

## **Effectiveness of Irondo as a community-led security mechanism in Kigali**

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### **Abstract**

*This case study focused on the mentalities regarding security, technology and resources used to keep security as well as the relationship of the state and community-led security mechanism. These are key factors that explain the “node” theory, which was the main basis to assess the effectiveness of community-led security mechanism. In Rwanda, the study was conducted in four settlements and Professional Night Patrols commonly known as “Irondo ry’Umwuga” was identified as an alternative community-led security mechanism. Security governance system of Rwanda is strongly aligned with the administrative structure as well as the historical background of the country. In this context, citizens understand the importance of security and therefore willingly contribute to keeping their neighbourhoods secure. Technologies and resources, however, differ. Poor neighbourhoods have struggled to provide enough means while in some areas, coordination by local leaders has effectively contributed to raising much resource and provide needed technologies to patrollers. Importantly, professional night patrollers closely collaborate with public security agencies, mainly the Rwanda National Police, which ensures capacity building of patrollers.*

**Keywords:** Security, Irondo, Community, Kigali

### **Introduction**

Security governance is defined as “the application of any means that will promote safe and secure places in which people live and work” (Johnston et al, 2003: 71). Security provisions have been increasingly regarded as responsibility of the state; which consequently exercise a monopoly of security. Indeed, thinking on the governance of security in the state has been dominated by the Hobbesian idea of a centralized authority- the Leviathan

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(Wood et al, 2007). This philosophy presided over the imposition of order and authority over the chaos and brutality of the state of nature and exercises a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. This view explains the traditional approach to security of exclusive pre-occupation in studying state security institutions such as the police and militaries (CHRIPS, 2014). Nevertheless, the absence or inefficiency of state providers can also lead to the institutionalization of self-help, under the guise of voluntary vigilante associations (Dupont et al, 2003). These authors further argue “such organizations arise from the inability of public police agencies to be everywhere and to do everything with their own personnel and their own resources. This has given rise to some quite creative partnerships with non-police agencies” (Dupont *et al*, 2003: 334).

In the same flow of ideas, Baker (2014) states that the perceptions of failing state police and rising crime have created a situation today where a plethora of non-state policing groups has emerged across the continent. Rising crime in African cities has seen innumerable initiatives by communities to tackle it ; as further argued by Baker (2014).

Confronted with this new development in security, scholars and policy experts have come to recognize the transformation in the nature and architecture of security within nation states. Scholars in the field of criminology and security studies have in particular pioneered the call for a critical examination of this loss of centrality in security (CHRIPS, 2014). Experts point out that security production, regulation, authorization is now hybrid (Black, 2002), polycentric (Shearing, 2007) and networked (Castells, 2000). In thinking about security therefore, we are at a juncture where its governance, in terms of production and authorization needs to be re-imagined (Shearing, 2007).

This paper is oriented through a “nodal governance” perspective in security governance (Burris et al, 2005). In this context, nodes should be understood as “a site where knowledge, capacity and resources are mobilized to shape the flow of events” (Burris et al, 2005). More specifically, a nodal orientation relies on the quality of cooperation between a diverse range of public and other actors involved in security, in the form of network-like structures; thus calling from cooperation between the police and other agencies (Sluis et al, 2010).

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The analysis was made using four essential characteristics of a node. Firstly, a way of thinking (mentalities) about governance (these are the narratives on how we see the world). Secondly, a set of methods (technologies) for exerting influence over the flow of events (these are the means of intervention). Thirdly, resources to support a node's operations, and lastly institutional structure that enables the directed mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies over time (here there are different levels of formality).

This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of how low income urban communities in Rwanda negotiate their security in the face of existing formal State security forces. In a more specific way, the paper firstly seeks to critically study the mentalities, technologies, resources and institutional structures and develop a typology of community-led mechanisms for security provision for men and women in poor communities in selected neighbourhood in Kigali. Secondly, this research aims at providing a better policy and scholarly understanding on the nature, potential and limits of community-led mechanisms for security provision for men and women in poor communities in sites where the study was conducted.

#### **Methodology**

This research project was framed by the development of the research design and methodology working paper, presented and approved during a methodological workshop held in Nairobi on 29 and 30 May 2014. The objective of this workshop was to first establish broad familiarity with all relevant, available literature and documentation on issues of community-led mechanisms for security provision in Rwanda. The working paper therefore determined the research questions that framed subsequent studies undertaken over the duration of the project. It also provided a preliminary analytical mapping of the nature of different kinds of mechanisms that are available in Rwanda and suggested more detailed policy recommendations.

The first phase of the research involved a comprehensive review and analysis of published literatures in the form of books, journal articles and any relevant reports or official documents. The analysis of this literature allowed developing an intimate familiarity with all relevant, available literature and documentation on issues of security governance in Rwanda. Secondary data also helped to clarify on the assumptions on which the study is predicated. In addition, a comprehensive review of the literature served as a basis for the identification of key informants and the development of interview questionnaires. Literature and documentation reviewed included online and

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hardcopies of books, journal articles, occasional papers, media reports, government policy, planning and programme documents, legal texts, documents and reports of non-governmental and international agencies working on issues of security governance in Rwanda.

In constant efforts to identify suburbs to be considered during the actual data collection phase, a pilot study was conducted in selected 8 suburbs located in the three districts of the City of Kigali. In **Nyarugenge District**, the pilot was conducted in Nyabugogo, Kiruhura, Gitega and Biryogo. In **Gasabo District**, Nyabisindu, Bannyahe and Batsinda were selected for the pilot survey. Lastly, in **Kicukiro District**, Sodoma was the researcher's target for this specific activity. Findings of the pilot survey were presented to different stakeholders gathered in the country workshop in Kigali, on May 21, 2015.

Initially, among the eight selected suburbs of the City of Kigali, two sites were purposively selected to be subject of the study. The criterion for the selection was first of all the district's *crime rate*. Between July and October 2014, Nyarugenge and Gasabo Districts were reported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as being the two districts where most of the crimes were committed<sup>1</sup>. This implied that the research was to select one suburb in each of the two districts. The second criterion was related to *infrastructural facilities* such as tarmac roads, public lights, etc. The last but not least criterion was the *level of insecurity* as either observed by the researcher or reported by residents. Based on these criteria, Nyabugogo suburb of Nyarugenge District as well as Batsinda suburb in Gasabo District were selected.

As mentioned above, on 21 May 2015; CHRIPS organised a country workshop in Kigali aiming at sharing findings from the pilot survey with various stakeholders and agree on the methodological aspects to guide the actual research. One of the recommendations was to widen the sample size, without necessarily changing the area of research. It was therefore suggested and agreed to add, within the selected administrative sector, one more administrative cell, preferably where the sector is located. This selection, as argued by some participants, would help find a balance and compare the information received from the two selected suburbs and the 'somehow' well-settled places where the sector offices are located.

Based on the above recommendation, the researcher purposively selected two cells in each of sectors where the initially selected suburbs are located. In Kigali Sector (Nyarugenge District), in addition to Nyabugogo suburb

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(located in Nyabugogo Cell), Mwendo Cell was selected; while in Kinyinya Sector (Gasabo District) Gaculiro Cell was selected in addition to Batsinda suburb (located in Kagugu Cell).

Participants were selected based on their activities and the number of years spent in the selected neighbourhood. This was to ensure the inclusiveness and diversity in the information to be collected by the researcher (see details on Focus Groups Discussions - FGDs participants and Key Informants Interviews - KIIs as detailed below).

In total, six FGDs were conducted whereby one FGD was organised in each of the four selected sites. On one hand, a group which discussed security in poor neighbourhood gathered at each of the selected site (four in total) was composed by local citizens. To ensure diversity and homogeneity of the group discussions, gender and socio-economic characteristics were taken into consideration. In this regards, researchers selected unemployed young boys and girls (between 18-30years), citizens who lived in the selected sites for 5 years and above, small entrepreneurs operating in the identified suburbs as well as employees residing in the suburbs but work outside. The group, where applicable, would include members of Youth Volunteers in Crime Prevention, street vendors (including phone vendors) as well as members of former defaulters. In total, 86 persons (including 27 female) participated in our FGDs in the four selected sites described in previous paragraphs.

On the other hand, one group composed of leaders and security service providers in the visited sectors gathered at sector level. These included members of the community policing committees in the sector, local government leaders at lower level, reserve forces residing in the visited sector (commonly known as Inkeragutabara), night patrollers operating in cells which are part of the research (commonly known as Abanyerondo), District Administration Security Support Organs (DASSO)<sup>2</sup> and members of the evening parents' forum committees (commonly known as Umugoroba w'ababyeyi)<sup>3</sup>. Two FGDs of this kind were conducted, one in Kinyinya Sector of Gasabo District, and another one in Kigali Sector of Nyarugenge District.

