

How are Development Projects Selected? The Case of the UNDP in Uganda and Tanzania

SUSAN AURELIA GITELSON*

Disappointment with the progress of many development plans and aid projects in the new states has led several leading economists, such as Albert Waterston in *Development Planning: Lessons of Experience*,¹ to stress that planning is a continuous political process, and others, such as Albert O. Hirschman in *Development Projects Observed*,² to acknowledge the importance of political, cultural and other indirect factors in the success of projects. It is now essential for political scientists to analyse the actual dynamics of the selection process more carefully to detect the origins of later difficulties. This article will attempt to assess the interaction between politicians and civil servants of the recipient governments and officials of aid agencies in selecting projects to be executed with external assistance. Concentration on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Special Fund Projects for the two East African countries of Uganda and Tanzania will facilitate a deeper examination of some of the central matters that other writers, such as the German political economist, Rolf E. Vente,³ have only touched upon. Uganda and Tanzania make suitable subjects for such an inquiry because they are at similar levels of economic development and planning capabilities. Moreover, as Vente points out, they both have suffered, particularly in their first five-year plans, from too much planning from above and from an over-emphasis on general aggregate goals rather than on specific development projects co-ordinated within an integrated framework. The plans tended to follow the recommendations of World Bank missions and of resident economists rather than to reflect a balance of indigenous political and social forces.

Closer examination of the selection of specific development projects should help to illuminate the relative participation by expatriates and indigenous leaders within the guidelines set forth by the World Bank and the goals enunciated by the leaders themselves. Probably the most important expression of East African feelings in this regard was the *Arusha Declaration* of 1967

* Susan Aurelia Gitelson is a lecturer in International Relations and African Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965).

2 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967).

3 See his general study of the formulation of the first five-year plans in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in *Planning Processes: The East African Case* (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1970), and my review of the book in the *Journal of Modern African Studies*, IX, 2 (August, 1971), pp. 316-18.

in which President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania emphasized the necessity for self-reliance both in determining national priorities and in raising resources to finance development. Thus Tanzania learned from its disappointed expectation of 80 per cent foreign financing for its first five-year plan and indicated hopes for only 40 per cent in its second plan. In contrast, however, Uganda increased its expected reliance upon foreign financing from 40 per cent in its first plan to 50 per cent in the second one.

Of all sources of aid, the UNDP should be theoretically the most responsive to the development needs and the desire for self-reliance of the new states. The major impetus to international development assistance efforts within the UNDP itself, in line with the UN Charter, is supposed to be the response to the requests of the recipient states to help promote their economic and social development goals. This sometimes can differ markedly from the more openly political, military, commercial or other motivations of bilateral donors. (The UNDP also is more likely to reflect the needs of the developing countries than the World Bank, for whom it prepares pre-investment studies, because it provides more equal representation in its major decision-making bodies among donor and recipient states than the World Bank, where the voting structure is determined by the amount of financial contributions.)

Are people in the UNDP system really this impartial and altruistic when it comes to developing countries or do their own institutional and career interests seriously affect the types and quality of assistance they offer? Are they really as responsive to the needs of the new states in practice as they are supposed to be? In view of the potentialities and limitations of UN and other external assistance, to what extent have the indigenous political leaders been trying to determine the selection of development projects in conformity with their own development goals?

These are some of the questions I examined during more than a year of field work in 1968-69 in East Africa and at the headquarters of the UNDP in New York and of the UN specialized agencies sponsoring East African projects, in Europe. On the basis of the empirical data collected, it will be possible to analyse who initiated the various projects, the influence of the availability of international assistance on the selection decisions, and various criteria which governed the ultimate selection or rejection of the UNDP projects.⁴

UNDP SPECIAL FUND PROJECTS IN UGANDA AND TANZANIA

UNDP activities in Uganda and Tanzania include both the fairly large Special Fund projects ranging in cost from one-half to six million dollars, which are the subject of this study, and individual technical assistance experts in the crucial development sectors. The projects follow the Special Fund predilection for pre-investment and research studies and training institutes.

⁴ For a more complete analysis and evaluation of the UNDP Special Fund projects in Uganda and Tanzania, see my forthcoming book on *Multilateral Assistance for National Development and Self-Reliance: Case of Uganda and Tanzania*.

Most of them, at least at first glance, appear to have potential to contribute constructively to satisfying general development needs and to conform to the goals and priorities set forth in Uganda's and Tanzania's development plans, such as increased productivity, diversification of agriculture, industrialization, more skilled manpower, and so on. Uganda has two projects in agriculture, two in industrialization, one in education, two in natural resources and one in infrastructure; while Tanzania has five in agriculture, two in industrialization, three in education and one in natural resources.

Table 1 indicates the specific nature of the projects, the UN executing agency, the corresponding government ministry or agency, the date approved by the UNDP Governing Council, the duration and financing, as well as the dates for signing the plan of operation and for commencing execution. It indicates, in addition, the delays of up to two or three years which may occur between the Government Council's approval and the official inauguration of the project.

