

THE LUSAKA MANIFESTO ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Lusaka 14th-16th April, 1969

with a commentary by N. M. SHAMUYARIRA*

Text

This Manifesto is a joint statement, agreed by the representatives of:

Burundi
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Kinshasa)
Ethiopia
Kenya
Rwanda
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia

at the Lusaka Conference of East and Central African States in April, 1969.

It has been published in Dar es Salaam by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania because of a desire that the commitment it contains should become known, understood, and accepted by all citizens of the Republic. It says:-

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1. When the purpose and the basis of States' International policies are misunderstood, there is introduced into the world a new and unnecessary disharmony. Disagreements, conflicts of interest, or different assessments of human priorities, already provoke an excess of tension in the world, and disastrously divide mankind at a time when united action is necessary to control modern technology and put it to the service of man. It is for this reason that, discovering widespread misapprehension of our attitudes and purposes in relation to Southern Africa, we, the leaders of East and Central African States meeting at Lusaka, 16th April, 1969, have agreed to issue this Manifesto.

2. By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion, or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any other group of sane adults, without their consent, and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organization.

3. On the basis of these beliefs we do not accept that any one group within a society has the right to rule any society without the continuing consent of all the citizens. We recognize that at any one time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognize that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equality is being effected. But we affirm that without an acceptance of these ideals—without a commitment to these principles of human equality and self-determination—there can be no basis for peace and justice in the world.

4. None of us would claim that within our own States we have achieved that perfect social, economic and political organization which would ensure a reasonable standard of living for all our people and establish individual security against avoidable hardship or miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, we acknowledge that within our own States the struggle towards human brotherhood and unchallenged human dignity is only beginning. It is on the basis of our commitment to human equality and human dignity, not on the basis of achieved perfection, that we take our stand of hostility towards the colonialism and racial discrimination which is being practised in Southern Africa. It is on the basis of their commitment to these universal principles that we appeal to other members of the human race for support.

5. If the commitment to these principles existed among the States holding power in Southern Africa, any disagreements we might have about the rate of implementation, or about isolated acts of policy, would be matters affecting only our individual relationships with the States concerned. If these commitments existed, our States would not be justified in the expressed and active

hostility towards the regimes of Southern Africa such as we have proclaimed and continue to propagate.

6. The truth is, however, that in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and the Republic of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination. This is not a matter of failure in the implementation of accepted human principles. The effective Administrations in all these territories are not struggling towards these difficult goals. They are fighting the principles; they are deliberately organizing their societies so as to try to destroy the hold of these principles in the minds of men. It is for this reason that we believe the rest of the world must be interested. For the principle of human equality, and all that flows from it, is either universal or it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being is denied.

7. Our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our commitment to this principle of human equality. We are not hostile to the Administrations of these States because they are manned and controlled by white people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working for a rule in those countries which is based on the will of all the people, and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen.

8. Our stand towards Southern Africa thus involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skins; and we would oppose a racist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin. We are not talking racialism when we reject the colonialism and apartheid policies now operating in those areas; we are demanding an opportunity for all the people of these States, working together as equal individual citizens, to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live together and work together to build a harmonious society.

9. As an aftermath of the present policies it is likely that different groups within these societies will be self-conscious and fearful. The initial political and economic organizations may well take account of these fears, and this group self-consciousness. But how this is to be done must be a matter exclusively for the peoples of the country concerned, working together. No other nation will have a right to interfere in such affairs. All that the rest of the world has a right to demand is just what we are now asserting—that the arrangements within any State which wishes to be accepted into the community of nations must be based on an acceptance of the principles of human dignity and equality.

10. To talk of the liberation of Africa is thus to say two things. First, that the peoples in the territories still under colonial rule shall be free to determine for themselves their own institutions of self-government. Secondly, that the individuals in Southern Africa shall be freed from an environment poisoned by the propaganda of racialism, and given an opportunity to be men—not white men, brown men, yellow men, or black men.

11. Thus the liberation of Africa for which we are struggling does not mean a reverse racialism. Nor is it an aspect of African Imperialism. As far as we are concerned the present boundaries of the States of Southern Africa are the boundaries of what will be free and independent African States. There is no question of our seeking or accepting any alterations to our own boundaries at the expense of these future free African nations.

12. On the objective of liberation as thus defined, we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred and we still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the States of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors. This is why the signatory states participate in the movement for the liberation of Africa under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity. However, the obstacle to change is not the same in all the countries of Southern Africa, and it follows therefore, that the possibility of continuing the struggle through peaceful means varies from one country to another.

