

Addressing social inequality in Tanzania: Aspects of continuity and change in social policy between 1961 and 2020

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Abstract

One of the main challenges that newly independent African countries inherited from colonialism was that of inequality. Reviewing literature on the experience of Tanzania in dealing with this challenge, this article examines some social policies put in place by the Tanzanian state to address inherited inequality. The focus is on policies aimed at curbing inequality through economic centralization and nationalization of major means of production, agricultural products pricing and marketing, state financing of primary education as well as land use for small businesses. The article covers the efforts made by the socialist state in Tanzania starting from 1967 up to the introduction of liberalism in the early 1980s. The period starting 2015 and ending 2020 is treated as a period of attempted return to some of the interventionist social policies of Ujamaa. It is shown that the earnestness and political commitment of the leaders of Ujamaa succeeded in controlling the levels of inequality in the country for only sometime. Forces from both within and without the group of political elites culminated in the reversal of these efforts and the result is that inequality has persisted and, in some cases, increased in the country. Whereas a complete return to Ujamaa is not envisioned, it is suggested that a certain level of state control of capital employment in production and distribution of goods and services in the country is the way to curb the disturbing levels of inequality.

Key words: *inequality, social policy, Tanzania, ujamaa.*

Introduction

Most of African countries attained political independence in the early 1960s and the immediate task for the newly born states was to choose the best political path for the development of their respective societies. These efforts were to be spring boarded from a historical background of colonialism. One of the problems facing African states at that time was that of inequality (Pratt, 1976; Rodney, 1973). In the case of Tanzania, Van de Laar (1972) describes a serious disparity in income between rural and urban areas as well as between the bureaucratic elite and the masses. Even among town dwellers at that time, marked inequality existed between sub groups distinguished in terms of type of occupation as well as race. This was a major characteristic of the period between 1961 and 1967. Within this period the state focused more on economic growth and modernization envisaging economic trickle down to lift the lives of the poor sections of the society.

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The introduction of African Socialism (Ujamaa) in 1967 ushered in an array of social policies aimed at addressing the challenge of inequality and building an egalitarian society. The focus of the state at this time was on state control of capital employment in production and distribution of goods and services. After living with Ujamaa for more than twenty years, liberalism found its way into the Tanzanian society and the state changed its social policy stance to focus more on productive and administrative efficiency. From 2015, with the ascension of John Pombe Magufuli into power, the Tanzanian state changed its stance again to focus on rapid growth through industrialization. This period witnessed stark daring of the state in controlling capital as well as affirmative actions to uplift the poor. Elements of Ujamaa social policies were manifested during this period. How social policy has changed following these changes in the state's economic stance and how equality was affected along the way, is the gist of the sections that follow.

Equality – a theoretical overview

Equality is a normative concept. Theoretically, it has a political origin and it can also be politically determined. In this case, the normative definition of equality becomes socially relevant when it is politically determined. The fairness of social justice is seen in the functioning of political institutions (Rawls, 1971). So, inequality has a political dimension, not only on positive grounds but also on normative grounds in which case levels of inequality in any society can be effectively determined through state policies (Cogneau, 2012).

Dworkin (1981) grapples with the consequential levels of satisfaction given a certain common level of equality in material provision; for example, when people have equal income. According to him, a good theory of equality should not recommend the inefficient compensation of those who develop expensive tastes but should be able to defend a just society based on the ability of political institutions to strike a mean between efficiency and distribution. He insists that, of the several types of equality that exist, it is ultimately equality of welfare that really counts. He argues (finally) that:

‘If we want genuinely to treat people as equals (or so it may seem) then we must contrive to make their lives equally desirable to them, or give them the means to do so, not simply to make the figures in their bank accounts the same’(1981, p. 188).

Practically it may not be easy to strike the mean as suggested by Dworkin of the competitive and monopolistic behaviour of capital. Marxism is said to be the only theory that addressed inequality in its breadth (in its economic, political and social dimensions) and in both its capitalist and socialist forms. Socialism provides an alternative thinking through Marxist analysis. One of the peculiar strengths of Marxist analyses of inequality is that it distinguishes equality from uniformity. In Marxism the type of private property that should be put under check is the one related directly to the means of production. Otherwise people are

free to remain different and cultivate habits that correspond to the demands of the society and which prioritize satisfaction of social needs. People will be able to fully realize their potentials and enjoy cultural and moral values only if the society they live in can ensure survival and well-being (Mishra, 1982). According to the fundamental Marxist perspective, under capitalism, the well-being of humans is in the bondage of capital which is controlled by few, and therefore looking for equality within capitalism is contradictory. To Marx and Marxists inequality is first and foremost economic and it is based on classes as they differ in the ownership of means of production and their position in the relations of production. It is the exploitation of labour's surplus value leads to other alienations (Pereira, 2013). We see from this analysis an important relationship between economic production and social wellbeing.

