welcoming policies towards potential investors. Another theme is resource scarcity which to some extent is mitigated by the influx of capital which Kenya gets because it can be put to use (that is, on grounds of effectiveness rather than of compassion). And finally he reviews the theme of administrative performance, the factors impelling and impeding productivity in the public service. He indicates the urgency of an effort of administrative reorganization and renewal—which was indeed being made at the time of publication by the Ndegwa Commission. Such local commissions become a feature of many new states a few years after independence—Trinidad and Guyana, Ghana and Nigeria are examples that spring at once to mind—as new Governments seek new ways to increase the performance (and alleviate the grievances) of their public services.

One does not know if, in the editing, discussions on the role of the foreign service had to be omitted. And it may be regretted that more could not be said about the actual internal working of the bureaucracy and the daily issues and dilemmas of the administrator. Do public service regulations still inhibit serving officers from contributing to such a volume? But the concept behind the book is an excellent one, and the editors are undoubtedly right to stress the task environment in which the administration serves, which fundamentally is nothing less than the creation of one nation out of a grouping of heterogeneous peoples.

This useful book confirms the value of such efforts of analysis and understanding, not just for the advancement of scholarship, but also to clarify the objectives and reinforce the endeavours of those who seek to respond to the people's desire to attain, with all speed, a better and fuller life. This desire had driven people to throw aside the ascriptive biases of colonial society, and to reject all authority but of their own choosing. In Kenya this was done with resolute violence. But Kenyans know that this better life will depend greatly on the effectiveness of human mechanisms, including the bureaucracy, which they have devised to work for their chosen ends. Sir Ivor Jennings, a close student of the transfer of power, had said that the most difficult obstacle on the road to self-government was the staffing of the public service. This satisfying case-study of Kenya reminds us that thereafter the quality and performance of their public service remains a key factor in attaining those purposes for which men had struggled for independence.

Leadership and Institution Building in Uganda

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The process of political modernisation requires consummate political leadership. At the same time it poses acute problems for such leaders who seek to found a new state out of a former colonial territory made up of diverse groupings. Most new states are plural societies, and it is the primary task of the leadership to integrate the many groups in the society, divided though they be on ethnic, regional, economic and religious lines, into a new national entity. At such times personal leadership may well be vital; and the legitimacy of that leadership provides the source of political stability. Consequently the charismatic leader becomes a focus of considerable attention.[1]

But leadership cannot be considered in a vacuum. The leaders of new states work within a situation characterised by fragile institutions, and it is their task to build and stabilise an institutional framework that can contain and accommodate the tensions and conflicts inherent in the modernising situation. Political stability may depend on the charismatic qualities of the leadership of the new state; but increasingly it will come to depend on the kind of political institutions created, and the degree to which the legitimacy of those institutions is recognised.[2] Thus the consideration of leadership in any particular situation must take into account the institutional environment within which the leadership works, and also such adaptations or changes as are made.

This paper seeks to consider the relationship between leadership and institution building in Uganda, where in January of last year the former President, Milton Obote, was deposed by his own Army. For nine years, from independence in 1962 until January 1971, the primary responsibility for keeping Uganda together lay with Obote, first as Prime Minister and then (from 1966) as President. Uganda's political problems had for many years been focused on the difficulties of associating the Kingdom of the Buganda situated in the heart of the country, the single largest ethnic group, and the most economically educationally developed, with the rest of the country, in the face of that Kingdom's deep reluctance to acknowledge or accept such association. But Uganda's pluralism is based on more than the division between Buganda and "the Rest". Her people are also divided in terms of ethnic background, regional interests, and particularly religious divisions primarily between Protestant and Catholic Christians. There has also for many years, since the late 1940s at least, been a strong attachment to district (the basic colonial administrative unit which was usually, but not always, an ethnic group) which has created a strong local

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political focus at the expense of the centre. Obote therefore had to keep together, and to weld into a single whole, peoples divided in terms of ethnic, economic and religious background, as well as to overcome the key problem of Buganda.[3] At independence he started out with a quasi-federal constitution that gave Buganda a good deal of autonomy (but ultimately less power than they imagined) and status, if not independence, to the Districts as Local Authority units in acknowledgement of the loyalty attached to those units. In addition Uganda had a two party system which outside Buganda genuinely cut across tribes. It was only in Buganda that both parties, the ruling Uganda People's Congress and the Opposition Democratic Party, were active and represented both at national and district level.

