our own resources. The danger of our isolation will then stimulate our imagi-
nation and release our latent energies for the desperate effort we must make.

FOOTNOTES

1 J. K. Nyerere, "Tanzania Ten Years After" (Dar es Salaam, 1971), p. 50.
2 "The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance"
   (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1967), p. 19.

The District Development Front in Tanzania

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In describing and evaluating the Tanzanian Government's attempts to reach
the rural populace and encourage it to participate in the development effort
attention must be drawn to several important characteristics of the *general
strategy* adopted by the leadership. Though subject to ambiguities in its detail-
ed interpretation and difficulties in its realization, it is, in many of its parti-
culars, a strategy distinctive in East Africa as brief comparisons with Kenya
and Uganda will subsequently make apparent. We have used the term "the
development front" to epitomize its most salient features for central to it is
the intention to co-ordinate as closely and as fruitfully as possible the activities
of *all* institutions with a presence in the Tanzanian countryside. Ideally this
is designed to achieve the construction of an integrated phalanx of "development
agencies" over a broad front (local councils, co-operatives, government mini-
stries) capable, in turn, of presenting a uniform set of stimuli to Tanzanian
peasants designed to encourage their adoption of novel patterns of behaviour
desired by the central government. Equally important, primary responsibility
for achieving such co-ordination and galvanizing the related agencies into
action rests, at least theoretically, with the ruling political party.

Though these various agencies interact at the national level in ways that are
relevant to policy-making for the rural sector we shall direct our attention
primarily to the local level, particularly to the districts. A sub-district, even
village, focus would also be an illuminating one for certain purposes, but the
district does have the advantage of being large enough to bring into full play
all the relevant agencies (indeed some districts in Tanzania are as large as
Sierra Leone!); and, generally, it is uniform enough geographically and socio-
logically to make coherent planning a valid and valuable aspiration. The
government's attempt to forge a front for effecting the realization of develop-
ment is thus of particular importance at that level.

Moreover the pattern of politics specific to the development front becomes
most graphically apparent at the district level. This point will become clearer

as we proceed (in Section II) with an analysis of the various agencies themselves and the character of their interaction, but it may be noted at the outset that these agencies often bring very different capabilities and financial resources (and even somewhat different aspirations) to any regional or district discussion of the breakdown and distribution of responsibilities for development efforts. Therefore, even where co-ordination is finally and effectively maximized, some debate will have preceded such a result, a debate relating primarily to questions of who will take the various initiatives required and who will pay for them. Under less favourable circumstances a fierce, partially unresolved, form of in-fighting may characterize local politics, in which the outcome determines the precise definition of priorities, the distribution of financing and the locus of initiative in the cause of development. It will therefore be necessary to sketch in the lineaments of such a novel pattern of "competition".

We feel it is also essential to relate, as we do in Section III, the discussion of interagency relationships and of "frontist" attempts to address the people coherently on development matters to the broader social context within which such efforts take place. Otherwise, a concentration exclusively upon institutions without reference to the social structure which gives them their meaning and significance runs the risk (which a related article noted[2]) of obscuring certain important dimensions of the actual relationship between the "government" on the one hand, ostensibly devoted to realising development goals, and the mass of the population on the other. Having looked at the agencies themselves and some of the forces which play upon them we will be better placed to strike a balance sheet regarding the Tanzanian strategy (Section IV). Inevitably, in offering this kind of analysis, we shall focus considerable attention upon certain weaknesses in the working of the system and several challenges which continue to confront the Tanzanian leadership. Nonetheless it should be clear that few if any of our observations challenge the essential wisdom of such an imaginative, frontist strategy. We shall return to the complexities of analysis and evaluation but before proceeding further, we will discuss the historical background which underlies Tanzanian efforts and compare the framework which has been adopted with some aspects of the alternative strategies articulated in Kenya and Uganda.

I AN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

A basic requisite for the creation of Tanzania's development front in its present form was the consolidation of the single-party system. At the level of ideas it is essentially a corollary of the President's argument in *Democracy and the Party System* that TANU is, in effect, "a national movement which is open to all" and therefore "has nothing to fear from the discontent of any excluded section of society, for there is then no such section".[3] A party so conceived on a national level has a right—even a duty—to play a co-ordinative role in the district development process. This may seem all the more self-evident when the development effort is conceptualized, as in many of the speeches of the Tanzan-

ian leaders, as a genuine struggle, paralleling and continuing the struggle which also dictated unity during the nationalist phase.

It is important to note that there is rather less reason to dismiss this rhetoric as being a mere rationalization for the vested interests of the leadership in Tanzania than is the case for many other African countries. The Tanzanian historical experience has enabled the present leadership to present itself and its party convincingly as the legitimate spokesman for the bulk of the population. The reasons for the degree of unity which has characterized Tanzania under TANU are diverse and have been much discussed among historians and political scientists. They include the absence of a single dominant tribe, a long tradition of centralized political activity (viz, the Tanganyikan African Association), the personality and skills of Nyerere, the importance of the common Swahili language and of an integrative "Swahili culture".[4] But whatever the cause it is quite evident that an effective national opposition has found little fertile soil in which to take root. Moreover, in contrast to Uganda for example, traditional authorities were deprived of their formal status with a striking absence of incident, thereby removing at an early stage another potential impediment to TANU's monopoly of political life.

The stage was therefore set in the immediate post-independence period for the institutionalization of the development front under party guidance, a process which crystallized most dramatically at the local level in the appointment in 1962 of a new cadre of Regional and Area Commissioners. These were political appointees who succeeded the former Provincial and District Commissioners as administrative heads of the regions and districts. In the early days they were drawn from the ranks of TANU regional and district officials and had their political standing further enhanced by the fact that in addition to being representatives of the new central authorities they automatically became the chief executives of the local party organization (Regional and District Secretaries of TANU).[5] Thus in this crucial early decision one sees the aspiration to fuse, where possible, the numerous agencies involved. The shifting terms of this attempted fusion will be our recurring theme. Moreover one already glimpses the premise that political structures and peculiarly political skills are essential to effective communication with the people and their "mobilization". The working out of this premise must also be assessed.

The terms of the local develoment equation are different in Kenya and Uganda, and a brief comparison may be instructive. In Kenya, Gertzel suggests[6] that a decision was made by the President and his advisers "at the end of 1964, to use the Provincial Administration rather than the party machine as his major link with the people". The strength of the Administration provided a dramatic contrast with the weak and divided nature of the nationalist political forces, and the lessons of this contrast were reinforced during the "short-lived episode of regionalism (May 1963-December 1964)" which saw the KANU Government fall back upon the inherited administrative network to counterbalance and master pulls towards undesired decentralization. Hence the decision "not to integrate party and state and to maintain the Provincial Administrations as the agency through which the executive would rule". This

remained the dominant motif even after the withering away, for a period, of formal opposition. During that period in particular, as Gertzel documents, questions as to the ways in which politicians might be integrated into the development process introduced certain severe strains, many politicians favouring "the politicization of the service, on the lines of the Tanzanian model, as more appropriate in the one-party state"; certainly the legitimacy of the Provincial Administration playing the role allotted to it had not been fully established in the eyes of all concerned. Co-ordination of certain of the most important agencies did take place under such administrative leadership, of course, as well as efforts to direct, move and engage the people. But when such strategy is juxtaposed with that of Tanzania, it renders more precise questions as to the benefits (and costs) of directly *politicizing* the process of co-ordination and mobilization as has been one of the chief aspirations behind the construction of the development front in the latter country.

Awareness of the Ugandan experience may also sharpen our approach to other dimensions of Tanzanian practice. For, as Leys has argued,[7] the fierce inter-party competition which has characterized the Ugandan local situation (at least as he observed its operation in Acholi between 1962-65) tended to inflect the development process in several striking ways. He notes, for example, that it may have reduced the government's ability to generate a substantial surplus from the rural areas and turn it to development purposes. The logic of competitive bidding for support meant that "what (Acholi politicians) worked for and got was a net improvement in the peasant's share of national income"; the possibility remained that this depressed the level of productive investment on infrastructure and capital formation at all levels except possibly that of the individual homestead. A second impact of such competition was that "in Acholi at any rate party considerations were allowed to permeate into the fabric of rural life at every point". This meant, among other things, that

> . . . the co-operatives were thoroughly permeated by party loyalties, their committees and boards of management being commonly split into opposing factions, leading to discrimination in employment at the ginneries, in the provision of transport for collecting the cotton from the primary societies' stores in the peak picking weeks, and so forth. DP supporters expected to be assessed more heavily for graduated tax, and did not expect to benefit from government loans for traders or farmers, or generally to get anything which was at the disposal of the government and which was in short supply.

The obstacles that such realities may place in the way of coherent local planning will be apparent. Here a comparative framework may encourage us to critically assess the degree to which the development front can, in contrast, underwrite a rationalization of the planning process and permit a more efficacious use of the surplus potentially available for development.

II THE AGENCIES

1. *Regional Administration.* At the core of Tanzania's development front is the Regional Administration, represented at the district level by the Area

Commissioner and his staff, and at the regional level by the Regional Commissioner. This pattern replaced the colonial system of "Provincial Administration", in which university-trained, European Provincial and District Commissioners were assisted by District Officers working within the districts, each of them combining administrative, judicial and political functions. With independence there was a division of labour with the separating out of magisterial functions for local magistrates and the undertaking of increasing responsibility for certain social and other services and certain administrative tasks by local authorities.[8] In addition to the fact that the new Regional and Area Commissioners link in their persons administrative and political hierarchies, it is relevant to note that in their role as *administrative* heads of their areas, they are also assisted in their duties by civil service officers, the Administrative Secretaries (in the regions) and the Area Secretaries (in the districts), who carry direct responsibility for such things as financial and budgetary control. We shall detail later the sorts of assistance the Commissioners also receive from the local party machine in their role as its chief executive.

The central role of these political commissioners was further underlined in 1964 when the Regional Administration was brought into the President's Office. More recently, their developmental role has been given further institutional recognition, for Regional Administration has been combined with the central departments responsible for Rural Development and Local Government to form a separate Ministry under a Minister of State in the President's Office. In addition, for some years the Regional Commissioners, who enjoy the same status as junior Ministers, have been responsible to the President himself and have had direct access to him. If we recall that the 1965 single-party constitution gives the R.C.s *ex-officio* seats in Parliament as well as on the National Executive Committee of TANU we can understand how closely the Commissioners are linked to the central decision-making power structures. Their all-powerful position is only limited in the developmental sphere by one structural factor: the Regional Administration is not a "spending ministry" and therefore has little say if the regular process of allocation of funds for various development projects or services. This factor is important; it affects the Commissioners' relationships with ministerial representatives; moreover it helps determine the nature of his dealings with such agencies as the co-operatives for it is the temptation, even the necessity, to enlist their support in financing various activities which has given rise to charges of undue "interference" in the affairs of these agencies.

Despite these financial limitations, within their own localities the Commissioners can wield great influence, combining as they do the roles of chief co-ordinator of central government departments, head of the administration and secretary of TANU. Their focal position in the development front is perhaps best illustrated by the fact of their being Chairmen of the Development Committees at the regional and district levels, because these committees, whose activities we shall discuss more fully below, are designed quite explicitly to draw together central government officers and local representative elements for the planning of local development. Furthermore, the Commissioners' hand in

development planning matters seems to have been strengthened with the appointment at the end of 1968 of Regional Economic Secretaries, qualified economists who advise the Commissioners on planning matters—at least to the extent that the Commissioners have taken advantage of the expertise available to them. The fact that these Secretaries are attached to the Regional Commissioner's office yet also linked with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning may be expected in the long run to give the administration more leverage over the allocation of development expenditures, while at the same time making its own priorities more rational.[9]

The power which accrues to the Commissioners in their strategic position at the centre of the local decision-making process appears somewhat less sweeping when we turn our attention to the machinery available for implementation. The full-time governmental personnel directly concerned with development have been either officers responsible to the various technical ministries, or the executive officers and other officials of the district council. Thus the Area Commissioner has had no line staff directly under his own office within the district. This is different from the situation in Kenya, for instance, where the Provincial Administration provides an unbroken chain of command from the President's office through the P.C.s, D.C.s and District Officers to the appointed chiefs and sub-chiefs.

