officials from the Department of Agriculture colluded with buyers to frustrate the exercise by transferring inspectors who took their responsibility seriously and replacing them with those who tended to ignore growers' grievances to facilitate exploitation.²⁴³ Additionally, the corrupt inspectors were seen on a number of occasions taking tea or beer with buyers.²⁴⁴ In other instances, growers were intimidated if they questioned traders' tricks. It is obvious that the growers were intimidated as to silence them from raising an alarm over their tricks. All these that generated an impression that the government officials appointed to check cheating are in the racket. One of the factors that contributed to the weakness lies on the law that provided that, the inspectors only to report the matter to the District Commissioner and Provincial Commissioner.²⁴⁵ In short, under the law, inspectors were not empowered to act. In that regard, cheating persisted with support of newly recruited officials.

²⁴² Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, Ref. No. 1312, February 22 1935, TNA 22813.

²⁴³ Uzinza Farmers Association to Sukumaland Ibanza (Council of Chiefs) of October 2nd 1950 TNA, 215/1423/A

²⁴⁴ Ibid, Uzinza Farmers Association to Sukumaland Ibanza (Council of Chiefs) of October 2nd 1950 TNA, 215/1423/A.

²⁴⁵ Geita District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, Ref. No 1/2/12 April 28th 1950, TNA, 215/1423C.

4.1.7 The Growers' Responses against and government obstructions

Faced with the colonial authority's failure to stop cheating, local growers decided to act by organizing themselves into informal groups to help illiterate farmers to read scales and ensure they are given payment in accordance to his/her cotton load's weight. Inevitably, the informal weighing groups, locally referred to as *avapimi va magafu* first at Bwiro in Ukerewe officially emerged in 1947 to challenge cheating practices.²⁴⁶ The rest of WCGA emulated Ukerewe groups where they were known as and *Mabebete*. The groups called *avapimi va magafu* (that is, cotton weighers in Kikerewe language) in Ukerewe district and *mabebete* in other parts of the WCGA were formed to curb cheating of growers by cotton buyers.

The accommodation of these groups in the WCGA was mixed. The Native Authorities in Buchosa and Nassa were supportive as they enacted by-law to enhance curbing cheating of growers as provided under the Cotton Ordinance No. 4 of 1949. The by-law was designed to provide for their operations, control of the groups and empowered by legalizing them in their effort to check cheating. The Mwanza district Commissioner defended accommodation of these groups arguing that, 'if we forbade them we are likely to be accused of being in the same league (collusion) with the cotton buyers and may raise eyebrows or distrust of the NA by growers'.²⁴⁷ Of course, the provincial

²⁴⁶ Ibid, Popat Ranji to Provincial Commissioner, June 20th 1947 and August 19th 1947, TNA 215/1423C; Popat Ranji to Bishop of Mwanza December 22nd 1947, TNA 215/1423C.

²⁴⁷ Mwanza District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, September 3rd 1948, TNA 215/1423/C.

colonial officials understood the political risk of restricting the native groups' activities.²⁴⁸ Therefore, regulations became necessary for amicable solution in cotton buying. For example, transparency in weighing cotton delivered was a priority. For decades, the cotton buyers read the scale. Under the new rules, weighing scale had faces the seller so that s/he can be able to read the weight of his/her load.²⁴⁹

However, the operations of these groups were not smooth. For example, those who helped growers to read the scales found themselves in trouble, being flogged and locked away by cotton buyers.²⁵⁰ Support was not availed in Ukerewe district specifically led by the District Commissioner, R.K.M. Battye who was against them. Battye labeled them troublemakers.²⁵¹ He viewed them not as a solution, but rather as a nuisance to buyers due to their disruptive behavior at cotton buying businesses premises across the district. All this was an attempt to degrade and undermine the *avapimi va magafu* groups credibility. Most of cotton buying clerks and traders saw this as a lost opportunity. They complained to the colonial authority that *mabebete* members were crippling their functions.²⁵²

Additionally, the challenges arising from failure of the Department of Agriculture and rising grievances from growers

²⁴⁸ Memorandum for Natural Resource Committee: Co-operative Cotton Buying in the Lake Province, TNA 215/1423C

²⁴⁹ Geita District Commissioner to Sukumaland Ibanza, July 6th 1952, TNA 215/1423C.