The qualitative aspect of this study further involved Key Informants Interviews (KII) at sector, district and national levels. Key informants were identified through the snowball method<sup>4</sup>. At national level, Police Commissioners in charge of Community Policing and the Criminal Investigation Department were contacted. At this level, the National Security

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Services officer deployed in the City of Kigali was also contacted. At district level, Mayors, Police officers and national security officers in the two districts (Nyarugenge and Gasabo) were interviewed. Lastly, at sector level, the Executive Secretary, the Reserve force, and ordinary citizens were interviewed in Kinyinya (Gasabo District) and Kigali (Nyarugenge District) Sectors. In total, 25 key informants (including 5 women) contributed to this research through face-to-face interviews.

This research also employed observation method to collect data on areas such as decision-making within the community-led security initiatives. Observation is important as it enabled the researcher to study these initiatives within their “natural” context and in their complexity and depth.

#### **Security governance context in Rwanda**

Rwanda is an independent country situated in Eastern-Central Africa. Security history of Rwanda is divided into three periods, considering the historical context of Rwanda; i.e. pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. Each of the periods enjoyed security on one hand, but also citizens suffered from insecurity, resulting in 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. For the sake of this paper, the author focused on the contemporary Rwanda, with more focus on the period after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.

The first period (1994-2000) of the post-genocide Rwanda was characterised by extreme insecurity whereby citizens were both mentally and physically insecure. During this period, Rwanda had the flow of refugees (in and out) and displaced persons within the country but most importantly the insurgency which followed the dismantling of refugee camps (which also included the former Government of Rwanda authorities, soldiers and militias) after the failure of the international community to repatriate them despite repeated calls to return home (Cyrus, 1998). Then followed the institutional building and policy reform period (2001-2010) in which Rwanda experienced a number of reforms and policy/legal adjustments including security sector reforms (SSR). A noticeably important reform in security area was the formation of Rwanda National Police (2001) and the establishment of Community Policing committees in local government entities (2007)<sup>5</sup>. The drafting and adoption of the Internal Security policy in 2008 is also another development process which aimed at preventing and reducing crimes through cooperation with the citizens, security bodies in support to the process of Good Governance, Unity and civic education, rehabilitation of offenders, economic growth and improved living conditions of citizens,

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adequate capacity for intervention in areas hit by hazards and disasters and availability of clear legislation regarding crime investigation, prosecution and taking offenders before the courts of law (Republic of Rwanda: 2008).

As a result of the above mentioned SSRs, the Rwanda Governance Scorecard (RGS)<sup>6</sup>, over the years, has revealed that the homicide rate decreased from 1.1 per 100,000 citizens in 2010 (RGB, 2010) to 0.08 per 100,000 citizens in 2012 (RGB, 2012) and 0.003 per 100,000 in 2014 (RGB, 2014). It was also reported that crime rates in 2016 dropped by 12 per cent in the first three quarters compared to the same period of 2015<sup>7</sup>. Rwanda is increasingly commended to be a better place to live and one of the safest countries in the world (Global State of mind, 2012). A safe country not only benefits Rwandans but also the international community, who are coming to work and live in Rwanda in increasing number<sup>8</sup>. These achievements are primarily attributed to the stringent policing measures initiated and preventive measures (RNP, 2014) through community policing, which places more emphasis on involving all areas of society in safety and security of the country<sup>9</sup>.

In light of the above security context in Rwanda's historical background, questions raised by this research remain relevant in this context: what is the role of citizens in the security management in the poor neighbourhoods in Kigali? What are the mentalities, technologies, resources and structures to keep these neighbourhoods secure? Are they effective? Before answering these essential research questions, the author proposes to discuss security management in the City of Kigali, focusing on its heterogeneity and multicity especially in the poor neighbourhoods.

#### **Security management in urban areas and in poor neighbourhood: Heterogeneity and multiplicity**

Understanding security management in urban area requires a clear understanding of the broader structure of the governance system of a country. In this context, the researcher intends to introduce the reader to the governance and administrative structures in Rwanda, after which the reader would be able to understand the heterogeneity and multiplicity of security management in the City of Kigali (CoK), particularly in the city's poor neighbourhoods.

#### ***Governance and administrative structure of the Republic of Rwanda***

In pre-colonial Rwanda, some form of political pluralism and power sharing was practiced through an administrative system that combined both

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centralization of power and decentralized autonomous units (Rwanda Senate, 2010). The monarch was the supreme leader of the country, while the Chief was nominated to govern a province, the second administrative unit from the top. The province was divided into districts, led by two chiefs (one in charge of land, another in charge of cattle) nominated by the Chief of the Province.

With the changes brought by colonization, the country shifted from this complex and indigenous system of governance to tightly centralized colonial governance. The first and second republics were characterized by single party rule deeply marked by social and political exclusion (Rwandan Senate, 2010). Political analysts estimate that the second republic appears at first glance as a pyramidal regime and strongly hierarchized from top to bottom<sup>10</sup>. The country, at least until 1999, was divided into twelve regions, known as prefectures, each led by a prefect named by the president. The prefectures are divided into communes, led by burgomasters, and the communes into sectors<sup>11</sup>.

The Republic of Rwanda, in the post-genocide era, is governed through a decentralized system of governance. In 2001, the highly centralized system was abolished and the Government opted for a system which vets more power in the Local Government (LG) through a number of administrative, fiscal and political reforms. These reforms were implemented in three phases as described in the following paragraphs.

The first phase (2000-2005) aimed at empowering Rwanda's people to determine their destiny (RoR, 2001) through democratic elections. To facilitate the functioning of these structures, a number of legal, institutional and policy reforms were undertaken, especially in promoting democratic election. Among other achievements, the constitution of 2003 was drafted following a wide participatory approach and local leaders were elected (RoR, 2004). Although security was one of the leading aspects to ensure success in this process, there was a continued security threat, which impacted on various programs planned to deepen the participation of citizens in the governance process (RoR, 2004). Prior to policy and legal mandates, both central and newly established local governments were expected to secure the population, especially those unable to acquire security by private means.

The second phase (2006-2010) aimed at consolidating progress on national priorities, such as Vision 2020, and deepening the decentralization process by



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enhancing effectiveness in service delivery to communities (MINALOC, 2011). The strategy to achieve this was to increase capacities at levels of administration (Villages, Cells and Sectors) close to communities, promote integrated Local Economic Development (LED) and foster community participation at Village level, in the planning and management of local affairs. Administratively, under the second phase, the country was composed of two layers of government (central and local) and of six administrative entities: the Central Government, the Province (Intara), the District (Akarere), the Sector (Umurenge), the Cell (Akagari) and the Village (Umudugudu). In this process, the Government proceeded at the reduction of administrative entities, thus reducing provinces from eleven to four provinces and City of Kigali, districts from 106-30, sectors from 1545-416 and cells from 9165-2148. Specifically, the City of Kigali presently covers three of the thirty districts of Rwanda, namely Gasabo, Kicukiro and Nyarugenge districts.

Decentralization reforms have made a great improvement on socio-economic living conditions of Rwanda through the ease of implementation of various government programs and service provisions. In a more specific aspect of security, these reforms have been implemented simultaneously with security sector reforms which, as discussed in the section on security management in urban areas, were also initiated in the second phase of decentralization and onward.

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The security of the country is coordinated through the Rwanda Defence Forces, Rwanda National Police and the National Security Services (RoR, 2003). For the purpose of this study, the focus is put on the security heterogeneity of the Kigali city.

The Security of the City of Kigali (which is subject of study) is coordinated and managed by the Security Committee, an organ mandated to take decisions relating to all security issues in the city.<sup>12</sup> The committee is representative at security administration level as it is composed by the Executive committee (that of the CoK and districts that are under the city administration), Commandants of police, intelligence officers, the prosecutor of the higher instance of the CoK as well as directors of prisons located in the CoK<sup>13</sup>. It is observed that the communities particularly those in the poor urban areas are represented by the hierarchical authorities, especially those who are elected by the citizens in the City of Kigali. However, this approach is promoting indirect participation which would constitute a constraint

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during the implementation of different security decisions taken by the committees.

In addition to public mechanisms to provide security, there are also mechanisms put in place by local residents commonly known as “Irondo”. Though this mechanism is largely discussed in subsequent sections, it is important, beforehand, to discuss the participatory approach, focusing on the role citizens generally play in securing their neighbourhoods. Readers must also bear in mind that security provisions in Rwanda are applied to both urban and rural residents, though with different means and approaches. The author has not found any particularity to any suburb or other areas in the City of Kigali.

