

on items which do not contribute to the development of the national economy as a whole.

Surpluses

34. The Government must supervise and guide the expenditure of surpluses accruing from the economic activities of the parastatals.

35 'We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution—a revolution which brings to an end our weakness, so that we are never again exploited oppressed, or humiliated.'

COMMENTARY ON MWONGOZO WA TANU, 1971

BISMARCK U. MWANSASU*

INTRODUCTION

In February 1967, the National Executive Committee of the Tanganyika National Union (TANU) issued the Arusha Declaration outlining the country's path to socialist development. In February 1971, the National Executive of TANU issued a comprehensive, thirty-five paragraph document, *Mwongozo wa TANU, 1971*.¹ Is there any significance in these documents being issued in February? Besides the coincidence of the months there is a very significant connection. If the Arusha Declaration initiated the country's movement to socialism, *Mwongozo* reviews the progress in terms of pinpointing the obstacles and provides guidelines for overcoming such obstacles and carrying on the struggle.

One of the novel features of *Mwongozo* is its perspective. The problems of Tanzania are discussed within a very wide framework, within the context of the problems and challenges of the contemporary African situation. The interpretations of these problems and challenges presented in *Mwongozo* are very significant—a point which can easily be lost sight of when one reads this document from the perspectives of the 1970's. To appreciate the significant contribution of *Mwongozo* in clarifying the nature and character of the dominant issues and problems in the contemporary African situation, a review of some of the conflicting images of these issues and problems in the early 1960's will be presented, so the aim of this review is to provide a useful background for discussing *Mwongozo*.

*Bismarck Mwansasu is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam.

1. This document was initially issued in Kiswahili alone. The Government paper, *The Standard* carried out its own translation into English which was published on 22 February 1971. Subsequently, the Party has issued the English version of this document entitled *T.A.N.U. Guidelines*. The main problem with the English version is that it does not, I feel, convey the feelings, expression and mood of the message that the document wants to put across. This weakness is a general problem of all translated works because as Dr. Okot lamented with reference to his *Song of Lawino*, translation had 'clipped a bit, of the eagle's wings and rendered the sharp edges of the warriors' sword rusty and blunt'. The Kiswahili word *Mwongozo* is used to refer to the document throughout this paper.

'Africa ripe for revolution' was the heading the *Tanganyika Standard* chose to give its story of a speech reported to have been given by Mr. Chou en Lai in Mogadishu in February 1964. It should be noted that it was the *Tanganyika Standard* which coined this particular phraseology rather than Mr. Chou en Lai because the expression that appears in the text reads '... revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout Africa.'²

The actual phraseology used by the paper is significant because it represents its interpretation of what was conceived as the essence of Mr. Chou en Lai's message. Coming so soon after the army mutinies in East Africa, incidents which were suspected as having been instigated by outside influences, Chou's remarks could have been interpreted as reflective of his government's attitude to incidents of that nature. For those who had suspected the intentions of the Chinese in Africa, Chou's remarks seemed to confirm their fears and suspicions that China's policy in Africa was that of working towards the overthrow of existing African governments by encouraging and supporting revolutionary movements. This, certainly, appears to be what was in the mind of the editor of the *East African Standard* when he wrote '... could anything be more callous or more indifferent to the suffering of the ordinary people? The whole tenor of his (Chou's) public utterances (sic!) has been shaped towards the same end, international communism through the Marxist methods of revolution.' The editor proceeded to draw his readers' attention to the activities of the Chinese government in supporting revolutionary movements in South-East Asia.³

Sixteen months after Mogadishu, Mr. Chou en Lai made similar remarks at a mass rally in Dar es Salaam during his first state visit to Tanzania. He declared 'An exceedingly favourable situation of revolution prevails today not only in Africa but also in Asia and Latin America.'⁴ These remarks prompted the Kenya Government to issue a sharp and strongly worded official statement as follows:

The Chinese Prime Minister is reported as having said in Dar es Salaam that "an exceedingly favourable situation for revolution prevails in Africa." It will be remembered that Mr. Chou en Lai made a similar remark when visiting Mogadishu last year. But the Kenya Government wishes it to be known that Kenya intends to avert all revolutions, irrespective of their origin or whether they come from inside or are influenced from outside.⁵

As if to reiterate the Kenya Government's position, the Minister of Finance remarked, when introducing the Foreign Exchange Bill in Parliament: 'There are Chinese agencies in this country and the time has come to challenge them. The other day, Mr. Chou en Lai, who has no shame, said that the whole of Africa is ready for revolution, but against whom may I ask?'⁶ As in 1964, these reactions suggest that Mr. Chou en Lai's remarks were interpreted as

2. *The Tanganyika Standard*, 5 Feb., 1964.

3. *The Reporter*, 14 Feb. 1964. Implicit in this comment is the idea that the various African governments had already completed their struggle after completing the process of formal transfer of power.

4. *The Nationalist*, 6 June, 1965.

5. *The Reporter*, 18 June, 1965.

6. *Ibid.*

a declaration of intent by the Chinese government to assist revolutionary movements working towards the overthrow of existing African governments.

That there is such a similarity in the nature of reactions to Chou's remarks on both occasions is significant in two senses. The reactions characterize a dominant climate of opinion in the early 1960s about the prospects and problems of the newly independent African countries. Africans were encouraged to believe that their independence during the 'development decade' augured for a bright and prosperous future. The newly independent African countries, it was believed, were to grow and mature as full and active participants of this world-wide 'development decade' which had the support and financial backing of the entire community of nations. The most important task before the African people and their governments, therefore, was to work hard and push their countries until they reached that marginal moment of 'take off' whereupon they would leave their poverty behind and soar into the same skies of material wealth and abundance as the richer nations. Therefore to suggest, as Chou was interpreted as implying in his remarks, that African countries should abandon that line of development and pursue a completely different line dubbed as international communism through the Marxist method of revolution, was, to say the least, irresponsible if not subversive. If his remarks were meant to be an advice to African leaders, then they had to be dismissed in their entirety if only because they did not come from a friend.

