Governing Security at the grassroots Level: Effectiveness of Community-led Security Mechanisms in Dar es Salaam

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Abstract

Security provision, such as the protection of people from crimes has traditionally been regarded as a domain of the State. This article makes a case, however, that as the concept of 'security governance' would suggest, security provision and organization is presently negotiated and organized differently – by a combination of formal, informal organs and voluntary organizations. Indeed, this is a case about Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini sub-wards in Dar es Salaam region – where data collection took place through qualitative research approach. Community members from these two sub-wards acknowledged that community-led security mechanisms are more close to the people than the police who always come when incidents of crimes have already occurred and sometimes when people have already been injured. In the view of community members, the number of insecurity incidents decline when community-led security mechanisms, such as patrol units of ulinzi shirikishi (participatory security) are effectively operational.

Keywords: Effectiveness, Community-led security mechanisms, Dar es Salaam

Introduction

The provision of security has conventionally been regarded as a domain of the state (Wood and Shearing, 2007). The police department of the state is the one always tasked to protect people from crimes and related forms of insecurities. In effect, governments have traditionally tended to invest huge amount of resources on security organs of the state to strengthen their capacity to address security challenges. But the organization and the provision of security is experiencing significant changes in that "the state no longer has a monopoly on policing" because "the demand for public security often exceeds the capacity of the state to provide it" (Dupont, Grabosky,

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Shearin, 2003: 332). More specifically, the state is no longer the lone provider of security (Black, 2002; Shearing, 2007 and Castells, 2000). The increase of security threats and rising demand for security prompted the proliferation of non-state formal and informal of institutional arrangements providing security alongside the state. This is what is now commonly known as 'security governance' – that security is currently provided and organized in different ways by the collection of formal, informal, commercial or voluntary establishments (Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing, 2003).

Security governance (formal or informal) takes different forms in diverse communities and locations – rural or urban. The forms taken by any established security arrangement is shaped by prevailing security challenges, geographical locations, socio-economic and political status of areas where community-led security mechanisms are established. In addition to the presence of state security, for example, affluent areas are well positioned to pay for security services provided by private security companies and individuals. This, however, is not a case in vulnerable low-income neighbourhoods where there is less presence of the state police and police patrols.

The current study, which is located in the 'nodal governance' approach, contributes to the debate about security governance by analyzing the effectiveness of community-led security mechanisms in relatively low-income urban neighbourhoods in Tanzania.[1] The nodal government approach acknowledges and provides a framework to understanding the plurality and polycentric nature of security governance, which is the reality in modern societies (Dupont *et al.*, 2003; Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005). A node, as Dupont *et al.* (2003) posit, is an assemblage of such actors, such as the state, private sector and civil society through which security is provided and government. Community-led security mechanism is thus one of the nodes of security provision.

The study identified and analyzed two forms of community-led security mechanisms in Dar es Salaam: *Jirani Tujilinde* (JITU) (neighbourhood watch) and *ulinzi shirikishi* (participatory security). *JITU* operated in Changanyikeni sub-ward (*mtaa*), Kinondoni district from 2000 to 2007 while *ulinzi shirikishi* started widely operating from 2006 in several urban areas as a response to rising concerns about the increase in number of crimes against persons and properties, and criticism regarding corruption and unsatisfactory performance the police force (URT, 2013; James, 2013).[2]

But for this particular study, the analysis of JITU and *Ulinzi Shirikishi* is confined to Changanyikeni in Kinondoni district and Kigezi Chini in Ilala district.[3] The selection of these two neighbourhoods was based on strategic considerations – that they have fairly well established community-led security mechanisms that can be used to draw lessons and shed light about the effectiveness of community-led security mechanisms in East Africa. Changanyikeni, in particular, adopted JITU from 2000 to 2007 and afterwards switched to *ulinzi shirikishi* in 2008, while Kigezi Chini adopted *ulinzi shirikishi* in 2008. Analysis of the two forms of community-led security mechanisms in Changanyikeni and Kigezi is done by taking into account the following aspects: their effectiveness in terms of organizational structure; availability and mobilization of financial and non-financial resources; and the relationships between the state, JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi*.

The current study defines JITU as a community-led security mechanism that obliged all-abled men residents of Changanyikeni aged between 18 to 60 years to wake up at night to provide security to the community. Abled-men falling within the age limit mentioned were divided into seven groups – in which each group woke up once in every week to patrol around the neighbourhood. On the other hand, the study defines *ulinzi shirikishi* as a participatory community-led security management system involving initiatives of community members and local governments at the ward and sub-ward levels. This initiative involves the establishment of patrol units of youths that often patrol around neighbourhoods at night. Activities of patrol units are sustained by voluntary and compulsory contributions from community members staying in respective sub-wards *(mtaa)* where *ulinzi shirikishi* is established.

The article is divided into six sections. Following this introduction, the next section provides the methodology and section three analyses the evolution of community-led security mechanisms in Tanzania. The section that follows examines the roots and drivers leading to the establishment of JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi*, and section five analyses findings regarding the effectiveness of community-led security mechanisms in the two study areas. The conclusion is provided on the last section.

Methodology
The study primarily employed a qualitative research approach to collect and analyze data regarding community-led security mechanisms in Tanzania. Actual data collection process took place from July to October 2015. Three

qualitative research methods were employed. First, the study used in-depth interviews involving face-to-face detailed conversations with elected chairpersons and *Mtaa* (sub-ward) Executive Officers (MEO) of Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini, the Ward Executive Officer of Makongo Juu, the Police Commissioner (PC) responsible for community policing, the chairperson, secretary and accountant of *JITU*, key individual stakeholders voluntarily financing *ulinzi shirikishi*, commandants and assistant commandants of *ulinzi shirikishi,* and Officer Commanding Stations (OCSs) of Chanika and University of Dar es Salaam. A total of 27 in-depth interviews were conducted.

Secondly, the study employed Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) to gather collective viewpoints regarding effectiveness of community-led security mechanisms. In this qualitative method, 10 FGDs (5 from each neighbourhood) involving such groups as youths participating directly and indirectly in *ulinzi shirikishi* and groups of women in Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini were organized. During FGDs, groups of 8 to 12 participants assembled together to discuss their experience and perception about community-led security mechanisms and the management of security issues in their neighbourhoods. It is worthwhile noting, however, that the number of interviews and FGDs conducted was not based on any predetermined or quantifiable formula, but it was rather based on the quality of information collected from participants. The saturation point was reached after it was established that there was repetition of information during interviews and FGDs.

Lastly, documentary review method was employed to review documents about community-led security mechanisms in the two neighbourhoods. The review was envisioned to uncover and understanding how *ulinzi shirikishi* and *JITU* handle different forms of crimes experienced in the two neighbourhoods. Documents regarding *JITU* and *ulinzi shirikishi* were retrieved from different offices, including offices of MEOs, chairpersons of the two neighbourhoods and the Police Commissioner responsible for *ulinzi shirikishi*. Documents reviewed include security reports of Commanders of *ulinzi shirikishi* and *Mtaa* chairpersons. The reports describe cases of crimes and nature of crimes handled on daily basis by patrol units of youths involved in *ulinzi shirikishi*.

The actual data collection process was preceded by a pilot study conducted for the period of seven days between 5 and 11 September, 2014 in the

following relatively low income neighbourhoods: Changanyikeni, Makongo Juu, Survey, Mlalakuwa, Kimamba, Kagera, Mtogole, Sisi kwa sisi, Kilimahewa, Kwa Jongo, Mihanzini, Mkunduge, Pakacha, Maritani, Kwa Tumbo, Sokoni and Kigezi. The pilot study employed a participatory research approach allowing elected chairpersons and chief leaders of the community-led to define security related problems in their neighbourhoods. The use of this research approach intended to get a general picture regarding different experiences with the organization and operation of community-lead security mechanisms in relatively low-income neighbourhoods of Dar es Salaam.

The pilot study uncovered that an increase in the number of insecurities, especially crimes against properties is a major concern in all 17 neighbourhoods involved in the pilot study. The most pronounced insecurity challenges include, but not limited to crimes, such as break-in, theft, vehicle and *boda-boda* (motorcycles) theft and assaults. Important to note here is that despite the fact that security challenges seem to be the case across the board, not all neighbourhoods have established clearly defined community-led security mechanisms. Of the 17 neighbourhoods covered in the pilot study, for instance, only seven have established community-led security mechanisms – the rest do not have or they are at the early stage of establishing one. In the seven neighbourhoods having established security-lead mechanisms, *ulinzi shirikishi* appears to be the most prominent one. Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini were, therefore, selected considering that they have fairly active *ulinzi shirikishi* allowing to draw lessons and shed light regarding the effectiveness of community-led security mechanisms in Tanzania. The two areas are not surveyed, and are not reliably supplied with water services and related services. Kigezi Chini, for example, does not have electricity.

