

way it would be able to work on the basis of high information while employing a minimum of coercion. That, generally speaking, is as desirable a situation as any political system can hope to attain.

Our object in this discussion has been to put the issue of development into a constitutional framework. We emphasize in this manner the need to create more opportunities whereby governments can deal with problems that confront them. In modernizing societies these crowd in at every turn until, overwhelmed, political leaders take actions designed to protect themselves against the people rather than work with them and for them. To harness technocratic resources is a way of making responsible and efficient knowledge which relates to development. Today governments are not able to adequately control those whose special knowledge gives them exceptional access to the resources and means of power, without substantially reducing their usefulness.

However, and this point should be made very clear, a development constitution such as the one suggested here, should not be seen as a long term affair or a permanent political framework. It is suggested as an interim measure, a temporary device designed to coincide with what should be a transitional period in which a society is making particularly strenuous and special efforts to increase its choices, its developmental infrastructure, and its public opportunities. After that the development constitution should give way, especially when a different ordering of social preferences becomes possible—one which places lower priorities on development than distribution, and is less concerned with growth than with equity. Indeed, the latter might be called an "equity constitution" to emphasize the stress on new and alternative ways of representation, and the need to deal with the problems of the modern meritocracy, which places its emphasis on the functional rather than the humane qualities of life.¹⁵ In these matters the new industrial society poses far more serious threats than the modernizing ones and the traditional frameworks of representative governments are not equipped to handle them. To deal with the deficiencies of the constitutions of industrial states requires a fresh look. But this would engage us in another discussion.

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¹⁵Contrasts between a "development constitution" and an "equity constitution" are suggested in D. E. Apter, *A Structural Theory of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

OKWUDIBA NNOLI*

I

Introduction

Political independence in Africa gave birth to the direct participation of African states in the international system. The leaders of these states had looked forward with high hopes and great expectations to this participation. Among the reasons for this is the fact that the international system played some part in the African struggle for independence. Anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces within the system had joined hands with the nationalist leaders to impress on the colonial powers the anachronism and inherent injustice of colonial rule. The United Nations formed one of the forums where such pressures could be exerted and the injustices of colonialism exposed. The organization emphasized the necessity of submitting colonial rule to public scrutiny, as well as the need to institutionalize progress towards the national independence of trust territories. In addition, several agencies of the UN such as the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization, etc., aided the social and economic advancement of the colonies. Direct participation at the U.N. and its agencies thus raised hopes of increased benefits from the international system.

Above all, however, participation in the international system raised hopes that the resources of the advanced states of that system would be used for the socio-economic and political development of the African states. As a result of the widely disseminated development ethos of the contemporary world, the definition of the national purpose of the Africans is one of development. Emphasis is on the improvement of the living conditions of the African people and the narrowing of the gap between the wealth of the advanced and underdeveloped areas of the world. But precisely because African states by themselves lack the resources to achieve this national

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purpose, the tendency has been for them to emphasize international relations which tend to acquire the requisite resources. Thus independence was welcomed as likely to ensure a greater degree of development than the stultifying phenomenon of colonialism could allow. The African states had hoped that by interacting with the advanced states they would raise the necessary funds for their development.¹

After several years of participation in the international system, however, it has become obvious that the high expectations of the benefits of international relations may not be realized. The gap between the rich and the poor nations is increasing rather than decreasing and the rise in the welfare expectations of the African peoples has led to the increased frustration of African leaders. This paper intends to examine the factors which are important in this relationship between the African states on the one hand and the other units in the international system on the other, in order to assess the prospects that external resources would assist the development of African states.

II

World Ideological Splits and African Affairs

In the inter-relationship of African states and other units in the international system certain realities are crucial for understanding African development. Among these, the set of realities regarding the extent and nature of conflicts in Africa is very important. Where these conflicts are numerous, intense and persistent, the international environment makes development impossible. Another set of important realities is related to the configuration of the units of the international system and the dynamics of their interaction. The inter-relationship of the former and the latter sets of realities largely determines whether African development, stagnation or retrogression may take place.

To say that African states are in an age of development is more of a truism than a significant observation. What is of critical importance is the exact character of the transitional process of development—not only in terms of the present position in these states but also where they are heading. Furthermore, it is ideology which helps to define the character of this process as well as the rules for bringing it about.² A major feature of

¹African foreign policy was thus explained by writers as an extension of the needs for development cf., for example, the articles in V. McKay, ed., *African Diplomacy* (N.Y. Praeger, 1967); C. Phillips, *The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy* (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964); Doudou Thiam, *The Foreign Policy of African States* (N.Y. Praeger, 1965); W. Zartman, *International Relations in the New Africa* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966); R. C. Good, "Statebuilding as a determinant in Foreign Policy in the New States" in L. W. Morton, ed., *Neutralism and Non-Alignment* (N.Y. Praeger, 1962), pp. 3-12; and R. C. Good, "Changing Patterns of African International Relations", *American Political Science Review*, LVIII 3 (September, 1964), pp. 632-641.

²A good and short discussion of ideology is found in K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1936), pp. 55-108.

contemporary world politics therefore is the intense competition of different ideologies.³ Thus African development and contemporary international politics are intertwined.

Ideologically, the international system is characterized by the existence of two global subsystems which stand in opposition to each other. These are the bloc or Socialist States on the one hand, and that of anti-socialist and largely Capitalist States on the other.⁴ Within the socialist camp, however, the Sino-Soviet schism is in part ideological.⁵ This means that apart from the struggle between the two global subsystems to guide the development of African states there is also an intra-subsystem competition between Moscow and Peking regarding the socialist development of African states. Nevertheless, the Sino-Soviet ideological struggle and its implication for African development by and large follow the same dynamics as the broader conflict of socialism versus capitalism and may be illustrated by a focus on the latter conflict.