Discussants of the concept of equality differ – not in their understanding of the implications it may have on humanity – but on the various forms of its manifestation. With regard to economic equality, two major views are dominant: equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes. While equality of opportunity is about ensuring an equal starting point, equality of outcomes is concerned with the finish line and with factors and circumstances that may be beyond one's control, talent and personal effort (Rawls, 1971). Amartya Sen's capability approach to development can rightly be said to dominate the equality of opportunity view. Sen proposes that equalizing income alone would not adequately address the problem of inequality because people convert their respective incomes differently into well-being and freedom (Sen, 1999). For Sen, inequality is a socio-cultural order, which reduces peoples' capabilities to function as complete human beings.

Inequality of outcomes is evident where people do not enjoy the same or comparable levels of material wealth or average economic conditions. For a long time, development theory has not been concerned with distribution, believing that eventually economic growth would lift the livelihoods of all through trickle down. Attendant economic and social policies applied to Africa and other developing countries in the 1970s proved otherwise. Trickle down did not happen (Rugumamu, 1997). Just after independence, the first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, allowed the country to experiment with economic modernization led by the private sector. This stance changed dramatically in 1967 when the country chose to turn to an African path of socialism known as Ujamaa to build a just and equal society. Whether Nyerere was influenced more by Marxism than by Rawls is a question of debate. Some have argued that Nyerere actually borrowed from Rawls' position on social justice (Cornelli, 2012). What is obvious is that Nyerere and the other socialists of Tanzania intended to create a classless, socially just society and put in place social policies to this end.

Literature that came out in the 1990s, explored how policies on economic growth determined social equality outcomes through asset distribution (Aghion et al., 1999). They showed that because of their starting point of poverty, poor families

were at a disadvantage in terms of ability to borrow to finance the education of their children and hence inequality persisted along the generations of the poor families even during periods of economic development. These kinds of literary works provide a rationale for state's income redistribution policies and emphasize the political aspect of social equality (Cogneau, 2012).

Among the theoretical explanations of the origin of human inequality is the political model. The political model of the origin of inequality is upheld, for example, in Hayden (2008). In this model, inequality in any society is understood to come about as some self-interested individuals get access to the control of the labour of others. Dominant social classes are born out of predation upon available surpluses through various tactics including economic, political and violent power. The validity of this claim is clearly seen in both slavery and colonialism (Austin, 2009). Hayden (2008) contends that it was the ambition of political leaders that led to an increase in inequality in their societies as they used production for their own material benefit. In addition, the growth in transportation infrastructure as well as military power helped the political elites to control the economy through taxation and also to advance as far as undertaking imperial conquests. The same political logic is said to have led to the colonization of Africa (Ngowi, 2009). The introduction of colonialism in Africa had one dire consequence of creating two very distinct classes – that of the ruling minority Europeans and that of the poor ruled Africans.

Political institutions and resource allocation

Recently, scholars have focused attention on how politics and political institutions inform and shape distribution of resources in the society (van de Walle, 2009; Cogneau, 2012). It has also increasingly been accepted that much of the variation in poverty is in terms of differences in politics and institutions. These scholars have also shifted their emphasis from demographics and economics towards social policy (Brady et al., 2016). Within the 2000s, some scholars lamented that Sociology and Political Science had failed to study increasing inequality. But in recent years there has also been growing interest in the sources of rising inequality and along with this interest, political and institutional explanations have grown in prominence partly because economic and demographic explanations have provided only limited explanations of this phenomenon (Brady & Leicht 2008; Brady et al., 2016).

According to Brady et al., (2016) there are at least two major theories that can explain how societies reduce poverty and social inequality. One is Power Resource Theory (PRT) while the second is Institutionalism. In short, power resources theory contends that inequality can be curbed through collective actors' work (like the work of labour unions). Institutionalism focuses on the effect of political institutions on social relations (Korpi, 1983; Moller et al., 2003). Brady et al. (2016) continue to argue that, regardless of where scholars sit on the

continuum of power resources and institutions, most of them agree that the state plays a pivotal role in shaping poverty and levels of inequality. The conventional approach views the state as a mediating variable. The relevance of state policy is best understood as a combination of social policy and regulatory activities that shape the distribution of economic resources and life chances (Wilensky, 2002). But unions have faced significant challenges of solidarity and mobilization as well as experiencing declines in their memberships and affiliations and that, in general, unionization is declining. The situation in Tanzania has not been different. The problem of politicization has historically rendered unionism in Tanzania completely ineffective during and after the era of socialism (McHenry, 1994). Unions have therefore not contributed significantly to the reduction of inequality in Tanzania. It has historically been the role of the state in the economy that has determined levels of inequality in the country.

The centrality of the role of the state is seen for example in Rugumamu (1997) who asserts that ‘the role of the state features prominently in historical and contemporary explanations of European and Japanese development experience. States have historically provided not only political but also economic leadership’ (p. 265). States also invest in capabilities when they used public resources to educate and train citizens. State policies organize the distribution of resources (Moller et al., 2003) through influencing how resources are distributed in the market and after the market. State policies also shape how much people earn from investment returns. This is done, for example, through the adjustment and control of minimum wages and through the control of the behaviours of market actors (Ferrarini& Nelson, 2003).

