

domestic capital: that is, the profits derived from their reinvestment should not be repatriated at any future date;

- (c) an acceptance that foreign-owned enterprises should only invest in ventures where they will stimulate growth in wider areas of an increasingly integrated national economy, i.e., they should invest largely in industries that will expand the internal market, but where export-oriented industries are set up they should also have some substantial backward linkages.

Certainly given the political and financial strength of the giant oligopolies represented at the conference and the weak bargaining position of the periphery's representatives, it is unlikely that the latter would have been able to negotiate these minimum conditions. Yet from what has been said above, if private investment cannot even meet these requirements it is perhaps better not to have it at all.

TANZANIA—SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION AND PARTY DEVELOPMENT

H. BIENEN, *Tanzania—Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton University Press, 1967).

LIONEL CLIFFE*

Anyone who sets out to write a book analyzing the contemporary working of some African political system, embarks on a risky venture. The chances of being out-dated by events are especially great if the author is concerned with some political institution. If the writer is fortunate he might be able finally to publish his opus as the "background" to the declaration, revolution, coup or whatever upheaval has occurred since he first set pen to paper. Often, however, the pace of change makes the data about the working of a party or government institution of historical interest only and even the questions posed may be literally "academic". Henry Bienen's book—published at the end of 1967 on the basis of field work then some three years old—is obviously prone to these risks. Although there has been a continuity in the regime in Tanzania, there have been significant changes in both party and government organs since the author left East Africa.

For instance, although Bienen reports the results of the 1965 Parliamentary Elections under the contested single party system, he was unable to assess their impact on the overall political system, especially the changed relations between party, parliament and government. In 1965 it was "too early to evaluate the . . . functioning of (T.A.N.U.) cells" (p. 359).¹ Yet these new units based on groups of ten houses (not ten members as he indicates) have, to varying extents in different parts of the country, given TANU a more effective grass roots presence. At present the cell leaders form the membership of the Village Development Committees, a change in the lowest unit of local authority which has occurred since Bienen wrote—and within a few months further changes will most likely take place at this level. Moving up a further stage, the contested electoral system was applied to local government elections in 1966, resulting in a considerable influx of new blood.

Lionel Cliffe is Director of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam.

¹All references with page number in brackets refer to H. Bienen, *Tanzania Party Transformation and Economic Development* unless otherwise stated.

A certain amount of restructuring of TANU organs has occurred in the last three years. The district has always been the key organizational unit of the party, with "branches" operating at a sub-district level. Now separate urban TANU districts have been created in those towns with Town Councils. The rural district organizations that have been set up in the administrative districts concerned tend to diminish the local dominance of "town-based, 'Swahili' elements" (p. 355). The boundaries of branches have been redrawn to correspond to local government wards and have thus tended to proliferate. Such alterations in the local units of TANU together with more rigorously applied and hotly contested internal elections have helped to alter the pattern where "TANU elected organizations in the regions and districts constitute political oligarchies that have a good measure of success in perpetuating themselves" (p. 110).

The most significant new point of departure in the post-independence period in Tanzania has undoubtedly been the Arusha Declaration and the new policies, institutions and ideas which have followed in its wake. Naturally, the mere announcement of a commitment to socialism and self-reliance has not transformed Tanzania into a classless society nor made it any the less underdeveloped economically; neither has TANU suddenly become a strong, centralized party capable of unerringly directing government agencies and the people towards a socialist goal. Indeed, it is precisely because of the underlying economic and social realities—a very low level of available resources, a tiny modernized sector, and a mass of disparate peasant households—that, according to Bienen, TANU can only be a limited force for change. This thesis raises the question which will be a main theme of this article, as to whether the new goals for Tanzania society that have been proclaimed and the strategies for development that are being worked out are likely to be realized.

While there has been little time to alter the nature of society, or the basic political structures, there have been significant changes already in the political atmosphere. First, there has been a realization on the part of the leadership that Tanzania was moving along a familiar post-colonial path; that the benefits of Africanization and what development has occurred have been enjoyed by a small privileged group consisting of the political leaders themselves, senior civil servants, the tiny group of businessmen and traders and the executives of large companies, as well as some of the skilled and semi-skilled workers employed by the larger companies.² Nationally, there has as a result been a rapid process of class formation, while a similar process not yet subjected to precise measurement, has gone on in the rural areas, with the concentration of land, skills, new techniques and non-farming opportunities in a limited number of hands. The upshot of this realization has been a desire to reverse the trends and to work out plans for development that do not involve the formation of highly differentiated classes. The

²See for details Tanzania Government Paper No. 4, 1967, *Wages, Income, Rural Development, Investment and Price Policy* (Dar es Salaam, 1967).

Arusha Declaration and the policy statements that have followed it,³ as we shall see, are only the first tentative stages in the definition of such a development strategy, yet the new ideals are already changing the outlook of party leaders and of students and to a more limited extent are modifying government programmes. Many Tanzanians now have a self-image where they see themselves in the revolutionary vanguard in Africa. At the same time, new tensions have been set up as those with a monopoly of governing skills and administrative and economic power—the civil servants, high party officials—are feeling the pinch of many of the new policies.

