

APPENDIX IV

Selected Indicators—Expansion of the U.E.B.

Year	Loan (I) Indebtedness (£)	Net capital Expenditure (£)	Units Generated (millions)	Units Sold (millions)	Total No. Consumers	Balance on Net Revenue Account (£)
1948	664,112	673,106	=	=	3,263	818
1949	1,714,112	656,743	10.7	8.8	4,143	(4,670)
1950	3,759,494	3,648,709	16.4	13.8	5,298	4,824
1951	5,558,916	6,128,123	28.5	24.6	6,836	43,060
1952	10,124,244	10,496,231	39.9	33.8	8,783	20,769
1953	14,512,510	14,717,764	59.5	51.1	10,400	62,009
1954	71,168,451	16,525,654	73.2	63.6	11,423	=
1955	19,623,124	19,379,282	79.7	69.3	14,550	29,201
1956	22,264,086	23,046,288	94.9	82.3	16,798	(24,830)
1957	24,252,831	25,703,114	148.8	133.5	19,819	11,164
1958	26,999,201	28,238,968	278.4	252.7	24,010	(1,067)
1959	28,323,746	29,767,190	345.9	314.8	27,720	8,678
1960	28,949,305	30,788,229 ²	396.5	362.5	30,037	(22,304)
1961	29,793,951	29,133,371	434.8	400.5	32,116	(381,749) ³
1962	30,554,731	30,182,034	453.1	417.2	33,749	(727,832)
1963	31,069,979	31,633,424	497.0	460.6	37,466	(781,150)
1964	31,092,687	32,756,645	521.0	470.9	32,298	(694,724)
1965	31,205,423	34,053,096	572.0	522.6	44,454	(331,194)
1966	30,718,566	34,760,091	634.7	578.7	48,412	384,005
1967	30,490,138	35,317,999	704.1	639.1	51,184	1,423,756
1968	30,188,580	36,004,145	731.4	658.5	55,368	1,420,514
1969	24,126,904	36,756,001	730.7	663.8	55,739	1,319,555

- () = Deficit
 = = Not available in reports
 (1) = Not including interest that accrues
 (2) = Including an item of £2,052,770 Deferred Expenditure
 (3) = The large increase in the deficit due to a reorganisation incorporated into the accounts from 1961 as part of the conditions of the IBRD loan agreement.

Source: U.E.B. *Annual Reports*, 1948—1969.

ENTREPRENEURIALISM AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION IN ZAMBIA¹

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Throughout the developing world, governments act to achieve rapid economic development in a planned and conscious way.² The most visible evidence of this is the proliferation of development plans in the post-colonial era. Virtually all new states have a plan that extends over a period of three to ten years.

A major purpose of these development plans is to maximise rationality and minimise waste in the use of scarce public resources for development. Economists and planners have responded to this need by advocating a strategy of balanced economic growth. According to this strategy for economic development, the various sectors of the economy should grow at about the same rate. The necessity of this growth pattern emerges from the interdependency of different sectors.

Albert O. Hirschman distinguishes between two different kinds of theories advocating balanced economic growth, one stressing demand and the other supply.³ The theory of emphasizing balance in demand posits that in order to make self-sustained growth possible, it is necessary to start at one and the same time a large number of industries so that the workers and owners of one might serve as clientele for the others.⁴ This theory contends that if a large number of industries are not started simultaneously, then the few that are started are

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1. This essay is based upon field research conducted in Zambia from November 1967 to March 1969. Financial support for this research was provided by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program. The author also wishes to acknowledge gratefully the assistance of the Institute for Social Research, University of Zambia, and Mr. V.S. Musakanya, then Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service.
2. For some of the justifications given for development planning and state participation in the economy, see the discussions in the volume edited by William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg Jr., *African Socialism* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964).
3. Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1958) pp. 50-54.
4. The principal authors of this theory are: P.R. Rosenstein-Rodan, 'Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe', *Economic Journal*, LIII (June-September 1943), p. 205; Ragnar Nurske, *Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries* (Oxford University Press, London, 1953), Chapter I.

likely to fail because they cannot generate enough demand and purchasing power among themselves to buy their own products in quantities sufficient to maintain the industries. In short, the argument is that balanced growth is necessary to ensure enough demand to support new enterprises.

Contemporary development planning is primarily based on the second type of theory for balanced growth, i.e. the one emphasizing supply.⁵ The basic concern of this theory is that interdependent sectors of an economy develop together so that when the output of one is needed as an input for another, there will not be shortages that retard development. An industry must not grow so rapidly that a supporting or agricultural activity cannot keep up with the demand for raw materials. Infrastructure like transportation facilities power, water supply, and trained personnel must be available at the right time and in the right amounts in order to support the growth of other sectors of the economy. Revenue-earning sectors must develop rapidly enough to pay for the capital and recurrent costs incurred in providing infrastructure. Balanced economic growth emphasizing supply is essentially an exercise in coordination.

The strategy of balanced economic growth places a heavy burden on planners and administrators. Planners must be able to make accurate assessments about a country's resource base. They must consider a wide range of variables and formulate a comprehensive and logically consistent plan. Administrative systems must be capable of coordinating the activities of bureaucratic units so that the logic of the plan can provide the dynamics of its implementation. Bureaucratic expertise and organisational cohesion are required to make the general and specific goals of the plan realities.

A major argument generated from the study of development administration in Zambia is that the administrative system is incapable of formulating and implementing development plans that aim for a coordinated and balanced pattern of growth of economic sectors. The attraction of development planning is that it provides for the use of scarce resources in a way that takes cognizance of the interdependency of sectors of the economy. One aim is to avoid waste by eliminating developmental efforts that needlessly duplicate or overlap and by coordinating the growth rates of sectors of the economy in order to ensure the availability of goods and services produced by some sectors that are needed to facilitate the growth of others. The characteristics of underdevelopment, however, prevent Zambia from benefiting from the advantages of development planning. Rationality, a capability that eludes men of all cultures and circumstances,⁶ is especially elusive where statistics of a country's resources are incomplete and unrealisable⁷ and where there is a shortage of skilled and experienced manpower.

The implementation of development plans also assumes a bureaucracy that

5. The principal authors of this theory are: Tiber Scitovsky, 'Two Concepts of External Economics', *Journal of Political Economy*, LXIII (April 1954), pp. 143-152; and W.A. Lewis, *Theory of Economic Growth* (R.D. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1955), pp. 274-283.
6. Charles E. Lindblom, 'The Science of Muddling Through,' *Public Administration Review* XIX (1959), pp. 79-88.
7. Wolfgang F. Stolpher, *Planning without Facts: Lessons in Resource Allocation from Nigeria's Development* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1966).

possesses a coordinating capacity. The bureaucracy in Zambia, however, is fragmented. Departments and agencies that are functionally or technologically specific enjoy a substantial amount of autonomy. Effective hierarchical authority structures exist within units of the bureaucracy, but not throughout the bureaucracy as a whole. To a significant degree, the inability of a central body, such as a planning office, to exert control over departments and agencies is a question of expertise. The lack of training in a special skill or field of knowledge is a serious impediment to evaluating and directing those who do possess that expertise. The absence of central control and coordination in bureaucracies of developing countries is also due to a lack of institutionalisation of political order and political processes. Power and authority in Zambia reside in disparate and overlapping sources. Groups are still striving to attain a secure position of dominance and the rules of the game are still not well established. Thus, there is no source of political power and authority external to the bureaucracy with the capacity to impose central control over administrative units, either directly or through a planning agency or some other central body.

The formulation and implementation of a rational, comprehensive development plan for balanced economic growth is difficult in any society. In that Zambia lacks personnel with expertise and an administrative structure with cohesion and central control, its capacity for effective planning is even further limited.