13. In *Mozambique* and *Angola*, and in so-called *Portuguese Guinea*, the basic problem is not racialism but a pretence that Portugal exists in Africa. Portugal is situated in Europe; the fact that it is a dictatorship is a matter for the Portuguese to settle. But no decree of the Portuguese dictator, nor legislation passed by any Parliament in Portugal, can make Africa part of Europe. The only thing which could convert a part of Africa into a constituent unit in a union which also includes a European State would be the freely expressed will of the people of that part of Africa. There is no such popular will in the Portuguese colonies. On the contrary, in the absence of any opportunity to negotiate a road to freedom, the peoples of all three territories have taken up arms against the colonial power. They have done this despite the heavy odds against them, and despite the great suffering they know to be involved.

14. Portugal, as a European State, has naturally its own allies in the context of the ideological conflict between West and East. However, in our context,

the effect of this is that Portugal is enabled to use her resources to pursue the most heinous war and degradation of man in Africa. The present Manifesto must, therefore, lay bare the fact that the inhuman commitment of Portugal in Africa and her ruthless subjugation of the people of Mozambique, Angola and the so-called Portuguese Guinea, is not only irrelevant to the ideological conflict of power-politics, but is also diametrically opposed to the politics, the philosophies and the doctrines practised by her Allies in the conduct of their own affairs at home. The peoples of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea are not interested in Communism or Capitalism; they are interested in their freedom. They are demanding an acceptance of the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and for many years they called for discussions on this issue. Only when their demand for talks was continually ignored did they begin to fight. Even now, if Portugal should change her policy and accept the principle of self-determination, we would urge the Liberation Movements to desist from their armed struggle and to co-operate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power from Portugal to the peoples of the African territories.

15. The fact that many Portuguese citizens have immigrated to these African countries does not affect this issue. Future immigration policy will be a matter for the independent Governments when these are established. In the meantime we would urge the Liberation Movements to reiterate their statements that all those Portuguese people who have made their homes in Mozambique, Angola or Portuguese Guinea, and who are willing to give their future loyalty to those states, will be accepted as citizens. And an independent Mozambique, Angola, or Portuguese Guinea may choose to be as friendly with Portugal as Brazil is. That would be the free choice of a free people.

16. In *Rhodesia* the situation is different insofar as the metropolitan power has acknowledged the colonial status of the territory. Unfortunately, however, it has failed to take adequate measures to re-assert its authority against the minority which has seized power with the declared intention of maintaining white domination. The matter cannot rest there. *Rhodesia*, like the rest of Africa, must be free, and its independence must be on the basis of majority rule. If the colonial power is unwilling or unable to effect such a transfer of power to the people, then the people themselves will have no alternative but to capture it as and when they can. And Africa has no alternative but to support them. The question which remains in *Rhodesia* is therefore whether Britain will re-assert her authority in *Rhodesia* and then negotiate the peaceful progress to majority rule before independence. Insofar as Britain is willing to make this second commitment, Africa will co-operate in her attempts to re-assert her authority. This is the method of progress which we would prefer; it could involve less suffering for all the people of *Rhodesia*, both black and white. But until there is some firm evidence that Britain accepts the principle of independence on the basis of majority rule and is prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to make it a reality, then Africa has no choice but to support the struggle for the people's freedom by whatever means are open.

17. Just as a settlement of the Rhodesian problem with a minimum of violence is a British responsibility, so a settlement in *South West Africa* with a minimum of violence is a United Nations responsibility. By every canon of international law, and by every precedent, *South West Africa* should by now have been a sovereign, independent State with a Government based on majority rule. *South West Africa* was a German colony until 1919, just as *Tanganyika*, *Rwanda* and *Burundi*, *Togoland*, and *Cameroon* were German colonies. It was a matter of European politics that when the Mandatory System was established after Germany had been defeated, the administration of *South West Africa* was given to the white minority Government of *South Africa*, while the other ex-German colonies in Africa were put into the hands of the British, Belgian, or French Governments. After the Second World War every mandated territory except *South West Africa* was converted into a Trusteeship Territory and has subsequently gained independence. *South Africa*, on the other hand, has persistently refused to honour even the international obligation it accepted in 1919, and has increasingly applied to *South West Africa* the inhuman doctrines and organization of apartheid.