Also, the actual data collection was preceded by a preliminary workshop held on May 4, 2015 at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. The workshop that consisted of 15 participants from the academic institutions, NGOs and the police forces deliberated on two things related to the study. First, the workshop participants discussed the conceptual and methodological aspects of the study. Secondly, the workshop deliberated on the findings emanating from a pilot study. The conceptual and methodological aspects of the study and findings of the pilot study were presented at the workshop. Participants to the workshop were selected on the basis of their knowledge on security, community organizing, research

and policy within Tanzania. Insights raised by workshop participants enriched the study by drawing in new insights and practical experiences of different participants, especially senior officials of the police dealing with community policing.

Content analysis technique was used to analyze data collected through interviews, FGDs and document review. The analysis involved three phases. The first phase took place while in the field in which at the end of each day the researcher made sense out of collected data and typed them in the computer. This helped establishing gaps in collected data, sharpening research questions and looking for alternative sources of data from participants not included in the sample. The second phase involved placing collected data in different themes connected to the study's objectives and research questions. And the final phase of data analysis involved the interpretation of data placed in themes developed out of collected data. The interpretation was done in connection to the nodal governance approach in which the study is located.

Community-led Security Mechanisms in Tanzania – from *Sungusungu* to JITU and *Ulinzi Shirikishi*

As earlier noted, the state no longer enjoys monopoly of policing. The rise of security threats has made it possible for the proliferation non-state formal and informal actors providing security together with the state. But it should be noted that in post-independence Tanzania, discussions about the notion of security governance could not be done in isolation from Sungusungu, a famous collective innovation of rural community members to seek solution to security concerns. Sungusungu was first introduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s by local community members of the Sukuma tribe in Mwanza region and the Nyamwezi tribe in Tabora region to respond to the increase in number of insecurities, such as cattle rustling, violence, and banditry (Reisman, Mkutu, Lyimo and Moshi, 2013; Heald, 2005, 2002; Cross, 2014; Fleisher, 2000). The increasing number of insecurities during this period is, among other factors, connected to economic crisis arising from the direct involvement of Tanzania in the 1978-78 Kagera War (Reisman, Mkutu, Lyimo and Moshi, 2013; Heald, 2002).[4]

Albeit the fact that it was established outside the government administrative structure at the national level and local levels, Sungusungu became so popular and managed to spread widely to approximately half of Tanzania after only about ten years of establishment. Groups of people involved in

Sungusungu conducted patrols, interrogated, arrested and punished suspects, and in some occasions they were accused of punishing suspects to death. "Thieves were sometimes beaten to death and there were many killings at the beginning. For those who could not pay the fine the punishment was ostracism" (Heald, 2002: 5). In other words, Sungusungu took over the police role of arresting, interrogating suspects and investigating cases. Punishing suspects implies also that Sungusungu by-passed the judicial power and mandate to hear cases, interpret laws and punish offenders.

Originally, the police were against Sungusungu and they arrested its leaders naming them criminals and outlaws, but Sungusungu received support from the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The support received from CCM comes without surprise considering the popularity and widespread community support, which Sungusungu enjoyed in areas it operated. As such, in 1989 the government legally accommodated Sungusungu by enacting the People's Militia Act empowering community policing initiatives, such as Sungusungu to provide protection to community members and properties. The Act also empowered Sungusungu to "arrest without warrant of arrest, arrest on reasonable suspicion for having committed or about to commit a crime, and powers of search and seizure of any property found in possession which form material evidence of crime committed" (Reisman, *et.al.*, 2013: 91).

Nonetheless, the eminence of Sungusungu has seemingly declined in the last two decades following governance reforms accompanied by activities of human rights groups condemning excessive use of force by vigilante groups. In urban areas, however, Tanzania has recently witnessed a move by several neighbourhoods to establish community-led security mechanisms, such as JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* (participatory security) to address rising security challenges. Indeed, several neighbourhoods in major cities, such as Mwanza, Dar es Salaam and Mbeya, for example, adopted *ulinzi shirikishi* to deal with increasing security concerns. In the view of recent studies, such as Reisman, *et al.* (2013) and Cross (2013) on community policing in Tanzania, *ulinzi shirikishi* is an extension of Sungusungu from rural settings to urban areas. This view is, however, virtually problematic in that unlike Sungusungu, *ulinzi shirikishi* does not involve the use of excessive force and it operates within established local government structure at the ward and *mtaa* (sub-ward) levels. Also, *ulinzi shirikishi* does not punish suspects arrested during patrols – suspects arrested by patrol units involved in *ulinzi shirikishi* are

handed over to the police for investigation and afterwards filing cases in courts of law. In this respect, as opposed to *Sungusungu*, *ulinzi shirikishi* does not replace, but it complements the police role of arresting and interrogating suspects and investigating cases. In a similar vein, the *ulinzi shirikishi* does not practically by-pass the judicial power and mandate to hear cases, interpret laws and punish offenders. The subsequent section provides discussion about the legal frameworks in which *ulinzi shirikishi* and JITU are founded.

Legal Frameworks for Community-led security mechanisms
The constitution of Tanzania (1977), as amended in 1982 to establish local governments, is the foundation of community-led security mechanisms in the country. Functions of local government as identified by article 146 of the Constitution and the Local Government (District Authorities) Act (1982) (as amended in 2002) and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act (1982) (as amended in 2002) include, but not limited to ensuring the implementation of government laws and the promotion of peace and security at the local level. Also, according to the Local Government Authorities (District Authorities) Act (1982) and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act (1982), other responsibilities of local governments involve the formation of security committees at the ward, village and sub-ward levels to strengthen peace and security. Security committees headed by elected village or sub-ward (*mtaa*) chairpersons deliberate on security situations in their respective administrative areas, and afterwards suggest solutions to deal with cases of insecurities like crimes. Such solutions geared towards dealing with crimes include the adoption of community-led security mechanisms.

In light of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act (1982) and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act (1982), therefore, elected chairpersons at the village or *mtaa* levels are tasked to ensure peace and security in their respective areas. This involves monitoring and reporting crimes and facilitating the formation of community-led security mechanisms. Headed by *mtaa* or village chairpersons, village or *mtaa* assemblies are the highest decision making bodies regarding the establishment of community-led security mechanisms at the village and *mtaa* levels. Members of village or *mtaa* assemblies include all residents aged above 18 years old.

Moreover, the legal basis of community-led security mechanisms in Tanzania is founded in by-laws enacted by local government authorities, such as cities, municipals, districts, villages and *mtaa* councils. These local government

authorities are empowered by the Local Government (District Authorities) Act (1982) and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act (1982) to make by-laws binding on their residents. Such by-laws may be passed to promote environmental protection, security and tax collection. This is indeed a case with the 2002 By-Law (no. 80) on Community Security, enacted by Kinondoni Municipal Council (KMC) (where Changanyikeni is located) to strengthen and enforce community-led security mechanisms to deal with crimes.

The said by-law requires all residents of Kinondoni to take part in established community-led security mechanisms through two mechanisms. First, residents can participate directly by providing security, for example, patrolling, in line with established procedures at the *mtaa* and ward levels. Secondly, residents can participate indirectly by contributing an amount of money agreed upon and approved by *mtaa* assemblies. The contribution is used by local government authorities to pay honoraria to people physically providing security services as well as buying working equipment, such as whistles, torches, batteries, uniforms, arrows and bows. A by-law enacted by Kinondoni Municipal Council imposes a fine amounting Tanzanian shillings 50,000 (approx. USD 25) or three months imprisonment or both on residents refusing to take part in established community-led security mechanism or convincing other people not to take part.

In light of the legal framework on community-led security mechanisms in Tanzania, one point is worthwhile pointing here. That, community-led mechanism has two dimensions: voluntary and compulsory. The voluntary dimension is that community-led security mechanisms are established through direct democracy in which residents through their *mtaa* or village assemblies deliberate on and eventually approve their establishment to deal with security challenges. The compulsory dimension comes in at the level of implementation of community-led security mechanisms agreed upon and approved by village or *mtaa* assemblies. Here, a penalty is imposed on people defaulting to adhere to established community-led security mechanisms. Penalties intend to make community-led security mechanisms sustainable and effectively generating intended outcomes. The subsequent section describes and analyses the roots and drivers of insecurities leading to the establishment of JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi*.

Establishment of *JITU* and *Ulinzi Shirikishi:* Roots and Drivers
The formation of JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* needs to be understood in connection with the increase of security challenges, such as crimes in urban areas of Tanzania. Rapidly growing cities of Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, Arusha and Mwanza, which host nearly 20% (United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 2013) of the population in Tanzania, have significantly been dominant centers of crimes. The 2013 study commissioned by the government unveiled that crimes against property are the most prominent crimes in Tanzania (URT, 2013). These crimes, which constitute 70.7% of recorded crimes, involve theft of cash, mobile phones, electronics (e.g. television), cameras, and jewellery. In a similar vein, the 2000 survey of the Safer City Project indicated that many residents of Dar es Salaam are less safe. According to the survey, burglary is the 'most prevalent' form of crime, 'with 43% of the victims saying their households were burgled over the past five years' (Louw, *et. al.*, 2000: 13).