Milton Obote, as Professor Mazrui has pointed out in a typically penetrating article on his style of leadership,[4] has not been greatly endowed with personal charisma. His rise to prominence in Uganda politics after his return from Kenya in 1956 was due in the first place to his ability to challenge the Protectorate Government in the Legislative Council (where he became the member for Lango District in March 1958) more strongly and vehemently than the other members, and his emergence as leader of that group of African Legislative Councillors. In the second place he successfully turned the internal divisions in the Uganda National Congress, of which he was a member, to his advantage, to emerge in control of the dominant wing in that party in 1959, backed primarily by UNC groups in the Eastern and Northern Provinces. His behaviour both in the Legislative Council and in party politics showed him to be a consummate tactician. His ability to reconcile disparate groups was illustrated by his political leadership over the period of negotiations of 1960 to 1962, out of which emerged the compromise federal constitution which provided Buganda with the federal relationship she wanted, but also welded her closer to the centre. In fact Obote probably had no alternative course of action at that stage. The circumstances in Uganda in the late 'fifties made a reconciliation, through compromise, the only possible solution to the difficulties of associating all parts of the country together. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the skilful leadership Obote provided at that time, which was characterised, as Mazrui points out, by reconciling interests and groups in order to maintain political unity. Mazrui sees Obote as a reconciliation leader, and his subsequent actions from independence up to 1970, as similar steps in a reconciliation process that would reconcile all parts of the country and create a new political order. He maintained his UPC alliance with the Ganda Kabaka Yekka movement until 1964, at which time he had won over a sufficient Ganda representation into the UPC to dispense with the party alliance. He held the referendum on the lost countries (that part of Buganda which had originally been part of Bunyoro) and demonstrated his control. His republican constitution was introduced in such a way as to reconcile the Ganda to the loss of kingship; and the "Move to the Left" of 1968-69, intended to create a new political order, was an exercise in reconciliation which took into account the cleavages within his own party.

Many other events during this same period would reinforce this picture of

a leader who was essentially pragmatic, and who achieved his objectives by mediation and reconciliation. The intense internal party conflict within the UPC over the decision to elect the late Kabaka Mutesa II as President, which Obote won by hard argument and negotiation with his own party and followers, is one case in point. His handling of both the Mbale UPC Delegates Conference in 1962, and the Gulu Conference in 1964, further testified to his tactical ability. Moreover Obote's willingness to reconcile groups undoubtedly helped to avoid even greater open conflict in Uganda at certain crucial points in the 'sixties, particularly during the crisis of 1966. Nevertheless that particular crisis, and the more recent coup, suggest that somewhere Obote failed; this style of leadership was not altogether successful in welding Uganda together. It therefore seems essential to consider not only Obote's style of leadership, and his mediation between and reconciliation of groups, but also the kind of institutions he was seeking to build in these same years, to integrate not only Buganda, but all Uganda's peoples, into a United Nation. "At the birth of societies", Montesqueiu pointed out, "it is the leaders of the Commonwealth who create the institutions. Afterwards it is the institutions that shape leaders".[5] What institutions was Obote creating and shaping in these years in order to promote Ugandan integration and to provide alternative bridges, in particular between Buganda and the Centre, to the original UPC-KY alliance? To what extent was the institutional structure that emerged in the 'sixties capable of integrating the various parts of the country together, and at the same time regulating political competition?

One explanation of the timing of the disbandment of the UPC-KY alliance has been that this was a deliberate stage in a long-term policy gradually to assert UPC control over Buganda. Obote's alternative to the alliance was to use the UPC, the party, as the bridge between Buganda and the Centre, as the major integrative structure.[6] Thus by the middle of 1964 there had been sufficient development of the party to move on these lines. But this explanation does not accord with the facts, which were that in the middle of 1964 the UPC had virtually no following of any kind in Buganda. Nor had the Opposition Democratic Party had much greater success. Parties were still rejected by the Buganda Establishment, and up to the end of 1964 that rejection had successfully prevented the development of any considerable following. Equally important, when in 1965 Ganda did begin to join the UPC (primarily to gain control of that party and so control of the Central government, to secure the advantages that federalism had not apparently won for them), and in early 1966 moved in large numbers, the UPC as a party could not accommodate them and at the same time protect the rest of the country from potential Ganda domination. The structure of the party, and party representation, meant that the most populous part of the country could indeed dominate the party—as the Baganda proposed to do. Thus the decision of the Ganda to join the UPC provoked the crisis of disintegration that led to the suspension of the constitution in February 1966. Obote's own leadership was certainly at stake. But at the same time the crisis was also concerned with the difficulties of integrating Buganda into the UPC without allowing the Ganda to dominate the party. The