The pattern had always been less straightforward in Tanzania due to the system of "indirect rule", and this tendency was further advanced when, with the abolition of chiefs in 1963, the Divisional and Village Executive Officers who replaced them were made responsible to the District Councils. Significantly one aspect of this pattern—the gap caused by the fact that the Regional Administration as a direct channel comes to an end at the district level—will be redressed with the planned appointment of "Divisional Secretaries".[10] These new officers will not only be responsible to the Area Commissioners, but will, like the latter, combine administrative and party secretary roles. It is also intended that their capabilities will be greater than the Divisional Executive Officers they will replace, insofar as this can be assured within a general context of severe manpower constraints by means of careful selection, by a minimum educational requirement and by special initial training. Similarly, better qualified Ward Executive Officers will operate in the same way, replacing the former, more numerous Village Executive Officers. Nonetheless, up to the present the Commissioners have had either to work directly through the party itself or to rely on the staff of the technical ministries and of the local authorities for continuing the development initiatives they (the Commissioners) have set in motion. This reliance can again place them in the position of apparently "interfering" in these other official agencies; where aims and priorities conflict, resentment may result.

Such conflicts are rendered the more likely because of the norms which have emerged to define the proper functions of the Commissioners. They are seen, and see themselves, as having a primarily developmental role. As suggested by our conception of the development front, the Commissioner's role is intended to be that of chief mobilizer, giving impetus to the network of party and gov-

ernment agencies for which he is the hub. The developmental criteria whereby his performance is to be judged naturally set up pressures. Thus the Commissioners may tend to act as "entrepreneurs", searching out and putting their weight behind some pet project—a settlement scheme, youth camp, a new crop or industry, a game park, or more often today, an ujamaa village. And while such responses to the pressures which exist can be beneficial in their results, there are possible costs which must be noted.

In the first place, some political heads look for specific, clearly visible, and preferably dramatic "projects" which will enhance their reputations. There has been a tendency for some to go in for the grandiose, often over-ambitious schemes to the detriment of a concern for the overall development picture in the district (although, to be sure, other Commissioners will be more preoccupied with things like the overall production figures for their areas). The pressures for achievement can generate a second set of problems. Because the Commissioners' skills have typically rested in the more conventionally political sphere, or, increasingly, in the regular administrative fields, they are sometimes insensitive to the need to make projects pay for themselves.

The pressures on them to initiate provide a temptation to lack caution and an eschewing of rigorous evaluation; their concern merely with the continued life of a project and the fact that they have no strong incentive to "cut their losses" can lead to a continued wastage of resources on unviable projects. While this tendency is somewhat restricted by the Commissioners' lack of immediate access to funds, even this limitation can be overcome. Thus the direct access to the centre which they enjoy helped one R.C. to acquire government finance for a press for a nascent wine industry despite fairly negative prognostications concerning the project by the Treasury.[11] Another Commissioner financed a youth service camp he "entrepreneured" by means of pressuring the local business community into making voluntary contributions.

More generally the pressures on the Commissioners make them impatient and eager to find shortcuts. They are sometimes inclined to dismiss as obstructionist any criticism of their plans, and to ride roughshod over the objections and hesitations of other officers and the people themselves. That their feelings on this score may be partly justified, as we shall see, by the tendency of the latter groups either to work unimaginatively to the rule book or to respond conservatively does not mean that this practice is without its dangers. For example, one specific tendency has been for them to seek short-cuts to economic growth through some kind of enforcement of things such as minimum crop acreage rules, movement to new settlements, cultural transformation like the changes in dress introduced among the Masai. More recently, such tendencies have been less obvious, although by no means completely displaced, as pronouncements from the centre have stressed that rural change should be effected principally by persuasion and by a style which is less "commandist".[12] It is clear that factors other than the Commissioners' desire for achievement make these practices difficult to dispense with altogether. For example, the agricultural ministry, which has been suffering a reaction from its reliance in the colonial period upon agricultural enforcement, finds it convenient to call in

the Commissioner when a "tough line" needs to be taken to introduce some new measure or enforce a particular crop regulation. In addition, the occasional reliance by Area and Regional Commissioners on such pressure may in part be necessitated under present conditions by the limitations imposed upon them owing both to lack of personnel under their direct command and the lack of an effective network of "persuasion". As one Area Commissioner put it, after outlining the inadequacy for his purpose of other agencies, "the only people I have to rely on are the Field Force".[13]

There is a final factor inhibiting a coherent drive for development which can derive from the central role and mobilizing initiative assigned to the Commissioners. It is easy for some of them to pass from the conception that their job is to initiate economic development to a belief that they should have a monopoly of such entrepreneurial functions. Thus the Ruvuma Development Association (R.D.A.), a dynamic organization which has been a vehicle for the spontaneous development of some fifteen socialist villages in the south-west, has fallen foul of various Regional and Area Commissioners there who have resented its "initiative", and its members have often entered into local TANU politics in order to counter such pressures. The RDA experience is not perhaps typical but is by no means an isolated example.[14] Such a problem of demarcating responsibilities could cause especial confusion with respect to the implementation of the new policy of "Socialism and Rural Development" for the relevant policy document merely says that responsibility for starting the proposed *ujamaa* villages can lie with "anyone who understands the principles behind them".

2. *Central Government Ministries.* Despite the central role of the Commissioners and, as we shall see, the weight of the party in defining Tanzania's ideological direction, most of the responsibility for formulating and implementing local activities, especially the routine ones, rests in practice with the technical departments of government. They have a virtual monopoly of the more technical skills relevant to development, and they are literally the "spending ministries", the channels through which almost all funds necessary to meet recurrent as well as capital costs are made available. As such they are well placed to determine what programmes are to receive priority. In addition, they represent hierarchies to which belong the largest single group of field personnel available for carrying out the various development tasks in a district. The biggest such task-force may often be the road-builders and repairers of the Ministry of Communications and Works, but other Ministries similarly endowed with personnel—Agriculture, Rural Development and Health—are more directly concerned with "penetration", dealing as they do with the people face to face. Thus each of these Ministries operates an extension service, a corps of field workers who are in various ways trying to teach, advise, persuade and encourage the peasants to adopt new methods of production, organization or sanitation. The thickest on the ground are the field-workers of the Agricultural Extension Division; in fact, the *Bwana Shamba* may be the only representative of the central authorities some peasants ever see (although even then there is only an average of one to more than a thousand farm families). Field staff of

the Veterinary Division within the same Ministry, Rural Development (formerly Community Development) Assistants, and rural (public) health workers are also represented at the local level, though with less than half the personnel of Agriculture; moreover, all will have a trained officer in charge of the field staff working from the district *Boma.*

Part of the problem of co-ordinating these ministries with each other and with other agencies is a problem of the "centre" itself, but to see how these district bureaucracies fit into the overall operation of the district front we have to understand something of their style of work. The norms which underpin much of the behaviour of civil servants in the various government departments found in the district are typically different from those which motivate the Commissioners as political appointees. Like all civil servants they have security of tenure and in normal circumstances can expect fairly rapid promotion if properly qualified. Far from being under pressure to initiate they will tend to be motivated primarily by a desire to avoid mistakes or risks; in comparison with the political commissioners they may therefore be less ready to embrace new projects. Their own promotion prospects—as well as their main source of directives—lie within their own Ministries. While they will try to avoid conflict with the Commissioner, they will be much more sensitive to pressures from their own superiors. Moreover the warrants which finance the bulk of their activities will also emanate from the ministerial centre. Conversely, if they have reservations about some locally-proposed schemes necessitating co-operation between different departments they can always appeal to Dar es Salaam, playing off their own Ministry against local pressures—indeed, if a project is put forward by the commissioner this will be the only device open to the technical officer to halt the project or avoid his own involvement.

The attitude and situation of the individual officer may thus inhibit co-ordinated action, but there is also the possibility that government officers corporately will view themselves as a group with a common interest which must be defended. Particularly in the years immediately after independence the bureaucracy as a whole tended to regard with some suspicion novel "political" directives and influences upon their activities, and some legacy of this has carried over to the present day working of the development front. This kind of stance partly stemmed from the inbred attitudes fostered by a colonial education and by the traditions of a British-type civil service. They have become less marked owing to a blurring of some of the distinctions between civil service and political hierarchies which has resulted from postings across the dividing-line and from TANU's success in attaching "many of its values to the structure (of the civil service)".[15] As we shall see later in this section a further process of socialization has become necessary with the recent adoption of a more explicit commitment to socialist programmes but the wrench of an adjustment to the new policies is not something which civil servants alone have had to face.

If this sort of tension is no longer quite so endemic, however, there are some other difficulties which are even more apt, upon occasion, to stand in the way of fully effective co-operation. Such a situation, evidencing a structural basis

for conflict, could be one in which particular technical ministries come to express an "interest", developing a stake in their own norms, priorities and methods. This has been particularly true of the Ministry of Agriculture which has tended to regard the multi-purpose Community Development division, or even the party, as infringing upon the Ministry's prerogatives when they concern themselves with agriculture. Similarly, relations between Agriculture and the ministry with responsibilities for settlement programmes have been marked by rivalry; the former, with its vast numbers of qualified staff, having felt its position to be encroached upon by the efforts of the latter agency.[16] Sometimes too, a department has resisted too great an involvement in some combined development programme out of concern for the supremacy of its own programme. Thus one reason for the Agriculture Ministry's growing luke-warm towards the cotton "block-farms" in the East Lake area from the mid-sixties was its realization that 60 per cent of its field staff was being drawn away from normal extension duties in the effort to get the project on its feet.[17] To cite another example, the Agricultural Division encouraged large pyrethrum farmers in one district to sell outside the local co-operative because of their feeling that this might contribute to the realization of their paramount goal—that of raising production—with rather less consideration being given to the viability of the institutions and the appropriateness of social structures which were being thrown up in the process. But as it was the policy of the Co-operative Division at work in the same district to foster co-operation this became the basis of a major clash.[18]

In the case of agriculture and some of the other technical agencies, such "separatist" tendencies are further encouraged by a "professional" tradition in the service which makes it prone to resent the intrusion of non-qualified personnel, whether from the political sphere or from parallel agencies. This seems to have been true for the archaic British-type of agricultural education which encourages the graduate to see himself as a "scientist", with attendant overtones of superiority. From this angle we again see that harnessing expertise to initiative and innovation is a major challenge for the development front. Moreover, the factors which may inhibit co-ordinated effort in agriculture are especially discouraging, not only because increases in agricultural production must be the central pivot for any rural development in Tanzania, but also because the field personnel of the Agriculture Division are by far the most numerous.[19] Some general assessment of the role, present and potential, of the agricultural extension service, is now available elsewhere;[20] here we are concerned only with those characteristics which facilitate or inhibit co-ordinated action for agricultural development. And it is therefore of interest to note that in the years immediately after *Uhuru*, the various divisions of the agricultural ministry did not readily co-operate either with other departments, against which it was defending its territory, or with the party, often its erstwhile opponent. A case like one we documented in Arusha in 1965,[21] where one Division instructed its local staff not to participate in a campaign initiated by the Regional Development Committee, was rather an extreme version of the problem but probably not atypical.

More recently, in 1968, a new Ministry policy statement[22] has tried to reverse these trends, and has required Agriculture staff to give top priority to locally-initiated, combined-agency projects. And in 1969, the now Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Co-operatives was dramatically reorganized and decentralized, with new Regional Directors appointed, whose duty was not only to co-ordinate more effectively the work of the various divisions of the Ministry itself (Agriculture, Co-operatives, Veterinary, Research, etc.) but also to take the lead in implementing the 1968 emphasis on locally planned programmes. It is too early to assess the full impact of such a change but it is perhaps significant that it coincides with a period in which the Ministry's key role is now more clearly recognized (with, among other things, the decline of the settlement emphasis); it may therefore be less defensive.