Citizens find the motives to participating in night patrols in the idea that it is a general understanding that public security organs cannot reach every single household in the country mainly due to limited human and financial resources. Subsequently, as the informal but organised security mechanisms were inevitable, citizens have organised to participate in the night patrol, commonly known as “Irondo”. As recalls a citizen in Nyabugogo Cell, Kigali Sector, “we used to participate in night patrols with the intention to keep our neighbourhoods secure. Every household was required to provide an adult male to rotationally participate in night patrol” (FGD 23 July 2015, Kigali).

Nonetheless, given the nature of selected neighbourhoods, this approach was quite challenging because most of the citizens earn their lives from a job, generally performed during the day. As expressed by a small trader in Batsinda neighbourhood (Kagugu Cell, Kinyinya Sector),

I have been participating in night patrols and would take a stick and torch to keep my neighbourhood secure, together with some other identified neighbours. However, honestly speaking, we were not able to keep our neighbourhood secure because we are not trained for that specific assignment. In addition to this, we used to fail to perform our daily businesses for the next day because we have not slept the whole night (FGD 16 March 2016, Kigali).

With the aim to make Irondo more useful to the community, citizens have opted to release a financial contribution. As stated by one of the contributor in Gaculiro Cell (Kinyinya Sector), “we have decided to collect some money as a new form of contributing to security within our neighbourhoods” (FGD 24 July

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2015, Kigali). The fund collected is meant to replace a physical contribution of any adult citizens through night patrol. Details about the amount per person/household, recovery and accountability systems of collected fund is broadly discussed in the section on “Financial and Human Resources” below.

Another equally important form of keeping security by citizens is sharing information about any security threat in the neighbourhood. Citizens generally understand that there are many insecurity acts beyond their capacity. “Cooperation between citizens and competent security organs is needed. We [Citizens] therefore play our role through pointing a finger at any person or activity that would be suspicious to cause insecurity” (FGD 18 March 2016, Kigali). states a citizen in Gaculiro, Kinyinya, during an exclusive interview. This cooperation is instrumental in crime prevention as states ACP Damas Gatere (former Commissioner for Community Policing at the Rwanda National Police) during the presentation of pilot survey findings held in Kigali on 25 May 2015, “Community policing was established to prevent crime in the smallest administrative entities of our country. Citizens are requested to cooperate through primarily sharing information and this seems working and yielding results for the moment.”

It has become a norm among Rwandans to ensure safety of a neighbour through the practice commonly known as “Ijisho ry’umuturanyi” translated as “Neighbourhood Watch”. In fifth issue of RNP’s regular magazine, this security organ states that “this has become effective as ‘Neighborhood Watch’ Systems has become a norm among Rwandans where every citizen ensures safety of a neighbour” (RNP, 2012).

It is right to conclude that the City of Kigali has a clear method of keeping security. Worth to note is also the role played by the community in keeping their neighbourhoods secure through various means as described in this section. Equally significant argument to advance is that the state, the Kigali City Council in this case, while recognising the important contribution of security beneficiaries, ensures it also plays its role through listening to and collaborating with the locals with the aim to jointly secure the nation, with focus to those who are not capable to individually secure their homes. It is under a cooperation framework that the “Professional Night Patrol” was established in various neighbourhoods of Kigali, especially in poor areas such as Nyabugogo and Batsinda. Before elaborating on this mechanism, it is important to first provide a broad description of these suburbs. The

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following section therefore describes Nyabugogo and Batsinda, in a way that gives detailed insights to the readers about these sites.

#### **Description of research sites**

There is a need to make a brief description of sites under research, focusing on the selected poor urban neighbourhoods, i.e. Nyabugogo and Batsinda. This section provides insights of the geographic location, occurrence of crime and the response from Government, as well as the nature of security provision in the communities of these two suburbs.

Nyabugogo is located in Kigali Sector, Nyarugenge District, the City of Kigali. Nyabugogo is one of busiest areas of Kigali as it hosts the Kigali International Car Parking, the Nyabugogo Market and different sales places commonly known as Ku Mashyirahamwe and Ku Madepo<sup>14</sup>. It is also a junction of three main destinations to Southern and some parts of the Western part of the country (The road to Rusizi via Huye, and Karongi via Muhanga), Northern and other parts of Western (Road to Musanze and Rubavu Districts as well as the road to Gatuna Border in Gicumbi District). As far as poor neighbourhoods are concerned, one of the villages within Nyabugogo Cell is Nyabugogo Village, mostly known for sheltering thieves known as “Marines” from busy suburb of Nyabugogo, who hide in marshlands located named Kiruhura, close to Nyabugogo. They are famous in not only robbing trucks and lorries carrying goods from the Southern, Western and Northern provinces, but also disturbing local residents both on streets and at their homes in Nyabugogo village and other neighbourhoods, including Kiruhura, to name just a few. It was reported at the time of the pilot survey that Police secured open places but rarely reached insecure/remote places such as Kiruhura. “The marines are untouchable, they disappear after stealing and no one can dare following them in their marshlands which are considered as their headquarters” (Interview, 15 September 2014, Nyabugogo). Nevertheless, the “Marines” have gradually reduced their operations following Police and Army joint patrols which start as early as 3pm as reported by the Commissioner in Charge of Community Policing<sup>15</sup>. Community-led security is available in Nyabugogo and receives support from the Local Government and collaborates with the Police and Army. As an illustration of collaboration between the police and LG, joint forces conducted a Cordon and Search Operation (CSO) on 18 October 2012 with the help of local leaders; capturing 21 robbers, code named (abamarini) with 15 other thieves in Nyabugogo cell, Kigali sector in Nyarugenge

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District<sup>16</sup>. The same source reported that this group of muggers is known to commit robberies in different sides of Kigali City especially in Nyabugogo.

The second urban poor neighbourhood selected for this study is Batsinda suburb; located in Kagugu Cell, Kinyinya Sector, Gasabo district. It was initially a less densely populated but later received people expropriated from other suburbs of Kiyovu cy'Abakene (in Nyarugenge district, Muhima Sector, Ubumwe cell). In the expropriation process, the City administration facilitates citizens' relocation to Batsinda whereby relatively small houses were built. Being a new place and affordable for all, it is believed by residents that all the causes of insecurity were moved to this place. One respondent reports: "It is as if all the evils were moved to Batsinda: those from Kiyovu, Kaninja, Bannyahe<sup>17</sup> are all here. You can imagine the insecurity challenges we are facing as normal inhabitants"(Interview 16 September 2014, Kigali). The police, in 2014, also acknowledged Kinyinya Sector (where batsinda is located) was one of the areas in Kigali City with the highest rate of crime<sup>18</sup>. According to a senior local leader, they realized the crime occurrence was increasing in 2012 (when more citizens relocated to Batsinda from Kiyovu and Kimicanga expropriated areas) and took security measures in collaboration with the Police and citizens. In collaboration with Kinyinya sector, citizens established a security organization which is in charge of patrolling during the day and the night. More details on this mechanisms established and led by local populace are highlighted in subsequent sections.

### **Historical background of Irondo and Motives of its establishment**

As argued in the section on Security Management in urban areas especially in the section on Security management in the City of Kigali, Irondo emerged as an alternative community-led security mechanism to security generally provided by public agencies. This study defines community-led security initiative as non-state security mechanisms or options; which are not necessarily are isolated from state security mechanisms in the form of public police. The major characteristic should be understood in the nature of governance and the role played by the community in the shape of the community-led security mechanism (CHRIPS, 2014). This section therefore highlights the historical background of this initiative, before tackling its effectiveness.

Although there are no, understandably, legal or policy framework which motivated the establishment of Irondo, this community-led mechanism existed few years ago before the genocide committed in 1994 against the

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Tutsi in Rwanda. Interestingly, many interlocutors in Kigali emphasised that neighbourhood watch schemes rose in the early 1990s, concomitantly with a noticeable increase in violence and banditry that was allegedly resulting from the civil war (Kartas et al, 2011). The authors further argue that 'however, the assertion needs to be taken seriously, as the increase in banditry was part and parcel of the propaganda of the Habyarimana regime (Kartas et al, 2011: 16).

Though the 'Irondo' was meant to benefit citizens in needs of security in places where the Government through 'gendarmerie' and 'police communale' would not be of much help, Habyarimana regime found this mechanism as an opportunity to oppress a part of the population, taking into consideration the political and security situation of Rwanda, especially in the City of Kigali. This argument is backed by the view of Kartas and Jütersonke (2011: 16), who further argues as follows:

Although the surge in banditry may have been real, it was instrumentalised to co-opt the neighbourhood watch initiatives and vigilante groups that had probably formed quite spontaneously. So-called "rondes" (ronde being an "inspection round" in French) were to be organised and vetted to become tools of defence, and in case of military defeat, of destabilisation.