Inherited inequality in Tanzania

Before its political independence in 1961, Tanganyika’s economy was under colonial masters. It was first under the Germany colonialists (1885 –1918) and then under British colonialists (1919-1946). In 1947 Tanganyika became a United Nations Trust Territory administered by Britain until its independence. The economic motive of colonizers was acquisition of raw materials for the development of the colonial countries (Ngowi 2009; Rodney, 1972). Tanganyika got her independence from the British colonialists in 1961 and was united with Zanzibar in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania – henceforth Tanzania. Between 1961 and 1967 the economy continued to be mainly in the hands of the Europeans and Asians. Industries, plantations, banks, mines and relatively large commercial activities continued to be owned by these foreigners. The economy remained basically market – oriented and dominated by private sector capitalism. The political decision just after independence was to continue with the capitalist mode of production inherited from colonial masters. The interests of colonialists were continued form1961 to 1966 (Ngowi 2009).

In 1967, led by its first president Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Tanzania chose to turn socialist and embrace Ujamaa – a version of African socialism based on

familyhood and fraternity. By this time, value added in commerce had increased by 50% and industrial production doubled but the growth was almost exclusively led by the European and Asian minority. Out of 569 listed industries employing more than ten people in 1965, 321 had majority shareholding by foreigners. Europeans and Asians together constituted less than one percent of the total population but had the strongest influence on policy as they controlled both trade and top managerial positions (Van de Laar, 1972). Rodney (1973) asserted that the colonial education system created economic disparities along racial lines. The minority whites also enjoyed the highest paying jobs followed by the Asians (Rugumamu, 1997). Africans were at the bottom in terms of income.

During this period about 34,500 Africans and only 7,500 Asians held retail licenses but Asians controlled well over two thirds of the trade volume. The majority of Africans engaged largely in marginal commercial activities like itinerant peddling and street vending and small-scale retailing. It was the colonial divide and rule policies that caused this apparent inequality in access to assets. The Credit to Natives (Restriction) Act of 1931 required Africans to have specific government authorization before applying for a bank loan – and they could not borrow more than Shs. 100 at any time (Rugumamu, 1997). According to Ngowi (2009), the state did not intervene in the economy. The expected “fruits” of independence were not realized by the majority of people. While the minority foreigners prospered, poverty continued to dominate the lives of the indigenous Africans and the common man and woman did not see the benefits of independence from an economic point of view. There were also clear differences in salaries with the relatively better educated Europeans, Asians and generally those working in the private sector enjoying the advantage (Van De Laar, 1972).

In terms of educational services, an unequal society is what Tanganyika inherited from colonialists in 1961. Mosha (2000) and Mushi (2009) both argues that the Western form of education was introduced in Tanzania by the missionaries in the 1860s mainly with the goal of introducing Christianity and Western ways. This argument sounds biased because is difficult to prove that these were the only aims of education at that time. The colonial system was an administrative system and thus it must have had other aims including preparation of manpower for the administration. Both Mosha (2000) and Osaki (2007) attest to the fact that the German colonial government in Tanzania established only a few primary schools in the country. When the British took over in 1919, the English language was made the language of instruction in schools. Both Missionaries and the government provided education and the focus was to prepare teachers, clerks, secretaries and laborers in the industries. But the system segregated between White (European) children from Asian and African children. There were special schools for each race (Rodney, 1973). Ibanga (2016) argued that some of the structural problems of the then existing educational system was that it promoted

an attitude of inequality, intellectual arrogance, and individualism among those who entered the school system.

According to Noruzi et al. (2011) social policy primarily refers to guidelines and interventions for the creation, maintenance or changing of living conditions considered best for human welfare. Social policy is therefore concerned with education, health, housing, employment and food for all people and is part of the wider span of public policy. Reisman (2001) argues that social policy is concerned with those needs which must be satisfied if the existing social matrix is to continue. The author understands social policy to mean group policy as it is deeply integrative and communitarian in its objective and focusing on those social institutions that foster integration and discourage alienation. In line with the argument laid down by Titmus (1965), Reisman continues to argue that the model for social policy is that of a gift or a unilateral transfer – unlike economic policy which is concerned with exchange of equivalents or bilateral transfers. Social policy is therefore aimed at improving the livelihoods of the less disadvantaged and balancing social benefits.

This conceptualization of social policy implies that social equality includes equal access for all the sections of the society to available social advantages. Ricketts (2013) studied women's access to secondary school education in Tanzania and Rwanda with focus on the goals of the Belgian and English colonial governments in creating the education systems they did. Emphasis was on how they considered women and the amount of education that women should have according to the policies that guided the respective systems. She showed that the colonizers imposed a patriarchal Christian education system that led to the subjection of women to the category of second-class citizens and that this shaping of the place of women in the society has continued to affect education policy on women for the years that followed.