Other crimes prevalent in the city of Dar es Salaam include theft, assault, vehicle theft and hijacking. According to the said survey, the question about rising security challenges in urban areas is gendered given that women are the most vulnerable to thefts than men. Accordingly, women's jewelleries, mobile phones and money are the most targets of burglars (Louw, Robertshaw and Mtani, 2000; 2001). Thus, addressing security challenges equals finding solutions to concerns facing women residing in urban areas. In other words, effective community-led security-led mechanisms contribute to addressing the gendered nature of insecurities in urban areas.

It was in response to increasing incidents of crimes and insecurities that in 2000 residents of in Changanyikeni *Magharibi* (West) resolved to establish JITU (neighbourhood watch) to address crimes in their neighborhood. Explaining the security situation in Changanyikeni and motivations to establish community-led security mechanism, the chairperson, secretary and accountant of JITU recapped:

> When I just moved to this area in 1979, burglars mugged my house, and all my university certificates were stolen. To date I have not found my certificates for undergraduate and masters degrees.[5]

> We experienced so many cases of break-ins. That was the time when people were buying televisions. So, televisions were the major targets

of thieves. These thieves would come to collect televisions from one family to another and no one dared to wake up to confront them.[6]

When you leave your cloth outside, you would not find them on the next day. My wife was walking from the university coming home – they took her wallet and her handbag. Theft of chicken was also a big problem here. I had twenty chickens here, but one day I woke up and found feathers only.[7]

As the quotations above suggest, it is worthwhile reiterating here that the establishment of JITU in Changanyikeni Magharibi was motivated by the fact that this neighbourhood had many security challenges, especially the increase in number of crimes against properties of residents. In particular, Changanyikeni Magharibi and the entire area of Changanyikeni sub-ward in general are vulnerable to crimes due to two reasons. First, geographically, Changanyikeni boarders an air force military base and an open area bordering the University of Dar es Salaam, which are covered with thick natural vegetation. This vegetation has always been used as hiding grounds of burglars breaking-in households of Changanyikeni residents. The vegetation has too often been used by burglars to escape from the hands of the police and residents. Secondly, Changanyikeni does not have its own police station making it difficult to deal with crimes. Residents of Changanyikeni are served by a police station located at the University of Dar es Salaam and sometimes Kawe Police Station, which is about five kilometres from Changanyikeni.[8]

It should be noted here, however, that the immediate factor leading to the establishment of JITU started with a 2000 incident of break-in happening in a household of a resident that had just moved to Changanyikeni to live in a rented house. Residents of the family in question shouted calling for help, but no one woke up at night to assist. Frustrated by this awful experience on its very first day in Changanyikeni, the family in question left Changanyikeni on the next day abandoning the house it had rented for one year. Responding to this state of affairs, residents of Changanyikeni Magharibi established JITU, which made it compulsory for all abled men aged between 18 to 60 years to wake up at night to provide security and assist addressing incidents, such as break-ins. JITU successfully operated for about seven years only (from 2000 to 2005), it collapsed in 2007, and was afterwards replaced by *ulinzi shirikishi* in 2008. Discussions about success stories and reasons for the collapse of JITU will be dealt in the subsequent sections.

On the contrary, *ulinzi shirikishi* emerged in 2006 in response to a national-wide outcry about the increase in number of crimes against properties and persons and criticism regarding corruption and unsatisfactory performance of the police force (URT, 2013; James, 2013). A good number of people in the country had lost trust on the ability of the police to protect citizens and their properties because the police had failed to address security concerns and some of the police were accused of being behind insecurity incidents. Accordingly, people questing unsatisfactory performance of the police suggested that the police force needed total overhaul (Mallya, 2008; Mhina, 2008). Explaining the forces behind the establishment of *ulinzi shirikishi*, the Commissioner of Police dealing with community policing reiterated:

> By 2006, we had so many problems in the police force. People never trusted the police; there were many complaints that we used excessive force; there were many complaints about involvement of the police in crimes. Some members of Parliament and people suggested that the police force needed to be dissolved because it had failed to deliver. Some suggested that the Inspector General of Police should be recruited from among the military officials rather than within the police force.[9]

Important to note here is that the establishment of *ulinzi shirikishi* coincided with the coming in power of a new government of President Jakaya Kikwete who was sworn-in on December 21, 2015. The new government placed emphasis on security of citizens and their properties to address alarming cases of crimes and other forms of insecurities (Mallya, 2008). This too coincided with the appointment of a new Inspector General of Police (IGP), Said Mwema in 2006 who embarked on different reforms of the police force to address security problems and people's complaints regarding poor performance of the police. Consultations between the new IGP and different stakeholders suggested that resolving looming cases of security challenges required making three changes in the police force: modernization of the police, professionalism, and community policing to strengthen the broken relations between the people and the police.

In this respect, *ulinzi shirikishi* needs be understood as one of the initiatives within the community-policing program emanating from the police reforms starting in 2006. Other initiatives emanating from the same program include – neighbourhood watch, police-youth sports program, establishment of a gender–based violence desk in police stations, and stationing one police

official in each ward to link the police with community members.[10] According to the 2013 study of the government (URT: 5) on community policing, the establishment of community policing was premised to achieve the following core objectives:

> [….] strengthening capacity of the community to prevent and solve crimes; strengthening the capacity of the police to work with community; enhancing police service delivery; enabling joint problem identification; and solving through effective police – community communication and interaction; improving local policing; improving trust between the police and community.

Thus, as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (2008) would argue, *ulinzi shirikishi* was established to compliment the traditional state-centric security system by building partnerships between the public and the police in finding solutions to alarming cases of crimes. This is in line with the concept of security governance positing that security provision is no longer the only domain of the state, but it also currently involves other established formal and informal institutions. Defending the idea behind the establishment of *ulinzi shirikishi*, the Police Commissioner dealing with community policing strongly emphasized, "To be effective, the police need to engage and cooperate with people."[11] This view is founded on one of Robert Peel's (1829) principles of policing positing: "The police are the public and the public are the police." This way of understanding security is built on the philosophy that resolving security challenges requires close cooperation between the police and the people who live with criminals.

It is thus worthwhile maintaining here that the establishment of *ulinzi shirikishi* was an important step-forward to build people's trust towards the police and bridging the gap between the police and the community. As opposed to traditional policing practice focusing on fighting crimes and criminals, *ulinzi shirikishi* is broader in that it is geared towards fighting crimes as well as finding their root causes from within the community living with criminals and that which is a victim of crimes (Mushi, 2013). *Ulinzi shirikishi* acknowledges that the number of the police and police stations are not sufficient to cater for the security needs of community members across the country; as such, activities of the police need be complimented with community-led security mechanisms generated by community members. Justifying, for example, the establishment of *ulinzi shirikishi* in Kigezi Chini, the Chairperson of Kigezi Chini pointed out:

> In this area, we do not have a police station. The police station is located in Chanika, which is about 8 kilometres from here. The police have always been coming when incidents of insecurities are reported. The police come when people have already been injured. But the police station in Chanika does not have a vehicle that can allow the police to carry out night patrols.

Nonetheless, even though the idea behind the establishment and domestication of *ulinzi shirikishi* is tied to the police reform program starting in 2006, the creation and implementation of *ulinzi shirikishi* remain in the hands community members in each respective administrative area. The domestication, for example, of structure and decisions about the amount and mode of household contributions to sustain *ulinzi shirikishi* is in the hands of each respective community. That is why some neighbourhoods in Dar es Salaam have established *ulinzi shirikishi* while others are yet to establish. The police play advisory role, such as providing training to youths recruited to serve in the patrol units and advising the community regarding best ways to manage and sustain established *ulinzi shirikishi*. To put this point differently, the role of the police force in the implementation of *ulinzi shirikishi* is that of a partner. *Ulinzi shirikishi* and JITU, therefore, fit well in the category of community-led security mechanisms in that the idea behind their establishment emanates from the community and that establishment is deliberated and endorsed by community members.

Concluding this section, it is worthy reiterating that the establishment of community-led security mechanisms, such as JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* recognizes that security is just like other public goods; as such, its provision needs to involve collective efforts of the state and community members. Indeed, JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* place responsibility on the state together with community members to provide for security services. It is premised that engaging community members in security provision helps to generate sustainable results meetings community demands and empowering community members to appreciate and provide for their own security. The next section analyses the effectiveness of JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* in providing security.