There was no coincidence for Habyarimana regime to take advantage of community-led security mechanism and successfully instrumentalize the 'Irondo'. Scholars point out that from the perspective of Habyarimana's regime, the *ronde* became a nuisance, because concomitantly to the introduction of multiparty politics, the vigilante groups could be (and indeed were) co-opted as potential militias (Kartas et al, 2011). The fact is that the mechanism was adopted by, originally, the ruling party, considering political situation in the country; but, once adopted by other political parties<sup>19</sup>, would become a threat to the existing regime. In addition to these informal security machineries, the example set by the ruling party was slowly followed by other newly recognised parties which organized their own militia (Article 19, 1996).

Between 1991 and 1994, until few months before the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, the state security forces were mostly concerned by pushing back the RPF attacks. The only possible option to ensure security at local level was to accommodate and cooperate with the newly community owned

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mechanisms. The argument maintained by Kartas and Jütersonke (2011) is that, rather than pushing back the emergence of these groups, the regime decided to systematise and regulate them for the creation of an informal civilian back-up organisation that ultimately became a handy instrument for the genocide.

After liberation and having stopped the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, the newly established Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), set security as its top priority. As put by Kartas and Jütersonke (2011), once the RPF had gained control of Kigali city, it was very concerned to enforce law and order; the security institutions of the state, however, had disintegrated. Nevertheless, limitations related to financial and human resources leave the GNU no further option than working closely with the neighbourhood watch communities system. Already used to relying on neighbourhood watch initiatives, local communities rapidly organised new *rondes* and vigilante groups. The system relied on solidarity and mutual interest. Each household contributed at least one person to the *ronde*, which initially took place both night and day. What is more, since 1996-97 the flow of war refugees in Kigali had increased progressively: Kigali's demographic explosion was taking off. The government thus continued to encourage local communities to organise their own neighbourhood watch schemes. As argued by Kartas and Jütersonke (2011), Police forces would not patrol inside the neighbourhoods, but remained quite static on the main roads and crossroads. Of course, such an approach simply seeks to increase the visibility of "the state" in the hope of deterring crime, but hardly allows for crime prevention.

Strategies to promote security in Rwanda's contemporary history include the establishment of Community Policing Committees, who, among other responsibilities, are to 'streamline night patrols program (Kartas et al, 2011). Since this policy framework was established, Government officials tirelessly encouraged citizens all over the country, and in the City of Kigali, in particular; to bring their contribution in the process of restoring and effectively keeping security, through existing locally (community-based) established structure named as Irondo. During the official closing of training of 180 people, including members night patrollers, one of senior officers of the RNP urged that "security comes forward of everything and ensuring it is not only the responsibility of Rwanda National Police and other security organs but also all Rwandan"<sup>20</sup>. This was therefore a clear message that

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without their contribution whatsoever, citizens would not enjoy security, especially those who cannot afford hiring private security.

Based on the definition and characteristics of community-led security mechanism given in the introduction of this section, one can argue that before the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994 Irondo was state-motivated, but gradually emerged as a community-led one after 1994. In the next section, the study introduces a “modern” form of Irondo which is labelled “Irondo ry’Umwuga-Professional Night Patrol” and at the same time, provide grounds for an arguably possible effectiveness of this initiative.

#### **Effectiveness of Irondo as a community-led security mechanism**

One of the objectives of this study is to contribute to a detailed mapping of the community-led mechanisms for security provision in poor communities Kigali. Findings have revealed that the “Professional Night Patrol (PNP) - *Irondo ry’umwuga*” is the relevant mechanism and shall therefore be detailed in this section, which relates to the effectiveness of this mechanism. Assessing the effectiveness of this mechanism therefore focuses on how the communities define and motivate security, technologies, i.e. means used and strategies meant to the community secure, the human and financial resources that contribute to the effectiveness of these initiatives, and, lastly, the relationship between the identified security mechanism and the state.

#### ***Community definitions and motives of security***

In the context of Rwanda, security is considered as a pre-condition for the national and individual survival. Considering the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, Rwandans have now a sense that security is necessary for any other social, political and economic development. It is worth mentioning that even though there is this broader understanding, different layers of the urban population have their definitions of security and various factors that motivate them to play their role in promoting and maintaining security in their respective neighbourhoods. In this context, the following definitions were provided through FGDs and interviews organized to feed this study with empirical data.

Security, as commonly stated, is regarded as a national priority and therefore a state responsibility. Citizens generally believe that they cannot be secure when the country as a whole is insecure. As put by a citizen in Nyabugogo Cell, “security should be defined in the national context as a situation where the country is not at war” (FGD 23 July 2015, Kigali). In addition to this



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argument, one of the participants in Nyabugogo Cell, Kigali Sector describes security as a “peaceful situation whereby the people and their goods are safeguarded”. The community is secure in a situation when any individual is safe and their properties are not robbed or looted.

The notion of security of the goods is emphasised by a small scale business person in Batsinda suburb (Kagugu Cell, Kinyinya Sector) who believe that their neighbourhood is secure when their businesses are safe both at night and during the day. “*There is a belief that*”, explains the small trader, “*we feel secure when we leave our goods in the store at night and we find them safe in the morning*” (FGD 24 July 2015, Kigali). In the same context, another respondent shares his experience, stating that, “*in the past, people would come even during the day and take your belongings and run away, no one would dare intervening. Is that security?*” (FGD 24 July 2015, Kigali).

A woman in Mwendo Cell, Kigali Sector provides another equally important definition of security, with a focus on gender based violence. According to her, “security is all about absence of violence against women within families. A country cannot achieve full security when women are beaten every night and their basic rights are violated. Women are further secure when they enjoy their free movement with no fear of being raped or physically abused” (FGD 21 July 2015, Kigali).

### *Technologies used to make the community secure and their effectiveness*

The effectiveness of “professional night patrol” entirely depends on technologies available for their activities as well as strategies made to ensure their efforts are fruitful. By technologies, we are referring to the means of intervention by which mentalities are to be implemented; in other words, the methods for influencing governance. This research therefore seeks to understand what technologies the communities under study have employed to secure themselves. In other words, we looked at the approaches they use to secure their neighbourhoods as clarified in the research project design (CHRIPS, 2014). In this sub-section, the study highlights various means used by professional night patrollers to fulfil their missions as well as strategies which are worth mentioning here.

The history and experience of “professional night patrol” have a great influence on means and strategies employed to make the community secure. It is worth mentioning that the process to professionalize ironondo started in Kinyinya Sector, in Gasabo District which was rewarded for its

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effectiveness<sup>21</sup>. It is to be noted that, surprisingly, it started with a relatively wealthier village of the sector, whose inhabitant were able to individually keep their households secure through private security companies. This initiative was emulated to benefit other villages as a best practice, including Batsinda, a crime torn and poor neighbourhood. It is not therefore surprising that most of technologies highlighted below are found in Kinyinya Sector. Findings in Kigali Sector will help in comparing a well-coordinated PNP and a start-up PNP, thus allowing drawing lessons and policy recommendations.

First of all, tackling the issue of identification of night patrollers was a top priority. All night patrollers should be dressed in uniform which would enable citizens to easily identify them. As indicated by a citizen in Gaculiro Cell, “these uniforms are so important in the first place. We used to confuse them with gangs because they did not have uniforms from the beginning. We therefore decided to buy uniforms for them for easy reference” (Interview 18 March 2016, Kigali). Another one added that “In the past, some of them would collaborate with the defaulters and would not be easily identified by citizens. These uniforms were therefore needed for this purpose” (Interview 18 March 2016, Kigali). The same applies to the night patrollers in Kigali Sector. As narrates one of them in Mwendo Cell: “we have been able to buy uniforms for our night patrollers and we are able to tell by far the person securing our neighbourhoods” (FGD 21 July 2015, Kigali).

Strategic communication is a key aspect to keep the neighbourhoods secure. In Kinyinya Sector, the research revealed that all night patrollers are equipped by a mobile phone which is connected to a Closer User Group (CUG) used by all security actors in the Sector, including the night patrollers, reserve force directly collaborating with night patrollers as well as police officers in the sector. In addition, every village is equipped with a walk talk commonly known as “Icyombo” or “Motorola”. Results of these communication strategies are tremendous. As explained by a night patroller of Batsinda suburb, “when a defaulter has just committed a crime in one village, they just announce it and the message is received by all the villages whose members do the necessary to track and arrest him/her” (FGD 15 August 2015, Kigali). In Kigali sector, they are only using mobile phones with CUG facilitation. However, there are sometimes network problems which constitute a major obstacle to their mission of alerting security organs at higher levels. In the journey to professionalise their “night patrollers”, the community in Kigali Sector looks forward at providing them with relevant communication tools such as walk talks. Using mobile phones and walk talks

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is a working strategy to share information among community-led security stakeholders and timely track and arrest defaulters when they try to escape.