Ujamaa and its policies on equality

Ujamaa was a major turnaround in economic and social policy in Tanzania. McHenry (1994) discusses at length the political struggle for equality through socialism in Tanzania. He supports the view that Tanzania's socialism was no exception to the claim that equality should be regarded as a key socialist value. The primacy of equality was widely affirmed in the writings of Nyerere. He quotes Nyerere as having written that the first principle of socialism was the equality of man; that without the acceptance of equality of man there can be no socialism and that socialism is the application of the principle of human equality to the social, economic and political organization of society. This meant that 'economic, political and social policies shall (should) be deliberately designed to make a reality of that equality in all spheres of life' (p. 75). In 1967 Nyerere made it very clear that Tanzania was going to be a classless socialist society. The "aim of TANU is (was) to see that the government gives equal opportunity to all men

and women irrespective of race, religion or status” (Nyerere, 1977, p. 15)². Nyerere may very probably have applied this principle to justify economic nationalization as well as education for self-reliance, which was intended to provide qualifications for all who wanted (equality of educational opportunity). The criterion for employment opportunities was to be based on skills, educational qualifications, and character.

The major policy document of the era of Ujamaa in Tanzania was the Arusha Declaration. It was a firm resolution adopted by the National Executive Committee meeting of the TANU in the Community Centre at Arusha. The meeting took place between 26th January 1967 and 29th January 1967. The policy document was officially published on the 5th of February 1977. It was a declaration on socialism and self-reliance. Its first part carried the Tanganyika National Union (TANU) creed whereas the first principle stated that TANU believed that all human beings are equal. The declaration imposed many limitations on what the leaders of TANU could do with the economic endowments they had. The policy aimed at creating an equal society through equal opportunity and equal distribution of outcomes and the elimination of exploitation of man by man (Lihamba, 1985, p. 59 – 60). An examination of some of these policies is given hereunder.

Nationalization policy

According to Ngowi (2009) following the Arusha Declaration, the capitalist, private sector market-led economy that was inherited at independence was replaced by state-owned and centrally planned economy. Major means of productions were nationalized and put into government hands. The state became the major owner, controller and manager of many enterprises. There were parastatals that were formed following nationalization of private property. The Arusha Declaration made the end of capitalist mode of production in Tanzania. Emphasis was on public ownership and individual initiatives and the role of the private sector were side-lined. The objective was to build a socialist egalitarian society with public ownership of the economy.

Mass nationalization of private businesses in 1967 and creation of new public enterprises led to a quick increase in state owned enterprises from three firms in 1961, to 43 in 1966 and 380 in 1979 to a total of 425 parastatals by 1990 (Waigama, 2008). At first the performance of the parastatal sector was encouraging so that by the early 1970’s output grew by 5.1% per annum. Nevertheless, Waigama continues to show that by mid-1980’s fiscal losses had exceeded 7% of the GDP by 1987. Mismanagement, embezzlement, nepotism and rapid changes in technology are among the factors reported to have led to this

² This ties well with the second principle put forward in John Rawls’ second principle which states that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both ...attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1971, p. 302).

underperformance. In order to survive, the parastatal sector heavily relied on borrowing and on government subsidies. Reform measures and policy changes became a necessity and one of the policy changes was that of privatization. This move was supported by components of Structural Adjustment suggested by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Policy on Education

The state took control of the economy and the provision of social services. Kassam (1994) argued that in 1967, the Tanzanian government transformed the education system and its focus and directed it towards skills for nation building. Kiswahili became the national language and was also made the language of instruction for all primary schools (Osaki, 2005). Misiya & Kariuki (2011) recorded four limitations noted by Nyerere in the curriculum inherited from the colonialists. The first one is that the education inherited from the colonialists was elitist in nature. It was designed to meet the interests and needs of only a small proportion of citizens, hence failing to produce an egalitarian society. The second is that the education tended to uproot its recipients from their native societies and so severing the link between them and their society. The third was that the education emphasized book-knowledge and not practical life experiences. The fourth and the last is that the education did not combine school learning with work, hence the introduction of education for self-reliance following Arusha Declaration.

In discussing the party and government's policy on education, McHenry (1994) argued that of all the services, education was given the most attention as a tool for socialist transition. Education was regarded as the gateway to a good life. This made equal access critically important. According to Mushi (2009) in the early 1970s, primary education in Tanzania was made universal – provided and controlled by the government. Tuition fees were also abolished at all levels of education in the country. The government continued to be the main provider of education at all levels (although private schools also existed).

Kassam (2000) posited that Nyerere's philosophy of education is contained in a policy directive on education which was issued in March 1967 following the inauguration of the Arusha Declaration. The directive was entitled Education for Self-Reliance and in it Nyerere analysed the system and attitude of education in Tanzania at that time and then demands an educational revolution intended to address the needs and social objectives of the new Tanzania. Nyerere's philosophy of education insisted productive work and self-reliance in schools, as well as a 'radical restructuring of the sociology of school knowledge' (p.3). Nyerere's educational philosophy was designed to address the defects in the then existing educational system which was inherited from the colonialists of which a major characteristic was that of inequality.