The main elements in this socialist pattern of development are now emerging. First, it is intended to limit the further expansion of the indigenous capitalist and *rentier* classes and to eliminate all such groups completely from access to political power. This implies, secondly, that Tanzania should progress from a pre-capitalist society directly to a socialist structure. Thirdly, it is clear that such a socialist society will be made up in very large part of co-operative farming communities. Fourth, the small industrial and commercial sectors, and the necessary infrastructure of public works, social services and bureaucracy should serve the interests of these socialist villagers. To do this, they will have to be subject to popular control and manned by a cadre of officials who will be responsive to the aspirations of the rural masses and have limited opportunity for personal power or gain.

Specific programmes have been spelt out in four main policy areas. The most immediate priority was the manning and running of the public enterprises that were taken over after the Arusha Declaration. Yet the challenge is to do more than merely keep these public concerns ticking over as before. If they are to contribute to an overall strategy of socialist development, new policies will have to be worked out for the financial, trading and manufacturing sectors. The second area in which policy has been defined consists of the new leadership conditions precluding TANU officers and civil servants from having private business or property interests or from employing labour. Salaries of the higher strata of officials have also been cut. Yet only if the spirit as well as the letter of these restrictions are followed will the bureaucratic and political elites cease to develop as a privileged class. Depending too on the rigour with which these conditions are applied and on the degree of ideological purity on which the party insists, TANU could take on a very different character from that of the loose federation of forces Bienen describes. A third set of programmes is concerned with the more positive task of socializing leaders and the population at large to the kinds of roles expected of them. There are three main strands making up these programmes: political education for party officials and activists; efforts to put over socialist values and the willingness to sacrifice among the future elites in the upper reaches of the educational pyramid; the radical reorientation of primary education so that it is relevant to the life of rural

³See, for instance, the pamphlets by President Nyerere, *Education for Self-Reliance*, and *Socialism and Rural Development* (Dar es Salaam, 1967).

communities which most of those in school face. A fourth programme has been announced which will involve a gradual and voluntary transformation of rural life from scattered family *shambas* towards co-operative forms of living and working. This programme is only just getting off the ground.

Certainly these immediate programmes constitute a very ambitious undertaking; the achievement of the long term goals represents a formidable task of a much greater order. Indeed, some socialist as well as many non-socialist thinkers have doubted the possibility of any country moving from a pre-capitalist predominately rural society directly to a socialist, but still largely rural society without the formation of marked social differentiations in the process. Few countries have attempted this and not even China started from Tanzania's low resource base. In particular, a high degree of sacrifice will be demanded from the Tanzanian political and administrative elites, perhaps more than they would be willing to offer—especially given their very close associations with elites in neighbouring countries, who are hardly exhibiting much self-denial. At the same time, it would be dangerous if the bureaucratic, educated stratum were completely alienated from the regime, as happened in Ghana, and anyway their skills are needed. The maintenance of control and legitimacy by the present leadership, so essential to the success of the socialist experiment, will also imply a rate of growth and a sufficiently wide distribution of benefits that most areas and most groups in the society see some immediate improvement in their general lot.

These broader questions aside, the key question for the success of efforts to build socialism is: what agency or agencies can or will be used as instruments to effect this bold transformation of society? Specifically who is to see that the many public enterprises are not only run efficiently but follow socialist employment, pricing and investment policies? Can the reform of the educational system be left entirely to the administrators and teachers who ran, and were themselves products of, the former, colonial education system? Can one expect those party and government leaders who had been acquiring interests to apply the new conditions of leadership to themselves; and who will instruct them in a proper understanding of socialist principles? And the toughest task of all—what agency will persuade, encourage and guide the rural population so that they revolutionize their modes of production and their way of living?

It is in the light of these questions that Henry Bienen's approach to the analysis of TANU and its role in development is still relevant today. Indeed, it is now even more crucial to examine how "the party interacts with the economy it undertakes to transform" (p. vii), precisely because TANU now seeks not merely to achieve economic growth but to alter radically the structure of Tanzania society. In addition, the specific tasks listed above—guiding the state sector, providing committed leadership, reorienting the educational system and revolutionizing rural life—all imply a major role for the party. This being so, it is appropriate to assess the capabilities of

the party, to ask as Bienen does "What is TANU and How Does It Work?" (p. 3), and to examine the accuracy of his analysis.

In fact, he paints a gloomy picture. He concludes that, despite the myth of a strong party, "it is the relative weakness of structures, even within the modern sector, which is striking, not their relative strengths" (p. 14). In particular, "TANU is unable to manage political affairs at the local level; that central TANU organs cannot exact the desired responses from regional and district party bodies; and that there is a great deal of deflection from orders and plans made at the centre" (p. 4). Perhaps more depressing to the hopes for socialist transformation in Tanzania is his explanation that this party weakness is in a sense inevitable. There is a particular vicious circle of underdevelopment which goes: limited resources—weak organizations—limited capabilities to transform the economy—limited resources. Thus TANU, he concludes, "does not provide an institution which can transform the economy and make itself more effective in the process; it is too weak and too loose and has too few material and human resources to tackle development problems" (p. 407).