party thus failed as an integrating structure in this case, although it had succeeded in the rest of the country. This may help to explain the changes made in the UPC's structure in 1968, which will be discussed below.

A second institutional change Obote made concerned the position of the Head of State, when in 1963 the government amended the constitution to provide for a constitutional President to replace the Queen. After a tense internal party struggle, and a good deal of inter-party argument, the late Kabaka, Mutesa II, was elected President in October, 1963. The new Presidential Office, and its occupation by a Muganda, did not however visibly promote the sense of genuine national Ugandan identity or create a closer bond between Ganda and the rest of the country. For one reason the dual office created a conflict of loyalties for the Kabaka, and therefore for his people, in which in the last analysis Ganda loyalties won.[7] Second, the limitations placed upon his nationwide activities, by both the written constitutional provisions, and the unwritten conventions of a "constitutional presidency", meant that Mutesa would have found it difficult (had he wished to) to perform the role of Ugandan leader. That role lay with the Prime Minister. It is frequently argued by African leaders that a constitutional, titular Head of State does not provide the kind of integrative institution required in the developing state, because the conventional relationship between Head of State and Head of government is little understood or accepted at large in the African situation. Power has to be seen to reside in the man at the top. Moreover, the apparent limitations on the Prime Minister's exercise of executive power creates difficult political as well as institutional situations. While such arguments may be valid, it is equally possible that the difficulty may arise because the division of office is understood, but not necessarily accepted by one or other of the incumbents. This was part of the Ugandan dilemma: the relationship was understood, but neither President nor Prime Minister was agreed on the actual distribution of power. Had the President not been a Muganda, this might not have been so significant. But the President was a Muganda, and thus able to call upon a power base to rival that of the Prime Minister.

The 1966 and 1967 constitutions abandoned the concept of a constitutional Head of State and introduced an executive President, of a kind to which most African leaders are publicly committed. There is little need to discuss in detail the republican constitution, which has been admirably dealt with elsewhere.[8] The position and powers of the President need however briefly to be summarised. The constitution provided in the Executive President a theoretically powerful office at the centre of a much more centralised government system, although not at that time (1967) a one-party state. He had a cabinet whom he himself appointed, whose function was to formulate and implement the government's policy and which was collectively responsible to Parliament. Executive powers were however vested in him alone. He did not necessarily have to be a member of Parliament. As Head of State he was also Commander in Chief of the Army, and as Head of government, Chairman of the controlling Defence Council. He held considerable if implicit power over the civil service,