The point that must be stressed is that these ideas on Africa or the image about the African situation presented above were not so much based on facts or serious analysis as on beliefs and impressions. The dominant climate of opinion on the prospects and problems of the newly independent African countries was usually based on what the leaders said was happening in their countries or on impressionistic stories by newspaper columnists and, sometimes, on newspaper headlines. The nature of the reactions to Chou's remarks seems to characterize this tendency. The questions raised by critics strongly suggested that those who were bothered by his remarks had probably not read carefully both the text of the speech and the context in which the 'ripe for revolution' remarks were made. Before elaborating on this, it will be useful to bring up two points related to the main interest of this paper.

The first issue relates to the fact that events in the later 1960s seem to have radically altered the climate of opinion in the African situation which was dominant in the early 1960s. Not only have the changes expected to occur during the 'development decade' not materialized, but various governments have been toppled by the army. References to the future are no longer expressed with the same optimism nor are the prospects viewed as rosy and bright as was common in the early 1960s. The other important change has been a marked shift of attitude towards the word 'revolution'. Not only does this evoke an emotively negative reaction, it is also used with approval. In certain cases, revolutions are recognized as both desirable and necessary. An important policy statement in Tanzania, for example, has boldly stated:

We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution—a revolution which brings an end to our weakness, so that we are never again exploited oppressed or humiliated.⁷ Is this the type of revolution Chou had in mind? Do *coup d'etats* which have swept the African continent constitute revolutions?

These questions are important because with the proliferation of the use and meaning of the word 'revolution' there are temptations to give rather simple answers. However, answers of this nature could prove unfortunate because by taking Chou's remarks for the familiar, we might fail to understand what he was trying to get at and, hence, the essence of his message. In addition, without putting the 'ripe for revolution' remarks in their context we will not only be singing the same old song with a new tune but we will miss an opportunity of informing ourselves of what Chou meant by 'revolution'. Therefore, a review of his speeches seems to be imperative and valuable particularly because TANU, as already pointed out, has issued *Mwongozo* which not only attempts to summarize the dominant issues and problems in the contemporary African situation but also spells out a possible approach and ways of resolving such issues and problems. What are these issues and problems? Are they the same as those identified and referred to by Chou? These questions are significant and indicate an additional value of reviewing Chou's speeches because those speeches promise to provide us with a peg on which to hang our commentary on *Mwongozo*. It is to these speeches that we now turn.

II

In the last speech during his first and largest state visit to the African continent, Mr. Chou en Lai is reported to have told his Somali hosts in Mogadishu that: 'The African continent, which gave birth to a brilliant civilisation and suffered the most cruel colonial oppression and plunder, is now undergoing world-shaking changes.' He warned his hosts, that the nature of changes taking place were not without problems, mainly because of the fact that they were designed to liberate the African continent and the African people from colonialism and imperialism. A major source of these problems stemmed from the fact that:

... the imperialists would never be reconciled to their defeat in Africa. They do not like to see the African people becoming masters of their own house nor do they like to see independent African development and prosperity.⁸

Chou seems not to have elaborated on why the imperialists were opposed to changes likely to contribute towards 'independent African development and prosperity'. Nevertheless, this line of thinking is significant because it is contrary to what was observed earlier about the 'development decade' and the dominant opinion that effort was supported and backed by the entire world community.

7. *Arusha Declaration and TANU Policy of Socialism and Self Reliance* (Dar es Salaam: TANU Publicity Section, 1967).

8. *Tanganyika Standard*, 5 February 1964.

The suggestion here is not so much to reject the idea that the entire community is favourably disposed towards any form of 'development' in Africa as to suggest that certain forms of 'development' are not only unlikely to receive support, they might actually be opposed or sabotaged. Because this view contradicts the already dominant opinions and was expressed by Chou, there are temptations to take it lightly and dismiss it as 'communist propaganda'. In order to rescue this line of analysis from this smear, it is necessary to support it with the findings of other people who cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be regarded as 'communist propagandists'.

In his study of foreign investment in India, Michael Kidron puts forward the following reasons why some members of the world community are not favourably disposed to supporting certain types or forms of development:

... The proliferation of independent states, each reaching out for economic independence and power, each pursuing these goals to some degree... through controlling their relations with the world economy. Some of the methods adopted—currency and capital control, protection, and the regulation of international trade—are bound to affect the operations of the giant international firms.⁹

To the extent that 'controlling... relations with the world economy' is a move towards 'independent African development and prosperity', it is unlikely that those forms of development would receive the support of those countries whose 'giant international firms' are adversely affected. Hamza Alavi carries the argument further:

The big capitalist firm seeks to thwart any real efforts in the underdeveloped countries to make progress towards industrialisation which would affect the secure exploitation of these markets by monopoly capitalism. If it cannot prevent progress towards industrialisation, it seeks to contain the drive towards it and to secure for itself participation in what cannot be prevented.¹⁰

The significance of these findings is not so much that they collaborate Chou's line of analysis as the fact that their respective studies were carried out in the early 1960s. This means that Chou was not a lone voice. Secondly, these studies, particularly Alavi's, bring out a number of methods used in preventing, slowing down the tempo, or actually frustrating those forms of development aimed at 'controlling (the country's) relations to the world economy'. Mr. Chou en Lai's observations on this question are worth noting:

They (the neo-colonialists who are more cunning and sinister than the old colonialists) are now stepping up their infiltration and expansion in political, military, economic and cultural fields by hypocritical means.¹¹

A similar point was made in Dar es Salaam.

The imperialists and old and new colonialists... have brought political and economic pressure to bear on you and even resorted to frenzied and despicable subversion.¹² Such was the African situation and its problems as seen and interpreted by Chou.