Perhaps the revival of some familiar problems may be anticipated insofar as the policy to encourage a socialist mode of agricultural production through the development of *ujamaa* villages gathers momentum. In this sphere the Rural Development Ministry has been assigned undefined but growing responsibilities, and more recently the party has been brought to the fore as the major agency responsible for such an emphasis; such trends may be viewed by some of the agriculturalists as yet another threat. This might be considered the more likely given the fact that the whole socialist emphasis is against the Agriculture Ministry's time-honoured emphasis upon focal-point farmers and rural individualism. However, it can be noted that some elements in the Ministry have recognized the necessity for a quite different approach on the part of the extension service. In the light of these new imperatives further restructuring has begun, training programmes are being adjusted, field staff are giving priority to existing *ujamaa* villages and a whole series of fairly thorough "refresher" courses have been arranged for administrative, training and field staff in which TANU political educators as well as technical officers present the basic ideological and practical aspects of *ujamaa*. Some of the Ministry's programmes—for instance, the spread of tea and dairy cattle—are being recast in an *ujamaa* mould, although there seems to be a general preference for the highly-mechanised state farm (or even a similarly run *ujamaa* village) which avoids the "complications" of peasant involvement. As for the Rural Development Ministry, the assignment of increased responsibility for the specific task of *ujamaa* development (compared with its hitherto very broad, general and hence vague mobilizational role in the sphere of community development) has probably given that service a new sense of direction—even though the absence of a precise division of labour in this sphere between the division, the Agricultural Ministry and the party may still have a somewhat inhibiting effect upon activities.

Such problems of co-ordinated implementation of the new policy are compounded by the persistence of a view that sees *ujamaa* as just an additional type of rural project which should thus be the prime responsibility of one agency, rather than as a principle which should underpin all rural programmes and inform the work of all government bodies.

3. *The Party.* The role of the Tanganyika African National Union

(TANU) cannot be separated completely from that of the Administration. The political commissioners who head the administration are, in effect, agents of the party, while at the same time the party machine is the one instrumentality directly available to the Commissioners. But there is a pre-supposition that the party has distinctive attributes and it is with reference to these that TANU's prescribed role in the development front can be defined. This role is, in theory, two-fold. Firstly, as the main source and custodian of policy it should permeate the other institutions and provide a coherent ideological under-pinning for the programmes of all agencies. Presumably the successful exercise of this role would also have the related effect of integrating the energies of these various agencies into a unified drive. Secondly, as a party which has its own officials and which seeks to "mobilize" the masses, it should provide a major instrumentality for the actual implementation of projects and programmes. In particular, it might be expected to provide a framework within which the persuasion referred to earlier as a valued technique of mobilization becomes a meaningful possibility. By providing new organizational involvements for the population and raising their level of consciousness through ideological work, it can foster the attitudes which could ensure voluntary, rather than enforced, compliance with government policy initiatives.

In looking at the nature of the party organs at the local level, therefore, we shall be interested in asssesing the exact purchase the party has upon local development policies and the extent to which it is an effective agency for carrying out co-ordinated development efforts. It must also be borne in mind that one of the most important facts about the party is that it is not merely or inevitably a "national" agency carrying out national policies, though the commissioners and some other functionaries of the local party are in fact national appointees. The local party has an essential representative dimension (from the elected Regional and District Chairman down), and therefore many of the most prominent party personnel will directly represent inside the party local pressures and even local interests which may or may not conflict with nationally-defined aspirations. As will be detailed later, a similar reflection of local interests is of course found within the co-operatives and district councils.

Even at the national level we may doubt whether TANU plays quite the decisive role in central government decision-making, especially with reference to the detailed drafting of plans for development, which is sometimes postulated for it.[23] It lacks the technical apparatus to be an effective prod upon the bureaucracy, and has not been granted the financial resources to fully develop such capabilities. Moreover, it would be hard to identify a TANU development policy *per se*, in the sense of a coherent set of action programmes and ideological directives. Where some fairly clear-cut general development programme does emerge—as has recently been the case with the statement of intent to start *ujamaa* villages—central ministries, administration and party may all tend to follow and reinforce the same initiatives; but even here there is as yet little clear definition by the party of the desired social and economic character of such villages, or of the preferred means to their realization. More recently, several new trends have emerged which begin to clarify the details of

this policy initiative in potentially important ways, as we will indicate in our conclusion. But in the recent past, apart from a few such policy areas, the only common denominator in TANU's strategy has tended to amount to a commitment to the general idea of "development". In a situation where all projects and improvements are therefore "good" and desirable, there are no easily applicable criteria for the ordering of priorities. Yet definition of the latter is the crucial development decision both at the centre and in the localities themselves.

In the absence of a clearly defined party line spelt out from the centre, what is the influence of local TANU organs on the direction of development likely to be? TANU representatives are involved in the development committees which exist at Regional, District and Village levels, and nowadays all elected members of the District Council are nominated through the party. Moreover, to a limited but increasing extent the district committees of the party itself are also discussing such items as crop priorities, transport and other development themes. Thus, through one or other of these channels—local authorities, development committees, and party organs—local TANU initiative may lead to campaigns for the introduction of a new crop, the starting of settlements or new villages, the passing of by-laws requiring the cultivation of minimum crop acreage or the drive to get all enrolled children to attend school. But local TANU bodies do tend to take something of a back seat in defining the direction of development; discussions in the district are often dominated by technical officers of government.

We have seen that this judgement on the "party" does not apply to the majority of Regional and Area Commissioners, but they have other channels beyond the party for pressing their initiatives. It should be noted that within the party they also have one direct and reasonably unequivocal channel which they can use to effect their plans—the network of appointed Branch Secretaries. These individuals, because they are often centrally paid and appointed, are potentially more responsive to the district headquarters than to their locally elected Branch Committees. In one or two districts, in fact, it has even been the case that the *Boma* (the Area Commissioner and the district headquarters officials of TANU, working through the Branch Secretaries) has been challenged by a representative element consisting of Branch Chairmen and Committeemen. But whatever the local situation, the ability of the Branch Secretaries—and thus, to some extent, the national party within the district—to act as an effective channel along which directives can pass is severely limited by the calibre of the personnel (usually young primary school leavers); moreover, it is not uncommon that full-time officials can only be financed in half the branches of a given district or less.[24]

It is therefore to the quality and motivations of the locally-elected personnel (including, among others, Regional and District Chairmen, District Committee men, Branch Chairmen, and the Tenhouse Cell leaders who have also formed the membership of the Village Development Committees) and to the kind of relationships which the Commissioners are able to establish with them that one must turn in order to discern the likely development role of TANU in a given district. These elected politicians may well be less qualified in terms of

modern organizational skills than the Branch Secretaries and less responsive to central direction, but they will tend to be endowed with more status and legitimacy in the eyes of the local people; they will in short be figures to be reckoned with in local terms. At the Regional level the Regional Chairman and the elected Regional representative on the National Executive (M.N.E.),[25] as well as other party Committee members, may have considerable standing. The District Chairman of TANU has also been, since 1966, the Chairman of the District Council and as such may command some status and thus wield significant influence. M.P.s, who are also TANU influentials and members of the Development Committees, are often in an even more independent position and can lay claim to representing the wishes of the electorate not only in the district but in Dar es Salaam. The identification of these and other notables within the local party is of importance for there are also a number of sets of circumstances under which local politicians may find themselves viewing things from a different perspective than that of the Commissioners, who are immediately and exclusively answerable to the centre. It is then that the difficulties inherent in the Commissioner's role, even within the one-party framework, of dealing with local political forces and rallying them to the support of his initiatives become most apparent; this can in fact be one of the most delicate areas of manoeuvre within the development front.[26]

Sometimes the potential for tensions may lie merely in the conflict of personalities, this being the more likely in that the different categories of officials will often have very different backgrounds. Sometimes it may be located more structurally in the juxtaposition of a concern on the part of central officials to increase productive investment with a concern on the part of local representatives to expand social services. We shall return to a discussion of these and other issues which may affect this relationship in section III. At this point, however, a brief description of one rather extreme situation of disparity of views between an Area Commissioner and TANU (and other local) leaders may help to suggest how far, upon occasion, the practice can fall short of the ideal, thereby clarifying the nature of the general challenge in other districts. The particular development problems in this district, a crowded highland area, have been seen to dictate a number of pressing development priorities to the administration—movement to surrounding plains, construction of terraces and other conservation measures. But these are far from being readily accepted by the people; moreover, the local TANU had used resentment of just such measures as a rallying-point for resistance during the colonial period. It became apparent, however, that the councillors, TANU chairmen and committee men and the cell leaders were the last to advocate such measures precisely because they were anxious to retain their elected positions. Such situations obviously affect TANU's efficacy as a tool for implementation; as the Area Commissioner quoted previously forcibly put it: "All the people I am supposed to rely on— TANU and VDC leaders—are even more conservative than the ordinary people because they are elected. As a result, the field force is all that I have left to work with."

Under these circumstances "party discipline" is replaced by "intra-party

diplomacy". It is significant, nonetheless, that a more general effort to increase the development consciousness and effectiveness of those occupying strategic local positions is to be seen in the recent emphasis upon programmes of political education.[27] Of course the success of these programmes will be of particularly crucial significance if the policy of implementing rural socialism takes on more rigorous definition and political urgency. There has been some greater tendency to replace particularly reprehensible local party notables by central party fiat when this was felt to be necessary.[28] It remains to be seen how rapidly such initiatives may begin to shape local parties into fully reliable partners in socialist development efforts, partners which broach progressive initiatives and prod the bureaucracy (in effect, "politicize" it) towards a more creative role. Moreover, such a goal cannot be realized simply by laying the heavy hand of central control athwart the representative functions of the local party. Much will depend upon the more general educative functions of the party *vis-a-vis* the mass of the population, and upon the "methods of work" which it now evolves at the grass-roots level. Only by moving forward on these fronts can it begin to create the pre-conditions for the kind of democratic participation (based on popular attitudes cognizant of and sympathetic towards national policies) which throws up progressive representatives and thus reinforces rather than hinders development.

To be sure, the potential for a more effective party role as implementor and educator is already there. Even now the network of party committees and representative bodies which reach right down to the cells (based on groups of ten houses) perform something of a developmental role. Various projects, especially new settlements and *ujamaa* villages, have been started by the party or TANU Youth League. The party has also had a very significant role in organizing turnouts for self-help schemes and regional and district TANU leaders will often be drawn in to propagate some new crop or measure, or to resolve some difficulty or misunderstanding which has arisen in the introduction of some new development. Similarly, meetings organized by the party can provide an important forum within which technical officers will spread advice and, in some districts, the agricultural extension service is even able to work through the cell leaders to communicate with the growers. It is probably true that, given its present organizational capabilities, the party is better suited to such tasks than to enforcement or the actual initiation of projects. In fact, its potential contribution to the ordinary extension tasks of getting over simple improvement messages has been, if anything, relatively neglected.

Nonetheless, just as the party's capacity to politicize planning at the local level (in a progressive direction) is important, so is its capability for "politicizing" the process of actual implementation. For in seeking to encourage development under difficult conditions—with declining prices in the international market-place and a necessity to remove by various means some surplus from the rural areas for use elsewhere in the economy—and at the same time to shift the agricultural economy to a more collective mode of production it becomes all the more imperative to *complement* "material" with "moral" incentives, to raise the peasant's level of consciousness so that he engages in deve-

lopment programmes as much from an identification with national goals and aspirations as from his own short-run self-interest. As noted at the outset, this is a role TANU must make its own if it is to be done at all; it is the agency which gives most promise of reaching down to the grass-roots level and effectively involving the rural masses in their own development. To date it has yet to evolve the organization and methods of work which can fully sustain such a role, and it is in any case working in an environment of severe man-power constraints. In sum, the potential contribution to be derived from the country's commitment to "politicizing" the development front has scarcely been appreciated and seldom achieved.