PERSONNEL RESOURCES

Because access to education and to positions of responsibility in the bureaucracy was restricted to Europeans during the colonial period, Zambia began its existence as an independent state with a severe shortage of civil servants with skills and experience. At the time of Independence in the whole country there were only 2,723 places in the secondary schools at the Form II level and only room for 724 students at the Form IV level. The only university was one that was planned. In 1964, there were in Zambia just over 1,200 Africans with secondary school certificates and only 104 Africans with college degrees.⁸ The results of a manpower survey conducted by the government in 1965 of employees in the private sector who occupied positions requiring at least a Form II level of education further demonstrates how acute the shortage of trained Africans in Zambia is.⁹

8. Zambia, Cabinet Office, *Manpower Report. A Report and Statistical Handbook on Manpower, Education, Training and Zambianisation, 1965-1966*, (hereafter referred to as the *Manpower Report of 1966*), 1966, pp. 1 & 2. By comparison Kenya had 1,200 Africans with secondary school certificates in 1957.
9. A word is in order here about Zambia's grading structure in the educational system. Children normally enter Grade 1 of primary school at age 7 and progress one grade per year to Grade 7. Progression is automatic in the urban areas, but in the rural areas there is a selection process at Grade 4 and about 75% are allowed to continue to Grade 7. After Grade 7, students sit for an examination and about 30% are entitled to enter Form I of secondary school.

TABLE 1—ACTUAL EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF EMPLOYED CIVILIAN LABOUR FORCE, 1965

	Less than Form II	Form II	O Level	A Level	College degree	Total
Africans	12,015	7,282	1,516	517	150	21,480
Non-Africans	1,853	11,385	11,917	5,933	3,468	34,556
Total	13,868	18,667	13,433	6,450	3,618	56,036
Africans as a percentage of total	87	39	11	8	4	38

Source: Presented in C.C. Greenfield, 'Manpower Planning in Zambia' in *Journal of Administration Overseas* Vol. VII, No. 4 (October 1968), p. 502.

As the table indicates, there has been an extremely heavy reliance upon non-Africans in the jobs requiring relatively high educational qualifications.

In addition to this general shortage of educated Zambians available for the public and private sector, Zambia has a paucity of civil servants who had the experience of significant administrative responsibility prior to the demise of colonialism. Until October 1961, the Northern Rhodesia civil service was composed of two divisions, the European civil service and the African civil service. Membership in the former was required in order to hold senior positions in the public bureaucracy and membership in the latter coincided with junior status and positions.

The details of the pattern and pace of Zambianisation are not discussed in this paper. Here it is necessary only to note that a legacy of the colonial civil service was the severe shortage of Zambian citizens with the training or experience needed to foster rapid economic development. As Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate, this shortage is particularly acute in the technical and professional positions, i.e. those positions most directly involved in developmental efforts.

TABLE 2—ZAMBIANISATION BY POSITIONS

	1963	1966	1967
Administrative	14%	36%	60%
Professional	1	6	8
Executive	24	52	70
Technical	38	45	51
Clerical/Secretarial	?	57	73

Sources: Zambia, *The Manpower Report of 1966* and records maintained by the Establishment Division.

Note: All figures are percentages of the total number of positions in the specified category.

TABLE 3—VACANCIES BY POSITION, 1966

Administrative	17%
Professional	42
Executive	32
Technical	42
Clerical/Secretarial	15

Sources: Zambia, *The Manpower Report of 1966*, p. 8.

Note: Comparable figures are not available for other years, but officers in the Establishment Division believed the pattern was essentially the same.

While the employment of expatriates has provided some expertise not otherwise available to the Zambian public bureaucracy, their presence has also caused some tension that tends to debilitate the administrative system and somewhat offsets the contribution they make. Almost 85% of the expatriates in Zambia are British. To those who are militant in their demands for rapid Africanisation and who give priority to this goal rather than to the maintenance of high standards of education and experience for senior positions in the civil service, filling posts with expatriates is not desirable and relying primarily on the former colonial power is even worse.

This grievance was aired publicly in an editorial in the August 1968 issue of *Vanguard*, the monthly publication of the Zambia Youth Service. The editorial warned civil servants against accepting the advice of expatriates without first scrutinising that advice very carefully. It noted that most of the expatriates in the civil service were British and charged that the British civil servants were unhappy with Zambia's non-aligned posture in international relations. The editorial warned:

... Those advised must be aware that in the same way as they (the British) unceasingly militated against the attainment of independence, these advisers are likely, if left unchecked, to create a situation which will make the extension of their term of employment inevitable. ... The imperialist does not want to go ... he gives advice or training which leaves much to be desired. This is simply designed to achieve a situation in which the Zambian still appears not to have acquired the necessary know-how and consequently looks to the expatriate for further advice.¹⁰

A survey of Zambian civil servants posted outside Lusaka also revealed a general desire on the part of Zambians to be rid of expatriates in the civil service.¹¹ *Inter alia*, the questionnaire asked the respondents: 1) if they had an immediate superior who was an expatriate; if so, whether or not they felt

10. Editorial, *Vanguard* (August, 1968), p. 1. The Zambia Youth Service is a program run by the government of Zambia designed to provide training and job placement to young Zambians.

11. The author is grateful to the Zambia Localised Civil Servants' Association for releasing the data obtained on a questionnaire distributed to a random sample of Zambian civil servants posted to stations outside Lusaka. The sample was drawn from staff lists of all civil servants, rather than from the membership rolls of the Association. Out of 195 questionnaires mailed, 154—78.9%—were returned. The author accepts full responsibility for the interpretations made of this data. The data collected through this questionnaire will hereafter be referred to as the ZLCSA Survey.

they could do his job as well or better than he was doing it; 2) if the expatriate superior had been in the civil service longer than the respondent; 3) if the respondent preferred working under a Zambian or an expatriate superior. These questions were not designed to probe the causes of tension between members of the Zambian civil service, but rather to gauge the satisfaction Zambians feel towards the presence of expatriates in the civil service. One would expect, for instance, that in addition to real and relevant grievances, expatriates would become scapegoats for difficulties that are unrelated to them as individuals or as a group, just as expatriates might tend to blame the Zambians with whom they work for problems that might be caused by other factors. Bearing this in mind, it is significant that 74.4% of the respondents said they would rather work under a Zambian than an expatriate. 18.2% said that it didn't matter and the remaining 7.1% preferred an expatriate superior. Of the total number of respondents, 41.6% actually had an immediate superior who was an expatriate. Of this group, 81.4% said they felt they could do as well or better than their superior. The break-down of those who said they would rather work under an expatriate is interesting. 14.1% of those presently under a non-Zambian preferred an expatriate supervisor, while only 2.2% of those who did not have an immediate superior who was an expatriate responded in this manner. This probably indicates instances—which apparently were seldom—where the working situation under an expatriate was reasonably pleasant and the Zambian overcame any apprehensions that he might have had. Another significant indication apparent from the data is that Zambians are not finding it intolerable—to put it negatively—to work under fellow Zambians.

Comparable information on the attitudes of Zambian civil servants working in Lusaka is not available.¹² However, from information obtained through interviews conducted by the author, it appears that while there might be differences in degree, there are not significant differences in kind.¹³ There is a general admission that the manpower for certain positions requiring a great deal of technical or professional expertise must come from outside Zambia, but slightly over half of the forty-nine Zambian civil servants interviewed in Lusaka reported grievances against expatriate colleagues or superiors. The most common complaint was that expatriates with whom the interviewees worked made no more of a contribution than could be made by available Zambians. Several cited specific instances in which they had made a recommendation and it was turned down, and then an expatriate made an identical recommendation and had it accepted. There is a belief among Zambian civil servants, in other words, that their superiors, Zambian and/or expatriate, tend to equate expertise with expatriates and inadequacy with Zambians. This is not surprising given the assumption that expatriates are employed only because of a lack of Zambians with the required skills.

12. The Zambia Localised Civil Servants' Association attempted to extend the survey made of civil servants outside Lusaka to those working in Lusaka but received so little cooperation that the effort had to be abandoned. The Association, in fact, has encountered a great deal of apathy from Zambian civil servants in Lusaka since 1963.

13. See also James R. Scarritt, 'Political Values and the Political Process in Zambia', *Institute for Social Research Bulletin*, vol. I, (1966).