Coming from a person who had spent most of his life 'making a revolution' in China, Chou's perception and interpretation has greater significance than

9. Kidron, M. *Foreign Investment in India* (London: O.U.P.) p. 254.

10. Alavi, H. 'Imperialism Old and New', in R. Milliband & J. Servile (eds.), *Socialist Register*, 1964.

11. *Tanganyika Standard*, 5 Feb. 1964.

12. *The Nationalist*, 6 June 1965.

just providing a context in which the 'ripe for revolution' remarks were made. It helps to clear some of the ambiguities surrounding the word 'revolution'. If it refers to situations undergoing 'world shaking changes' which are telling blows to the 'imperialists and old and new colonialists', then it excludes a number of changes that have taken place, particularly military *coup d'états*. However, if all situations of change are not necessarily revolutions, a number of questions emerge. In what ways was the African continent undergoing 'world-shaking changes'? In what ways was the situation that prevailed in Africa 'exceedingly favourable for revolution'? Whose revolution? Because these were almost the same type of questions that critics of Chou raised, they require our special attention.

An important point when considering these questions is that Chou's remarks, at least the 1964 ones, were made after an extensive visit to different African states; different in the sense that their systems of government and levels of economic development varied widely. After this exposure and personal experience, a perceptive political mind and astute observer like Chou must have seen more than his hosts displayed to him throughout his brief and officially guided tours. Therefore, his remarks must be taken as a summary of his appreciation and assessment of what struck him as the most striking characteristic common to what appeared to be dissimilar situations. What seemed strikingly common was the fact that the political stability and calm, prevalent in the various countries were only apparent, just as the affluence and material wealth displayed by his hosts were illusory in terms of not being reflective of the country's economic conditions. Apparent because beneath the surface were instability and disorder; illusory because the majority of the people in each of these countries were still locked in the battle against poverty, ignorance and disease.

A possible explanation for the delicate nature of the political situation was probably that the structural foundations or pillars on which the newly independent African governments were built were basically weak. And yet this weakness was a manifestation of a large problem, a deadlock in resolving the fundamental question—'after independence, what next?' This is a fundamental question because answers to it would enable a regime to decide about the nature and form of the structures it wants. This deadlock has been expressed in two apparently different political situations.

The first one related to those countries which had as it were, decided to take things easy in terms of not recognizing the necessity of addressing themselves to what we have termed the fundamental question. Implicitly, countries in this category accept the colonial institutions as the basis for building their newly independent governments. Decisions of this nature hardly contribute towards solving the problem of structural weakness of the regimes concerned, mainly because of the fact that the colonial institutions were partly created with the purpose of assuring stable conditions within which the colonial government could exploit. That is, they were partly concerned as instruments to

subjugate the colonial peoples and prevent them from protesting lest they disturb the process of production. Therefore, to the extent that colonial institutions were designed as instruments exercising 'most cruel colonial oppression and plunder', their perpetuation after independence would continue generating the same forces which were instrumental in undermining the authority of the colonial government. In other words, so long as people feel that independence has not brought an end to their oppression and exploitation, they will, according to the *Arusha Declaration*, 'want a revolution—a revolution which brings an end to... (their) weakness, so that... (they) are never again exploited, oppressed, or humiliated'.¹³ Persistence of forces which express these feelings would constitute permanent elements of instability.

The second case relates to the few countries where Chou encountered an explicit rejection of the inherited colonial institutions. However, what struck him most was the lack of awareness of the complexity and costs of the tasks ahead. The declared commitments and expressed desire for carrying out 'world-shaking changes' he heard from some of his hosts were hardly matched by a realisation that such changes would not come about as a result of a natural process of evolution or reform by tinkering with the colonial system. In other words, there was little realisation that those changes had to be accompanied by a complete transformation of the inherited colonial institutions. Lack of realisation or appreciation of this led to an underestimation of the nature of the problems which had to be overcome, the obstacles or hurdles that had to be surmounted and the costs that a country and its people had to pay. This situation was probably manifested in the general lack of preparations for carrying out the struggle, firstly in educating the people about the nature and necessity of the changes that were introduced, their implications in terms of the sacrifices and hardship everybody would have to make; and secondly in creating an institutional capacity adequate for these changes.¹⁴ What made the situation arising from an underestimation of the problems and a lack of preparation tragic was that it was detrimental to the entire efforts towards complete transformation. These efforts were doomed to failure because when the enemies (both internal and external) decided to attack, the regime was either caught unawares or completely unprepared to fight back and destroy them.¹⁵ This applies both to military attacks (outright foreign aggression or *coup d'états*) and more indirect and subtle attacks (withdrawal of foreign aid for planned projects, manipulation of commodity prices in the world market, propaganda

13. This idea of revolution is very similar to the Marxist views. For a detailed discussion of this see, F. Schurmann, 'On Revolutionary Conflict', *Journal of International Affairs*, XXIII (1), (1969), p. 41.

14. That this state of affairs bothered Mr. Chou en Lai. See Selwyn Ryan's remarks: 'Reportedly, Chou was very disturbed by what he saw in Ghana in 1964 and was very frank with Nkrumah about his disappointment', S. Ryan, 'Socialism and the Party System in Ghana, 1947-1966', *Pan-African Journal*, III (1) p. 70, fn. 63.

15. Except for the case of the People's Republic of Guinea and other few cases, this seems to have been generally the case. The situation with which governments have been toppled, even those supposedly headed by 'charismatic' leaders and reportedly stable because they were based on popular support, has astounded both critics and admirers.

and so on).¹⁶ To the extent that failure of the efforts towards transformation would imply existence of conditions which make people look to revolution as salvation, even these countries would still face the same problems as those in the earlier case.