Local Party Organization

The roots of TANU's organizational character have to be sought in the historical process of the party's growth. Bienen's early historical chapters in fact contain more errors⁴ than the later sections, but his conclusion that the achievement of political independence did not call for "a tightly organized, disciplined party" (p. 70) is certainly correct. Indeed, much of TANU's growth in the countryside was spontaneous and much of the impetus for the movement came from the local units rather than the centre. However, Bienen's picture of TANU absorbing "tribesmen in their tribal union and (being) itself drawn into the countryside as an instrument for voicing rural discontent" (p. 48) is somewhat oversimplified. The loose nature of the TANU organization derives in part from the fact that it was an outgrowth of the local political forces that emerged and not an external agency that was "drawn into the countryside". Few TANU district organizations had to be prompted into existence by the centre and it wasn't until four years after its birth that any party officials were posted into the regions from the centre. This spontaneous local growth also threw up very different local political patterns. The TANU district organs did not simply take over the mantle of "tribal organizations", which had earlier mobilized and organized the local "tribesmen". The existing political issues and the alignments of local political forces around them reflected the vast differences in the levels

⁴For instance, it was *Martin* Kayamba not Joseph who was the prominent figure of the early movements (p. 22); H. O. Kallaghe was the local TANU chairman who was prosecuted in Korogwe and not M. F. K. Chogga, who was in fact the TANU District Secretary in Iringa (p. 30); Mkwawa did not "lead the Hehe in the Maji Maji Rebellion of 1905" (p. 36) but in a separate revolt in 1895; it is not the case that "by the time the Sukuma Union became active, TANU had been formed" (p. 34)—its peak of activity was about 1952/53.

of economic and educational development which different districts had achieved. The local TANU bodies in turn reflect these different local political configurations and relate to them in various ways, and thus have taken on different characteristics in terms of their leadership, the issues on which they feed, and their basis for support.

Dr. J. Iliffe⁵ has suggested three types of local, pre-TANU political situations in Tanzania:

- i) conflict between competing groups of modernizers, each seeking to control and to reap the benefits of development;
- ii) conservative, traditional authorities being challenged by educated, ambitious elements.
- iii) the "politics of underdevelopment" where a general discontent is shared by the more or less undifferentiated population of a neglected area.

In each of these types of situation TANU's role might vary. Thus in Kilimanjaro, it was more or less identified with a later, highly educated radical group; while in Bukoba, another area which produced rival "modernizers" at an early stage, TANU was to a degree identified with neither group but with an underprivileged Moslem minority which had been left out in the mission-based educational advance. In Sukumaland and Lushoto, TANU was also to build on the resentment against agricultural enforcement to pose a challenge to conservative indigenous rulers. Yet in Ufipa in the south west, TANU leadership was on the contrary identified with the ruling dynasty and challenged by a group of educated, younger Catholics. In areas where little development had taken place, TANU reflected the aspirations of local people in the face of this neglect, while areas like Masailand had so little contact with the outside world that the party was able to establish very little presence there. In several districts, for instance in Sukumaland, the party was closely allied with the co-operatives and reflected the aspirations of cash crop farmers, while in others the co-operatives were more of a colonial-imposed institution. Even where there was such an alliance, the co-operative and political leadership was in some instances concentrated in the hands of a few better-off farmers; in areas where the production for cash was more evenly spread these institutions were probably more representative. Thus the party was indeed "a congerie of regional, district and sub-district organizations which communicate with each other and with Dar es Salaam only intermittently" (p. 413).

This pattern of growth—partly spontaneous at the local level, around different kinds of local issues, with leaders and support bases drawn from different social groups—also makes any attempts at central penetration into the district more complex. The differing local political systems, together with extreme variations in the ecological and ethnic environments, call for a great deal of flexibility in central plans. Yet the limited capabilities of central government personnel both in Dar es Salaam and at the local level often lead to plans being spelt out and applied too literally. Or, a particular

⁵J. Iliffe, "The Age of Improvement and Differentiation" in I. Kimambo and A. Temu (eds.): *A History of Tanzania* (Nairobi, 1969).

danger in the post-declaration period, local leaders left to apply generalized central directives, may well have interests which lead them to distort them very greatly.

The very characteristics which limit the extent of central direction meant, as Iliffe has observed of the earlier Tanganyika African Association (T.A.A.) in this respect, that "it did have . . . virtues which were corollaries of its vices".⁶ In particular, it enabled "branches to take the character best suited to the areas in which they worked". Given the very uneven development of different areas, the heterogeneity of the local party units was inevitable and only a very light central control would make it possible for the national movement to embrace them all. Thus the lack of central direction stems not only from lack of resources but in part from TANU's very success in building a united front against colonialism. It is this party success in welding a broad-based national movement that is often stressed by both propagandists and analysts. Bienen does well to remind us that this stress on the process of amalgamation should not delude us into labelling TANU too glibly as a "monolithic", "mobilising" or "centralising" party, or the system as a "revolutionary, mass-movement regime".