²⁵⁰ Uzinza Farmers Association to Sukumaland Ibanza (Council of Chiefs) of October 2nd 1950, TNA 215/1423/A

²⁵¹ Ukerewe District Commissioner to Lake Provincial Commissioner September 3rd 1948, TNA 215/1423/C.

prompted the provincial and district administration in the WCGA to come up with a local solution. Some of the critical measures includes legalizing groups and setting up guiding their functions. Under new rules groups had to be stationed 400 metres away from either the cotton buying post or ginneries.²⁵³ In setting up these rules, the government did not involve these groups. The Ukerewe district Commissioner neither approved *avapimi va magafu* nor enforced the 400 metres rule simply because were manned by semi-illiterates who frequently made errors and that 50 per cent of their scales were proved defective when they were checked on August 24th 1948.²⁵⁴ Such disapproval by the Ukerewe district Commissioner had support in Ruthenberg, (1964) work. However, Ruthenberg's support is insignificant as this study established evidence produced by the Ukerewe District Commissioner shows that there were 7 and not 9 defective scales that were being used by *avapimi va magafu* at Murutunguru and Bwilo cotton buying posts.²⁵⁵ Further evidence from primary sources shows that, the Lake Province Ginner Association supplied some of these scales. According to District Commissioner, the defects were not intentional and likely the supplier tempered with them with intention to

²⁵³ Report on the Co-operative Development in Geita prepared by the District Commissioner to the Administrative Office Sukumaland Ibanza, July 6th 1952, TNA 215/1423C.

²⁵⁴ District Commissioner, Mwanza to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, September 3rd 1948, TNA 215/1423/C.

²⁵⁵ District Commissioner, Mwanza to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, September 3rd 1948, TNA 215/1423/C.

discredit *avapimi va magafu* who were using them during the inspection.²⁵⁶

All in all, pressure from these groups remained less organized, spontaneous, and lacked legal and policy base approved by the colonial office. Therefore, demand for fare share could only be achieved through co-operative marketing societies in cotton value chain to maximize their efforts and end growers' marginalization.

4.1.8 Demand for and emergence of cooperatives in the WCGA

The history of agricultural marketing cooperatives in Tanzania dates back to 1932 when the Ordinance was passed that by late 1940s had significant achievement in Kilimanjaro, Mbeya and Ruvuma regions, also in Ngara district where they made a significant step in curbing exploitation through monopoly provided under the cooperative societies law. In her work, Dawe wonders that, cooperatives in the WCGA come into existence surprisingly late.²⁵⁷ While Iliffe argues that small-scale growers in the WCGA pressed for their stake in cotton value chain due envy or frustration in seeing the dominancy of the Asian merchants in the ginnery industry and that cooperatives emerged in 1940s.²⁵⁸ The fact is spontaneous attempts in the WCGA to form co-operative societies was in place during the 1930s made by Chief Mgemela of Kwimba District but was discouraged by the district commissioner because the Native

²⁵⁶ Ibid, District Commissioner, Mwanza to Provincial Commissioner.

²⁵⁷ Dawe, A History of Cotton-Growing, p. 366.

²⁵⁸ Ibid, Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, p. 295.

Treasury could play the same role.²⁵⁹ Thus formation of cooperatives could not materialise because the colonial authority in the 1930s was cautious on organised groups which were by and large viewed as a political threat. Additionally, the rejection of Chief Mgemela proposal implied that growers were denied an opportunity to market their produce a function that was kept under the Indian traders

Attempts by the *avapimi va magafu* and *mabebete* had some limitations, as outlined earlier. Clearly, the *avapimi va magafu* and *mabebete* primary goal was to primarily address cheating of cotton growers by traders. Surely, their initiatives had some impact but lacked a sustainable solution for example as far as entry into cotton market. However, they laid a foundation for organised groups that expressed their concern over cheating.

The earliest action for sustainable solution stemmed from a consumer co-operative, the Mwanza African Cooperative Society (MATCS) that was registered in 1946 with a number of affiliated embryonic organisations across the WCGA's villages and townships of which members were native traders. Yet, some of these embryonic societies were independent and with no influence by an outside force. The organisation in Ukerewe was most aggressive particularly under an embryonic organization, the Ukerewe Growers Cooperative Society Ltd with affiliation to the MATCS that led by Mr Eupharat Mahunde, Ibrahim Tanganyika, Mfalme Gataki and Mzee Seifu.