In fact, with few exceptions, the expatriates willing to serve in Zambia are not the most qualified and experienced personnel from their respective countries. Expatriate civil servants can be divided into two groups according to their background and potential contribution. One group is composed of older men who began careers in the Colonial Service. Some of these had been in Northern Rhodesia and elected to stay on as long as possible. Since Independence, they have signed short-term contracts to work in former colonies rather than starting a new career in their home country. Members of this group have a great deal of experience but usually lack in-depth modern training in any particular specialty. The second group includes younger men. Some joined the civil service in Northern Rhodesia just prior to Independence and want to continue working in Zambia while making plans for beginning a new career elsewhere. Others have recently graduated from a college or university and see an opportunity to receive the experience and financial benefits of working in a position of higher rank and responsibility than their qualifications would entitle them to in their home country's civil service. For this group, the experience of working in Zambia is perceived to be valuable for later careers in their own country or with an international organisation. While they can be expected to be well-trained and educated, they cannot bring the benefits of years of experience to their work.

Volunteers present a peculiar and related problem and thus could be considered as a third group. There is a tendency among both Zambian and expatriate civil servants to measure the expertise of their superiors, subordinates and colleagues by the salary they are receiving. The general image of volunteers, regardless of their qualifications, is that they are energetic and idealistic but low-paid amateurs. Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) volunteers working with the engineers and mechanics of the Public Works Department became so frustrated because of this image of amateurism that VSO has avoided placing volunteers in these positions in Zambia. At least one perceptive Permanent Secretary has advised Canadian University Students Overseas (CUSO) volunteers in his ministry to avoid letting their colleagues know they were volunteers, lest their opinions and recommendations not be considered seriously.

The fact remains that the Zambian public bureaucracy lacks the expertise needed to provide for rational planning and efficient policy implementation. An important part of the colonial legacy to Zambia was a severe shortage of educated and experienced manpower. Zambia can fill this void to some extent by employing expatriate personnel with needed skills, but expatriates hired on contractual terms do not provide continuity in the administrative system and some of the tension caused by their presence constricts their effectiveness. The expertise of expatriates, moreover, is not always appropriate or of the highest quality.

ORGANISATIONAL RESOURCES

The strategy of balanced economic growth requires not only personnel with expertise but also a controlled and coordinated effort from administrators.

The Zambian bureaucracy is not, however, a unified and hierarchical body that is capable of pursuing a common policy. Rather, the administrative system is best characterised as a collection of departments enjoying a great deal of autonomy and only loosely tied to each other.

Since Independence, there has been a proliferation of functionally specific departments and agencies in the Zambian bureaucracy. In 1959, there were nine ministries and twenty-nine departments in the Northern Rhodesia government. At the time of Independence in 1964 there were fourteen ministries, plus the Office of the President which was virtually a ministry and seventy-six department-level bodies.¹⁴ In 1968 this expansion increased to fifteen ministries, plus the Office of the President and the Office of the Vice-President, and 102 departments.

Invariably, the motivation for the establishment of a new administrative unit was the government's wish to provide a new service or to accomplish a new goal. Rather than working within the existing structures and merely adding more personnel, these new governmental activities were considered significant enough to establish a new structure that would be devoted entirely to the newly assumed task. The Commission for Technical and Vocational Education, for instance, was established in January 1969, to introduce programs for filling Zambia's need for middle-level technicians and artisans. This function was not added to the responsibilities of an existing department within the Ministry of Education, and in fact the new Commission was included initially as part of the Office of the President, rather than of the portfolio of the Minister of Education. Similarly, the Ministry of State Participation was established in August 1969 as a result of the government's decision to acquire at least 51% ownership in major industries and retail trade. This expansion of the functions and structure of the Zambian bureaucracy was bound to cause problems of control and co-ordination. Although the Zambian administrative system is the direct descendant of the Northern Rhodesia bureaucracy, in a fundamental way it is a new institution confronted with all the problems of establishing operative procedures and norms.

There are several formal institutions that in theory could provide for the co-ordination of the activities of different departments. One of these is the ministerial superstructure. All departments are assigned to a ministry or its equivalent, the Office of the President or Vice-President. Each ministry is headed by a cabinet minister and has a supervisory staff of senior political and civil service officers. An important factor that has limited the capacity of this superstructure in providing effective direction and control over departments has been the frequency with which alterations are made in ministerial leadership. Since Independence, there has been a change in top ministerial personnel and/or the departments assigned to each ministry at least once every ten months. The Department of Community Development is not atypical in the experience it

14. There are a number of administrative bodies that do not have the label of department but are nonetheless in the same analytical category for our purposes. A department-level body is considered to be a distinctive part of a ministry or of the Offices of the President and Vice President which has its own title, its own hierarchy of positions, and its own funds.

has had with constant changes in ministerial organisation. Within a five-year period, this department was successively assigned to the Ministry of Native Affairs (prior to Independence), the Ministry of Labour and Social Development, the Ministry of Cooperatives, the Ministry of Youth, Cooperatives and Social Development, and the Ministry of Rural Development.

Michel Crozier notes in *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* that administrative units can and do continue to operate without stable ministerial leadership.¹⁵ In the absence of control and direction from the top, bureaucratic units formulate and implement policy themselves. The instability of ministerial officials and organisation in Zambia is not due to the kind of multi-party competition that existed in the French Fourth Republic analysed by Crozier. However, the phenomenon is similar in that departments and agencies within the bureaucracy are offered the opportunity to establish their own priorities in the absence of stable ministerial leadership. While Ministries and superscale civil servants are constantly adjusting to new responsibilities, departments are left fairly well intact.

Since finance and planning in a government involve the allocation of common, public resources to all units of the bureaucracy, the agencies primarily responsible for these activities provide a potential source of authority for cohesion and control in what otherwise might be a fragmented bureaucracy. In Zambia, the process of making authoritative allocations of public funds has had a bifurcated structure. The administrative unit responsible for finance, which prior to January 1969 was known as the Ministry of Finance, compiled the recurrent expenditure items in the budget; capital expenditures were formulated by the central planning agency in Zambia, which prior to January 1969, was called the Office of National Development and Planning (ONDP).¹⁶ In making annual budget requests, departments had to submit two estimates. One was for recurrent expenditures and the other for capital spending. Departmental requests were forwarded to the appropriate agency by permanent secretaries and ministers, who of course could exercise their prerogative to alter these requests. Once the Ministry of Finance and ONDP compiled their parts of the budget, the Cabinet considered the budget proposals.

This budget-making procedure added an important dimension of conflict to what was inherently a contentious situation and limited the ability of either the Ministry of Finance or ONDP to mould the bureaucracy into a cohesive, coordinated entity. The budget that was presented to the Cabinet did not represent a settlement of competing claims made by bureaucratic units. ONDP invariably, and understandably, sent its part of the budget to the Cabinet with the contention that the funds for capital spending should be increased. The Ministry of Finance presented the opposite argument. Thus the Cabinet, which

15. Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

16. In January 1969, the Ministry of Finance was made the Finance Division of the Office of the Vice President and the Office of National Development and Planning was made the Development Division of the same office. In August 1969, these two divisions were removed from the Vice President's portfolio and formed a new Ministry of Finance and Development. In 1970 they were again split into two ministries.

has been a visibly divided body in the Zambian political system,¹⁷ was invited to play a critical role in resolving budgetary disputes.

Even the Cabinet has not been able to function as an effective source of central control. In addition to the limitations that stem from its own divisiveness, the Cabinet lacks the resources to supervise administrative agencies that are highly specialised. Moreover, there is evidence that ministries and departments have not regarded Cabinet decisions as necessarily final decisions. The budget presents an important example of this. According to the Auditor-General's report of 1968,¹⁸ for instance, deviations from budgetary limitations were so substantial and so widespread that it is not reasonable to blame them on errors and inefficiencies in book-keeping. There were departments in virtually every ministry which had a pattern of spending that was not consistent with the provisions of the budget and that committed the government to expenditures it had not authorized. Mis-spending in Zambia is generally not an instance of corruption benefiting individual civil servants. Rather, it is a result of the autonomy and discretion enjoyed by department-level units.