This focus on the very low level of resources stresses TANU's weakness in relation to the tasks of totally mobilizing the nation's resources in order to transform the society—a task which has now been given greater emphasis. Yet it is perhaps more useful to go on to ask how successful TANU has been *within the limits of its resources* in mobilizing the country, and thus highlight the potential which exists for moulding political structures in Tanzania into more effective instruments for socialist development. Unlike most neighbouring countries, there always was a central focus to which local political organizations related even before the days of TANU. This central focus together with TANU's broad early spread enabled central party organs to post some full-time officials out into the regions and districts some years before independence. Localism in politics, the absence of a *lingua franca*, as well as insufficient funds, put even this step beyond any other party in East and Central Africa. Thus some central political presence was established in all districts before Uhuru and there were no areas—like, say, Ashanti in Ghana—where local political leaders antagonistic to the party wielded influence. In addition, a network of representative party committees and conferences from the district up to the regional and national levels have provided reasonably effective channels for upward communication and participation.

This degree of integration had at least provided some of the pre-conditions for some central directives to be passed down through the party. The central presence was strengthened after Uhuru when politically-appointed Area and Regional Commissioners replaced the colonial District and Provincial Com-

⁶J. Iliffe, "The Role of the African Association in the Formation and Realisation of Territorial Consciousness in Tanzania", *University of East Africa Social Science Conference Paper*, 1968.

missioners and became also the secretaries of the equivalent party organization. Yet this strengthening of party personnel at the regional and district level did not immediately lead to a marked increase in local party activity—largely because with the achievement of independence there did not seem the same point in people supporting TANU. There was also a counter process as many of TANU's most able full-time officials were drawn off into government positions. Nor did the linking of government and party in this way give the administrative and technical departments of government a particular policy inflection or provide much more centralization. Commissioners were responsible for co-ordinating the activities of central government ministries in their areas and had some supervisory responsibility for local authorities. But the degree to which commissioners could provide a common focus for policy was limited by departments in the field having prior responsibility to their ministry's Dar es Salaam headquarters and by their lack of any but the minimum of technical or planning advice in their own offices. Below the district level there was no direct chain of command down from the commissioners other than through the party; the sub-district administration which had replaced chiefs was part of the local authority, while technical field personnel were part of another administrative hierarchy.

Initially the Regional and Area Commissioners were recruited almost exclusively from the ranks of TANU activists. An increasing trend in the last few years to appoint people with administrative experience has improved capabilities and led to "a greater understanding of the economies of development and the laws within which (they) work" (p. 153). But a civil servant appointee may be less likely to "master his local TANU organization"—his only executive instrument . . . "and to understand TANU values and goals" (p. 153). Also in the present situation, whether a commissioner had a "political" or "civil service" background is no guarantee that he shares, understands, or can give local expression to the new, socialist values.

Ideology

The confederal character of the party has also encouraged, and in turn been a product of, a political style which puts great emphasis on the maintenance of a widely-based consensus. National unity was the watchword during the anti-colonial struggle, but the strategy of preventing cleavages based on regional imbalances, budding class interests, or individual competition among the elite, could only succeed while there was no attempt to spell out how the benefits of Uhuru would be distributed. TANU was "a national movement which is open to all . . . which is identified with the whole nation . . . (and from which there is no) excluded section of society".⁷ It is only in the last year or so that the central leadership has begun to move away from this idea of a national consensus, by specifying that peasants'

and workers' interests should be rated higher. On the one hand, the historical character of the party nationally, which gave some voice in the leadership to elements other than the national *bourgeoisie* (contrary to the trends elsewhere in Africa) and the party's success in avoiding regional antagonisms have made the definition of new goals easier. Contested elections for parliamentary and party office in 1965 also helped to ensure that the national representatives had to take peasant interests more into account. Yet, the old TANU style of trying to maintain a broad consensus still persists, even though certain class interests have in theory been denied a voice in its affairs. The tactics TANU seems to be following in converting itself into a party of "peasants and workers" have not involved a purge, but, through the application of leadership conditions and political education, the party is seeking to convert the former leadership, many of whom were acquiring property and business interests, into "peasants and workers"—and socialists! The expectation was that as "good Tanzanians", TANU leaders would not carp about being asked to make sacrifices, nor indeed have they done so publicly.

The past policy of maintaining a national consensus posed another difficulty in building up central direction. As the party encompassed all interests, "political commitment to TANU (was) essentially unspecific and undefined" (p. 244), except in terms of a general commitment to the nation. TANU was unable to command a response to central direction, because there were no central directives. Other than commitment to "nation building", to "hard work", and to unspecified economic growth and some other oft-repeated slogans, TANU had no coherent programme for the development of Tanzania. The party had not, nor while still an amorphous national movement incorporating all interests could not, answer the question of "*what is to be done?*". There were few statements of priorities. At the centre all foreign aid was accepted whatever the terms, all new enterprises whatever they produced and whoever owned them were welcomed. Although post primary education was given priority, the colonial content was not questioned. The question of growing regional imbalances was left by default. Not only was the party not involved in the formation of the first Five Year Plan, and scarcely mentioned in it (pp. 294-95), but the plan's basic objectives—to double *per capita* income, to raise life expectancy, and become self-sufficient in manpower—were merely quantitative targets involving no choice about the strategy for development or the nature of the future society.