18. The United Nations General Assembly has ruled against this action and in 1966 terminated the Mandate under which *South Africa* had a legal basis for its occupation and domination of *South West Africa*. The General Assembly declared that the territory is now the direct responsibility of the United Nations and set up an *ad hoc* Committee to recommend practical means by which *South West Africa* would be administered, and the people enabled to exercise self-determination and to achieve independence.

19. Nothing could be clearer than this decision—which no permanent member of the Security Council voted against. Yet, since that time no effective measures have been taken to enforce it. *South West Africa* remains in the clutches of the most ruthless minority government in Africa. Its people continue to be oppressed and those who advocate even peaceful progress to independence continue to be persecuted. The world has an obligation to use its strength to enforce the decision which all the countries co-operated in making. If they do this there is hope that the change can be effected without great violence. If they fail, then sooner or later the people of *South West Africa* will take the law into their own hands. The people have been patient beyond belief, but one day their patience will be exhausted. Africa, at least, will then be unable to deny their call for help.

20. *The Republic of South Africa* is itself an independent sovereign state and a Member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of *South Africa*. Yet the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the *South African* Government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defence of humanity.

21. There is one thing about South African oppression which distinguishes it from other oppressive regimes. The apartheid policy adopted by its Government, and supported to a greater or lesser extent by almost all its white citizens, is based on a rejection of man's humanity. A position of privilege or the experience of oppression in the South African society depends on the one thing which it is beyond the power of any man to change. It depends upon a man's colour, his parentage, and his ancestors. If you are black you cannot escape this categorisation; nor can you escape it if you are white. If you are a black millionaire or a brilliant political scientist, you are still subject to the pass laws and still excluded from political activity. If you are white, even protests against the system and an attempt to reject segregation, will lead you only to the segregation and the comparative comfort of a white jail. Beliefs, abilities, and behaviour are all irrelevant to a man's status; everything depends upon race. Manhood is irrelevant. The whole system of government and society in South Africa is based on the denial of human equality. And the system is maintained by a ruthless denial of the human rights of the majority of the population and thus, inevitably of all.

22. These things are known and are regularly condemned in the Councils of the United Nations and elsewhere. But it appears that to many countries international law takes precedence over humanity; therefore no action follows the words. Yet even if international law is held to exclude active assistance to the South African opponents of apartheid, it does not demand that the comfort and support of human and commercial intercourse should be given to a government which rejects the manhood of most of humanity. South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations Agencies, and even from the United Nations itself. It should be ostracized by the world community. It should be isolated from world trade patterns and left to be self sufficient if it can. The South African Government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity, and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. And certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent.

23. The signatories of this Manifesto assert that the validity of the principles of human equality and dignity extend to the Republic of South Africa just as they extend to the colonial territories of Southern Africa. Before a basis for peaceful development can be established in this continent, these principles must be acknowledged by every nation, and in every State there must be a deliberate attempt to implement them.

24. We re-affirm our commitment to these principles of human equality and human dignity, and to the doctrines of self-determination and non-racialism. We shall work for their extension within our own nations and throughout the continent of Africa.

Commentary

The Lusaka Manifesto¹ on liberation and human rights in Southern Africa which was signed by thirteen Heads of States in East and Central Africa in April, 1969, (Malawi alone refused to sign) is the most prestigious document produced in Africa since the drafting of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity in 1963. It has since been endorsed by the Organization of African Unity and accepted almost unanimously by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Its acceptance by the General Assembly was regarded by African States as a substantial achievement of the twenty-fifth session of that august body.

This document has been well-received in the West because of its conciliatory tone. Senator Edward Kennedy of the United States said, "perhaps the greatest importance of the Lusaka document is its tone as a manifesto for peaceful revolution not violent revolution in Southern Africa".² Newspaper editors and policy-makers in Britain, France and West Germany have drawn attention to its moderate tone; others have seen it as a retreat by African States from the position of total support for liberation movements taken at the founding conference of the O.A.U. in 1963. Even the South African Government has found itself in agreement with certain parts of the Manifesto. Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the chief architect of the policy to seek friendship with African States, saw the document as a sign of growing realism on the part of African States and a realisation that they have to co-exist with South Africa. He stated confidently that African States were changing their attitude towards the Republic.

