

failure of the majority of States even to withdraw diplomatic representatives from Britain over the Rhodesia case exposed the weakness of the O.A.U. and the bankruptcy of its moral prescriptions. The freedom-fighters who were encouraged by the 1963 position to organise liberation forces are bound to feel disheartened by the complacency that permeates the 1969 Manifesto.

The silver-lining in this cloud is that the committed States have not slackened or reduced their financial and material support for the liberation movements in the first year of the life of the Manifesto. The uncommitted have remained uncommitted. Therefore, the Manifesto has become an instrument for pan-African diplomacy outside the continuing work of liberation.

The Manifesto has revealed as never before the moderate nature of African Governments today. Many of them are products of peaceful change by negotiations with their former masters, although that change was one of personnel rather than of social systems. Naturally, they would like to apply the same procedure to a region that has totally different circumstances and conditions of oppression. Many African Governments fear the consequences of violence and revolution in any part of Africa on their own domestic societies. The O.A.U. Charter confirms the *status quo* and conforms to the traditional concepts of sovereignty and independence. The nine States that withdrew diplomatic representatives from Britain over Rhodesia, the eight that have continually supported the Liberation Committee since 1963 and especially Zambia and Tanzania that have borne the main burden of the work of liberation, are notable exceptions. The majority are *status quo* states that would happily and willingly embrace a neo-colonial situation in Southern Africa that would change the personnel running the Governments but not the system of exploiting the masses of the people.

NATIONAL IDENTITY IN AFRICAN STATES

CARL G. ROSBERG.*

A central concern of leaders in new states is to establish and maintain a modicum of national identity. For they realize that if their states are to prosper, if national goals are to be pursued, there must exist a minimal degree of national cohesion and identity among their politically relevant members. Moreover, few leaders can feel secure that the unity already forged will endure. For as modernization cuts deeper into society and as men compete in new patterns of interaction, loyalties and sentiments are engendered at both the national and sub-national levels and it is by no means certain which will be the focus of terminal loyalties.¹ Speaking on the eighth anniversary of Tanzania's independence, President Nyerere said, "Our country is one of those in Africa which are highly praised for their unity"². Still he went on to warn that the level of unity and identity already achieved could be threatened by divisive forces of tribalism and racialism.

The quest for national identity—the creation of a sense of territorial nationality transcending parochial loyalties of race, ethnicity, religion, language and region—is not solely a commanding developmental problem for new states. More than one hundred years of Canadian self-rule produced not a sense of transcendent national identity, but the strengthening of the sub-national sentiments of two communities distinguished by language and tradition. While the future of the Canadian state remains uncertain, Flemish and Walloon separatism and nationalism also place the Belgian state in jeopardy. Even under communist regimes possessing well disciplined parties, sub-national sentiments persist and influence political action and organization as the Czechoslovakian case demonstrates.

*Carl G. Rosberg, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, wishes to acknowledge the valuable suggestions that have been made by Professor James S. Coleman and Mr. Robert Jackson.

¹For an excellent treatment of the issues of national identity in Africa, Asia and South America see Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden and Crawford Young, *Issues of Political Development*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967. pp. 15–83; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States", in Geertz, *Old Societies and New States*. New York: Free Press, 1963. pp. 105–157 and Rupert Emerson, "Nation-Building in Africa", in Karl K. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, *Nation-Building*. New York: Atherton Press, 1963, pp. 95–116.

²From a speech delivered by President Julius Nyerere on December 9, 1968. *The Standard (Tanzania)*, December 10, 1968.

I

Some Dimensions of the Identity Problem. While problems of national identity are most certainly not confined to developing countries, they tend, with few exceptions, to be more acute. Three generic factors, by no means solely inherent in the African environment, help to account for the tensions and conflicts in the developing national communities of new African states.

In the first place, colonial regimes did not consciously pursue policies of nation-building in the political units they carved out of Africa. The main thrust of policy was the ruling and administering of culturally and socially discrete groups; not the formation of new nations. In many instances colonial boundaries divided people and took little account of cultural clusters. Policies were not directed towards creating a national language and culture and the symbols of authority employed were almost always those of the imperial power. While social change brought forth new and wider identities both at the local and territorial level,³ African participation in territorial-wide institutions remained limited until the terminal stages of colonial rule; hence parochial loyalties and sentiments continued to be more salient than national ones. Where indirect rule, regional distinctiveness and separation long prevailed—as in Nigeria, Uganda and the Sudan—sub-national identities were created causing critical problems of unity for their post-independence rulers.