At the local level, no clearly laid down formulations or priorities were available for the guidance of regional and area commissioners and other local leaders. Apart from the abolition of freehold (which applied only to a small part of the alienated land) there was no policy about land and its distribution and tenure. Self-help was encouraged, but no priorities as to the kinds of projects were given. People were urged to cultivate more, but again without thought as to which crops or to alternative modes of production. Tractor-cultivated block farms were started in some areas but

⁷J. K. Nyerere, *Democracy and the Party System* (Dar es Salaam, 1963).

there were no guide-lines as to which people should get plots on the blocks. Co-operatives were encouraged for the sake of Africanization or for their own sake rather than for the sake of a better deal for the farmer. "Villagization" was a popular slogan at one time, but apart from the abortive pilot settlement programme (which was run by the expatriate-controlled Village Settlement Agency and which in practice had nothing to do with villagization or any other TANU ideal) and some voluntary settlements that never had enough resources to make a go of it, little was done to implement this goal. We have suggested there are special features about Tanzania's regions which give added weight to arguments for local flexibility, but in fact the local commissioners were given almost no guidance as to what should constitute local priorities. In fact, there were no clear notions as to what TANU as an institution should be doing. Local party secretaries were being told they should concentrate more on organizing people rather than merely exhorting from the platform: there were even courses mounted at Kivukoni College and elsewhere to improve TANU's organizing capabilities; but what was lacking was a clear notion of the programmes of activities for which people were to be organized.

Bienen concentrates more on TANU's lack of capability to direct, rather than its failure to offer directives. But in so far as he deals with this latter problem he puts it down to the weakness of central organs, and to the fact that many party and other leadership groups do not accept Nyerere's ideology. This ideology, Bienen suggests, is summed up in the President's writings on *Ujamaa* (African Socialism). Opposed to his position is a group "not . . . clearly defined . . . (or) openly opposed to Nyerere", who speak of "scientific socialism" and not African Socialism; who analyse society in "Marxist-Leninist-Maoist" terms; who opt for greater economic nationalism — an emphasis on industrialization, on public enterprise, import substitution and Africanization" (p. 224); and who want to see a tight, disciplined, elitist — (in a word) a *Leninist* — party.

Several challenges can be made to this distorted picture — many of them with the advantages of hindsight! First, we can admit there are in the TANU national and middle-level leadership many who are not motivated by the same basic humanitarian values as Nyerere. This was perhaps visible as open policy conflict only in the early disputes over Africanization and citizenship. For the rest, Bienen accurately pictured the situation as one where "those who put forward different ideas simply by-pass Nyerere's own formulations; they do not confront them head on" (p. 207). But it is in part the nature of these formulations that they *can be* by-passed, for they are seldom couched in terms of specific action programmes. "Ujamaa" was a statement of the ethical principles which in Nyerere's mind underlay socialism; "Democracy and the Party System" had more to say about the weaknesses of the two party system than it illuminated the form democracy should take in a single party system. The ideology enunciated from the centre, inspiring as are the values it expressed, has not been specific in

terms of actions; it could mean all things to all men. Henry Bienen, or I, or Nyerere himself might feel that some specific action or statement by some leader did not reflect a concern for these same values, but this was not readily apparent.

This situation has now changed. The Arusha Declaration has been a significant first step in working out an ideological framework of programmes on the basis of the ideas of Ujamaa. It is not enough for leaders now to call themselves socialists, they must concretely exhibit their commitment through conforming to a self-denying ordinance. It has been made clear not only that the commanding heights of the economy are to be in public hands, but to which sections this refers. New purposes and directions have been set for the educational system. There is a less ambiguous policy with regard to foreign investment. Nationally and locally, the regime has called attention to, and set itself against, the entrenchment of highly differentiated classes. The outlines of incomes and tax policies are deducible from this. In the rural areas a halt has been called to grandiose, bureaucratically controlled settlement schemes in favour of the voluntary and gradual formation of "ujamaa villages".

