

- the tax collector or some other official, perhaps once a month, and scarcely any other emissary from the central authorities.
- 60 For additional information on the working of party cells see W. Klerru, "The Systematic Creation and Operation of TANU Cells", TANU (Dar es Salaam, 1966); B. N. Njohole, "The TANU Cell System", undergraduate dissertation, Political Science Department, University College (Dar es Salaam, 1967); and K. Levine, "The TANU Ten-House Cell System", in L. Cliffe and J. S. Saul (eds.), op. cit., Vol. 1.
- 61 For the outline of this "frontal" approach to *ujamaa* transformation see Tanzania Government, *Second Five-Year Plan for Economic Development, 1969-74* (Dar es Salaam, 1969), and *President Circular No. 1* (Dar es Salaam, 1969).
- 62 C. J. Gertzel, "Provincial Administration in Kenya . . .", op. cit., and C. Leys, *Politicians and Policies in Uganda . . .*, op. cit.
- 63 See L. Cliffe, "Socialist Transformation . . .", op. cit., J. S. Saul, "African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania", in G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York, in press).

Administrative Authority and the Problem of Effective Agricultural Administration in East Africa

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INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, a large literature has grown up analysing the special situation administrators face in promoting "development" within the Third World. Development administration has gained the status of being a legitimate academic discipline,¹ but its basic concepts and its findings are the object of continuing controversy.² The nub of the argument is found in the contradiction that although development administration claims to have been especially concerned with the analysis of the management of development activities, studies done under its banner have seldom come to grips with the managerial dimension of administrative performance, and, where a few have made the attempt, they exhibit marked difficulty in relating their findings to the analytical paradigms in fashion within development administration.

This paper takes stock of the concepts and methods in development administration as a field of inquiry, trying to establish which administrative features are most important for the effective management of agricultural administration. It reviews several key changes in our conventional image of bureaucratic organization which field research on East African administration has shown to be necessary. Methodologically, more precise descriptive techniques are needed to identify which internal administrative linkages are vital to the effective transfer of central initiatives into local practice. I suggest that an extended definition of the idea of "administrative penetration" could guide future researchers in collecting and analysing data to insure that all the salient features of East African administrative systems are adequately documented. Conceptually, my point of departure is the need to visualize administrative systems as independent entities, whose capabilities for effective performance cannot be evaluated apart from a prior analysis of their internal characteristics. Although the illustrative materials are restricted to the sphere of agricultural administration in East Africa, the issues raised are general to any analysis of administrative effectiveness in the ex-colonial, Third World nations.

The inventory of images which guides most analyses of development administration has now become quite standardized. First, it has become customary to treat administrative systems in their wider political and ecological context, receiving "inputs" and responding with "outputs". Second, administrative structures are viewed as taking the classical form of a staffing pyramid. Third, it is

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assumed that the actors within such a pyramid receive most of their behavioural predispositions—their ideology, values, and interests—from the external social and political environment. Fourth, most writers implicitly accept the Weberian *schema* which treats bureaucratic authority as being a monolithic type and which perpetuates the politics/administration dichotomy: “administration”—consisting of actors’ internal relations within an administrative structure, and “politics”—the power implications of their actions in the outside political system. Fifth, when it is necessary to evaluate administrative performance, attention is usually directed towards the bureaucracy’s ability to carry out organizational objectives in the form of centrally determined policies, plans, programmes, and projects. Although no single study contains all of these elements, the group of concepts as a whole is internally consistent and seems to present a rational paradigm for studying administrative action.

The blank spots in the paradigm are hard to pinpoint until one can compare it against the actual structures and activities of the field administration, as was done in the case of the agricultural extension services in Embu District of Kenya. For me, the warning signals that first triggered my concern about the adequacy of the paradigm itself were: its inability to portray the distinctive features of an administrative system, the wide range of procedural issues which completely escapes attention, the difficulty one has when using the paradigm in explaining certain strong motivations which administrative actors seem to derive from within the administrative system itself, and, lastly, the lack of guidelines to tell us why similar planning techniques yield such vastly dissimilar results when employed in closely comparable situations within the Administration. In the pages following, therefore, I shall turn our familiar paradigm inside out, retaining many of its customary concepts but combining them in an unconventional fashion to give a more sharply etched picture of the East African field administration as I conceive it to be. Since this account compresses a much longer analysis (being published separately), I shall concentrate on the logic of the argument rather than upon its verification by means of empirical illustrations and detailed case materials.³ As Kuhn has long since pointed out, paradigms are in essence selective devices: though they set up the rules under which more limited hypotheses can be empirically verified, they themselves are not subject to empirical validation.⁴

The more complex picture of field administration which I shall try to establish can be delineated as follows. First, one’s analysis must start from a comprehensive description of the administrative system itself, considered as a *system* with self-determined propensities, rather than as a specific expression of vague socio-cultural variables from the larger environment. Here the concept of “administrative penetration” allows us to identify the internal and external linkages which have a potential importance for the analysis of the effective transfer of central initiatives into local practice.

Second, the aggregate transfer of initiatives from the centre to the periphery is better represented by a “tree” metaphor than by the usual pyramid. In East Africa, at least, development “from above” has led to a proliferation of agencies and administrative infrastructure at the top, while factionalism and a

diversity of types of contact groups have accelerated differentiation at the bottom, giving by default the middle level staff (at provincial or regional headquarters) the greatest opportunity for taking coherent and planned action to stimulate development.

Third, the strongly centrist tendencies manifested within East Africa at the present time cannot be fully understood apart from an analysis of rival ideologies of authority which have their roots within the administrative sphere.⁵ Much of the utility of “penetration analysis” in an African context derives from its congruence with the dominant assumptions which many African leaders share about how and where development action should originate.

Fourth, once we realize that bureaucratic organizations can emphasize different and even contradictory types of authority, we can unravel several administrative paradoxes: including that the colonial regime reconciled its reliance upon formal authority in the field administration with its need for “problem solving” actions by always placing professional staff in the central position of a hub-and-wheel” structure; that attempts after independence to spread the benefits of development through the impartial application of civil service rules inherited from the colonial regime have actually *increased* the politicization of the staff in their internal relations within the administration; and that an internally politicized civil service can still be usefully studied from the standpoint of its effectiveness in implementing development “from above”; but, that given present administrative structures, the desire to speed the tempo of development by increasing the pressure from the centre can easily have the unintended effect of further reducing the willingness of field administrators to act in a “problem solving” capacity.

Fifth, the development “initiatives” which we customarily try to document in the field turn out, upon closer examination, to be in reality planning devices for packaging information—policies, plans, programmes, and projects—to guide implementation decisions *at the centre*. When transmitted to the field in disaggregated form as individual instructions, these initiatives become well nigh invisible. The more significant units for analysis in field administration which have almost completely escaped scrutiny until now are: (1) the total selection of development *measures* which exist in any particular area, and, (2) the field *agencies* which have been set up to give these measures a concrete, local existence in the form of internally organized staff, resources, and activities.

And, sixth, in using these ideas to describe the field administration, one becomes aware of additional features which are extremely important for understanding the system’s performance capabilities.

The second half of the paper puts these general ideas about administrative systems to the test of explaining which administrative features are related to effectiveness in agricultural administration. Agricultural services impose a high threshold on the quality of administrative performance. I have coined the term “engaged planning” to highlight the need (exemplified to an extreme degree in agricultural services) for the maintenance of planned control over administrative activities sufficient to ensure that the organization responds quickly and rationally to changing external circumstances. Unfortunately, the usual civil

service procedures strongly inhibit the exercise of "engaged planning" by officials on the spot. It will be seen that there are several institutional innovations which governments are using or might consider adopting in order to facilitate economic management in the field administration. Five such innovations are discussed in greater detail, including: (1) the "hub-and-wheel" solution, (2) "designed organizations", (3) multi-purpose professionalized teams, (4) increased pressure from the centre, and, (5) decentralization. I agree that under East African conditions each of these "solutions" exhibits certain characteristic flaws, but that by careful analysis compensating mechanisms can be built into the total administrative structure. The paper closes with a look at the emergent problems of rural development in East Africa, which underscore the Government's need to become more self-aware of the performance capabilities of the existing field administration.

COMPETING PARADIGMS IN ADMINISTRATIVE ANALYSIS

Anyone proposing paradigms to political scientists may be justly accused of carrying coals to Newcastle. Nonetheless, that is my main intention in this paper. Political scientists launched the field of "development administration", and, in East Africa at least, they continue to supply the teaching force for training in public administration. My charge is that while political scientists stimulated the evolution of comparative administration as an academic subject, they also bequeathed it a fascination with comparative politics which has diverted later investigators from giving administrative structures serious consideration in their own right. Students of comparative politics in the early 1960's quickly found that institutional charters often have little meaning in the Third World countries. They soon enlarged their focus to take in the whole "political culture", analysed as a system coterminus with the polity itself. However brilliant the stream of studies that followed in this tradition, it had a devastating impact on the struggling sister discipline of public administration which was also being recast (for export) within America at this time. As Riggs has observed, the mode of analysis "tended to regard the governmental system as a dependent variable, an epiphenomenon based on social, psychological, cultural, and economic determinants". It gave a strange twist to much writing which purported to show how leaders in new nations administer development:

The capacity to see politics as itself an essential, indeed formative, variable in processes of social change was almost lost. Irony lay in the fact that, of all kinds of social systems, the transitional societies of the "third world" are the ones in which government initiatives mean the most.⁶

Thus the barrenness of this intellectual marriage between politics and administration was most evident in the sphere of policy advice. When national leaders did consult "experts in comparative politics", the results were often "mutually distressing", while the attempt to merge public administration into political science contributed insights of only "limited utility" to general theory of administrative systems as was La Palombara's conclusion.⁷

As a consequence, despite two decades of activity we still do not have any comparative mode of analysis which takes administrative systems in their own right as its primary focus for analysis. The lack of "grounded analysis" has had serious ramifications for each of the three groups who were in a position to have used such information: outside researchers, policy advisers, and, policy-makers.

Outside researchers are probably the least important of the three groups, but they deserve mention because up to now they alone have had the time and resources to look for answers to long range questions of social policy. In Tanzania, this could have been a significant resource. Norman Miller lists no less than forty-four separate research projects on rural Tanzania in recent years.⁸ But Ph.D. students tend to choose topics where an intellectual scaffolding already exists, and among the forty-four projects referred to, students in the two largest categories have neatly dodged the central topic of administration to yield thirteen studies of local politics on one side and thirteen of agricultural economics on the other.

Compared to alternative topics, administrative analysis does present rather severe conceptual and methodological problems. As a rule, administrative organizations in the Third World are institutional hybrids, embodying various permutations of formal models which have been transplanted from the colonial powers at successive points in time. The overseas researcher coming to any ex-British or ex-French country is confronted by complex administrative structures, whose arrangement seems to follow known Western patterns, but whose operation is affected to an unknown extent by the exotic economic and cultural milieu. Until he can build up his own image of the administration as a distinctive system—a difficult feat unless one is already on the inside—the researcher will remain blind to powerful but intangible influences which originate in the system itself. Either he falls into the "ecological fallacy", interpreting divergent behaviour in terms of the alien setting, or else he reduces his scope of observation to activities which seem to be explicable in conventional terms.