including the teaching service, although there was both a Public Service Commission and a Teaching Service Commission (all members of which were appointed by him) and Ministers responsible separately for the public service and for education. As Executive he enjoyed the power of detention without trial, which the constitution specifically provided (section 10j) was not overridden by the fundamental rights of personal liberty incorporated into that document. In addition he enjoyed certain legislative powers when the National Assembly was not sitting, although these were finally dependent on subsequent ratification by the legislature. The Presidential Office of 1967 that Obote assumed was therefore a powerful one. Power lay where it was seen to reside—a feature of African Government which Nyerere and Mboya and others have asserted is necessary because it is characteristic of past African systems and is conducive to the strong government unity demands. Events force us to question however the success of these arrangements in Uganda in providing the necessary institutional bridge between the various groups within the country (not only Buganda) and the centre. In the case of Buganda it could be simply the possibility that the Baganda as a group, were opposed to Obote the man, and thus would never have recognized the office. If the attempt to assassinate him in December 1969 was ethnically orientated, that would seem to suggest this was the problem—not the institution itself. But the emphasis upon Buganda as the dominant problem in Uganda's political system overlooks the fact that other areas of the country have also competed for power and influence in a manner that implied a challenge to the centre. It is important to bear in mind that Obote's noticeable emphasis upon unity as the dominant objective of the new political culture in the various documents of the "Move to the Left", published from 1968, was directed not only at Ganda attitudes but at what he saw as a general task of transferring loyalty from the district level to the centre. The existence of a strong executive Presidency had not apparently overcome this problem. It is possible that the weakness lay in the method of election of the President as provided for in 1967. Any discussion of this point must bear in mind that Obote automatically assumed the office in 1966, but it is worth considering the implications of the electoral proposals for the presidency incorporated into the 1967 constitution which provided for an indirect election. Every political party participating in a general election was required to nominate a presidential candidate. The presidential candidate whose party returned the largest number of members became President. How much consideration was given at the time to the actual method of election it is difficult to conclude. The precise mathematical arrangements laid down for a situation where no single party had as much as a 40 per cent majority, and the arrangements for specially elected members, suggest an awareness of the dangers that could face such a powerful Executive *vis à-vis* his legislature in Uganda's then multi-party system. But it is relevant to point out that one of Obote's proposals for constitutional change to a one-party state in Document No. 5 of the "Move to the Left" was that the President be elected *directly* by universal adult suffrage. There was a good deal of intense debate over this proposal both within the UPC's National Executive Council and at the two UPC Delegates' Conferences that discussed the

proposals in July and December 1970.[9] The proposal for direct election by a national electorate was modified. But Obote's main argument in favour of such a national countrywide election was that only in this way could the President be a genuine national leader. What he had not perhaps been able to do between 1967 and 1970 was to create the kind of country-wide base that a President must have if he is to act as an integrating agency. He had in that period taken a number of steps to reconcile the people to the new Uganda, and to the proposed governmental changes. He had also conducted a series of apparently successful "Meet the People" tours in a number of districts (although not Buganda).[10] Clearly he wanted to go further, however, in order to create a national, country-wide *political* base for the man holding Presidential office, which the indirect electoral system of 1967 and the proposed changes under the one-party state in 1970 did not necessarily ensure him.

The need to find a new method of securing a country-wide electorate for the Presidency was however directly linked to a different situation, arising out of other changes made by the 1967 constitution, concerned with the centralisation of power that characterised that constitution. The 1967 constitution radically altered certain other institutions in the country, and in particular the Local Administrations at district level and thus the distribution of power between district and centre. Again understandable emphasis on the most dramatic changes, the abolition of the Kingdoms, and the division of Buganda into four districts, obscures the radical change made in the powers enjoyed within the existing system of all these administrations, and so on of each district. The impact of those changes is intimately connected with the changing party situation, and discussion of these two questions must therefore necessarily overlap.

Uganda's experience before independence had made the district (the basic administrative unit and usually but not always single ethnic unit) the most important political base that any national leader had to control.[11] The district formed the main political focus, and up to the time of independence the two major parties were each in a very real sense an alliance of leaders, each with his own secure district support. Local Government bodies (whose titles have suffered successive changes but to which I shall refer by their latest—Local Administrations) with their District Councils were the primary institutions at district level within which political competition took place, and the main bargaining body in local-central relations. In his discussion of Obote as a reconciliation leader Mazrui has ignored perhaps what was Obote's greatest achievement: keeping together his own UPC, and particularly his UPC Parliamentary Group, by continuing reconciliation of disparate district interests and objectives within a strongly collegiate leadership system. In addition there were numerous occasions when he slowly but ultimately brought a recalcitrant UPC-controlled District Council into line. It took nearly three years, for example, to persuade the Lango District Council (Obote's home district) to give up the policy of free primary education that they instituted in 1960 contrary to central government policy. Numerous methods were attempted to keep Local Administrations under control; for example in 1964 UPC Members of Parliament