At the head of each global subsystem is a superpower who, together with lesser great powers, or even alone, constitutes the elite of that subsystem. This structure has shown some signs of loosening up largely on political rather than ideological grounds except for the Sino-Soviet conflict which is ideological as well. Nevertheless, there is a good measure of cohesion within each subsystem. This cohesion is the consequence of increased interdependence of the members as a result of improvement in the means of communication and transportation as well as the advancement in the art of control and domination on the part of the elites of these subsystems. In addition to these two subsystems, there is a group of states which, ideologically, is relatively independent of these two blocs. Although the members of this group share certain norms, values and structural characteristics, they are, however, not organized into any cohesive bloc under an elite. Most of the African states are part of this non-aligned group which operates at the margins of the two ideological blocs and in between them.⁶

Apart from the ideological factors, the dynamics of the interaction within, across and between these subsystems and the non-aligned African states are also influenced by several factors. Among these are: (1) the

³See M. Kaplan, "Bipolarity in a Revolutionary Age" in M. Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (N.Y., John Wiley & Sons, 1962), pp. 262-266. See also I. L. Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development* (N.Y. Oxford University Press, 1966) and W. W. Kulski, *International Politics in a Revolutionary Age* (N.Y. & Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964).

⁴For a discussion of these blocs and the changes taking place in them, see A. Wolfers, ed., *Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964).

⁵See Z. Brezezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1960); D. Zaforia, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict — 1956-1961* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton Univ. Press, 1962); A. Dallin, "Long Divisions and Fine Fractions", *Problems of Communism*, XI, 2 (March-April, 1962), pp. 7-16; A. Dallin and J. Harris, *Dissension in International Communism* (N.Y., Columbia Univ. Press, 1963).

⁶On non-alignment, see J. W. Burton, *International Relations: A General Theory* (London, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1956).

intra-bloc and inter-bloc conflicts of national interests; (2) the conflicts within the African states; (3) the nature of the development process in the African states; (4) the nuclear parity between the superpower leaders of the two global blocs; and (5) the general interdependence of the units of the international system.

Ideologically, each bloc has an interest in opposing or preventing internal changes within the political systems of its members that may cause them to move out of the bloc or worse still to move into the other bloc. Each is also interested in bringing about changes in the internal organizations of the members of the other bloc in such a way that the members may move out of it and possibly switch over to its own bloc.

Such inter-bloc intrigues are, however, checked by the existence of nuclear terror between the superpower elites of these two subsystems. Nevertheless, the balance-of-power and spheres-of-influence mentality reminiscent of the eras of Prince Metternich in Europe and President Monroe in America still pervades the activities of the big powers in world affairs. Competition between the two blocs is therefore transferred to the non-aligned states which are not yet part of the established spheres of ideological influence of the two blocs. In this region, the stakes of the two blocs are not so high as to lead them into a nuclear confrontation. The stakes are, however, high enough to justify limited wars fought by proxy. Thus new weapons, technology, and the resultant East-West *détente* and ideological coexistence, have forced the two ideological blocs to test each other's strength and contest each other's influence through involvement in the internal affairs of African states. The doctrine which asserts the legitimacy of limited wars, therefore, also asserts the need for unlimited intervention. Consequently, the Soviets supported Somalia with arms and the U.S. supplied Ethiopia with weapons at the time Somalia and Ethiopia were engaged in a conflict; the Soviets and the Americans were consistently on the opposite sides in the Congo conflict.

Traditional national interests of the big powers are also influential in their intervention in African affairs. The process of socio-economic change envisaged by the African states is very rapid and involves a high degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome. Under such circumstances, the big powers become apprehensive of their ability to control the situation. They fear the possible repercussions of these changes in the international system.

In this regard the change in question does not necessarily have to be a violent one. Even peaceful changes may have serious international implications. Examples include the attainment of nuclear capability by China and the emergence of many Afro-Asian states to political independence. What is significant is the combination of rapidity with uncertainty. It is here that the issues of colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism on the one hand are joined with those of African development on the other. Thus, even when no violent conflict exists within an African state, big powers

are still interested in being closely involved in its activities and through such an involvement to guide changes to ends which they desire. The big powers also wish to make sure that the next coup does not jeopardize their interests or increase the influence of their opponents in the area. This explains, for example, why France intervened in the social upheaval in Gabon in 1994 but did not intervene in similar situations in Congo-Brazzaville, Togo and Dahomey the previous year.

III

Big Power Traditional Interests and African Development

As a result of the considerations of traditional national interests by the big powers, intervention in African affairs is not confined to the consequences of inter-bloc competition. In fact, intra-bloc political and economic competition may be more significant. When France sent troops into Gabon in February 1964 there was evidence of mounting anti-Americanism among the French expatriates in that country. They saw an American sympathy for the Gabonese rebels. France sent in troops in part to force the issue of which influence, French or American, would prevail in the country. The United States still had the dominant share in Camilog which worked the rich manganese ore in the country and France controlled the uranium fields at Mounana and was urgently occupied in the attempt to foil U.S. oil interests in the area.

In fact, Britain, France and Belgium, as former colonial masters of African states still retain high political and economic stakes in these states. They are bound, therefore, to resent U.S. efforts to extend its bloc leadership in these areas. France's renewal of links with Guinea after the Solod episode was probably the result of increasing U.S. influence in that country rather than because of the waning Soviet influence. Nevertheless, inter-bloc competition in this regard between the Communists on the one hand and the former colonial powers or the U.S. on the other is still a present reality.

Under these circumstances of high potential for inter-bloc and intra-bloc conflicts in Africa, pre-emptive actions may be taken by a big power to induce certain types of conflicts in the domestic systems of the African state; these are usually conflicts whose outcome it could channel into desired ends. The Belgians did this when they instigated Katangese secession. The big powers may manipulate the prices of the major exports of the country to intensify the economic hardships in it. Such manipulations by the Western countries, particularly Britain and the U.S., were crucial in the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana. Thus domestic conflicts in African states may originate from domestic sources or from external ones.

Nevertheless, whether a significant African conflict has domestic or foreign origin, foreign intervention would usually be involved. This is logical. The only way of redressing an internal power imbalance after an exhaustion of internal power resources is to invite outside aid.⁷ Since it is the responsibility of the incumbent government to maintain law and order in a state, domestic conflicts which need external aid inevitably involve the incumbent government. Normal international relations, alignments and friendships, however, tend to develop into those with the incumbents. Consequently, opponents of the government seek the support of the enemies of the incumbent's allies.

African Multipolar Conflicts and Foreign Intervention

Contemporary external interventions in African affairs are facilitated by several factors. Among these is the fact that rapid advance in the field of communications technology, propaganda, horizontal mobility and the emergence of super-powers whose influence could be effectively exerted in any part of the globe, have minimized the difficulties, faced in earlier interventions, of inadequate means of communication.⁸ More important for African development, however, is the existence of poles of contradictions and conflict within the African states which can easily be manipulated by external powers.