Secondly, the politics of the period of terminal colonial rule exacerbated and heightened ethnic identity in many countries.⁴ In Kenya and Ghana, opposition parties appealing to ethnic sentiments bitterly opposed the majority party demand for a unitary political system. Both feared majority domination and sought the protection of minority interests in federalism. Unlike Ghana, the opposition party shared power in Kenya and could more successfully pursue its goal of limited government at the centre and maximum protection and participation of regional and ethnic interests. If nationalism in Kenya and Ghana could be challenged by ethnic assertions and fears as each country approached independence, in Uganda nationalism scarcely existed as a force for unity. Ugandan politics were basically parochial and the political system was dominated at the centre by the modern yet secessionist-minded Kingdom of Buganda, the largest ethnic group, comprising sixteen per cent of the populace. Resisting each move toward majority rule, it demanded and obtained a federal relationship with the centre as its price for joining with other units in an independent Uganda. Less powerful kingdoms had to be satisfied with more limited autonomy.⁵

Another fissiparous effect of terminal colonial rule was brought on by the introduction of national elections and the rapid extension of the franchise

³See Anderson, von der Mehden and Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–39 and I. Wallerstei "Ethnicity on National Integration in West Africa", *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, (October 1960), pp. 129–139.

⁴Emerson, *op. cit.*, pp. 99–100.

⁵See Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin, "Uganda", in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 337–339, 411–418.

to greater numbers of peoples which permitted some leaders and parties to gain support by appealing to ethnic sentiments and interests and in some cases to make claims to as how power and resources were to be distributed in the new states. As Geertz has argued concerning both Africa and Asia, "the very formation of a sovereign civil state . . . stimulates sentiments of parochialism, communalism, racialism and so on, because it introduces into society a valuable new prize over which to fight and a frightening new force with which to contend."⁶ The politics of state formation in the Congo is perhaps the most dramatic African example of this.⁷

Finally, while egalitarianism is a pervasive ideology in African politics, the pattern of development in most countries has been and continues to be uneven with resulting disparities in income, resources and amenities between regions and ethnic groups. Some have benefited far more than others from educational and economic development and have better opportunities for further development. Moreover, groups in some areas are simply better endowed in terms of developmental potential, that is, they have better soil, a better climate and a more convenient location to communication and transport, among other things. These inequalities in the level of development promote ethnic tensions and feelings of relative deprivation as men and groups compete in a situation of scarcity for jobs, educational and welfare facilities, government funds for development, and other desired values. The struggle for equality is therefore often cast in ethnic or regional terms and acts to reinforce cultural discontinuities and identities. While African governments do play a critical role in the allocation of scarce resources and may mitigate inequalities in the application of policies, beliefs by ethnic groups that some are more advantaged than others generate an almost inevitable ethnic rivalry and distrust that hinder the growth of a national outlook. All of these factors—colonial policies, pre-independence politics, the struggle for ethnic equality—have together acted to complicate the problem of creating and maintaining national identity in many new African states.

Still, this picture does not apply equally to all African political systems and some do enjoy advantages which promote rather than impede the creation of national identity. In some cases these were inherited from the pre-independence period. Although Somalia has had to integrate peoples who were exposed to different regimes, the relative cultural homogeneity of the Somali people provides a ready disposition in achieving nationhood. Morocco, Swaziland and Lesotho are historic kingdoms with a sense of national identity. The Basotho nation of Lesotho, for example, was forged out of disparate groups under the leadership of Moshoeshoe in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, and during the colonial period "constant fear of being swallowed up by South Africa reinforced a reflexive and defensive national identity."⁸

⁶Geertz, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁷See Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965.

⁸Richard F. Weisfelder, "Defining Political Purpose in Lesotho", prepared for delivery at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Los Angeles, October 16–19, 1968, p. 17.

For Mali, a cultural core associated with a tradition of state building provides the basis for a cultural and national identity.⁹ Although in most African countries channels of communication are vertical, several states possess languages which cut across ethnic and regional barriers. In Lesotho, Malagasy, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi nearly all of the population speak a common national language, while in Tanzania and the Central African Republic Swahili and Sango respectively serve to foster national identity.¹⁰

While African nationalists during the colonial period had an image of a new national community, only rarely could nationalism generate a territorial-wide organisation incorporating and containing the existing pluralism. Unlike the Indian National Congress, which had existed for sixty-two years before India became independent. African political organizations seeking mass support date only from World War II. The national struggle for independence was too short in many cases to build an integrative force embracing the important parts of the country. Nevertheless, this was achieved to a significant extent in mainland Tanzania, Tunisia, Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Senegal. As mainland Tanzania approached independence it is worth remembering that there had been continuity in the development of a territorial political organization for thirty-two years.¹¹ Also of great importance in this case were the ethnic groups—some 120 or more—which were essentially non-competing. Most were small and even the largest did not possess the cohesion, economic resources, and numerical strength to act as sub-national collectivities in the national political system. While the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) identified itself with a wide and varied range of local issues and grievances, the colonial government's pursuit of the concept of a multi-racial community based on "communal equality" rather than "individual equality" was inevitably perceived by the majority African community as a deliberate effort to structure "communal inequality", and therefore furnished a national issue which the party could employ in mobilizing widespread support. Moreover, the fact that national elections did not take place before TANU had established its commanding position in the country helped to contain the development of ethnic-oriented politics, for all significant forms of political recruitment were channelled into the party. TANU, incorporating all major sectors of society, provided a political structure in which a "sense of community" could grow after independence.¹²