If subsequent events in Africa have borne out Mr. Chou en Lai's anxieties, we are faced with the question Lenin once asked: 'What is to be done?' For Tanzania, this question has been both urgent and relevant because the Party has declared its intention to effect a complete transformation of society and important steps have been taken in that direction to concretize those intentions. The value of Mr. Chou en Lai's speeches was not merely in pinpointing the problems but also in indicating the obstacles which must be recognized if those problems are to be overcome. *Mwongozo*, as referred to earlier, has attempted to indicate or spell out some of the possible ways of confronting and overcoming these problems. It is, therefore, necessary to examine this document carefully and see whether and in what ways our earlier claim that it was a very important document was justified.

III

One of the major claims to importance is the smallness and compactness of the document itself. Compared to the previous policy statements, *Mwongozo* excels in brevity without losing clarity and forceful expression of the ideas it seeks to convey. Dealing with such an important and complex problem in thirty-five well argued and inter-connected paragraphs in such an interesting and readable manner is no mean achievement. Before commenting on *Mwongozo* in terms of its contribution to provide a way out of the problems discussed in the preceding section, a brief review of the various provisions will be presented.

The document is divided into four broad sections which complement each other both sequentially and thematically. The first section attempts to identify the problems by defining the major issues in the contemporary African situation; the second section discusses the policies necessary for tackling the problems defined, particularly the kind of politics most suitable for carrying out the programmes designed to implement these policies; the third section focuses on defence and national security and the fourth deals with a discussion of economics and the meaning of progress. The last paragraph reiterates the statement from the Arusha Declaration on revolution.

16. The case of Ghana can be used to illustrate the impact of some of these policies. Part of Dr. Nkrumah's problems arose from a steady decline in cocoa prices. This declined from an average export price of £358 per ton in 1953-1954 to £100 per ton in 1965; in terms of prices paid to producers the decline was from £149 per ton in 1951-1952 to £74 in 1964. (To be sure, there were fluctuations over years but the figures in 1965 were the lowest since 1947/48). However, after the coup, the price rose from £100 per ton to £194 per ton, going up to £300 in 1966. One could draw interesting parallels with the case of sisal prices in Tanzania. The Ghanaian case has been discussed elsewhere: 'Military Regimes in Africa with Special Reference to Sudan and Ghana', (M.A. Dissertation, University of Sussex, 1967).

To analyse in more detail, the introduction is interesting not only because it reiterates some of the ideas expressed in the Arusha Declaration on the relationship between realisation of weakness and exploitation and the propensity for revolution, but also because it complements Chou's interpretation of the African situation at least in the 1960's. Equally interesting is the distinction made between liberation and flag independence and the implication that these are not necessarily the same. Thirdly, is the clear recognition of the difficulties and complexity of the tasks ahead: 'It is both a bitter and continuing struggle.'

Recognition of the problems is followed by a discussion of possible ways of facing up to and resolving them successfully. The first concern is clearly stated:

... our Party has the duty to spell out the aims of the Tanzanian and the African revolution, and to identify the enemies of this revolution in order to set out policies and strategies which will enable us to safeguard, consolidate and further our revolution.

If the revolution is a *Tanzanian* one, then it is necessary that all the people should understand what it is about, what their government is doing and why and who their enemies are in the struggle. The second concern is to define the meaning of the revolution (paragraphs 2 and 3) and the identity of the enemy. As well as defining the enemy in spatial terms, i.e. 'in western Europe, particularly Britain, France, Portugal and Spain' (paragraph 6) including 'the racism and apartheid of South Africa and Rhodesia' (paragraph 7), the document also names the internal neo-colonialists and exploiters as enemies.¹⁷ The implications of this latter enemy are considered in paragraphs 8 to 10 in the light of experiences in other countries.

The first section of *Mwongozo*, therefore, states the situation; the remaining three sections deal with problems implicit in the question: What is being and what can or should be done in such a situation?

One of the first points stressed (paragraph 11) is the central role of the Party as the key instrument in defining the objectives and policies, charting the path towards safeguarding, consolidating and furthering the revolution and guiding the people along the chartered path. The Party's responsibility is not simply to provide leadership but good leadership (paragraph 12) and paragraph 13 shows that this leadership relates not only to people but also to all other contemporary institutions in the policy in terms both of deciding their structures and their mode of operation and decision-making patterns. This responsibility does not end at prescription; it extends to 'supervising the implementation of the Party's policy and reviewing the results of implementation'. The 'responsibility to fight vindictiveness of some of its agents' is also emphasized. This specifically refers to the mode of conduct and styles of certain leaders whose behaviour helps to 'drive a wedge between the Party and the government on the one side and the people on the other side'.

The discussion on a strategy to confront the enemies of the Tanzanian and

17. What makes the internal neo-colonialist and exploiter enemies of the revolution is that lacking an independent economic base, their fortunes are dependent upon participation in foreign trade or enterprises dominated by foreign firms. An attack on foreign interests is automatically an attack of these elements.

African revolution raises a number of issues. Tanzania's commitment to participate in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism inevitably links Tanzania's struggle to that carried on by other forces in Africa and beyond. Recognition of the indivisibility of the nature of Tanzania's struggle to the entire liberation movement is expressed in paragraphs 17 to 20 where the implications as far as foreign policy is concerned are clearly brought out. This awareness and commitment is not just an invention of *Mwongozo*: similar views were expressed in 1961-62 in TANU's new constitution after Independence.

The discussion on politics and policies is followed by an attempt to map out a strategy for safeguarding the revolution and carrying it to a higher stage. In considering defence and national security (paragraphs 21 to 27), *Mwongozo* starts from the recognition of the technological military superiority and material wealth of the enemy as well as the fact that the enemies 'will be ready to attack us whenever they have the opportunity'. That is, the enemy will attack us whenever he is convinced either that he will realise his objectives or that he will get away with his aggression. Partly because the enemy sometimes uses 'local puppets to overthrow the revolutionary government' and partly because of the enemy's military supremacy, Tanzania cannot afford to rely on the traditional methods of defence. Therefore, just as the Arusha Declaration has noted in the field of economic development that 'the development of a country is brought about by people', *Mwongozo* has advised:

Tanzania's defence and security depend on Tanzanians themselves—every Tanzanian, in particular each patriot, each socialist.