A further disincentive to serious research has been the lack of paradigms in the related disciplines of sociology and economics which are applicable to units in the vital, intermediate range of scope. In either discipline, the classic units of analysis focus on the macro- and micro-extremes: concerning at the national level whole sectors and societies, or at the local level individual communities, projects, and firms. By way of contrast, many administrative decisions deal with units of intermediate scope—industries, regional administration, economic zones, service clusters, town planning, and so forth—about which the social science disciplines (apart from geography) have very little to say.

Whereas academic researchers can simply turn aside to study other, more fashionable topics, the policy adviser cannot. We shall see in the succeeding sections of this paper that the East African governments are increasingly relying upon central action to stimulate development. Officials at the centre are intervening in administrative and economic activities at all levels beneath; their extensive powers force them to act as if they had reliable information about situations for which they are responsible. Often the end result is that economic

advisers are asked to frame policy alternatives about matters which are primarily administrative in content.

A special danger arises when advisers are obliged to base their recommendations on sophisticated but partial techniques such as benefit/cost analysis. These techniques are highly selective in their coverage of reality, and, by the same token, they make numerous assumptions about the situation they appear to describe. Anyone who has sweated through the prodigious effort required in order to obtain genuinely reliable recommendations from either benefit/cost or mass social survey analysis in African conditions will be suspicious of the facile application of these techniques to guide national decisions.⁹ The dimensions which we know how to measure—costs and communication, for example—are by nature emergent characteristics of an organization; their expression is continuously determined by other, undefined organizational features. We can assume that low cost operation or accurate communication accompany effective administration, but we cannot deduce the factors responsible from this evidence alone.

How does an adviser respond to negative evidence on programme impact? (Several evaluators of major government programmes in East Africa have been unable to document any positive impact.) One adviser will question the survey methods; a second will point out that certain intangible benefits were not measured; a third will recommend a change in the institutional model; a fourth insists that more resources must be put in to reach the minimum threshold necessary for effective interaction; a fifth recommends staff training and administrative reform; a sixth calls for a higher level of political commitment; and the last tells the government to shut the programme down. The room to diverge is widest where correct advice is most strategic: in the cases where a given institution is operating far below its potential performance (a particularly acute problem in countries trying to move towards the socialist management of a mixed economy). In the last analysis, an adviser's concrete recommendations depend on his conception of the larger system to which his data apply. Recommendations based on partial analysis, no matter how elegant the techniques, may lead to worse results than if no recommendations had been given at all.

Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of this situation has been the loss of opportunity to make changes when change was easy. Policy-makers in East Africa have had unusual scope for changing the direction and form of their inherited institutions. Since independence, leaders have been deciding many fundamental features of the emergent administrative system: the replacement of almost the entire cadre of senior officials; revision of terms of service throughout the public sector; creation of new forms of professional training; negotiation of technical assistance from new sources; transfer of resources from immigrants to Africans; and the formulation of revised legal codes congruent with a centrally managed economy. These decisions are of a "once-for-all" nature. While easy to take, they cannot be lightly reversed later. Once new interest groups and a revised structure of political economy have crystallized, further change becomes increasingly difficult. It is regrettable that East African

governments have had to rely mostly upon advice from economists during the honeymoon period when so many decisions were being taken about the future form of the administrative system. Even so, the margins for planned action are still large enough in this sphere to justify high priority in the planning of public policy.

Our discussion so far has emphasized the crucial role of descriptive paradigms in applied policy analysis. No research tradition can expect to achieve predictive capabilities if it cannot succinctly describe the key features of the main causal agencies operating in the field which it studies. Administrative organizations are highly structured entities, which control powerful social and economic rewards, and which show remarkable powers of persistence. It is logical, therefore, that we should concentrate our initial attention on the organization itself, studying it as a self-contained system with stable performance capabilities. The remainder of this paper will be directed towards answering this question.

THE CONCEPT OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENETRATION

In any science, some terms are useful for their analytic power, to reduce data to testable propositions, and others are needed for their integrative power, to give a larger coherence and meaning to many individual findings. The concept of "administrative penetration" can serve this latter purpose in studies of field administration, since it unifies many of the key concerns of development administration by relating them to a common process of centrally-initiated change. What administrative factors are involved in the origin, transfer, and acceptance of central initiatives? How do people in any given locale respond to directives which they receive through the various branches of the Government's rural administration? These questions do not rule out the simultaneous analysis of the transfer of power and benefits between levels in the territorial hierarchy (i.e., "political penetration"), but they do instead focus one's primary attention on *the effective implementation of substantive policy*. They provide a criterion for deciding what features inside and outside of the administration are of interest if we want to evaluate its performance from the standpoint of objectives set at the centre. In this latter respect, a major advantage of "penetration analysis" as advocated here is that its theoretical assumptions are congruent with the premises which administrative actors in the real world hold about development. If administrators assume that development starts from the centre, then the same linkage should be at the centre of the stage in our analytical image of administrative behaviour. Yet, by looking also at local response, we retain a brief to study the influence of external factors on the administrative process.

In administrative contexts, we can extend the idea of centrally initiated change to yield several components:

1. One or more people at the centre who are organized to formulate directives.

2. Intermediary organizations of an administrative or representational nature which link the centre to the field.
3. The content of the initiative at each stage in its transfer through the total system.
4. Local contact, including: (a) change agents, (b) contact methods, (c) contact groups, and, (d) contact reinforcement.
5. Local response, positive or negative.
6. Exogenous systems influencing response.

While this definition obviously falls under the general heading of a communications model of social change, it puts peculiar emphasis on the *direction* of change, on the *structures* involved, on its *substantive content*, and on the nature of the *response* elicited.

Further details which could be investigated under each of the above components are self-evident. Instead of dealing with them here, I will highlight three larger changes in our image of centre-periphery relationships which are needed if we are to get maximum advantage from an analysis of "administrative penetration".¹⁰ Part A following proposes that a "tree" image should replace the conventional administrative "pyramid" in order to sharpen our awareness of the top-heavy nature of East African administrative organizations. Part B argues that policies which give priority to development "from above" reflect an underlying ideology of administrative centrism which is widely shared among East African leaders. Part C tries to explain why, despite the importance of the centre, its individual plans and policies appear to be relatively insignificant within field activities. Taken together, these images portray a complex administrative structure whose features appear to be very different depending upon whether one is viewing it from the standpoint of those above it, within it, or beneath it.

A. The Tree Metaphor and Structural Analysis

A pyramid is the standard metaphor used to depict the structure of national administration, no doubt because it does well represent the hierarchical character of individual civil service agencies. But a study of administrative penetration must also document the aggregate resources available at each level in the territorial hierarchy. Here the classic model ignores the possibility that multiple institutions are structurally related in an interacting network at the centre, a phenomenon which contemporary innovation theory highlights as being especially significant for the launching of technical innovations.¹¹ What agencies and resources at the centre regularly interact in formulating various categories of central directives?

To see where this question leads, let me illustrate the point with data drawn from a joint study of rural development in Kenya.¹² The change in focus at the national level brought to light many additional institutions, programmes, and linkages which would have been missed if agricultural administration were studied one agency at a time. As of 1967, I counted 20 major national projects in rural development in Kenya,¹³ while a preliminary listing of

aggregate resources at the district level by E. R. Watts gave not less than twenty-three separate agencies which had some formal commitment to undertake extension work in Embu District.¹⁴ Further inquiry showed that Embu's haphazard contact with any one agency was only to be expected. Most agencies had their headquarters in Nairobi, and naturally located their most experienced staff and main administrative resources there.

Indeed, Nairobi has accumulated the preponderant share of Kenya's technical expertise and administrative infrastructure. As a World Bank report observed in 1963, "few underdeveloped countries can compare with Kenya in the magnitude of the organizational arrangements which have been provided by Government to further agricultural development and marketing."¹⁵ For instance, we found that the country had three complete networks of agricultural research stations (serving respectively the East African Community, the different major cash crop industries, and the Ministry of Agriculture itself).¹⁶ Again, it has two rival sets of short-course training centres (one under Agriculture and the other Community Development), just as it has three overlapping extension services aimed directly at rural women (the same two Ministries plus Health).¹⁷ Where development is implemented "from above", each agency begins its work by strengthening its central office in Nairobi, a tendency exacerbated by the shortages of suitable housing in the rural areas and by the desire of both technical assistance staff and their Kenyan counterparts to keep near the centre of power and innovation in Nairobi itself.

It is the same story wherever one turns. To study Kenya's irrigation schemes, we were sent to the National Irrigation Board, which is housed in a former Nairobi Hotel. To visit the largest agricultural research stations, one must motor only a few miles into the Nairobi suburbs, where almost all of the major research centres have been located. To evaluate agricultural training, one goes to the Faculty of Agriculture, newly established in Nairobi even though Kenya had a well developed agricultural college upcountry at Njoro which could have easily been upgraded into a degree-granting facility. Nairobi contains the regional offices for the World Bank, for USAID, for FAO, for the American Foundations, for East African agricultural research, for most commercial suppliers of agricultural inputs, and for many other, lesser agencies. Add to this the recent arrival of agricultural technicians from Holland, Scandinavia, West Germany, and Japan, and one can see why technical assistance has become one of Nairobi's leading industries.

Whatever the political ramifications of this situation, in relation to agricultural development Nairobi has passed the point of take-off. Its overall complex of institutions, specialists, and services for rural development has reached the threshold for self-sustaining interaction: Nairobi can very nearly generate its own solutions to Kenya's internal technological needs. At the same time, however, the attention of the Nairobi-based administrators is becoming involuted because of the sheer complexity of the many different agencies and interests caught up in this interaction. It is not stretching the point to say that most rural development initiatives in Kenya are launched from Nairobi; many never leave Nairobi.

Though extreme, the pattern of urban dominance I have just described is not atypical of "development administration" in many new nations, irrespective of whether they are capitalist or socialist in orientation. It certainly complicates how one analyses the transfer of initiatives to lower levels in the country.

It highlights the distortions introduced by viewing the administrative bureaucracy in conventional terms as a pyramid. Considered individually, the larger departments (such as Agriculture) do have a staffing pyramid that widens in numbers towards the bottom. But considered jointly, the top layers are in sum total far more extensive and differentiated than those immediately beneath within the regional administration.

A more apt image would be, therefore, the Biblical "Green Bay Tree": the Nairobi agencies constituting the sunlit leaves and interlocked branches at the top; the provincial organization being the solid trunk; and the local, sub-district organizations forming roots of unknown depth and strength, invisible in the muck beneath. And, to push our metaphor to the limit, one's view of the tree will be almost unrecognizably different depending upon whether it is seen from the vantage point of its roots, its trunk, or the branches above.

The view "from below" in such a structure explains why local officials tend to conceive of their problems in terms of strategies for "penetrating" upwards to find some point of influence on action at the centre. With so much going on in Nairobi, high level officials can easily forget the periphery unless the outlying districts can develop sufficient purchase on key national actors to ensure that they are not neglected (hence the importance of national "big men" in local African politics). The structure encourages an intense but distinctive type of politicization, wherein local clients line up beneath their national patrons.¹⁸ From the simplistic vantage point of a local man looking upwards, the main feature about national level administration is that it appears to afford almost unlimited access to influence and privilege. This feeling is exacerbated in Kenya because of Nairobi's elite life style inherited from the Europeans.

Contrariwise, the view "from above" is so distant that those at the centre are all but forced to rely upon the provincial administration or their own district heads for information about the state of affairs in the field. Intervening officials in the provincial administration acquire considerable *de facto* power through their mediation of most information going upwards and directives coming down. The steep hierarchy interposes numerous communications barriers between the centre and the field. This means that the overall quality of central administration is highly dependent on the adequacy of information held by the intervening levels. A particular danger is the lack of knowledge at the centre about the operative strength of local organization at the sub-district levels.