Colonialism introduced new poles of conflict into the African continent. The arbitrary nature of colonial boundaries created cleavages within the African states and between them. The crises which have marked the politics of Nigeria and the Congo are in part the consequence of the cleavages based on the grouping of different ethnic groups within the same political unit.⁹ The disputes between Somalia and Kenya and between Somalia and Ethiopia arose from the fact that the Somalis were dispersed into three different but contiguous political units.¹⁰ In each of these conflicts foreign intervention took place. In the Congo the interventions were ideological as well as political and economic. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries supported Lumumba and all the Congolese factions which shared his ideals. The United States and her allies, including the UN, supported factions opposed to Lumumba's ideals.

In addition to ethnic cleavages, there exist differences in religion, language and culture.¹¹ In many cases these differences coincide with other cleavages

⁷G. Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War" in J. N. Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 20.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁹For a general discussion of these cleavages and their impact on African politics, see M. Wiener, "Politics and Political Development" in C. E. Welch, ed., *Political Modernization* (Balmont, Calif., Wadsworth Publishing Co. Inc., 1967), pp. 154-155.

¹⁰See K. W. Grundy, "Nationalism and Separation in East Africa" in *Current History*, vol. 54, No. 318, Feb. 1968.

¹¹See C. E. Welch, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-160.

to increase their potential for conflict. In general, however, the existence of all these differences contradicts the demands for a greater integration of the African states. The Nigeria-Biafra war, the struggle of the Southern Sudanese for more autonomy, the Togo-Ghana border disputes 1960-1965, the Ghana-Ivory Coast dispute over the "Sanwi state" 1957-1962, the Banda claims to parts of Tanzania and Zambia in 1968 are all manifestations of a malaise which is widespread in Africa.

Colonialism introduced another kind of cleavage. It eliminated the traditional boundaries based on geography and historical heritage and replaced them with others based on market forces as well as forces of economic, political, cultural and racial exploitation. Consequently, the African social system, defined in terms of transactions and responsiveness, is not confined to the national boundary of the African state but includes groups which have roots in the international system, particularly in the former metropolitan country. The existence of these externally linked groups within the African system provides another area of conflict in Africa. The long struggle of the Algerian people for independence was the consequence of the presence of a large number of French citizens in Algerian life. Similarly, minority racial regimes have suppressed the African majority in South Africa, Rhodesia, Namibia and Portuguese African territories and are now faced with wars of national liberation. In these struggles the socialist bloc has intervened on behalf of the oppressed African majority while the Western bloc has intervened economically and even militarily to support these oppressive and reactionary racist regimes.

There exist, however, poles of conflict which are the result of factors other than colonialism. Both colonialism and the desire for rapid development have led to the rapid rise of cities to the neglect of the rural areas. Increasingly, tension and conflict have built up between the desires of the rural areas on the one hand and those of the cities on the other. The tendency of the urban areas to exploit the rural areas has a high potential for domestic conflict.

Conflict also inheres in the gap separating the elite and the masses in Africa. This socio-economic and political gap creates contradictions, tensions and conflicts in the relationship between the elites, i.e., the *bourgeoisie*, the labour aristocrats and the political ruling class on the one hand, and the masses of the people, the workers and peasants on the other. For example, dissatisfaction among Nigerian workers came to a revolutionary head in the disastrous general strike in 1964 which virtually paralyzed the whole country. Foreign intervention in such conflicts is seen in the Solod affair in Guinea in 1961. In November 1961 the Guinean Teachers' Trade Union demanded changes in the status and condition of teachers. President Toure denounced them and jailed the leaders. This was followed by a twenty-four hour sit-down strike and an anti-Guinean plot managed by an alliance of Moscow,

East Germany, the editor of a London newspaper and others. As a result Mr. Solod, the Soviet ambassador, was expelled from Guinea.

The struggle for political power among African elites as well as the intergenerational differences among African civil servants are other sources of conflict. Such conflicts have found expression in the military coups and governmental instability which have plagued African politics. For example, 1963 was a year of instability in ex-French Africa. The deposed Prime Minister of Senegal, Mamadou Dia, was tried and jailed; President Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated in Togo; plots and counter plots featured in the Ivory Coast; Presidents Fulbert Youlou of the Congo and Hubert Maga of Dahomey were overthrown. Between 19 June, 1965 and 22 March, 1967 military *coups d'état* overthrew nine African governments including the militant Pan-Africanist government of Nkrumah and the pro-west regime of Sir Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria. The speed with which the new African regimes switch foreign friends underlines the foreign support of the rival elites in these conflicts. Thus Russia and the other socialist countries fell out of favour with the overthrow of Nkrumah and British and American influence increased in Ghana. In the pre-independence elections in Kenya, the British worked unsuccessfully to frustrate the victory of Jomo Kenyatta and his party, the Kenya African National Union.

Even the development process itself involves contradictions and conflict. In the first place, there is conflict between tradition and modernity. Secondly, African peoples are aware of the riches of consumer affluence in the U.S. and the successes of the new military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union. This awareness has created conflict between African economic realities and African expectations of material welfare. Thus multiple poles of conflict and potential conflict exist in the African states which even when acting singly can frustrate the desires of the African peoples to realize their ideals of a better life. By their permutation and combination as well as their exacerbation by foreign intervention, they are bound to intensify and reinforce this frustration.

If development is conceived, in a general sense, as the creation of a better life in which contradictions, tensions and conflicts are continuously and progressively minimized, then African development would involve the reduction in the number and effects of the multiple poles of conflict and conflict potential within the African states. It is, therefore, possible to conceptualize African development as the existence or emergence of contradictory currents which lead to conflict as well as the continuous process of resolving such conflicts in the direction of a self-sustaining condition for a better life. This way of looking at development avoids the tendency towards evolutionism and teleology noticeable in several concepts of development. It also gives a very dynamic character to the phenomenon. Societies may be more or less developed depending on the intensity of contradictions within them.

