

the stability of a regime is much easier to estimate than is the productivity of a community. Strength of the regime becomes the operational measure of 'political productivity'.

In the same vein they refuse to worry about the basic philosophical issues raised by their bargaining and self-aggrandizing assumptions about human nature. In all these respects—logic of social evolution, critical standpoint, and meaning for men's lives—the reader of the Ilchman-Uphoff model will do well to compare it with the development of underdevelopment literature which have a critical and philosophical potential which the Ilchman-Uphoff formulation lacks. At the same time political economists of the development of underdevelopment school ought to read this book, not just to 'know the enemy', but also to learn from him.

THEORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOUR IN AFRICA

NELSON KASFIR*

The study of administrative behaviour, one might assume, would be a central concern of researchers investigating the field of development administration. However, few aspects of the 'Dark Continent' have been the subject of less illumination than the internal operating characteristics of African bureaucracies themselves. The natural opposition of any group of people to approval of studies into their own behaviour provides only part of the answer. Of equal importance has been the failure of theorists to work out conceptual guidelines around which meaningful research designs could be formulated. I am not suggesting that useless theorizing has been the problem (though that has been the consequence of many of the elaborate models constructed to explain other aspects of development administration). On the contrary, the absence of theorizing has been the difficulty.

Many who have struggled through the tortured prose of the model-builders of this subfield may regard this inattention as a welcome development. But the absence of theory means either the absence of research, or research that is based on older, half-forgotten, half-disproved conceptions.¹

In this article I want to take a brief look at the failure to consider administrative behaviour as an important theoretical focus in developing countries, and then consider a variety of suggestions that could be united into two basic approaches to the examination of African administration. If research along these lines succeeds, the benefits that would follow from a better understanding of why civil servants act in the ways they do, could be extremely useful in improving the structure of policy formulation and implementation.

*Nelson Kasfir is an Instructor in Government at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, USA; he was formerly a Lecturer in Public Administration at Makerere University, Uganda. This article is based on a paper delivered to the Conference on Comparative Administration, Arusha, Tanzania (September, 1971). The author is grateful for comments made at the Conference as well as suggestions offered by V. Subramaniam, Larry Radway, and particularly Ken Prewitt.

1. '... we all use models in our thinking all the time, even though we may not stop to notice it. When we say that we 'understand' a situation, political or otherwise, we say in effect, that we have in our mind an abstract model, vague or specific, that permits us to parallel or predict such changes in that situation of interest to us.' Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, (Free Press: New York, 1965), p. 12.

THE FAILURE TO FOCUS ON ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOUR.

Over the past ten years there has been a wide, and (until recently) increasing volume of discussion of how best to conceptualize administration in developing countries. However, the major writers have tended to focus on an older question in the public administration literature—the accountability of administrators to the government and ultimately to the public. Indeed, the question has been raised whether the performance of administrators *ought* to be improved (assuming we know how to do that), since it could increase their ability to evade public control.²

Consider three leading examples of development administration theory: the work of Ralph Braibanti, Milton Esman and Fred Riggs. Much of Braibanti's work is concerned with the question of external technical assistance and the effect it has on internal administrative reform.³ Esman has initiated a major project to study 'institution-building'—the deliberate planning of new development-oriented institutions by leaders of new nations.⁴ Riggs is well known for his formulations of the impact of 'ecological' factors stemming from the political, social and economic environments upon the behaviour of civil servants.⁵

Each of these three approaches could have been extended to conceptualise internal administrative activity in spite of its emphasis on external influences. But none was, save in cursory fashion. Riggs' general hypothesis that in the absence of public checks bureaucrats maximize private interests carries the argument about as far as any of these theorists have done. It is a relatively simplistic hypothesis, insensitive to many variations in internal administrative structure, and has not itself been tested.⁶ Furthermore, given the fluid and changing nature of most political institutions in African countries, discussions which focus on external accountability are likely to lead to a dead end.