Effectiveness of JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* in providing security
This section analyses the effectiveness of JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* in providing security to neighbourhoods within which they have been established. In connection to the nodal governance approach in which the

study is located, this section addresses three specific questions: How are the two forms of security-led security mechanisms (JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi*) structured and which of the structure is more effective in providing security to the community and addressing looming security challenges in urban areas? To what extent is *ulinzi shirikishi* and JITU related to the state? How and which forms of financial and non-financial resources are mobilized by community members to sustain JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* and how are they sustainable? The section below addresses the first question about effectiveness of the structure and operation of JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi*.

Organization Structure and Operation of JITU and *Ulinzi Shirikishi*
As pointed out earlier, the story behind the establishment of JITU is rooted in the increase of insecurity incidents, especially break-ins in Changanyikeni Magharibi. But as also earlier noted, the immediate factor leading to the establishment of JITU was an incident of break-in targeting household of a family that had just moved in Changanyikeni Magharibi. The family in question shouted calling for help, which it never received from the community, whose members did not have an established community-led security mechanism. As such, the family in question moved out of Changanyikeni Magharibi a day after the incident. Frustrated by this state of affairs, few heads of households in Changanyikeni Magharibi met to discuss the possibility of finding solution to looming security concerns. Explaining this state of affairs, the chairperson of JITU maintained:

> Everyone was tired with incidents of break-in. So, I and other four influential neighbours decided to meet and discuss the security situation in our neighbourhood. We all came to an agreement that something needed to be done to address the problem. Because of our influence in the community, everyone accepted when we introduced the idea.[12]

In terms of structure, therefore, JITU adopted a bottom-up structure whose leadership and operation were not connected to established government structures at the ward or sub-ward levels. The idea behind the establishment of JITU was conceived by about five heads of households who afterwards passed it to the rest of the community. Important to note here is that the first leadership of JITU was elected from among the five heads of households that first initiated the idea. Leadership of JITU constituted of the chairperson, secretary, accountant and commanders of patrol units. Local government officials and elected leaders at a ward and sub-ward (*Mtaa*) levels did not

have administrative roles in JITU – they rather took part in JITU activities just like other residents of Changanyikeni Magharibi. Also, employees of other government agencies residing in Changanyikeni took part in JITU activities by virtue of being residents of Changanyikeni Magharibi.[13] The accountant of JITU noted during interview:

> During JITU everyone was equal – we all woke up at night to patrol. Each one of us had one night in a week to patrol. Only women and elders above sixty years were exempted. I was above sixty years old, but I was leading a group that patrolled at night.[14]

JITU established seven patrol units – in which each constituted about ten men headed by a commander. The selection of commanders was based on their commendable community respect, influence and acceptance by patrol units they commanded. Each patrol unit was tasked to provide security for one night in a week. As the preceding quotation unveiled, with the exception elders aged above 60 years, women and youths below eight years, the remaining community members were obliged to take part in the seven patrol units. The chairperson, secretary and accountant also served as commanders in some of the patrol units. This, according to the chairperson, secretary and accountant of JITU meant to show exemplary leadership and to remind community members that security provision was the responsibility of everyone. During operation (patrols), people in the patrol units carried local weapons, such as machetes, arrows, sticks and whistles. Patrols took place from 11:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. and suspects arrested during patrols were interrogated and afterwards handed to the police.

On the contrary, *ulinzi shirikishi* has an administrative structure attached to the government at the mtaa and ward levels. As posited in the previous section, the establishment of *ulinzi shirikishi* is tied to the police reform program whose intention was to involve community members in addressing security challenges. However, the establishment and domestication of *ulinzi shirikishi* remains in the hands of each respective community members. The highest decision-making body regarding establishment of *ulinzi shirikishi* is the Mtaa Assembly constituting of all residents above 18 years old. It is this high decision-making body that decides on the amount of household contributions to sustain *ulinzi shirikishi.* In a similar vein, the *Mtaa* Assembly has final decision-making power regarding penalties imposed on residents not participating in *ulinzi shirikishi.*

But the overall responsibilities regarding day-to-day operation of *ulinzi shirikishi* rests in the elected *mtaa* chairpersons who are also the chairpersons of the *mtaa* assemblies and the mtaa security committees.[15] The *mitaa* chairpersons (sub-wards) are responsible for safeguarding and promoting peace and security in their respective administrative area. It is the responsibility of the *Mtaa* Chairperson to understand security concerns of his/her neighbourhoods and to record on daily basis all crimes taking place. It is too the responsibility of the *Mtaa* Chairperson to deliberate on and come up with such ideas like the adoption of community-led security mechanisms. Further, by the virtue of their position, the *mtaa* chairpersons are responsible for communicating and defending the idea about the establishment of community-led security mechanisms to the Mtaa Assembly (Mushi, 2012). Indeed, the establishment and implementation of *ulinzi shirikishi* in Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini adhered to this order in which the *mtaa* chairpersons are custodians of patrol units.

In practice, the election or re-election of the *Mtaa* Chairperson is dependent on his/her ability to address security concerns facing residents. This is a case in Changanyikeni in which residents of this area posited that their new chairperson was in 2014 elected because of his previous positive track record of finding solutions to security concerns. In particular, the new chairperson of Changanyikeni used to be the Secretary of JITU, which several residents of Changanyikeni cited as the most successful community-led security mechanism that managed to significantly reduce crimes in this area.[16]

The commanders appointed by *mtaa* security committees and vetted by *mtaa* assemblies head patrol units involved in *ulinzi shirikishi* in Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini. Each *mtaa* has a commander heading all patrol units and there are assistant commanders heading small units of youths. Assistant commanders are appointed by the Commander of *ulinzi shirikishi* and vetted by the Mtaa Security Committee. The commander of *ulinzi shirikishi* reports on daily basis to the *mtaa* chairperson regarding the general security situation and incidents of crimes observed during patrols. Assistant commanders heading small patrol units also report on daily basis to the Commander regarding incidents of crimes and the security situation in the areas patrolled. The *Mtaa* Security Committee and afterwards the Ward Security Committee regularly discuss reports submitted by commanders to the chairperson. This will be discussed in detail in the next section focusing on the relationship between *ulinzi shirikishi*, JITU and the state.

In Changanyikeni, there are currently about 20 youths registered to take part in *ulinzi shirikishi*. These youth who are residents of Changanyikeni have been divided into four patrol units – each constituting up five youths. In Kigezi, there are about 40 registered youth taking part in *ulinzi shirikishi*. These youths are divided into four zones in which each zone has 10 youths.

In terms of operation, patrol units start patrolling at 11:00 p.m. to 05:00 a.m. in Kigezi Chini. This too used to be a case in Changanyikeni, but recent increase of incidents of crimes taking place before 11:00 p.m. compelled the patrol units to start patrolling from 07:00 p.m. to 05:00 a.m. Each youth involved in the patrol unit is given a whistle, a touch and local weapons, such as machetes, arrows, sticks and whistles. Each household in these two areas is too required to have a whistle. When any of the patrol units comes across an insecurity incident or suspected criminals, whistles are blown to alert community members and other patrol units to assist. Also, a household experiencing an insecurity incident, such as break-in is required to blow a whistle to alert community members and patrol units. This mode of operation was also used during JITU.

Residents from the two areas acknowledge the usefulness and effectiveness of JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* in addressing increasing security concerns, especially crimes against properties.[17] As noted in the introduction, Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini do not have police stations and residents complained that they always see the police when an insecurity incident, such as break-in is reported and that the police never come in time. Thus, the presence of patrol units helps to reduce the security threats and fill out a vacuum left by the police. Accordingly, some of the women involved in a FGD in Kigezi Chini observed:

> *Ulinzi shirikishi* is more close to us than the police. Patrol units are here, the police are far away from here even though they have weapons and training.

> *Ulinzi shirikishi* understands this *mtaa* than the police. Even when you call them (patrol units) they come straightaway than the police. The police who have weapons do not even have vehicles.

> You can call the police, but by the time they arrive here from Chanika, people are already injured or dead. I have never seen the police with

weapons coming here when there is no incident of crime. They come when an incident is reported.

The police are very few. When the police arrive at this place, they always find thugs have already left and people already injured.

Ulinzi shirikishi is ours. It is our family members that patrol at night. It is like a husband that you know going out in the night to protect you. When an incident occurs, it is *ulinzi shirikishi* that calls the police. The police come here when people have already struggled and when they have already been injured.[18]

According to the quotations above, *ulinzi shirikishi* is a trusted community security-led mechanism complimenting the traditional security system provided by the state. As the quotations suggest, community members appreciate the presence and usefulness of the police in addressing security problems, but they raised concerns that the police are few and the police stations are located far away from Kigezi Chini making it difficult to come in time when incidents of insecurity are reported. The distance from Kigezi to Chanika where a police station is located in about 8 kilometres, and according to residents of Kigezi Chini, the police station in Chanika does not have a vehicle allowing the police to promptly respond to incidents of insecurities facing people. It is on this basis that *ulinzi shirikishi* has social license in areas like Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini.