⁹Aristide R. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration in Tropical Africa", prepared for delivery at the September, 1967 meetings of the International Political Science Association, Brussels, Belgium.

¹⁰For analysis of language and national identity see Danwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1967, pp. 47-55, 285-286; Pierre Alexandre, "Some Linguistic Problems of Nation-Building in Negro Africa", in Joshua A. Fishman, Charles A. Ferguson and Jyotirindra Das Gupta, editors, *Language Problems of Developing Nations*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968, pp. 122-123, and other articles in this volume.

¹¹This point is made by Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 424-425.

¹²For a recent political study see Henry Bienen, *Tanzania Party Transformation and Economic Development*. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1967; in addition see Lionel Cliffe, "Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika During the Colonial Period", paper presented at the EAISR Conference, December, 1964, and published in (*Taamuli*) Vol. No. 1, July 1970.

In the post-colonial period, the almost universal inclination of African statesmen to accept and seek to stabilize the inherited boundaries of the colonial framework has greatly strengthened or furthered efforts to create national identities co-terminal with the political units thus defined. The international legal order of Independent Africa, as embodied in the Treaty of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), accepted the boundaries of the inherited political order, thereby making secession illegitimate. While the OAU cannot enforce the maintenance of the *status quo*, the adherence of members to its rules has genuine political relevance. Katanga's attempt at secession was widely denounced by many African leaders who later formed the OAU. Neither has the OAU been willing to support Somali irredentism in the horn of Africa, nor the southern Sudanese secession movement from northern Arab hegemony in the Sudan. Indeed, for a member of the OAU to recognize secession the burden of proof as to the legitimacy of the action rests with this member. Thus, in being the first state to recognize Biafra, Tanzania held that there were times when there could not be unquestioned support for the doctrine of territorial integrity and that the need for unity and equality may sometimes be served in creating smaller political units. Tanzania proclaimed that:

States are made to serve people; governments are established to protect the citizens of a State against external enemies and internal wrong-doers. It is on these grounds that people surrender their rights and power of self-defence to the Government of the State in which they live. But when the machinery of the State, and the powers of the Government are turned against a whole group of the society on the grounds of racial, tribal, or religious prejudice, then the victims have the right to take back the powers they have surrendered, and to defend themselves . . . When the State ceases to stand for the honour, the protection, and the well-being of all its citizens, then it is no longer the instrument of those it has rejected. In such a case the people have the right to create another instrument for their protection—in other words, to create another state.¹³

Few governments would project these principles into national policy and only four African states officially recognized Biafra.¹⁴ On the whole the international legal system is conservative and biased toward preserving established state boundaries. When a sovereign state is threatened by secession, the national interests of most states are seldom served by giving support and recognition to the secessionists and this places the survival of the new political unit in doubt. The established order favours existing sovereign states no matter how just the secessionist cause.

However, if the international state system serves to impede the emergence and discourage the attainment of secession in Africa, this does not mean that the potentiality, or even the desire, for secession is non-existent. Indeed, the absence of any overt manifestation of secession may simply reflect an acceptance of or an accommodation to the existing political framework because no alter-

¹³United Republic of Tanzania: News Service, Mission to the United Nations, "Case for Recognition of Biafra: Statement by Government of the United Republic of Tanzania", April 13, 1968, p. 5.

¹⁴In addition to Tanzania, there were Zambia, Gabon and the Ivory Coast.

native is perceived as possible. It may well be that a cultural group has no better alternative than to seek accommodation in the existing political unit. There may be no contiguous state willing to accept the group. Where secession or irredentism is not possible, there may be passiveness and withdrawal, yet no positive support for the national political community. Political quiescence and national identity are clearly not necessarily synonymous.