One consequence of the development of an "official" ideology with some concrete content, is that it is now possible to sort out the sheep from the goats far more rigorously than was the case when leaders at various levels could make up their own orthodoxy so long as they related it to a handful of slogans. It should also make it less likely that observers should read the ideological positions of different leaders on the basis of their vocabulary, which I feel Bienen has done. For instance, it is now scarcely true to say that some in the TANU hierarchy "demand more vigor, dynamism, and drama than Nyerere's formulations provide" (p. 204)! Even more interesting is the position today of some of the people Bienen uses to typify the "Mao-Leninist" tendency. Oscar Kambona's criticisms of developments in Tanzania since his political demise smack more of liberalism and self-interest than "left deviation". But even assessing his earlier record as "more outspoken and anti-Western (than Nyerere) . . . in foreign affairs" (p. 210), Bienen seems to have been taken in, like many Western observers, by Kambona's more strident rhetoric. Not only does his more militant nationalist and Africanist stand not necessarily imply a genuine socialist commitment, but in terms of actions as opposed to words, Nyerere has probably been a more militant neutralist as Foreign Minister than was Kambona. A. S. Mtaki is another whose crude, Marxist-sounding pronouncements Bienen quotes, yet Mr. Mtaki was an executive of one of the remaining bastions of international capitalism in Tanzania and was the only M.P. not to declare his acceptance of the Arusha Declaration's conditions of leadership.

These examples underline the conclusion that in Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, it is very misleading to categorize political leaders by reference to the language and tone they use. Indeed one of the unique features of

Nyerere's style is that in a continent where typically politicians talk tough and act mild, he justifies decisive action in moderate tones. It is also becoming increasingly misleading in the changing international alignments of the late 1960's to categorize nations or their leaders in terms of cold-war labels. Thus those party leaders who want to maintain a more closed party without contested elections were probably motivated by political self-preservation more than a desire to build a "Leninist" party.

There were on the other hand, as many middle-level leaders who saw a more open system as giving them an opportunity to fulfil their aspirations for higher office. To suggest further that the new electoral one party system reflects these antidemocratic views "rather than Nyerere's" (p. 246) is to see a dichotomy which did not exist in reality. Certainly the report of the Presidential Commission on the single party state and the 1965 elections when all but 17 incumbents lost, do not support the notion that the proponents of a closed party had their way. A final and significant example of the misuse of labels is Bienen's categorization of some Zanzibaris and the other handful of advocates of the development of heavy industry, who also talk of tractor stations and collectivization of agriculture, as "Maoist". In so far as these labels are relevant at all, it is becoming increasingly evident that these people, in their notions about economic priorities, are "Stalinist", and it is Nyerere, with his emphasis on rural development, who in terms of internal social and economic policy (though not in international affairs) comes closer to the "Maoist" position.

Even with the present clearer goal definition, there is still room for misunderstanding and misapplication. My favourite example is the district council which decided the most important step they could take to implement the policy of socialism and self-reliance was to become more self-reliant financially by cutting down on the practice of refunding school fees to the very poorest inhabitants! Further, there are still important areas where general principles but so far no concrete programmes of action have been laid down. Nationalized concerns are carrying on a large part of the nation's industrial and commercial affairs, but little has so far been done to outline what policies these socialist enterprises should undertake with regard to investment, prices, profits or employment. There has been little attempt to face up to the problems of regional inequalities in wealth and educational opportunity. And perhaps the most significant omission limiting the effectiveness of the party at large is that while the goal of ujamaa villages has been set, the questions of how and by whom this task should be performed has been left open. President Nyerere's view is that "the initiative for movements in the direction of ujamaa villages can be taken by anyone . . . it does not have to be a *TANU leader or Government official*".⁸ Specifically the task is not left to state authorities, which have been notoriously unsuccessful in organizing such settlements. Thus the lack of explicit-

⁸J. K. Nyerere, *After the Arusha Declaration*. Presidential Address to the National Conference of TANU, Mwanza, 16 October, 1967.

ness in policy is here due to the lack of suitable instruments to work out and carry out the details of implementation. In this and other instances, the gaps in policy articulation are also in part due to the intractable nature of the problem and the lack of positive experience on which to base an answer.

Central Decision Making

We have thus argued that the fact that TANU has not put an authentic party stamp on what is happening in the regions and districts, either through its own mechanisms or through its control of government organs, has been as much due to the absence of a defined party in many areas of policy, as to the weakness of central-local party links. The fact that the party has now adopted an ideological cutting edge is leading already to clearer policy definition, although understandably the central leadership has not yet come up with answers to every problem. However, to see what residual problems are still likely to occur in translating these ideological statements into action-programme implementation, we must now turn to look more closely at the processes of central decision making and of execution in Tanzania.

It is Bienen's conclusion that the principle of TANU supremacy is a myth. The National Executive Committee, rather than the large and representative National Conference or the small Central Committee or National Headquarters, is the important decision-making TANU central organ — "in so far as TANU organs make policy" (p. 175). But, "TANU and Government policy rarely *originates* in the N.E.C." (my emphasis), and economic issues are "monopolised (by) . . . central government machinery . . . largely through its expertise" (p. 183). This is probably understating the importance of the N.E.C. a little. Some decisions, even on economic affairs (e.g., the creation of mechanized block farms) do seem to have originated there — although not always with very productive results. Its status and, hopefully, its ability to consider technical matters have also been increased since 1965 for it now has the power to call witnesses and evidence, while the members are paid the same salary as M.P.s. It certainly is the body which must discuss and approve major changes in policy — the Arusha Declaration is a declaration of the N.E.C. — and it has often critically questioned policies of government ministries. Most recently it has sought to extend a greater degree of influence over the nation's two most important interest groups — the Co-operative Union (C.U.T.) and the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (N.U.T.A.) — by refusing to accept their latest annual reports. The *wazee* who form the representative element on the N.E.C. — one delegate and the chairman from each region — are certainly figures with some prestige in their own areas, but their role lies more in explaining central policies rather than in shaping them. A recent seminar for them at the University College which discussed the strategy behind the next development plan and other key development problems was seen as an opportunity for them "to study and understand these matters so they could explain them to the