African Development as the Resolution of Multipolar Conflicts

Conflict is inherent in inter-human and inter-societal relations. It is self-evident that no two or more human beings can occupy the same space at one and the same time, nor can they consume the same unit of air or water for instance. Even when they share certain items the possibilities of sharing are not infinite. These considerations give rise to conflict. The inherent conflictual nature of human interactions means that contradiction or conflicts can never be abolished. As such, development is a never-ending process. It must be emphasized, however, that the distinction between human conflict and human co-operation and organization is not clear cut. The two are not mutually exclusive. There is conflict in organization and organization in conflict.

The conceptualization of African development as conflict resolution is, nevertheless, realistic. As a result of the above poles of conflict within the African states, conflict is, more than consensus, the reality of the African domestic scene. In addition, the inclusion of non-national groups in the social system of the African states, in many cases, was not by mutual agreement. Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism were largely the vehicles through which these groups have been introduced. In external affairs, imperialism, spheres of influence, military sites, etc., which African states confront are largely involuntary and hence not derived through mutual consent.

Unless conflict is thus emphasized, these divisive elements and involuntary interactions which are the significant factors for understanding Africa are left out of analyses. The alternative consensus approach has a self-fulfilling prophetic dimension because what is examined presupposes a high degree of social cohesion and interaction. Such traits, however, are confined to largely homogeneous national systems which in this historical epoch are the goal and not the reality of the African scene.

Although African development faces the problem of resolving multipolar conflicts, the tendency of African leaders has been to emphasize the conflict between the economic realities of their states and the welfare aspirations of their people to the neglect of the other areas of conflict. Their consciousness of impoverishment *vis-a-vis* the wealthy countries of the world has given an aura of frenzied immediacy to their conception of social changes almost exclusively in terms of concrete evidence of improvements in the economic factors of production and in the material wealth of the population. Another reason why African leaders tend to emphasize economic development to the neglect of general human development is that the propaganda of the advanced countries, in their ideological competition, has tended to portray development as an accoutrement rather than a necessary aspect of any society. Facts and figures on everything from consumer goods production to the rates of capital investment now serve as the evidence for the superiority of capitalism over socialism or socialism

over capitalism. Industrialization, increased *per capita* income and improved social amenities have become the hallmark of development.

The fact remains, however, that African states, compared to advanced states just before their take-off into economic prosperity, have graver problems. They contain more varied and fundamental structural defects which conflict with economic development. The removal of these defects must precede economic development. On the other hand, partial development characterized by imitative modernism in the economic field may exacerbate conflicts in other areas and in the long-run jeopardize general development as well as genuine economic development. African development must, therefore, be regarded as the dynamic and sustained resolution of the multiple poles of conflict and potential conflict within the African states.

IV

The Link between African Conflicts and Foreign Intervention

How are African conflicts linked with external intervention in African affairs? The connecting links are the linkage groups with roots in both the African domestic system and in the advanced countries. Their existence has virtually neutralized the initial resistance to becoming involved in the internal affairs of other states which every potential intervening power suffered from. Consequently, big powers may intervene to protect the investments of their citizens or as in the Stanleyville intervention of 1964, to protect the lives of these citizens. The massive economic intervention of Western powers on behalf of the racist minority regimes of Southern Africa are in part the consequence of the close affinity between the white population of these countries and those of Europe and America. Similarly, it took a great deal of bloodshed to detach the French from Algeria, and Portugal is anachronistically hanging on to its African territories because of the existence of such linkage groups.

When, for example, on 11 May, 1964, Tunisia proposed to take over all land then held by French companies and individuals, French reaction was immediate and far-reaching. On 13 May, France cut off all financial aid to Tunisia, and on 9 June denounced the 1959 preferential tariff trade treaty with Tunisia and reimposed a five per cent tariff on imports of Tunisian wine. As nearly half of Tunisia's exports went to France, the French government's decision was bound to have grave repercussions upon the Tunisian trading position.¹² This and British hostility toward Tanzania following its post-Arusha nationalization of major industries illustrate big power intervention in Africa when interests of their linkage groups are affected.

Apart from the linkage groups introduced into the African states as a result of colonialism, others have resulted from the imperative needs of

¹²Report on Foreign Affairs (April, May, June 1964), p. 136.

development. Given the high emphasis of African leaders on economic development and the lack of domestic resources for this development, African Governments have invited loans, investments, grants and technical assistance from external sources to supplement domestic resources. But technical assistance programmes, cultural exchange programmes, foreign investment enterprises, etc., involve informal access by agents of the advanced countries to the population and political processes of the African states.

The roots which these groups have in Africa are much weaker than those which they have in the advanced countries because the latter constitute their base and core of activities with the African sector being largely peripheral. Since these advanced countries are more powerful than the African states and the African states need the roots of these linkage groups more than the groups need the African scene, the influence of these advanced countries in Africa is bound to be strong.¹³ This influence is fully utilized because the advanced countries wish to control the direction of African development.

The impact of these external influences on the domestic African scene could be minimized if the African states were cohesive and their governments stable. On the contrary, many African regimes do not exert effective control over the internal forces of their state systems. Consequently, in many of these countries, the linkage group is more relevant to the individual African than the African government itself; the case of Union Miniere in Katanga is a good example. Through such groups, the advanced countries have the opportunity to greatly influence activities within the African states.

A linkage group becomes more susceptible to inputs from abroad if its ties to the African system are weak as, for example, when non-citizens of the African state constitute such linkage groups. The same effect is produced if the size of their inputs into the domestic environment is large.¹⁴ In other words, Africanization of the linkage groups reduces the impact of external influences while increased investment and foreign aid increase their impact. A comparison of post-Arusha Tanzania and Kenya in this regard is illuminating. This is a genuine reason for the nationalization of expatriate enterprises in African states.

As a result of the increased and increasing interdependence of the significant operative forces in the world, the existence of linkage groups is not confined to the African states. Practically all countries contain such groups in varying degrees. It is this fact that has impelled some people to assert that the world is becoming more international in outlook.

¹³Karl W. Deutsch in R. Barry Farrel, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 8-11.

As Karl Deutsch and Amitai Etzioni have, however, argued, increased interdependence of units of the international system has not yielded increased internationalism.¹⁵ Deutsch's explanation is that in many countries the social mobilization of the domestic environment has also increased. Its rate of increase is, however, greater than that of the interdependence of nation-states. And since increased domestic social mobilization yields increased nationalism, internationalism is growing more slowly than nationalism.