II

National Identity and Political Rule. As a central problem of political development in many new African states, the development of a sense of national identity is an abiding concern of political leaders. Astute and skilful leadership, especially of a single national leader accepted by a majority of key groups and factions and recognized as superior to other leaders, can play a vital role in managing the problem of national identity.¹⁵ In Africa such leaders have been a source of political stability and continuity during an interim period when national political institutions are being created or strengthened. The skill and determination of national leadership in Uganda and the Congo (Kinshasa) are largely responsible for a radical restructuring of their inherited political systems in the direction of greater national unity. So important have national leaders been in managing conflict and containing inter-elite competition that succession to "Founding Fathers" in new states looms as the major imponderable in preserving the sense of national unity already achieved.

African states with a single paramount leader tend to be one-party or one-party dominant political systems. In the initial years of independence, leadership in most cases had to relate its methods and procedures of institution building to the inherited structures imposed by the colonial power. Despite hortatory ideology and declamatory statements concerning the mission of the party in nation-building, the fundamental concern of leadership for maintaining a minimal level of unity pre-disposed them to rely upon the available government institutions as well as party structures in building a viable framework of national institutions.¹⁶ In a few one-party systems, such as Guinea and Mali, the political party initially played a decisive role in providing a minimum institutional framework for nation building.¹⁷ Occasionally, as in Tanzania, the building and expansion of formal government institutions led to a fusion of the structures of party and state, while in other cases a fairly sharp distinction was drawn as in Kenya. In the latter instance, the incorporation of leaders from the salient cultural groups of society into the party hierarchy and formal

¹⁵Ali A. Mazrui, "English Language and Political Consciousness", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 4, 3 (1966), p. 306, puts forth the hypothesis "that a capacity to be joint followers of the same leadership is evidence of some degree of integration, as well as a contributory factor towards the consolidation of that integration."

¹⁶This is an important point in Aristide R. Zolberg's *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa*. Rand McNally and Company, 1966, p. 122. While Zolberg makes this statement with reference to Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Ghana and the Ivory Coast, it holds for many other one-party dominant or one-party states.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 101.

governmental institutions provided a means of linking such groups to the centre while alleviating fears that one or more groups might dominate the majority of the population.

National leadership in most one-party or one-party dominant states has found it necessary to operate pragmatically within the framework of the pluralistic situation they confront, with politics characterized by bargaining both within the hierarchy and between the centre and the periphery.¹⁸ Yet because of the prestige and authority of the paramount leader, bargaining coalition politics never completely dominate the scene.

"Pragmatic-pluralistic"¹⁹ politics operate within dominant parties which are properly viewed not as command organizations but rather as networks of leaders linking cultural groups and regions to the centre. In Africa such parties have not been organizations of disciplined and ideologically committed cadres and the demands made for attitude and behavioural changes by the populace have been limited and mild. Such party organization may be quite weak, yet still able to generate sufficient support when it is required. As loose coalitions or collectivities of diverse interests, their primary goal is usually to achieve a balance of interests among the basic political groups in society. This balance and its corollary—support for the national leaders and institutions—are most often achieved by satisfying the welfare and development claims of salient cultural groups. Political conflict based on direct public appeals to ethnic or regional sentiments is kept in check by the ethos of national unity and progress which leaders seek to inculcate. Leaders who choose to make public claims in ethnic terms are thereby vulnerable to charges of disloyalty and tribalism. Few sectional leaders are willing to suffer such a reproach. In the last analysis, the dominant party claims to represent and speak for the national whole through an ideology of consensus and national purpose.

Kenya, where ethnicity has been a salient political factor, vividly illustrates nation building in a situation of "pragmatic-pluralistic" politics. At the apex of the political system is the national leader, President Jomo Kenyatta, whose position is unassailable. A powerful instrument of his rule is the provincial administration whose senior officers are directly responsible to him. It is the administrative officer, with responsibilities for economic progress and public order, that is the link between the President and the population, not the party leader.²⁰ Though usually remaining well above the bargaining process of politics, the President may intervene in disputes or be called upon to arbitrate as, for example, in conflicts between the cabinet and members of Parliament

¹⁸For a discussion of bargaining see William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962.

¹⁹James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., editors, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964, pp. 5-6, used this term in distinguishing one of "two general tendencies in uniparty or one-party dominant states".

²⁰Cherry Gertzel, "The Provincial Administration in Kenya", *Journal of Commonwealth Studies*, 4 (1966), pp. 201-202.

or between ministers themselves.²¹ Yet intervention in such disputes will only occur occasionally. It is a last resort and must usually be acceptable to the disputants themselves, since the President cannot risk the loss of authority that frequent unilateral intervention could bring.