Michael F. Lofchie has discussed the potential role that planning agencies can play in countering centrifugal tendencies in a bureaucracy. He argues that if planners are given sufficient power, they can provide an otherwise fragmented bureaucracy with cohesion and common purpose. Lofchie warns, however:

Regardless of how much administrative power planners are given . . . their role cannot be effective unless there is an extra-bureaucratic source of power to sanction and enforce their decisions. Planners can buttress and supplement political authority by performing certain politically sensitive functions—selection of economic priorities, coordination of the bureaucracy, and mobilisation of administrative resources for development—but if the polity lacks an independent source of authority, planners will become impotent despite administrative measures to enhance their position. When the absence of political authority leads to dysfunctional bureaucratic tendencies, planners will be no more immune than anyone else. They are, in the last analysis, one group of civil servants among others and as such politically unequipped to acquire the necessary degree of legitimacy and support to function as an autonomous political force.¹⁹

Fred Riggs has also cited the need for a non-bureaucratic source of power to impose central control over administrative agencies. A major argument made by Riggs is that there is an inverse relationship between the autonomy of a bureaucracy and its effectiveness.²⁰ When a bureaucracy is left to itself, not only will it lack a capacity for coordination, but also individuals and units within the bureaucracy will submit to particularistic and parochial pressures

17. For an account of the factors determining the composition of the Cabinet, see David C. Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence 1957-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 329-331, and Robert I. Rotberg, 'Tribalism and Politics in Zambia', *Africa Report*, December, 1967, pp. 29-35.
18. Zambia, Auditor-General, *First Report of the Auditor-General on the Public Accounts for the Financial Year Ended 31st December 1967* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1968), pp. 9, 10, 40.
19. Michael F. Lofchie, 'Representative Government, Bureaucracy, and Political Development: The African Case', *The Journal of Developing Areas*, II (October 1967), p. 54.
20. See especially his analysis of 'level of performance', in Fred Riggs, 'Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept', John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1966) pp. 225-236.

(which Riggs calls 'clect influences'),²¹ rather than working to attain nationally defined goals. Essentially, Riggs is calling for an instrumental bureaucracy, in accordance with the legal-rational model presented by Max Weber.²²

President Kaunda attempted to increase the development capabilities of the Zambian government by trying to establish firm UNIP control over the public bureaucracy through administrative reforms introduced in January 1969. The logic behind the reforms was similar to the reasoning of Lofchie and Riggs. The assumption was made that UNIP was development-conscious and could provide dynamic, central control over a bureaucracy that was publicly characterised as sluggish and unruly.

One of the most visible examples of what UNIP officials perceived to be the problem with development administration in Zambia was the bureaucratic resistance to the establishment of new cooperatives. President Kaunda and other UNIP officials have considered cooperatives as the best way of using traditional forms of organisation for achieving economic development. Shortly after independence an extensive campaign was waged to get people to form cooperatives. The number of these organisations increased from 220 in 1964 to 468 in 1965, 601 in 1966 and 875 in 1967.²³ However, in late 1967, the Department of Cooperatives decided that it would not register any more cooperatives until the existing ones were viable and productive societies. A major reason for the establishment of this policy was that forming more cooperatives would so drain the limited personnel and financial resources of the department that adequate services could not be provided to old or new cooperatives.

Despite this change in departmental policy, UNIP officials, including President Kaunda, continued to urge the establishment of more societies. Thus, a confrontation developed. Personnel in the Department of Cooperatives either ignored the efforts of UNIP or actively worked to counter UNIP's impact. The frustration of men like Maselino Bwembya, then Assistant Minister of State for the Northwestern Province, became public knowledge. Mr Bwembya openly assailed provincial officers for discouraging the formation of new cooperatives. These officers explained that they did not have enough staff to help run new cooperatives. The response of Mr Bwembya was that it was government policy to establish more and more societies, 'staff or no staff.'²⁴

President Kaunda expressed his general disappointment in the bureaucracy's failure to follow UNIP's leadership in an address he gave on 16 November 1968:

I must indicate how disgusted I have been in the past by the apathy, sheer lack of initiative and indiscipline which has been prevalent in the civil service. I must say that this has not helped to accelerate development at the pace UNIP and its Government wanted . . . in future I will certainly take the strongest measures possible to deal firmly with any manife-

21. Fred Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Societies* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1964).
22. See especially Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford University Press, London, 1946) and Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Oxford University Press, London, 1947).
23. Zambia, Department of Co-operatives, *Annual Report for 1967* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1968), p. 23.
24. *Times of Zambia*, 9 September 1968.

stations of apathy and indiscipline in the public service—let alone any manifestations of corruption. The UNIP Government has been readjusting to the administrative machinery and although there have been achievements, the present administration which served the UNIP government leaves much to be desired.²⁵

The major effect of the reforms introduced by the President was the establishment of new political positions at all levels of the bureaucracy. The head of the civil service had been a civil servant, the Secretary to the Cabinet. This position was abolished and in its place a cabinet minister was appointed, with the title Secretary-General to the Government. In order to exert closer control over field administration, a cabinet minister was appointed to be in charge of each province and 53 District Governors (46 of whom were from UNIP) were appointed to replace District Secretaries (a civil service post) as the chief representatives of the government in the districts. Related to these steps, the UNIP Central Committee was expanded to include permanent secretaries (albeit only temporarily as it turned out) and the new District Governors, and civil servants were encouraged to become active members of the ruling party.

When the President first outlined these reforms, in November and December 1968,²⁶ he described the authority that the District Governors and the Ministers posted to provinces would have as being very extensive and certainly sufficient to deal with all administrative problems hitherto slowing the pace of development. The formal document detailing the authority of these positions was not distributed until six weeks after the reforms went into effect. In the absence of this information, some provincial Ministers and District Governors asserted wide-ranging powers, and, in the aftermath of the December 1968 general elections, took it upon themselves to punish those suspected of supporting the opposition African National Congress. Civil servants, police and court officials were dismissed or threatened with dismissal. ANC supporters living on the Copperbelt and some of the other urban areas were told to change their allegiances or return to their home villages. The District Governor of Choma, whose behavior was particularly well publicised, on January 12th gave policemen and civil servants in his district three weeks to 'bow to UNIP or get out'.²⁷

In large part because of this excessive militancy, the extent of authority of District Governors and Provincial Ministers was, as provided for in Cabinet Office Circular No. 13 of 1969, much more restricted than the powers outlined in the President's initial description of the reforms. Paragraph 23 of the circular, for instance, stated:

District Governors are the political heads of districts, appointed personally by His Excellency the President. They are immediately responsible to their respective Provincial Ministers, and are the chief Government co-ordinating officers in their districts, *with particular reference to the task of political and economic development . . .* They will also have the task of supervising generally the activities of all Government departments within their districts. But this does not mean that they will preside over the day-to-day running of Government departments as this type of supervision is the task of the local officers of the ministries or departments concerned. The work of the District Governors will be

25. *Zambia News*, 17 November 1968.

26. See, in particular, Zambia Information Services, Press Release No. 2223/68, pp. 8 and 9.

27. *Times of Zambia*, 13 January 1969.

to ensure that other officers of the Government are doing their jobs properly, and they will therefore need to be fully conversant with the policies, plans and programmes of the ministries in Lusaka. If it is found that such other officers are not doing their jobs well and if they do not heed the advice of the District Governor, the latter will be required to inform the minister for the province, his permanent secretary, and the senior officers of the department concerned in the Province. *The District Governors, however, will have no direct and immediate responsibilities for the disciplinary control of civil servants, and will be required to work in such matters through the formal administrative channels indicated above.*²⁸

The circular similarly restricted the authority of Ministers posted to provinces.