In most of the cases, areas to be covered are relatively big by size. For the “professional night patrollers” to effectively keep security in their respective working areas, they require transport facilities. In Kinyinya Sector, citizens have been able to buy a night patrol car. However, as explained by the Executive Secretary of Kinyinya Sector, “we support them in the maintenance but it was their [citizens] initiative to buy a patrol car from the savings of their contribution after expenses” (Interview 30 October 2015, Kigali). This is a tremendous achievement which is mainly a result of the long history of the PNP in Kinyinya Sector.

Community in Batsinda, in collaboration with other villages in Kinyinya Sector has gone as far as providing their “Professional night patrollers” with security cameras (commonly known as CCTV) which ‘would be there’ when they are not on site. In the initial phase, the cameras were installed in Batsinda, a crime-torn suburb. This means is yielding results as narrates a small trader in that suburb, “We used to park our cars at our own risk and robbers would come and still our goods without any fear, because the Irondo would not stay at all shops in Batsinda. Our security people therefore suggested us to buy cameras. We organised a fundraising day and we collected money to buy them as suggested. We are happy that today there are fewer cases of robbery” (FGD 24 July 2015, Kigali).

As detailed above, Kigali Sector has not a long history in “professional night patrol”. Consequently, citizens have not been able to equip their night patrollers as much as those in Kinyinya to make them more professional. As narrates one citizen in Gaculiro: “we have been able to properly equip our night patrollers but we feel they need more equipments to make sure our neighbourhood is secure” (Interview 18 March 2016, Kigali). Limited materials in Kigali Sector makes citizens feel insecure given that the robbers would easily penetrate their neighbourhoods and loot their goods; leave alone other forms of crime and violence.

Important to note at this point is that the professional night patrol use some of military strategies such as the security mapping. The security mapping is done by citizens with the guidance of Reserve Forces who are also member of the community but with military background. The Sector Commander of Kinyiya Sector explains that “in this mapping, community members at

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village level identify crimes that happen often in their neighbourhood” (Interview 19 October 2015, Kigali). According to him, the next exercises would be then to ensure there is a closer follow up of the village with the ‘red’ mark so as to restore security and turn the mark to ‘yellow’ and progressively to ‘green’.

Researchers have also observed that there exists a permanent position for PNPs named “Irondo post” at village level. This is a place where night patrollers meet every day (morning and evening shifts) for briefing and reports. In addition, through these Irondo posts, citizens are also able to get any information related to patrollers including contacts of those who are on duty. It is worth mentioning that at least one member of PNPs is deployed at the post every day.

To conclude, it results from this section that the “Professional night patrol” has set up clear strategies and means are available to enable them better and effectively keep security. This study also found that although there is a good will to provide enough material means to the night patrols, community in poor neighbourhoods still lack that capacity due to limited contribution as this will be detailed in the next sub-section.

#### *Financial and human resources: key ingredients for the sustainability of Irondo*

“Professional Night Patrollers” would hardly be effective if they lack financial and human resources. Resources, as note Shearing and Foerstad (cited by CHRIPS, 2014), “come in many forms, quantities and combinations” and they often drive the node (or community mechanism’s) participation with other actors or nodes. Resources may be financial- in the form of budgets or even informational- it could be the information access that one has. This section therefore seeks to investigate and report on resources available to support the operations of PNP.

#### **Financial resources**

This section discusses financial resources, with focus on collection of funds as well as a accountability measures taken to ensure appropriate use and management of collected fund. To start with, it is understood that financial resources are solely provided by citizens. More understandably, citizens have not the same financial means nor did they rely on a similar source of income. This, therefore, implies that the contribution would differ from one citizen to another. With guidance from the Sector Advisory Council

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(Njyanama), as explains the Executive Secretary of Kigali Sector, contribution from citizens is determined based on the poverty category<sup>22</sup> of each and every citizen and their daily activities, and this works perfectly. He further explains how it works:

Economic conditions differ from one citizen to another. From Category 3, every adult citizen provides, on a monthly basis, FRW 1000 (equivalent to USD 1,25), those with small scale business activities provide FRW 2000 (equivalent to USD 2,5), and those with excessive business provide FRW 5000 (equivalent to USD 6,25). We also have those who provide more but when there is a specific fundraising activity (Interview 17 October 2015, Kigali).

The community is mobilised to allocate resources to be used to keep security. To facilitate the mobilization, the community selects, through votes at village level, one community member to help them mobilise and collect funds. As explains one participant in the FGDs in Nyabugogo (Kigali Sector), “we have elected a member of the community which is in charge of resource mobilization, including reminding members of the community to release their contribution” (FGD 23 July 2015, Kigali). However, the task to mobilise and recover resources is not easy in some instances. In Kagugu surbub, Kinyinya Sector, a member of the committee explained that “there has been a joint effort to sensitize them and get their trust but it was a difficult task, because some of them wanted to participate in night patrols and keep/save the money instead” (FGD 24 July 2015, Kigali). He added that it is currently easier because they have understood the importance of having professional night patrollers” (FGD 24 July 2015, Kigali).

However, some people’s mindsets remain unchanged. It was revealed that some citizens do not regularly pay their contribution even when they are wealthy. The local government has established some motivation practices to encourage everyone’s participation. As explained by the Executive Secretary of Kagugu Cell, Kinyinya Sector, “In collaboration with the population, we established a rewarding mechanism and in addition, the list of those who are able to contribute but refuse to honor their word is shared with the population” (FGD 15 October 2015, Kigali). In the same vain, a person in charge of the collection of contribution explains further: “we have a system whereby every year we show the ranking of contributors during a community meeting. The evaluation aims at rewarding the good contributors but also remind the public that those defaulters are failing the community”

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(FGD 24 July 2015, Kigali). According to her, there are three categories. Citizens in Green are known to be regular and honest contributors. The Yellow category consists of those citizens who irregularly contribute; thus failing to honor their promises by skipping some months. Lastly, those in Red are community members who have never contributed in the last 12 months, yet they are able to do so.

This research also found out that the performance of PNP heavily contributes to the amount of funds collected. The Coordinator of PNP in Kinyinya Sector has proudly narrated: “We started with difficulties: we hardly collected one million (approximately \$1,250) but today we easily collect three million (approximately \$3,750). This is due to the impact of Irondo, citizens are now enjoying the result of security. Consequently, they voluntarily provide their contribution without hesitation” (Interview 19 October 2015, Kigali).

Irregular sum of amount recovered is also another challenge that faces the PNP scheme. On this issue, the Sector Commander of Reserve Force in Kigali Sector who doubles as a Coordinator of PNPs simply put it as an issue related to citizens mobility in urban areas. He explains that “we live in a city where not only mobility is a reality, but also the socio-economic capacity of our households differs from one another. This is in fact the cause of this challenge” (Interview 13 October 2015, Kigali).

Accountability of collected funds is an essential factor that contributes to the trust of PNP and sustainability of the community-led security mechanism. To ensure that citizens’ money is not mismanaged, the following accountability mechanism has been established. The first step in the accountability journey starts with the collection of funds. The contribution is voluntary, as explains a citizen in Mwendo, Kigali Sector. He adds that “even when you do not have money by the time of collection, they do not push you because we know it is our obligation to contribute. The initiative emanated from us”. It is worth mentioning, at this level, that the contributor receives a receipt on which a stamp of the sector is applied as a guarantee that the money is safe from any financial abuse. In Kigali Sector, as argued by the Executive Secretary, “we (Sector administration) help them with stamping the receipt to avoid any counterfeiting of receipts to be provided to citizens/contributors” (Interview 17 October 2015, Kigali). Once the money is collected, the second step is to deposit the money at the account. In Kigali Sector, every Village has its own account in the Saving and Credit Co-operatives (SACCO)<sup>23</sup>. The practice differs in Kinyinya Sector, where all the

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Management is done at Sector level and the financial coordination is under the PNP Accountant. The collector is requested to deposit the money every day. A failure to do so is regarded by the security committee as an attempt of embezzlement and risk to be fired. The third step, observed in both sectors involves checking the receipts and bank slips. In Kigali Sector, the Sector accountant supports village collectors and is therefore in charge of checking whether the contribution matches with the amount remitted at the SACCO. In Kinyinya sector a similar activity is performed by the PNP Accountant at sector level.