Nasongo&Musungu (2009) conceive of Nyerere's Education for Self – Reliance as being universal. According to Mushi (2009) in the early 1970s, Tanzanian primary education in Tanzania was made universal; provided and controlled by the government. Tuition fees were also abolished at all levels of education in the country. The government continued to be the main provider of education at all levels but private schools also existed and their fees were higher. In primary government schools, parents were required to make small contributions only and, although they were called fees, the real costs were met by the government through taxes (URT, 1967). In this documented titled 'Arusha Declaration: Answers to questions', Nyerere remarked:

'... all secondary education and University education in Tanzania, is paid for by the taxpayer. The only time Tanzanians pay for the education of their children is if they decide to buy privilege for them...a few 'private schools' where the fees are high' (p. 4).

Policy on agriculture

The socialist state in Tanzania considered agriculture to be the major sector of the economy. It made deliberate efforts to commit national resources to people's development and to fight inequality particularly in the agriculture sector. As such, in the early 1970s, the state organized peasants to live and work together in communes, popularly known in Tanzania as *Ujamaa villages*, with the view to creating a classless society without exploitation of man by man. It is believed by some analysts that, the Tanzanian state played a developmental role, which included availing people in the ujamaa villages (and beyond) with agricultural inputs and extension services (Shivji 2009; Sundet 2007).

Not only that, but the state oversaw the pricing and marketing of agricultural products. According to McHenry (1994), agricultural price controls were used by the party and the government to reduce inequality both among the rural dwellers and between farmers and urban salaried employees. In events of decline in real income from agriculture, the party and government used subsidies and price controls to combat the resultant increase in inequality.

Before privatization of the cashew nut marketing in 1991/92, cashews were marketed through a compulsory single channel system based on a two-tier monopolistic structure with a purchasing, processing and exporting parastatal at the helm and cooperatives at the base. Cashews were marketed through the National Agricultural Products Board (1963/64—1973/74) and by the Cashew nut Authority of Tanzania (CATA) (1973/74—1991/92). Historically, the government fixed into – store prices, hoping that cooperative unions/societies would pass on reasonable returns to producers. However, increasing costs and levies reduced residual producer prices. Efforts to rescue the failure of the cashew nut sector are not new in Tanzania. In the 1980s, faced with declining export commodity prices and increasing marketing costs, the government introduced export price subsidies to protect farmers. This meant income transfers from non-

agricultural to agricultural sectors. In the final analysis therefore, the cashew nut pricing system has historically passed through various phases: formally fixed into store prices based on forecast export realization prices (1963/64 – 1974/75); fixed producer prices based on forecast export realization prices (1974/75 – 1989/90); and variable prices based on actual export realization prices (from 1990) (Mwase, 1998).

Policy on land use and small business

To facilitate the pursuit of equality, land ownership was also assumed by the state. Individual ownership was on lease bases and the ‘development’ or ‘improvement’ of each leased piece of land was the duty of individuals. This reality led to the de facto ownership of land by individuals. Slowly but surely, competition for land in urban areas became more intense than in rural areas. By the 1990s urban land had become a commodity, which made it more accessible to the rich than to the poor (McHenry, 1994). One of the sections of urban poor that have been marginalized for a long time is that of small informal businesses. We shall focus on the most visible section of urban informal businesses – street vending.

The welfare of street vendors in Tanzania has historically fluctuated following the changing winds of political agenda (Lyons & Brown, 2009; Msoka&Ackson, 2017). In the 1960s and 1970s, local laws illegalized the use of urban land for petty trading. The major focus of the Socialist Government was on rural development and unemployed people in the urban areas were mostly labelled ‘loiterers.’ Force was used to return them to the villages. In 1983 the Penal Code, Cap 16 was enacted to support the Human Resources Deployment Act (HRDA) enacted also in that year. The penal code had the effect of labelling all informal self-employment in urban areas as a practice against the virtues of socialism and self-reliance. Through its *NguvuKazi* campaign, the HRDA was the official response of the government to the booming informal activities – including street vending (Tripp, 1996). A small change in this approach followed the economic hardships of the early 1980s. *NguvuKazi* license was introduced which gave some legitimacy to petty trading (Lyons & Brown, 2009; Ackson&Msoka, 2017). The *NguvuKazi* national campaign required every able-bodied person to work and municipal authorities were directed to support work for income generation (Nnkya, 2006). During the phase of president Mkapa (1995-2005) two formalization programs were initiated and implemented under the Business Environment Strengthening program for Tanzania (BEST), directed by the Ministry of Planning and Lands. BEST was also a program meant to simplify business registration. But during this period the *NguvuKazi* itinerant license established in the late 1980s was abolished through the Business Licensing Act of 2003.