There are, however, sources from which we could construct guidelines to the study of African administration. In the first place there is an extensive body of literature on administrative behaviour and organisation theory based on studies carried out in Western Europe and United States. To test such propositions against African practices should not be dismissed out of hand, as many researchers and teachers in Africa have suggested. If local values and procedures differ from those of the West, the propositions considered will be falsified or restricted. If not, an enormous advantage is gained by being able to explain

2. Ferrel Heady, 'Bureaucracies in Developing Countries', in Fred Riggs, *Frontiers of Development Administration* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), p.464.
3. External Inducement of Political-Administrative Development: An Institutional Strategy, in Braibanti, *Political and Administrative Development*, (Durham: Duke University Press 1969), and 'Transnational Inducement of Administrative Reform: A Survey of Scope and Critique of Issues,' in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin, *Approaches to Development: Policies, Administration and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).
4. *The Institution Building Concepts—An Interim Appraisal*, (Pittsburgh: Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, 1967)
5. The argument is most fully brought out in *Administration in Developing Countries*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964). He has recently restated his approach in 'The Structures of Government and Administrative Reform' in Braibanti, *Political and Administrative Development*.
6. See Nelson Kasfir, 'Prismatic Theory and African Administration', *World Politics*, vol. 21, no. 2, (January 1969), pp. 311—13.

consequences through the existing literature without having to repeat all the studies which comprise it. In any event the use of existing studies tells us where we might find some interesting and useful results.⁷ Furthermore, there are some investigations that have been carried out in African countries, as well as a variety of general observations on African administrative behaviour. From these sorts of materials we can outline the parameters of the problem and gain a sense of direction for further research.

Two general approaches which gather together many studies concerned with administrative behaviour could be called the 'productivity' approach and the 'decisional premises' approach. Each asks a different question about administrative activity. The productivity approach focuses on inputs and outputs in a manner parallel to the work of economists. The basic issue here is how to increase the output of administrators without increasing the input into the civil service structure by the same margin (if at all). The decisional premises approach focuses on the specific factors (or premises) that a particular administrator takes into account when he acts to formulate or implement a policy. The basic issue here is to determine what influences are actually governing administrative decisions. While the productivity approach focuses on the consequences of the administrative process, the decisional premises approach concentrates on the internal dynamics of a particular department, divisional office, or ministry headquarters. Naturally, the combination of both approaches will yield a more useful understanding of administrative behaviour. But it is better to avoid confusion at the beginning by separately examining the rather different problems that each must confront.

THE PRODUCTIVITY APPROACH.

If development means that significant changes in attitudes, demands and activities of large groups of citizens will constantly occur, the nature of effective administration may have to change as well. Bureaucracies established by colonial powers, and new administrative techniques mindlessly imported from them, may turn out to be unproductive. Or as suggested below, an important distinction may have to be drawn between departments whose basic tasks are uncertain and constantly changing, and those whose tasks are relatively fixed and repetitive.

In order to reduce this question to manageable terms, it would be useful to consider how we might measure the productivity of administrative units. We need to find some way to relate the work civil servants do to its actual impact on the public, to link administrative inputs to governmental outputs.

In this sense productivity is measured by effectiveness and efficiency. The first question that any researcher, government official, or citizen wants answered is:

7. David Leonard has tested Theodore Caplow's theory of organisational effectiveness (which was developed in industrialized countries) in Kenya, and shows that it is useful, but must be modified to include size of work group before the relationships become statistically significant. 'A test of Organisation Theory on Agricultural Extension Work Group in Kenya.' (Conference on Comparative Administration, Arusha, September, 1971).

'Does it work? Is it a success'? That is, was the policy effective in achieving the goal government intended or, more complexly, the goal government would have intended had it known what would happen? There is greater productivity when output is increasing, Effectiveness is a crude measure of productivity, because it does not take costs into account. Success at too high a price, however, is still success.

The next step is to compare input to output in order to develop a measure of the efficiency of the administration. If output goes up while input remains constant, productivity has risen in a more sophisticated sense than was possible to measure when considering effectiveness alone. Since most organisations—and government administration is no exception—tend to expand, that is the inputs consumed tend to rise over time, their output must rise at an even faster rate in order to increase productivity. The notion is directly parallel to wage negotiation in industry where workers demand higher wages due to inflation and management attempts to link increases to greater output per unit of time.