While this explanation may be valid for the advanced countries of the world, in Africa it is invalid. The opposite is rather the case. Social mobilization is increasing more slowly than the dependence of these states on other non-African states. For them, the tendency, therefore, is to be more internationalistic than the advanced countries. Thus, African peoples are much quicker to adopt European and American modes of life than the latter are to adopt African or Asian life styles. In order to avoid the increased exploitation of Africa by the increasing nationalism of the advanced countries, African internationalism must give way to African nationalism.

This growing nationalism of the advanced countries means that increasingly their external behaviour will be dictated by the imperatives of their national interest above any international interest. Foreign policies are first and foremost in the service of national domestic needs. These, however, may not be compatible with the developmental needs of the African peoples. The degree and nature of their external involvements are inevitably related to the relative benefits and costs to their domestic situation before any considerations are made regarding the benefits and costs to the African states.

Thus informal access to an African state may serve the advanced countries as a means to gather intelligence, harass and weaken the African government, influence or divide the African public opinion, seize political power, accede to power legally and paralyze and influence the domestic and/or foreign policy of the African state. Whichever activity is engaged in depends not on the genuine desires and needs of the African people, but rather on the needs and desires of the people of the advanced countries. Thus Russian informal access into Hungary led to its establishment of the puppet Kadar regime to sanction its 1956 intervention in that country. Similarly the Americans have maintained a stream of puppet regimes in South Vietnam to facilitate their intervention in the affairs of the Vietnamese people and Belgium set up the puppet Tshombe regime in Katanga in 1960.

The facilitation of external intervention by the advanced countries in the affairs of the African states as a result of the increased interdependence of world forces, and the existence of linkage groups from the advanced countries in these new states poses a serious problem for African develop-

¹⁵For Deutsch's explanations, see *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17. For Amitai Etzioni's discussion, see Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society*, chapters 19 and 20.

ment. These developments coincide with and reinforce the mounting pressures for radical changes in situations of multipolar conflicts in the African states. Such radical changes and multipolar conflict present the ideological blocs of the contemporary international system, who are desirous of guiding African development with opportunities for strategic expansion that do not involve the high risks of reaching the self-destructive levels of conflict which they fear. Thus external imperial ambitions of the big powers combine with domestic conditions of conflict and instability to give an unprecedented prominence to the inter-relationship between African development and contemporary world politics. Big powers through the linkage groups take advantage of African conflicts to promote their international interests.

The linkage groups have access to the populations of the African states. This access makes it possible for them to be involved on one side or the other of the conflicting currents within these states. Since these groups have roots in the advanced countries and their activities thus are beneficial to the population of these advanced countries, the tendency is for the governments of these countries, in supporting the linkage groups, to take sides as well in inter-African and intra-state conflicts in Africa. It is no coincidence, for example, that Belgian intervention in the Congo against Lumumba was preceded by the support of Belgian mining and other interests for Katanga's secession.

Thus a new development has taken place in the contemporary world. It is the external management, by the advanced countries, of internal conflicts in the new states of Africa and Asia. With the rise of overall strategies on a large scale, such as the assertion that American national policy is to promote and secure a structure of world relationships compatible with the values of the U.S. and the West, in addition to the Soviet desire to lead an international socialist society, local control, and idiosyncratic factors in the African states can no longer be allowed to influence events. Tshombe, Ghenye, etc. must remain instruments in the service of the projected *pax Americana*, socialist solidarity under Soviet hegemony or other big power interests.

V

The Consequences of Foreign Intervention for African Development

Of course, external intervention in African affairs has very deleterious effects on African development defined in terms of the resolution of the multiple poles of conflict in the African states. External intervention may not only increase the poles of conflict in Africa, it may also exacerbate existing conflicts and make them more difficult to settle. In addition, it may encapsulate conflicts and prevent them from being successfully resolved. In the Ethiopia-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia disputes, external intervention motivated by big power confrontation in the area unsuccessfully sought to encapsulate these conflicts.

Marshall Sahlins, an anthropologist, has pointed out that if the lineage-spatial distance between groups is small then peace is more effectively waged. This is because of the felt moral obligation to settle disputes which more closely related groups usually have, as well as the fact that the opposed parties are fewer in number. However, the greater the degree of segmental distance, as a result, for example, of external intervention, the more intensively war is waged because of the disinclination to settle, the high probability for mutual misunderstanding of the conflicting interests and the size of the opposing parties which increase proportionately. Such conflicts are, therefore, more difficult to settle.¹⁶

Foreign intervention in the violent conflicts of the African states means also that large-scale weapons' technology is introduced as instruments for conflict resolution. By 1964, for example, the Soviet Union had placed several Mig-15s in Somalia; and in the neighbouring Ethiopia, with whom Somalia had a live border dispute, the Ethiopian Air Force had a squadron of F-86 supplied by the United States.¹⁷

Herbert Marcuse has discussed fully the consequences of the increased use of technology on violent conflicts. Under such circumstances, the act of killing is divorced from its consequences. The feelings of the individual are not related to his violent acts.¹⁸ It is thus much easier to drop bombs on civilian targets from many feet above the targets.

Another consequence of foreign intervention is the weakening of the target state. A country consumed by civil war, for example, is too weak and powerless to ward off the designs of an outside power. Usually, a severe curtailment of its independence and its virtual elimination for a period of time as an effective member of the international system are the consequences of prolonged foreign intervention in a civil conflict. The Congolese experience in this regard is illuminating. Usually, big power intervention in the affairs of smaller states is put forward as a means to promote the development of the target. More realistically however, such interventions are dictated by, among other things, the requirements of big power international politics, and the low costs and high profits which characterize such actions. The fact is that the technique of informal attack compared to those of conventional attack as a means towards the achievement of political objectives is extremely effective under favourable conditions. The political situation of low cohesion, economic underdevelopment and political instability provides a set of such circumstances. It depends on the vigour, skill and inventiveness of a relatively small group of people and as such is relatively

¹⁶M. D. Sahlins, "The Segmentary Lineage: An Organization of Predatory Expansion", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 63, April 1961, pp. 332-333.

¹⁷John L. Sutton & Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms to Developing Countries 1945-1965" in *Adelphi Papers*, No. 28, Oct. 1966, (London, Institute for Strategic Studies), p. 11.