4. *The District Council.* The varied fortunes of the Tanzanian district councils in recent years illustrate some of the problems of reconciling local and national priorities within the development front at its present stage of evolution. One of the most significant post-independence developments was a marked devolution of local responsibilities to these representative bodies. Such responsibilities lay primarily in the sphere of the provision of social services, of which by far the most important was primary education; they also had responsibility for secondary roads within the district, for water supplies, health centres and dispensaries, and for providing a number of other facilities such as markets. The revenue for these activities was to come from a system of local taxation (which in the case of most District Councils was an only slightly graduated headtax) and, in many districts, from cesses imposed on various cash crops. These sources were supplemented by often substantial central government grants and by fees charged for schooling and medical treatment and for various kinds of trading licences.

In the past the kinds of services with which the councils were concerned and the methods for financing them have tended to reduce the local authorities' involvement in the development front. In particular the emphasis on education tended to a situation where the Council's development aims were at variance with those of other agencies and of the central authorities and where the council's contribution to other fields, especially of productive investment, were kept to a minimum. When one realizes that in colonial times the acquisition of education was seen to be the key to advancement and emancipation and that there had been in Tanzania a long history of self-help efforts by local communities to provide education, it is not surprising that as local authorities were given responsibility and provided with the means to raise funds they tended to concentrate on the provision of more educational opportunities. The pressure for more schools probably increased after 1966 when the competitive elections then introduced made councillors more responsive. In addition, since the politics of many District Councils often has as its major dimension the competition between different parts of the district for resources — and particularly for new services — this too served to bid up overall demand. The fact that new school buildings were often built by self-help, and that most of the extra revenue required would automatically come from fees and proportional grants, provided encouragement for this education boom. Most councils

spent a large—on average at least 50 per cent—and rapidly growing proportion of their total expenditures on primary schooling.[29]

This local government emphasis had, prior to 1969, to be set against a national policy, based on a consideration of manpower needs and other priorities, of limiting expansion of primary schooling so that the proportion of school age children attending school remained at about fifty per cent.[30] Thus to the extent that the decision to expand primary school facilities remained up to the Councils, it tied up their own resources but also called into play certain central government funds beyond the amount earmarked for such activities. Yet these were councils for whom the proper officer was the Regional Commissioner and which had been even more strongly integrated with national political institutions after 1966 when the District Chairman of TANU became, automatically, the Chairman of the Council and TANU was empowered to nominate all candidates for the competitive local government elections held within the framework of the democratic one-party system. Clearly politicization did not serve to stem inconsistencies in this sphere, and this was one of several reasons which gradually forced central government personnel to begin to rethink the role of these local representative bodies.

The fact that this pattern of expenditure was paralleled by a general inefficiency in assessing and collecting local rates (this task being, in the best of circumstances, difficult and costly in a poor, agriculturally dependent country) has meant a general lack or even a total absence of funds for capital expenditure and little to meet the recurrent costs of other development activities.[31] Though most councils have spent some money on employing community development staff who work in varying degrees of cooperation with central government rural development staff, fewer have employed any agricultural field staff or undertaken activities designed to improve crop or livestock husbandry. The neglect of developmental services had shown up particularly in transport, an area of traditional Council responsibility likely to have a powerful and direct impact on rural development. In a country like Tanzania the lack of adequate communications is a dramatic constraint upon economic growth; the absence of feeder roads in an area may make production for the market unprofitable or even impossible. Yet the evidence suggested that the critical financial situation of councils (and their variable efficiency in such matters) had led to too little attention being paid to road-building and road maintenance; many councils were allocating less than the recommended annual mileage vote to the upkeep of local roads with often disastrous results, especially during the rainy season. The recent experience of the Lake Victoria cotton-growing area, where the poor state of roads during the picking was having marked negative effect upon the quantity and quality of the cotton collected and sold, is a case in point; there, pressure from the Regional Administration led to the establishment of a Regional Roads Board, run chiefly by officials, which was responsible for the maintenance and improvement of the local transport network, merely billing the local authorities for what was spent.

But such local examples were merely straws in the wind of a **more** general

1967 of the "Regional Development Fund" designed to encourage more small scale development projects, these to be initiated on a decentralized basis by the local representative bodies themselves. One million shillings is to be allotted annually to each region for this exercise, and this has meant some pump-priming for Councils (as well as other local agencies) to undertake such tasks as the building of bridges, feeder-roads and new cattle-dips, crop storage facilities and water supplies. The Rural Development Ministry and the Regional Commissioners have retained certain supervisory functions in relation to the Fund and as a result some familiar features of the central-local dichotomy in defining acceptable development activities have asserted themselves.[34] But this experiment may eventually have more far-reaching effects.

The same may prove true of another decision, one taken at the end of 1968 permitting, even encouraging, local authorities to initiate profitable enterprises in industrial, commercial and other fields. So far, apart from a couple of examples of 'municipal' enterprise (the Dar es Salaam City Council's share in the local bus company and the Arusha Town Council's inheritance of a coffee and sisal estate), there has been scant local involvement in such productive business, a fact which compares unfavourably with the activities of many Kenya County Councils, for example. While some scepticism has been expressed as to whether the Councils have the capability to handle such enterprises, it is felt that these activities could nonetheless lead not only to the proliferation of sources of public enterprise but might also help to generate a surplus which could in part solve the financial crisis of the district councils. Whatever the case, the mere existence of this particular emphasis in central government plans for the future of district authorities is what is significant here. These examples, and others,[35] may suggest that in pulling back from a strong emphasis upon responsible local government, the national government has been guided in part by a desire to build a stronger base—politically, educationally, economically—upon which a sound system of local government will eventually develop further.[36] The terms of the involvement of local bodies in the development grant have been changing dramatically, and may well change again.

5. *The Cooperatives.* The marketing of all peasant-produced export crops and of an increasing proportion of internally-disposed food-crops in Tanzania is now handled by cooperatives, generally under compulsory marketing orders which rule out alternative channels for selling one's crop. Every region has at least one cooperative union and some of the better-off districts have had two or three, to which will be affiliated anything from a handful to some 30 or 40 primary societies. The cooperatives are thus key bodies in the development process, affecting the price and therefore the material incentives which are made available to the farmer. Indeed, the availability and quality of the marketing service which they provide can help either to stimulate or to forestall the realization of a particular area's full productive potential. In addition to their marketing functions *per se*, they have the potential to play a wider development role. Theoretically, they provide a network of grass-roots contacts, and a structure well-suited to the channelling of new forms of rural

credit, which can sustain programmes for providing agricultural advice and for making available fertilizers, insecticides and other inputs. Similarly, they can, and sometimes do, act in the spheres of research, transportation, processing and the like—all these being activities which can affect the pace of development. Already, in terms of the staff they deploy and the funds which pass through their hands, they may be the largest of the development agencies at work in some districts; in fact the largest cooperative, the Nyanza Co-operative Union, handles each year a volume of business which makes it perhaps the largest non-public enterprise in East Africa.

In brief, it is tempting to see the cooperative as a major agency for carrying out many initiatives relevant to the development effort, and it is equally tempting to see the surpluses which some of them have been able to generate through levies and the like as a source for the financing of programmes thrown up by various participants (especially the technical officers and Commissioners) in the development front. Indeed it is in considering the role of the cooperative that some of the most difficult dilemmas about the distribution of initiatives and, in particular, the use of surpluses are posed, for there may be a conflict between the basic development aims of the cooperatives and those of the central authorities. Cooperatives, at least in theory, represent peasant interests and as one goal may be expected to seek the maximization of the farmers' share of the income derived from marketed produce. Yet, as we have already suggested, in predominantly rural countries like Tanzania, agricultural produce must also be a major source of the limited amount of investible surplus which can be directed towards development; the government is inevitably drawn towards a consideration of what are the legitimate amounts and legitimate uses of the surpluses which are available to the co-operative. In addition, given the existence of an accumulated surplus, straightforward disagreements between government and co-operative on technical aspects of agricultural requirements and investment priorities may exist.

The situation is rendered all the more complicated when one recognizes the possibility that the co-operative might represent not merely the growers' interest in income maximization (which can sometimes be contrary to government priorities) nor be simply the source of an alternative development strategy. It may just as readily, under Tanzanian conditions, represent some narrower interest—an institutional interest in the aggrandizement of the organization itself or the interest of some powerful group or class that controls the cooperative and wants to turn the use of its surpluses to its own purposes. The need to "defend the growers" that these realities may promote can serve to further legitimate government control; the other alternative, to educate and encourage the mass of the growers to assert their own control within their cooperative organizations, is equally relevant to the solution of these latter problems, though it will not, in and of itself, remove the possible dichotomy we have been discussing between the cooperative's short-term interests and government priorities;[37] it may not always be obvious under such complex circumstances whose will can (or indeed should) prevail, but

it cannot be doubted that this is an important focus for observation in attempting to understand rural politics.

Despite their significance, however, the cooperatives are only partially integrated into the development front. There may be representatives of the cooperatives on the development committees in some of the regions, districts or villages, but there is nothing automatic about such membership. It may also happen in some areas that leading TANU or local government figures are important in the cooperatives; indeed, as suggested above and as we shall further note in Section III, it is not uncommon for a particular sector of local society to enhance its position in an area through exercise of TANU and/or cooperative leadership. Yet the connection between the party and the cooperative is not institutionalized. At the national level, to be sure, the Cooperative Union of Tanzania (C.U.T.—the cooperative pyramid organization) is affilliated to TANU, and the rejection, in 1968, of the C.U.T.'s annual report by the party's National Executive Committee suggests an effort to exert a degree of political control over the movement. At the local level, political commissioners and others may have sufficient influence to affect cooperative policies in more informal ways; cooperatives can thus be drawn (sometimes reluctantly) into combined development operations.

Indeed, to take one example, much of the drama of rural politics over the past few years in the East Lake cotton-growing area (home of the giant Nyanza Cooperative Union mentioned earlier) has revolved around just this latter process. There the cooperative (known until recently as the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions—VFCU) has accumulated large surpluses over a number of years. By the mid-sixties many of the central government personnel in the area felt that these surpluses were not being used with full effect for development purposes. Rather, it was argued, surpluses were being wasted on excessive salaries and perquisites for committee men and employees on the one hand or, when invested, directed too one-sidedly to undertakings in the processing field. Initiatives designed to transform the system of agriculture in ways that might more directly benefit the grower were being relatively neglected. Pressure was therefore brought to bear upon the cooperative to take a more active role in servicing the large block-farm experiment in the area (especially through their making Federation tractors available to these schemes) and in putting across a more active fertilizer and insecticide campaign linked to a national credit programme. For a variety of reasons such schemes lost considerable sums of money in the short run and this cut deeply into cooperative surpluses.[38] In so far as the failure was seen to be a result of cooperative inefficiency and malingering this increased the pressure which had been building up in government circles to reorganize the VFCU; such a step was taken in 1967-69 by means of sharp and direct government intervention, culminating in the creation of a transformed 'Nyanza Cooperative Union'. But the spokesmen for the cooperative during the period argued that the activities of government agencies operating at the local level in stimulating and implementing these very development program-

mes had sometimes been misguided—and indeed certain mistakes were made by the government.