people" (as one of them put it), rather than for them to participate in defining priorities. The N.E.C. with these shrewd, respected *wazee*, provides an invaluable forum for discussion between central TANU/Government leaders and more articulate non-official elements representative of at least some of the population. However, given its composition it is hardly likely to constitute a body which is capable of working out detailed policy programmes, nor do its members provide a channel along which precise, central instructions can flow to the local party units. But Bienen correctly points out that the central decision-making organs of TANU, however constituted, are unlikely to be able to do either of these tasks effectively without a strong, central party bureaucracy.

The small size and impermanence of TANU's Headquarters staff continues (but is still not as marked as in neighbouring countries), although there have been some recent improvements. A few graduates, and others with administrative experience have been recruited into the central office, some on secondment from government. The head permanent official—Oscar Kambona's post of Secretary-General having been abolished—is a former civil servant of principal secretary rank. Yet the very much greater administrative efficiency tends to have been accompanied by a somewhat apolitical atmosphere in headquarters. Shortage of funds is still a limiting factor, but the annual TANU budget now runs at Shs. 9 million⁹ instead of the Shs. 1½ million for 1962–63 reported by Bienen. He also suggests that there was some opposition "in certain TANU quarters . . . to building a strong central staff" (p. 195). Certainly a strong, centrally-controlled party bureaucracy has not developed in several African countries as it has been seen as a potential weapon to be used in leadership struggles. In Tanzania, until Kambona's virtual withdrawal from active TANU affairs in 1966, there was something of a tendency for TANU administrative posts to be allocated on a patronage basis.

Perhaps the most crucial constraint on the development of a strong secretariat is the manpower shortage. It is quite beyond Tanzania's present means to build up a separate party technical and bureaucratic hierarchy parallel to that of government to undertake the detailed studies needed to give precise shape to policy programmes and to check that they are applied in accordance with the party line. However, the party does need to build up some independent expertise in the applied aspects of such fields as agriculture, marketing, administration, investment and employment and foreign affairs. Without this, N.E.C. discussions will remain at a fairly general level. TANU officials will continue to be "blinded by science" on the occasions when they are drawn into planning and other official discussions. At the moment, there is a tendency for ideological principles and economic and technical considerations to coexist in separate compartments in the decision-making process. For instance, despite the declaration of the new policy of creating ujamaa villages, there seems to have been only a token mention of this in the early discussions that took place on the coming

⁹The Nationalist, 13 June, 1968.

Five Year Plan. When such matters are raised in general discussion a frequent reaction of civil servants is that the building of socialist villages is "politics" and has nothing to do with agriculture or rural development.

The civil service is not, however, generally antagonistic to the party and the leadership, as was reputedly the case in Ghana, but tends to be apolitical, perhaps a little upset by the personal implications of the new self-reliant incomes and leadership policies. A feeling of defensive insecurity, common in new bureaucracies, often leads to a policy of "no mistakes", which might be safe and less costly in conservative regimes, but is certainly not suited to Tanzania's new revolutionary ideas. In this situation some political stimulus is needed, not just in the negative sense of checking on the ideological correctness of particular programmes, but in helping to formulate new and creative programmes which can give effect to the new ideals. The political education programmes, which include civil servants within their scope, can help to change the style of the bureaucracy, but the party itself must be able to play a more informed role. This might be done through having party commissions and advisory groups, in addition to building up a gradually more experienced staff.

Even a brief survey of the central decision-making machinery in Tanzania cannot end with this brief glance at the TANU N.E.C., its Secretariat, and the civil service. The key decision-making institution is in fact the President of the United Republic and of TANU, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. His political style and the nature of the ideals he has set the country contribute in many ways to the way the party goes about its work. The unique position he has always held in the party and among the people has been further enhanced by the new goals and the honesty and concern for the common man that he has shown in being the first to cut his own salary and to declare his interests. Not only do local officials make appeals in his name, but there has been a tendency for him to point out the self-interest that party and other leaders have fallen prey to and thus speak over their heads to the people directly. Thus there is a tendency for the necessary enthusiasm for mobilization to be generated without the organization and direction to sustain it. In this situation the politicians have a limited view of their role as "announcing and exhorting"¹⁰, while the civil servant will not stick his neck out to frame new policies without much more specific instruction. Bienen also remarks that Nyerere is "suspicious of creeds and dogmas . . . of detailed blueprints for the new society", and thus "has not very successfully married his ideas and symbols to programmes for action" (p. 212). However, this can scarcely be regarded as a failing on his part, as it is hardly fair to expect one man to do the ideological ground-breaking, manage the day-to-day political affairs of the nation, and undertake the exacting task of working out action programmes. At the present time, constructive policy suggestions are lacking partly because others are content

¹⁰John Nellis, "A Note on the Policy-Program Dichotomy", *Rural Africana*, No. 4, Winter 1968.

to leave most of the thinking to one man. Thus we can conclude in this section that the absence of ideas for implementation is only in part due to limited manpower; the emerging traditions of the bureaucracy, and, perhaps, an educational system which puts no premium on initiative and inventiveness also contribute to this situation.