²⁵⁹ Extracts from meeting between P.M. Huggis, the District Officer of Kwimba and Chief Mgemela of Bakwimba, May 20th 1932, TNA 20999.

One of its demands was the replacement of Indian buyers as they occupied the Ukerewe Cotton Company and Mwanza Cotton Trading Company business premises to on what they argued as measure to acquaint with the business. They also pressed to be involved in buying cotton delivered by growers at buying stations and ginneries owned by the two companies.

However, the district commissioners disagreed with demands simply he had negative perception against co-operatives. For example, he reiterated that the society would not offer a reliable solution to undertake their own cotton marketing, if allowed a scheme in Ukerewe would be calamitous as would lead to exploitation by a few individuals for private gain; he added that the growers would as a result suffer under a co-operation scheme.²⁶⁰ He clearly indicated that 'although cultivators suffer (exploited by traders) but financial loss incurred is exaggerated'.²⁶¹

Disapproval of demand by the district commissioners gone unheeded by the Ukerewe Growers Cooperative Society. This placed him at loggerheads with people like Mr. Eupharazi Mahunde in his attempt to promote co-operatives. Mahunde perceived the prohibition was racially motivated that discriminated Africans in favour of non-Africans.²⁶² The reaction from Mahunde prompted the district commissioner to call a meeting, which was held between 20 and 23 May 1952 to

²⁶⁰ Ukerewe DC to PC, Lake Province, September 3rd 1948, TNA 215/1423/C.

²⁶¹ District Commissioner, Mwanza to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, September 3rd 1948, TNA 215/1423/C,

²⁶² Mr Eupharazi Mahunde to Ukerewe District Commissioner, September 3rd 1948, TNA 215/1423/C.

resolve the situation in attendance of Mr. Eupharat Mahunde, Ibrahim Tanganyika. Other members were Mfalme Gataki and Mzee Seifu all from the Ukerewe Growers Cooperative Society Ltd, as well as the representatives from the Ukerewe Cotton Company and Mwanza Cotton Trading Company.

Privately, the Ukerewe Growers Cooperative Society Ltd had fruitful meeting with ginnerers as the Tanganyika Cotton Company and Ukerewe Cotton Company officials to discuss over the collaboration as agent that operated at Murutunguru ginnery.²⁶³ The Tanganyika Cotton Company accommodated growers to evade business disruptions if sidelining them continues. The Tanganyika Cotton Company cautioned the government over restricting natives to evade political implications and end treating cotton marketing as the sphere preserved for Asians.²⁶⁴ However, the Provincial Commissioner and Cooperative Department were informed about such collaboration.²⁶⁵ The Provincial Commissioner did not approve the idea because the Registrar of cooperatives the MATCS 'they debarred by its by-laws, from trading cotton and the Ukerewe Cotton Company was not a registered organisation.'²⁶⁶ Moreover, a desire by the growers to have a stake in cotton marketing in late 1940s and early 1950s was so high that they organized themselves under embryonic associations which

²⁶³ Tanganyika Cotton Co. Ltd to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, June 2nd 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., Tanganyika Cotton Co. Ltd to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., Tanganyika Cotton Co. Ltd to Provincial, Commissioner, Lake Province.

²⁶⁶ Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province to Tanganyika Cotton Company Ltd, June 9th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.

were formed across the WCGA districts that comprised of hundreds members (see Table 3).

Table 3: MATCS/LPGA affiliated and non-affiliated societies

	District and Society	Membership
	Mwanza District ²⁶⁷	
1	Nassa Growers Co-operative Society	3,000
2	Mwanza Agricultural Co-operative Society	400
3	Bukumbi Growers Co-operative Society	78
4	Massaza II Growers Co-operative Society	600
5	Sukuma Growers co-operative society	23
6	Mwanza II Growers co-operative society	203
	Ukerewe district	
1	Ukerewe Growers Association - affiliated to MATCS	718
2	Nyanza Growers Co-operative Society	n/a
	Maswa District ²⁶⁸	
1	Unnamed/unspecific society/societies in Itilima Chiefdom	600
2	Unnamed/unspecific society/societies in Ntuzu Chiefdom	600
3	Unnamed/unspecific society/societies in Dutwa Chiefdom	600

²⁶⁷ Mwanza Districts Commissioner to the Lake Province PC (Ref. No. NA/45/18 of July 17th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.