The fourth and important step to retain PNPs is checking and approving lists of night patrollers. The money collected is initially used for patrollers' stipends. At the end of every month, a pay roll is prepared and checked at the sector level. After checking and approving the lists, it is sent to Umurenge SACCO with a request to transfer the stipends to night patrollers' accounts<sup>24</sup>. It is worth mentioning that, so long as stipends to PNPs are concerned, there is no minimum or maximum stipend for the night patrollers in Kigali Sector. In Kinyinya Sector, the stipend is regular and uniform. In this sector, they started with a pay of FRW 20,000 (approximately US\$25) and by the time of data collection PNPs were receiving FRW 50,000 (approximately US\$63). In Kigali Sector, PNPs receive less pay: FRW 20,000 (approximately US\$25). This confirms that, as also noted by other observers, in most of the sectors of the City of Kigali's districts, these "patrollers" are remunerated depending on the revenue of the citizens<sup>25</sup>. However, the amount given to night patrollers is not enough to cover their basic needs. For example, as narrated by one night patroller in Kigali Sector, sometimes you fall sick and hardly get money to go to hospital, yet in most of the cases the illness emanated from your work. On this specific challenge, leaders have encouraged the night patrollers to acquire health insurance (commonly known as *Mutuelle de Sante*<sup>26</sup>), which will facilitate them to receive treatment once sick.

Last but not least, the fifth step concerns reporting to citizens about the use of mobilized funds. Efforts to ensure accountability of the public funds entail reporting to the funds providers, village community in this case. In both sectors, it was observed that every month, during a community work commonly known as "*Umuganda*"<sup>27</sup>, the community receives a report of the money collected.

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### **Human Resources**

A second aspect of this sub-section points out the status of human resources mobilised for PNP in the visited neighbourhoods. As noticed in previous sections, the village community selects at least four to six patrollers who shall be in charge of keeping security of the neighbours. As argued by a citizen in Nyabugogo Cell, Kigali Sector, “night patrollers are selected by citizens through the general council<sup>28</sup> at village level” (Interview 11 March 2011, Kigali). As far as the number is concerned, there is a sense of belief that the village is too big to be secured by only 4 to 6 individuals. Arguing about this concern, a citizen in Mwendo cell, Kigali Sector narrated as follows: “Although we provide financial contribution to night patrollers, we are ready to wake up and intervene when we are required to” (Interview 10 March 2016, Kigali). This commitment provides a guarantee that once PNPs are attacked; members of the community can support as they wait for public security organs such as RDF or RNP to intervene.

It should also be mentioned that part of the PNPs are the members of the Reserve Force (RF) at village level, where applicable. As narrated by the Coordinator of the PNP in Kigali Sector, “We combine citizens elected to be part of PNPs and RF in the village for the mechanism to be effective” (Interview 17 October 2015, Kigali).

As far as the structure is concerned, the PNP bottom organ is established at the Village level while the highest level is at the Sector through the Cell. At village level, the PNPs are coordinated by a Village Commander, who is in most of the cases a member of the RF. The same applies to Cell level, whereby all the operations and activities within a respective cell are coordinated by Cell Commander, who, as observed at Village, is in most of the cases a member of RF. Lastly, at Sector level; the PNPs are supervised by a Coordinator who doubles as a Sector Commander of RF at that level of administration. The leadership of the PNP by members of RF are visibly noticed at all level as narrates a night patroller in Kigali Sector: “Village Commander at village level is a reserve force and leads the night patrollers, which include citizens elected by the populace and some of the reserve forces available in the village; the same applies to Cell and Sector levels” (FGD 1 August 2015, Kigali). This can have both positive and negative implications. Positively, the experience and discipline of former soldiers, commonly known as “Inkeragutabara”<sup>29</sup>, have contributed to the effectiveness of PNPs. On the other hands, errors committed by night patrollers, especially at the beginning of the mechanism, were attributed to them, thus acquiring a



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negative name of “Inkerakwiba”<sup>30</sup>. It was further observed that citizens have a common perception that those keeping their neighbourhood are “Inkeragutabara”, even though they are not former soldiers. As explained by the current Commissioner for Community Policing within RNP, ACP Celestin Twahirwa, the role of RF in Irondo operations is slowly being clarified following various training provided by the RNP. According to him, “Members of RF have been instrumental in the professionalization of PNP though some errors were made. However, we have trained PNPs and they are all treated the same way, be it RF or citizens” (Validation workshop 13 January 2017, Kigali). Efforts however, need to be continuously deployed to ensure a clear differentiation of the RF and the PNP especially at leadership level.

Talking about citizens’ participation in the coordination of PNP activities, findings have shown that at Sector level, there exists a “Security Advisory Committee-SAC” which foresees activities of the PNP as well as provides strategic orientation and advices to the community-led security mechanism. As narrated by the Executive Secretary of Kigali Sector, the SAC is composed by the PNP Coordinator, one representative of citizens, one representative of the leadership and one in charge of contribution.

“Professional Night Patrol” mechanism is hailed to have contributed to poverty reduction through employment creation. As argued by the former Executive Secretary of Kinyinya Sector, Mr. Mberabahizi Raymond, “Besides contributing greatly to security and safety in Kinyinya, these initiatives have also led to creation of jobs to area residents and the youth in particular.”<sup>31</sup> In fact, in Kinyinya only, at village level, there are 166 PNPs who were employed by the time of data collection. This implies that the scheme is also contributing to the country’s global employment agenda and to the welfare of PNPs and their families in particular.

To conclude this section, there exist clear mechanisms to ensure financial and human resources are availed. Most importantly, the fund mobilization and utilization follow clear guidelines with the aim to abide with financial management and accountability principles. However, the community, especially in poor urban settings, have not been able to raise enough funds to sustain their pay and provide necessary means for their night patrollers. This is mostly due to unclear harmonisation of fund mobilization systems which, in some of the cases, leave some households behind. Limited collection of contribution not only impedes the stipends for the PNPs, but also affects the

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acquisition of various technologies needed to secure urban poor neighbourhoods. Citizens requested coordination and establishment of clear strategies to ensure the participation of every citizen in their respective capacities.

#### *Relationship of Irondo and the State*

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda as revised in 2015, security organs are the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF), Rwanda National Police (RNP) and the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) (RoR: 2015). For the sake of this study, however, this report also discusses another public security mechanism: the Community Policing Committees (CPCs).

The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) is a combination of two former fighting forces, namely the liberation force known as the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) and Government forces known as Forces Armées Rwandaises-*Rwanda Armed Forces* (FAR). In 2002, the Law No 19/2002 of 17 May 2002 renamed the RPA as the Rwanda Defence Force<sup>32</sup>. According to Article 7 of this law, Rwanda Defence Forces' mission is firstly to safeguard the Country's sovereignty and to defend the integrity of its territory as well as to co-operate with other security institutions in keeping and restoring law and order and enforcing the law. This mission however looks more or less broad, essentially dealing with security issues at national and international levels. Findings have shown that the RDF play a crucial role as they help tracking defaulters identified by night patrols where necessary. As reiterated by a night patroller in Nyabugogo, Kigali Sector, "we have contacts of all security organs, including RDF officers deployed in our area. Once we identify a defaulter who is dangerous and beyond our capacity to track him, we immediately call them and rapidly intervene" (FGD 1 August 2015, Kigali). The reward for this collaboration is the confidence of RDF by both the local citizens and international residents in Rwanda. In its annual Citizen Report Card (CRC)<sup>33</sup>, the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB)<sup>34</sup> has recently reported that the RDF has the highest trust by citizens compared to other security organs, whereby 99.1% of the surveyed population has expressed this (RGB: 2015). Participation and cooperation with the RDF remain, according to the same report (RGB, 2015), core explanation of this trust. Internationally, the RDF's outstanding achievement of securing Rwanda and its borders is also very much appreciated. As noted by one of the diplomatic missions in Rwanda, Rwanda is no longer a by-word for 'genocide' and is now associated with a safe, secure and calm country where people want to do business, where

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young people can walk the streets late at night and where citizens are safe in the knowledge that their borders are secure<sup>35</sup>.