Conclusions

The President puts his stamp on the character and role of TANU not merely because of his own position but by virtue of the very ideas he proclaims. Bienen's main thesis — offered sometimes it seems with a sigh of relief — is that Tanzania has not yet reached a level of economic development which could sustain a "Leninist party". It has been my purpose to suggest that factors other than the actual shortage of personnel and other resources, and factors more susceptible to purposeful change—the lack of clear ideological direction, the relative absence of concrete action programmes — also accounted in the past for TANU's limited ability to affect rapid, radical change in Tanzania's society. Some changes are now in train following the Arusha Declaration. But looking ahead, there must remain doubts as to whether the kind of socialist development Julius Nyerere envisages in Tanzania calls for a "Leninist" party.

My doubts on this score stem not merely from Nyerere's liberal notions, his concern for the freedom of the individual in society¹¹, and his apparent distaste of such terms as "cadre and party militants" (p. 232). His desire to see that TANU and other institutions do provide a vehicle for popular participation, through which demands, criticisms and suggestions can be channelled is genuine, and also is not easily reconciled with the development of TANU as an instrument for ensuring the implementation of central directives. But even beyond these concerns, he sees the main agent for the transformation of society as the people themselves and not the state apparatus. It is precisely because of this that Bienen's analysis of Tanzania, in terms of a Soviet model, with his concern for exploring the conditions for a Leninist party, has its limitations. Admittedly, this approach is of interest and has more relevance to single party African states than models based on Western political parties. The Soviet Union has followed a path to modernization — whether one calls it state socialism or state capitalism — in which the state plays the crucial role. Productive units are initiated and controlled by the state, and in the rural areas, agricultural production is collectivized into a factory system and the people themselves into towns, so that the same processes of state control can be applied. The party in this situation becomes the instrument through which the leadership controls the state machine and makes it serve these ends. In origins and style, the C.P.S.U. is an essentially *urban* party.

¹¹See the Introduction in J. K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity* (Oxford, 1966).

The kind of socialism that is emerging in Tanzania, in its emphasis on a rural, village basis, in the trust placed on the people, in the formulation that the people should initiate and control their own socialist communities and in the belief that this transformation can come about without the creation of status hierarchies or marked income or other differences, has more to learn from Chinese rather than Soviet experience. Here I would like to take issue with Bienen, and with Goran Hyden writing in *Transition* 34, and argue that in the above respects Nyerere and not the Babus of the continent come closest to Chairman Mao. One of the key sixteen points of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution says:

"In the great cultural revolution the only method is for the masses to liberate themselves, and any method of doing things on their behalf must not be used. Trust the masses, rely on them and respect their initiative."¹²

The significance of this aspect of the Cultural Revolution was realized by Mwalimu when he decided to visit China to see its impact, and when he said there:

"Since my previous visit to China in 1965 there have been many important developments both in China and in Tanzania . . . All of the major changes Tanzania has introduced have been intended to secure or at least to further the supremacy of the people. As I understand it, that was also the purpose of the Cultural Revolution."¹³

In China, reliance on the people rather than a state bureaucracy does not of course, mean there is no need for a disciplined and strong party machine, able to command ample resources of its own. But the significant feature of the Chinese Communist Party is not so much its strong central organs but the local cadres, for

"by training a new type of leader, the cadre, Chinese communists were finally able to achieve what no state power in Chinese history has been able to do; to create an organization loyal to the state which was also solidly embedded in the natural village."

In Tanzania the state controls most of the non-agricultural, urban sector and the party must evolve mechanisms to see that this public sector follows a socialist path, despite the elitist orientation of the administrators and managers. But in Nyerere's phrase the most urgent task is "to reach the village". The superstructure for this, with a party/government machinery reaching down to the cell, in part exists; the task of animating this machine and directing it towards socialist goals is vastly more difficult. But the answer must lie in producing cadres¹⁵ — or cell leaders, or whatever one might call them — who are not merely disciplined to follow the dictates of a strong party centre, but who remain part of the "village" and are responsive to its needs and values.

¹²Decision of Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, "Let the Masses Educate Themselves in the Movement".

¹³*Daily Nation*, Nairobi, 20 June, 1968.

¹⁴F. Schurman, *Ideology and Organisation in Communist China* (Berkeley, 1966).

¹⁵TANU has in fact recently created a new "Ujamaa Section" in the party headquarters, whose task will be to train rural party cadres.