

## POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POLITICAL MANAGEMENT

*The Political Economy of Change* by Warren Ilchman and Norman Uphoff, University of California Press, 1969, 316 pp. 8.50 dollars; First Paperback Edition, 1971, 3.25 dollars.

JONATHAN S. BARKER\*

### I

Two fairly well-defined paradigms or schools of thought can be distinguished in the study of the politics of underdeveloped countries.<sup>1</sup> The *modernization* school traces its intellectual heritage to Marx Weber via Marion Levy and Talcott Parsons. Since its flowering in the middle 1950's in the United States, it has had a major impact on American political science. With the financial and organizational support of agencies such as the Social Science Research Council's Committee for the Study of Comparative Politics, it has developed a series of case studies and a substantial theoretical and comparative literature. Work on African politics has had a formative impact on the modernization school—witness the publications of James Coleman, David Apter, Aristide Zolberg, and Carl Rosberg.<sup>2</sup>

The *development of underdevelopment* school traces its ancestry through Paul Baran to V.I. Lenin and Karl Marx. It has less coherence of academic organization and financial sponsorship than the modernization school. Much of the recent influential work of the school has focussed on Latin America as seen in the writing of Andre Gunder Frank, Celso Furtado, and James Petran. There has been more continuity in the treatment of the development of underdevelopment in French than in English and the school is certainly more inter-

\*Jonathan S. Barker is a Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department of the University of Dar es Salaam.

1. For a similar distinction applied to economic theories see Jacques Freyssinet, *Le Concept de Sous-développement*, Paris and the Hague: Mouton, 1966.  
2. All the major publications in this literature are cited in the bibliography of the book here under review. For an appreciation of the contribution of this school by a sympathetic British political scientist, see the editor's introduction in Colin Leys, ed. *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

national than the primarily American modernization school. On black Africa the work of Frantz Fanon, Samir Amin, Jean Suret-Canale, Amilcar Cabral, Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, Giovanni Arrighi, and John Saul are important examples.<sup>3</sup>

Only the briefest indication of the differences between the two schools can be given here. The modernization school stresses cultural facts such as ethnicity, western education, and role conflicts. It gives central consideration to problems of national integration and organizational stability and efficacy. It finds its historical bearings in terms of the rise of nationalism and the spread of secular values and social differentiation. In contrast the development of underdevelopment school emphasizes economic-based facts such as modes of production, class formation, and class conflict. It gives central consideration to the process whereby stable class-based domination is achieved or threatened. It orients itself historically with reference to the spread and evolution of capitalist market relations and imperialism and to the rise of movements which challenge or reinforce the world division of labour which produces underdevelopment.

Because they use different concepts, address themselves to different problems, cite different data and respect different traditions, the two schools have had little to say to each other. However, they share a number of traits. Both seek to be comparative and historical and to use hard-headed analysis in a way which will contribute to improving the way people live in underdeveloped lands. There are important controversies and debates within both schools; neither has become closed and doctrinaire as a school.

Finally, both schools have had trouble developing an adequate policy-oriented or action-oriented component, despite the growing need felt for practical relevance. The modernization school has been advised by Almond to seek a 'rational choice model of political growth,' and some thought has been given to the institutional requirements of meaningful political choice by its practitioners, but the received framework of analysis is not very helpful. The development of underdevelopment school has concentrated more on the problematics of revolutionary action and on the transition to socialism. For example, Amilcar Cabral on the basis of revolutionary experience in Guinea-Bissau gives a leading role to the 'revolutionary petty bourgeois', a category hard to relate to theories of class dynamics.<sup>4</sup>

3. A useful compendium which includes contributions by Frank, Arrighi, Baran, and Fanon among others, as well as a selected book list is Robert Rhodes, ed., *Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader*, New York and London: Monthly Review Press 1970. A good bibliography of work on Africa from this school is found in the two articles by Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, 'Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, (1968), pp. 141-169 and 'Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-saharan Africa' in R. Milliband and J. Saville, eds. *The Socialist Register 1969*, London: The Merlin Press, 1969, pp. 137-188. Another useful bibliography is: Africa Research Group, *Radical Study Guide to Africa*, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass.  
4. Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, London, 1970. See also Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution*. Marxist writers are beginning to see an urgent need to go beyond the texts of the masters. See Paul Sweezy, 'The Transition to Socialism,' *Monthly Review*, May 1971.