However, the ten liberation movements organizing an armed insurrection in Southern Africa are opposed to the document. They view any suggestion of achieving independence by discussion as prejudicial to the present state the struggle has reached, and, at best, an attempt to seek for a neo-colonial solution that will create even more acute problems. However, without exception, the liberation movements have refrained from campaigning against the document. There is hardly any reference to it in their propaganda pamphlets. Their attitude has been influenced largely by the support given to the document by States supporting the liberation struggle, especially Zambia and Tanzania which presented the original draft to the fourteen States.

An analysis of the Lusaka Manifesto must begin with the audience the signatories had in mind. Although it is addressed to "members of the human race" (para. 4) in fact it is directed at Western nations whose economic and military support props up the White regimes of Southern

¹Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1969. Proceedings of the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States, held in Lusaka, Zambia, April 14th-16th, 1969.

²The Nationalist, Dar es Salaam, June 11th, 1969.

Africa. The signatories appeared anxious to secure the withdrawal of that vital Western support. As one supporter of the Manifesto put it in a letter to me:

"... the Lusaka Manifesto is using the language of the West because it is speaking to the West as much as to anyone. They, as you yourself say, are the ones who are in practice helping the regimes of Southern Africa, and my belief is that the signatories wanted the West to be aware of what it was doing and what the implications were. For this purpose you have to speak the language they listen to and understand—you have to argue, not shout."

But Western nations cannot be persuaded by peaceful means alone because their security and prosperity is inextricably interlocked with that of the White regimes in question. Britain has invested over £1,600,000,000 in South Africa alone, its third largest customer.

Given the perpetual balance-of-payments crisis in post-war Britain, the collapse of the South African economy would have a very adverse effect on the British economy as well. South African ports remain the main channel for British and West European trade with Asia and the Middle East (especially since the closure of the Suez Canal in June, 1967). Furthermore, South Africa occupies a strategic position in the defence of Western interests in the Indian Ocean. The withdrawal of British naval power from the Indian Ocean by 1971, the so-called "East of Suez" policy, must have been preceded by an agreement for increasing collaboration between South Africa and Britain to defend joint vested interests, and to maintain Western supremacy in the area.

The reluctance of Britain to take any steps in support of African political and social rights which may jeopardise her economic interests in South Africa was shown over the mandatory economic sanctions she sponsored against Rhodesia. The principles guiding British policy on that issue, in their order of importance, were: a) to avoid economic confrontation with South Africa; b) to keep Zambia and her vital copper industry afloat; and c) to topple the Smith regime in Rhodesia if and when possible. The passionate appeal in the Lusaka Manifesto could hardly change these priorities in the policy of the British Government.

The Portuguese Government is in a worse position in that its budget is only balanced by exploiting the natural and mineral resources of the colonies of Angola and Mozambique through the concession and tax systems which benefit Portugal. Even the contracting agreement for labourers recruited in Mozambique annually for work on the South African gold-mines benefits directly the Portuguese exchequer, and the port at Lourenço Marques. Of late the economies of the Portuguese colonies have become intertwined with the South African one, especially in mining and hydro-electric power. The South African Company, ZAMCO, heads a group of western companies that are investing large sums of money in the Caborra

Basa hydro-electric scheme on the Zambezi river in Mozambique, and the Kunene scheme on the Kunene river in Angola.

American and French investment in the South African economy used to be small but it has leaped forward in recent years. The South African re-armament programme which started in 1961 increased budgetary expenditure on the military from £20 million in 1960 to £100 million in 1965. The French Government has supplied the main items like helicopters and fighter bombers on the South African shopping list. South Africa alone accounted for thirty per cent of U.S.A. direct investment in Africa in 1966.³

These economic, military and strategic interests of the West in this region are so vital that they cannot be given up as easily as the signatories of the Lusaka Manifesto may want or think. Indeed, if they were threatened by an armed insurrection it is quite conceivable that the West would find a suitable formula for intervention on the side of the incumbent authorities, or at least against those Africans threatening such vested interests.

On the other hand, Western nations which are being requested to give a positive lead in Southern Africa, have unsolved racial problems in their own domestic societies. In the U.S.A., Afro-Americans are having to fight in the streets and ghettos for rights granted to them in the American constitution. The entry of one million black persons (about two per cent of the total population) into Britain has provoked deep racial emotions, and led to the enactment of restrictive legislation on non-white immigration. The fear of an outburst of racial feelings, especially among the white workers who supported the Labour Party, in power at the time, was possibly the strongest factor in restraining Harold Wilson's Government from taking military action against the rebellious and racist regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. In 1968, London dockworkers marched to the House of Commons to express support for Enoch Powell who had been dismissed from the Opposition Conservative Party front bench for making an inflammatory and racist speech.