The explanation of the duties of these Ministers was based on two key sentences:

The ministers for the provinces will, however, have no direct responsibilities for the deployment and operation within their provinces of the staff of the Lusaka ministries or departments, as these matters remain the responsibility of the Lusaka-based ministers. Even in the case of the Provincial and Local Government Division, the ministers for the provinces will not be responsible for civil service staffing and administrative matters, which will be the responsibility of their Permanent Secretaries reporting through the Permanent Secretary, Provincial and Local Government Division in Lusaka, to the Permanent Secretary, Establishment Division for reference if necessary to the Secretary-General to the Government as head of the civil service.²⁹

In essence, then, Cabinet Office Circular 13 represents a decision to refrain from implementing the policy of establishing UNIP control at all levels of of bureaucracy.

The most severe limitation on UNIP's ability to direct and control the bureaucracy has been the serious division and indiscipline within the party itself.³⁰ Individual officials of the party may be able to provide effective leadership to segments of the bureaucracy, but UNIP itself has not been a unitary organisation with a common policy orientation. The President has long realised that neither his directives nor the policies articulated by the Central Committee have evoked uniformly positive and cooperative responses throughout the party.

UNIP has faced a series of crises because of its internal division and the lack of institutionalisation of political processes in Zambia. President Kaunda responded to most of these crises by pleading for changes in attitudes and introducing piecemeal changes in the party and/or government. However, when Simon Kapwepwe resigned as Vice President in August 1969 because he felt he had not been accepted as the legitimate Vice President, despite his election at the 1967 Annual Conference of UNIP, President Kaunda began an effort to revamp the entire party organisation. On 25 August 1969, the President dissolved the entire Central Committee of the party and himself assumed the new post of Secretary-General of UNIP, instead of President of the party. He also announced that he was appointing an Interim Executive Committee to run the affairs of the party until a new Central Committee was elected, a commission to review the

28. Zambia, Cabinet Office Circular No. 13 of 1969, 1 February 1969, paragraph 23. Italics in the original.

29. *Ibid.*, paragraphs 15 and 16.

30. Rotberg, 'Tribalism and Politics in Zambia,' Richard Hall, *The High Price of Principles* (Africana Publishing Corporation, New York, 1969); Thomas Rasmussen, 'Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, VIII, 3 (October, 1969), pp. 407-424.

party's constitution, and a special committee to act as disciplinary body for party officials and members. On August 26th, the President also reorganised the government and reshuffled both personnel and departments into new ministerial portfolios.³¹

In contrast with the administrative reforms introduced at the beginning of the year, the steps taken by President Kaunda in August 1969, were not designed to achieve greater efficiency in development administration as such but rather to institute greater unity and discipline within the ruling party. The President increased his own authority both in the party and the government after dissolving the Central Committee and reorganising the government. As the UNIP Secretary-General, President Kaunda issued a circular to all UNIP officials in mid-September stating that the past offences of UNIP members and officials would be forgotten so that a new start could be made, but that in the future any indiscipline would be dealt with very severely. The President ended his circular with a warning:

If you fail to perform your duty, if you fail to unite the people, to assist in the development of your area, to maintain peace and to make UNIP effective, if you promote misunderstanding or dissension, then you are not fit for service and no doubt the party will seek a substitute who will lead the people in the road to unity and development through Humanism.³²

The new UNIP Disciplinary Committee proved ineffective and nearly two years passed before the party, in May 1971, adopted a new constitution and elected a new Central Committee. These latter changes spurred the discontent of the hitherto dominant group in UNIP, the Bemba, and in large part prompted former Vice-President Kapwepwe to break away from the party and form his own United Progressive Party in August, 1971.

In sum, as a fragmented body, the bureaucracy was vulnerable to a piecemeal imposition of central control by a non-bureaucratic source of power. UNIP is not, however, able to provide common, unified control and direction because the ruling party is itself fragmented. Individual UNIP officials are effective in prompting development activity from bureaucratic agencies, but the party as a whole has not provided effective direction for the entire administrative system. As long as UNIP and other non-bureaucratic sources of power are incapable of either unifying the bureaucracy themselves or endowing planners or some other administrative group with the authority to co-ordinate the bureaucracy, the administrative system will remain too fragmented to provide the resources of organization and expertise required for attaining rapid economic development through plans for balanced economic growth.

ENTREPRENEURIALISM IN DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

These assessments of the futility of attempts to plan for rapid economic development in a way that would minimize waste and maximize the use of

31. *Zambia Mail*, 26-28 August 1969.

32. *Zambia Mail*, 11 September, 1969. Further efforts have been made to strengthen UNIP's organization in the aftermath of the formation of the United Progressive Party by Mr. Kapwepwe in mid-1971.

scarce resources are discouraging. If the analysis were to stop here, it might be necessary to conclude that there is little hope that poor, developing countries will ever reach a position of national prosperity of self-sustained economic growth. However, economic development is taking place in Zambia. In part this is undoubtedly due to the sheer, massive input of capital in developmental efforts. But this process is not entirely random. Decision-makers in the Zambian bureaucracy are interacting with an environment that provides a set of opportunities and constraints that orders their behavior in significant ways. That environment is not one of a hierarchically structured administrative system in which bureaucrats respond primarily to commands from superiors. Rather, the environment includes a substantial amount of stimuli that prompt bureaucrats to act in entrepreneurial ways. In that decision-makers respond to these stimuli, important elements of dynamism and rationality are infused into development administration.

The essential characteristics of an entrepreneur are that he has access to resources and that he can, and does, invest these resources in the establishment or expansion of a given enterprise in order to secure a desirable payoff. If the investment is sound, then the entrepreneur profits. When bad judgement is utilised, the entrepreneur suffers a loss. Entrepreneurialism has traditionally been considered as a characteristic of behaviour in the private sector of the economy. The suggestion here is that the concept be extended to the analysis of public development activity. The discretion and autonomy available to departments in a bureaucracy like Zambia's provides the opportunity for making entrepreneurial judgements in establishing an agenda for the use of departmental personnel and fiscal resources, and bureaucrats have incentives that prompt them to take advantage of this opportunity.

The payoffs for policy-makers responsible for successful development programs are not primarily monetary in nature, as is the case of entrepreneurs in the private sector. Rather, the rewards are self-satisfaction and, more tangibly, enhanced career opportunities. Zambian civil servants have generally experienced rapid upward mobility within the government since Independence. This has been particularly true for the relatively well-trained and well-educated.³³ Increasing pressure to Zambianise senior positions in private businesses has opened a whole new set of opportunities for many civil servants in addition to those within the bureaucracy. Indeed, almost half of the 83 Zambian civil servants interviewed by the author³⁴ said that they anticipated leaving the civil service before normal retirement age for a role in the private sector.

In an environment with an abundance of opportunities for rapid advancement, some will be tempted to rest secure in the position they have attained and rely on the qualifications that got them into that position rather than be concerned with job performance and new achievements. For those in Zambia who have reacted in this way however, there is the threat that the government may

33. Dennis L. Dresang, 'The Civil Service in Zambia', in William Tordoff (ed.) *Government in Zambia* (Heinemann, London, forthcoming).

34. See the account by R.G. Rainford, 'Provincial Department Committees in Zambia', *Journal of Administration Overseas*, X, 3 (July 3, 1971), pp. 178-191.

exercise its prerogative to force retirement 'in the public interest.' The government has done this in the case of a number of superscale officers. Thus, this is a credible threat and can serve as a disincentive for a noncontributory performance.

More commonly, Zambian civil servants occupying positions of responsibility in departments dealing with development are motivated to act in ways that they believe will advance their careers. An important concern in this regard is with increasing one's visibility in a positive way by becoming identified with successful programs. The purpose of this visibility may be to obtain a higher or more favourable position in the government or it may be to secure an invitation to fill a high position in a private enterprise. Visibility is, of course, not desired by most civil servants, who calculate that tenure and promotions go to the most faithful. However, there are civil servants in Zambia who dream of unusually successful careers and are thus prompted to act in entrepreneurial ways. It might be hypothesised that the dramatic difference in the limited mobility possible during the colonial period and the chances for rapid advancement since Independence is largely responsible for the ambitions and confidence of many Zambians. Political discontent may result if gaps develop between these visions and reality. For dynamism in development administration, however, these ambitions are critical.