## II

In this context the book, *The Political Economy of Change* by Warren Ilchman and Norman Uphoff is of particular interest. It grows squarely out of the modernization school as a 'respectful protest' (vii) against it.<sup>5</sup> Despite its adoption of the political economy label, it makes no reference to the classics of the development of underdevelopment school which claim this designation.<sup>6</sup> It proposes a model of politics which is designated to be relevant to the practical policy problems of political actors, both 'statesmen' and 'anti-statesmen', although the book adopts the point of view of the statesman. It claims a sensitivity to economic realities, and employs the concepts of an economic model to order its political content.

In form the book is the description of a new 'model of politics' (ix) together with short illustrations of how its components might be applied and spirited defences against anticipated criticisms of conservatism and Machiavellism. The active elements in the model are the 'statesman' or 'regime' on the one hand and 'sectors' on the other hand. The aim of the regime is to maintain itself in power in the present and in the future and to adjust to social change or to carry out social reform. Sectors are groups or categories of persons who 'respond to political issues in a similar fashion,' (39). They seek to maintain or improve their material welfare and social status and they have propensities to behave which can be ascertained through research. The heart of the political process is found in the exchanges of resources which occur between the regime and the sectors as each tries to maximize its particular goals. Exchange takes place on three related markets which together constitute society: an economic market for goods and services, a social market for status, and a political market for authority and legitimacy. Authority is the essential and most important resource of the regime. It is the 'right to speak in the name of the state' (81).<sup>7</sup> When no sector wants it either because it cannot pay the price or because authority is ineffective, the regime has all but fallen. Other resources not attached to specific markets are information and coercion.

In the model, sectors can be grouped into those which support the regime, those which oppose it, and those which are unmobilized. In underdeveloped countries the regime typically is faced with the mobilization of new sectors and the politicization of transactions which formerly did not involve the regime. Thus there is an expanding demand for regime resources. One of the dilemmas of the third world statesman is the necessity of continually improving his

5. Numbers in brackets refer to page numbers in Ilchman and Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. First Paperback Edition, 1971.

6. For example, Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957.

7. Anticipating a later argument contrast this mechanistic definition with the following: 'An authority is one whose counsels we seek and trust and whose deeds we strive to imitate and enlarge. . . . (Authority) provides counsel and justification, and it increases the confidence and sense of ability of those under it by assuring them that the actions it recommends will succeed and will enlarge the actors.' (John Schaar, 'Legitimacy in the Modern State,' pp. 291-2, in P. Green and S. Levinson, eds. *Power and Community, Dissenting Essays in Political Science*, New York, Random House, 1969, pp. 276-327.

resource position to meet new demands while maintaining support from an adequate spread of sectors. Ilchman and Uphoff believe that their model will eventually help him to choose those strategies of exchange and investment which will enable him to keep ahead of the rising demand.

It will do so, it is claimed, by dealing in issues and time periods of direct relevance to the regime and by introducing new possibilities of measurement. The regime is seen as managing an array of flows of resources in an unending series of exchanges with society. Through its choices it makes marginal adjustments in the flows of resources paid out and these in turn yield marginally changed quantities and mixes in resource receipts. The productive regime manages its resources in such a way as to increase its ability to stay in power and to achieve the goals of the community. In developing countries two strategies are recommended. Exchanges should be managed so that sectors are willing to pay progressively more in information, legitimacy, absence of violence, goods and services, and status for the resources allocated by the regime. This 'controlled inflation' allows the regime to handle the demands of newly politicized sectors and markets. At the same time the statesman should invest in infrastructure such as educational institutions, bureaucracies, a political party, a police force, or an army which will increase the efficiency of future resource allocations. At the forefront is always consideration of the *costs* to the regime of choices and an awareness of alternatives. For example, 'Landless laborers who have been organized to support a regime's land reform policy and decrease the regime's dependence on landowners in rural areas are likely to make demands for status and economic resources that will be costly for the regime to meet' (139). Similarly, 'It costs an African leader little to proclaim an ideology of *Negritude* because this ideology raises the status of Africans at the expense of whites. On the other hand, where the educated elite is exalted by the leaders in the drive for modernization, the status of illiterates is depreciated. Illiterates may seek compensations for this loss. . . .' (241).