installed as chairmen of a number of (recalcitrant) District Councils, presumably in an attempt to establish greater central control over the district party following. The Central Government that Obote led was thus regularly confronted with demands from its own party councils which contributed to the difficulties of local-central relations. There are many threads to this part of Uganda's political experience. Here only two points need to be made. On the one hand the Local Administrations enjoyed a good deal of status, power and resources, and between 1962 and 1967 the Ministry of Regional Administration exercised its powers over them hesitantly. But it is highly doubtful if any district leaders at that level, or any of the national figures from the districts, thought in terms of secession. They wanted to build up the district, and they challenged the Centre on behalf of the district in matters of resource allocation; but they did not challenge the existing political structure.[12] On the other hand, the existence of the district level leadership was crucial for the national leadership. If the national leader—Obote—had the district leaders on his side, he was assured of a dominant position in the district. The brokerage system could be an asset, although it meant infinite attention to district level issues and politics. One of the characteristics of Obote's period of office is in retrospect the time he expended on these relationships, and while his Cabinet and the UPC Executive Committee hung together, he could work through those colleagues as intermediaries if he maintained a collegiate system. The Uganda Club as much as the Cabinet Office acquired a certain symbolism in this respect.

In 1967, radical changes were made in the powers of the Local Administrations. But before discussing these changes, something must be said of the impact of the district as a political arena on the UPC. The party in origin was as I suggested an alliance of leaders each with his own district base. Moreover the districts as the basic units in the party enjoyed a good deal of autonomy (not least because of the absence of a central party headquarters machine that could control them). But there is little evidence to suggest that internally the party divided in terms of alliances between districts; nor that there was any strong North-South divisions. Leaders no doubt made alliances on particular issues and it was alleged that it was the use of the Busoga element (whose number of voting members radically increased shortly before the 1964 Annual Delegates Conference) that enabled his opponents to oust John Kakonge in the election for the post of Secretary-General at that conference.[13] Nevertheless there were no comparable district combinations within the party such as emerged in Kenya's KANU in 1965-1966 or in Zambia's UNIP in the famous 1967 Mulungushi party elections. When divisions began to appear within the party, and the split in the leadership emerged in 1965, it appears to have been associated first and foremost with differences of opinion over policy, and in the way in which the ruling party/government should be organised.[14] The possibility of a district and so an ethnic group becoming dominant within the party emerged only when the Ganda began to join the party in large numbers in 1965 and at the beginning of 1966. Then the facts of their potential numerical majority made Buganda a balancing group within the party, as once they had been in the government, and alliances between various other leaders and the

Ganda became a distinct method of changing the leadership. Confrontation, in Mazrui's sense, became much more likely. And as Mazrui pointed out, one of the major precipitating factors of the 1966 crisis was a plot to oust Obote from the leadership of the UPC via such an alliance, either through the party elections or by extra-procedural tactics.[15]

To return now to the changes made in the Local Administrations in 1967. Those bodies at that time lost a very considerable amount of their authority. Unlike the 1962 constitution (which incorporated the structure of local government in great detail) the 1967 constitution simply provided that parliament might make provision for the administration of the Districts. It provided specifically for the direct intervention of the President into a district if the Cabinet so advised. The *Local Administrations Act 1967* and subsequent amendments which provided the basis for the new system gave the Minister of Regional Administrations a very tight control over all the affairs and activities of the Local Administrations, especially in the field of finance.[16] The District Commissioner (whose office was restored to one of greater power as agent of the Central Executive) acquired considerable rights of control, implicitly comparable to those of former colonial District Commissioners in the 1950s. All Estimates and all development proposals had to be approved by the Ministry. No Local Administration could, for example, write cheques without countersignature by the DC! No District Council could in effect call a meeting or draw up the agenda without the Ministry's approval. The Minister also acquired the right to nominate councillors to fill any vacancies, of which there were in 1966-67 a considerable number. The Local Administrations were thus brought very much under the direct surveillance of the Ministry, which did not hesitate to exercise its powers.

There were undoubtedly many problems facing the Local Administrations that called for some stronger degree of central direction. Nevertheless it could be argued that it was this centralisation of power which most weakened the centre—because the new institution at district level could not accommodate the tensions between centre and locality nor provide for the necessary accommodation between the two. Throwing compromise out of the window bred divisions and dissensions that threatened district loyalty to Obote's government and to him as leader and did not bring unity closer, because political party control was still dependent upon the old compromise system. It is no doubt essential that local governments should acknowledge and accept their subordinate position within any governmental system. But in the Ugandan context this reform involved serious implications for the political support of the party in power and therefore its leader. In the new situation (after 1967) there were still UPC controlled District Councils that were prepared to challenge their own central government, and in view of the fact that the 1967 changes did not abolish the political executive at district level and in particular the Secretary-General, this had important implications for the party's position in a district. As President of both Uganda and the UPC, Obote did continue to negotiate and to mediate in a number of cases; but he appears to have been more prepared to dictate a solution, as he did to the Acholi District