How independent is the cooperative to be? Who is to make decisions as to its development role? Some such questions were in fact raised in Tanzania (albeit in general terms) in the important report of a special committee appointed by the President to investigate the cooperative movement in 1966. The report's criticisms of what was termed "political interference" were sharp; Regional and Area Commissioners were singled out for particular criticism in respect of their misuse of cooperative-owned tractors, and a number of other abuses of political authority in the cooperative sphere were cited. A subsequent Government Paper which addressed itself to the Report bridled at its generally negative views as regards the "outside" pressures which might be brought to bear upon the movement; a distinction was introduced between "political interference" and "political intervention", the latter being the legitimate prerogative of "the Minister, Regional and Area Commissioners whose duties might require their intervention". For, "cooperatives by their very nature and the role they play in the economic life of the nation cannot be isolated from political life". The argument of this second paper was that, within the framework of the kind of coordinated approach which we have been discussing, the cooperatives must play a vital role and cannot operate as independent institutions, even if this were to optimize their "efficiency" as judged by internal criteria. This exchange thus underscored the terms of the dilemma, but did not go far towards clarifying the criteria by which such interventions might be judged to have been justified or not, or help to guide various actors in their future dealings with the cooperatives.[39]

In part, therefore, decisions to intervene will continue to be made on a day-to-day basis through the political process which characterizes the functioning of the development front in various localities. The central government has also taken a more general interest in the quality of work of the cooperatives and has implemented policies designed to reinforce national criteria of acceptable cooperative performance. Following up the suggestion of the 1966 Report, a Unified Cooperative Service has been formed under a central agency which supervises the appointment of senior administrators within the various cooperative unions. This has been quite explicitly designed not only to introduce a spirit of "professionalism" and national accountability into the management cadres, but also to free them from the illegitimate pressures, as they were seen to be, of locally elected committee men. Government disillusionment with the character of local initiatives and performance, paralleling the mood we have observed to exist in regard to district councils, was revealed in 1967 when the Minister for Agriculture actually took over some 16 cooperative unions,[40] encompassing hundreds of cooperative societies; in a related vein we have also mentioned the dramatic steps taken to reorganize the VFCU in the East Lake Area.

Some cooperatives remain much more autonomous, of course, and it must be emphasized that one strand of government activity is to reinforce (in line with yet another recommendation of the 1966 Report) the educational pro-

gramme which might eventually make for more efficient cooperative performance and more effective grass roots control. A familiar dilemma appears here, one which again arises from the necessity of establishing sufficient control to realize government purposes without at the same time alienating that popular support for (and discouraging that popular involvement in) the cooperative which must be rallied in order to guarantee the movement's long-run viability.[41] The government's likely success in effectively resolving this dilemma remains an open question, but this course has at least guaranteed for it a say in the use of the cooperative surplus and the use of the cooperatives' resources and energies which can be advantageous to local development planning as this exercise is, in turn, made more coherent. Under the circumstances, therefore, the cooperative's place in the development front will also remain a matter of continuing redefinition.

III   THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

It will already be apparent that the interaction between the development agencies which, in the aggregate, we have termed the development front cannot be understood by looking exclusively at their various structural characteristics and formal roles. The character of the various agencies will be moulded in important ways by the broad sociological characteristics of Tanzanian society and by the particular social environments which define the various localities. Obviously this brief essay does not provide scope for discussing each of the various districts and all the possible local patterns which can mark the functioning of the development front; a brief attempt will be made, however, to modify some of the major dimensions of the socio-political situations which might be expected to affect its character and coherence.

First let us emphasize the diversity of situations which can mould the character of the "development front" in a country like Tanzania. Focusing again primarily on the district level, we meet a dramatic diversity of environment from district to district—from the dry, sparsely vegetated earth and the pastoral life of Masailand to some of the most fertile and intensively cultivated farming areas on the nearby volcanic slopes of Kilimanjaro and Meru. The social and political settings, not surprisingly, are also varied. Although district boundaries are drawn in an effort to define culturally homogeneous areas, only two pairs of districts (in addition to the five Sukuma districts) are occupied by the same cultural group. Within the 61 districts themselves about half do not have a single majority ethnic group, and only one or two of these in which a single people predominate have any history as a single political unit. The diverse legacies from traditional patterns are further differentiated by the wide range of levels of development of the districts—thus marketed agricultural production is about two hundred times greater in the richest district than in the poorest—and by the variable rates of attendant social change stimulated by the exposure to the international market economy. Finally, the local situations become even more distinctive because of the specific ways in which the agencies which make up the development front have emerged historically from district

to district and related themselves to the social forces thrown up by a particular pattern of ecology, indigenous social system and trend of economic and educational development. Clearly there is a pressing need for detailed studies of the operation of the development front in a variety of Tanzanian settings.

Yet even as a first and more general approximation we can suggest that the attempt to see its operation against the background of social forces at work in the district focuses attention on three types of potential cleavages which may disturb the theoretical harmony of the front. Analytically these are important, therefore, to the academic observer, but they are of equal relevance politically, for they serve to define the major dimensions of the task of realizing a development drive at once effectively co-ordinated and capable of enlisting popular energies. To summarize, these cleavages can be seen to arise from:

(a) certain features of the relationship between the centre and the locality;
(b) the character of the interaction between groups and interests within the districts; and
(c) the character of the district's pattern of stratification.

To a brief exploration of each of these dimensions we shall now turn.

1. *Central-local Relationships.* Inevitably certain crucial aspects of central-local relationships have been brought out in the discussion of the work of the various development agencies. As we have noted, in so far as party, local government, co-operative and even the development committees are "representative" another principle of organization is operative which in some ways runs counter to the aim of carrying out directives emanating from a single undifferentiated centre. Some of the possible reasons for the tensions which may emerge in such a context have been touched upon in Section II. Sometimes calculations concerning development priorities which differ on technical or prudential grounds will be involved; at other times differences will be a by-product of central attempts to allocate resources more rationally—for example, away from schools and other social services to more directly productive projects. Effective participation may lead to other, though related, kinds of conflicts. Thus the opportunity for more genuine competition granted by the new Parliamentary electoral system, put into practice in 1965, often precipitated a voicing of demands and complaints which ran counter to central aims. In one instance, on the cotton-growing island of Ukerewe in Lake Victoria, the election served to focus and encourage a peasant belief that the recently introduced fertilizer programme should be a free service; when the programme, of necessity, continued on the old terms peasant frustration laid the ground-work for its disruption.[42]

More recently, there have been additional dramatic examples of MPs and local committees coming into conflict with central representatives (like the Regional and Area Commissioners) as they sought to give expression to local grievances and alternative development priorities. Thus criticisms of the methods of Commissioners have sometimes boiled up to be voiced locally and in Parliament; yet from a central point of view these can come, in turn, to be seen as merely obstructionist or even, in the extreme case, as anti-party manifestations. Such controversy surfaced most clearly, perhaps, in West Lake

Region where two MPs from there criticized the Regional Commissioner, ostensibly for using undue pressure to move people into *ujamaa* villages. Though the setting up of such villages was TANU policy, they argued from the standpoint that the policy also emphasized the voluntary nature of their formation and the importance of persuasion in the recommended strategy. A TANU team sent to investigate the incident concluded that it was in fact the MPs who had undermined a legitimate party initiative, and they were subsequently expelled from the party and from Parliament.[43] But the story did not end there; soon afterwards the Regional Commissioner was himself transferred by the President and subsequently relieved of his duties altogether. In this instance responsibility for the failure of co-ordination was felt to fall on both sides of the central-local equation, providing a particularly graphic demonstration of the dilemmas inherent in striking an effective balance between the two terms of that equation.

Viewed in historical perspective it can be noted that some of these conflicts may result from inherited identification of government agencies on the one hand and local institutions on the other with particular positions on key development issues. This is especially true in some areas with respect to certain unpopular agricultural policies. Cattle de-stocking (Kondoa, Sukumaland), or the construction of terraces in eroded, hilly areas (Lushoto, Morogoro) met with substantial opposition during the colonial period, due in part to distrust and lack of understanding of colonial intentions, in part to (no doubt legitimate) political opportunism. This opposition was often directly associated with the efforts of TANU or the co-operatives.[44] In more than one area there remains some legacy of suspicion of either the programme, or, more generally, of the agricultural or other agency associated with it, and at the same time a reluctance on the part of the local institutions formerly in opposition to it to adopt such a programme as their own and work for its realization.

More generally, certain important socio-political dimensions of the bureaucracy and party themselves, touched on peripherally in Section II, are relevant to this issue, and may define the problems of their practice in any or all of the districts. Thus technical officers will have legitimate professional pride in their proposals concerning development matters both centrally and locally; therefore, they may develop a suspicion and distaste for the "irrationalities" of local initiative and delegated responsibility, this suspicion being apparently justified by their experience. But by the same token this mood can all too easily pass over into a certain "technocratic arrogance" which may serve to blind governmental practitioners to many nuances of the local situation (which might be revealed through the contributions of local representatives), to encourage them to oversimplify or ignore the task of engaging popular energies and to overlook the possibility that even on technical questions the peasants may know best. Within such an administrative ethos spontaneity can become suspect under almost any conditions. Concomitantly, a tendency to reach for "administrative solutions" to local development issues becomes all too prevalent and this is a drift from which the Tanzanian bureaucracy has not been completely free in recent years.

A complementary ambiguity of purpose, equally difficult to evaluate, may be observed in political circles. Thus the party's interest will lie in having the various districts stick to such political and/or ideological priorities as have been established at the centre. Certain of the party's interventions may evidence this spirit, and document the necessity of such a concern. But there are dangers of possible abuses in such an assertion of predominance. Unless rooted out with vigour a hectoring style may come to serve as the equivalent in the political realm of the bureaucracy's "administrative solution", with results that in the long-run can prove self-defeating. Moreover, under certain circumstances, this style may itself come to be more the defensive expression of the party's narrow institutional interest in control for its own sake and for the perpetuation of its unchallenged predominance than something growing out of the presumed imperatives of the development effort.[45] And TANU has not been immune from each of these possible variations on the theme of "political leadership". Of course, the kind of ethos and style which will characterize bureaucracy and party are not given once and for all, but will change in relationship to national developments and decisions.[46] For our purposes it is important to note that these broad characteristics will vitally affect the functioning of the district development fronts, though their precise impact will be shaped by the varying local context within which they operate.

These observations must be supplemented by awareness of another potentially important sociological factor: the extent to which representatives of both central bureaucracy and political party may come to represent a *class apart* within the local situation. A perception that civil servants and other members of the educated elite in post-colonial Africa can become, in effect, a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" is now less likely to be debated than it was when Fanon first emphasized the point some years ago, but it is important to see that in Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, it represents a fact which has had important implications for the development effort.[47] Thus assessment of the government Village Settlement schemes, which were a paramount feature of the first Five-Year Plan period, indicate that one reason for the poor morale, and the consequent lack of success, of several of these schemes was the large socio-economic gap between the staff of these schemes and the members and the aloof, somewhat authoritarian, attitude of the former.[48] Other grass-roots observations have indicated that administrative personnel, field-workers, teachers and others in paid employment in the rural areas can come to live a separate existence sealed off from the peasant population (and even, on occasion, use their greater expertise and prominent positions to deflect the development front in their own interests).[49] In so far as this is the case it will make it more difficult for central representatives to develop the habits of thought which permit the genesis of creative solutions for development problems or the essential contacts which facilitate popular mobilization and effective communication of government purposes at the local level.

That there are valid reasons arising from the imperatives of planning for central suspicion of local representation is apparent; this point will be all the more clear after we examine, in the next two sub-sections, the potential impact

of intra-district rivalries and of rural classes upon the planning process. But this does not remove the possibility that any such discounting of participation may spring from less pure motives and carry more intangible costs. In fact the President's regular reiteration of the argument that the Tanzanian peasantry should not automatically trust its leaders presumably springs from his awareness that a check from below is necessary to keep central, as well as local, actors in party and bureaucracy responsible and responsive.[50] Similarly, as argued above, the popular enthusiasm necessary to a sustained development effort is more easily achieved when participation is unequivocally voluntary, a fact which several of the President's speeches and pamphlets have also emphasized. This is presumably one of the premises underlying the theme of increased decentralization which, paradoxically, has coexisted in government thinking with various centralizing trends over the past few years. To this paradox in policy we shall return in our concluding section; suffice to note that the realization of that pattern of institutionalization which will serve to mesh effective direction and responsible participation is certain to remain a continuing and important challenge to the Tanzanian leadership in the immediate future.