The tree image helps us to understand why attempts to co-ordinate development activity at the top and bottom layers are so difficult. At either extreme, the diversity and uneven differentiation of structures works against the planners' aim of orchestrating all of the Government's development activity. It is

only in the relatively compact provincial administration that co-ordination stands a reasonable chance of success.

We should not react to the administrators' own perceptions of client politics by concluding therefore that the administrative tasks they perform are not "development oriented". As Silberman has shown in respect to the Japanese bureaucracy, restrictions on eligibility do not necessarily impair the effectiveness of bureaucratic performance (contrary to Weber's ideal type), nor are ascriptive and achievement criteria for role allocations always mutually exclusive.¹⁹

For example, a trained research scientist in Kenya's agricultural services does not hold unusual privileges when compared against other scientists holding comparable posts in the international network (within which he has been trained). But relative to the surrounding peasantry, the scientist's car and government salary mark him out as a member of the national elite; it is almost inevitable that his appointment will be interpreted in political terms even in the face of his technocratic qualification. Where jobs are scarce and marginally qualified candidates numerous, any appointment becomes a political act with potential ethnic overtones.²⁰

B. Centrist vs. Participation Ideologies in East Africa

The dramatic growth of institutions and structures at the centre in African states has passed almost without comment by national leaders, since they associate it with the increased resources for promoting development which they expected to obtain from Independence. Similarly, its meaning has gone unnoticed in academic analysis because economics and political science both share many of the same centrist premises. Instead, it is customary to view ideologies of development in a classic, western frame as consisting of policy decisions mirroring the ownership and control of real property in society. Of course, there is a genuine competition underway in Africa between socialist and capitalist institutional forms, a conflict which several writers have fruitfully analysed at length in an ideological framework.²¹

Equally interesting, however, is a second, cross-cutting ideological conflict whose very existence is not generally recognized: a clash inherited from the colonial regimes but intensified since Independence between two relatively coherent but mutually exclusive viewpoints about how development ought to take place. On the one hand, we find a well articulated and cohesive set of premises about how development takes place "from above" which we might label "centrist" or "penetration ideology"; on the other, we find a rival view (less integrated but also strongly held in some quarters) about local development "from below" which we could label "participation ideology". The designation as ideologies is a fair one, since each view is built up from internally consistent premises which are often used by leaders to legitimize particular styles of administrative action. Unfortunately, the resultant rationales for development-oriented action point in contradictory directions, differing as they do in their fundamental conception of what development is.

Our task in dissecting these rival viewpoints is complicated by the references their proponents make to external, economic conditions as the *raison d'être* behind specific administrative actions. In turning attention outwards towards the grim imperatives set by the economic environment, leaders clothe their actions with an inevitability that hides the implicit and inter-linked premises upon which they are based, which collectively form larger thought systems that define what development means and how it ought to occur in a specific historical situation.

As a start towards identifying the two types of administrative ideology which concern us here, I suggest that they diverge sharply in respect to the implicit premises on which they are based. The dominant administrative centrist viewpoint proceeds from an acceptance of the following basic points:

1. All parts of the country have a right to see visible progress being achieved towards their eventual incorporation in an integrated, modern economy.
2. Major initiatives required for development will be supported by public expenditure, at least to the extent that the Government undertakes to supply the capital and services required to get development underway.
3. Many areas do not have the human, physical, or financial resources to develop themselves unaided by the centre.
4. Development initiatives will be planned centrally to see that the best use is made of local resources, within a broader framework of programmes for developing the whole country.
5. The centre will maintain sufficient administrative machinery at the local level to ensure that central directives can be implemented at will.
6. Where necessary, the Government will set up specialized bureaucratic institutions to give it direct control over key economic activities (as in the parastatal sector).
7. In sponsoring overall industrialization, the Government will not neglect the transformation of the agrarian sector.
8. The time available is limited: people expect to see the economy transformed within their children's lifetime, so that the higher the rate of development the better.
9. The centre is best qualified to decide what is in the national interest; if necessary, development activities will be implemented even if they are opposed by the people concerned locally.

While some of the above concerns were accepted in the colonial period, the willingness to shoulder the responsibility for the development of the whole country within a relatively short time horizon represents a very real shift in the terms of reference under which administration is conducted. We might take it to indicate the emergence of "development administration" in East Africa.

Carried to its logical conclusion, the centrist train of thought leads to the view that no local decisions about development should be taken without consideration first being given to national interests, i.e., without having been subject to central planning. Economic planning and political action, in that order, become the co-ordinated expression of common policies affecting the whole of

the "political economy". (Parenthetically, we might note that while such premises have obvious affinities to Russian style "big-think" socialism, they can also be used to buttress state capitalism in mixed economies, such as one finds in Kenya.) And, in the intellectual sphere, the social science disciplines should be merged into a single, multi-faceted discipline of "political economy".²²

Those committed to popular participation start from a very different conception of what development is. They argue that:

1. Development ultimately consists in the development of group consciousness and a people's ability to manage and understand their own self-development.
2. Capital and manpower constraints are only superficial "causes" of underdevelopment; through more adequate symbolic communication people can learn to make more effective use of resources already present in the local environment.
3. The real underlying constraints affecting economic development are those related to failures of local leadership, blockages in the transfer of skills, weaknesses in managerial know-how, and imperfectly organized local production services.
4. Outsiders interested in promoting genuine local development must attack the above motivational and organizational constraints first, leaving expanded economic activity to follow in due course.
5. Outsiders will not be listened to locally until they find a point of entry related to people's perceived needs.
6. Having assisted people to articulate their needs, the development agent must work with people to expand their common consciousness of the causes of under-development, the nature of local problems, and the measures which they themselves could organize to improve their situation.
7. The scope of development projects undertaken should be expanded gradually, to strengthen people's common involvement, to encourage the emergence of new types of leaders, and to extend the community's ability to manage more complex types of economic activity.
8. People do not realistically acquire increased managerial expertise unless they are allowed to make decisions at their own pace and unless they experience the fruits of their own mistakes.
9. Attempts to hurry development by solutions imposed from above run the risk of short-circuiting the more fundamental process of strengthening local capabilities, so that apparent physical development may be a misleading indicator of a people's genuine self-transformation.

These ideas are at the root of the community development movement, and it was their acceptance in the post-War period by the British colonial government that lay behind the attempts to make co-operatives and local councils the key agencies for local development. Thus participation ideology stresses the primacy of the local community as its main analytic unit, and it favours the inclusion of a strong representational component in all types of bureaucratic administrative structures.

Since Independence, however, the substantive changes which have taken place in East African administration generally reflect a reversion to the centrist premises which had already been in competition with the participation ideology during the colonial phase. Indeed, among senior officials at the centre the importance of the centrist position is taken to be self-evident. All of the East

African governments have set up the machinery for central planning.²³ Without exception, each Five-Year Plan has been larger and more ambitious than its predecessor; no Kenya plan has yet run its course before having been superseded by a revised version, and in 1968 there was even talk of revising the revised Five-Year Plan.²⁴ Again, in Tanzania the Government has moved so much faster in nationalizing the economy that its current Five-Year Plan is no longer of use to guide financial decision-making.²⁵ We should also note that the differences between Tanzania and Kenya in economic ideology do not extend to differences in view over the importance of central control. As Mitchell has observed:²⁶

The basic distinction between the two plans for rural development does not lie in the extent to which government will attempt to involve itself in the rural economy. Both plans call for increases in the number, type, and co-ordination of government activities concerned with rural betterment. . . . Kenya's plan states that 20.6 per cent of central government development expenditure over the next plan period will be allocated to agriculture, while the corresponding figure for Tanzania will be 20.8 per cent. . . . Both forecast far-reaching changes in traditional structures of ownership and degree of social co-operation (for example, by increasing the extent of specialization and exchange in agriculture).

Having discovered that actual decisions diverge from planned forecasts, the East African governments have not reacted by abandoning their centrist premises, but rather have tried to tighten control over the economy from above. Uganda experimented briefly with regional planning commissions,²⁷ whereas in Kenya and Tanzania the national planning agencies have appointed their own regional and local staff, and have created an elaborate hierarchy of planning committees to facilitate central control.²⁸ Similarly, at the national level much effort has been put into the synchronization of training and employment opportunities (in return for government subsidies, most students are "bonded" to public service for a specified period) by means of centralized manpower planning.²⁹ There has also been the usual post-independence expansion in all three countries of public investment under loan financing from the World Bank and other technical assistance sources, an increase which can only be repaid if these centrally planned investments do realize the projected returns. All of these developments are defensible to the extent that the basic premises hold true, so that costly commitments undertaken by the centre "from above" do, in actual fact, influence output from below.³⁰

But if we accept that the trend outlined above is in practice often antithetical to the achievement of popular participation, in the sense that it expresses a different set of priorities concerning how scarce resources should be used, we can better understand the fundamental ambivalence which underlies the public policy statements of leaders like Nyerere or Kaunda. As Ingle documents, Nyerere has consistently advocated working *with* people to realize development goals, but in actual fact his Government has often had to rely upon the threat of compulsion at the local level to attain centrally determined objectives.³¹ This conflict between priorities became especially clear in Tanzania in 1969. At this time, Nyerere was seeking outside advice on how to more

effectively decentralize development services while simultaneously his Government took back the financial resources and authority it had delegated to District Councils after Independence, and outlawed the Ruvuma Development Association, which was the prototype for *Ujamaa* settlement in Tanzania and one of the country's few examples of a successful development effort generated from below.³² Such contradictions do not necessarily indicate that a leader's commitment to participation is merely political rhetoric. They represent anomalies which are almost inevitable when policy commitments are made that go against the grain of the existing order. That grain was set many decades ago in the image of Whitehall, not Westminster: so perhaps it is not too surprising that the ideal of non-bureaucratic participation is proving so alien to the philosophy and procedures of an Administration at work.³³

We might note the warning given by Ghai and McAuslan, in view of the tremendous temptation which administrators face to short-circuit development problems by the raw exercise of administrative authority:³⁴

In an attempt to increase the effectiveness of the administration, wider discretions are conferred upon officials by law, and these officials are prepared to take, and can get away with taking, short cuts. It is here that a glaring discrepancy exists between the rhetoric and the practice of the exercise of power. . . . This use of the law to increase the power of Government and decrease the opportunities to challenge it in the name of development will result in development itself becoming suspect, and losing its legitimacy as a unifying force in . . . the nation.

C. *Plans and Policies in Field Administration*

The conventional myth in the literature on economic development sees central initiatives as consisting largely of policies and projects. In theory, the policies come first: they represent a choice between rival development strategies arrived at by the national leadership, and packaged by them for onward transmission in the form of locally allocated projects which trigger the field organization of manpower and resources to achieve the desired disaggregated plan targets. Assuming this is how central initiatives get translated into living reality, one is justified in devoting most attention to the macro- and micro-extremes: "policies" and "projects" respectively.

In the field, however, I was surprised to find how difficult it was to identify central initiatives under the usual rubrics of "policies", "plans", and "programmes". They describe only a limited sphere of central to local activity, and the activities they cover do not appear to be very significant operationally. One experienced field researcher in Kenya has suggested that "probably less than 5 per cent of rural development activities are initiated, shaped, or controlled by the formal planning structure."³⁵ How do we square this finding with the earlier image of the immense administrative resources being devoted to centrally-induced change?