The propaganda of the White regimes has stressed two themes that strike a responsive cord in Western societies: first, the fact that they are "cousins" or fragments of Western society, propagating Western civilization and Christianity on the African continent. Secondly, they have sought to identify the demands of Africans for human dignity and equality with international communism. The Southern African press describes freedom-fighters as "Communist terrorists". The fact that freedom fighters use Russian and Chinese weapons confirms the propaganda to White settlers. No one else can supply the arms needed to fight against these regimes: African States do not make them and they have no money to buy them, Western nations supply some of theirs to the White regimes. The regimes

³See F. Taylor-Ostrand: "U.S. Investment in Africa", in *African-American Dialogues*, Background Papers, First Conference held in Nairobi, Kenya, 1968, p. 6.

would stand to benefit by making their advocacy for racism part of a global ideological conflict. The Manifesto stresses that the people of Southern Africa are not interested in "Communism or Capitalism; they are interested in their freedom" (para. 14). Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, elaborated on this point as follows:

"If the West accepts the South African and Portuguese argument that they are fighting on behalf of the free world against Communism, then I believe that in time this interpretation will become defensible—at least as regards their enemies. For if the West supports these racist and fascist states, the freedom struggle will in reality become a part of the world ideological conflict. For Africa, the West will be on opposite sides of the barricades."⁴

It should be obvious to the reader that vested interests, domestic politics on the issue of race, and the cold war overtones discussed above will not induce the West to join the Africans in taking decisive action against their own vested interests, cousins, brothers, and ideological supporters. The Manifesto could not achieve its main objective.

No time need be wasted here considering whether the Manifesto could persuade the leaders of the White regimes in Southern Africa to change their in-bred instinct of racism or to take steps to bring about their own downfall. For White settlers, racism and white supremacy is not a policy choice, it is a way of life. No African leader in his proper senses (excepting Malawi's Dr. Banda) dreams that he could persuade settler leaders to change their policies. The decision of leaders of African nationalist movements in this region to take up arms in 1961 following half-a-century of attempts at peaceful negotiations summarises the facts of settler politics.

However, in fairness to the settlers, it should be stated that the universal principles recited in the Manifesto have been applied either to minority groups in Europe or to colonised people. Granting such rights does not involve fundamental changes in the position of the ruling classes or the form of Government in the society on whom the claim is being made. For example, granting self-determination to Gabon did not change the position in France or its rulers. But self-determination and equality for the majority Africans in Southern Africa would effectively terminate settler rule and dominance. Statements by African leaders have not left the settlers in any doubt about this. It should be stressed that one is tackling basic issues of power, wealth, and citizenship, and not just reciting old universalistic and moralistic principles.

Some Positive Aspects

There are some positive aspects in the Manifesto. The most important is the desire to find common ground on which African States can approach the question of Southern Africa. It is an open secret that the majority

⁴*The Standard*, Dar es Salaam, Friday, October 3rd, 1969, reporting President Nyerere's speech at Toronto University in Canada, which followed closely on the theme of the manifesto.

of African States do not give financial or material support to the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity, or to the liberation movements. Of the thirteen signatories only three States—Tanzania, Zambia, and Congo (Kinshasa)—have given active support to the Committee and / or liberation movements. The remaining states have been passive, neutral or plainly disinterested. There is a danger that some of them may be attracted by the abortive course of collaborating with the White regimes followed by the Republic of Malawi. It was necessary, therefore, to commit the majority of African States to the realistic course of liberation through the armed struggle by means of a moderate document that threw out an olive branch of conciliation and negotiation. The unanimous support given to the document by African States at the O.A.U. meeting last September and at the United Nations last November would indicate that this objective has been achieved.

The Manifesto has given the African States a new and valuable diplomatic instrument. The burden of guilt has been shifted clearly onto the shoulders of Vorster, Smith and Caetano where it belongs. Even if Western nations will not take any positive steps against these regimes for reasons that have been stated above, they can have no doubts about the moral bankruptcy of the case advanced by White settlers and supported both directly and indirectly by their own Governments.