2. *Diversity of Local Interests.* A second type of political cleavage affecting the coherence of the front is that between diverse local interests; these interests may find expression through their control of specific local bodies or as factions within such bodies. Needless to say, the range of possible permutations and combinations over the 61 districts is vast. At one extreme, for example, there are circumstances under which aspects of the traditional social structure (as modified by colonial administrative practice) may retain an important vitality, though Tanzania has, of course, destroyed the formal structure of "native authorities". In some cases a former ruling class, family or caste may be intimately associated with some particular institution—in Ufipa with the TANU leadership, in Usambara with the important Lutheran church and, to a degree, with the co-operative—and such realities will have an unavoidable though variable impact upon the performance of such an institution. More generally, sometimes the legacy of an indigenous political hierarchy may make it difficult for other leadership groups to establish their legitimacy; in other areas with a tradition of egalitarianism and absence of formal authority any authority structure may give rise to local suspicion.[51] Often the importance of such residues will be difficult to measure but will be important nonetheless. But in districts with marked "parochial" identifications conflicts within, say, the district council over the siting of such benefits or resources as classrooms or schools, clinics, water supplies, roads have sometimes occurred between representatives of a wide range of different "interests"—clans, tribes, geographical areas, religious groups and the like.

The fact that, upon occasion, particular agencies may become subservient to, or at least identified in people's minds with one of these latter groups can also have a significant impact upon the activities and overall contribution to development of such agencies. Thus in Bukoba, and elsewhere, the patterns of local political history had the result that TANU became somewhat identified, at an early stage, with the educationally underprivileged, town-based Moslem minor-

ity;[52] in such cases the party may be rendered a rather ambiguous instrument for mobilizing and politicizing the district's rural, mainly Christian population still retaining some separate ethnic identity. Examples could be multiplied: it has been argued that in Kilwa district the stranglehold of the coastal Swahili leadership upon district institutions, including TANU and the district council, has served to alienate the "highlanders" from the development effort,[53] and in Kigoma region the strategic position of the "Wajiji", residents in the two main towns of the region, has structured a similar tension between themselves and the Baha of the hinterland. Similarly, co-operatives can become identified with the first farmers to grow a new crop; at times in Kilimanjaro, the large and established co-operative has been seen by some, however accurately, to represent primarily a Catholic group and to express the interests of some localities on the mountain more articulately than others, and so on. The existence of many such "irrationalities" obviously could impede allocations of resources and development efforts in line with effective planning criteria and an awareness of some of these problems may in part underlie the government's temptation to fall back upon administrative solutions. Even reinvigorated efforts at effective politicization would have to confront such factors, for they are important in defining the political problem of planning within the development front.

3. *Local Institutions and Class Formation.* When we look at a third locally-based cleavage which may affect the working of the development front, however, we see that a mere absence of local conflict is not necessarily the major goal to be sought in establishing machinery effective for carrying out Tanzania's chosen development strategy. For a situation does arise in many localities where earlier processes of development have thrown up a group of better-off farmers who will often have important links with the indigenous trading sector as well and whose families will generally have had privileged access to education and paid employment. In other words, the process of local class formation may have created a strata of "kulaks"; equally significant, parallel historical processes—the commitment of progressive farmers to the co-operatives, TANU's need in the early days for capable local leaders economically independent of the colonial government—will many times have left these elements in control of the various bodies making up the development front. An impressive body of evidence[54] is accumulating to illustrate the way in which local "economic activists" manipulate jobs, contracts, agricultural inputs, loans and other resources for the benefit of themselves and their families; furthermore, such resources as they have at their disposal can be used to build up a network of patronage to consolidate their leadership positions. Even those agencies which are most directly responsive to the centre can be influenced by such a class structure: thus agricultural extension workers and others may find themselves under considerable pressure to pay privileged attention to local notables.

This "upward penetration" of local agencies will be particularly evident in the case of those which are designed to be the most representative, of course. There the self-assertion of these "activists" may come to smother awareness

of potential differences of interest between social strata if there is no immediate challenge from their poorer, more "parochial" neighbours; yet this majority of the rural population is in any case often uninformed and only marginally participant within the modern institution in the locality. Moreover, when competition does emerge it may merely reflect factional strife aimed at the replacement of one self-interested segment of the locally privileged by a similar group. In neither of these cases is the focus of politics likely to be upon questions of overall development or popular mobilization, nor are the interests of the poorer elements of the rural population likely to be well-served.

Such patterns of rural class formation are increasingly perceived by the leadership and, particularly since the articulation of the *Arusha Declaration,* are felt to run counter to central objectives. Yet under the set of social circumstances alluded to, the local development front may be likely to promote goals other than those set by the present regime; it may even prove capable of distorting the new slogans of *Ujamaa* by translating them into local programmes which benefit the better-off elements rather than the broad mass of the peasants. One district council, for example, sought to be more self-reliant by cutting down the refunds of school fees to poor families;[55] a system of *ujamaa* farming was introduced in one area which under the guise of labour exchange gave the larger land owners the benefit of free labour.[56] We thus return to the problem of establishing a "check from below" hinted at earlier in this section, only this time the reference is to a local rather than a national privileged stratum which must be checked—within the party, within the councils, within the co-operative. Clearly, a further vital challenge in Tanzania is to find the political key—the correct mix of education, organization and ideology—which guarantees effective representation of the interests of the poorer, more parochial peasants within the development front, for only then will Tanzania's policies of Socialism and Self-Reliance have any chance of being implemented.

IV PLANNING AND POLITICIZATION

In the preceding two sections we have specified something of the disparate nature of the agencies which may be expected to assume development responsibilities, while also highlighting the diversity of social forces which find expression through these agencies. In the course of undertaking this exercise it has become apparent that such diversity defines the nature of the challenge which confronts any attempt to co-ordinate development efforts in the district arena in a way likely to realize national priorities and maximize popular enthusiasm and effort. In this concluding section we shall merely summarize some of the most important implications of the evidence presented in an effort to lay the ground-work for a continuing discussion of the possible modalities of effective local planning in Tanzania.

However, it would be well to begin such a discussion with a review of the activities of the one piece of local development machinery quite specifically designed to facilitate co-ordination and planning—the various *development committees.* These were to operate at regional, district and "village" (now ward)

levels, and to be, in effect, the chief institutional framework for the development front—to facilitate horizontal cohesion between the different hierarchical and representative agencies at each of the various levels. In practice, of course, all the ambiguities which we have seen to characterize the development front in general terms have found full expression within these forums: the interplay between the technical, administrative and political criteria of various agencies, the interplay of central and local priorities and of the interests of various groups and strata. To be sure, these committees have sometimes served as a forcing-house for co-ordination. In this respect, for example, the attempt to bridge the central-local dichotomy has been particularly graphic; thus the District Development and Planning Committee (DDPC) is in effect a committee of the district council, but one expanded in such a way that its Chairman (the Area Commissioner) and many, if not most, of its participants—including a large representation from the various technical ministries—are not members of that council but appointed officials of central government. But contradictions persist and these also account for certain weaknesses to be discerned in specific characteristics of the committees' operations. Thus the effectiveness of the committees as such suffers from the fact that they have, in practice, no executive arm. Action agreed upon by the committees is left to individual departments to implement. Even the "checking up" function performed by the Cabinet Secretariat at the national level is often lacking, or at least fragmented and diffuse. One of the authors of this paper enquired in a certain district of the Area Commissioner (the Chairman of the DDPC), the Executive Officer of the district council (the Secretary) and the Area Secretary (the Assistant Secretary) in turn as to who was responsible for seeing that committee decisions were carried out. They each answered after some hesitation that it was up to them personally. In many districts there also exists a lack of purpose and effectiveness in the committee and a consequent lack of interest in it. A perusal of the minutes of such committees can often reveal a range of issues at the forefront of discussion which are at worst trivial and at best only marginally "developmental" in substance;[57] a fully effective *method of work* is generally lacking. Perhaps it is because they have become known as mere talking-shops from which little action stems that the meetings are viewed with no greater anticipation. In Arusha in 1966 for instance, the DDPC did not hold three of the monthly meetings while on more than one occasion in the same district members have been upbraided for poor attendance.

A continuing effort to streamline the functioning of these committees and to maximize effective co-ordination is obviously a major priority. In the last analysis the success of such an effort will be vitally dependent upon the results of the ongoing redefinition and rationalization of relationships between the various agencies in the development front which has been discussed in earlier sections; nonetheless, the problem of finding the method of work most appropriate to the successful operation of these forums parallels this exercise and must not be ignored. Unfortunately, the precise meaning which might be given to the task of "planning" at the district level has not always been clear, nor have reasonably unequivocal guidelines been made available to the various

participants in that task. Even if common *general objectives* and *aims* increasingly emerge and tend to underpin the activities of all these participants, it will remain necessary to translate them into specific *programmes,* based on agreed priorities and with their components carefully divided and distributed as *complementary* tasks to the various agencies. Coherence in the work of the development front must both be stimulated by and expressed through the actual process of planning a development strategy for quite specific situations and localities.

An attempt to formulate development plans for the administrative regions was first made following the drawing up of the first Five-Year Plan for the period beginning July, 1964. Despite some prior consultation with Regional Development Committees and other bodies on crop production and other targets, the regional plans were derived primarily by dividing out the national targets and projects which had emerged from the macro planning operation. They consisted of little more than crop targets (which then were supposed to be sub-divided between districts and other local units), and extrapolated investment levels intended as guidelines for the various sectors. The limited local consultation, the lack of trained planning personnel outside Dar es Salaam, and the complicated nature of the statistics local bodies were expected to handle, all contributed to making this a largely paper exercise. In addition, the absence of any strategy based on an overall survey of an area, its possible patterns of land use, its infrastructural and other needs, ensured that the definition and location "of each item of investment has to be decided on an *ad hoc* basis", as one report put it.[58] This reduction of planning to the isolated discussion of capital projects would seem to preclude the possibility of developing broad, co-ordinated programmes, nor does it enable the various development agencies operating at the local level, most of whose functions have tended heretofore to be those of advisory and exhortative extension bodies, to develop a planning focus and the requisite capabilities through sustained exposure to a serious planning exercise.

Unfortunately, the genesis of the Second Five-Year Development Plan in 1969, exemplary though it was in certain other respects, seems to have advanced relatively little beyond this unsatisfactory stage in the integration of local planning into the national planning process. In fact shortcomings with respect to inadequate local consultation and unclear regional and district guidelines evoked a measure of criticism from various Commissioners and MPs, and it was only in the wake of the original publication of the plan in two volumes that the national planners embarked upon a third volume designed to set out "regional plans" for the country. But this too has remained primarily a national exercise, drawing, for example, more upon the expertise of the University of Dar es Salaam than upon an effective network of contacts within the localities or any cumulative planning effort which is underway there. It does seem that this effort will produce a more nuanced result than the activities of 1964; thus unrealistic crop priorities, soon not worth the paper they were printed upon, are unlikely to figure so prominently in the final volume. But the key to local activities in this planning sphere remains an elusive one. It must

continue to be pursued, though with increased vigour, and, as we argued in our introduction, the district is perhaps the most appropriate unit to be the focus of such an effort. However the realization of this goal would not necessarily involve the specifying of detailed production or other targets, or even a comprehensive micro-plan embracing all sectors; certainly it would not be necessary or feasible to expect elaborate cost-benefit evaluation of every single project.

Rather the need, as hinted above, is for the development of a planning consciousness on the part of the various actors in the development front. This would imply the emergence of a sensitivity to the broad trends, problems and needs of the district and the adoption of a longer time-horizon by all concerned in order that priorities and programmes might be mutually and rationally agreed, rather than proceeding along *ad hoc,* project-based lines or reflecting narrow agency-centred definitions of reality. It would thereby stimulate the replacement of "inter-agency diplomacy" by genuine blending of related initiatives. Moreover, this emphasis will become all the more important as the new Tanzanian objective of restructuring rural society on a co-operative basis (in order that development should not lead to growing economic disparities between individual families) becomes a more pressing one. The policies which can bring nearer the realization of this latter goal will also have to be varied to suit the wide differences in ecological and socio-economic conditions which were mentioned above. But at the same time they will require an even more self-conscious, planned and co-ordinated effort in order to guarantee their realization—if only because they demand a reversal of the premises upon which many of the agencies have heretofore operated, however unconsciously. The general point to be made here is that the effecting of these sorts of co-ordination depends as much upon a clearer conceptualization of what, ideally, a local planning exercise should involve as upon any streamlining of co-ordinative machinery, and the more precise spelling-out of such requirements by the government would be a signal advance.