The country, however, cannot be governed in a purely hierarchical manner. The limits of the authority of the President and his officialdom, together with the presence of powerful countervailing political forces, result in a political process strongly characterized by bargaining relationships. Kenya comprises four ethnic groups with more than a million people each—Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba and Luhya—and ten other groups each with a population of more than one hundred thousand persons. Not only are these groups large in numerical terms; they also possess a strong sense of individual identity fostered during the colonial period. The processes of modernization during the colonial period produced a very uneven pattern of development with sharp inequalities in income distribution and educational advancement among ethnic groups.²² In the same period politics and policies of separate development made ethnicity even more prominent. As a new pattern of nationalism unfolded during the Emergency, its aftermath in terms of colonial policies further impeded national integration by allowing political organizations to be built only at the district level. Thus, during this critical period nationalism was organizationally fragmented and power tended to attach to those leaders who built organizations and secured followings in their own areas. Emerging political structures, by being restricted to the district level, enhanced the divisive forces of ethnicity in Kenya.

Only after the British Government had belatedly been made aware that Kenya must become an African state were national political parties permitted to function. But now the question of how power should be distributed became the key issue of politics. The two parties which were formed in 1960 to contest the first national election—the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU)—tended largely as coalitions of ethnic leaders to contest the election and seek support through an appeal to local interests in different areas. By this time regional-coalition politics were firmly established in Kenya and even in 1964 after independence when KADU leaders dissolved their party to join KANU the remaining pattern of politics rested firmly on bargaining principles. Political unity had at last been established, but it rested upon a coalition of key ethnic groups and could be endangered if any of these chose to withdraw their support.

The bases of political power in Kenya are essentially rural, centred on large ethnic groups or regional aggregates of such groups. To maintain control and co-ordination from the centre and integrate this plural society, the leadership engages in a complicated system of bargaining which occurs at various levels. But it is a fluid rather than a structured process, as factions and alliances have

²¹Cherry Gertzel, "Parliament in Independent Kenya", *Parliamentary Affairs*, (November, 1966), pp. 499–503.

²²Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya", forthcoming in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*.

a way of shifting over time leaving few leaders with any feeling that their position will remain secure. At the ethnic, district and regional levels factions almost continuously attack each other for local support and many national leaders are forced to return to their locality to fight off the challenges made by opposing groups. The more powerful and fortunate leaders are those who command support which transcends their electoral constituency.

While bargaining politics is critical in managing parochial loyalties and sentiments, leadership does recognize the need for a national perspective in governing. Since the national organs of KANU are seldom employed, Parliament has become a critical arena where diverse interests are represented and heard. This process takes place both in sessions of the National Assembly and in Party caucus meetings.²³ Indeed it may be argued that this legislative institution, which has been for so long the fulcrum of bargaining politics in Kenya, plays a key role in managing conflict, thereby fostering political integration and national cohesion. This is especially important in that the dominant party lacks both the hierarchical authority and the organizational coherence to perform these functions.

Under these conditions Kenya relies heavily upon the more autonomous forces of economic growth, urbanization, education and Africanization to induct individuals into modern roles and the new national political community. Reasonably rapid economic growth and development is crucial to Kenya's rulers, permitting them to cope with the growing demand for jobs while providing the state with a growing stock of resources to allocate to key individuals and groups of the populace. This fosters national identity and so also does the ever widening network of voluntary associations, many of which cut across ethnic boundaries. However, the rapidly rising aspirations for modern values and the corresponding movement of increasing numbers of persons into the urban sector—brought on primarily by the revolution in primary education—may well begin to exceed the capacity of the polity and economy to provide opportunities and resources that will satisfy increasing demand. Were this to occur in conjunction with growing perceptions that only a few groups were reaping the fruits of independence and prosperity while others were denied them, a potential for ethnic violence could develop. In order to succeed, the bargaining politics of a country such as Kenya require that all key groups participating in the process believe that it rests fundamentally on the principle of ethnic equity.

In a few African one-party states the political process has been quite different. In Tanzania and Guinea, and until quite recently Mali and Ghana, it has been the intent of leadership to radically transform patterns of political and social behaviour by making them responsive to a set of desired values and goals. Where most bargaining party states have only a limited vision of the future, here the goals and purposes of the new political community are defined. Where previously the ideology of the dominant party had been diffuse and accommodating, now the party strives to institutionalize an explicit ideology defining the

²³Gertzel, "Parliament in Independent Kenya", pp. 501–503.

ends to which programmatic action is to be directed. Institutions need now to be made viable and effective, staffed by men responsive to the demands of the new politics. Governmental and party organizations are needed which have the capacity to induce and channel desired change at the local and rural level and this, in turn, calls for competent and dedicated cadres. Moreover, effective one-party mobilization presumes a high degree of cohesion among leaders and a sense of commitment to the new ideology. Yet there is a very real danger of political cynicism in employing this model if the attempt at revolutionary change brings cant and rhetoric in place of actual concrete development.