²⁶⁸ Maswa Districts Commissioner to the Lake Province Provincial Commissioner, Confidential Ref. No. C/16/165 of July 22nd 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.

	District and Society	Membership
	Kwimba district ²⁶⁹	
1	Kwimba Produce Marketing Co-operative Society - affiliated to LPGA	890
2	Kwimba African Traders	n/a
3	Kwimba Native Traders	n/a
4	The LPGA Kwimba branch	n/a

Source: TNA 215/1423C, Kwimba, Maswa and Mwanza Districts Commissioners to the PC, Lake Province

As the embryonic associations kept on spreading and attracting hundreds of members their strength kept on growing and their footprint kept on expanding across the WCGA that created a fertile ground and a foundation for a formation of a new organisation, the Lake Province Growers Association (LPGA) in 1952 under which Mr Mustafa Shija Mabenga as the President and the secretary was Mr Paul Bomani. The LPGA primary goal was to have it registered as a cooperative society, but the application was rejected. Despite the failed registration setback, the LPGA managed to galvanise all groups across all chiefdoms²⁷⁰ in the WCGA.

The LPGA established its roots in the Chiefdoms with support from the local chiefs as they too strongly opposed exploitation of their subjects by Indian traders.²⁷¹ Chief David Kidaha

²⁶⁹ Kwimba Districts Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, Confidential Ref. No. C/16 of July 19th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.

²⁷⁰ Such Chiefdoms were Nassa, Ukerewe, Massaza I and II, Magu, Dutwa, Ntuzu, Itilima, Karumo, Kanadi, Nunghu, Sima, Ndagalu, Usmao, Bukoli, Uduhe, Nera, Kome, Buchosa, Ushashi, Buyombe, Mwanza, Bujashi, Bukumbi, Bugeneji, Ikizu, Usiha, Sukuma.

²⁷¹ Maguire, *Towards 'Uhuru' in Tanzania*, p.91.

Makwaiya of Usiha was one who backed the LPGA's demand to have cooperatives registered. Support from Chief Makwaia was a strong message to the Provincial Commissioner that the colonial authority was losing support from prominent chiefs.²⁷² The very opportunity was also seized by the African unofficial representatives in the Lake Province Council who also pressed for the promotion of cotton marketing co-operatives in the WCGA.²⁷³

By early 1950s, pressure to approve native growers' organisations featured in Geita district. One of such organisations was the Mweli Co-operative Union, which voiced some demands to the district authority that were:²⁷⁴

- a) To scrap the zoning system because it created not only a monopoly to Indian traders but also undermined free marketing competition, which was irrelevant in the post-World War II era
- b) Stamping out of cheating in cotton marketing
- c) Reconsideration of the cotton rule that required *mabebete* to be stationed 400 yards from buying post as it stimulated cheating.

The demands put forward by growers, traders, chiefs and embryonic associations were part of the British Colonial Office (CO) post-war Marketing Policy for Colonial Primary

²⁷² Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province to Provincial Council, TNA 21032.

²⁷³ Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province to Commissioner to Commissioner of Co-operative Development, November 16th 1951, TNA 215/1423/C.

²⁷⁴ Geita's District Commissioner to Sukumaland (Ibanza) Administrative Officer Incharge on July 6th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.

Products.²⁷⁵ The policy stressed that growers be organised either in producers' associations or under some form of government statutory marketing organisation to market their produce in an orderly manner and obtain the best possible price.

Such policy was pivotal for the amendment of the 1930s marketing legislation in Tanzania and the integration of the cooperatives. The colonial authority in Tanzania had an obligation to comply with the CO's post-war Marketing Policy for Colonial Primary Products of which the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies developed the policy that was in line with the policy. Hence, the African Agricultural (Control and Marketing) Ordinance of 1949 was brought in place that among other led to the creation of the Lint and Seed Marketing Board (LSMB) in 1952.

4.1.9 Pressure to register cooperatives

The demand by various stakeholders' entry and replace Indian traders in the cotton marketing and processing was linked to a number of interconnected efforts to address and end the exploitation of cotton growers. The pressure to register cooperatives in the WCGA was fought from various fronts and involved a number of other stakeholders such as the MATCS which was the consumer cooperative based in Mwanza town with branches across the Province or WCGA. Also, by growers from Geita district who had support from the district authority.