The expatriate civil servants who were interviewed indicated similar motivations for having a stake in the soundness of their judgements and fate of the projects for which they shared responsibility. Expatriates are attracted to contractual employment in the Zambian civil service by the relatively high salaries, also by the opportunity to assist in development efforts. In addition to following these materialistic and idealistic motives, individuals have sought to establish the kind of record and obtain the kind of experience that would be useful in securing a good job at the termination of service in the Zambian bureaucracy. As has been already observed, this was an important concern for almost all except those nearing retirement age. Young expatriates occupy positions of greater responsibility and higher status than their formal qualifications would entitle them to in their home countries. They believe that if they can use the opportunity afforded them in Zambia and establish an impressive record, then they can get their careers off to a better start than if they had not had this experience. Expatriates already established in a career stream perceive their experience in Zambia as a means of furthering that career.

It should also be pointed out that some Zambian politicians act to ensure positive and successful governmental responses to development needs. The payoff for these political figures is visibility within the government and public support from those benefitting from governmental action. Both of these payoffs are invaluable to politicians. While the administrative reforms of 1969 have not given extensive formal power to politicians nor established UNIP control over the bureaucracy, politicians have been presented with the opportunity to exercise leadership in evoking development activity from bureaucrats. Provincial

Development Committees have been particularly useful forums for politicians seeking to influence administrative behavior.

The entrepreneurial motivations that have been described do not, of course, apply to all who occupy decision-making positions in departments concerned with development. But it is not necessary for all administrative personnel to have this orientation in order to have dynamism and entrepreneurialism in the formulation of policy. A highly motivated element in a bureaucracy often has an influence that is not reflected by its numbers. 77 civil servants in senior posts of departments involved in development administration were interviewed.³⁵ Of these, 46 expressed the kind of career aspirations and motivations that have been described as entrepreneurial. This is a significant proportion and bound to have an impact on decision-making.

The entrepreneur in the public bureaucracy must make the same kinds of calculations as the entrepreneur in the private sector. The factors of production must be surveyed. The response of individuals and communities to innovation must be estimated. Marketing facilities and the likely reception of a product on the market must be considered. Where infrastructure is concerned, utility function must be calculated. If outputs from other bureaucratic units are required, the likelihood of obtaining these outputs must be assessed. The imperfect state of information on many of these factors renders completely rational decision-making improbable. Nonetheless, judgements are made and based on a comparison of the prospective returns that would come from varying patterns of investing departmental resources. In this way, although development administration is not structured by the logic of planning for balanced sectorial growth, it is ordered by the environment—bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic—within which policy-makers operate. The style of decision-making is not hierarchical but entrepreneurial.

THE PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA

It is difficult to prove with any rigour the existence of a causal relationship between the features of the administrative system and the pattern of a nation's economic development. There is a multiplicity of factors that affect economic growth and productivity. The impact of the bureaucracy is a variable, like others, that cannot be measured in a precise or systematic manner. Yet it is reasonable to assume that the bureaucracy has had an impact and that the nature of the impact has been congruent with the characteristics and capabilities of the administrative system.

There is a very interesting convergence of the discussion above of the characteristics of the bureaucracy in Zambia, the theory of unbalanced economic growth presented by Albert O. Hirschman, and the actual pattern of public investment and economic growth in Zambia. The perspective of Hirschman as he

35. These interviews were sought on the basis of the position that an individual held. They represent no effort at representative or random sampling and thus do not lend themselves to broad generalisation.

discusses feasible strategies for economic development emphasizes the decision-making process.³⁶ Hirschman doubts, as we have, that developing countries have the capacity to exercise the kind of rationality required by the strategy of balanced growth. Hirschman's discussion of unbalanced economic growth, on the other hand, is in large part concerned with a pattern of stimuli that affects decision-makers in a way to help compensate for their limited rationality. Like those who discuss balanced economic growth, Hirschman begins with a recognition of the interdependency of sectors of the economy. These sectors can be defined in general terms, such as the agricultural and industrial sectors, primary and secondary industries, infrastructure and revenue-earning sectors. In any given country, of course, these sectors can be identified in a more detailed and specific manner.

Basically, the theory of unbalanced economic growth envisages one or more parts of an interdependent economic system spurting ahead and then having its growth stopped because of the need for certain inputs from other sectors of the economy. The lagging sectors then become very visible and present themselves to decision-makers (especially entrepreneurial ones) as both urgent demands and timely opportunities for investment. These sectors then spurt ahead in growth and in so doing permit the resumption or the commencement of growth of other sectors. As Hirschman puts it: '... sectoral imbalances will induce a variety of sensations—presence of pain or expectation of pleasure—in the economic operations and policy makers, whose reactions should all converge toward increasing output in the lagging sector.'³⁷

Hirschman admits that unbalanced growth is much more costly and inefficient than balanced growth. The pattern of growth, viewed as sectors and as the total Gross Domestic Product, is likely to be erratic under the former approach. Nonetheless, unbalanced growth is much more congruent with administrative capabilities and much more realistic than is the strategy of balanced growth. Hirschman notes that in Latin America the actual pattern is one of sectorial imbalance, despite the presence of development plans designed to follow the edicts of balanced growth.³⁸ This is true of Zambia as well.

Zambia's development plans have essentially been documents outlining a strategy of balanced economic growth, emphasizing supply. From goals explicitly articulated by planners in Zambia and from the pattern of allocations authorised in the plans, it is clear that three basic policies guided the formulation of the Transitional Development Plan (1 January 1965 to 30 June 1966) and the First National Development Plan (1966 to 1970). These policies were:

1. Efforts would be made to develop all sectors of the economy at the same time and at about the same rate.
2. The primary role of the government would be to develop economic and

36. The fundamentals of the theory of unbalanced economic growth are best outlined in Albert O. Hirschman, *Strategy of Economic Development* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1958).

37. Albert O. Hirschman and Charles E. Lindblom, 'Economic Development, Research and Development, Policy Making: Some Converging Views', *Behavioral Science*, (April 1962).

38. Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America* (Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1963).

social infrastructure, leaving the productive, revenue-earning sector primarily to the private segment of society.

3. Alternative facilities and supplies would be developed to those necessitating heavy reliance on Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique.

These goals were, of course, translated into specific projects and programs that were authorised for funding from the public treasury and/or were projected as areas of growth in the private sector.

Three general categories were used to classify development activities: 1. economic infrastructure—public facilities providing transportation, power, and communications needed for the establishment and maintenance of revenue-earning activities; 2. social infrastructure—the provision of a healthy and educated population and of defense, order and governmental administration so that the social and political prerequisites for rapid economic development are present; and 3. productive investment—the expansion of revenue-earning activities, in the agricultural, commercial and industrial sectors of the economy. Table 4 presents a comparison of the planned public expenditure for each of these categories for the Transitional Development Plan³⁹ and the First National Development Plan.

TABLE 4—GENERAL PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES

	Transitional Development Plan		First National Development Plan	
	K million	Percent	K million	Percent
Economic infrastructure	19.2	20.9	165.0	29.2
Social infrastructure	51.8	56.4	194.1	34.4
Productive investment	20.8	22.7	188.3	33.6
Miscellaneous	—	—	16.2	2.8
Total	91.8	100.0	563.6	100.0

Note: The figures given are in millions of Kwacha (K). One Kwacha is equal to U.S. \$1.40 or 10 shillings in the currency of East African countries.

Sources: Zambia, Central Planning Office, Office of the President, *An Outline of the Transitional Development Plan* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1965) and Zambia, Office of National Development and Planning, Office of the Vice-President, *First National Development Plan, 1966-1970* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966).

It is clear from the table that, except for the heavy expenditures authorized under the Transitional Development Plan for social infrastructure, the variance in the proportion of funds allocated to each of the three major categories is

39. The Transitional Development Plan ran from 1 January 1965 to 30 June 1966. It covered the last six months of the 'emergency extension' of the last plan of the colonial administration, six months for formulating a new plan and first six months of what was called the First National Development Plan.

minimal. This exception was due largely to the expenditures that the newly independent government had to incur in assuming responsibility for its own defense and foreign relations and in providing administrative facilities for the new regime. Another urgent need that is classified as a type of social infrastructure was education and training. The relative scarcity of secondary school places and absence of a university has been described above. It is little wonder that the plan explicitly assigned positions of top priority to these concerns.