Tanzania is the latest African country to declare its intent to pursue nationhood with an emphasis on social and economic egalitarianism within the context of a national ideology embodying the unifying symbols and values of inherited traditions of what is common to the ethnic groups making up the nation. The goal of leadership is not merely the creation of a Tanzanian identity, but a Tanzanian-defined socialist community. To accomplish this, leadership is seeking to maintain a high level of control over the direction of social and economic change. Development strategies which give rise to severe inequalities between individuals and cultural groups and which offer leadership only limited control over the scope and direction of social and economic change, are regarded as inapplicable to nation-building in Tanzania. A new strategy, embodied in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and subsequent policy statements, was developed which sets forth guidelines for socialist development which emphasize self-reliance in both domestic and foreign policy.²⁴ To insure a leadership which will retain firm control of socio-economic changes, only those leaders willing to abide by a strict code of behaviour founded on socialist values are permitted to hold office in party or government.²⁵ The envisioned path to socialism is through rural change with an emphasis upon self-reliance and the development of co-operative and communal patterns of production and living. In defining the meaning of development, social values of egalitarianism take precedence over narrower economic ones such as efficiency or production. TANU, the ruling and only party on the mainland, becomes the "moral community" in which both individual and national identity is achieved.

Critically important to the Tanzanian quest for identity and development is the role of President Julius Nyerere. Possessing a vision of the future and the intellectual and policy-making skills to pursue such a vision, he is in addition a moral leader capable of inspiring both devotion and selflessness. Because of his very rare gift for projecting a sense of moral purpose President Nyerere inspires widespread popular loyalty, thereby enhancing the legitimacy not only of TANU and the national government, but also of the Tanzanian political community. His skills and popularity are indispensable to Tanzania's strategy of development and national unification.

²⁴These documents are brought together in Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968. For a commentary see Henry Bienen, "An Ideology for Africa", *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1969), pp. 545-559.

²⁵See an interesting set of questions on qualifications for leadership answered by President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere in The United Republic of Tanzania, *Arusha Declaration: Answers to Questions*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967.

Notwithstanding such assets, Tanzanian leadership must rule and develop its vast country in a situation of severe scarcity of resources and a low social product. These constraints impose grave limitations on the capacity of leadership to deal with the problem of identity by rendering the political and administrative penetration of rural areas exceedingly difficult. While Kenya's identity problem is one of countering and balancing the centrifugal forces of ethnicity, Tanzania's is that of generating a capacity to reach people in the rural areas and to implement policy. The problem is not to counter entrenched local patriotisms but rather to find the organizational means and resources for instilling in rural peasants the communal values of a new national socialist community. To accomplish this, a new status system which attaches fundamental value to worker and peasant roles is being fostered. It is hoped that by giving workers and peasants a position of respect and honour they will regard themselves as integral parts of the new socialist nation. Through the doctrine and practice of self-reliance, each individual's and community's work will hopefully be viewed as a contribution to the national effort. Individual and local action is thereby conceived as intimately bound to the pursuit of national goals and the creation of nationhood.

III

National Identity in Crisis. In most African states, the problem of establishing and maintaining a viable modicum of national identification among the populace, or at least key segments of it, has been controlled. However, in a few countries the problem has escalated into a crisis when secession movements or attempts by significant sectors of a population to form a new political unit or join another have been threatened or actually carried out. The escalation of ethnic or regional conflicts and tensions to this level of crisis is currently the cause of conflict in Ethiopia, Sudan and Nigeria. It may be argued that a theme common to all three is the threat of loss or actual loss of a group's dominance in the larger political whole.²⁶

The national identity of historic and imperial Ethiopia is rooted in the culture and tradition of the Amhara people, who comprise perhaps twenty per cent of the populace. Amharic ascendancy reaches back seven centuries, during which time they expanded and consolidated their dominion over other cultural groups. As the group that has inherited political control, it is their language which is the national one.²⁷ Over the past century, the Ethiopian political system has become increasingly centralized as the Emperor consolidated his control of the regional nobility. However, under the aegis of the United

²⁶I am grateful for Professor James S. Coleman's suggestions in respect to this interpretation. See James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (February, 1962), pp. 5-19, where he argues that "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. People then subjectively fear that ground gained with most effort will be quite lost; their mood becomes revolutionary."

²⁷Donald N. Levine, "Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism", in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, editors, *Political Culture and Political Development*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 246-250.