Also, according to the preceding quotation, the operation and perceived effectiveness of *ulinzi shirikishi* connect to the question about gender. As unveiled earlier, women are the most victims of rising insecurity challenges in urban areas; as such, it is in the interest of women to see *ulinzi shirikishi* operating – as it helps relieving women from insecurities. Even though women do not directly participate in patrol units at night, they view *ulinzi shirikishi* as a security approach, which is more close to women, and the community in general. Thus, it is worthwhile reiterating here that addressing security challenges through *ulinzi shirikishi* equals finding solutions to concerns facing women.

In terms of the number of suspects arrested by patrol units, the commander of *ulinzi shirikishi* in Changanyikeni posited that from January to October 2015, about 6 suspected burglaries were arrested and handed over to the police. Sadly, one of the suspects died in September when attempting to

break-in one of the homes. He was caught with some other three suspects attempting to poison dogs making it easy to break-in. Some people constituting a mob that woke up at night to witness the incident forced one of the suspects to eat the poisoned meat that was to be given to dogs, and so the suspect in question died on the spot.[19] In Kigezi Chini, the commander of *ulinzi shirikishi* and the *mtaa* chairperson maintained that nearly 7 suspects were arrested by patrol units and handed over to the police during the period between January to October 2015. In total, therefore, patrol units in Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini arrested about 13 suspects during the period from January to October 2015. This signifies that the presence of *ulinzi shirikishi* helps to address security concerns, which the police would hardly address.

Even so, despite the usefulness and effectiveness of *ulinzi shirikishi*, leaders of JITU and residents of Changanyikeni who were around when JITU existed maintained that JITU was more effective than *ulinzi shirikishi*. In their view, JITU was more effective because it was directly attached to the community and that every community member was part of JITU. Indeed, during FGD with women, four of the participants maintained:

> There is nothing better than JITU and I have not seen such a thing as JITU. JITU was very strong – it was about neighbourhood watch. We neighbours were obliged to provide security services to each other.

> When we had JITU even my children were involved in patrol units. There was no discussion. Now the security of this area has deteriorated. These days you can be robbed even at 9:00 p.m. Just three days ago we had three cases of break-in in this area. These days they can even come to rob you during the day.

> The good thing about JITU is that when you sleep at night you were never worried because you knew there was someone outside from your family or neighbour protecting you. When a whistle is blown we knew something was wrong and we all woke up. But these days when you sleep, there are so many fears.

> JITU built friendship and fraternity. When a woman wanted to go to hospital at night, we called each other to help. One day I was involved in an accident and got admitted at Muhimbili National Hospital. I tell you; almost everyone in Changanyikeni came to the hospital to see me.

In view of some leaders of JITU, *ulinzi shirikishi* does not have strong community participation because not everyone is involved in providing security services. According to these leaders, *ulinzi shirikishi* slightly resembles private security companies because its sustainability depends on contributions from community members. As section 5.1.3 about mechanisms used to sustain community-led security mechanisms will unveil, *ulinzi shirikishi* always stopped when there were less or no contributions from community members. In Changanyikeni, for example, the number of youths involved in patrol units has decreased from 40 to 20 due to declining financial motivations from community members.[20] In Kigezi Chini, more than 10 incidents involving break-ins were reported between January and October 2015 when patrol units stopped patrolling because many community members stopped contributing.[21]

In practice, however, JITU is hard to organize and operate in a complex community having a large number of households. JITU operated smoothly for the period of about seven years when there was a small number of households that knew each other. The operation of JITU was limited to Changanyikeni Magharibi only, a small area within Changanyikeni that had less than 150 households. The entire area of Changanyikeni had about 590 households when JITU operated. But when the population and the number of households increased, it proved difficult if not almost impossible to organize and mobilize all households to provide security at night. The number of households in Changanyikeni Magharibi is currently about 2,000 while the entire area of Changanyikeni has about 8,000 households making it difficult to mobilize every community member to wake up at night to provide security. Also, according to leaders of JITU, a good number of new comers that were not in Changanyikeni when JITU was initiated were reluctant to wake at night to patrol because such a community arrangement never existed in the areas they came from. Again, in the course of time, some new comers too started refusing to wake up at night to provide security arguing that they did not have time.[22] In this light, the change from JITU to *ulinzi shirikishi* was practically inevitable.

Further, the administrative structure of JITU was practically susceptible to problems related to succession of leadership. JITU was not attached to a formal administrative structure of local governments at the *Mtaa* and ward levels. Also, JITU did not have any formal constitution or related written document establishing it. In this respect, JITU did not have a clear and

predictable plan of leadership succession. In 2005, for example, the chairperson of JITU wanted to retire from his position and he informed community members about this intention, but no body volunteered to replace him and take up the administrative role of JITU.[23] In the end, JITU almost did not have leadership and, therefore, collapsed.

As opposed to JITU, *ulinzi shirikishi* has a practically clear and predictable leadership succession arrangement because it is attached to the local government administrative structure at the *mtaa* and ward levels. However, it is worthwhile noting here that the effectiveness of *ulinzi shirikishi* is dependent on effective and committed local government leadership – capable of mobilizing people to contribute and create awareness about usefulness of *ulinzi shirikishi*. In particular, the presence of *mtaa* chairpersons committed to promote *ulinzi shirikishi* makes it possible for it to be effective. The question about presence of committed leadership is especially a case in Changanyikeni, which had established *ulinzi shirikishi* from 2008, but effective and consistent operation started in 2014 after the election of the new *mtaa* leadership.

As way of concluding this section, it is worthwhile making a case here that *ulinzi shirikishi* is operationally and sustainably viable than JITU because leaders in charge of day-to-day operation of *ulinzi shirikishi* are elected by residents of respective neighbourhoods. In other words, leaders in charge of day-to-day operation of *ulinzi shirikishi* directly account to community members who elect them during local government elections taking place after five years. In practice, therefore, the election and re-election of leaders is partly dependent on their ability to find solutions to security challenges facing community members. This is contrary to JITU that was headed by leaders who had volunteered to establish it and take charge of administrative roles. That is why JITU collapsed when its founding chairperson asked other community members to replace him. In a similar vein, it is worthwhile reiterating the argument that as opposed to JITU, *ulinzi shirikishi* is the ideal practical community-led security mechanism in areas, such as Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini having a huge number of households and population. In the subsequent section, the relationship between JITU, *ulinzi shirikishi* and the state is analyzed.

Relationship between JITU, *Ulinzi Shirikishi* and the State
As argued in the section above, JITU was initiated outside the administrative structure of the government at the ward, *mtaa* and hamlet levels. Every

resident, including government officials living in Changanyikeni participated in the provision of security. Local government officials and elected leaders at the *mtaa*, ward and hamlet levels did not have upper hand in the administrative structures of JITU, but they too participated in the provision of security just as other community members.

In terms of operation, however, there was a close interaction and connection between JITU and the state, especially the police and senior officials of the state at the district level. Suspected criminals arrested during patrols were handed over to the police for further actions, such as investigation and filing cases in courts. In this light, JITU also assisted the police during the investigation of cases of suspects arrested during patrols. In recognition of the effectiveness of JITU in combating crimes, the police pledged to cover the medication costs of people injured while patrolling at night. Nonetheless, according to leaders of JITU, there was not any case of people being injured during the whole period when JITU operated. Further, the police worked closely with JITU – during patrols, for example, the police communicated regularly with leaders of JITU to understand what was happening on the ground and to determine whether assistance was needed.[24]

In a similar vein, in recognition of the effectiveness of JITU, the district government of Kinondoni provided uniforms for residents to use during patrols. Funds used to buy uniforms were drawn from the United Nations (UN) Habitat Safe City Program (SCP), which was attached to the Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC). Further, JITU was awarded a trophy by the regional government of Dar es Salaam in recognition of the good work it played in addressing crimes. The trophy was presented by the then Regional Commissioner of Dar es Salaam, Yusuph Makamba during JITU day that was celebrated after every three months.[25] During JITU day, officials of government and the police were invited to share success and sad stories regarding security JITU. Detailed discussion about how JITU day was organized will be made in the next section.

On the other hand, the administrative structure of *ulinzi shirikishi* is entangled in the existing local government administrative system at the *mtaa* and ward levels. As too maintained earlier in the previous sections, the idea behind the formation of *ulinzi shirikishi* emanated from the reform program taking place from 2006 in the police force. The establishment of *ulinzi shirikishi* was premised to help addressing security challenges by involving community members that practically live with criminals. The *Mtaa* Executive

Officer (MEO) who is the government employee stationed at the mtaa level serves as the secretary and accountant of *ulinzi shirikishi.* The MEO documents and keeps records of incidents of crimes reported on daily basis. The *mtaa* chairperson who is elected by community members is too, a chairperson of the *Mtaa* Security Committee (MSC) while the MEO, is a secretary of the same committee.