Unfortunately, unlike the industrial situation administrative inputs and outputs are extremely difficult to measure. Improved agricultural production may result from higher prices offered to farmers, better weather or more effective assistance from extension agents. To sort out which of these inputs actually contributes to higher output will be problematic at best. The wider our field of comparison the more complex this problem becomes, as new considerations of culture, governmental structure, education and language must be taken into account.

Administrative inputs can be measured in terms of their costs in money and time in spite of these problems. For example, the cost of tax collection can be compared with the revenue acquired. But, a government may be able to justify a tax whose administration costs more than the additional revenues collected. It may wish to demonstrate that it treats all of its citizens equally even though the additional effort costs more than it is 'worth'; or it may attempt to 'penetrate' a new area of the country. Thus while we must proceed cautiously, since governments employ a variety of criteria, it would be extremely useful to begin to assess productivity with the crude but clear measure that money provides.

The inputs into Kenyan administration have been quantified in preliminary fashion in order to show that 'general' administrative expenses declined slightly between 1964 and 1968 while salary and other payments relating to the administration of health and education rose in terms of total GDP.⁸ These figures must be broken down into functional or 'program' categories and differentiated in terms of different types of regions to make them more meaningful. They could also be analyzed to compare different mixes of senior and junior officials in the same department but in different areas in terms of total salary and other pay-

8. Henry Bienen, 'The Economic Environment,' in Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Okumu, *Development Administration: the Kenyan Experience* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 53—54.

ments.⁹ The information on which to base such analyses is easily available in public documents in many African countries.¹⁰

Another way of conceiving of administrative inputs along a single measuring rod is to analyze the ways in which civil servants spend their time. There are many styles of administration at each level in the hierarchy. Taking a single level, it is possible to compare the administrators who spend most of their time in their offices (subdivided into those who see clients, and/or other officials and those who do not), those who are constantly touring their district, and those who return frequently to the capital city (perhaps subdivided into those who go back to consult senior officials and those who return to enjoy urban life). Which type of administrator is associated with successful and increasing policy outputs? By using time as the dependent variable to compare administrative inputs, we may gain insight into why certain areas adopt new crops faster than others, introduce more co-operative primary societies and the like.

Measuring output is no easier than measuring input but equally essential, if meaningful statements about productivity are to be made. Administrative output does not refer to the number of files examined or memoranda written. 'Paper productivity' is only a means (or sometimes a deterrent) to achieving policy goals in any field. True productivity means advances in agriculture, health, education or industry by governmental action. One test might be to ask knowledgeable civil servants to compare ministries in terms of their ability to handle problems. During the Obote years the Ministry of Animal Industry, Game and Fisheries often received praise as the most 'successful' ministry in Uganda. One could then, examine differences in administrative inputs between the 'successes' and the 'failures' for possible causes.

Often African administrators think in quantitative terms in expressing the productivity of a ministry or department. For example, the Director of Public Prosecutions in Uganda noted that the average detection and successful prosecution rate averaged 45% of the number of reported complaints to the police in developing countries, but amounted to only 20% in Uganda.¹¹ This is a statement about the productivity of the Ugandan Criminal Intelligence Department and the explanations of administrative inadequacy offered by the D.P.P. attempted to link inadequacies in administrative behaviour of officers to the low rate of crime control.

Ultimately input-output analysis can only spotlight significant relationships

9. An interesting comparison of different ratios of agricultural officers and field extension agents (Agricultural and Field Assistants) in Uganda is presented in E.R. Watts, 'Extension Staff Organisation in Uganda' (Conference on Comparative Administration, Arusha, September, 1971), pp.11—12, 26—27.
10. Analysis of this data would be greatly enriched by a statistical analysis of the Government Staff List. A profile for the higher Ugandan Public Service is currently being worked out by Garth Glentworth and Nelson Kasfir.
11. *Uganda Argus*, 13 December 1971, p. 1. Mr. G. J. Masika, the D.P.P., might feel better about Uganda's seemingly poor performance in light of the record of the New York City police. 'In 1969, according to a report of the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, arrests were made in only 18 per cent of reported robberies, 7 per cent of burglaries and 6 per cent of grand larcenies. Only 32 per cent of those arrested were found guilty of any charge. Of these, only 7.4 per cent received sentences of more than a year, and 42 per cent didn't go to jail at all, receiving suspended sentences.' Tom Buckley, 'Murphy among the "Meat-Eaters"' *New York Times Magazine* (19 December, 1971), p. 47.