Nations a principle of decentralization was introduced when in 1953 the former Italian territory of Eritrea federated with Ethiopia. This introduced an ambiguity in an otherwise centralized structure and in 1962 the Emperor dissolved the federation and relegated Eritrea to mere provincial status. This act may have been to forestall any incipient demands by other groups—notably the Tigre and Galla—for greater autonomy and regional control. In this it appeared to be successful, but it caused Eritreans who had supported federalism because of the equality it implied to join with more secessionist minded Eritreans. They launched the Eritrean Liberation Front, which has fought a sporadic war with Ethiopian forces ever since.²⁸

Historical Arab dominance of the Sudan has also been threatened by demands from the Nilotic south calling for at least a federal constitution and, in some cases, complete secession. Tensions between these demands for southern autonomy and northern resistance have occurred since 1956. Since two-thirds of the population are Arabic-speaking Muslims domiciled in the north, they tend to dominate the government, civil service and army and for some time have been attempting to eradicate the vestiges of British rule—Christianity and English—in the Nilotic south and to replace them with Islam and Arabic. A military strategy has been the primary means employed to transform the southern Sudan and to integrate it with the north. However, this policy has largely failed and southern Any'anya guerillas are reported to be controlling large regions of the southern countryside. A clear indication of the failure of this policy which sought to build unity by force was the military coup of May 25, 1969 and the subsequent formation of a new policy which offered the south what has been described as regional autonomy together with crash programmes of economic, social and cultural development.²⁹ But the south must accept, as its part of the bargain, a unified Sudan. Whether southern leaders will now accept this offer, which promises a new approach while implicitly opposing secession and independence for the south, remains to be seen.³⁰

While secession attempts in Ethiopia and the Sudan may be viewed as threats to the status of historically dominant groups in those countries, in Nigeria perhaps the actual loss of status by Ibo's in the national political system may have been the precipitant to eventual separation and ultimately civil war. Ibo separatism is paradoxical in that that group had previously become "Nigeria's most modern, progressive, nationally-oriented people"³¹ and a strong force for pan-Nigerian nationalism and unity. During the colonial period, thousands upon thousands of Ibo's moved out of their home areas in the East and settled

²⁸*Daily Nation*, (Nairobi, Kenya), May 26, 1969.

²⁹*East African Standard*, (Nairobi, Kenya), June 11, 1969.

³⁰*Daily Nation*, (Nairobi, Kenya), July 25, 1969, reported the "formation of a new military-led government" which "declared that, as of July 18, (1969) it has renamed the southern Sudan as the independent State of Anyidi." Representing the Any'anya their demand is for "total secession and independence."

³¹Paul Anber, "Modernization and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibo's", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5, 2 (1967), p. 167. See also John P. Mackintosh *et al.*, *Nigerian Government and Politics*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966, p. 559.

in large numbers in the urban centres of the West and North where opportunities for "economic and educational advancement were greater".³² By independence in 1960 Ibo's had become "the major source of administrators, managers, technicians and civil servants for the country, occupying senior positions far out of proportion to their numbers."³³

The Ibo quest for a unified Nigeria was expressed in political no less than social and economic activity. When in 1944 the NCNC (formerly National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, and subsequently the National Council of Nigerian Citizens) was established as the spearhead of Nigerian nationalism Ibos quickly became its foremost supporters. In the early 1950's the NCNC wanted a unitary Nigeria, but reluctantly accepted a federal constitutional solution to demands by the West and North for regional autonomy.³⁴

The NCNC, of all Nigerian political organizations, came closest to achieving a base of support which transcended ethnicity. Though the organization was never able to gain any marked support in the backward North, in the West it became a strong minority party. In the federal compact of independence, the national government was dominated by a partnership between the NCNC and northern politicians, and Ibos occupied vanguard positions and aspired to even greater power. But their expectations and aspirations were frustrated by the harsh political realities of northern numerical superiority and the events which led in 1964 to an alliance of one sector of the Yoruba west and north, thus reinforcing northern hegemony of the Nigerian political system. The defeat of the Ibos and their allies in the December 1964 federal elections confirmed the threat to Ibo aspirations and power.³⁵ Then came three events in 1966 which led to a massive status reversal of the Ibos in the Nigerian political system. The first of these was the January coup which terminated the national integrative role of Namdi Azikiwe as President of Nigeria. Azikiwe had long been an outstanding leader of Nigerian unity and was, as well, a central symbol of Ibo status on the national scene. Secondly this loss of status was furthered by the July coup which resulted in the death of Major-General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi and other high ranking Ibo officers. The final event which ended the national aspirations and identification of the Ibos and provoked them to begin taking action and making demands for a high degree of autonomy was the massive killing of thousands of their kin in the north in May, July and September with impunity.³⁶ For a people who perceived themselves as dominant or aspirants to dominance in the national political scene, these events constituted a sudden loss of dignity, esteem and status. A widespread and sudden perception of a climactic status reversal in the national system of ethnic stratification inherited from colonialism would appear to be the precipitant factor that propelled the

³²*Ibid.*, p. 170.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 172.