In other words, every citizen is a participant in defending his country and the revolution as well as in ensuring the security of the country in general. By committing himself to fight if the need arose, by refusing to act as a counter-part or engage in any activities likely to betray the revolution, by exposing suspicious elements and traitors and working towards the strengthening of the revolution, a citizen becomes a participant in the struggle. But citizens must be motivated; there is

the need to arouse political consciousness so that every Tanzanian understands our natural environment and the importance of safe-guarding the security and the lives of the people, and of safe-guarding our policies, our independence, our economy and our culture.

Mwongozo stresses the importance of political education (paragraph 25) in stimulating political consciousness.

Exposing people to the realities of their internal and external environments can be considered as the 'theoretical side' of political education. Paragraph 26 emphasises the practical side of which the most important dimension is the training in the people's militia not only as a way of preparation for strengthening the nation's defence and security but also as a means of steeling the people in increasing their resoluteness in the struggle. The second dimension is that of involving them 'in considering, planning and implementing their development plans'. The rationale for the primacy placed on participation seems to be that it gives people both a better grasp of the problems involved in transforming a society and sense of pride in whatever achievement is realised

by their own efforts. This not only helps to solve problems of alienation of workers, it also gives them a stake in defending, by arms if necessary, the system they have helped to create and consolidate. The third dimension is to broaden their conception and understanding of the meaning of development to include 'the elimination of oppression, exploitation, enslavement and humiliation and, the promotion of our independence and human dignity'.

Paragraph 28 is highly ideological. It demands a high level of political consciousness amongst the people so that they do not equate any action which 'brings a little better health and a little more bread' with development or progress. In saying this, one is not asserting that the particular motive of development advanced in *Mwongozo* excludes improving living conditions and the life of the people. Recognition of the primacy of improving the health and living conditions of the people is clearly expressed in paragraph 29, but the point that is being made is that the solution envisaged in *Mwongozo* for enabling Tanzania 'to safeguard, consolidate and further our revolution' is political education. That is, the creation of a politically conscious nation capable of mass participation in politics, administration and national defence and security.

The concluding paragraphs (30 to 34) are guidelines on specific areas of the economy. These include the Party's duty to educate the people on the importance of saving through national institutions instead of just hoarding money; the need to build and promote the international economy; frugality and care in the utilization of the country's foreign exchange reserves and greater control and supervision in the expenditure of surpluses from the activities of the parastatals.

IV

The brief review of the main provisions of *Mwongozo* has attempted to show the manner in which it could be considered an important document. The recognition of the fact that it was wrong and self-defeating to try to build socialism under the colonial super-structure is followed by a discussion of courses of action both for transforming the whole colonial system as well as the implications effecting those changes and for rebuilding a socialist society. This matching of intentions and aspirations with courses of action for their concretization is, certainly, an important development from the situation discerned by Mr. Chou en Lai in the early 1960s.

The major instrument for spearheading the struggle to concretize and consolidate the transformation of the colonial super-structure is the Party. The primacy and centrality of the Party is reflected in the fact that *Mwongozo* makes thirty-eight separate references to 'the Party' or 'TANU' twenty of which confer responsibilities. These range from spelling out the aims of the Tanzanian and the African revolution, providing guidelines on work methods and attitudes and decision-making to arousing political consciousness of the people and educating the people on the importance of savings. So critical and decisive is the role assigned to the Party that it has become the king pin and motor to the concretizations of the intentions and aspirations of *Mwongozo*. The

reasons for this heavy accent on the Party are not difficult to find. There are some clues in *Mwongozo* itself.

In one of the paragraphs of *Mwongozo* we read that 'our short history of independence reveals problems that may arise when a Party does not guide its instruments'. What are these problems? How and in what ways do they stem from the absence of supervision and guidance of 'the various institutions' by the Party? One reason for this could be that in so far as TANU was formed with the objective of terminating colonial rule, it was the only organisation which had a vision about the future, particularly about the nature of society that was to replace the colonial society. It was the only organisation, among the country's numerous organisations, which was conscious of the fact that transfer of power was only a step towards total liberation and, therefore, that the country should double its efforts in the struggle rather than put down its oars. Both this consciousness and vision is what gives the Party the authority and ability to lead and guide the masses and their various institutions to carry on the struggle and push the revolution to a higher stage. Because the other organisations lack this consciousness of the uncompleted nature of the struggle and vision about the future society, they cannot, on their own, move society forward. Left to themselves, they are likely to stabilize and begin defending the *status quo*, in which case, they become obstacles to changing the society.¹⁸

An important point that must be stressed is that when *Mwongozo* talks about the Party, it means TANU. This is important because TANU represents a particular historical and political development in the country's history. From its humble origins in New Street (now Lumumba Street) on July 7 1954, it grew into a strong organisation whose mighty telling blows forced the British to transfer political power to the people. One of the greatest secrets behind TANU's strength was the unity and determined opposition of the ordinary workers and peasants who resolutely backed TANU. The 'educated' and the 'haves', it should be pointed out, did not feature prominently in this struggle. 'Prominently', because there were exceptions. For a number of reasons which need not concern us here, after independence those who came to occupy important positions of authority in the new political system came to be drawn heavily from the 'educated' and 'haves' category. The ascendancy of these people showed a marked decline in the importance attached to the people as participants in the struggle in terms of their exclusion in politics, administration and technical advance.