²⁷⁵ CO's Confidential Memorandum on General Price and Marketing Policy for Colonial Primary Products, (London: The Colonial Office, February 1947), TNA, 37192.

The MATCS demanded entry into cotton purchase but was rejected by the colonial authority given its licence was mainly for consumer goods.

The restriction policy on the MATCS entry into cotton purchase by colonial authority led to a decision by the members to transform it into the LPGA. The LPGA managed to pressurise the government that finally deployed cooperative officers for registration of societies. Thus, the MATCS, LPGA and grassroots groups forged an alliance that for campaigning for the formation of cooperatives and encouraging growers to join.

However, the Cooperative Department headed by the Registrar who was responsible for promotion of cooperatives was an obstacle and central in undermining efforts from the WCGA.²⁷⁶ For example, the Registrar openly snubbed the initiatives by pointing out that “I do not see clearly what is envisaged and do not have faith with cotton marketing organisation in Tanganyika.²⁷⁷ A failed experience in engaging native in cotton marketing in Uganda guided his perception. He further argued that ‘due to difficulties, aggravation and frustration of co-operatives in Uganda in their participation in handling and ginning cotton’.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁶ Provincial Commissioner to the members of Tanganyika Agricultural and Natural Resource Committee Ref. No. 772/463, January 14th 1952, TNA 215/12423C

²⁷⁷ Registrar of Co-operative Societies to the Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, Ref. No. Co-op.1058/3/191, February 18th 1952, TNA 215/12423C

²⁷⁸ Registrar of Co-operative Societies to the Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, Ref. No. Co-op.1058/3/191, February 18th 1952, TNA 215/12423C

Understandably, the Registrar position however remained confidential to the LPGA leaders who perceived the Provincial Commissioner as an obstacle. Therefore, the LPGA leaders demanded to pursue the matter with the Registrar by asking the Provincial Commissioner to facilitate the appointment of which six LPGA's delegates who eventually had a meeting with Commissioner in Moshi that was held on 26th June 1952 (see Table 4).

Table 4: Delegation to the Commissioner of Co-operatives Development

S/N	Name	District
1	Petro Kazi	Maswa
2	Jacob Mtiro	Ukerewe
3	Stephen Sanja	Mwanza
4	John Katorusa	Geita
5	Paul Bomani	Mwanza

Source: TNA 1423/C in a letter to the Lake Province from the LPGA of June 21st 1952

It was from the meeting that the Registrar had for the first time a grasp of the clarity and extent of development in the WCGA for the potentiality to promote co-operative societies.²⁷⁹ As a result, the Registrar approved development of by-laws and electing office bearers. The meeting however, was not fruitful as envisioned by delegates; as the Registrar could not in 1952 owing to shortage of staff until 1953. Instead, the Registrar

²⁷⁹ Registrar of Co-operative Societies to the Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province with Ref. No. Co-op.1058/3/191, February 18th 1952, TNA 215/12423C

recommended to the delegates to nominate four (4) individuals provided they have standard eight (8) education of which the Co-operative Department would fund their training and upon graduation to be deployed in the WCGA to promote co-operatives.²⁸⁰ Obviously, the Registrar promise was encouraging, but failed to meet the delegate expectation to have cooperative societies registered and start handling cotton immediately.

A disappointment from the Registrar prompted the MATCS and LPGA leaders to pursue the matter further through other avenues. One of such avenue was the LSMB under which Paul Bomani was a member. The LSMB meetings became Bomani's platform to pressurise for the registration of cooperatives for example in a meeting held in Dar es Salaam on May 19th 1952 when he threaten to mobilise cotton growers to withhold cotton during the 1953 season.²⁸¹ Such threat prompted the Cooperative Department to act immediately by deploying the officer who after preliminary activities as development of by-laws and election of office bearers registration of cooperatives begun in 1953. In this respect, the first eleven cooperative societies in the WCGA were registered.²⁸²

Registration of cooperative societies in the WCGA marked the beginning of the new era and concluded decades of

²⁸⁰ Ibid, Registrar of Co-operative Societies to the Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province.

²⁸¹ Extracts from Second LSMB meeting held in May 19th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.