At this point, one must guard against jumping to the erroneous conclusion that therefore the centre has little influence in the field. The slippage exists in the image and not in reality. If we consider how "policies", "plans", and

"programmes" are used in business administration, we can see they are all devices for packaging and arranging small decisions into larger wholes. They are used primarily to facilitate the making of decisions, and then the subsequent allocation and scheduling of implementation directives. In the sphere of public affairs, the comparable level is at the centre itself, where, after all, the bulk of administrative resources is to be found. Plans, programmes, and policies are extremely important to facilitate rational decision-making by national leaders; they also help senior officials to monitor what is happening subsequently in the field—but they will always be located principally at the centre.

When putting these planned decisions into effect, senior officials customarily disaggregate them into component instructions whose passage is difficult to trace once they arrive in the field. Only if there has been substantial deconcentration of decision-making will plans, programmes, and policies become analytically fruitful devices for looking at the transfer of initiatives within the field administration. Since at the moment the pan-African trend is in the opposite direction, one must find other, more relevant images to describe how the centre influences the periphery. At the centre, then, plans, programmes and policies matter a great deal; in the field, they are well nigh invisible.

We can take our cue from the perceptions of the local officials themselves, who judge the Government's commitment to any particular policy by its willingness to establish a corresponding physical presence, represented by manpower and money, in the field. Whatever the form that central initiatives may take, the actual process of transfer requires the simultaneous existence of two accompanying components (whose existence is implied when one analyses plans, programmes, and policies): (1) a substantive content, and, (2) a continuing organization which is relied upon to accomplish the actual transfer to the local level. In terms of substance, we can divide agricultural development initiatives by function into a large number of complementary types of development measures (which may or may not be institutionalized in the form of programmes at the national level and projects at the local level). In sum total, the East African governments are already operating an astonishingly wide range of such measures, numbering between fifty and one hundred and fifty depending upon how finely one is inclined to subdivide each functional category. Different types of measures are associated with different types of institutional models, and have certain basic requirements in common. When national decisions about rural development are taken, they almost always begin with the selection of a particular type of development measure, followed by a choice of operative agencies which will bring the desired activities into existence on the ground.

It is much more expeditious to view an approach such as "land settlement" or "agricultural education" as a type of development measure linked to corresponding development agencies than it is to try to conceptualize such approaches as "strategies", "policies", or even "programmes". Even if it were desirable, one would have great difficulty in proposing a standard administrative module to suit the field agencies attached to different types of develop-

ment measures. Crops vary greatly in the sophistication of the services they require, just as districts vary greatly in the range of environments and associated crop industries they contain. The sheer number of attractive permutations for grouping agricultural services into manageable wholes leaves wide latitude to the discretion of the field agency. The missing element which has hardly been studied at all in East Africa is the question of how existing field agencies of different types go about organizing their own internal activities. The structure and operation of rural development agencies is an obvious area for administrative analysis, provided that we can first assemble a general picture of the salient characteristics shared by most branches of the field administration.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIELD ADMINISTRATION

Let us for the moment assume a "penetration analysis" of the type advocated here had been carried out in detail. What internal features of the field administration are most salient for explaining its performance capabilities? From research on agricultural administration, I suggest that the following generalizations might be worth closer investigation.

1. Individual units in the field bureaucracy are quite small, falling in the same range of from five to twenty or less officials as one finds in, for example, North American public service agencies.³⁶ However, whereas overseas small professional bureaucracies are the least likely to show a centralized hierarchy of managerial authority, in East Africa field bureaucracies of a similar size are strongly hierarchical. Field staff are separated into three or more parallel cadres, differentiated by formal qualification, length of service, and salary scales. The typical agency headquarters in the field with a staff of ten or less will contain officers in four or five sharply distinct ranks; Watts mentions an extreme instance from Uganda where one agricultural officer supervises one agricultural assistant who in turn supervises one field contact man.³⁷ The professionally trained staff occupy high level posts of an administrative nature; the least trained staff are the ones in actual contact with farmers or in day-to-day control of field operations.

2. Many of the older field staff entered government service in the colonial period when all one needed was a full primary education. Having completed a one or two year post-primary occupational training in a service profession such as teaching or health care, these officials became the nucleus of the emerging African elite in their districts. Today, however, the educational qualifications for entry to the same occupations have risen steeply. At best, the older officials maintain a foothold in the national elite but work under younger, better trained cadres who have been superimposed on top and who permanently block them from further advancement. At worst, the untrained staff in bottom level posts cannot be transferred and are simply marking out their time in the same positions which they have held since colonial days. Together these older officials constitute what we might term "trapped elites": though they

identify with the modern political system, they are no longer upwardly mobile at a time when higher level opportunities are being dramatically expanded.³⁸

3. The better trained officials who are now joining the national elite have no local audience to whom they are accountable. Unlike the stabilized subordinate staff, senior officials are subject to frequent transfers (under Kenya's regulations, for example, an official is entitled to only three days' notice). Various researchers have independently documented extremely high rates of transfer in several parts of East Africa. This phenomenon has not been scrutinized because it appears to be caused by the necessary replacement of high level manpower following independence. In actual fact, however, it is structurally caused. The features internal to the administrative system which contribute to the rapid circulation of senior staff between posts include the lack of regard for individual interests and capabilities in the initial training and posting of staff; the ineffectiveness of other formal sanctions which might be used to correct bureaucratic misbehaviour; the availability of the transfer mechanism as an easy way out to solve personnel problems; the expectation by leaders that anyone who develops strong local ties will be tempted to contravene civil service ethics; the importance of a headquarter's posting for officials who want to keep political connexions to national leaders alive; the continuing expansion of public sector employment into new spheres of activity (such as banking or high level training); and the lack of a pool from which replacement staff can be drawn, so that each high level transfer entails further transfers all down the line. Thus staff movement is being continuously triggered by many independent stresses within the system, and it has become endemic within most higher level administrative posts throughout East Africa.

4. The high rate of staff transfers solidifies relationships within the elite while cutting senior officials off from genuine contact with local problems. Officials are forced to maintain a second household in their home areas, and it is largely through this circle of kinsfolk at home that they keep in touch with "grass roots" sentiment.³⁹ The younger officials soon realize that they will not stay in any one place long enough to bring about external achievements which can be identified with their own efforts, nor do they have much social contact with the subordinate staff who provide the main element of continuity in rural administration. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that they regard their relationships to "big men" above as the key to personal advancement, that they interact primarily with other members of the national elite, and that they value friendship ties among themselves highly. In circulating back and forth across the country, they have the opportunity to maintain a network of friendships begun in school and cemented in early jobs.⁴⁰ Other elite Africans form a potent reference group against which the individual official is continuously evaluating his own postings, privileges, and advancement. In an administrative system sensitized to observe minute distinctions in rank and privilege and devoid of techniques for evaluating work performance, an individual official's own perception of his situation may be vastly different from what an external observer might think it to be.

5. Field staff are seen to be government servants, not farm advisers. Those

who have professional qualifications hold formal title as *officers*; they do development-related tasks on assignment. The occupational norms, i.e., the expectations about hours of work, type of work, behaviour on the job, etc., are those of a civil servant, even in technical fields where one might have expected individuals to orient themselves towards professional reference groups instead. We have already seen that the field worker, as an official, is accountable upwards to his superior rather than downwards to his clientele. In this respect, field staff in East African administration have much in common with local officials in other ex-colonial nations. They can take unpopular actions with relative impunity; but, for the same reason, the Government cannot assume that its field staff are automatically local leaders. Indeed, within East Africa strong local leaders are often noticeably absent; local communities wait passively for the Government to take the initiative, while at the same time local officials are disinclined to take the risks involved in forthright action.

6. To be effective in this internally politicized setting, an official must be willing to pay a considerable private cost. Either he will incur the disfavour of senior officials because he uses departmental resources for purposes which are important but not specifically sanctioned, or else he must invest extra time and money of his own to establish informal liaison across departmental boundaries. Administrative entrepreneurship in the field carries few rewards and many risks. The few who do take such risks tend to expect as a *quid pro quo* that the Government will allow them certain privileges not strictly required for the immediate performance of their official duties.

7. In many localities, there is still a wide split between the formal or "paper" system, representing the Government's official view of its achievements, and actual realities in the field. This divergence originated in colonial attempts to rectify certain undesirable activities by passing statutes to make them illegal. (Tanzanians have their own term for this affliction, *wazimu wa Mzungu*, or "the D.C.'s madness".)⁴¹ Regulations and policies continue to be made in all the East African countries which far exceed the field administration's implementation capacities. Faced with conflicting and even impossible directives, officials react in much the same way as their predecessors did under indirect rule. Cohen has shown from Nigerian data that when conflicting standards are selectively enforced, officials will feign the public achievement of most targets while privately seeking out informal contact with the centre to learn what respective levels of non-performance will be tolerated.⁴² Local officials find their authority is greatest in regard to those who are breaking the formal regulations, but since such large numbers are involved, enforcement will appear to be haphazard and arbitrary. Either the local official must turn a blind eye towards events taking place around him, claiming official achievements which exist only on paper, or else in his zealous attempts to implement unrealistic directives he will destroy the Government's legitimacy and his own future effectiveness in the area concerned. Thus, the widespread existence of a double standard corrodes centre-periphery relationships at all levels within the field administration.

8. The field administration is starved for administrative capital. The extra

items which give an organization its administrative strength, Land-Rovers, mileage allowances, typewriters, proficient secretarial staff, etc., are very thinly spread below the provincial level (with the exception of certain fashionable programmes managed directly from the centre). In the remainder of the field administration, most recurrent expenditure goes directly into staff salaries. Officials are already cutting corners at many points: employing temporary staff, keeping bottom level salaries as low as possible, withholding mileage funds and bicycle allowances for half the year, running old vehicles without inspection, and so forth. Recent increases in the total numbers of staff are building up a huge but invisible appetite for more administrative capital, waiting to be triggered by well meant decisions to "improve efficiency". It is possible that the Government might have to double its capital outlay and total salary bill if it is genuinely serious about getting maximum effectiveness from the existing staff establishment.

9. Whereas most provincial or regional centres in East Africa have a nucleus of reasonably competent administrative and technical staff, administrative performance at lower levels is highly variable from district to district. One cannot assume in advance that a district's staff are effectively implementing the programmes listed for their area at the centre. In particular, certain districts have acquired a reputation as being "punishment posts". Here the officials will tend to be either those in disfavour at the centre, or those without sufficient qualification to be nationally mobile. The features which give rise to such a reputation in the first instance—physical isolation, poor soils, a subsistence economy, low value annual crops, labour migration, weak ties to the national leadership—are aggravated by public sector personnel decisions. Frustrated by a lack of local response, the Government resorts to sporadic campaigns with punitive undertones. When these fail, officials lapse into inactivity. The few educated officials from the area are rarely returned to it afterwards; outside staff have neither the skills nor the interest to solve local problems; and the people withdraw into an attitude of hostile suspicion towards the "strangers" who are sent their way from the centre.