The adoption of 'colonial working habits and leadership methods' whereby 'one man gives orders and the rest just obey' was one of the factors. A second one was the behaviour of those leaders who tended 'to be arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive'. That is, they assumed the role of foremen and bullies vis-a-vis their subordinates rather than that of ordinary leadership. And yet these factors stemmed from a third factor—an elitist assumption that ordinary workers and peasants are inherently incapable of understanding the complex issues of development and are not able to make useful contributions

18. For a more penetrating exposition of the inadequacies of bureaucracies see Samir Amin, 'Class Struggle in Africa', *Revolution* Vol. 1 No. 9, (1964.)

to resolving problems of development. Only the educated, the professional and experts are endowed with knowing, planning and directing. Even defence and national security were considered the preserve of the 'experts'—the People's Defence forces, the Police and the Security Services.

The ascendancy of these ideas, values or beliefs has not only led to situations where people 'feel a national institution is not theirs, and consequently workers adopt the habit of hired employees' but also has had far more serious repercussions. Excluded from participating in influencing and shaping the working of their institution and their country and bossed around by the 'commandism' and arrogance of their heads of institutions, apathy, indifference and cynicism emerged among the ordinary workers and peasants. Relegated to the role of observers in the struggle, they withdrew and cynically looked at the struggle as that of 'eating' because its participants were seen as motivated by no higher ideals than keeping what they had and, if possible, grabbing more. People who feel this way could not be expected to come to the forefront when called upon to safeguard the regime if it was attacked either by internal or external enemies. This, I think, is one of the 'problems that may arise when a Party does not guide its instruments'.

Given these developments, it is not accidental that the primacy of the Party has also emphasized the necessity of participation and involving the people in various spheres of the nation's political and socio-economic life. This, I think, has grown out of the realisation that if the Party is going to succeed in concretizing the intentions and aspirations expressed in *Mwongozo* then it will have to rely and deploy the same weapons with which it defeated the colonialists. An important feature of the structural changes of the inherited colonial institutions included not only 'colonial working habits and leadership methods' but also making it possible for the people to 'participate in devising solutions to their problems in offices, institutions, the army, villages, industries etc' including 'considering the development of our nation and preparing plans'. The changes in leadership call for a person who 'respects people, scorns ostentation and . . . is not a tyrant', in addition, such a person 'should epitomise heroism, bravery, and be a champion of justice and equality'.

Involving the people as active participants in the struggle has greater significance than its contribution to productivity. People who are highly politically-conscious are not only likely to be more motivated and committed to the struggle but also to exert themselves more and make greater sacrifices. The possibilities of the people constituting a potent weapon in fighting against enemies of the revolution in the manner discussed earlier was illustrated in Guinea last year. As for *coup d'etats*, the examples of the failure of the Kapp Putsh in 1920 in Germany, the abortive February mutiny of 1936 in Japan and the April 1962 rebellion in France demonstrate quite clearly that a *coup* cannot succeed without mass support or against active hostility and opposition of the people.¹⁹

19. For a detailed discussion of these cases see S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, pp. 93-98.

If the discussion in the preceding section has helped to highlight the various qualities which make *Mwongozo* an important and path-breaking document, it is hoped that it has also indicated that its significance lies in terms of ideas and suggestions rather than in being a record of concrete achievements realised to date. The question or problem which demands our attention is that of operationalizing *Mwongozo* or concretizing its aspirations. Is it possible to translate these? How can *Mwongozo* be operationalized? What steps have been taken in this direction and what is the record of achievement?

Although these questions can be hastily brushed aside on the grounds that they are premature, it is nevertheless essential to pose them even at this early phase of the implementation stage. That it is possible to move along the path charted by *Mwongozo* has been amply demonstrated by the Party's efforts to launch an ambitious programme of political education and training of militias amongst the workers as a prelude to a nation-wide campaign. Although some of these preceded *Mwongozo*, the decision to introduce workers' councils and participation in factories and other places of work as well as to establish Party sub-branches and branches in factories, offices and other places of work are manifestations to concretize what has come to be the main spirit behind *Mwongozo*. The introduction of these units of the Party marks an important development not only towards establishing the Party's 'presence' but also to its assuming the responsibilities which the *Mwongozo* has placed on its shoulders.

However, if the claim made earlier about *Mwongozo* not being a record of achievement is valid, the important start made to implement the declared intentions and aspirations should not preclude us from considering the questions posed above. The remaining part of this commentary dwells on those questions by relating them to the Party which largely holds the key to the effectiveness and success of the whole programme. The major problem that will be considered is centred on the question: does TANU, as presently constituted and organised, have the capability of shouldering effectively all the responsibilities assigned to it in *Mwongozo*? (Capability relates both to adequacy of personnel and organisational capacity.)

On the face of it, the problem of inadequacy of personnel appears not to be a serious one in the sense that it is a problem which faces all the contemporary organisations in Tanzania. One could mention the shortage of accountants both in the civil service and the parastatal organisations in the country. However, the personnel problem for TANU has special meaning and significance. A major source of this problem stems from the particular origins of TANU as a 'mass' party which imposed the character of a rally of diverse interests and groups on the organisations. An essential character of such a rally is lack of a clear ideology and strict criteria for membership. This character of the Party was, in the main, imposed by the nature of the freedom struggle TANU was forced to undertake. That there was a need to change the character of the Party so as to equip it with the capacity to face up to the new types of struggle

has been expressed in a number of policy statements. The Arusha Declaration and subsequent policy statements have attempted to spell out and clarify the country's ideology. In particular, the Arusha Declaration has addressed itself to the problem of membership

... the time has come to shift away from mere size of membership on to the quality of the membership. Greater consideration must be given to a member's commitment to the beliefs and objectives of the Party and its policy of socialism.