²⁸² Commissioner of Co-operative Development to Provincial Commissioner, Lake Province, Ref. No. Co-op.1038/3/A/25, July 10th 1952, TNA 215/1423/C.

marginalisation era that was marked by opening a door for growers to handle their produce through cooperative societies.

The following cotton-buying season i.e. 1953 a number of primary co-operative societies was 38 that managed to handle one-third of the total crop. This was remarkable achievement to newly formed societies. The opportunity provided to co-operatives was important for them be able to begin cotton purchase with effect from 1953 when 38 registered societies purchased 13.2 per cent of entire cotton produced in the WCGA (see Table 5).

The capacity for cooperative societies to gain ground in marketing cotton was given an impetus by the government backing as well as financial and logistical support from the LSMB.²⁸³ The sum of £32,500 was made available to registered cooperative societies in 1953, repayable over 5-10 years with an interest of 4 per cent, for the purchase of equipment such as cash boxes, safes, and tarpaulins.²⁸⁴ A total of £3,900 was allocated to purchase trucks for the transportation of cotton.²⁸⁵ In 1954 the LSMB provided a loan to 65 societies to erect cotton stores as well as to purchase capital equipment.²⁸⁶ Further, in 1957 the LSMB made a loan amounting to 540,000/- shillings to

²⁸³ Commissioner of Co-operative Development to LSMB, Ref. No. Co-op. B/9/24 and Co-op. B/9/26, April 11th and April 24th 1953, TNA 215/1423C.

²⁸⁴ Commissioner of Co-operative Development to LSMB, Ref. No. Co-op. B/9/24 and co-op. B/9/26 of April 11th and April 24th 1953, TNA 215/1423C; Tanganyika, Annual Report on Co-operative Development, 1954, p.11; LSMB Annual Report, June 30th 1954, TNA 215/1423/A.

²⁸⁵ Ag Regional Assistant Director of Agriculture, Lake Province to the Secretary LSMB Ref. No. 247/35, June 1st 1953, TNA 215/1423C.

²⁸⁶ LSMB Annual Report, June 30th 1954, TNA 215/1423/A.

two societies in Maswa district.²⁸⁷ The support provided by the LSMB and Cooperative Department was by and large to enable them to market cotton efficiently.

Table 5: Cooperative societies (membership and cotton handled)

Year	Number of co-operatives	% of cotton handled by co-operatives	Co-operative members	Non members
1953/54	38	13.2	15,334	144,276
1954/55	65	32.5	33,935	149,845
1955/56	113	45.2	53,282	165,568
1956/57	198	60.1	86,627	158,373
1957/58	235	70.1	92,400	175,600
1958/59	275	85.4	N/A	248,546
1959/60	360	100	N/A	N/A

Source: Tanganyika Reports on Co-operative Development Department for the year 1953 - 1965

The development illustrated in Table 5 illustrates that co-operative ability to compete with private capital and experienced traders. This success by co-operatives was likely to have been attributed to years of cheating by traders and advocacy role played by the *mabebete* and *avapimi va magafu*. Such success is clear by 1959 when cooperative societies almost monopolized the entire cotton value chain.²⁸⁸ This was a significant step for cotton growers to improve their position in the cotton value chain. In less than a decade, cooperative societies (primary and secondary societies as well as the apex

²⁸⁷ Maswa District Annual Report, 1957, TNA 215/1423/C.

²⁸⁸ Mwanza Rural District, Annual Reports 1959, pp.11, TNA 967/823/30

organisation) successfully managed to shift and wrestle power from cotton traders in the favour of growers and the co-operative movement.

4.1.10 Registration of the secondary and apex cooperative societies

The increase of primary cooperative societies created a need for a secondary co-operative society (Union) for each zone, which would look after the needs of primary societies in, for example, marketing of their crop. The decision to form secondary societies was a significant departure for primary societies' reliance on assistance from government institutions, the LSMB and the Cooperative Development Department.

In 1955 seven Unions were formed and registered. The names of most Unions were intimidating or discouraging Indians and others called for unity mostly against the traders (see Table 6). All in all animosity against the traders was exploited by growers to support the movement. By 1960 the number increased to 20 scattered through the three cotton growing areas that cover Mwanza, Shinyanga and Mara regions.²⁸⁹The unions were given polemic names such as *Idetemya Bageni* that symbolised independence and autonomy against years of exploitation and marginalisation by cotton traders. Having cheated by the traders, the growers gave unions names that implied a victory, relief and retaliation (see Table 6).