MKURABITA, the Swahili short form of the Program to Formalize the Property and Business of the Poor in Tanzania was also introduced during the rulership of former President Mkapa to lead the formalization process. By recognizing the

value of land which is in business use, MKURABITA had the potential of uplifting the livelihoods of the poor street vendors. Under this approach, street-trade is regarded as an engine for the economic growth of the poor as well as their means for participation in the larger economy. This approach sees access to space (which is a crucial factor for the success of street trade) as a right (Lyons & Msoka, 2009; Lyons & Brown, 2009). But because it failed to incorporate the important elements of the business legalization agenda, it could not create dependable and effective legal frameworks for the street vendors. But, the land formalization programs could neither legitimize street trade nor legalize its location (Lyons & Brown, 2009). So, street traders have so far remained without land.

Literature has documented the shortcomings of formalization policies, which were implemented inconsistently and which were, to a large extent, ill-suited for street vendors. The result is that the vendors faced a very harsh environment in urban Tanzania. Such harshness has brought about enormous hardships for the small informal traders. For instance, one study has indicated that as many as one million traders may have lost their livelihoods in the nation-wide clearances of 2006, (Lyons and Msoka, 2009). Lyons and Brown (2009) have argued that, in the final analysis, the Doing Business reforms marginalized street-traders and have been used to 'formalize dispossession...and street traders have become more than ever dependent on a diminishing municipal tolerance' (2009. p. 11).

Early signs of inequality and the road to liberalization

Even after six years of living with the Arusha Declaration, Van De Laar (1972) notes that growing income inequality was a problem in Tanzania. The higher strata of the bureaucratic elite maintained European consumption habits, narrowing the opportunities for the local market and burdening the balance of payments. The same elite had the power to influence policy in such a way that social services continued to favour the already better off urban areas while sidelining the rural areas. Fewer people enjoyed luxurious lives while the majority poor remained marginalized. Such a type of growth is termed as 'perverse' because the elite had discretionary power to allocate investment while negatively affecting re-investment of the revenues from agricultural exports to improve the conditions in the country. This trend culminated in the introduction of economic liberalization in the 1980s.

Nyerere stepped down from the post of Tanzania's president in 1985. The new president Ali Hassan Mwinyi, faced several and serious economic hardships brought about by several internal and external socioeconomic factors (Skarstein, 2005). These included a chronic balance-of-payment problem, a budget deficit, debt servicing, budgetary constraints and the deterioration of social services, especially health and educational facilities. President Mwinyi responded by adopting the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1986 – a package of reforms aimed at liberalizing the economy. The move led to a devaluation of the shilling,

liberalization of trade, and the encouragement of private capital. The liberalization policies sharply conflicted with the strong statist economy and with the ideology of socialism of the ruling political party as promoted under Ujamaa (Hartmann, 1994).

The Parastatal sector reform policy was officially pronounced in January 1992. Its aim was to 'give a sharper focus to the Government's traditional role of maintenance of law and order and provision of economic and social infrastructure, ensuring a level playing field for efficient economic competition and balancing of economic and social activities' (Waigama, 2008, p.6). In order to execute the privatization policy, the government established the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) through the Public corporations (amendment) act of 1993. By March 2000, PSRC had privatized a total of 283 entities and 16 non-core assets out of 425 parastatals (PSRC, 2000, as cited in Waigama, 2008).

McHenry (1994) shows that policies aimed at individual equality worked to some extent during the first decade of Tanzania's attempt to build socialism, yet the economic decline of the late 1970s undermined them all. In the latter half of the 1980s the government shifted its emphasis from equitable distribution to increased production. This was due to pressure partly from pragmatic socialists within the country (and particularly within the ruling party CCM) and partly from the IMF and World Bank – among other international donors. Although there was a shrink in inequality levels in the country between 1980 and 1989 the period of liberalization was generally a period of high and increasing inequality.

Liberalization – an enemy of equality

Shivji (2000) describes the social situation under liberalism as a situation where '...few prosper without caring for the future while (the lives of the masses) are reduced to sub – human existence' (p. 33). He calls this agreement between political ideals and actual practice 'democratic consensus'. According to Shivji, Ujamaa, notwithstanding its many apparent pitfalls was one of the few African post – independence political constructs with a desired consensus between politics and the actual lives of the masses in practical ways. Following the economic hardships of the 1970s, by early 1980s Tanzania was forced to abandon Ujamaa and embrace political and economic liberalization through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Liberalization is said to have crippled Tanzania's economy and society (Mufuruki et al., 2017) and also resulting in serious rises in inequality. According to Matotay (2014) in 2007, the richest 10 percent of Tanzanians earned 1.65 times the income of the poorest 40 percent. The trend shows rising income inequality, with the Palma Ratio moving from 1.36 in 1992 through 1.41 in 2000 to 1.65 in 2014. The author argues that in Tanzania inequality has continued to increase since 1992.