or deviations from expected norms. This approach to productivity offers no casual propositions to *explain* why those relationships exist. However, there are other approaches to the problem of productivity which attempt to do so. Riggs' argument that administrators tend to work inefficiently when political accountability by external institutions is low is an hypothesis about their productivity. It could be tested by comparing two parallel agencies — perhaps Co-operative Ministries—in countries with different levels of outside political controls. The amount of auditing per government official of the financial records of co-operative societies would provide a useful quantitative measure. Or, two regions in the same country staffed in different patterns might provide an interesting 'field experiment'.

A more radical perspective on productivity in developing countries is taken by those who argue that bureaucracy and development do not go together. The essence of this position is that bureaucracy works well in a society in which tasks have a high degree of predictability, clients are willing to accept decisions based on general rules rather than the merits of their cases, and officials are satisfied with incremental responses in adapting policy to a slowly changing environment.¹² If this 'bureaucratic style' is adopted by developing countries in which fundamental changes are anticipated, it will be unproductive, or even counterproductive. Administrative techniques that work well in an industrialised country consume a large fraction of skilled manpower with negligible results in developing countries according to this view.¹³ Thus, in the case of Kenya—it is argued—the bureaucratic style will create problems for development administration when it characterizes technical ministries which bear a prime responsibility for initiating and managing the development process.¹⁴

While this argument has a certain surface plausibility, it mistakes change for development. Some aspects of development will require an administrative apparatus capable of turning out a predictable rule-oriented performance on a day-to-day basis. In other cases development will require a flexible agency capable of initiating large-scale changes. The two sides of the development process are related in complex ways which vary from one situation to another. Compare for example the problems involved in the introduction of a new cash crop involving small risks and small, but certain, material returns for farmer and another new crop in which the risks are high and so is pay-off—if the farmer follows a complex routine carefully. If adoption of both is important enough to the government, it may opt for introducing the two crops through departments organized in entirely different ways—the farmer emphasizing a bureaucratic style, the latter focusing on a more *ad hoc* personalised, approach using highly trained senior officials in the field to 'sell' the program.

12. Bernard B. Schaffer, 'The Deadlock in Development Administration' in Colin Leys, *Politics and Change in Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

13. Warren F. Ilchman, 'The Unproductive Study of Productivity: Public Administration in Developing Nations', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2 (July 1968), pp. 234–36

14. Robert H. Jackson, 'Administration and Development in Kenya: A Review of Problems Outstanding', in Hyden, Jackson and Okumu, *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, p. 330 no. 8. See also pp. 324, 329–30.

Thus, we might increase productivity by organising administrative agencies in terms of two fundamentally different styles depending upon the task. Operating a successful telephone system, social security scheme, or tax office may require more bureaucracy than is now found in many African administrative structures. On the other hand, change-oriented agencies like development planning and national development corporations may require a great deal less. There is a limit, however, to the extent to which any African country is able or likes to organise change-oriented agencies. These 'rational-productivity bureaucracies'¹⁵ are voracious consumers of the most highly qualified professional people in the country and demand the greatest autonomy from direct governmental control.

THE DECISIONAL PREMISES APPROACH.

If we turn from the issue of the contribution that administrators make toward the achievement of government goals to the internal dynamics of making and implementing policy, a new range of concerns must be examined. In this approach the premises of administrators are the considerations that enter their calculations, as each makes decisions—whether large or small. As Herbert Simon argued, these premises involve a mixture of facts and values.¹⁶ To an important—though varying—extent they reflect the pattern of substantive policy, operating procedures, and the set of 'decision rules'¹⁷ that have grown up over the previous period. Just as much of the government budget of any country cannot be changed from year to year, so fixed is the range of options available to a civil servant. The degree of available discretion will vary according to country, position, ministry and situation. Thus, the freedom of civil servants to personally determine the premises on which they base their decisions is a question for research.