One further point emerges: the formulation of such locally appropriate strategies, which link broad agricultural, marketing, infrastructural, industrial and welfare programmes, as well as those efforts aimed at the genuine transformation of rural society, would seem to demand an important degree of decentralization. We thus return to a recurrent theme. Specifically, we have already cited the Regional Development Fund, the appointment of Regional Economic Secretaries, and the deconcentration of the Ministry of Agriculture (through the creation of Regional Directorates) as evidence of the government's appreciation of this imperative. Moreover, the Pratt Commission, appointed in early 1969 and presenting its as yet confidential report in July of that year, was specifically requested to examine the possibilities of advancing these trends while further rationalizing the process of co-ordinated planning; the eventual response to its recommendations will be an important index of government thinking on these matters. In the meantime however, there are two additional points which should be noted in order to situate such an emphasis. The first concerns the skilled manpower constraint: although the need for concentrat-

ing many more capable people, especially those with planning skills, at the regional and district levels is great, the supply is severely limited. This remains among the most unyielding parameters of the current situation; in fact in the short run many waves of good intentions can be expected to break on this particular rock. Nonetheless a spirited attempt must be made.

Secondly, we have seen that this kind of "decentralization" or "deconcentration"—delegation of responsibility to officials lower down the hierarchy—does not necessarily imply increased popular involvement; indeed the exact reverse may be the case. But as we have also had occasion to note, the problem of "representation" will remain a live one, even in the context of freshly minted institutions. Thus in many of the spheres of rural development policy—the use of new seed, the extension of feeder roads, the increasing of levels of literacy, or the changing of the social setting into socialist communities—the actual implementors will be the peasants themselves, rather than employees subject to unmediated control by a government department (as might be the case if it were a new factory, secondary school, housing estate or other urban or major capital project which was being planned). This being the case, it would not be surprising if, in a situation like Tanzania's, effective mobilization could only spring from genuine participation.

Establishing a link between mobilization and participation could be the role of the various "representative" bodies which we have discussed. Equally important, it could characterize practice at an even lower level of the politico-administrative system. Tanzania's large districts, whatever their merits as planning units, are still much too large to be fully satisfactory foci of activity with which the peasant can identify his real needs and interests. Even the lowest levels of the development apparatus—formerly the Village Development Committees—often covered such a large area that not all members were within walking distance of the meeting place. And yet all too familiar man-power constraints, and administrative considerations as to the efficiency (and savings) which might accrue from operating on a larger scale, have served to exacerbate this problem; the implementation of a recent decision to replace the VDCs with Ward Development Committees geared to more extended geographical areas will tend to lift the development agencies further away from the people. This is to be regretted, both because the official presence at the community level is already intermittent[59] and because an important forum of local representation is now more distant from the village. What is equally apparent, however, is that problems of village-level organization, as well as those problems posed by the functioning of participative agencies at the district level, raise once again the question of TANU's role—a theme to which we may revert by way of conclusion.

Throughout our discussion *politicization* has appeared to be an important aspect of the solution to many problems of the development front, and it is also clear that the political party must be the major vehicle of that politicization. Such a party must be characterized in turn by an effective organization and ideological coherence if it is to accomplish its twin tasks: to engage and involve the mass of the people, while simultaneously raising their level of con-

sciousness—educating them, that is to a heightened awareness of the context of imperialism and historical backwardness within which the development effort must take place. A realization of these joint goals provides the only circumstance under which increased involvement can be expected to exemplify popular commitment to national goals and local transformation. Not until then is the local development effort likely to be postulated on the premise that only increased productivity can pay for increased services, for example. Not until then is the national interest in the use of surpluses, wherever they may accumulate in the economy, likely to be readily accepted as legitimate, nor is a full awareness of the long-term implications of the development of capitalist forms likely to be grasped, especially by the poorer and most vulnerable elements in the rural areas. It is this kind of popular awareness, in brief, which provides the major means of pre-empting excessive and debilitating reliance upon the "administrative solution", and which beyond that is a pre-condition for any responsive and progressive check from below upon abuses of authority by administrator or politician, singly or as a group. Moreover, a confident party, because less defensive and surer of its touch in the development field, can also deal more effectively with technical expertise, drawing upon it (though not slavishly) and discounting its biases where necessary—thereby moving to integrate more smoothly the development front.

At the village level, where it matters, the cells as they develop could become even more effective instruments of involvement;[60] this contribution would be most marked if they were to be encouraged to take on productive functions. This latter suggestion may also serve to introduce a point of even wider significance, for it is possible that transformation in the agricultural mode of production can contribute significantly to the future of the development front in more general terms. In the first place, the emphasis on applied rural *ujamaa*, and recent strenuous efforts to educate local leaders in its importance and its ramifications may provide some of the ideological nutriment upon which a more coherent TANU presence can grow, as well as a set of more substantive objectives around which agency activities can cluster. In the second place, it is apparent that the policy initiatives outlined in Nyerere's *Socialism and Rural Development* are not merely to be directed towards the creation of settlements, but also towards the restructuring of dense and settled rural societies.[61] As and when this policy begins to take effect, the new sense of community which it stimulates could help to forge a more conscious peasantry—one more ready to plug into development efforts from above and to provide the responsible check from below referred to in the previous paragraph. Thus, the realization of socialist objectives might make an important contribution to the development front, even while it grows out of it.

We have moved some distance from our starting point and may now return briefly to our initial comparisons with other East African experience. It is important, therefore, to reiterate both that increased politicization has, potentially, a vital role to play—in co-ordination of agencies, rationalization of the use of the surplus, mobilization of the population—but also that its role as a development technique will vary in relation to other dimensions of the parti-

cular socio-political situation under discussion. In certain contexts the party could become merely an additional tool for use by the ruling classes or elites in Africa to suppress the legitimate demands of the peasants and workers. Unfortunately, the analysis of Kenyan and Ugandan strategies by Gertzel and Leys,[62] which were cited earlier, do not supply data on the socio-economic structure underlying administrative institutions and political infighting, though such data are necessary for making any broader judgement about the full implications of various institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, one may suspect a growing tendency in those countries for state and party to represent the interests of a political-bureaucratic elite and a class of indigeneous businessmen, traders and large-scale farmers; to the extent that this is true, the meaning of trends towards centralization of power and increased control will have to be evaluated most critically. In Tanzania, by way of contrast, some of the pre-conditions for a more progressive sort of politicization have at least begun to emerge. The *Arusha Declaration* has attempted to provide the framework within which a more dedicated political and administrative leadership, shorn of compromising ties with the private, economic sphere, can be expected to predominate and, by means of nationalization, it has moved to restrain the power of the private sector—national and international—to harness the state to its narrow interests.

If this national policy initiative continues to be consolidated, then to that extent politicization is less likely to be a mere means of reinforcing exploitation and may make possible an identification with genuine national needs and the interests of the most humble, and most numerous, strata of the society. But it is again evident that there is a parallel need for further *institutional creativity*—with respect, in particular, to consolidating and clarifying TANU's role as an agency with responsibilities for education, planning and implementation, as a force for socialism, as a framework for popular participation, and as the core around which a more effective front can be structured.[63] There is a firm basis for such an evolution within the development front as it is presently constituted, even though this paper has tended to emphasize the areas for possible improvement in its operation. But in the last analysis the further *political* task remains the most crucial dimension of the local development effort.

FOOTNOTES

1 The term "development front" was first coined with reference to Tanzania by J. S. Saul in a paper presented to a conference concerned with "agricultural politics" at Molo, Kenya in 1966; that paper will shortly be published under the title "Agricultural Politics in Tanzania: an introduction and an approach" in a collection edited by E. A. Brett and D. G. R. Belshaw, *Public Policy and Agricultural Development in East Africa* (Nairobi, forthcoming).

2 J. S. Saul, "Class and Penetration in Tanzania" in J. S. Coleman, L. Cliffe and M. R. Doornbos (eds.), *Political Penetration in East Africa* (Nairobi forthcoming).

3 J. K. Nyerere, *Democracy and the Party System* (Dar es Salaam, 1963).

4 See for instance L. Cliffe (ed.), *One Party Democracy—The Tanzania General Elections 1965* (Nairobi, 1967), Ch. 1; I. Kimambo and A. Temu (eds.), *A History of Tanzania* (Nairobi, 1969), Chs. 6, 7, and 10; H. Bienen, *Tanzania—Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton, 1967); J. M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa", *Journal of African History*, Vol. IX, No. 1

5 These new officials were set up under the *Regional Commissioners Act* and the *Area Commissioners Act* of 1962; their duties were set out in Staff Circular 14 of 1962.

6 C. J. Gertzel, "The Provincial Administration in Kenya" in *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 3 (November, 1966).

7 C. Leys, *Politicians and Politics, An Essay on Politics in Acholi, Uganda 1962-65* (Nairobi, 1967).

8 For details of this reorganization, see W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi, 1967), Ch. 3 and S. Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania* (Nairobi, 1968), Ch. 2.

9 In the short run, however, it must be admitted that there has been some confusion while the two chains of command through which the Economic Secretaries are connected to the Regional Administration and to the Planning Ministry are still entangled. One secretary found that the R.C. was unwilling to allocate him specific duties; another was offended when his Ministry diplomatically sent correspondence through the Regional Commissioner.

10 The first batch of Divisional Secretaries took up their appointment in 6 regions in the latter part of 1969 after a 6 month training course.

11 Subsequent progress has suggested that the R.C.'s optimistic entrepreneurship was as "realistic" as Treasury calculations which were based essentially on the ecomonist's low opinion of the wine's bouquet and thus its market potential! See W. Mwabulambo, "Viticulture at Dodoma", an undergraduate dissertion, Political Science Department, University College (Dar es Salaam, 1969).

12 To appreciate the negative impact and the present legacy of past enforcement see L. Cliffe, "Nationalism and the Reaction to Agricultural Enforcement in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period", E. African Institute for Social Research (Makerere) Conference Paper (1964); for the logic of the new emphasis on persuasion see President Nyerere's 1968 pamphlet, *Freedom and Development*; for his thoughts on the avoidance of "commandism", see a speech "Leaders should not be Masters", reprinted in the collection *Uhuru na Ujamaa—Freedom and Socialism* (Oxford, 1969).

13 The Field Force is a para-military, trouble-shooting wing of the Police.

14 After the first draft of this article was completed the R.D.A. was in fact declared an unlawful organization in the wake of a TANU Central Committee decision that all *ujamaa* villages should henceforth come under party control, *Sunday News*, Dar es Salaam, 5 October, 1969.

15 H. Bienen, "The Party and the No-Party State: Tanganyika and the Soviet Union", *Transition* No. 18 (Kampala, Mar./Apr., 1964).

16 For further details of the Agriculture and Settlement rivalry and the difficult structural position of the Settlement agency see L. Cliffe and G. L. Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania" in L. Cliffe and J. S. Saul (eds.), *Socialism in Tanzania: Politics and Policies* (Nairobi, 1972), Vol. 2.

17 In retrospect the Agricultural Department's Reluctance to commit their staff had some justification in the poor economic performance of the cotton block farms, although the Department had been in any case responsible for much of the original initiative; see Cliffe and Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization . . .", op. cit.

18 Saul, "Agricultural Politics . . .", op. cit.

19 There are almost 3,000 agricultural field extension workers throughout Tanzania, but even this number enables them to visit each farm family perhaps only once a year on average, according to figures quoted in Rural Development Research Committee: *An Interim Report on the Evaluation of Agricultural Extension* (Dar es Salaam, 1968).

20 Rural Development Research Committee: "Interim Report . . .", op. cit., provides some evidence for this section, and we have also drawn on work on agricultural administration undertaken by students under the direction of the Rural Development Research Committee and by Dr. G. Saylor of the Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam.

21 This case was taken from the Minutes of the Arusha Regional Development Committee (24 September, 1965).

22 The first Conference of Senior Officers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives in August, 1968, for instance, resolved that "there must be consultation and agreement between politicians and technical officers in all matters affecting the development of people. . . ."