Worth to mention in this study as part of security organs established by the Rwanda Constitution of 2003 as revised in 2015 is the Rwanda National Police (RNP). Under the former Ministry of Internal Security<sup>36</sup>, the Rwanda National Police is established by the law no 09/2000 of 16 June 2000. Article 14 of this law stipulates that the RNP has the mandate (among others) of enforcing the law order, maintain and restore of public order; prevention, detection and investigation of crime; protection of life and property and assisting persons in danger or distress. The RNP shall exercise its authority on national territory as per the presidential order number 29/01 of 09 July 2012, determining Police Regions and districts of the Rwanda National Police. Under article 2, the law states that RNP is composed of 5 regions namely the Central region, Southern Region, Northern Region, Eastern Region and Western region; which as stipulated in article 3, is divided into police districts. It should be noted therefore that Regions and Police Districts boundaries shall be in accordance with the boundaries of provinces (and the City of Kigali) and districts as per administrative entities of the Republic of Rwanda<sup>37</sup> as clarified by article 4 of the 2000 law above mentioned. Since the establishment of the RNP, and following legal and policy development, this organ has increasingly invested in the capacity building process, both at institutional and human resource levels. As a result, the number of policemen has also increased over the years, whereby the police rate was estimated to 1/ 1074 inhabitant in 2010 (RGB, 2010) and increased to 1/1007 in 2014 (RGB, 2014). Despite professionalization and capacity building initiatives, however, material resources of the RNP are extremely limited, and police are unable to respond to an emergency call in a timely manner. These challenges are acknowledged by RNP leadership which is striving to improve its operations and reputation<sup>38</sup>. To supplement its “limited” capacities, RNP partners with other security organs to ensure security of people and their properties. These mechanisms include a mix of defence and police patrols in the city and neighbourhoods to prevent residential crime.

Importantly, this study disclosed a close collaboration between the RNP and PNP. The RNP contributes to the effectiveness of “*Irondo ry’umwuga*” as a strategy to supplement their activities and hopefully bridge the security gaps especially in poor neighbourhoods. This is done through equipping them with skills related to crime prevention, protection of neighbours as well as basic laws and rights. Trainings contribute also in strengthening the

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relationship between the police and the citizens through trained night patrollers. In this regards, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in charge of Operations, Deputy Commissioner General Dan Munyuza officiating a closing ceremony of a training of CPCs in 2014, says that, “this training is an indication of the good police-public partnership to further ensure security collectively”. He promised to “continue to build from what has been achieved together by tightening night patrols and share information in time to prevent crimes rather than fighting”.<sup>39</sup>

The study has revealed that, as also noted by Kartas and Jütersonke (2011), the police system has been reformed in a way that relies heavily on local participation. The core of the police reform consisted in placing the emphasis on the non-state (informal) policing capacities of the communities, a factor which explains its heavy involvement in operations of professional night patrollers.

The National Intelligence and Security Services is yet another security organ that is established by the Constitution of Rwanda voted in 2003 and revised in 2015. Article 161 of this constitution states that this organ is generally responsible for internal and external intelligence, as well as immigration and emigration matters, for the prevention of and protection against threats to national security<sup>40</sup>. It should be clear at this stage that, although the NISS is one of security organs established by the constitution, the study did not found any formal or informal relationship with the community-led security mechanism.

Another important legally established security organ worth mentioning here is the District administration security support organ (DASSO). The law N° 26/2013 of 10/05/2013 establishing DASSO and determining its responsibilities, organization and functioning, in art 3, stipulates that DASSO is in charge of supporting District authorities to enforce their decisions and instructions that were taken in connection with security, among other responsibilities. As this organ was just established during the inception phase of this research, findings did not establish its relations with PNP.

This study, lastly, identified the community policing as a parastatal mechanism which links the state (mainly RNP) on one hand, to the local communities and leaders on the other. Community-Based Policing is a guiding philosophy which strengthens the partnership between law enforcement and all the people in the communities<sup>41</sup>. In the Rwandan

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context, policing concept conforms to the ideal of a “multi agency approach” whereby the police, the public, elected officials at all levels; government and other agencies work in partnership to address crime and ensure community safety<sup>42</sup>. Activities related to community policing are implemented essentially at the level of the districts and its lower administrative entities, through the community policing and security committees as established by the Ministerial order No 02 of 18 October 2007 establishing the community policing committees (CPCs)<sup>43</sup>. This mechanism, as directed by the Internal Security Policy (RoR, 2008), should ensure night patrol are streamlined.

None can dissociate the link between local government and night patrol initiatives. The local government, from village to cell, sector and districts remain a channel for night patrollers to report crime occurred in their neighborhoods, as well as providing information for crime prevention. Community mobilization, being a key role of the decentralized entities, is a technique used by local leaders to encourage citizens to participate in security through financially or physically supporting night patrols. The former Mayor of Nyarugenge District, Solange Mukasonga, for example, has appealed to residents to play an active role in crime prevention and community development, during a meeting with Nyarugenge Sector residents, on 28 October, 2014<sup>44</sup>.

To conclude this section, it is important to note that the relationship between security organs and the community-led initiatives is largely observed in Rwanda, and in the City of Kigali in particular. This is attributed to two main factors. First of all, the country’s history plays a key role in this aspect, considering the perceived and active role of state security organs of former regimes in troubling citizens, in collaboration with militias and night patrollers, especially early before and during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. The Government therefore keeps a closer eye to alternative security mechanisms to ensure they use positive approaches to keep poor neighborhood secure. Secondly, the Government through public security provisions is a key resource provider to PNPs especially in terms of capacities and most importantly discipline. The Government helps in improving the capacity of night patrollers to ensure they do not abuse the power of keeping security of their neighbours vetted in them.

### **Conclusion**

Rwandan citizens’ mentality on security goes beyond the understanding of security in terms of individual and community security. National security

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was found to be, in a broader sense, dependent on security of persons and properties of citizens, especially in the selected neighbourhoods of Kigali. These perceptions are basically influenced by the tragic history of Rwanda in regards to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi and influences, therefore, the willing to establish an effective community-led security mechanism to keep their neighbourhoods secure.

The community in selected settings is organised to keep security within their neighbourhoods through an identified mechanisms known as “professional night patrol”. The findings unveiled that this community-led mechanism is getting momentum in the urban area compared to times when citizens were required to physically participate in night patrols. It was found that the nature of activities performed by urban citizens is the reason of this paradigm shift. The citizens in selected suburbs in the City of Kigali are currently financially contributing to their security and feel responsible to provide information to security organs with the aim to make the neighbourhood more secure. PNPs are selected from the population and benefits support from the Reserve Force, which, apart from being part of the mechanism, they provide command support to the community-led security mechanism.

Night patrollers must be well equipped in order to effectively keep security for their neighbours and respond to any security threat at their level. It was found that in a mixed urban setting<sup>45</sup> there are more tangible means and effective security technologies than in poor neighbourhood. The poverty level of the citizens heavily affects the contribution to be raised, and consequently dictates the technologies required to keep security.

Resource management was found to be an essential factor to encourage citizens to massively contributing to their security and ensure sustainability of these mechanisms. In all areas under research, funds raised for security matter have a clear management system from the collection to the end use. This could also be attributed to the collaboration between local leaders and the citizens whereby in most instances, the management and the security advisory committees at sector level keep a closer eye to ensure a proper management of both human and financial resources.

It was further revealed that, in Rwanda, public security organs have played an important role in nurturing these mechanisms, especially the Rwanda National Police. They play a key role in ensuring the night patrollers receive

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relevant training and behave appropriately. They have also contributed in the follow up of activities of night patrollers by requiring daily reports and making sure they respond to any challenge faced on the ground, especially when defaulters are tracked.

Generally, the PNP was found to be effective in keeping the neighbourhoods secure. Some bottlenecks need, however, to be addressed to ensure it meets its objectives and becomes sustainable for security is a continuous effort. First, this paper highlighted a prevailing confusion between the RF and PNP, whereby the community-led security mechanism is closely linked to the RF. The study has highlighted a negative perception; whereby faults committed during the patrols can be attributed to the RF which is a well-positioned organ of the RDF. Continued efforts are needed to dismantle this perception among the population. This cannot only benefit the confidence of the RDF but also the increase of ownership by citizens, who would, in turn, respond by massively supporting the PNP through voluntary financial contribution. Second, in line with financial contribution, local governments, especially in poor urban settings, are advised to utilise their structures to ensure harmonisation of citizens' efforts. It is understood that, though willing to contribute, citizens in poor neighbourhoods fail to raise enough funds to ensure the PNPs are provided with regular stipends and required technologies. Harmonized strategies and resources at, for example, sector level, would join efforts and contribute to the effectiveness of these mechanisms, regardless of the level of poverty and historical background of the urban settings within one administrative sector. Last but not least, subsequent studies were recommended to understand the nature and causes of crimes committed within poor-urban neighbourhoods. This would shape a ground for another research to understand the level of contribution of the community policing, after 10 years, in preventing crime in Rwanda, with a focus on poor-urban neighbourhoods.

### **Notes**

1. Press Conference hosted by the Minister of Internal Security, Mr. Sheikh Fazil Harerimana, on 16 October 2014.
2. DASSO is a newly (2014) established security organ in charge of supporting District authorities to enforce their decisions and instructions that were taken in connection with security, among other responsibilities. For details, please refer to the law N° 26/2013 of 10

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May 2013 establishing DASSO and determining its responsibilities, organization and functioning, available at [http://www.minaloc.gov.rw/fileadmin/documents/Minaloc\\_Documents/DASSO.pdf](http://www.minaloc.gov.rw/fileadmin/documents/Minaloc_Documents/DASSO.pdf) (Accessed: 19 May 2014).