... where it is thought unlikely that an applicant really accepts the beliefs, aims and objectives of the Party, he should be denied membership.²⁰

Although the Arusha Declaration emphasized the Party being that of workers and peasants, its accent on quality seems to create the impression that its message was mainly to *leaders*²¹ and *new* members. However, such an impression seems to be erroneous because, as President Nyerere pointed out in a mass rally speech to commemorate the sixteenth year of TANU, 'TANU's five principles were the basis of socialism and those who opposed socialism should do a self-re-examination and see if they also disagree with the principles of the Party'.²²

To the extent that these statements point to the necessity of having a membership with a new orientation quite different from that prevalent during the freedom struggle, they raise problems of personnel. This change has been necessitated by the increasing volume of responsibilities placed on the Party. Since TANU is and has always been what its members have wanted to make it, this has meant that TANU members have to shoulder a greater part of these responsibilities. They have to be the carriers of the new message, to bear the torch and provide leadership to their fellow peasants or workers either in their places of work or their homes. They are not only expected to be the most politically conscious peasants and workers, they are also supposed to educate and, by example, show the proper way of doing things.

This would suggest that TANU is in the process of transformation from a mass party to a party of dedicated, loyal and ideologically committed members. However, in thinking about the possibilities of effecting this transformation, Che Guevara's advice to Ghanaians who were debating on a similar problem in 1965 seems to be relevant:

To turn a mass party into a party of cadres is a relatively simple affair *as far as the formal aspects are concerned*, but the execution of such a change inevitably carries with it the need for changes in the mentality of the leadership as a whole and, in many cases, also a physical change of previous personalities of the mass party. It also requires a general drive in the education, selection and development of new cadres. The fundamental aspects of this change towards a party of cadres are the characteristics of the militant. In a mass party, a militant only has to accept a broad general line of action and be subjected to a very general sort of discipline. In a Party of cadres, every one of its members should accept being subject to an effective control of his ideological activity and even of his private life. This is a very important difference and for this reason a very careful selection of cadres should be made *before* proceeding to re-organisation of the Party structure.²³

(first italics added)

20. *Arusha Declaration*, p. 19.

21. The term 'leader' is defined on p. 20 of the *Arusha Declaration*.

22. *The Nationalist*, 8 July 1970.

23. Cited in S. Ryan, *op.cit.*, note 61.

Coming from a person with personal experience and involvement in revolutionary practice, these observations are very instructive. They clearly indicate the need for a change in orientation of the Party's membership policy, a development which has clearly been appreciated by the leadership in Tanzania. President Nyerere's question at the *Saba Saba* mass rally in 1970 was clearly an expression of the need to change not only 'the mentality of the leadership as a whole but 'also a physical change of previous personalities (leaders and ordinary members) of the mass Party'. The second important point is that changes will not come about automatically. The required change must be consciously and meticulously worked for. It is not simply the question of 'purging undesirable elements' as it is always assumed by those who have talked in these terms in Tanzania. Efforts in the transformation of the Party must have 'a very careful selection of cadres' as its most important task even 'before preceeding to a re-organisation of the Party structure'.

The third point is the requirement for a more explicit commitment by the members, in particular that everyone 'should accept being subject to an effective control of his ideological activity, and even his private life'. This is essential because in so far as Party members are the torch bearers and exemplars of the new ideals it is imperative that their activities and lives should be controlled by the organ which they purport to present or speak for. If these people are necessary, if only because they are the effective carriers of the new message, then the problem of their inadequacy in the contemporary situation is linked to that of the Party's organisation capacity.

This problem relates to questions of identifying and selecting cadres, controlling their ideological activities and even their private lives, providing leadership and assuring the correct implementation of policy undertaken by its agencies. The Party's effectiveness in this field will depend on its capacity to acquire and store information on all spheres of the nation's life as well as on its ability to operate independently of its agencies. Enhancing the Party's capacity is particularly pressing partly because *Mwongozo* has entrusted the Party with the responsibility of translating its aspirations and intentions into reality and partly because 'our short history of independence reveals problems that may arise when the Party does not guide its instruments'.

The purpose of raising this as a relevant and pressing problem is not to belittle the hard work and thinking that has gone into improving the Party's organisational capacity. The point is rather that a lot of work remains to be done and that this has become a very urgent task indeed. With all the changes that have occurred, it still remains true that the Party is, in many important ways, very dependent on its instruments particularly the Civil Service. This dependence is expressed in terms of reliance not only for various types of information but also on personnel for carrying out the work of the Party. The secondment of civil servants to the Party Headquarters is one of the most glaring examples. The experiences of the formulation of the Second Five Year Plan reveal an insignificant role played by the Party. Professor Svendsen has observed:

During the preparation of the Second Five Year Plan in 1968-69 attempts were made to involve the Party in a number of broadly composed, but civil service dominated working parties of various aspects of the plan preparation. It became clear, however that the capacity of the Party was much too limited to allow it to participate in a work of this nature, given the other pressing needs for headquarters work.²⁴

If the phrase 'attempts were made to involve the Party' suggests that the initiative did not come from the Party, then the experiences of the Second Five Year Plan revealed more fundamental problems than those alluded to above. Its initiative for instituting policy also seems to depend on other institutions.

Another weakness relates to its capacity to acquire and store information related to members. This was clearly brought out during the 1970 national elections. Although the Party is assigned the critical role of selecting and recommending to the electorate two candidates for its final decision, the selection process carried by the Party in 1970 revealed clearly that it did not have its own independent sources of information from which to assess the qualities of the prospective candidates. Lacking its own independent source, the delegates relied heavily on the information provided by the candidates themselves for their assessment and choice.²⁵

This problem of capacity for information is critical because the role assigned to the Party in *Mwongozo* brings it into various decision-making roles. Effective decision-making depends, to a large extent, on access to and availability of information on which decision-makers will base their considerations. Inadequacy or incompleteness of information on a question under consideration could result in wrong decisions being taken with possible undesirable consequences.