23 This is the main thrust of H. Bienen's earlier survey of TANU, *Tanzania—Party Transformation . . .*, op. cit.; for a slightly different view see L. Cliffe (ed.), *One Party Democracy . . .* op. cit., Ch. 14 and "Tanzania: Socialist Transformation and Party Development" by the same author in *The African Review*, Vol. I, No. 1 (Dar es Salaam, March, 1971).

24 In Lushoto District, for instance, there are 22 TANU Branches but only about half have offices.
25 The standing of the M.N.E.s was considerably enhanced in 1969 after the TANU Central Committee had been reconstituted so as to consist almost entirely of these regional representatives.
26 For a case study of some of the problems which can arise from the relations between the Commissioner and local political forces see A. A. Kazimote, "Political Development of Mahenge (Ulanga District)", undergraduate dissertation, Political Science Department, University College (Dar es Salaam, 1967). This topic has also been the focus of follow-up research in Ulanga District by J. S. Saul. A similar case is spelt out on page 78 below.
27 Political education programmes have been a feature of party activity since the Arusha Declaration in 1967; among current (1969) activities have been a series of seminars on *ujamaa* for officials of government and party from the TANU Central Committee down to sub-district personnel. See, for example, *The Nationalist*, Dar es Salaam, I and 22 September, 1969.
28 Among other instances in April, 1969, the TANU Central Committee barred 29 out of 73 candidates for the 17 posts of Regional Party Chairmen, including 2 then chairmen, *The Nationalist*, Dar es Salaam, May, 1969.
29 See R. C. Penner, *Financing Local Government in Tanzania*, Economic Research Bureau, Monograph (Dar es Salaam, 1970); and for educational aspects S. Rea, "Tanzanian Local Education Authority Profile, 1967-68", Institute of Education (mimeo, Dar es Salaam, 1969).
30 It is worth noting that the Second Five-Year Development Plan, 1969-74, also marked a change of general emphasis by bringing the date for achieving primary schooling for all children up to the 1980's from 1999; thus there is no longer the "freeze" on primary places of about 50 per cent of the age group.
31 Penner, *Financing Local Government . . .*, op. cit., quotes the figures for 43 districts, 20 of which spent only 2 per cent or less of their 1965 annual budget on capital items, whereas only 2 District Councils spent over 20 per cent on capital expenditure.
32 Speech by the Minister for Finance introducing the Estimates, 1969/70, Govt. Printer (Dar es Salaam, 1969).
33 The abolition of the local rate has had the further effect of getting rid of a largely regressive tax and of introducing a significant redistribution of income from the rural dweller to the urban dweller who will bear the main brunt of the sales tax which replaces the local tax. However, it is not clear how far considerations of rural-urban balance influenced Government's actual decision, or how far a calculation of the rural sector's long-run capacity to yield a surplus for investment has been made.
34 For some early findings of what will be a longer term project see P. D. Collins, "A Preliminary Evaluation of the Working of the Regional Development Fund", Rural Development Research Committee (Dar es Salaam, 1969).
35 For a discussion of some of the problems and potential of local authorities in undertaking productive or other profit-earning enterprises see R. C. Penner, "Local Government Revenue in Tanzania", ERB (Restricted) Paper 68, 1 (Dar es Salaam, 1968). An important additional area of local government control over development resources, which may lead to conflicts with both the Administration and the Judiciary, includes their power to distribute unoccupied land, regulate land tenurial arrangements and settle land disputes.
36 However, this may in part reflect a tendency for the centre instinctively and uncritically to rely upon administrative solutions to difficult problems of local development, a point to which we shall refer in a later section.
37 This and related issues are discussed in J. S. Saul, "Marketing Co-operatives in a Developing Country: The Tanzanian Case", a paper presented to a conference on co-operatives held at Sussex University in April, 1969, and published in P. Worsley (ed.), *Two Blades of Grass* (Manchester, 1971) and, in East Africa, in *Taamuli*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1971).
38 For further discussion of the economics of blockfarms, see for example, M. P. Collinson, "The Economies of Block Cultivation Schemes" (mimeo) Western Research Centre, (Ukiriguru, 1965) and Cliffe and Cunningham, "Ideology, Organisation . . .", op. cit. An assessment by J. S. Saul of the reorganization of the VFCU—the background and the nature of the policies pursued—was presented as a paper to the seminar on changes in Tanzanian Rural Society and their Relevance for Development Planning, Leiden, December, 1970, and will be published in Rural Development Research Committee, *Towards Rural Co-operation in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, in press).
39 This debate is summarized in *Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards* (Dar es Salaam, 1966), and *Tanzania Government Paper No. 4* (Dar es Salaam, 1967).
40 Tanzanian newspapers carried a series of reports announcing these take-overs in mid-

1967; by the end of 1969 only 2 of these Unions were still under direct control. The initial reaction of the Co-operative Union of Tanzania can be gauged from an article entitled "CUT hits out at co-ops takeover", *The Nationalist,* Dar es Saalam, 29 August, 1967.
41 J. S. Saul, "Marketing Co-operatives . . .", op. cit.
42 This case is also examined in Saul "Agricultural Politics . . .", op. cit. and A. M. Mtesigwa, "The Politics of Agriculture in Ukerewe: The Role of Fertilizers and Cotton Production", undergraduate dissertation, Political Science Department, University College (Dar es Salaam, 1969).
43 For the details of this case, see *Report of the West Lake Committee of Enquiry,* reprinted in *Sunday News,* Dar es Salaam, 13 October, 1968, and H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen and J. J. Sterkenburg, "The Party Supreme", *Kroniek van Afrika* (Leiden, 1969), pp. 65-76 and reprinted in L. Cliffe and J. S. Saul (eds.), op. cit., Vol. I.
44 Cliffe, "Nationalism and Agricultural Enforcement . . .", op. cit.
45 H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen and J. J. Sterkenburg, "The Party Supreme", op. cit., discuss several events of 1968 and 1969 in this vein but their interpretation that these reflect the reassertion of control by a single undifferentiated, central party core is perhaps oversimplified, not allowing for the possibility of differing attitudes on the part of individual leadership elements within TANU.
46 In this regard, the degree to which the new overall policy directions spelled out in *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance* (Dar es Salaam, 1967), documents written by President Nyerere, are realized can be expected to have a vital impact upon the quality of "government" presence within the development front.
47 The potential anti-development role of this "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" or "labour aristocracy" has been discussed in such works as F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (English Edition) (London, 1965); R. Dumont, *False Start in Africa* (London, 1966); G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa" *Journal of Modern African Studies,* VI, 2 (July, 1968).
48 Cliffe and Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization and Settlement . . .", op. cit.
49 H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen, "Staff, Kulaks and Peasants—Study of a Political Field", in L. Cliffe and J. S. Saul (eds.), op. cit.; J. S. Saul, "Class and Penetration . . .", op. cit.
50 See for example, the extempore speech by the President on the island of Mafia in February, 1966, "Leaders must not be Masters . . .", op. cit., also *The Nationalist,* Dar es Salaam, 5 September, 1967.
51 For instance the Arusha people of northern Tanzania traditionally had a complete absence of permanent authority roles, see P. Gulliver, *Social Control in an African Society* (London, 1963), for a description and this had certain consequences for the ensuing pattern of development, as described in L. Cliffe and P. Puritt, "The Differential Response to Penetration of the WaArusha and WaMeru", in J. S. Coleman, L. Cliffe and M. R. Doornbos (eds.), *Political Penetration . . .*, op. cit.
52 The tendency for TANU in Bukoba to become identified with the less educationally-privileged Moslem minority is mentioned in Ch. 3 (by G. Hyden) of L. Cliffe (ed.), *One Party Democracy,* op. cit.
53 Information on Kilwa from our colleague G. C. K. Gwassa, Senior Lecturer in History, University College, Dar es Salaam (personal communication).
54 The likelihood of "Kulak" control over local development institutions is suggested by several case-studies: H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen, "Staff, Kulak and Peasant . . .", op. cit.; J. S. Saul, "Marketing Co-operatives . . .", op. cit.; and "Class and Penetration . . .", op. cit.; L. Cliffe, W. L. Luttrell and J. E. Moore, "Socialist Transformation in Rural Tanzania—a Strategy for the Western Usambaras", *University of East Africa Social Science Conference Paper* (Nairobi, December, 1969); and S. E. Migot-Odholla, "The Politics of a Growers' Co-operative Society", to appear in Rural Development Research Committee, *Towards Rural Co-operation in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam, in press).
55 This example in quoted in Cliffe, "Tanzania: Socialist Transformation . . .", op. cit.
56 Personal communication from H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen on the basis of his research in Rungwe District.
57 Analysis of the Arusha District Development Committee Minutes of the year 1966 shows that about a third of the items discussed dealt with productive services, another third with social services, while a third had no real development content at all.
58 *Regional Development-Experiences and Prospects,* Vol. 1, Preliminary Report on Africa, U.N. Research Institute for Social Development (Geneva, 1968).
59 Evidence from Lushoto of the limited penetration to the grass-roots level (see Cliffe, Luttrell and Moore, "Socialist Transformation in Rural Tanzania . . .", op. cit.) suggests that the typical village there might receive the agricultural field man, and

the tax collector or some other official, perhaps once a month, and scarcely any other emissary from the central authorities.

60 For additional information on the working of party cells see W. Klerru, "The Systematic Creation and Operation of TANU Cells", TANU (Dar es Salaam, 1966); B. N. Njohole, "The TANU Cell System", undergraduate dissertation, Political Science Department, University College (Dar es Salaam, 1967); and K. Levine, "The TANU Ten-House Cell System", in L. Cliffe and J. S. Saul (eds.), op. cit., Vol. 1.

61 For the outline of this "frontal" approach to *ujamaa* transformation see Tanzania Government, *Second Five-Year Plan for Economic Development, 1969-74* (Dar es Salaam, 1969), and *President Circular No. 1* (Dar es Salaam, 1969).

62 C. J. Gertzel, "Provincial Administration in Kenya . . .", op. cit., and C. Leys, *Politicians and Policies in Uganda . . .*, op. cit.

63 See L. Cliffe, "Socialist Transformation . . .", op. cit., J. S. Saul, "African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania", in G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York, in press).

Administrative Authority and the Problem of Effective Agricultural Administration in East Africa

JON R. MORIS*

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, a large literature has grown up analysing the special situation administrators face in promoting "development" within the Third World. Development administration has gained the status of being a legitimate academic discipline,[1] but its basic concepts and its findings are the object of continuing controversy.[2] The nub of the argument is found in the contradiction that although development administration claims to have been especially concerned with the analysis of the management of development activities, studies done under its banner have seldom come to grips with the managerial dimension of administrative performance, and, where a few have made the attempt, they exhibit marked difficulty in relating their findings to the analytical paradigms in fashion within development administration.

This paper takes stock of the concepts and methods in development administration as a field of inquiry, trying to establish which administrative features are most important for the effective management of agricultural administration. It reviews several key changes in our conventional image of bureaucratic organization which field research on East African administration has shown to be necessary. Methodologically, more precise descriptive techniques are needed to identify which internal administrative linkages are vital to the effective transfer of central initiatives into local practice. I suggest that an extended definition of the idea of "administrative penetration" could guide future researchers in collecting and analysing data to insure that all the salient features of East African administrative systems are adequately documented. Conceptually, my point of departure is the need to visualize administrative systems as independent entities, whose capabilities for effective performance cannot be evaluated apart from a prior analysis of their internal characteristics. Although the illustrative materials are restricted to the sphere of agricultural administration in East Africa, the issues raised are general to any analysis of administrative effectiveness in the ex-colonial, Third World nations.

The inventory of images which guides most analyses of development administration has now become quite standardized. First, it has become customary to treat administrative systems in their wider political and ecological context, receiving "inputs" and responding with "outputs". Second, administrative structures are viewed as taking the classical form of a staffing pyramid. Third, it is

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