Commanders of *ulinzi shirikishi* have been given mobile phone numbers of the Officer Commanding Stations (OCSs) whose police stations serve Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini. The police too have mobile phone numbers of commanders and assistant commanders of *ulinzi shirikishi*. The OCSs have too shared their cellular phone numbers with *mtaa* chairpersons. When coming for patrols or when coming for any kind of engagement at night, the police have always been informing the commanders of *ulinzi shirikishi*. Patrol units use mobile phone numbers given by the OCSs to call or seek assistance when they arrest or come across suspects. This makes it easy for the patrol units to report security incidents requiring attention of the police.

To strengthen community-led security mechanisms and address security concerns at the local level, one police has been stationed in each ward. This police officer links the community with the police, and advises the community on how to deal with security concerns. The same police officer stationed at the ward level is a member and secretary of the Ward Security Committee (WSC).[26] The WSC meets regularly to deliberate on security concerns, solutions to incidents of insecurities and the conduct and operation of *ulinzi shirikishi*. The MEOs are secretaries of MSC and they are the accounting officers of funds collected to finance activities of *ulinzi shirikishi*. Commenting on this arrangement, the Police Commissioner responsible for community policing observed: "So, it is local solution for local problems."[27]

It is thus important to restate here that even though the formation and the mobilization of *ulinzi shirikishi* remains in the hands of community members, its administrative structure and operation at the *mtaa* and ward levels is practically entangled to the state. This close connection between the state and administrative structure and operation of *ulinzi shirikishi* comes without surprise because the idea behind *ulinzi shirikishi* was conceived by the police wanting to establish a structure that allows the state to get hold of security information from the community. The police officer stationed at the ward level works with *ulinzi shirikishi* and provides advice on the best ways to establish patrol units. Youth recruited to take part in *ulinzi shirikishi* have

been receiving auxiliary police training organized and financed by the state at the district level. A good number of youth serving in patrol units in Kigezi Chini and Changanyikeni have not been trained. According to the chairpersons from the two neighbourhoods, youth involved in patrol units will soon be registered for auxiliary police training.[28]

The interface between JITU, *ulinzi shirikishi* and the state makes the two community-led security mechanisms more effective considering that it avoids operational conflicts between community-led security and state policing. The Police Commissioner responsible for community policing commended *ulinzi shirikishi* for helping to bring great impact in addressing security issues in Tanzania and complimenting activities of the police. In his view, people's trust in the police has significantly increased and the number of crimes has declined in comparison to the period when *ulinzi shirikishi* had not been established. The Commissioner maintained: "Community members can now volunteer to mobilize resources to construct police stations in their areas. People can now volunteer to give their land to be used to construct police stations." This position is supported by Mallya (2008) positing that after a year of the police reforms, networks of bandits were unveiled, names of the police accused of collaborating with bandits were disclosed and concerns about increasing insecurities were significantly addressed. Table 1 below unveils the number of reported crimes against persons and those related to properties declined in Tanzania, especially during the period from 2010 to 2012.

Table 1: Types of crimes and amounts committed since 2000-2012

Serious offenses from 2007-2012						
Type of crime/Year	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Crime against person	13,272	11,387	12,496	11,364	11,049	11,206
Crime related to property	60,913	76,568	75,525	68,527	50,863	46,773
Crime against public tranquillity	14,342	14,137	15,648	14,499	14,140	14,786
Total	**88,527**	**102,092**	**103,669**	**94,390**	**76,052**	**72,765**

Sourced from URT (2012: 5)

According to the table above, the number of crimes against persons in Tanzania declined from 76,568 in 2008 to 46,773 in 2012. This, as unveiled earlier, happened around the same time when *ulinzi shirikishi* started operating in Tanzania. The decline is conceivably connected to the operation of *ulinzi shirikishi*, which has in the last ten years been widely established in major cities, such as Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Mbeya and Arusha experiencing more insecurity incidents. Indeed, residents of Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini also shared the view that the operation of *ulinzi shirikishi* is helping to reduce cases of crimes. In fact, residents of these two neighbourhoods claimed that they feel safer when patrol units are effectively operating.

Concluding this section, it should be maintained, however, that recent lethal incidents involving attacks of police stations and theft of weapons has tarnished the established close relationship and cooperation between the police and *ulinzi shirikishi*. In Dar es Salaam, a recent incident of attack occurred in July 2015 at Stakishari police station in Ukonga in which four police, two civilians and one district auxiliary police were killed (Mwillo and Chilongola, 2015; *Habari Leo 2015*). This police station is also sometimes used to serve Kigezi Chini. Other recent incidents of the same nature include the July 2014 attacks of two police stations Ikwiriri, Rufiji district and Mkamba police station, Mkuranga district, Pwani region in which three police officers and one district auxiliary police were killed; and the September 2014 attack of Bukombe district, Geita region in which two police were killed.

Youths involved in *ulinzi shirikishi* in Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini complained that ever since the occurrence of an incident of attack at Stakishari police station, their relationship with the police has deteriorated. As earlier noted, the police have always been calling youth when patrolling in areas where *ulinzi shirikishi* is operating, but after the Stakishari incident, the police have not been constantly informing patrol units. According to the youth involved in *ulinzi shirikishi,* it is alleged that one of the leaders of *ulinzi shirikishi* was involved in engineering the robbery that took place at Stakishari Police Station. In effect, the police are now suspicious working with patrol units, and that they sometimes have been carrying out patrols without informing patrol units working in the same areas.[29] These allegations could not, however, be proved by the police.[30]

So, how was JITU sustained, and how is *ulinzi shirikishi* sustained? How sustainable and sufficient are the different forms of financial and non-

financial resources raised to sustain JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi*? Who makes decision regarding the amount of contributions to finance JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi*? What is the distribution of financial and non-financial resources raised to finance activities of JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi*? These questions are addressed in the subsequent section analyzing different forms of resources used to sustain activities of JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi*.

Resources and sustainability of JITU and *Ulinzi Shirikishi*
As maintained in the preceding sections, during JITU all abled men above 18 years and below 60 years were allotted a day in a week to provide security in the night. In this light, there was no established compulsory form of contributions requiring residents of Changanyikeni Magharibi to contribute on a monthly or daily basis. Instead, JITU was sustained by voluntary contributions of community members. Working tools, such as whistles, machetes and spears were donated by individual residents of Changanyikeni while the government through the UN-Habitat Safe City Program donated uniforms.

Leaders of JITU and community members who were around when JITU operated posited that two things made JITU successful. Firstly, there was a very high level of commitment of the top leadership and commanders heading the patrol units. Commanders took part in the patrol notwithstanding that some were above sixty years and some were employees of the public and private sectors. Most importantly, each commander established incentive mechanisms to motivate members of his group to take part in providing security at night. The Chairperson of JITU, for example, prepared free coffee and snacks for members of his group.[31]

Secondly, after every three months, community members celebrated JITU day – that brought together all families to share food and deliberate on concerns and thoughts regarding security of their neighbourhoods. JITU day was held in different households on rotational basis. During JITU day, the police and government officials at the district and regional levels were invited to witness what was happening in Changanyikeni. Local televisions and radios were invited to come and publicize what was happening during JITU day. This made JITU a well-known community-led security mechanism in Tanzania. During JITU day, community members slaughtered cattle, goats and other types of foods were prepared for community members and invited guests to eat. Residents ate half of the cattle and half of it was sold on a raffle

to raise funds for the next JITU day and other activities, such as medication for people who would be injured while patrolling.

Funds to finance JITU day also came from voluntary contributions of community members. According to leaders of JITU, each family contributed between 2000 (approx. USD 1) to 5,000 (about USD 2.5). The chairperson, secretary and an accountant organized the process of collecting money designated for the celebration of JITU day. Commenting on the experience and success of JITU day, the chairperson, secretary and accountant of JITU posited during interviews:

> On JITU day we were all together; we talked about our own problems, our successes and financial status. We never wanted to be like orphans during our meetings to celebrate JITU day.

> JITU day allowed us to know each other and celebrate our successes in providing security to our neighbourhood. For many cases, every family contributed (Tanzanian shillings) 5,000 (approx. USD 2.5) for JITU day.

> During our meetings to celebrate JITU day, we were all equal – only an invited guest of honour and the chairperson sat in front.