³⁴See James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles; University of California, 1958, for an excellent account of Nigerian political groups in the colonial period.

³⁵See Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 545-609, for an account of "The Struggle for Power, 1964".

³⁶Anber, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-164.

once "nationally oriented" Ibos to demand a high degree of autonomy and ultimately to secede.

These recent Nigerian events which culminated in the most severe manifestation of an identity crisis—civil war—have fortunately not been repeated elsewhere. In most cases African leadership has succeeded in coping with the identity problem, though in no case has it been altogether solved. Even in the beleaguered Congo territorial integrity has been maintained. And in Uganda the national leadership has so far successfully arrested a politics rooted in ethnicity by enhancing the power and authority of central and national institutions against the sub-nationalisms of the districts and former Kingdoms.³⁷ The successful resolution of the Somali-Kenya dispute which concerned Somali irredentism in north-eastern Kenya was a skilful act of international African diplomacy and bargaining among leaders of both nations. The achievement is especially remarkable when it is remembered that the conflict was fundamentally a clash of two nationalisms—a nationalism of a single people united by bonds of culture, language and religion, and a pluralistic nationalism which embraced many cultural groups in its search for a new civic order. The resolution of such a seemingly irreconcilable conflict was an achievement of African statecraft, as well as a recognition by Somali leaders that the continuation of the conflict which entail serious future economic costs of exclusion from the opportunity to participate in the East African Community. In choosing to negotiate an end to the conflict, the Somali leaders apparently placed utilitarian economic interests above the primary bonds of culture.

The task of African leadership is not to eliminate cultural diversity but rather to create an order in which ethnic and regional identities might coexist in harmony with national interests and needs as a new national whole emerges. Such an order must rest in the beginning upon an enlightened group of national leaders and ethnic spokesmen who are perceptive enough to know that while ethnic interests do exist and should be heard, in any confrontation between ethnicity and nationalism that cannot be accommodated the latter must be permitted to succeed. The interests of ethnic spokesmen may be brought into harmony with national needs either through bargaining and accommodation—a process characteristic of countries like Kenya—or inspirational leadership and moral appeal—an approach more characteristic of Tanzania. But in each case, a crisis of identity is prevented from emerging by the willingness and flexibility of both national and regional leaders to place the embryo nation before the interests of their own elementary group. The majority of new African states has so far benefited from having leaders who possess the will and ability to prevent an almost universal problem of identity from escalating into a crisis.

³⁷For an excellent analysis of ethnicity in Uganda's politics see Nelson Kasfir, "The Decline of Cultural Subnationalism in Uganda", forthcoming in V. A. Olorunsola, *Cultural Nationalism in Africa*.

BUREAUCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

DAVID B. ABERNETHY*

I

To understand the African bureaucracy is to understand a great deal about African politics, for the ministries and parastatal bodies representing central government are the most powerful political institutions on the continent. This is due in large measure to the colonial legacy of "bureaucratic authoritarianism"¹—a legacy with deeper historical roots and a more pervasive impact than the representative institutions whose formation colonial rulers like to stress as their chief contribution to African political development. The colonial bureaucracy not only administered the law but also formulated and interpreted it; in a word, the civil servant ruled. By imposing complex hierarchical structures modelled after those in the metropolitan country on societies that in most cases lacked these structures, the European rulers successfully extracted the financial and material resources they needed while maintaining, for several decades, their own version of law and order. In view of the power, prestige, security, and income of colonial administrative posts, it is hardly surprising that most Africans educated under the colonial system should desire something similar for themselves and a major goal of the nationalist movement was to fill public offices with local citizens. As Africans began to occupy posts once held by expatriates, they exerted pressure on government to pay them comparable salaries; thus the extraordinary inequalities built into the colonial salary structure were carried over into independence.² The ablest and best-educated of the post-

*Dr. David B. Abernethy, is Associate Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, U.S.A., and was Visiting Lecturer at University College, Dar es Salaam in 1968/69 academic year. His paper is based on field work done in a rural district of Tanzania last June.

¹J. Coleman and C. Rosberg, eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley, Calif., 1964), p. 659.

²Inequalities are often greater than salary differentials alone suggest. In Nigeria, for instance, a senior official earning £2,500 a year in the early 1960's might pay £150 for a spacious, completely furnished house, whereas a subordinate earning under £700 was fortunate if he paid £240 for an unfurnished private flat. *Per capita income in Nigeria is approximately £30. Nigeria, Report of the Commission on the Review of Wages, Salaries, and Conditions of Service of the Junior Employees of the Federation and in Private Establishments, 1963-64* (Lagos, 1964), p. 56.