The above comments have been intended as the first step towards building up a more complex picture of development administration in East Africa. They suggest that East African administrators derive most of their power and influence from their positions, acquired by formal qualification and not by ownership, and so do not constitute a class in conventional Marxist terms. It appears that bureaucrats do constitute the dominant, national elite, but the bureaucracy is sharply split internally between local and national elites, and the latter group's influence is still closely tied to its access to public sector, bureaucratic positions. Thus the bureaucratic *salariat* is rapidly crystallizing at the top into a dominant class in those countries which allow officials to use their positions to obtain preferential treatment in acquiring other resources: an urban base, directorships, business interests, bank loans, real estate, job patronage, and educational opportunities.

East African administrators do not react to initiatives or perform in situations in the ways that an outsider might expect. These differences are only part-

ly cultural in nature; some of them relate to an official's outside interests, but many of them derive from the intrinsic features of the bureaucracy as a system. Although to a considerable extent the same tendencies are also present in Western bureaucracies, they are more clearly evident here because the well-being of the country is more directly dependent upon the performance of the central administration and because the economy lacks certain compensating or balancing institutions. At the moment the administrative organizations found in East Africa can perform certain types of central initiative quite adequately, provided that such initiatives fall in the domain of the administrators' peculiar expertise.

For example, the Tanzanian Administration has shown considerable organizational skill in performing routine administrative tasks, such as in the setting up of the ten-house cell system, the conduct of the 1967 census, or—most impressively—the planned resettlement of some 41,000 families into 72 *ujamaa* villages in Dodoma District during the last quarter of 1971. Yet this same Administration has experienced disastrous results from its attempts to achieve higher agricultural productivity from the other *Ujamaa* villages which had already been established by mid-1971—a failure which threatens to undermine the impact of its efficient registration of new settlements. The remainder of this paper will explain why one encounters such striking disparities between levels of administrative performance in routine vs. technical spheres. In our discussion so far, I have tried to show that we are dealing with rooted systems which have distinctive and uneven performance capabilities. One cannot expect any single reform to have a dramatic impact, except in so far as it taps momentum already built into the existing field administration. If leaders wish to intervene to improve administrative performance in the crucial technical sphere, it is extremely important that they first understand the underlying characteristics of the systems with which they are experimenting.

"ENGAGED PLANNING" IN AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION

Let us now examine how these general ideas apply to the sphere of agricultural administration. Can we use them to identify missing factors which might explain the vast differences in effective performance exhibited by similar field agencies?

Unlike other forms of public administration, agricultural administration can be judged against an external criterion: its ability to achieve planned crop and stock production targets. Our chief evaluative difficulty relates to the indirect nature of the linkage between producer services and the production response. To date, a large share of production increases in some crops (such as cotton) comes from expanded acreages grown by peasants without Government intervention. The Government's role becomes more strategic in those farming activities where: new crops are being introduced; production is primarily for sale; more capital is being employed; and, land and labour are used more intensively. All four trends are characteristic of technologically advanced farming.

which is consequently highly dependent upon the continuing support of efficiently organized agricultural services.

The deterministic nature of this linkage imposes a high threshold on the quality of supporting producer services. In using larger amounts of capital, producers need an efficient, off-farm financing system. To integrate purchased inputs and intermediate products more tightly into the farming system, there must be good local organization to ensure the timely supply of inputs. The labour force must be able to perform specialized tasks and must have access to "reserve" skills in times of crisis, which implies an institutionalized transfer of modern skills coupled with various technical specialists in reach of each community. Farm managers must be able to achieve a fine balance in the deployment of staff and equipment to avoid the labour bottlenecks so characteristic of East African peasant farming. Thus the process of intensification does not bring higher returns to either the Government or the farmers until a tricky backward linkage has been made operational; higher standards of husbandry must be backed by increased sophistication of management which in turn will not be effective unless supported by well administered producer services.

Farm modernization in East Africa is further complicated by the fact that the existing enterprises are highly variable and quite risky. Intensification may simply raise the risks and stakes all the way round. This poses a special problem when one is encouraging farmers (or groups of farmers or even state farms) to make the trade-offs typical of large-scale farming, where one hopes to offset the intrinsic risks by specialization, capital investment in irrigation, disease control, extra technical advisers, bulk storage facilities and a nation-wide marketing system. If there is still one year in five or ten when the crop totally fails, then productivity must be sufficient to cover the costs of both high overheads and high risk. Many forms of modern agricultural production in East Africa are intrinsically a high cost proposition. They simply cannot pay their own way unless they can rely on flexible, highly organized, and efficient supporting services—hence the incidence of protected markets for local farm products throughout East Africa.

Unfortunately, the same factors behind high cost production equally affect production services. Where production units are dispersed, the product mix changeable, timing important but varying between and within seasons, and where deliveries must be ordered long in advance, agricultural administration is necessarily organization-intensive. Few writers on development administration give this point adequate weight. Agricultural service activities typically consist of a chain of serially linked actions performed by various Departments and administrative actors in sequence. A slip-up at only one or two points may nullify the impact of all preceding and subsequent actions. Even simple tasks will require a large input of organizational effort to see that they are reliably performed, but it is hard to guarantee a sufficient level of administrative concern within standard civil service structures.

Perhaps one out of many possible examples will be enough to establish this point. An agricultural officer told to set up a spraying regime for a local co-operative society might well face the following list of activities:

1. Check the recommended sprays and application rates with the nearest research station.
2. Check what kinds of sprays or dust are in stock at the nearest suppliers, and arrange advance orders if necessary.
3. Check with the field staff on the current crop season to determine when spraying of plants ought to begin.
4. Arrange refresher courses for members of the spraying teams.
5. Check on the mechanical condition of sprayers and see if spare parts are in store.
6. Check on the credit-worthiness of the society and the Union with the bank and with potential suppliers, then arrange for a letter of credit to be issued.
7. See that the Co-operative Union issues local purchase orders to the society for spray and for the petrol of the lorry which transports it.
8. Obtain from the field staff lists of society members, whose fields will be ready and whose credit record warrants advance spraying.
9. Set up the schedule of visits for spray teams to follow and see that they, the Administration, and farmers are informed.
10. Doublecheck arrangements for transport and a driver to pick up the spray and later to collect the field staff and to deposit them at the scheduled points.

This schedule may be repeated all or in part up to eight times in a season (the currently recommended spraying regime for cotton in Sukumaland, Tanzania).

Larger programmes, such as the crop introduction campaigns proposed for several regions in the current Five-Year Plans, entail a commensurate increase in the total volume of administrative activities. Field trials must be located, maintained, and evaluated; seed supplies must be arranged; advisory materials must be prepared and staff trained; and processing facilities must be financed, constructed, and staffed. The general policy followed in East Africa of leaving producers (whether individuals or *Ujamaa* villages) to be the passive recipients of centralized, technical services carries with it an immense organizational load for the agencies responsible. The implicit service load is especially important in the high value, cash crop industries where it is further amplified by differences between industries and by the accident that some production services are organized horizontally across enterprise boundaries.

It is a safe conclusion that sustained agricultural development does not occur under either private or socialist auspices unless someone regularly puts in a large margin of extra "intelligence" effort of a managerial nature: what I shall term "engaged planning". The organizational imperatives for effectiveness are quite clear. Somebody must keep the daily activities of distinct but vertically interlocked services under surveillance, must frame contingency plans in case the season or market shifts prematurely, must indulge in bureaucratic politics in order to secure the commitments implied in an action programme, and must be prepared even to break the rules in an emergency. This is much more than the mere exercise of certain planning techniques. It is a special kind of relationship between an organization and larger events and evidence that the

organization as a whole is under rational control. When an organization regularly uses its planning capabilities for their maximum strategic effect, then it exhibits "engaged planning".

Needless to say, "engaged planning" is rarely evidenced by the usual civil service bureaucracy. First, civil service rules prohibit the lateral communication so vital to the co-ordination of complex processes. Second, it is difficult for anyone other than the man at the top to request re-evaluation of commitments because of changed circumstances. Third, civil service procedures almost never require the formulation of contingency plans: instead, when a crisis strikes, the organization goes into immediate paralysis until higher orders are received from above. Fourth, many of the initiatives needed to realize long range objectives are in their immediate context technically illegal. And, lastly, there is no shortage of good excuses relating to difficult local conditions to justify non-achievement of plans. In place of "engaged planning", therefore, one normally finds what Robert Chambers terms "planning without implementation" at the centre and "implementation without planning" in the field.⁴³

Economic planners who blame the lack of Plan realization on failures of "implementation" are missing the point. On closer examination, failures of implementation usually derive from a *weakness of planning capability* in the field agency itself. The usual remedies proposed by economists, better planning technique, more direct controls from the centre, more finely differentiated targets, do not stimulate "engaged planning"; quite the contrary, they inhibit its emergence. We must find other ways to ensure that organizational intelligence is created and used in the field administration. The task is doubly complicated by the civil service tendency already mentioned of putting all the resources needed for effective planning at the centre and not in the field.⁴⁴

Commercial organizations use three general tactics to build up their own planning capabilities: (1) they may simply put one man in overall charge, choosing him carefully on the basis of experience and demonstrated performance, and then holding him responsible to see that the organization acts in a rational fashion; (2) they may add extra intelligence staff—personal assistants, consultants, advisers, and planners—to sit at the manager's elbow; and, (3) they may stipulate that all decisions whose outcome have long run consequences must be subject to special preparation (e.g., required procedures for drawing up budgetary estimates, for costing major capital expansion, and so forth). Most large firms in fact combine all three solutions, experienced control, specialist staff, and designed procedures, to minimize the risk that external events may catch them unawares.

We can detect a parallel evolution in the measures taken by governments to give their agricultural administration a greater planning capability. The simplest solution is the one adopted by most colonial regimes which puts an individual professional officer in charge and leaves him to supply all the planning, co-ordination and evaluation personally. This "hub-and-wheel" form of managerial control tends to emerge naturally in the colonial situation (or, for that matter, in any organization that employs large numbers of lowly qualified staff under the supervision of a few, key professionals). Told to organize complex

activities from scratch without supporting professional staff, the centre-post man sets up a circle of subordinate workers each capable of doing one limited aspect of the total operation. Thereafter, it is always quicker for the centre-post man to perform the difficult tasks himself than it is to train someone else each time a special skill is required. The subordinates soon become accustomed to relying on the centre-post man for all inputs of a supervisory, planning, co-ordinating, or decision-making nature. The system can work quite smoothly, provided that the centre-post man is hard working and has access to the "reserve" skills needed from time to time. Even if not initially a good manager, under pressure he gets such intensive feedback that he either becomes reasonably competent or else must withdraw from the game. Of course, it helps if he is already professionally experienced and if he is left in his position for an extended period.⁴⁵

This pattern was responsible for many of the more successful colonial development schemes. Looking through the records, one will usually find that the successful schemes had behind them an individual willing to put in a large amount of invisible planning and supervisory effort for several years, in return for the freedom to act as king in his own sphere of administrative responsibility. The roll-call of men whose pet projects fitted this mould is formidable: in the Sudan, Gaitskell at Gezira; in Kenya, Benson at Meru, Chambers at Kerugoya, Maher at Kitale and Giglioli at Mwea; in Tanganyika, Malcolm in Sukumaland, Dundas and Bennett at Kilimanjaro and Nelson at Meru. Since even in the commercial world a few one-man empires survive the competition of highly institutionalized corporate giants, it is obvious that under the right conditions "hub-and-wheel" management can be quite effective.