Since JITU was not connected to established local government structures at the local level, its compliance mechanisms were never decided by formal government decision making organs, such as *Mtaa* Assembly and *Mtaa* Development Committee (MDC). To enforce compliance, community members rejected to cooperate with residents from households that were never actively involved in by JITU. Explaining about compliance mechanism established by JITU, the secretary of JITU observed:

> When someone does not want to cooperate with us, he is not our companion and when his family had problems we also left him alone. Even when he is robbed at night we never assisted. Without punishment things cannot go. We did this and we were very successful. We were a small community and we knew each other very well.[32]

Given that JITU was not connected to the formal government administrative structure, and that it did not have a constitution, in 2002 community

members resolved to institutionalize it by establishing a Non-Government Organization (NGO) known as Changanyikeni Environmental Initiative (CHENI). The establishment of CHENI was premised to help strengthening JITU by adding income to its activities. Accordingly, in 2007, CHENI secured about 5 million Tanzanian Shillings (approx. USD 2,500) from the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) to sensitize people on environmental education and conservation. But CHENI collapsed and was subsequently deregistered in 2008, a year after the collapse of JITU. The collapse and subsequently deregistration resulted from the failure to submit financial reports to the government and that the person who volunteered serving the position of Executive Secretary General left Changanyikeni for studies outside the country. In essence, the collapse of CHEN in 2008 was foreseeable considering that it was established to institutionalize JITU, which collapsed in 2007.[33]

On the contrary, *ulinzi shirikishi* is sustained by established contributions agreed upon and endorsed by the *Mtaa* Assembly. There are two forms of financial contributions sustaining *ulinzi shirikishi*. The first, which applies in Changanyikeni, only involves monthly voluntary contributions from about 40 individual stakeholders living in Changanyikeni. According to the chairperson and the commander of *ulinzi shirikishi*, about 106 stakeholders were approached and asked to contribute financial and non-financial resources to sustain *ulinzi shirikishi*, but only 40 welcomed the idea and started contributing on monthly basis. These stakeholders have also been severally invited to attend meetings of the *Mtaa* Security Committee to discuss the security situation of Changanyikeni. The said stakeholders contribute between Tshs 20,000 (approx. USD 10) to 50,000 (about USD 25) per month.[34] Voluntary contributions from security stakeholders are paid directly to the office of the *Mtaa* Executive Officer who is the financial accounting officer at the *Mtaa* level.

Important to note here is that a good number of stakeholders contributing voluntarily to sustain *ulinzi shirikishi* are landlords renting houses to other people. This comes without surprise given that the financial security of the said stakeholders depends on the security of Changanyikeni – their houses can only have customers when the security environment in Changanyikeni is good enough.

The second form of contribution applying to both Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini involves compulsory contributions agreed upon and endorsed by *mtaa*

assemblies. In this category of contributions, each household is required to contribute a certain amount of funds to sustain activities of *ulinzi shirikishi*. In Changanyikeni, for example, each household is required to contribute 5,000 Tshs (about USD 2.5), and in Kigezi Chini each household contributes 2,000 Tshs (approx. USD 1) paid on monthly basis.[35]

The collection of funds from households has always been done by the youth involved in *ulinzi shirikishi*. At the end of the month, youth divide themselves in different locations to collect monthly contributions from residents. Decision to engage youth in the collection of monthly contributions resulted from the reason that a good number of households never voluntarily remitted monthly contributions to offices of the MEOs claiming that they have been forgetting to do so. Changanyikeni used to have a specific bank account for funds contributed to finance *ulinzi shirikishi*, but this account was closed in 2013 when *ulinzi shirikishi* almost deteriorated due to fewer contributions from community members. According to the mtaa chairperson of Changanyikeni, the process is underway to open another bank account for *ulinzi shirikishi*. Kigezi Chini on other hand has never held a bank account for funds contributed to finance activities of *ulinzi shirikishi*. The chairperson and commander of *ulinzi shirikishi* in Kigezi posited that at the moment there are no plans to open a bank account because the amount of funds collected from community members is not huge enough to be kept in a bank account.[36]

Contributions collected from security stakeholders and households are used in two main ways. First, they are used to pay honoraria to youth involved in patrol units. In Changanyikeni, each youth involved is paid a monthly allowance of up to Tshs 100,000 (approx. USD 50). But this amount is not always paid consistently because there have always been variations in terms of the amount of contributions collected from community members. In June and July 2015, for example, each youth received Tshs 90,000 (approx. USD 45) because there was less contribution. In Kigezi Chini, however, there is no established amount of honoraria paid to youth participating in finance *ulinzi shirikishi*. The honoraria paid to youth in Kigezi Chini are always dependent on the amount of funds collected. Youth complained that they have for several occasions not been paid at all because of less commitment of community members to contribute to activities of *ulinzi shirikishi*.[37]

Secondly, contributions remitted by community members are used to buy working tools, such as whistles, torches and batteries used by youths during patrols. The same amount is used to buy uniforms for youth providing

security at night. In Changanyikeni, there are uniforms for youth involved in *ulinzi shirikishi,* but these uniforms are not sufficient enough for all groups of youth. In Kigezi Chini, youth do not have uniforms at all because community members have not been able to raise sufficient funds to buy uniforms.[38]

The question about contributions has been a major challenge inhibiting effective operation of *ulinzi shirikishi* in the two neighbourhoods. In Kigezi Chini, youth have for several times stopped patrolling arguing that they cannot do so without uniforms leave alone honoraria, identity cards and shoes. According to residents of Kigezi Chini, incidents of crimes, especially break-ins always increase when patrol units stop operating. In March 2015, for example, burglars raided 8 households in Kigezi Chini in only one night when youth had stopped patrolling demanding to be given uniforms and identity cards. After this incident, the *Mtaa* Security Committee pleaded to the youth to resume patrols promising that that they would be given uniforms. But the uniforms, shoes and identity cards had not been given as of October 2015.[39]

In Changanyikeni, the dilemma regarding payment of monthly contributions for *ulinzi shirikishi* has divided community in two opposing camps. The first camp constituting some people renting houses holds that costs related to activities of *ulinzi shirikishi* should be borne by landlords receiving rents on monthly basis. Community members in this camp argue that they are not permanent residents, and therefore they cannot pay monthly contributions. The second position, which is held by elected leaders, the MEO, WEO and majority of landowners, maintains that contribution to *ulinzi shirikishi* is the responsibility of every resident. Responding this dilemma, leaders posited that plans are underway to ask house owners to include the monthly contributions in the house rent.[40]

Nonetheless, based on interviews and FGDs with residents of Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini, the dilemma surrounding opposition of some residents to contribute largely ensues from low level of awareness of community members regarding the basis of *ulinzi shirikishi*. Residents acknowledge the importance of *ulinzi shirikishi* in their neighbourhoods and they have always been seeking assistance from patrol units when they face security problems. But they have less awareness about the origin and who the owner of *ulinzi shirikishi* is. Several residents associated *ulinzi shirikishi* with a security initiative owned and financed by the government. Indeed, some residents associated *ulinzi shirikishi* with the municipal auxiliary police. According to

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elected and unelected leaders in Changanyikeni, the lack of awareness about *ulinzi shirikishi* results from less attendance of people to *mtaa* assemblies, which deliberate and decide on the amount of contributions to finance activities of *ulinzi shirikishi*.

Comparing the mechanisms employed to raise financial and non-financial resources sustain JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi*, it is worthwhile maintaining here that *ulinzi shirikishi* employs feasible and sustainable mechanisms, which are easy to maintain in populous communities composed of many households. A mixture of voluntary and compulsory forms of contributions is advantageous in that it creates a sense of responsibility and ownership of the community-led security mechanism since every household participates by contributing financial and non-financial resources or participating directly in the patrol units. The same can be said that mixing voluntary and compulsory contributions allows identifying and approaching stakeholders who can volunteer contributing more while also continuing to depend on compulsory contributions raised at the household level. This approach has been a success in Changanyikeni even though it is not effective enough due to low awareness of community members regarding *ulinzi shirikishi* itself.

Enforcing compliance on *ulinzi shirikishi*, the MEO, WEO and chairperson of Changanyikeni noted that they have always been refusing to assist writing introduction letters for residents whose households are not contributing. According to these leaders, any resident wanting an introduction letter or any assistance needs to show evidence that his/her household is contributing. Those not contributing can only be assisted upon payment of pending contributions. The Chairperson of Changanyikeni maintained:

> We identify you as a resident of this area when only you contribute to *ulinzi shirikishi*. The decision to institute *ulinzi shirikishi* was made by a meeting of the *Mtaa* Assembly that involves all residents of Changanyikeni. So, there is no point some people refusing to contribute. If you do not have that receipt, then you are not our companion.[41]

As a way of concluding this section, it is worthwhile making a case here that albeit the challenges related to their implementation, JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* serve to promote the following: First, they help to promote and enhance social cohesion – considering that they bring together community members to find solutions to their security and related problems. During JITU day, for

example, residents of Changanyikeni had opportunity to know each other and find solutions to problems of common interest. The same can be said about *ulinzi shirikishi*, which is conceived by *Mtaa* Assemblies providing avenue for residents to know each other and deliberate on security and related problems of common interest. Thus, an avenue provided by JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* creates and strengthens cohesion of social groups with diverse backgrounds in terms of origin.