¹⁸See H. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston, Mass., Beacon Press, 1964), chapters 3, 6, 9, 10. For a general theoretical background to Marcuse's ideas, see H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (N.Y., Random House, 1965).

economical. The time required for informal attack is modest; it offers flexibility in the sense that there are numerous alternative ways of operation; and allows for a quick and uncomplicated disengagement when this is called for.

The fact that most informal attacks are covert means that the psychological and political penalties incurred by the aggressors may not be obvious and as such would be relatively low. To these advantages of informal attack is added the fact that several features of the contemporary international environment, such as the nuclear stalemate, the ideological struggle and the general interdependence of states encourage aggression by the big powers against the new states of the Third World. Thus informal access is divorced from the imperatives of development in the African states and rather than serve the cause of African development, the assistance which the major powers extend to Africa inevitably helps to frustrate African development.

In recognition of the development decade scheduled to end in 1970, the UN General Assembly set a minimum target to be achieved by the new states at a five per cent annual rate of growth of real GDP per head. But in 1966, in sixteen African countries with more than a quarter of the total 1966 population of Africa, annual rates of growth of real GDP per head were negative between 1960 and 1966. In a further eight countries comprising some 20 per cent of the 1966 population, rates of growth were one per cent or less. And in yet another six countries with more than 28 per cent of the 1966 population the growth rates were between one and two per cent. In the remaining twelve countries comprising rather more than one quarter of the 1966 population, the rate was more than two per cent. Thus if allowance is made for the rate of increase in population which averaged some 2.5 per cent per annum over the period for developing Africa as a whole, one of the evident implications of the above is that very few, if any, African countries are likely to attain by 1970 the target increase of five per cent per annum set for the first UN Development Decade in spite of the much-vaunted aid from the advanced countries.¹⁹

If, as has been argued above, the international activities of a state are primarily motivated by the domestic requirements of its population, then the external economic activities of a state must be and usually are dictated largely by the economic wishes of its members, especially but not solely in states with market economies. Consequently, it is impossible to expect assistance to the degree required to ensure the necessary development of the African states while still allowing these states a measure of political independence. A very large portion of investments and assistance inevitably must be utilized for development projects geared towards infrastructural

¹⁹J. Pickett, "An Assessment of Economic Development in Africa in the 1960's", in *The African-American Dialogues, Background Papers*, first conference held in Nairobi, Kenya, 1968. Pickett /5.

transformation that will not yield any short run profit to these advanced countries. And the members of these countries are not very willing to wait for the long term profits unless they can manipulate the government in such a way as to ensure that such profits are eventually realized. Even when such manipulation is possible, it is still not certain that sufficient investment and aid may be extended.

As far as the Western capitalist countries are concerned, African states constitute a potential rather than present area of meaningful economic activities. The lack of industrial structure, the growing shortage of foreign exchange which endangers the remission of profits, and the underdeveloped capitalist relations of production make these states comparatively unattractive for foreign manufacturing concerns except in those few countries such as Gabon, Zambia and Congo, etc., with some strategically important mineral resources. It is only in South Africa that conditions favour the capitalist countries in their economic operations. This explains why in spite of the inhuman activities of the government of South Africa, Western investments in that country are very much greater than in any other African state. Real economic development can only be aided by the West if it will yield economic benefits to their peoples. Thus, for example, South Africa alone accounted for nearly 30 per cent of U.S. direct investment on the African continent by the end of 1966. New investment during 1966 in South Africa was the highest over five years and represented about 43 per cent of new U.S. direct investment in all the fifty nations and territories of the continent in 1966.²⁰

Secondly, the new African states economically are only peripheral to Western capitalist interests. The core of such interests remains practically the industrialized countries of the West. It is in these areas that the bulk of capitalist investments is channelled. Attention devoted to African and other states is only secondary and insignificant and such that the slightest incompatibility between the interests of this periphery and core would mean an obvious sacrificing of the peripheral interests. Thus, for example, in 1966 the net U.S. direct investment in Africa, excluding South Africa and Libya, amounted to only 2.5 per cent of total U.S. overseas investment in that year.²¹

Although as a result of their colonial history most African countries are largely dependent on the West for capital investments, there is no indication that what has been said above might be different if the Eastern European countries predominated. In fact, the experience of the Eastern European satellite countries in their economic relations with the Soviet Union indicates that the situation would have been the same if not worse.²²

²⁰F. T. Ostrander, "U.S. Private Investment in Africa" in *The African-American Dialogues*, op. cit., Ostrander /6.

²¹Ibid., Ostrander /7.

²²See Mamadou Dia, *The African Nations and World Solidarity* (N.Y., Praeger, 1961), pp. 41-55.

In the socialist system of Europe, the Soviet Union has succeeded in making its partners dependent on it in many respects. Surplus Soviet food is shipped to these countries although they are largely agricultural. They in turn serve the Soviet Union as the providers of raw materials needed for the Soviet industries. As a result of such economic dependence by the satellites on the Soviet Union, the latter has literally reigned supreme in the system as master, appropriating key products, diverting trade to her own account, controlling the poles of development and imitating her capitalist rivals in reconstructing her economy at the expense of the normal growth of the other economies.

Even in its brief history of economic interaction with Africa, the Soviet record is not much better than that of the West. Her insistence on barter trade creates a situation where the primary products supplied by the African countries later find their way into the world market to compete with those from the same African country. This practice dictated by the Soviet search for foreign exchange eventually leads to the deterioration in the foreign exchange of the African state.²³

A genuine desire on the part of the advanced countries to aid African development would be evident in their activities in international trade that would increase the foreign earnings of African states as a means towards raising some of the capital necessary for development. But Soviet trade by barter arrangements greatly frustrates the African States' aspirations in this regard, and seeks by a new set of structural transformations to make the African economy dependent on the Soviet economy. It must be added also that as in the case of capitalist economy, the African states are only peripheral to the Soviet economy and as such suffer similar disadvantages.

The United States manipulates world prices of primary products through its control of international trade and money markets. Such manipulations are usually for military, political and cultural privileges and are definitely not in the interest of the foreign trade of the new African states.

In the areas of foreign aid, a similar lack of genuine concern for the imperatives of African development is noticeable. American foreign aid, for example, is much smaller than generally believed and never in the quantity needed to have a significant effect. Aid figures often indicate commitments and authorizations rather than actual disbursements. Furthermore, the United States tax payer and consumer benefits from the decline in prices paid for imported products especially when wholesale prices of U.S. exports rise. This decline in prices is linked to the purchase of U.S. goods produced or marketed abroad. U.S. domestic considerations predominate over African interests.