The first seven registered unions were affiliated to an umbrella federation, the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Societies

²⁸⁹ Co-operative Union of Tanganyika, 1962/63 Annual Report, p.18

(VFCUs), which was formed on May 15th 1955. Until 1965 the VFCUs was the largest growers' organization in Sub-Saharan Africa with over 275 primary societies and over 100,000 members.²⁹⁰

Table 6: Secondary Societies (Unions) affiliated to the VFCUs

No	Union	Translation	Zone	Registered
1	Ikumbo	Broom	Manawa Kwimba	- 1956
2	Iyungilo	Filter	Bukumbi Mwanza	- 1960
3	Kimisha	Awakening	Nyambiti Kwimba	-
4	Chenge cha Balimi	torch/firebrand	Uzogole Shinyanga	- 1956
5	Kipyena Bayanda	Exorcize children	Bukumbi Geita	- July 1956
6	Kiguna Bahabi	Sponsor of the poor	Nassa - Mwanza	1955
7	Nyamagana	One who give birth to hundreds	Ngasamo Mwanza	-
8	Kishamapanda	Road builder	Mhunze Shinyanga	- 1960
9	Tupendane	love each other	Ushashi - Mara	
10	Mweli/Ng'weli farmers	Western Farmers	Geita - Mwanza	1954
11	Mugango	-	Mugango Musoma	- 1955
12	Namuzuna	Supporter	Kibara Ukerewe Mainland	- 1955
13	Buchililo	A place to	Nyamililo	- 1954

²⁹⁰ Co-operative Department Annual Report, 1962/63, (Dar Es Salaam: Co-operative Union of Tanzania, 1963).

14	Idetenya bageni	Recuperate Terror to aliens	Geita Kasamwa - Geita	1955
15	Isangijo	Meeting place	Malampaka - Maswa	1955
16	Kilagabageni	Farewell to strangers	Sola - Maswa	1960
17	Lukubanija	Mshirikishaji	Luguru - Maswa	1955
18	Engabo union ²⁹¹ (Bukerebe)	-	Murutunguru - Ukerewe Island	1955/1961
19	Kilelamhina	One who cares the poor	Ihale-Mwanza	1956
20	Gwaging'olo bageni	Disappointment of strangers	Magu-Kwimba	1960

Source: Annual reports on Co-operative Development 1959 – 1961. Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer.

When the cooperatives emerged they did not own a ginnery, and so had to rely on Indian owned ginnery which was costly. The ginneries had high charges, and this necessitated the need for Unions to have their own ginneries. The first ginnery was purchased and imported in 1956 for £88,000 which was a loan from the LSMB that was installed at Kasamwa in Geita District.²⁹² The second ginnery was bought in 1958 and installed at Ushashi and in 1959 four more ginneries were bought and installed in Sola, Muhuze, Magu and Buyagu.²⁹³ This marked a climax in the control and access of the cooperatives into cotton

²⁹¹ Liquidated and Bukerebe was formed

²⁹² The Co-operative Union of Tanganyika Annual and Balance Sheet Report 1962/1963, p.18.

²⁹³ The Co-operative Union of Tanganyika Annual and Balance Sheet Report 1962/1963, p.18.

value chain and the end of the Indian merchant monopoly over the industry.

5.0 Conclusion

This paper has shown how cotton production by natives was guided by legislations and policies imposed without consulting the growers. Such policies favoured Indian cotton merchants and traders on the one hand and primarily exploitative and marginalised growers on the other by preventing them from the access of the most profitable portions of the cotton value chain. The exploitation frustrated smallholders due to their exclusion from cotton ginning and export value chain. The colonial authority ignored the growers' demands for a fair share in the industry.

Thus, growers had to find a solution through grassroots associations. Such associations formed a formidable army against marginalisation whose winds of change blew across the WCGA in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The grassroots movement was supported by embryonic organisations and local chiefs, managed to exert pressure that forced the colonial government to register cotton marketing co-operative societies. The registration of co-operative societies from 1953 was a significant step in wresting the Asian traders' monopoly in cotton marketing. Such success had an impetus from growers as well as financial support from the LSMB. Until 1954 one-third of the total crop was successfully handled by 65 societies, and by 1960 it had a monopoly of the crop.