Council in 1968. Early in 1968 the UPC in that Council clearly divided into two groups, one of which appears to have allied itself with the DP Opposition. This latter section, which included the Council Chairman, challenged the central government vigorously and very publicly over the allocation of resources, and specifically to the alleged preference given to Lango, its neighbour and Obote's home district. Obote called the UPC Councillors concerned before the Disciplinary Committee of the UPC, had them expelled, and so was able to call upon the Minister of Regional Administrations to appoint a new Chairman.[17] It is worth noting that on the occasion of earlier divisions in the Acholi branch of the UPC, which had been an internally working branch for many years, Obote had always adopted a quieter, more mediatory "behind the scenes" approach, to maintain both factions' support. His public dismissal of one faction was likely to affect his overall position in the district.

To some extent similar dissatisfaction existed elsewhere. The kingdoms may have become reconciled quickly to the abolition of kingship, but the Districts and District leaders were less able to reconcile themselves to their loss of power. Given the importance to central political control of the links maintained by national through local leaders, this could not fail to affect Obote's overall control. Paradoxically, therefore, the changes in the local government institutions which administratively made a good deal of sense did not make those bodies a stronger link in a centralised integrating structure, and weakened Obote's own political control as party leader and therefore as President.

For this reason it is necessary to return to the party and its role as an integrating structure and to consider the changes Obote introduced in 1968 in the new UPC constitution.[18] The UPC fortunes at that time were at a very low ebb; notwithstanding protestations of leaders and party publicists, the party as a corporate institution scarcely existed. It had not been called on to perform any electoral functions since 1964 (when the last District Council elections had been held); and the possibility of a development function had scarcely emerged. Obote's own position in the party had been questioned in 1966; and whereas he had survived that confrontation he had not immediately turned to use the party as the machine of integration. This may have been simply the result of his old tactical ability and sensitivity for timing; or because the entry of the Army into the situation was a preoccupying factor that changed the situation. Whatever the reason, the party as an institution scarcely functioned; the indication of party existence was a good deal of tension at the local level over the question of when party elections would be held and new figures recruited into the political hierarchy.[19]

By June 1968 Obote appeared ready to move the party into a more prominent position as a centralising and integrating institution. Perhaps the decision had been made earlier, and the timing might have been indicated by his speech to the UNIP Party Conference in 1967, when he spoke strongly on the essential role of party in nation building.[20] But it was not until June 1968 that a UPC Delegates' Conference was presented with a new party constitution. This constitution attempted two basic structural changes: it established a much greater degree of centralisation and party presidential control; and it

replaced the district by the Parliamentary constituency as the basic party focus for organization. The district was deliberately down-graded in the party structure at the expense of the constituencies the actual number of which varied from district to district. The District Party Executive remained, but it would in future consist of the chairman of each parliamentary constituency in the District, with three other members elected by each of the parliamentary constituency Executives; moreover the chairmanship would rotate among the Parliamentary Constituency chairmen. Such changes might be interpreted as an attempt to minimise the influence of the old style district leadership as well as an attempt to break down district identity and autonomy within the party. They made it more difficult for any one man to establish himself as the dominant district leader, or to control the whole district as his base. To this extent they were an attempt to move away from the old style of district leadership and the brokerage system of the past. The parliamentary constituency became the most important unit, both for leadership and for linking the branches (at miruka level) together. In future membership of the National Council of the party would be on a constituency, not a regional, basis.

The powers of the Party President were at the same time substantially enhanced by changes in the method of election of national party officials. Previously all national officers had been elected at the Annual Delegates' Conference. Under the new constitution only the President would be so elected. He in turn would then select the other national office bearers.

The change of emphasis from district to constituency level resulted first of all in intense competition in the party constituency elections that took place late in 1969,[21] and a good many contested results. Second, in the succeeding round of constituency elections that took place in 1970 Obote himself personally took charge, from the party headquarters, replacing those Ministers who had on the previous occasion toured the country to supervise the local constituency organization with his own nominees.