It should also be stressed that the common ground struck by the Manifesto, and the favourable diplomatic posture have not been achieved at the expense of the basic principles of the struggle. There is no compromise on self-government or on the use of violence to achieve this objective when all peaceful means have failed. While the heads of States prefer to "talk rather than kill", they conclude on the firm note that "Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent" (para. 22) in South Africa. At paragraph 12, they say that on the objective of liberation "we can neither surrender nor compromise". This important paragraph throws out the olive branch but at the same time retains the commitment to the main principles of the struggle for liberation.

Liberation Movements

The most serious and negative repercussion of the Lusaka Manifesto is the effect it is likely to have on the freedom-fighters in the liberation movements themselves. They are likely to feel that African States are abandoning the struggle. Although the commitment to the principles of the struggle remains as stated above, the main thrust of the document is towards peaceful negotiations rather than violence. African States have retreated many steps from the position they took at the founding conference of the O.A.U. in 1963. On that occasion they resolved to boycott South African and Portuguese goods, contribute one per cent of their national budgets into a special fund for liberation, and even provide volunteer corps as freedom-fighters. These brave words and resolutions were never fulfilled. The

failure of the majority of States even to withdraw diplomatic representatives from Britain over the Rhodesia case exposed the weakness of the O.A.U. and the bankruptcy of its moral prescriptions. The freedom-fighters who were encouraged by the 1963 position to organise liberation forces are bound to feel disheartened by the complacency that permeates the 1969 Manifesto.

The silver-lining in this cloud is that the committed States have not slackened or reduced their financial and material support for the liberation movements in the first year of the life of the Manifesto. The uncommitted have remained uncommitted. Therefore, the Manifesto has become an instrument for pan-African diplomacy outside the continuing work of liberation.

The Manifesto has revealed as never before the moderate nature of African Governments today. Many of them are products of peaceful change by negotiations with their former masters, although that change was one of personnel rather than of social systems. Naturally, they would like to apply the same procedure to a region that has totally different circumstances and conditions of oppression. Many African Governments fear the consequences of violence and revolution in any part of Africa on their own domestic societies. The O.A.U. Charter confirms the *status quo* and conforms to the traditional concepts of sovereignty and independence. The nine States that withdrew diplomatic representatives from Britain over Rhodesia, the eight that have continually supported the Liberation Committee since 1963 and especially Zambia and Tanzania that have borne the main burden of the work of liberation, are notable exceptions. The majority are *status quo* states that would happily and willingly embrace a neo-colonial situation in Southern Africa that would change the personnel running the Governments but not the system of exploiting the masses of the people.

NATIONAL IDENTITY IN AFRICAN STATES

CARL G. ROSBERG.*

A central concern of leaders in new states is to establish and maintain a modicum of national identity. For they realize that if their states are to prosper, if national goals are to be pursued, there must exist a minimal degree of national cohesion and identity among their politically relevant members. Moreover, few leaders can feel secure that the unity already forged will endure. For as modernization cuts deeper into society and as men compete in new patterns of interaction, loyalties and sentiments are engendered at both the national and sub-national levels and it is by no means certain which will be the focus of terminal loyalties.¹ Speaking on the eighth anniversary of Tanzania's independence, President Nyerere said, "Our country is one of those in Africa which are highly praised for their unity"². Still he went on to warn that the level of unity and identity already achieved could be threatened by divisive forces of tribalism and racialism.

The quest for national identity—the creation of a sense of territorial nationality transcending parochial loyalties of race, ethnicity, religion, language and region—is not solely a commanding developmental problem for new states. More than one hundred years of Canadian self-rule produced not a sense of transcendent national identity, but the strengthening of the sub-national sentiments of two communities distinguished by language and tradition. While the future of the Canadian state remains uncertain, Flemish and Walloon separatism and nationalism also place the Belgian state in jeopardy. Even under communist regimes possessing well disciplined parties, sub-national sentiments persist and influence political action and organization as the Czechoslovakian case demonstrates.

*Carl G. Rosberg, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, wishes to acknowledge the valuable suggestions that have been made by Professor James S. Coleman and Mr. Robert Jackson.

¹For an excellent treatment of the issues of national identity in Africa, Asia and South America see Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden and Crawford Young, *Issues of Political Development*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967. pp. 15–83; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States", in Geertz, *Old Societies and New States*. New York: Free Press, 1963. pp. 105–157 and Rupert Emerson, "Nation-Building in Africa", in Karl K. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, *Nation-Building*. New York: Atherton Press, 1963, pp. 95–116.

²From a speech delivered by President Julius Nyerere on December 9, 1968. *The Standard (Tanzania)*, December 10, 1968.