However, certain characteristic defects usually emerge in the longer run. Only the man at the centre accumulates direct planning experience, while the organization's planning techniques tend to remain non-formalized, personal to the manager. Total performance depends heavily on the vision, motivation, and skills of the centre-post man, and no provision is made for the time when the work load will be too great for one person to co-ordinate. The centre-post man becomes more and more irreplaceable, and in short, the features which are a help at early stages of organizational development become a handicap later on. If and when the top man is moved, someone just like him must be found: there will be no subordinate groomed to take his place.

Anyone who has lived in an ex-colonial country will need no introduction to the pattern described above. Examples abound on every side of men who, having once been socialized into this managerial pattern from beneath, now revert to it in order to "speed up" development. It is paradoxical that in a country short of "high level" manpower, qualified people are still underutilized because an even smaller group of top officials monopolize the key decision-making roles. Such officials find nothing strange in the fact that they are called upon to perform four or five jobs simultaneously; after all, this is what their colonial masters did. They fail to realize that the "hub-and-wheel" is most suited to field operations, not to high level positions at headquarters. The professional officers in the colonial service often put in a substantial invisible

component of planning and supervisory effort, so that mere replication of their formal duties will not bear the same results, and, in the larger bureaucracies found today, the formal aspects of one-man management prevent a large organization from making full use of its internal resources. Thus a main problem facing ex-colonial agencies is their need to break free from an over-dependence on any one top official: to encourage the widespread exercise of professional skills by a larger nucleus of key staff who jointly ensure that "engaged planning" takes place.

Over-centralization is especially hard to counteract in East Africa because it is strongly reinforced by an interaction between the environmental situation, managerial structures, and the predominant values towards administrative authority. As we have seen, the "hub-and-wheel" emerges naturally in situations where subordinates are mostly unskilled non-professionals. The manager comes to expect that subordinates should have very limited authority, and should simply "follow the rules" in their respective niches. This assumption neatly matches the attitudes towards authority shared by senior civil servants who have come up through the ranks. Similarly, the occupational structure of the typical field bureaucracy perpetuates the situation. When managers are provided with large cadres of poorly paid workers, whose work performance is both unreliable and not subject to realistic sanctions, it is only to be expected that they will continue to do the vital tasks themselves. Their reluctance to delegate such tasks is reinforced by the civil service rule that an official can be held accountable for all actions by his subordinates. The colonial experience has left senior officials fully aware of the need to husband the power which accompanies bureaucratic position. As a last resort, some of them even prefer to rely upon politically "neutral" expatriate advisers on short-contract rather than to risk giving subordinates the managerial experience that might enable them to constitute an effective challenge from beneath.

CONTEMPORARY SOLUTIONS TO THE NEED FOR "ENGAGED PLANNING"

If the one-man project structure is a potentially dangerous solution to the need for managerial independence in agricultural administration, what other possibilities might be considered? We can identify two, further structural innovations which have the same objective: (1) the "designed organization" whose structure and procedures have been preplanned to facilitate overall economic performance, and, (2) the "task group" of professionals working together as colleagues to achieve agreed targets. Alternatively, the central administration might resort to general solutions, either: (3) increasing the pressure on the field administration "from above", or, (4) decentralizing resources and decision-making to lower levels. Let us look at contemporary experience with each of these solutions.

The colonial regimes began moving towards the first structural reform listed above in their closing phase, after successful development projects had grown too large for individualized control and when Colonial Development Corpora-

tion funds were available to support the creation of new cash crop industries. By then, field administrators were well aware of the managerial deficiencies inherent in standard civil service practice. It was felt that the best solution would be to set up new, vertically integrated services designed from scratch to facilitate managerial control under typical East African field conditions. The largest and best known of such parastatal organizations were the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation (or TAC, now defunct), the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), and the British and American Tobacco Company (BAT) schemes. Since Independence additional agencies have been established on the same model (such as the Tanzania Tea Authority and the National Irrigation Board in Kenya), and today the parastatal form of agricultural services is spread across the whole of ex-British Africa.

The main departures from civil service routine were as follows. First, participants in the programme were usually registered so that known ratios could be maintained between farmers and service staff. Second, services were tied vertically to the predominant cash crop under an integrated overall management. The advantages which resulted from this important change were that co-ordination between separate functions became much easier; weaknesses in crop performance could be traced back to failures of specific services, and, there was a *de facto* ceiling on the total overhead costs that could be charged against the crop. Third, services were usually put on a self-accounting basis; economies made on one operation could be re-employed to maximum effect on another without being returned to the general revenue pool (as required in most civil service agencies). Fourth, close attention was paid to personnel management: jobs were analysed to determine realistic work loads, administrative resources were geared to actual need, incentives were tied to job performance rather than simply formal qualification, supervisory staff at the middle levels were strengthened, and individual managers were expected to take problem-solving action on their own initiative. Fifth, a built-in safety factor was added by having doublechecks on quality control and production performance at each level. Last but not least, the managerial staff were given slightly more attractive terms than those available in the public service, and were encouraged to remain in their posts for a number of years.

Thus the strengthening of planning and implementation capabilities in these large, parastatal organizations did not occur by accident. The men who planned them had long experience in agricultural administration. An excellent example is Kenya's smallholder tea industry, which the Government decided to centralize under common management in the late 1950's. Before finalizing its plans, the Ministry set up a pilot tea production plant for smallholders at Ragati, near Nyeri; it also sent a senior departmental official on tour of tea production areas in India and Ceylon. The working parties which set up the KTDA as an independent authority included representatives from the Treasury, the Administration, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation, and the Colonial Development Corporation. They relied heavily on the experience of commercial tea estates in drawing up a comprehensive programme for the expansion of smallholder tea in Kenya. Tea

is a technically demanding crop, which can only be grown in acidic soils, which must be carefully and regularly plucked, and which must be delivered to a processing factory within hours of plucking. The KTDA is a model case to illustrate how organization can be deliberately designed to achieve high levels of performance under adverse field conditions and using mostly low level staff.

The KTDA provides all essential crop services internally to its members. The crucial innovation was the KTDA's adoption of army-type four-wheel drive leaf delivery lorries. These allow the KTDA to collect picked tea from a network of buying posts dispersed in wet and mountainous areas without recourse to the construction of first class roads. Factories are jointly owned by commercial firms, the KTDA, and (eventually) the growers; factory plans are modified from already proven designs on commercial estates. Because of an overlap along the boundaries of collecting areas, it is usually possible to delay the construction of new factories until acreages have reached the minimum throughput required for economic operation. Growers are paid monthly (to facilitate the stabilization of the labour force used for tea picking), and they receive necessary inputs on credit through the KTDA. The leaf inspection officers at the factory provide a cross-check on the quality of extension staff (and vice-versa).

The field advisory staff are jointly appointed between the KTDA and the Ministry, and so cannot be transferred without KTDA approval. Each contact man receives a bicycle allowance and has about two hundred registered growers to visit at least quarterly. Farm visit books are kept in duplicate for each grower; the books are used to record advice given at each visit and to evaluate current standards of husbandry (under a complex system for awarding positive and negative points). Growers are categorized into three husbandry classes, so that those who persist in ignoring recommendations can lose their registration. They elect representatives to sit on Divisional and District Tea Committees, which control the allocation of new acreages and capital development loans. The local Committees elect representatives to the Provincial and National Boards. The field staff are supervised by Tea Assistants with motorcycles. In overall charge of each district is the Tea Officer, with a Land-Rover and membership in the usual co-ordinating institutions within the district. The KTDA organizes refresher courses for all its staff and for select tea growers at its own experimental estate; it also has direct links to the regionally-based Tea Research Institute at Kericho. By overlapping the memberships of its Committees and Boards, and by rotating the site of Board meetings to each of the field zones, the KTDA management has kept in close and continuing touch with production performance in the field. It is not surprising that it has consistently met or exceeded its national production targets, even though other attempts to sponsor smallholder tea in Asia have usually failed.⁴⁶

Perhaps the outstanding defect of this "solution" is the fact that those inside the organization are not aware of the functional linkages responsible for its success. The organization's carefully designed components are soon absorbed into its "routine procedures", and thereafter can be modified on an *ad hoc*

basis without regard for their role in the total system. For instance, the KTDA management takes considerable pride in its successful sponsorship of vegetative reproduction of tea by the growers (an "economy" measure to relieve the KTDA of the need to keep up its own nurseries). In actual fact, this innovation has destroyed the KTDA's long-standing monopoly over planting materials. The spread of illegal plantings is jeopardizing the KTDA's entire system for grower registration and control, since the illegal product has to be smuggled into the leaf being sold by legally registered growers.⁴⁷ At a stroke, all the carefully accumulated records of input use and yield become unreliable; and, once discovered, these irregularities become a potent source for duplicity and bribery among contact staff. The usual risk that an organization does not put in the effort needed to keep its activities under control is heightened in the "designed organization" once the designers have packed their bags and left.

Two further weaknesses of the "designed organization" might be mentioned in passing. First, because it offers such a comprehensive range of services, it necessarily operates with rather high overhead costs. A highly bureaucratized organization of this kind probably could not pay its own way under the tight cost margins which we find in low-value, annual crop economies. A second weakness is the organization's built-in technocratic bias: it pays scant attention to the growers' own welfare. Other balancing mechanisms are needed to ensure that parastatal crop services do not stimulate social and economic differentiation, and do not degenerate into a vast patronage system for privileged members.

A more radical solution is often recommended but has seldom been tried in Africa: the organization of quasi-professional service teams in the rural areas. The idea is appealing in its simplicity. Instead of the usual field bureaucracy, the Government could concentrate its resources at the contact level where its staff are in daily touch with production activities. Task-oriented, multi-functional teams should be set up, to be responsible for solving most local problems from internal resources. The composition of each cadre group would be prearranged to contain all essential professional skills needed to offer the vital agricultural services (e.g., specialists in the five main areas of crops, livestock, soils and chemistry, marketing, and mechanics). Intensive political education would substitute moral for financial incentives, making cadres conscious of their strategic role in national development. Cadre performance would be gauged in terms of the value of services rendered to the local community. The task-oriented focus of group action would make co-ordination almost automatic, and would encourage the maximum flexibility in the use of government resources to meet local needs.⁴⁸

However, if we look at the surrounding administrative context we can appreciate why such ideas have been extremely difficult to implement.

Few bureaucratic actions are at present left to the discretion of bottom level staff. If we distinguish between two fundamental types of administrative authority, that based on professional expertise vs. that based on the formal chain of command, it is clear that the administration recognizes the latter alone. Of course, it has long been observed that the two types do not mix easily, so that

a fundamental cleavage between "staff" and "line" appointments is found in most larger bureaucracies. The underlying antagonism has been clarified by D. Willar, who points out that command authority (i.e., where actions are determined according to rules) is associated with simple and routine tasks, with short training emphasizing procedures, and with close supervision; whereas professional authority (i.e., where actions are determined by decisions on-the-spot) goes along with complex and variable tasks, with long training, and with generalized supervision.⁴⁹ To expect local officials to act in a discretionary fashion and to be judged in relation to the completion of tasks is to ask them to work against the grain of the existing system. Unless the system as a whole is changed, the injection of professional staff at the bottom would only increase tensions within the field administration.

The appointment of new cadres implies that the existing contact staff would be gradually displaced. Senior officials are reluctant to endorse such a policy because new cadres would demand substantially higher salaries than the untrained staff receive, and the government would still be left with the question of what to do with those who are replaced. Given that recurrent costs have reached financial constraints nationally and that the administration is under pressure to supply as many jobs as possible, policy makers may prefer the situation as it is.