The changes made in 1968 in the structure of the party and the subsequent presidential control attempted over local level events suggest that Obote was seeking to make another fundamental change in the nature of local-central links, and to establish new style party links between the centre and locality such as would make the national leader independent of the district leaders and district brokers as he had been in the past. Having seriously challenged the local government base of district leaders he took the obvious further step to alter the old party identification with district, and establish new chains of central party command independent of district leaders. He was thus seeking to create new lines of communication between Party President and local level party institutions that would provide the means of creating the country-wide base he needed as national President—both for the presidential office, and for himself. Such a new style of communication might have been an advantage had he intended (as Mazrui suggested) to adopt a more mobilizing style as leader. At this point, however, this appears to be less important than the fact that he was seeking to obtain greater control by adapting the party institutions to alter (and improve?) the links between himself and the local level, and

his channels of communication. This required a centralization of control in the party as well as in the government, which had not previously existed. By such centralized command through the party president as national leader the latter might have been able to dispense with the intermediate district leaders as the source of mass following. It would be more possible to maintain party discipline and so leadership over constituency representatives in parliament than branch leaders in local government office. Similarly the President's right to select his own national office bearers gave him greater control over his Central Executive Committee.

Two other institutional innovations made before Obote's deposition can also be interpreted in terms of an attempt to strengthen the leader's control over channels of communication between centre and locality. These were the creation of the one-party state and the changes in parliamentary representation. The creation of the one-party state (originally proposed at the Delegates' Conference held in December 1969, and legislated into existence in 1970)[22] was probably the less important of the two changes. Its advantage to the President in building up the new centrally-controlled machine depended a good deal on his ability to control the new-style National Executive Council. One observer, for example, has suggested that the initial refusal by the July 1970 Delegates' Conference to Obote's proposals for the direct election of the President (of the Republic) could be traced to fears among some members of the Council that such a directly elected President would in fact be able to act more independently of that National Council.[23] Certainly a man elected first as President of the Party by a representative Delegates' Conference, and then confirmed in the office of the President of the Republic by an (independent) national electorate, would be stronger and would have a larger political base independent of any element within the party.

On the face of it the proposals for changing the basis of parliamentary representation[24] are more difficult to explain in terms of a basic desire to strengthen the national base of the President. Under those proposals each candidate for parliament had to contest four seats; one, his basic constituency, would be the constituency of his own choice. Each candidate had also to contest three other constituencies, one in each of the other Regions, to be known as the National constituencies. Thus each candidate would be contesting four constituencies, one in each region of the country.

Obote justified these unique proposals on the grounds that only in this way would members of parliament adopt a national outlook, and act in terms not only of their own tribal group, but of the nation as a whole. His introductory memorandum emphasised the dangers of Members of Parliament presenting a "united tribal front" for a District, and so inhibiting the growth of a truly national legislature. It is relevant to note that he explicitly referred to the danger of "the District Councils replacing the National Assembly in importance", a danger that had in fact been more real in the 'fifties than the 'seventies. But it is equally important to note that in the two party National Assembly of Uganda from 1962 onwards members had always divided on party rather than tribal lines including Ganda Members. The Acholi District Council effort

to bring pressure to bear upon the Central Government, referred to earlier, had not in fact created and link up between UPC and DP Acholi Members of Parliament, although it had led to an implicit alliance between DP and some UPC officials at the district level.

Bearing these reservations in mind, the 1970 proposals for parliamentary representation still deserve serious attention as a genuine attempt to create a new style national institution that would unite the country more firmly together. In terms of my present interest, however, that of the President's efforts to create a national network of communications independent of the old district intermediaries, it seems fair to suggest that a Member of Parliament elected in this way would in fact become more dependent on central direction. The central authorities were responsible for the specific combinations of basic and national constituencies subsequently drawn up. The individual candidate was not free to choose his national constituencies; these were laid down for him. He would be much more in need of central party assistance in campaigning than in the past. There were some criticisms made of the proposals that they favoured the rich, only those capable of finding the resources needed to campaign over the whole country. Had all campaigning been conducted through the party headquarters this need not have been so. Nevertheless such central party support must have increased the control of the centre over individual members, and so their subsequent behaviour as elected members. Taken in conjunction with the centralization of the party machine in the hands of the President, this could well improve his own control.