On the one side there is education and training (to make up for the omissions of the past and to ensure that there is an adequate supply of skilled Zambians in the future). On the other side the priority has been set by the need to achieve fully adequate standards in the classic functions of Government: the protection of the country's frontiers, the maintenance of law and order at home and the provision of efficient administration.⁴⁰

K14.6 million was allocated for education and training and K14.0 million for administration and defence facilities under the Transitional Development Plan.

Other than the initial emphasis given to social infrastructure, the strategy of economic development presented by the post independence development plans indicates a preference for balanced growth. Simultaneously, transportation and power facilities, trained personnel, agricultural production and secondary

TABLE 5—CAPITAL FUNDS ALLOCATED TO EACH MINISTRY BY THE FIRST NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN

	1966-67	1967-68	1968-69	1969-70	Total
	K'000	K'000	K'000	K'000	K'000
National Assembly	400	176	4	24	604
Office of the President	9,728	10,224	4,530	5,000	29,482
Secretary to the Cabinet	414	268	160	174	1,026
Office of National Development and planning	400	270	280	260	1,210
Foreign Affairs	312	80	170	80	642
Home Affairs	1,228	888	638	714	3,468
Justice	92	220	240	300	852
Finance	950	242	34	—	1,226
Information and Postal Service	3,284	3,776	2,714	2,894	12,668
Transport and Works	50,832	50,952	44,036	19,214	165,034
Commerce and Industry	8,986	13,540	17,914	13,340	53,780
Lands and Natural Resources	7,770	7,372	6,704	6,652	28,498
Agriculture	15,860	13,908	15,286	14,810	59,864
Mines and Cooperatives	10,238	6,022	2,338	1,910	20,508
Local Government and Housing	21,918	20,244	20,550	21,954	84,666
Labour and Social Development	606	602	470	400	2,078
Health	6,778	6,946	4,228	1,652	19,604
Education	19,250	18,188	20,472	20,500	78,410
Total	159,056	153,918	140,768	109,878	563,620

Source: Zambia, *First National Development Plan, 1966-1970*, p. 288.

40. Transitional Development Plan, p. 11.

industries were to be developed. No explicit attempt was made by the planners to demonstrate exactly how the growth in one of these sectors affected the others, but it is implicit in the spread of resources and the sum total of the goals established in the plans that the interdependency and mutual support of these factors had been anticipated.

The importance of the interdependency factor in the minds of planners in Zambia is perhaps most explicitly demonstrated in the provisions made for the development of economic infrastructure in the First National Development Plan. Table 5, which presents an annual breakdown of funds allocated to each ministry by the plan, illustrates that within the framework of balanced sectorial growth, the initial emphasis was to be placed on the development projects of the Ministry of Transport and Works. The formulators of the plan envisaged that this ministry would spend two-thirds of the total amount allocated to it during the first two years of the plan period and that by the end of the third year most of the economic infrastructure needed for the immediate growth of other sectors would be available. Most of the other ministries concerned with economic development were to spend about the same amount in each of the four years.

The priority given to the provision of more economic infrastructural facilities had both political and economic justifications. The most urgent need in this area was the establishment of alternative transportation facilities and power sources to those involving Rhodesia, South Africa and Mozambique. As a landlocked country dependent upon the export of a very heavy and bulky commodity—copper—for over half the country's income, Zambia is dependent on surface transportation routes to the sea. Existing rail lines run through Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique. Traditionally the routes through Rhodesia and Mozambique have been the most important. These are all territories with which Zambia has severe political tension and conflict, and this has made access to this vital infrastructure insecure. In addition to depending on transportation routes through the south, at Independence Zambia received virtually all of its electric power from the Kariba power station located on the Rhodesian bank of the Zambezi, its coal from Wankie in Rhodesia and its petroleum products from the Feruka refinery in Rhodesia. Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence and its aftermath demonstrated dramatically how economically dependent Zambia was on the south.⁴¹

Besides the political justifications for providing alternatives to routes through and supplies from Rhodesia, there are sound economic arguments as well. The Rhodesia Railways network does not have a capacity adequate to meet Zambia's existing needs, much less those of a more developed economy. Further, it would be ideal if Zambia had a competitive supply of transportation facilities so that it would not be subject to the prices and policies established by a monopoly supplier.

No attempt will be made here to evaluate in a systematic fashion how app-

41. See Richard L. Sklar, 'Zambia's Response to U.D.I.', *Mawazao*, Vol. I, No. 3 (June 1968) pp. 17-32.

ropriate the development plans were for Zambia. Regardless of the quality of the plans, it is clear that the administrative system did not have the capabilities needed to implement them. The plans did not present a complete list of authorised projects and so there is no way to measure the gap between plans and accomplishments by matching planned projects with complete projects. Nonetheless, there are a number of indicators that demonstrate the existence and the nature of this gap. One indicator is presented in Table 6. This table compares the Capital Fund to be used for development expenditures from 1966 to 1970, as that fund was first established by the First National Development Plan and as it existed at the end of 1968. The latter set of figures was the result of calculating the total cost over the four-year plan period of development projects that would be implemented, given the perspective available at the end of 1968. It should be noted that no systematic revision of the plan was made at the end of 1968. Rather this was a report of the Capital Fund, as amended in an *ad hoc* and incremental way, for inclusion in the 1969 budget.

TABLE 6—COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES BY SECTORS ACCORDING TO THE FIRST NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND THE CAPITAL FUND AS REPORTED IN THE 1969 BUDGET

Sector	Development Plan		Capital Fund 1969	
	K million	%	K million	%
Economic infrastructure	165.0	29.2	467.9	55.0
Social infrastructure	194.1	34.4	185.1	23.0
Productive investment	188.3	33.6	162.0	19.0
Miscellaneous	16.2	2.8	35.4	3.0
Total	563.6	100.0	849.9	100.0

Sources: Zambia, *First National Development Plan and Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure (Including the Capital Fund and Constitutional and Statutory Expenditure) For the Year 1st January, 1969 to 31st December, 1969*, (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1969), pp. 57-90.

There are a number of striking features of this table. One is the increase in the amount of money devoted to development. This increase represents some underestimation of costs at the time the plan was formulated, the addition of new projects, and the effects of inflation in Zambia between 1966 and 1969. Another change in the allocations made according to the plan and the estimates of total costs presented in the 1969 budget is the increase in funds devoted to the development of economic infrastructure, and the decrease in money to be spent on social infrastructure and productive, revenue-earnings investment. The decrease in absolute Kwacha for the latter two sectors is minimal, but the decrease is substantial when considering the reduced purchasing power of the Kwacha in 1969 and the decline in percentages of capital funds allocated to these sectors.

The change from a planned pattern of investment balanced between the sectors of the economy was altered to an unbalanced pattern in an incremental and unsystematic way. The change was primarily in response to factors on which the planners could not predict, or on which they had miscalculated. In large part the increase in the allocation for the development of economic infrastructure is due to two major additional burdens the government had to assume. One of these involved the construction of the railroad through northern Zambia and southern Tanzania. Only K10 million was set aside in the original plan for this project with the note that more would undoubtedly be required. In the 1969 estimates of the Capital Fund, this figure was revised to K110 million. The other major addition involved the pipeline through Tanzania to Ndola. When the Plan was formulated it was anticipated that private funds would supply virtually all of the needed capital. These funds did not materialise and the government had to spend over K23 million on the pipeline. These alterations certainly are consistent with a major goal of the First National Development Plan, i.e., to provide alternate transportation routes to those running through Rhodesia. However, the additional funds needed to attain this goal meant that funds for attaining other goals were more scarce.