The authors recognize some serious difficulties in the way of moving from model to theory. Without the possibility of comparing alternative choices rigorously the model is nothing but an overblown metaphor. The authors' answer is to encourage research into actual transactions so that the exchange rate of information for legitimacy and money for authority *et cetera* in a given polity can be estimated. They also advocate research into alternative strategies for the accumulation of political resources. What has been the payoff from policies of status equalization or sector mobilization? Again they want studies of the returns on resource investments into such infrastructures as newspapers, political parties, local governments, ideologies, elections, primary education. They also recognize in some paragraphs the special difficulties posed by resources such as legitimacy, authority, information, which have special properties making measurement difficult. The value of information varies not only with the scope of its dissemination; it also varies dependent upon which particular people have the information. Legitimacy is in some ways a separate resource and in some ways an indicator of the state of transactions between a sector and the regime.



There are other difficulties which Ilchman and Uphoff do not acknowledge. They speak of 'regime' or 'statesmen' and 'sectors', and specify exchanges between them. But the kind of bargaining they identify with politics goes on *within* regime and sectors as well as between them. There is no logical or empirical reason given for stopping the analysis with any particular units. In factional politics there is often an infinite redivision of factions. Where does the regime end and its relations with sectors begin?

The economic language of the model seems more appropriate to the hard bargaining of the highly-organized and profit-motivated interests of advanced capitalist society than to the amorphous and heterogeneous politics of post-colonial society. The authors themselves recognize 'that political economy becomes more applicable as more persons choose and act as "political men".' (280). Yet they think it is 'especially fruitful for the analysis of developing nations' (48). They believe that most people act implicitly as if they were calculating political costs and benefits under conditions of scarcity. And this is not seen to contradict their stricture against 'importing our own values into the model itself and imposing a logic external to the system' (282). Cultural characteristics and the realities of the historical era enter the model only in so far as they affect the behavior propensities of the sectors and the goals which the regime seeks to achieve. This is sufficient because: 'If useful predictions can be made, we would infer that some of the less tangible aspects of politics, such as ultimate values of psychological needs, are in effect incorporated into the analysis with resources, propensities, or other elements of the models serving as proxies.' (279).

No one would deny that bargaining over resources is an important part of politics. Political leaders in the third world need to be good at it in their dealings with their populations and in their dealings with foreign sources of investment, aid, and research. But the political and economic problems of their societies do not end there. In the changing third world, politics interacts deeply with its environment of people living their everyday lives. To take account of this deep interaction, the researcher must give attention to moral, historical, cultural, and economic questions which lie beyond the ordinary purview of political science and far beyond the allocation-support model of politics advanced by Ilchman and Uphoff. It would be a pity if the useful term 'political economy' came to designate the narrow concerns of Ilchman and Uphoff.

### III

There is a great need for thinking about what might be called 'political planning' including the invention of new institutions to suit new purposes and problems as well as step-by-step strategies of political construction. Despite the shortcomings noted, the Ilchman-Uphoff model is in this regard a significant advance over the older modernization models. Although they do not speak of political planning, they do describe a 'political budget'.

A political budget estimates what expenditures of authority, influence, coercion, threats, status, prestige, goods and services, money, and information must be made to reach the desired level of revenue of legitimacy, support, allegiance, goods and services, money, status, prestige, violence or non violence, and information. Sectors usually compete for preferred allocations in the statesman's budget, but the statesman obviously cannot satisfy all demands, especially if he wishes to achieve his own goals for the polity. Political budgeting determines which sectors will be favoured, which penalized, and which neutralized. It is an intricate and involved process. The statesman's success and fate rest upon his skills as a political budgeter and planner, yet he is seldom able to handle the tasks of budgeting and planning single-handedly. He relies upon his *political advisers* to collect requests, weigh the relative merits of each, try to accommodate conflicting demands, and get the most 'mileage' out of the statesman's limited resources. Collectively such advisers might be thought of as the 'Bureau of the Political Budget'. (168)

They acknowledge that the great political entrepreneurs have succeeded without professional advice. But they add 'Our concern is for the leader who is not a Lenin or a Gandhi, a leader who lacks their innovative capabilities and opportunities. It is he who most needs the guidance that political economy attempts to provide.' (206).