To sum up, Mazrui has aptly characterized Obote as a reconciliation leader. Obote's style of leadership, characterized to a high degree by his tendency to mediate, and reconcile the many interests in pluralistic Uganda had however since 1956 been in part his response to the existing institutions that linked centre to locality in Uganda. Part of his reaction against the existing situation in 1966 was to seek to establish a much stronger presidency as an integrative institution. This required other institutional changes, both at government and party level, to ensure presidential control. These changes can also, however, be seen as part of Obote's efforts to break away from the past, when the national leader had to work through local (district) intermediaries, and to establish new bases of power independent of those groups.

In the beginning of the new state, it has been suggested, the leader makes the institutions; later the institutions directly influence his style of leadership. But in Obote's case it is possible to argue that his style of reconciliation leadership, so characteristic of his first ten years in national Ugandan politics, was determined by the institutions in existence, themselves a compromise with Uganda's plural society. Moreover, at independence, Uganda lacked the kind of centralizing, controlling grid over the whole country that Kenya had in the Provincial Administration, or Tanganyika in the Party. The provincial administration was virtually dismantled in 1962, the party was decentralized and the headquarters had marginal control over branches. The "beginning" for Obote was therefore four years after independence, and at that point, when he began to change institutions, his fundamental problem was to establish the network

of central control of the localities, and at the same time a new base for national leadership.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernisation* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1968).
2. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", *World Politics,* XVII, No. 3 (1965).
   Also his *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, London, Yale University Press, 1968).
3. For an excellent account of Uganda see Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin, *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States,* ed. by G. M. Carter (New York, Cornell University Press, 1966).
4. Ali Mazrui, "Leadership in Africa: Obote of Uganda", in *International Journal,* XXV, No. 3, (Summer, 1970).
5. Quoted by Rustow, op. cit., p. 156.
6. Mazrui accepts this argument, op. cit. See also Rothchild and Rogin, op. cit., and Engholm and Mazrui, "Violent Constitutionalism in Uganda", in Mazrui, *Violence and Thought in African Politics.*
7. Mazrui notes this op. cit.
8. See especially articles by Mayanja and Bradley in *Transition,* No. 32 (August/September, 1967), Picho Ali in *Transition* 34 (December/January, 1968), and Akena Adoko and Nelson Kasfir, *Transition,* No. 33.
9. Akuki M. Mujaju, "The Uganda Presidential Election Debate". Paper read at *1970 Universities of East Africa Social Science Conference, December, 1970.*
10. See e.g. *Uganda Argus,* 6 March, 1967.
11. For an elaboration of this point see my "Local Government and Party Politics in Northern Uganda 1945-1962" (forthcoming, title provisional). The point is also discussed in my chapter on Uganda 1945-62 in the forthcoming third volume of the *Oxford History of East Africa.*
12. The Rwenzururu movement would be the one exception to this.
13. *Uganda Argus,* 1 May, 1964.
14. This interpretation is based primarily on discussions with the participants involved from both sides. There is certain circumstantial evidence to support the argument.
15. Mazrui, op. cit.
16. Act No. 16 of 1967.
17. The story can be followed in the Minutes of the Acholi District Council, February, 1968, but full reports appeared in the *Uganda Argus,* 16 and 17 February, 1968. The President replied to the Acholi District Council in a twenty-three page memorandum dated 23 March, 1968, copy in the Acholi District Council Minutes.
18. *Constitution of the Uganda People's Congress,* adopted by the 4th National Delegates' Conference, 11 June, 1968. Published by UPC National Headquarters Secretariat, P.O. Box 7024, Kampala.
19. This emerged very clearly from a tour I made of Northern Uganda in February, 1970.
20. Mulungushi Conference 1967, *Proceedings of the Annual General Conference of the United National Independence Party,* 14-20 August, 1967, Zambia Information Services (Government Printer, Lusaka), pp. 29-34.
21. See, for example, *Uganda Argus,* 6 December, 1969, 17 December, 1969, 20 December, 1969, 6 June, 1969.
22. *Uganda Argus,* 19 and 20 December, 1969.
23. Mujaju, op. cit.
24. Document No. 5 on the "Move to the Left", *Proposals for new methods of election of representatives of the people to Parliament,* by A. Milton Obote, Uganda Press Trust, Kampala, for Milton Obote Foundation (24 August, 1970).