If we assume that the present field hierarchies would continue, the new cadres would be placed in positions comparable to those now held by the "trapped elite". The younger, better trained officers in lower level posts are already the most frustrated and probably least effective members of the bureaucracy. It appears rather optimistic to hope that the new cadres would be the most highly motivated segment of the bureaucracy when in actual fact the present incumbents of similar posts are among the least motivated.

Moreover most leaders do not realize how high a level of skills and resources is required to sustain effective rural development. It is quite unlikely that economy-minded planners would allow the lengthened periods of training and increased field resources which task-force cadres would actually require in order to solve rural development problems.

The basic point which economic advisers have not grasped is that despite higher salaries and longer training, a professionalized development team can raise overall productivity of resources to more than cover its increased costs. Unfortunately, professional staff do not achieve higher productivity unless the institutional environment is congenial to task-oriented activity. The adoption of a rural cadre system without changes in incentives and a modification of the bureaucratic hierarchy could leave the field administration with the worst aspects of either system—defects which no amount of political education could fully rectify.

Until now we have only considered structural solutions to increase the effectiveness of agricultural administration. All three of the managerial patterns we have reviewed—the "hub-and-wheel", the "designed organization", and the task group—are devices to improve the internal organization of bureaucratic work groups. But are these reform measures really necessary? Anyone familiar

with the relaxed pace of field administration at the bottom levels might be attracted to a simpler solution: could performance be raised by merely increasing the pressure from the centre?

Bureaucratic pressure can take various forms. The measures which are frequently discussed at the centre in East Africa include: (1) directives enforcing the adherence of the field administration to civil service rules; (2) new procedures intended to improve "efficiency" by reinforcing central control; (3) reduction of privileges and freezing of salaries; (4) substitution of less qualified for professional staff; (5) shortening of pre-service training; (6) restrictions on the provision of administrative capital in the field; and (7) imposition of production targets. Basically, these are all ways to squeeze higher performance from reduced administrative expenditure. Though most widely employed in Tanzania, similar measures are being tried in all the East African countries.

Our earlier description of the field bureaucracy gives some indication of the reasons why these well meant "efficiency" measures often produce bizarre and unintended effects. Because civil service rules bear little relation to work performance, the attempt to enforce neutral procedures may in fact increase the internal politicization of the staff. To improve "efficiency", the Treasury may require that funds are tied rigidly to their original vote headings, thereby further diminishing flexibility and the room for individual discretion. The vehicles which make informal liaison across departmental lines feasible may be categorized as "luxuries", while the mileage funds so crucial to field supervision of relatively untrained staff are usually one of the first items to be cut. Economists succeed in reducing the training and quality of professional staff on the grounds that "by appropriate systems of delegation, supervision, and referral, the skill limitations of auxiliaries can be largely overcome",⁵⁰ without realizing that such systems for personnel management do not exist in the field administration. Actions taken to improve administration at the headquarters soak up all the capital investment available for the administration as a whole, leaving the field staff without the resources required for implementation. And, lastly, the mere setting of production targets without regard to an organization's ability to influence the activities being counted has the well known effect of producing trivial and misleading statistics. In the longer run, therefore, such measures may have a very undesirable after effect: the scope for local action to solve problems is further reduced; the field administration becomes even more dependent on the centre, and the existing rigidities are reinforced.

My analysis suggests that East African field bureaucracies tend to be quite brittle when put under pressure from above. Increased pressure might generate improved performance if planning linkages between professional staff already exist in the field. Where, to the contrary, key staff and services are missing, and where the field organization has not yet begun to react to its surroundings in a rational fashion, too much pressure can be extremely dangerous. Pressure alone does nothing to change an organization's capability for "engaged planning"; to be beneficial, it must be accompanied by complementary measures (such as unofficial permission to break civil service rules) which facilitate direct action and which increase the resources that can be brought to bear at the local

level. Otherwise, local officials react to increased pressure in counterproductive ways. The overworked senior officials become swamped with key tasks which they dare not delegate; work performance becomes subject to random breakdowns because of overload at the top. Junior officials who are being squeezed in salaries and benefits withdraw into the safety of performance according to regulations and local officials become afraid to tell their superiors of the growing split between the official objectives and actual performance. Thus central pressure accentuates the worst aspects of performance in the field administration, while at the same time destroying effective contact with the people. For this reason, then, attempts at improving administrative performance should concentrate first on changing the administration's performance capabilities before resorting to direct pressure.

Our last "solution", administrative decentralization, is much too large a topic for full analysis here. It encompasses many specific innovations which fall under the two broad categories of decentralization, where power is delegated to an outside agency (usually having some representative component), and deconcentration, where power is devolved from the centre to the field within existing hierarchies. Both approaches have had a mixed performance record in East Africa, especially in respect to the technical aspects of agricultural administration.

All the East African governments have tried to decentralize development activities to Co-operative Unions and District Councils. During the two decades that these innovations have been under intensive trial, the centre has experienced such sharp difficulties that it has frequently taken over the direct management of such services.⁵¹ The East African experience with deconcentration has been shorter, but both Tanzania and Kenya have tried to strengthen regional planning while also giving newly created provincial Directors of Agriculture great formal power over most agricultural services in their areas.⁵² In neither instance have these promising innovations had much discernable impact on economic performance in the regions.

From the standpoint of creating a capacity for "engaged planning", perhaps the problem has been that the designers of these innovations acted as if decentralization was a structural panacea. Insufficient thought was given to finding organizational correlates which must accompany decentralization if the new structures are going to develop the capacity to manage their own technical programmes. The issues which have never been adequately resolved are as follows.

1. The arguments in favour of decentralization imply that field staff somehow have a better knowledge of local needs than do central officials. But two problems have to be faced at the outset. This assumption is not necessarily true in current East African practice, given the rapid rotation of senior staff between postings, and better knowledge may lead local officials to oppose ill-considered national decisions. To be effective, decentralization as a policy must be matched by a willingness to stabilize the key implementation staff in their areas of assignment.

2. Leaders have been reluctant to admit that development priorities change

as one moves down the hierarchy. Substantial decentralization inevitably generates conflict about how resources should be used. If a Government is serious about participation, it must face the bitter possibility that actions will be taken which conflict with central priorities. Worse yet, national leaders are particularly sensitive about the overt expression of opposing political priorities (which are bound to surface under genuine decentralization), while senior officials do not accept (as we have already seen) the legitimacy of decisions taken without their prior approval and full support.⁵³ By definition, real decentralization must allow regional actors to commit the central government's subsequent allocation of resources, if not entirely, then at least to a degree which appears significant to them. In the prevailing East African circumstances, therefore, the policy of decentralization is foredoomed unless leaders at the centre change their attitudes to their own authority, and some mechanism is found to facilitate the rational resolution of conflict at the point where these tensions arise in the field.

3. Full scale decentralization implies a corresponding upgrading in the quality and diversity of technical staff based in the field. Indeed, in order to achieve integrated decision-making, one must presume that the Government can find generalists able to take decisions impartially in respect to radically different technical fields. It is no help, for instance (as Tanzania found to its chagrin) if a trained veterinarian continues to favour only livestock interests after he has been put in charge of all agricultural services in his territory. A similar problem arises in "backward districts", which already have the weaker technical staff. Unless special measures are instituted to provide such areas with additional, high calibre staff, full-scale decentralization may in fact accelerate economic differentiation between areas and regions.

4. Another way to safeguard the centre's legitimate interests is to build up an inventory of field tested procedures to be used in regional decision-making (the Government's hope being that such procedures will ensure a minimum level of standardization and economic rationality).⁵⁴ Unfortunately, the usual experience has been that structural questions pre-empt the centre's attention, leaving the design of procedures to occur haphazardly as the field administration moves from one crisis to the next; alternatively, the earlier procedures evolved under central administration are continued in a half-hearted way under the new system.

5. In some technical fields, there is little doubt that certain kinds of decisions—such as the physical design specifications for water installations or road works—can be most cheaply provided in high quality by small, central units who provide standardized instructions for the whole country. The field administration is often not aware of the strategic nature of many highly specialized activities, and it is not uncommon to find that one of the first "economies" to be instituted under decentralization is the sacrifice of funds for various planning, survey, or maintenance units.

6. This possibility raises a more general point. Types of planning and participation differ for programmes of varying scope and purpose, just as the suitability of planning techniques changes as a programme matures. So far, plan-

ners at all levels in the administration have defined their sphere of activity in relation to the allocation of new physical resources, leaving the subsequent implementation and operation of programmes without any systematic assistance. Since well proven techniques such as PERT exist for implementation planning, and since the field administration is more heavily involved in managing existing programmes than in creating new ones, this is the point to which priority attention should be directed.

7. Very little work has been done to identify the distinct planning needs of different types of development measures. Until we have such information, it is extremely difficult to decide which planning functions should be retained at the centre, and which located in the field. At a minimum, I suggest we need to distinguish between advisory and operational services; it is the latter—programmes for forestry management, water supply construction, crop storage, and the like—which pose the knottiest difficulties under decentralization. A further distinction might be made within the advisory services, between those oriented towards low value, annual crop areas and those attached to vertically integrated cash crop industries.

8. But most of all, decentralization in an African context can easily run foul of existing ethnic tensions. Here is an added reason why procedures for allocative decisions are so vital to the success of decentralization. Even so, there is always the danger that regional decisions which do not cater to tribal interests (as the primary basis for decision) may appear to do so when viewed from the centre. Planning for decentralization must anticipate that ethnic clashes may grow in intensity once people realize that decisions are being made in the field.

These difficulties have been well documented in several East African studies of local government, co-operatives, and provincial administration. In particular, they are clearly identified in two recent Tanzanian studies: Paul Collins' analysis of the working of the Regional Development Fund, and the research by H. C. Kriesel and others on efficiency in Tanzanian marketing co-operatives.⁵⁹ On the government side, however, there has been little corresponding willingness to think about decentralization in analytic terms. Rather, one finds a tendency to sweep embarrassments under the rug by a blanket abrogation of the powers vested in regional and district bodies. One hopes that this will not be true of Tanzania's impending reorganization of the entire field administration, which President Nyerere announced in December of 1971.⁶⁰ Another national experiment in decentralization can only be justified if careful attention has been paid to the lessons of the past, so that changes have a good chance of realizing their objectives. The day for blind experimentation ought to be over. We need more sophisticated thinking about administrative systems in their totality to identify which organizational correlates are essential for success under each kind of development programme.

EMERGENT DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS IN EAST AFRICA

Looking backwards, we can discern several worrisome trends which seem to be symptomatic of ex-British administration the world over. Under neither

the colonial regime nor the new governments of East Africa has it been possible to co-ordinate development activities horizontally within given territorial units, or even to devise effective techniques for regional and district planning. While some authors have written euphemistically about the "district development front", to date this degree of coherence represents an ideal and not an achievement in most areas of East Africa. The very fact that so many institutional innovations—development committees, district teams, agricultural coordinators, and the like—have been tried without success would seem to indicate that some underlying structural feature within the administration makes such liaison difficult.

Administrators face a whole set of problems related to the takeover of local services by the central government in both Kenya and Tanzania. What mechanism will be used to give a local voice in the allocation of these politically-charged services, and how will the people's enthusiasm for self-help construction be maintained in the face of continuing constraints on recurrent spending?