3. Umugororoba w'ababyeyi (translated as evening parents' forum) is one of Rwanda's Home grown initiatives which seeks to promote open community discussions on outstanding issues that face the family at village level. Details can be found at <http://www.migeprof.gov.rw/index.php?id=201>
4. In sociology and statistical research, snowball is a non-probability sampling technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snowball\\_sampling](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snowball_sampling)). The researcher, in this specific study, selected respondents to his interviews who, based on their knowledge of the topic and experience, would recommend other respondents/ right individual to provide accurate information.
5. The two security frameworks are discussed in details in the section on relationship of Irondo and the State.
6. The Rwanda Governance Scorecard (RGS) is an annual publication of the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) that seeks to accurately gauge the state of governance in Rwanda. For details and publications, please visit <http://www.rgb.rw/index.php?id=46>
7. This was declared by ACP Morris Murigo, the Acting Commissioner for Criminal Investigation Department (CID) during a press conference on a status of security, on January 3, 2017. For details, please visit [http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=8645&cHash=3f697abc0bc0314b31903264752f8b62](http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=8645&cHash=3f697abc0bc0314b31903264752f8b62) (Accessed: 19 May 2014).
8. <http://www.netherlands.embassy.gov.rw/index.php?id=819> (Accessed: 19 May 2014).
9. <http://www.netherlands.embassy.gov.rw/index.php?id=819> (Accessed: 19 May 2014).
10. <http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/fr/document/chronologie-du-rwanda-1867-1994> (Accessed: 19 May 2014).
11. <http://www.everyculture.com/No-Sa/Rwanda.html> (Accessed: 19 May 2014).



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12. <http://www.kigalicity.gov.rw/spip.php?article115> (Accessed: 26 May 2014).
13. <http://www.kigalicity.gov.rw/spip.php?article106> (Accessed: 19 May 2014).
14. These two places are famous for their activities, which are more related to wholesale business and storehouse.
15. In his intervention during the Country Workshop, ACP Damas Gatara reported that this treat has gradually reduced following joint efforts of the government (through Police and Army) and citizens (through community-led mechanisms such as Irondo). Another initiative to dismantle Marines, as argued by the Commissioner during the same event, is to form cooperatives of former defaulters whose mission, among others, is to track down their former colleagues.
16. [http://www.mininter.gov.rw/index.php?id=17&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=184&cHash=f10039897099b913343f05b8e8b6f040](http://www.mininter.gov.rw/index.php?id=17&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=184&cHash=f10039897099b913343f05b8e8b6f040) (Accessed: 28 November 2016).
17. These are other common suburbs in Nyarugenge and Gasabo Districts of the City of Kigali.
18. [http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=1568&cHash=822eb7d7c18f1c2292b559d3d3c2503e](http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1568&cHash=822eb7d7c18f1c2292b559d3d3c2503e) (Accessed: 28 November 2016).
19. In 1993, following a pressure to adopt democratization opted for a multiparty system. In this context, Rwanda opened a door to other political parties other than Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement et la Democratie -MRND (the ruling party).
20. [http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=1432&cHash=2bd8ecdf8e8f6c8a9252da7b6a225f14](http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1432&cHash=2bd8ecdf8e8f6c8a9252da7b6a225f14) (Accessed: 28 November 2016).
21. [http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=2111&cHash=956c44d03a66f16666e1bb84a6769c1b](http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=2111&cHash=956c44d03a66f16666e1bb84a6769c1b) (Accessed: 16 February 2014).
22. In Rwanda there exist four (4) poverty categories. The first category includes households that very often struggle to get food, eat at least once a day. In the second category include those households that often get foo, eat at least twice a day. The 3<sup>rd</sup> category is composed of those households with varying levels of welfare, while the 4<sup>th</sup> is composed of households with high level of investment and assets acquisition. For more details please visit

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- [http://www.minaloc.gov.rw/index.php?id=469&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=461](http://www.minaloc.gov.rw/index.php?id=469&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=461) (Accessed: 19 May 2014).
23. Savings and Credit Co-operative (SACCO) is a type of co-operative whose objective is to pool savings for the members and in turn provide them with credit facilities. The scheme is popularly known as Umurenge (Sector-a second lower administrative level after the District) considering its availability in all the 416 sectors in the country. For details, please visit <http://www.rca.gov.rw/spip.php?article71> (Accessed: 19 May 2014).
  24. After the nomination by citizens in a village council, every night patroller is requested to open an account in SACCOs.
  25. <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/Rwanda/News/Collection-of-informal-fees-upsets-residents--/-/1433218/1906214/-/rpc9rs/-/index.html> (Accessed: 27 May 2014).
  26. “Mutuelle de Sante” is a French name which is equivalent to the “Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI)”. In Rwanda, CBHI is regarded as community financing mechanisms, solidarity and risk sharing which aims at providing ordinary citizens equitable access to quality health services. For details, please visit [http://www.moh.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/Docs/Mutual\\_police\\_document\\_final1.pdf](http://www.moh.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/Docs/Mutual_police_document_final1.pdf) (Accessed: 19 May 2014).
  27. Umuganda is a monthly community work in Rwanda originating from traditional practices of bringing efforts together to solve a community problem. After the work, the community gather to discuss and find solutions for the challenges it encounters. For more details, please visit <http://www.rgb.rw/index.php?id=37>
  28. The village general council is composed of every adult citizen residing in the Village, which is the smallest administrative entity in Rwanda.
  29. Inkeragutabara is simply translated as “Those who are ready to intervene”, a Kinyarwanda name given to the members of the RDF’s Reserve Force.
  30. Inkerakwiba can be translated as “Those who are ready to rob others’ property.”
  31. [http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=1568&cHash=822eb7d7c18f1c2292b559d3d3c2503e](http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1568&cHash=822eb7d7c18f1c2292b559d3d3c2503e), (Accessed: 16 February 2014).
  32. <http://mod.gov.rw/index.php?id=49#.VvyzsOJ97IU> (Accessed: 14 March 2016).

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33. The Citizen Report Card (CRC) is an annual publication of the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) which aims at measuring the citizens' satisfaction on service delivery at local level. For more clarifications and report, please visit [www.rgb.rw](http://www.rgb.rw) (Accessed: 19 May 2014).
34. Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) is a state organization mandated, among other responsibilities, to conduct research on the status of governance in both public and private institutions. For more details, please visit [www.rgb.rw](http://www.rgb.rw).
35. <http://www.netherlands.embassy.gov.rw/index.php?id=819> (Accessed: 14 March 2016).
36. The Ministry of Internal Security was scrapped following the Cabinet meeting of September 4th, 2016. Its responsibilities, including the management of the RNP, were transferred to the Ministry of Justice. For details, please visit [http://www.minijust.gov.rw/media/news/news-details/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=579&cHash=e049756064af85a4118d0ff447d191e4](http://www.minijust.gov.rw/media/news/news-details/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=579&cHash=e049756064af85a4118d0ff447d191e4) (Accessed: 19 May 2014).
37. The reader is advised to refer to Section 4.1 on Governance and Administrative structures of the Republic of Rwanda.
38. <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=14038> (Accessed: 20 May 2014).
39. [http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=1222&cHash=2f208a2b79d89028dad2f7ca2480060](http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1222&cHash=2f208a2b79d89028dad2f7ca2480060), (Accessed: 28 November 2016).
40. Article 161 of the Rwandan Constitution of 2003 revised in 2015.
41. [http://www.popcenter.org/library/unpublished/OrganizationalPlans/42 Definition of Community Based Policing.pdf](http://www.popcenter.org/library/unpublished/OrganizationalPlans/42%20Definition%20of%20Community%20Based%20Policing.pdf) (Accessed: 20 May 2014).
42. <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15289&v=265&t=COMMUNITY%20POLICING:%20Keeping%20ahead%20of%20crime%20through%20pro-active%20innovation%20Getting%20communities%20in%20the%20loop> (Accessed: 20 May 2014).
43. Cited in the Police Magazine, Issue N° 005, p21.
44. [http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=2839&cHash=a08496a5ec49a2069e59c4bd1388629b](http://www.police.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=2839&cHash=a08496a5ec49a2069e59c4bd1388629b) (Accessed: 25 March 2016).
45. By mixed urban setting we refer to villages/ cells/ sectors where we find poor neighborhoods mixed with modern houses whose

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occupants are considered as rich though located in poor neighborhoods.

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