The premises of different administrators are integrated in two ways. First, the process of decision-making requires that they co-ordinate their activities with those of other officials (and certain outsiders) who are involved in the same policy. There are two problems, though, that immediately complicate any approach that focuses on the decision as the unit of analysis. One is the difficulty in isolating the 'critical decision' from the many others that led up to it.¹⁸ The

15. Warren F. Ilchman, 'Productivity, Administrative Reform and Antipolitics: Dilemmas for Developing States,' in Braibanti, *Political and Administrative Development*, pp. 474–49.

16. *Administrative Behaviour 2nd ed.*, (New York: Free Press, 1965) pp.45–60. See also, Martin Landau, 'Development Administration and Decision Theory,' in Edward Weidner, *Development Administration in Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 86–88.

17. For a discussion of decision rules (general principles for allocation resources without paying close attention to the specifics of a program) see Warren F. Ilchman, 'Decision Rules and Decision Roles: Some thoughts on the Explanation of Productivity and the Productivity of Explanation,' (Conference on Comparative Administration, Arusha, September 1971), pp. 39–49.

18. William R. Dill, 'Administrative Decision-Making', in Sidney Mailick and Edward H. Van Ness, *Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behaviour* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp.34–36, 42–47.

other is that in many situations an administrator solves or copes with a problem by ignoring it, that is by making no decision. Unfortunately, the absence of a decision is rarely as clean-cut as the making of one. While these obstacles may be difficult to overcome, it would be foolish to dismiss an approach which focuses on the central activity—making decisions—for which servants are supposed to be responsible.

The second form of integration of the premises of administrators is the social system that grows out the formal administrative structure and that involves them as members. This system is the set of closely interrelated roles involved in the administrative activities being investigated by the researcher, and felt to cohere by a consensus of the participants. The existence of coherence does not necessarily mean that the level of harmony or the smooth co-operation of members of the unit will be high. The boundaries of this sort of system will probably be fuzzy, though the participants will usually know its limits. Thus, the overall problem is to determine what decisions are being made *within* a specified social system.¹⁹

However, external considerations will undoubtedly play an important role in the premises that an administrator brings with him to his work. In spite of strictures on the non-political nature of the civil service in several African countries, national political disputes will often find their way into policy formulation. Child rearing practices, political socialisation patterns in schools and client demands will affect the premises of administrators. Fundamental cultural patterns may vary among ethnic groups. These could condition administrative responses in ways that are easily overlooked. Ability to get along in a hierarchy may vary in terms of traditional political organisation. Willingness to trust others and to take risks may also vary ethnically. Obviously, the level of education, religion and length of exposure to urban influence are only a few of the additional variables that may turn out to be important.

All of these considerations become important only insofar as they actually affect the premises on which an administrator is prepared to act. Of equal and perhaps greater importance—as a number of bodies in Western Europe and America have demonstrated—is the influence of internal arrangements: the way in which individual workers or civil servants interact among themselves. The work of the 'human relations' school and the 'dysfunctionalists'²⁰ has brought out the importance of informal organisation in shaping decisions that superiors thought they were controlling.

For example, a study of miners working under hazardous conditions showed how they were able to evade many of the rules established by management.²¹ In a state government office in America agents responded to the tighter supervision exercised by superiors who were responsible for assessing their performance by rarely consulting them for advice. Instead, they went to their less experi-

19. See Nicos Mouzelis, *Organisation and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Modern Theories* (London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 166—70.

20. Mouzelis, *ibid.*, contains a useful discussion of the theories of these two groups of investigators.

21. Alvin Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

enced co-workers.²² In a third study workers who produced too much in order to gain extra pay were ostracized by their compatriots until they accepted the rate of production deemed a 'fair day's work'.²³

These findings not only indicate that the social system may affect the behaviour of its members, but also have a special relevance to African administrative situations from which parallel examples can be put forward. Ugandan public servants assigned to the remote area of Bwamba (bordering on the Republic of Zaire) during the Rwenzururu secession movement were likely to act in a different manner from their counterparts in more peaceful areas closer to ministry headquarters in Kampala. Tanzanian civil servants may be less willing to consult their superiors on professional questions when the latter are high party officials who must conform to changes in party policy. And, as everywhere else, African civil servants may find ways to make unpleasant the life of colleagues who insist on staying in their offices after official hours to complete their assignments.