Liberalization has had many notable impacts on the educational system in Tanzania. The introduction of user fees in education (just like in most of the other

essential services) made education a commodity available to those who can afford it. Access and equity have greatly been affected – contrary to the efforts put in place during the Arusha Declaration in 1967 (Ishengoma, 2008). Ujamaa nationalized all the missionary schools to provide equal opportunity for the citizens (URT, 2000). Tanzania was very close to reaching UPE in the beginning of the 1980s. In 1981 the country had a Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of 97%. (Colclough et al., 1993). The transformation to a market-based system in the 1980s produced several unintended consequences, including the jeopardizing of equal access to quality education (Budiene, 2006; Silova and Bray, 2006).

According to Nkonya and Cameron (2015) since 2008, a warehouse receipt system (WRS) has been in place. The system ensures all cashew production is sold via cooperatives through an auction centrally managed by the Cashew Board of Tanzania (CBT). In this system, farmers send their cashew to the nearby Agricultural Marketing Cooperative Societies (AMCOS) and are paid 70% of the value of their cashew nuts minus any loans obtained from banks by the primary cooperatives and advances made to farmers in form of inputs. The remaining sum is paid to the farmer after selling cashew nut through auctions conducted in the warehouses under the supervision of CBT and regional cooperative societies. Notwithstanding the presence of auctions and AMCOS, the liberal markets allows for a mushrooming of middlemen. In many cases these middlemen buy directly from economically desperate and less informed small-scale farmers. The result is that for a long time, time farmers received disincentives of an average of 20% because traders were able to manipulate the market and offer prices much lower than the international equivalent (Nkonya & Cameron, 2015). As we shall see shortly, this reality prompted the government to re intervene in 2018.

Recent condition of inequality in Tanzania

The foregoing discussion shows that, actually, the Tanzanian state failed to realize its major goal of creating a classless society. Although the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 still maintains the goal of building an equal society, economic and social realities present a different picture. Maliti (2019) conducted an economic survey covering 25 years using six rounds of Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) to present a trend in education and wealth inequality in Tanzania. He showed that education inequality persisted.

Hassine and Zeufack (2015) investigated the structure and dynamics of consumption inequality and inequality of opportunity in Tanzania between 2001 to 2012 revealing moderate and declining consumption inequality at the national level but increasing inequalities between regions. One important finding of this study is that spatial inequalities are mainly driven by the disparities in endowments in the household which is in turn affected by intergenerational transmission of parental educational background. Father's education was shown to be the most important background variable affecting consumption and income

in Tanzania. The authors suggest that there is need for appropriate policy actions in order to increase the chances for the next generations to spring out of the poverty and inequality lived by their parents.

Economic research has also suggested that the net wealth of Tanzania's millionaires, who account for only 0.016 percent of the population, commanded about 17% percent of the whole country's national income. Tanzania has recently registered an impressive economic growth but inequality has not been reduced (Kinyondo&Pelizzo, 2018). The country ranks 18th among 45 African countries in terms of government's commitment to reduce inequality (Oxfam, 2019).

Tab. 1 Trend in Inequality (Gini coefficient based on expenditure distribution)

Period	Gini coefficient-national	Gini coefficient-rural	Gini coefficient-Urban	% of the total consumption by the poorest 20%
1991/92	0.34	0.33	0.30	7
2000/01	0.35	0.33	0.36	7
2007	0.37	0.35	0.38	7
2011/12	0.34	0.29	0.35	6

Source: Kinyondo and Pelizzo (2018).

Matotay (2014) has shown that the net wealth of Tanzania's millionaires, who account for only 0.016 percent of the population, commanded about 17% percent of the whole country's national income and that in 2011, incomes of 60% of Tanzanian's were below the per capita income of the country which stood at USD 532. Using Palma Ratio analysis, the author shows also that in 2007, the richest 10 percent of Tanzanians earned close to 1.7 times the income of the poorest 40 percent of their compatriots. One of the central questions about the implications of economic growth in Tanzania is why an impressive growth in GDP has not translated into the reduction of poverty nor inequality (Atkinson and Lugo, 2010).

The period between 2015 and 2020: A return to Ujamaa social policies?

There was another major shift in social policy in Tanzania beginning 2015. The characteristics of socialpolicy in this period had some resemblance to those of Ujamaa. One way of explaining this apparent 'return' is to see the state in Tanzania as having been trying to correct the social ills of liberalism by looking back at its historical success. Pierson (2008) posits that institutional effects on poverty and inequality often reflect "path dependency" which means that previous institutions set the only basis which dictates that only a certain kind of subsequent choices will be possible or efficient. Following Pierson (ibid.) it is logical to expect that, in order to address inequality, the state in Tanzania would put in place policies in line with its history of Ujamaa. Of all the business firms in the country, 98 per cent are at micro level and are mostly informal. The fifth phase government decided to support these firms to enable them participate in the development process through job creation, revenue generation and provision of livelihoods to millions of people (Mutakyahwa, 2020). Bhowmik (2005) has also

argued that policies are central to reducing harassment affecting street vendors and help municipal authorities to improve their revenue collection.