Not only has there been a deviation between the planned and actual pattern of allocation for development activity, but the expenditure of these funds has also differed from what was anticipated in the Plan. An indication of the state of completion of authorised projects is presented in Table 7. This table compares the total costs of development projects with the amount of money spent for these projects. There is a margin of error involved in using this indicator in that implementation includes more than the expenditure of funds and, further, costs can be underestimated or perhaps even overestimated. Despite these reservations, the comparison made in Table 7 does present some indication of progress in implementing the development plans.

TABLE 7—COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED TOTAL COSTS AND EXPENDITURE ON DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1968

	Estimated total cost	Estimated expenditure 1 July 1966 to 31 Dec. 1968	Percentage of total cost spent
Economic infrastructure	467.9	159.3	34.0
Social infrastructure	185.1	77.4	41.8
Productive investment	162.0	36.9	22.7
Miscellaneous	35.4	0.1	25.4
Total	849.9	282.7	33.3

Sources: Zambia, *Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for 1969*, pp. 57-90.

The pattern of spending provided for in the plan itself was that about two-thirds of the funds allocated for development would be spent by December 1968. Of the K563.6 million initially planned for the whole Plan period, K159 million was to be spent between July 1966 and July 1967, K153.9 million was to be spent the second year, K140.7 million the third year and K109.8 million the final year (see Table 5). As the data presented in Table 7 indicates, however, less than half the allocated funds were spent for development by the end of 1968. Productive investment, in particular, was far behind schedule. For the plan as a whole, only one-third of the authorised funds were utilised.

A significant deviation in one feature of the strategy of economic development initially presented in Zambia's plans was the decision to introduce government participation in major parts of the private sector. In an address to the National Council of the United National Independence Party on 19 April 1968, President Kaunda introduced what were to become known as the 'Mulungushi Economic Reforms'. The President announced that selected private firms were being invited to sell at least 51% of their shares of stock to the Zambian government. These businesses included retail firms, transportation companies, building supply firms and some secondary industries. On 12 August 1969 the President extended this same invitation to the mining companies operating in Zambia. At the same time, the President announced that the government would nationalise mining rights in the country. On 12 November 1970, major financial institutions operating in Zambia were informed of the government's intention to secure controlling ownership in this sector of the economy as well.

The policy to establish direct participation by the government in the productive sector of the economy did not contribute in an immediate way, one way or another, to the attainment of development goals. In part, however, this policy was made because of frustration in the efforts to implement development plans.⁴² Control over the affairs of companies and firms critical to Zambia's economy would, it was hoped, enable the government to coordinate economic activities and economic growth more satisfactorily and to ensure that the pricing, production, and investment policies of these firms would be consonant with the national interest.

The pattern of economic growth in Zambia reflects the pattern of government investment. As Tables 8 and 9 indicate, the contribution of the construction and transport and communications sectors to the Gross Domestic Product have been significantly greater than the contribution made by agriculture, forestry and fishing. This parallels the direction of government investment.

42. Zambia Information Services, *Zambia's Economic Revolution* (Lusaka: Government Printer, n.d.), pp. iii-vi, 26, 50-54.

TABLE 8—INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF ZAMBIA AT FACTOR COST

	1964	1965	1966	1967
	<i>K million</i>	<i>K million</i>	<i>K million</i>	<i>K million</i>
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	53.3	54.8	60.5	64.4
Mining and quarrying	220.8	208.9	240.1	235.5
Manufacturing	28.2	40.0	60.2	78.9
Construction	20.0	39.4	54.0	63.3
Electricity and water	3.0	5.3	7.4	8.9
Trade	45.8	71.3	78.3	96.4
Financial institutions and insurance ..	0.6	10.7	11.5	16.9
Real estate	10.6	9.2	15.2	14.9
Transport and communications	20.6	32.4	32.4	47.9
Government administration	21.1	30.4	35.7	29.4
Community and business services	19.6	34.1	34.6	51.3
Personal services	19.6	12.2	14.6	15.6
Total	464.9	548.6	644.5	733.4

Source: Zambia, *Finance Division, Office of the Vice-President, Economic Report, 1968* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1969) pp. 43-45.

TABLE 9—INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF ZAMBIA AT FACTOR COST (expressed as percentages of the total)

	1964	1965	1966	1967
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	11.5	10.0	9.4	8.8
Mining and quarrying	47.5	38.1	37.3	32.1
Manufacturing	6.1	7.3	9.3	10.8
Construction	4.5	7.2	8.4	8.6
Electricity and water	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2
Trade	9.9	13.0	12.1	13.1
Financial institutions and Insurance ..	0.1	1.9	1.8	2.3
Real estate	2.3	1.7	2.4	2.0
Transport and communications	4.4	5.9	5.0	6.5
Government administration	4.6	5.5	5.5	5.4
Community and business services	4.2	6.2	5.4	7.0
Personal services	4.2	2.2	2.3	2.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Zambia, *Finance Division, Office of the Vice-President, Economic Report, 1968*, (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1969) p. 46.

Also evident from the above tables is a pattern of economic growth that Hirschman identifies with the absence of effective central planning. That is, Zambia has had a history of unbalanced economic growth, in which various sectors have had periods of rapid expansion followed by a levelling off. These sectoral patterns, moreover, are independent of the pattern of rise and fall of the Gross Domestic Product. The expansion of copper mining in Zambia reached its peak during the World War II period and in the years immediately after the war. Expansion has continued, but at a less spectacular rate. In the immediate post-colonial period, the construction sector of the economy grew rapidly. This growth has slowed down since mid 1967⁴³ and the sector currently with the most rapid growth rate is manufacturing.⁴⁴ Agriculture, another major sector of the economy, has continued to increase its rate of production, but is contributing steadily smaller proportions to the Gross Domestic Product.

CONCLUSION

It is a cruel irony that Zambia, which needs the advantages of efficiency and co-ordination that accrue from planning for balanced economic growth, has a low capacity for planning rationally and implementing efficiently and effectively. The notions of entrepreneurialism and unbalanced growth, besides having explanatory powers, may provide some comfort for those in distress because of the gap between plans and accomplishments, aspirations and capabilities. However, it appears that the high costs, in time and money, of development in new states are unavoidable.

Moreover, entrepreneurialism in the bureaucracy is no more a guarantee of attaining development goals than investments and speculation in the private sector of an economy are guarantees of securing profit. There will be failures and successes. What is important is to recognise the existence of this force in the Zambian bureaucracy and the contribution it is making and can make to development. The ideal organisation for development administration would have enough central control and direction to minimise duplication of efforts and to guide activity towards major societal goals, while at the same time providing the incentives and opportunities to bureaucrats to make them innovative and responsive to the political, social and economic milieu in which they must work. The attainment of an administrative system with these characteristics is not a simple task. The limitations of incomplete information, finite wisdom, shortage of expertise, and bureaucratic fragmentation are severe and not easily overcome.

43. Zambia, Finance Division, Office of the Vice-President, *Economic Report, 1968*, (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1969), pp. 14-16.

44. During 1967, the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) began realising rapid growth. INDECO is a parastatal organisation responsible for making public investments in manufacturing and for managing government participation in industries in which the government has total or partial ownership. During 1967, the assets of INDECO increased from K2 million to K15 million and, despite heavy long-term investments, realized a 65% increase in profits. This record was achieved prior to the issuing of an invitation to selected companies to sell at least 51% of their controlling stock to the government through INDECO. See, Zambia, Industrial Development Corporation, *Annual Report for 1967*, (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1968).

This analysis suggests the need for more study of the variety of environments in which decision-makers operate and of the patterns of bureaucratic response in different environments. Entrepreneurialism and routinisation, for instance, are responses that probably vary with differences in the kind of administrative activity, the extent of hierarchical authority patterns, the opportunities for rapid upward mobility, the supply of resources for development, and the nature of non-bureaucratic sources of power. The delineation of these relationships would be useful both for theory-building and for suggesting prescriptively how governments might structure bureaucratic environments in order to maximize development administration capabilities. In the meantime, it appears wise and realistic to lower our assessments of what can be accomplished through development planning and administration.