There is a further consideration that makes these findings pertinent to the discussion here. All of them can be brought together in a general (though not comprehensive) explanation of administrative behaviour. In each example the actors attempted to retain as much freedom of manoeuvre as they could, while restricting other groups to as predictable a set of responses as they could manage.²⁴ In other words they are involved in power struggles and conflicts with other members of their social system. To examine these opens up a range of behaviour that has not been studied in African administration.

Reliance on this approach requires the researcher to think of the administrative unit as a miniature political system which may or may not be concerned with the issues of national politics. The conflicts in which actors in this system find themselves and the ways in which they resolve those conflicts become the central focus of investigation. To the disputes each actor will bring the political resources he can amass.²⁵ These are often closely related to the areas of activity that are not restricted by rules (at least not by those that are actually enforced). In most cases the subordinate is trying to evade the control of his superior, while the superior is attempting to use regulations to determine that the subordinate does what he or higher authorities are demanding.²⁶ Control over critical points in the communications network and over expert knowledge are important resources. Thus, expatriates in technical positions whose knowledge cannot be challenged by local civil servants, and who enjoy preferential access to higher officials may exercise power out of proportion to their numbers.

The important question concerns the uses made of the power resources, not the resources themselves. They may be used to form bargaining strategies which

2. Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955).

23. George C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), pp. 48—80.

24. This is the basic proposition put forward by Michael Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 156.

25. For a discussion of the notion of 'political resources' see Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961) pp. 223—67.

26. The imposition of new decision rules is an important tactic that superiors can employ. See footnote 17.

permit the individual or the faction to which he belongs to gain additional power, carry out some desired objective, or avoid being involved in a policy that may have dangerous consequences for the civil servants administering it. Even where a strategy is engaged in for completely personal reasons, it is likely to be cloaked with a public policy rationale of some sort. Thus, a close reading of official actions taken and justifications offered by civil servants, may give insight into the manoeuvring for position by different groups.

From this perspective the question of policy innovation—a significant concern for development administration—takes on a new meaning. Innovation will almost always mean increasing the power of one administrative body while reducing that of another. Thus, it is threatening and therefore blocked by those who will be restricted by it. The conflict between the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture and the planners over the adoption of the transformational or improvement approach to agricultural change involved just this issue. So did the planners' attempt to take the negotiation of foreign aid projects out of the hands of the Treasury.²⁷ If innovatory policies are not intended to die on the vine, national leaders have to give political muscle, that is, power resources, to the agency which is charged with pursuing the new goal.

CONCLUSION.

The argument of this paper has been that little empirical investigation based on even the most minimal theory has been directed to questions of African administrative behaviour. The work of development administration theories has focused on the influence of environment on administration and not on administration itself. The two approaches suggested here—productivity and decisional premises—could serve as bases to study administrative behaviour.

Of the two the productivity approach is more likely to interest national leaders and thus provide opportunities for research clearance. It has a more 'practical' and 'applied' cast to it than the decisional premises approach. The questions it raises mirror those raised by high political figures. Increasing output through government action is a good way to define development administration from their point of view.

But, if there are no short-cuts to development, there probably are few to certain knowledge of administrative performance.

Study of the influences that determine the premises on which civil servants act and how this affects their interaction will be necessary to explain why a particular pattern of organisation is more highly productive than another. This sort of research is extremely costly to the government. In addition to raising questions about the decision rules most African and other governments have regarding security, it may require an intensive investment of time by the administrators studied.

27. See R. Cranford Pratt, 'The Administration of Economic Planning in a Newly Independent State: The Tanzanian Experience 1963—1966' *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, vol. 5 (March 1967), pp. 38—59.

However, the successful execution of either approach creates a demand for the other. The linkage between input-output studies can only be supplied by studies of the social system integrating administrators' decisional premises, while explanation of internal administrative behaviour lacks application until related to differences in productivity. In the long run we can hope to combine the two into a more general theory of administrative behaviour that will be sufficiently useful to shape administrative reforms to the requirements of development.