Many localities appear to feel that they are cut adrift from influence within the central administration. Whatever the reasons for this state of affairs—which may reflect the downgrading of the role of representatives in the national government,⁵⁷ the marked differences in calibre of staff between district and lower level officials,⁵⁸ the failure to create viable sub-district administrative units with which people can identify,⁵⁹ the civil service policy of posting people outside their home districts as a check on "tribalism", or simply the dissipation of the solidarity generated by the independence struggle—it is not something which can be easily reversed.

A growing number of field surveys witness the failure of some local services to register any measurable impact after even several decades of activity.⁶⁰ Although this danger is most acute for certain types of ill-structured activity (notably literacy campaigns and community development work), the general quality of bottom level services is sufficiently uneven to be a cause for concern throughout East Africa.

The lower level cadres of officials who are expected to offer quasi-professional services in the countryside are themselves often intensely frustrated by their changing position relative to other cadres. As we have seen, the causes of frustration are manifold at all but the very top layers within the civil service hierarchy. The immediate consequence of this situation is that people are not being well matched to positions where their supposedly scarce skills would be fully utilized, nor are policies designed to stimulate development through increases in the numbers of trained manpower having their intended impact.

At least half of these "problem areas" fall in the sphere of personnel management for the public sector, and so are subject in theory to planned action from the centre. Given the tremendous motivational leverage which is intrinsic to decisions about postings, salaries, and promotions, one would have thought this would be closely watched by central planners. Unfortunately, however, personnel management in East Africa suffers from three crippling disabilities: (1) administrators have inherited a colonial pattern which splits personnel functions almost irrevocably between the President's Office, central establish-

ments, regional or provincial administration, the salaries sections of different ministries, and the manpower section of the planning ministry; (2) the spectre of tribalism and the accompanying accusations of favouritism make the Government very reluctant to have personnel matters aired in public; and, (3) the continuing debate about personnel policy has been distorted by the self-interests of those involved, so that despite the large volume of commentary by senior officials, disgruntled job holders, and utopian socialists, many aspects of the relationship between rewards and performance are still unexplored. As a result, individual civil service bureaucracies have made but minimal use of their potentially great powers for the sophisticated management of personnel. If and when central planners do begin to focus on personnel matters (beyond simplistic manpower budgeting), they will find that a chief advantage to be gained from a carefully constructed "penetration analysis" is its ability to identify the points where planned intervention might have the maximum marginal impact upon performance within an administrative system.

The strategic importance of such analysis becomes even clearer if we look ahead towards the policy issues which are likely to preoccupy the attention of national leaders in the coming decade. The unsolved problems which are directly linked to decisions about administrative structures include: the emergence of the bureaucratic *salariat* as the dominant class, the growth of regional differentiation which has accompanied existing development efforts, the inability of the subsistence economy to support bureaucratic jobs required in order to meet the demand for mass welfare services, and the explosive demand for wage employment which has followed the spread of universal education.

In the first respect, a "penetration analysis" gives the descriptive data to chart the allocation of resources between salary levels and between the nation's urban centre and its rural periphery. Forward projections can indicate the future composition and privileges of the salaried elite, making it easier for present day leaders to make astute use of training, recruitment, and postings to counteract the many built-in tendencies towards class differentiation in public service employment. Although macroscopic projections of this nature can be arrived at without constructing a formal model of the administrative system, the existence of the model helps to pinpoint exactly which internal decisions contribute most strongly to emergent class differentiation.

The growth of regional inequalities can be documented in a similar fashion. Information on past and present allocations of administrative resources within the field administration to various districts can show at a glance whether this allocation is relatively fair (when controlled in relation to other considerations such as population, magnitude of existing production, and development potential), while highlighting the areas which diverge most sharply from the general trend. Central planners must be kept aware of these trends when allocating new resources, since the Government has only small latitude to change its overall commitments in any one plan period. Once the data have been laid out to facilitate such comparisons, one customarily finds at least three kinds of special situation where further information on the inner workings of the administration is needed. There are Districts which are too heavily endowed with

administrative resources to permit additional expansion but ones where performance is weak; there are sparsely populated, peripheral districts where existing staff will have to perform "beyond the call of duty" if the people are to be adequately served; and, there are a few moderate to high potential areas where development must be started from scratch but where, for the same reason, the Government has the most room for administrative experimentation. It is not likely that the standard patterns of administration now in force will suffice for the future development of any of the three types.

An even sharper dilemma arises in respect to how rural services can be provided and wage employment expanded within areas still engaged in "subsistence" production. Typically, the larger share of the subsistence farmer's real income consists of home-grown produce, leaving only a small and highly variable surplus to enter the national economy. Yet, because the majority of East African men have at some time in the past worked outside their home communities, they expect the Government to supply a level of welfare services which cannot be supported from the restricted tax base in the rural areas themselves. Given that the educational and medical services in question are almost entirely bureaucratic in nature, how should a government either: get the maximum impact from its welfare services while paying the lowest possible salaries, or, supplement low salaries by non-monetary systems of exchange? We are dealing here with reductions that cut very near to the bone indeed. For example (and this is an actual instance from Tanzania) the economists may urge the Government to revert to the cheapest form of communal water supplies, only to learn subsequently that they have in the process sacrificed the potential health benefits which are so important for raising agricultural productivity.⁶¹ Again, a country whose educational system fosters the identification of its youth with common reference groups may find it politically impossible to hold educated youths at the bottom of an artificially rigid job structure. What is the minimax strategy to indicate which trade-offs are desirable between types of training, salary levels, ideological motivation, non-monetary work incentives, high cost work supervision, and on-the-job performance? No easy answers to such questions exist. However, this paper has tried to show that a systematic description of administrative penetration would avoid the glaring dangers of partial analysis, while making policy makers more self-aware about the administrative systems which they control but do not yet understand.

The last of our policy problems will be the hardest of all to solve. The tensions which result from the "labour force explosion" in the face of slowly expanding employment opportunities are by now well publicized in Africa.⁶² Universal primary schooling and widespread secondary education proceed apace throughout East Africa, but most rapidly in Kenya.⁶³ Government services are the largest wage employers in all three East African countries, just as the Government remains the prime advocate for the extension of mass education. It is not surprising that youths and their parents look to the Government to solve the problem of rural unemployment. In the short run, an analysis of administrative penetration can be the basis for estimates of employ-

ment benefits attached to alternative organizational policies in public services. In the longer run, the desire to increase employment opportunities while achieving high levels of productivity from salaried staff is self-contradictory. Administrative organization is only one component among a larger set of policy issues encompassing the entire organization of the rural economy. Even in socialist countries like Tanzania, willing to indulge in massive deficit financing, rural employment problems cannot be solved unless co-ordinated action is taken on many fronts.⁶⁴

CONCLUSIONS

We might note in conclusion Nyerere's recent admonition that the easy battles in rural development have been won. Now the hard work begins.⁶⁵ The problems reviewed above are not going to dissolve by the mere articulation of laudable development goals; nor is it likely that the international environment will become appreciably more hospitable towards the efforts of the developing countries. The attainment of development objectives will require sustained administrative performance at a level of managerial sophistication which has only rarely been achieved within East Africa to date.

For this reason, the derivation of a more accurate image of existing administrative structures is an urgent necessity. I have argued that while the field administration can perform certain tasks well, it has not shown the kinds of flexible and rational capability required for centrally planned development. The system's built-in limitations cannot be overridden simply by administrative fiat, through the application of increased pressure from the centre. This expedient soon leads to administrative overload at the top, evidenced by an increased "lumpiness" in economic decision-making, coupled with the erosion of the Government's legitimacy among the people and officials at the bottom.

Unfortunately, each of the potential "solutions" which might be adopted to stimulate "engaged planning" has, under East African conditions at least, certain characteristic flaws. The main point of the paper is that such limitations can be known and compensated for in the design of administrative structures. Provided that he is fully aware of the unique features of the existing systems, the analyst can fashion design specifications which greatly reduce the risks of low administrative performance. Such analysis should also identify the crucial linkages and key constraints affecting success in different types of development measures. It is most unlikely that any single administrative module will suffice to meet all the needs of a rural economy which is as diverse as that found in East Africa, nor is one necessary.

East African governments are beginning to recognize some of the limitations of standard civil service practice when employed for the management of critical agricultural services. However, attempts at reform have somehow managed to combine the worst features of both worlds: in the economic sphere, expensive parastatal institutions have been set up which are privileged but inefficient; while in the general administration massive changes have been applied indis-

criminally to the whole country (without accompanying evaluation). A prime aim behind the analysis of administrative penetration should be to reduce the Government's need for blind and risky experimentation, substituting in its place a more flexible and realistic use of the very great administrative resources which are already deployed within the rural sector.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 See D. Brokensha, "Development Administration: an Appraisal", *Rural Africana* (Winter, 1968), No. 4, pp. 3-11.
- 2 B. Shaffer, "The Deadlock in Development Administration" in *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, edited by C. Leys (London, Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 172-211.
- 3 This paper is a revised and condensed version of "Administrative Penetration as a Tool for Development Analysis: a Structural Interpretation of Agricultural Administration in Kenya", Conference on Comparative Administration (Arusha: the Working Party on Comparative Administration, 1971), p. 93. The details on agricultural extension will appear in a forthcoming volume on rural administration in Kenya, being edited by D. Leonard.
- 4 T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Ed., 1964). For a useful application of Kuhn's ideas in political analysis, see R. T. Holt and J. E. Turner, "Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics", in *The Methodology of Comparative Research* (New York, The Free Press, 1970), pp. 21-71.
- 5 By reference to "ideologies" of authority, I am emphasizing their rhetorical aspect, rooted inside administration (which usually contains more than one type of authority), in contrast to macroscopic formulations like Apter's which try to characterize an entire policy under a single authority type.
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"Harambee" Self-Help: The Kenyan Approach

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INTRODUCTION

Recent research findings in Eastern and Central Kenya show that the traditional community development approach inherited from the colonial administration was and is fraught with difficulties and often sowed its own seeds of failure.

An analysis of the programme content and communication strategies used to convey development programmes to the rural communities shows a clear disharmony in the identification of local requirements and planning needs and in the identification, mobilization and allocation of local resources. The analysis shows that rural change programmes tended to be imposed upon rural communities irrespective of their expressed needs or abilities. The disharmony isolated Planning from Implementation so that planning was a centralized government activity and implementation was in the form of imposed programmes such as hillside terracing, livestock destocking and road making, on rural people. The disharmony between programme planning and implementation isolates the two participant categories in rural development: the government official and local progressive on the one hand and the rural household heads, clan leaders "The Ma Mbai", village notables and ritual experts on the other. The significance of these categories can be seen in Table 1 where they suggest a correlation between local initiative, and the success of the project. It shows the relationship between the nature of specific rural projects, the centre of decision-making and planning, the nature of participation and the success of the project.

Such findings appear to support the old community development truism, "Get the community and its leaders to think it is their idea." Yet anyone who is familiar with the informality of community action knows that what is portrayed above is not only a conflict of leadership but a conflict of definition of goals, strategies and degree of involvement between bureaucracies and local interest groups. Also the term "government official" gives a mistaken picture of inter-departmental co-ordination on any given programme. Hidden are the jealousies, the competitiveness, the conflicting expert prescriptions and the uncertainties arising from undefined strategies for achieving any one goal. For example, in one of the communities studied, agricultural experts recommended the use of fish in their irrigation channels. The following month the health officials sprayed DDT on the water to stop mosquitoes from breeding. All the fish died. Obviously, a local man witnessing this stupidity will be hard put to

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