Here we see where some issues might be effectively joined with the development of underdevelopment school. Ilchman and Uphoff are political Keynesians. They consider only the short run and they do not search for an evolutionary logic in the transformation of sectors which might allow a combined short-term and long-term strategy. There is a science of political management, not political planning.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, they ignore the enduring logic of the international division of labour and power in constraining the effective choices available to third world leaders. One of the ironies of that reality is that the Ilchman-Uphoff model, to the extent that it is useful, will in fact rebound to the benefit of the powerful governments and international corporations which can afford to engage professional political budgeteers. The authors recognize this reality implicitly by returning again and again to the hypothetical example of a team of political scientists flying in (from the United States?) to advise Colonel Gowon on the eve of his elevation to power.

However, Ilchman and Uphoff hold stubbornly to the management consultant's professional ethic of working within the value frame of the government (or anti-government?) they are studying.

We want to determine what relationship between those in authority and those subject to it is likely to be most productive for the community. We also seek to determine what courses government must follow to see that resources of a community are used most economically and effectively to achieve the goals set for that community. (ix)

Who defines 'productivity' and who sets the 'goals'? Presumably the public, for Ilchman and Uphoff wish to promote 'the realization of public purposes'. But there is every probability that the effective measure of usefulness will be the results of the strength or weakness of the regime or the statesman, because a strong regime is a precondition for the achievement of other public purposes and there is a continuing and tangible interest in staying in power. Moreover,

8. It would be interesting to try to introduce the notion of political surplus value into the model. To do so might provide insight into the potentials of redistributing the political surplus and planning its employment for the good of the community.



the stability of a regime is much easier to estimate than is the productivity of a community. Strength of the regime becomes the operational measure of 'political productivity'.

In the same vein they refuse to worry about the basic philosophical issues raised by their bargaining and self-aggrandizing assumptions about human nature. In all these respects—logic of social evolution, critical standpoint, and meaning for men's lives—the reader of the Ilchman-Uphoff model will do well to compare it with the development of underdevelopment literature which have a critical and philosophical potential which the Ilchman-Uphoff formulation lacks. At the same time political economists of the development of underdevelopment school ought to read this book, not just to 'know the enemy', but also to learn from him.

## THEORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOUR IN AFRICA

NELSON KASFIR\*

The study of administrative behaviour, one might assume, would be a central concern of researchers investigating the field of development administration. However, few aspects of the 'Dark Continent' have been the subject of less illumination than the internal operating characteristics of African bureaucracies themselves. The natural opposition of any group of people to approval of studies into their own behaviour provides only part of the answer. Of equal importance has been the failure of theorists to work out conceptual guidelines around which meaningful research designs could be formulated. I am not suggesting that useless theorizing has been the problem (though that has been the consequence of many of the elaborate models constructed to explain other aspects of development administration). On the contrary, the absence of theorizing has been the difficulty.

Many who have struggled through the tortured prose of the model-builders of this subfield may regard this inattention as a welcome development. But the absence of theory means either the absence of research, or research that is based on older, half-forgotten, half-disproved conceptions.<sup>1</sup>

In this article I want to take a brief look at the failure to consider administrative behaviour as an important theoretical focus in developing countries, and then consider a variety of suggestions that could be united into two basic approaches to the examination of African administration. If research along these lines succeeds, the benefits that would follow from a better understanding of why civil servants act in the ways they do, could be extremely useful in improving the structure of policy formulation and implementation.

\*Nelson Kasfir is an Instructor in Government at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, USA; he was formerly a Lecturer in Public Administration at Makerere University, Uganda. This article is based on a paper delivered to the Conference on Comparative Administration, Arusha, Tanzania (September, 1971). The author is grateful for comments made at the Conference as well as suggestions offered by V. Subramaniam, Larry Radway, and particularly Ken Prewitt.

1. '... we all use models in our thinking all the time, even though we may not stop to notice it. When we say that we 'understand' a situation, political or otherwise, we say in effect, that we have in our mind an abstract model, vague or specific, that permits us to parallel or predict such changes in that situation of interest to us.' Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, (Free Press: New York, 1965), p. 12.