In December 2018 the fifth phase President of the United Republic of Tanzania John Pombe Magufuli inaugurated a nation-wide campaign to provide identity cards (IDs) to all traders with annual sales turnover of TZS four million and less – especially street vendors³. The IDs are intended to take care of two principal issues regarding informal small trade. One is to remove the harassment that vendors have suffered for a long time in the hands of municipal authorities and the police. The second is to introduce the informal small traders to tax paying through the payment of twenty thousand Tanzanian shillings annually for the identity card (Steiler and Nyirenda, 2021).

With regard to the education sector, the government of Tanzania has committed to offering fee-free education. Based on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Tanzania anchored its efforts towards Universal Primary Education (UPE) on the Dar Framework for Action (UNESCO, 2009). In addition, Tanzania has resolved to provide 12 years free primary and secondary education by 2030 and this aim is concretized in various Education Circulars informed by the 2014 Education and Training Policy. The Fee-Free Basic Education Program (FBEP) is the government's flagship policy to expand equitable access to basic education and was introduced in 2016. The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology reports that between 2018 and 2019, the enrolment in primary schools in Tanzania increased by 4.9% from 10,111,255 pupils in 2018 to 10,601,616 pupils in 2019 (URT, 2019).

The government has also taken some steps to improve the welfare of cashew nut farmers. Part of a press release issued to the media by the Ministry of Agriculture in September 2019 stated that during the 2018/2019 harvest season, the government decided to buy all the cashew nuts from the farmers following the turbulence or decline of prices in the market. The liberal cashew nut market had allowed middlemen to take advantage of the small-scale farmers. In most cases these farmers have too little or no information at all about international prices. They are also in many cases unable to directly access lucrative international markets. In 2019 bulk buying middlemen had proposed a price for raw cashew nuts which the government considered to be too low compared to the 2017/2018 harvest season's offer. Government intervention in the cashew nut market was reported to be aimed at safeguarding the welfare of the farmers, by making sure that farmers benefit adequately from their production. ⁴ (Ministry of Agriculture, 2019).

³ The IDs have been popularized in Swahili as 'vitambulishovyawamachinga' meaning street vendors/ hawkers/ petty informal traders IDs.

⁴ Buyers had proposed TZS 2,700 per Kg while the government showed readiness to buy at TZS 3,300/ Kg.

On 21st September 2019 the *Daily News* ran an article titled Tanzania: Government Unveils Online Cashew Nut Purchasing System. The author (one Hilda Mhagama) indicated that the government had introduced a new system called Tanzania Mercantile System for the management of the purchase of raw cashew nuts. In this arrangement, farmers were connected to buyers worldwide. Interested buyers would be required to register with CBT through the Agriculture Trade Management Information System (ATMIS). Qualified buyers would then be required to deposit bid security according to amount in tons of cashew nuts they intended to purchase. Lastly, the buyers would have to purchase all the available cashew nuts in one session to facilitate warehousing and delivery under first in first out arrangement.

Conclusion and recommendations

Colonial powers left behind a very unequal society in Tanganyika. The expected economic trickle down did not happen to uplift the lives of the poor during the early years of independence. Inequality persisted in several sectors and in various forms. In order to build a classless society through Ujamaa, the socialist government put in place policies and programs but achievement endured only for some time. Classes never went away. The same elites that were expected to cause a classless society to happen could not practice the wishes of Ujamaa policies. Colonial mindset lingered heavily on their consumption behaviours. It could be safely argued that the leaders of socialism cultivated an environment conducive for the sprouting of liberalism that rolled back the very tenets of Ujamaa. Starting from early 1980s the Tanzanian society turned liberal in economics and politics. Inequality increased and life conditions of the poor masses worsened. In place of interventionist social policies to control inequality, the Tanzanian government resorted to economic policies of privatization, formalization and creation of attractive business environment.

Tanzania's state behaviour towards social equality suggests that the country has a clearly desired normative and political path in dealing with the problem of social inequality. But, imperatives of economic stance affect this path giving it aspects of continuity and change. The fifth phase government (2015 – 2020) tried to revive some of the values of Ujamaa and maintain a continuity in social policy addressing inequality. It went back to economic intervention and state control of social and economic services. But the stance of Ujamaa, specifically its Arusha Declaration was in stark contrast to capitalism. Currently, it is not actually easy or practicable to re-introduce African socialism with its interventionist social policies in the age of neoliberal globalization. The best that the state in Tanzania can do is to selectively participate in the planning of the economy. Interventions in the economy must be well thought through and strategic. The state must consider pro poor welfare policies that are compatible with the contemporary demands of private capital. Some writers have suggested that John Pombe Magufuli was trying to build a developmental state imitating the so-called tiger economies of

East Asia. If this is taken into account, then a more feasible 'return' to the values of Ujamaa could be a social democratic developmental state which combines pro – poor economic growth with democracy, class compromise and a measure of state control of the economy.

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