²³For a brief account of the nature of Soviet trade with Africa, see under the caption "Foreign Trade", K. Muller, "Soviet and Chinese Programmes of Economic and Technical Assistance to African Countries" in S. Hamrell and C. G. Widstrand, eds., *The Soviet Bloc: China and Africa*, (Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1964), pp. 108-114.

Similarly, Soviet aid to African states does not stem from the paramountcy of the needs for African development. The countries of the East give credits with favourable repayment terms and interests, sometimes lower than the international rate. But it is known that such assistance subjects the countries that receive it to an intolerable dependence by depriving them of the freedom to buy wherever they please, and forcing them to supply themselves from the lending countries almost exclusively. Such aid is primarily in the economic, as well as political, interests of the socialist countries.

Even if aid is beneficial to African development, the African states still cannot depend on it. In any case, the supply of external capital flowing to Africa is falling at precisely the time when its need is most acute. Official aid has not increased significantly for more than half a decade. The decline is now significant in the case of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. A reversal of the trend does not seem likely, at least in the next several years.²⁴

When the penetration of the African states is thus divested of its pretensions to assist African development, it is more clearly seen as primarily the consequence of the ideological and political struggle between the two blocs of the international system within the context of the nuclear balance of terror. It is even doubtful that such penetrations are designed to ensure African development along the lines of either of the blocs. Its negative character of emphasizing the rejection of the opposing ideology rather than the adoption of one's own ideology seems to point to the fact that these advanced countries are more interested in scoring some ideological and international political points than in guiding African development. Americans, for example, support many non-democratic regimes and the Soviets allow the persecution of communists in some countries they support.

External intervention in African affairs centres around the multiple poles of conflict within the African states; the successful resolutions of the conflicts constitute genuine African development. Since such interventions, however, are primarily motivated by the imperatives of international politics and not those of African development they inevitably lead to an increase in the poles of African conflict as well as the intensity of such conflict. The result is retrogression rather than development.

African leaders tend to react to this increased need for development by increasing their invitation to foreigners to aid economic development in their states. When such aid is given they facilitate further intervention which yields further dedevelopment and thus the need for more development. This way a vicious circle is established which not only makes African

²⁴F. T. Ostrander, *op. cit.*, Ostrander /9.

development impossible but also reduces the pre-existing level of development.

Under these circumstances the problem that is posed is how African development can take place in the context of the world configuration of states characterized, as has been shown, by the domination of the interests of the big powers, the nuclear stalemate between these two powers and the existence of African countries through which these super-powers can carry on their competition and conflict at a very low potential level of destructive violence to them and at a relatively low cost as well. How can the African states assert their sovereign wish to make their own choice between the two systems of development, to limit their imperialism while holding both of them accountable for their ideal claims? In this age of high interdependence and inter-penetration of states is genuine African development possible and if so, how can it be brought about? How can African states which are low in conventional resources of power and characterized by rapid and uncertain change which threatens the big powers prevent those powers from intervening and frustrating African development?

VI

Conclusion: National Self-Reliance as Imperative for African Development

While there has been a recognition that social development needs international peace, there has not been an equal recognition of the fact that the price of one is sometimes purchased at the cost of the other. However interrelated world development and world peace may be, they are neither historical nor conceptual equivalents. Rapid social development has in the past been accompanied not only by widespread economic and political upheaval, but also by wars affecting a large number of people. Today the desire for world peace is frustrating African development.

Unfortunately, however, practically all African countries with the exception of post-Arusha Tanzania are firm believers in the importance of external assistance for African development. As a result of the fact that African states entered a world dominated by industrial giants, a definite mystique of industrialization developed in them. Factories, hydroelectric plants and oil refineries as the very symbols of modernity were valued as such in addition to the economic roles they perform. Consequently in many areas more visible development projects which may not be worthwhile are preferred over needed and fundamental infrastructural projects whose effects may not be so visible. This emphasis on visibility is encouraged by advanced countries in their aid programmes because it suits their political purposes. Since the African states lack enough capital to establish these paraphernalia of modernity, a myth developed that has been propagated for a long time now, that external stimulants are very necessary to place African peoples into a take-off position.

An effect of this myth is the great influence which considerations of sources of foreign aid have on the development of the African states. The

foreign aid component of Ghana's 1963/64-1969/70 plans was around one-third, that of the Nigerian 1962-1968 plan nearly one-half, that of Niger and Mauritania almost one hundred per cent.²⁵ As was mentioned earlier, a basic problem of aid is that the donor and the recipient may have quite different reasons for their interaction. Precisely because the major powers are engaged in a cold war in which they perceive their national interests at stake, aid has become a highly political act divorced from the imperatives of development. Sekou Toure's call on the West and East to show that they stand for the liberation of Africa from poverty has been answered in the negative.²⁶ To emphasize external aid under these circumstances as important for African development is to make that development a matter for bargaining.

Genuine development, however, is the natural outcome of the resolution of the conflicts of forces within a society. It is not a matter which should be bargained. It may be postponed but such postponement in itself does not constitute development. Development involves a social order which is not only different but is also morally superior and politically more inclusive than the one men presently live under. The modern contraptions which serve for development in Africa and for which a big rationale for external aid exists may in fact serve to reinforce the existing social structure by showing how it is possible for a small section of the population to share in the goods of the scientific-technological world without altering the forms of human relations or the character of social production. In addition, the emphasis on aid leads to the continuation of the situation in which African states remain imitative in technology. Innovation becomes the near-exclusive property of the advanced nations. But without innovation development is impossible. Thus, as the Arusha Declaration has rightly pointed out, the emphasis of external aid as a means toward development is misplaced.²⁷ In the light of contemporary world politics it may even be dangerous. The international environment of the African states is hostile in this regard.

The greatest challenge to African development is posed by this hostility of the international environment which frustrates African development at the same time as it seeks to make African states dependent on non-African forces. But human beings living in a generally unfavourable environment are challenged to reorganize it to suit their own purposes. Their efforts stimulate them to devise more effective forms of self-organization. To change their environments, Africans must first of all recognize that imperialism, both the old military style and the new monetary variant is not only

²⁵See S. Carlson and O. Olakankpo, *International Finance and Development Planning in Africa* (Uppsala, 1964), p. 22.