The last illustration of the Party's dependence on its instruments relates to *Mwongozo* itself. Although the Kiswahili version appeared in February 1971, the official English version was published, to the best of my knowledge, in September 1971. 'Official English version' because the Government paper, *The Standard*, had carried out its own translation in February. However, on close reading of the official version one sees that it is almost wholesale adoption of the translation which appeared in *The Standard* in February which suggests that the Party did not carry out its own independent translation. One can see, for example, that the word *mnyapara* (which literally means 'foreman') in paragraph 9 is given a different meaning in paragraph 15 where it is used again.

Part of the explanation for inadequate organisational capacity is that although the Party administration has greatly been strengthened since the time of Bienen²⁶ there is still much that remains to be done. The headquarters, for example,

24. K.E. Svendsen, 'Development Administration and Socialist Strategy, Tanzania After the Mwongozo', paper delivered at Conference on Comparative Administration in East Africa, Arusha, Sept. 25-28, 1971.
25. These problems have been discussed in detail in my chapter 'Background and the Selection of Candidates' in *The 1970 National Elections* (forthcoming).
26. H. Bienen, *Tanzania — Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1967).

consist of the following departments: Administration; Ujamaa village; Information and Research; Culture and Social Welfare; Political Education; Accounts; Tanzania-Zambia Railway Construction; and Youth. A close scrutiny of the Party Directory of August 1971 reveals that entire Party headquarters has fifty-one established offices listed, ten of which were shown as vacant and one was that of Personal Secretary to the National Executive Secretary. The distribution of personnel is equally striking. All departments except Youth have less than eight established offices. This raises the question of whether the headquarters, as constituted, can effectively exercise the organisational leadership of the masses and their institutions as well as act as the watchdog over them? Can the political education department, for example, with its present strength of seven, effectively discharge the new responsibilities of planning and spearheading the country's revolution in education. This refers both to formal education, workers education and political education emphasized in *Mwongozo*.

It is, of course arguable that the Party's leadership and watchdog role need not necessarily be exercised by 'shadow government' at the headquarters. 'Shadow government' in the sense that each department at the Party headquarters is assigned responsibility for providing policy guidance to a specified number of government departments as well as checking on their compliance with government directives and policies. An equally workable method, it could be argued, is that of introducing Party organs into the various departments, *ujamaa* villages, enterprises, offices etc. These organs would not only play a watchdog and supervisory role but also constitute gingering elements. They would help to ensure that 'leaders and experts (do not) usurp the people's right to decide on an issue just because they have the expertise'. However, if what one hears is correct about the organisation and composition of the leadership of the Party branches and sub-branches introduced in places of work, then there are doubts about these organs performing these functions effectively. What one hears is that the key offices are reoccupied by the heads or very senior officials of those places of work. This situation raises doubts whether such organs can act as watchdogs and a check that 'leaders and experts (do not) usurp the people's right to decide on an issue'.

If the observations on the Party's capability are correct, they also clearly indicate the inter-related nature of the problems of inadequacy of personnel and lack of organisational capacity. These observations also indicate possible ways of tackling the problem. This seems to be in the direction that its various institutions, particularly the Civil Service and parastatals, have approached a similar problem. If these institutions have found a solution in embarking on serious programmes of training, the Party will have to follow Che's advice on a similar programme of 'selection and development of new cadres'. This has to be the responsibility of the Party in terms of setting up its own institutions for developing its required personnel as well as for selecting those who would become the new cadres. The courses will have to be carefully thought out and their duration will have to be larger than those presently offered at Kivukoni College. Programmes of 'selection and development of new cadres' seem to

be essential because the experience of other countries which have put great reliance on the Party as the motor of change and as the watchdog over other institutions have not left this critical problem to chance. Both the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, for example, established and developed special schools and institutions for this particular purpose.

There are, of course, difficulties in adopting this line of action which must be pointed out. The first one relates to the problem of the availability of people who are going to assume responsibility for bringing up this new type of Party functionaries. This could be summed up in the famous question: Who is going to educate the educators? This is an important question because a false start could end in a disaster. The second difficulty relates to dangers implicit in strengthening the Party's organisation capacity. The main danger there is that all organisations tend to degenerate into bureaucracies. The tendency towards goal-displacement or self-perpetuation constitute possible dangers for the Party, being the author of change and check on other institutions, not to deviate from the socialist road. A related danger is that strong bureaucratic structures tend to create a wall between the Party and the people, thereby depriving the masses of an opportunity for effective participation. Another danger is the one that was envisaged by Leon Trotsky in 1903:

The organisation of the Party takes the place of the Party itself; the central committee takes the place of the organisation; and finally the dictator takes the place of the central committee.²⁷

This points to the danger of centralisation of power which usually accompanies strengthening the Party's organisation capacity.

The third difficulty relates to the consequence of a strengthened Party assuming the responsibilities *Mwongozo* has assigned to it. Its ability to exercise these responsibilities effectively in terms of probing its instruments, demanding explanations for courses of action adopted, and reprimanding, will constitute a challenge to the power and authority of the civil service and the parastatals. This might lead to conflicts and frictions.

This, then suggests that the course of action recommended is not without difficulties and, certainly, not cost-free. These are the problems which will have to be borne in mind, but these dangers must be compared with those implicit in other courses of action, particularly those related to leaving the situation as it is at the moment. *Mwongozo* has clearly recognized the complexity of the problems and dangers implicit in the struggle Tanzania has committed itself to: 'It is both a bitter and silent struggle'. The solution suggested in *Mwongozo* to democratize all the institutions in the country can surely be applied with profit to the Party. The creation of a politically conscious *nation* capable of participation in politics, administration and over-all development can greatly help to minimize the dangers noted above.

27. Cited in Bertram, D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution*, (New York: Oral Press, 1948), p. 253.