Secondly, *ulinzi shirikishi* specifically serves to provide solution to the question about youth unemployment, which is estimated to be about 14% in Tanzania (Tanzania Bureau Statistics, 2016). The monthly payment to groups of youth serving in the patrol units helps to compliment other informal activities that youth engage with during the day. *Ulinzi shirikishi*, therefore, allows unemployed youth to be productive by working at night to provide security. Finally, *ulinzi shirikishi* is a potential avenue that can help to engage youths in finding solutions to rising incidents about violent extremism in Tanzania. Already existing networks of youths serving in *ulinzi shirikishi* are well positioned to provide intelligence information that can be used to unveil possible cases of violent extremism. The same can be used to offer and disseminate counter violent extremism narratives to other youths that are not taking part in patrol units.

Nonetheless, it is worth recapping that the sustainability of *ulinzi shirikishi* depends on the will of elected leaders and awareness of community members. There is currently less commitment of community members to contribute because a good number of them are not sufficiently aware about *ulinzi shirikishi*. These residents appreciate the usefulness of *ulinzi shirikishi* in helping to address security concerns, but they have been hesitant to contribute thinking that it is part of the municipal auxiliary police.

Conclusion
Tanzania is experiencing a significant shift in terms of security provision and organization. Among other things, the shift is reflected in terms of a move of several neighbourhoods to adopt community-led security mechanisms, such as *ulinzi shirikishi* and JITU operating beside the police forces to find solutions to rising security challenges. The formation JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* in relatively low-income neighbourhoods of Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini is a point of reference unveiling that security provision is no longer an exclusive domain of the state. *Ulinzi shirikishi*, which is rooted in the reforms of the police army in Tanzania, acknowledges that the police

force can only be effective by accepting to work with established community-led security mechanisms. The same is acknowledged by community members in Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini who maintained that *ulinzi shirikishi* is more close to the people than the police who always come when incidents of crimes have already occurred.

The establishment JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* acknowledges that security is like other public goods; as such, its provision needs to involve collective efforts of the state and community members. JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* do not replace traditional state policing, but they complement it by placing responsibility on the state together with community members to provide for security. This is in line with the concept of security governance positing that security provision is no longer the exclusive domain of the state. It is premised that engaging community members in security provision helps to generate sustainable results meetings community demands and empowering community members to appreciate and provide for their own security.

Community members acknowledged that the number of insecurity incidents decline when patrol units of *ulinzi shirikishi* are effectively operational. Thus, as a home-grown approach to security management, *ulinzi shirikishi* helps to address the fundamental security challenges of community members in Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini. It similarly helps to address the question about youth unemployment considering that youths providing security at night receive some monthly honoraria. Most importantly, an avenue created by JITU and *ulinzi shirikishi* serve to create and strengthen social cohesion by bringing together community members to address problems common to their community. Also, a network of youths serving in *ulinzi shirikishi* is a potential avenue that can help finding solutions to rising cases of about violent extremism.

In comparison to JITU, *ulinzi shirikishi* appears, however, to be a viable and ideal form of community-led security mechanism to practice in current populated urban neighbourhoods, such as Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini where it is difficult to mobilize all community members to wake up at night to patrol. *Ulinzi shirikishi* is too viable considering that it is attached to existing administrative structure of the government at the local level, and that it empowers community members to elect leaders involved in day-to-day mobilization of patrol units. In practice, the election and/or re-election of sub-wards chairpersons is thus, among other things, dependent on their ability to find solutions to security problems facing people. The interface

between *ulinzi shirikishi* and the state makes *ulinzi shirikishi* more effective considering that it avoids operational conflicts between state policing and community-led security mechanisms.

Notes

1. Tanzania is a union of two countries – Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which united on April 24, 1964. The current estimated population of Tanzania is about 47.4 million people, and the total area coverage of the country is 945,087 square kilometres.
2. In Tanzania, *Mtaa* (sub-ward) refers to an urban or town administrative area below a ward. On the contrary, a ward is an administrative area below a division, and a division is administrative area below a district, which is an administrative area below a region.
3. Changanyikeni is one of the four sub-wards (*mitaa)* in Makongo Juu ward, Kinondoni district. Other *mitaa* in Makongo Juu ward include Mbuyuni, Mlalakuwa and Makongo. Kigezi Chini on the other hand, is one of the eight sub-wards of Buyuni ward, Ilala district. Other sub-wards in this area include Zahala, Buyuni, Mgeule, Mgeule Juu, Tariani, Nyebulu, Kigezi and Kigezi Chini.
4. Fought from 1978 to 1979, the Kagera War was a war between Tanzania and Uganda. It was named before Kagera region in Tanzania. The war originated from the declaration by President Idd Amin of Uganda that part of Kagera region belonged to Uganda, and therefore, he sent troops to seize. The war ended with the defeat of Amin's troops, and afterwards Amin running away from Uganda following the intrusion of military troops of Tanzania to Uganda territory.
5. Interview with the chairperson of JITU on 17 July 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
6. Interview with the secretary of JITU on 18 July 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
7. Interview with the accountant of JITU on 25 August 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
8. Interviews and FGDs with leaders and residents of Changanyikeni, July to October 2015.
9. Interview with the Commissioner of Police responsible for community policing on 12 August 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
10. Ibid.

11. Interview with the Police Commissioner responsible for community policing on 12 August 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
12. Interview with the chairperson of JITU on 18 July 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
13. Interviews with leaders of JITU and FGDs with residents of Changanyikeni Magharibi, July to September 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
14. Interview with an accountant of JITU on 25 August 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
15. The Mtaa Security Committee (MEC) constitutes elected chairpersons at a sub-ward (*mtaa*) level and five representatives elected from among residents in each respective sub-ward in urban areas. It too constitutes the Mtaa Executive Officers (MEO) who are government officials stationed in each sub-ward (*mtaa*). The MEOs take minutes during meetings of MSCs, and record cases of crimes reported on daily basis to the *mtaa* chairpersons by commandants of patrol units.
16. FGDs with residents of Changanyikeni, July to October 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
17. Interviews with leaders and FGDs with residents of Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini, July to October 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
18. Focus Group Discussion with groups of women in Kigezi Chini on 10 September 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
19. Interviews with the commander of *ulinzi shirikishi*, the MEO and Chairperson of Changanyikeni and the WEO of Makongo Juu, July to October 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
20. Interviews with the chairperson and commander of *ulinzi shirikishi* in Changanyikeni, August and September 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
21. Interviews with the chairperson and commander of *ulinzi shirikishi* in Kigezi Chini, August to October 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
22. Interview with leaders of JITU, July to September 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
23. Interview with the Chairperson of JITU on 17 July 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
24. Interviews with the chairperson, secretary and accountant of JITU, July to September 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
25. Interviews with leaders of JITU and FGDs with residents that lived in Changanyikeni when JITU operated, July to September 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
26. Other members of the WSC include all MEOs in respective ward and Officer Commanding Stations (OCSs) whose stations are located in a ward. If a ward has a military base or a prison, commandants of

prisons and military bases also automatically become members of the WSC.

27. Interview with the Police Commissioner responsible for community policing on 12 August 2015.
28. Interview with chairpersons of Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini, July to October 2015.
29. FGDs with youths involved in *ulinzi shirikishi* in Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini, August and September 2015, Dar es Salaam.
30. Interview with the Police Commissioner responsible for community policing on 12 August 2015.
31. Interviews with the Chairperson, Secretary and Accountant of JITU, July to September 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
32. Interview with the Secretary of JITU on 18 July 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
33. Interviews with leaders of JITU and FGDs with residents of Changanyikeni, July to September 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
34. Interview with the chairperson, the commander and the MEO of Changanyikeni, July to October 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
35. Interviews with leaders and FGDs with residents of Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini, July to October 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
36. Interviews with the Chairperson and MEOs of Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini, July to October 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
37. Interviews with leaders and FGDs with the youths involved in *ulinzi shirikishi* and residents of Kigezi Chini, July to October 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
38. Interviews with leaders and FGDs with the youths involved in *ulinzi shirikishi* in Changanyikeni and Kigezi Chini, July to October 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
39. Interviews with leaders and FGDs with the youths involved in *ulinzi shirikishi* and residents of Kigezi Chini, July to October 2015 in Dar es Salaam.
40. Interviews and FGDs with leaders and residents of Changanyikeni, July to October 2015, Dar es Salaam.
41. Interview with a Chairperson of Changanyikeni on 18 July 2015 in Dar es Salaam.

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