²⁶S. Tours quoted in C. F. Adrian, "Democracy and Socialism" in D. E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (N.Y., The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 194.

²⁷*The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance* (Dar es Salaam, The Publicity Section of TANU, 1967), pp. 7-11.

morally reprehensible, but is also socially and economically deforming with regard to the general needs of a people.

African countries contain structural defects which can only be overcome by forceful economic and political actions original to them. To this effect, there is a great need for the creation of African development consciousness. Conceptions of development depend both on the fact of change and the consciousness of change. Thus development does not involve exclusively technological or natural resources. If this were the case, then what C. Wright Mills has referred to as overdevelopment would arise. Overdevelopment, as exists in the United States, is a situation in which the life style is dominated by the living standard, and in which the technical capacity to satisfy the existing needs exists but there is a shortage of the human instrumentalities to utilize such a capacity.²⁸ On the other hand, development is not exclusively one of the sociological or human resources. Otherwise, the situation of underdevelopment in which the life style is limited by the standard of living, as in Guinea, would persist. Development is rather the interrelation and interpretation of physical and socio-psychological resources.

For backward countries to enter the road of economic growth and social progress, the political framework of their existence must be revamped. Foreign aid cannot substitute for such a change but may only postpone it and make it more difficult in the future, and in the process would frustrate the legitimate aspirations of the people. Since the development process is itself a source of discontent which the masses blame on the government, the need to stimulate achievement and development motivations must be preceded by the need to diffuse existing discontent.

If political leaders are reactionary, selfish and corrupt, the masses are in turn dispirited and disenchanted. If they win the confidence of the country which they can do only by the vigorous elimination of class privileges and racial inequalities, they can inspire the masses with an enthusiasm for development. Oginga Odinga emphasized this point when he argued that the people of Kenya "need a deep source of inspiration in order that they may experience a sense of belonging to the nation and so be able to increase their productivity towards the development of the Kenyan nation."²⁹ The great enthusiasm of the Tanzanian people for national development, the sacrifices they have made in this regard and their very high identification with the nation since the Arusha Declaration is primarily the conse-

²⁸For Mill's concept of overdevelopment, see C. Wright Mills, "The Problem of Industrial Development", in I. L. Horowitz, ed., *Power, Politics and the People: The Collected Papers of C. Wright Mills* (N.Y. and London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1963).

²⁹*The Standard, Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, 14 May, 1969, p. 1.

quence of the inspiration which the leadership code of that Declaration infused into them.³⁰

Once the people have rallied behind a wise leadership in their mutual dedication to the development and cause of the nation, then the stage is set for the struggle to overcome the hostile international environment and ensure genuine development. It must be recognized that ultimately the greatest power available is the determined will of a people united in their determination and dedication to the success of a national cause. The Vietnamese people have shown that the conventional factors of power, such as military weapons and economically advanced base must yield to national cohesion and determination.

A united and dedicated nation can then tackle the problem of capital accumulation. Investment must be on a scale and of a type that is facilitated by the efforts of the new state and willing advanced countries according to the imperative needs of development. The emphasis is on the domestic rather than the external resources.

But unless class extremes are blunted, political agencies would be unable to regulate the total economy for social purposes. There are inherited philosophies of life to be fought. Bonds of caste, creed, tribe, and race are to be destroyed. In the process people who cannot keep up with the canons of development would have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated.

Where economic power is concentrated in the hands of a small group whose main interest is in the preservation of the *status quo*, prospects for economic development are very slight unless a social revolution effects a redistribution of income, and sizeable domestic investments in long time development projects are thus assured. In the African states, where the economy is controlled by a small group of expatriate banks and companies, confiscation by the state of significant sources of productivity is thus imperative. Such confiscation is therefore not based only on ideological purity but is often the quickest way to rapid development.

Domestically, as long as large areas of capital formation are in the hands of large scale entrepreneurs, expatriate or indigenous, it is inevitable that there will be an outright struggle between the monied sector and the rest of the society. Confiscation therefore unites a sizeable portion of the African population in a common historic endeavour and mobilizes the masses behind the political system. Thus the power of the state will increase and make it possible for the government to introduce useful changes. It is thus anti-traditional and beneficial to development. It may, however, directly affect foreign credit arrangements and jeopardize existing securities; but this

³⁰The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

is a small price to pay for the sustained general and overall development of the state which may result.

Confiscation helps to clear the blurred boundaries of the African states and makes it possible to remove the other significant elements which have contributed to the penetration of these states, namely foreign aid and foreign trade. In the area of trade, the terms of trade continue to operate to the disadvantage of the African states thus accentuating their balance of payment difficulties. This instability in the primary commodity trade affects their incomes and thus jeopardizes development plans designed on a long-term basis. The new powers of the governments resulting from the increased mobilization of the nation may be geared, in part, towards a foreign policy designed to eliminate obstacles, restrictions and discriminatory practices in world trade which, adversely affect the necessary expansion and diversification of their exports of primary and semi-manufactured goods. Diversification of the direction of trade is also essential.

Domestically the receipt from trade may be improved by the increased diversification of export products as well as the increase in the quantity produced. Innovation in the field of manufacturing must be encouraged to make agricultural products more relevant to the population in the form of substitutes for manufactured goods. This will help to increase the size of the internal market and cut down imports. The encouragement of African economic grouping will help to increase the market for African products and thereby minimize the excessive trade dependence of the continent on non-African forces.

As far as foreign aid is concerned, the emphasis must be to make the aid as relevant to African development as possible. But since it is virtually impossible to have aid which does not have some political strings attached to it, the use of foreign aid for development must be de-emphasized but not totally eliminated. There is no substitute for a national policy of self-reliance. In order to avoid an unnecessary dependence on any one advanced state, diversification of the sources of aid should be encouraged with an emphasis on the avoidance of the major participants in the cold war. Countries which have much more limited political interests in the international system should be the sources of the bulk of the aid to the African states. Only thus may the informal attack against African states which arises from access through foreign aid be minimized. Tanzania's experience in this regard raises the hopes that the hostility of the external environment resulting from contemporary world politics can be minimized in such a way that it does not frustrate African development.