Actual Selection Process

The actual selection of UNDP projects is complex and often haphazard because the government leaders and the UN administrators have to reconcile their sometimes differing conceptions of what projects are necessary for the development of the recipient country in terms of their technical feasibility and their contribution to the entire development strategy and plan. Their choices will also reflect political and bureaucratic needs and interests on both the government and UN sides, which may seriously influence priorities and determine whether a project will have enough support to be implemented fully.

Theoretically it is possible to discern four ways in which UNDP projects are brought up for consideration. These include government initiative on the basis of its comprehensive development plan, government initiative with a "shopping list" of projects, UN initiative to suggest projects tailored to the country's requirements, or UN initiative to sell its standard projects.

It is not always easy in practice to distinguish clearly which of these four possible procedures has been followed. The UNDP's official refusal to accept any project that has not been requested by the national government compounds the difficulty. This means that even a standard model sold to the government can appear to be government inspired.

Which Initiation Methods Proved Most Effective?

The best approach of the four outlined if a project is to be conducive to national development and self-reliance is when the government has a comprehensive development strategy and attempts to relate specific projects to the larger framework even before it searches for external assistance. Thus the government leaders and their advisers have planned their strategy for development by bringing their needs and assets into the best relationship they

Number	Project Name	Agency	UN	Govt.	Approval	Duration	Project Costs (\$)			Plan of operations to commence	Authorization
							Total	G.C. cont- buton	Govt. cont- buton		
8	Kitulo Sheep-Raising Project	FAO	Kilimo	National Education	Jan. 1965	5	1,951,400	964,400	987,000	26 Feb. 66	14 March 66
9	Training of Secondary School Science Teachers at the Faculty of the University of Dar es Salaam	UNESCO	National Education	Jan. 1965	5 1/2	3,978,600	978,600	3,000,000	12 Nov. 65	17 Feb. 66	14 March 66
10	Industrial Studies and Development Centre, College, Dar es Salaam	UNIDO	Mincon	Jan. 1935	3	653,400	483,400	170,000	4 Feb. 66	18 Feb. 66	18 Feb. 66
11	National Institute for Productivity, Dar es Salaam	ILO	Comworks	Jan. 1965	5	1,185,500	860,500	325,000	7 Oct. 65	15 Nov. 65	15 Nov. 65
14	Work-Oriented Adult Literacy Pilot Project	UNESCO	Maendeleo	June 1966	5	6,397,900	1,181,900	5,216,000	20 Sept. 67	3 Jan. 68	3 Jan. 68
15	Forest Industries Development Planning	FAO	Kilimo	Jan. 1967	3	1,269,900	769,900	500,000	7 Aug. 67	28 Aug. 67	28 Aug. 67
20	National Industrial Apprenticeship Scheme	ILO	Comworks	June 1967	5	1,030,100	820,100	210,000	1 June 68	13 June 68	13 June 68
16	Livestock Development in Masailand, Gogoland and Sukumaland	FAO	Kilimo	June 1968	5	2,464,800	1,409,800	1,055,000	—	—	—

Abbreviations
 G.C. = Governing Council of UNDP
 Kilimo = Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Co-operatives
 Mincom = Commerce and Industries
 Comworks = Communications, Transport and Labour
 Maendeleo = Regional Administration and Rural Development

Based on UNDP, *Status of Projects in the Special Fund Component as of 31 January, 1970 (DP/SF/R/REPORTS Series B, No. 9)*, pp. 69, 75.

Table I—UNDP SPECIAL FUND PROJECTS IN UGANDA AND TANZANIA AS OF MID-1969

Number	Project Name	Agency	UN	Govt.	Approval	Duration	Project Costs (\$)			Plan of operations to commence	Authorization
							Total	G.C. cont- buton	Govt. cont- buton		
3	Aerial Geophysical Survey	UN	Mineral and Water Resources	May 1960	1 1/2	453,073	313,073	140,000	30 Nov. 60	15 Dec. 60	15 Dec. 60
1	Uganda Technical College	UNESCO	Education	Jan. 1962	6	5,112,500	1,159,500	3,953,000	18 Feb. 63	11 March 63	(June 63)*
4	Irrigation and Pilot Demonstration Project, Mubuku	FAO	UDC	Jan. 1964	4	1,214,300	655,300	559,000	7 July 64	28 July 64	(July 69)*
5	Karamoja Groundwater Survey	UN	Mineral and Water Resources	Jan. 1965	2 1/2	985,500	685,500	300,000	18 Oct. 65	19 Oct. 65	(Nov. 69)*
6	Management Training & Advisory Centre, Kampala	ILO	Commerce and Industry	Jan. 1965	5	1,782,600	1,134,600	648,000	11 Sep. 65	11 Nov. 65	(May 68)*
7	Small Industries Development Programme and Establishment of an Industrial Estate, Kampala	UNIDO	Commerce and Industry	Jan. 1966	5	1,875,400	746,400	1,129,000	9 July 68	11 July 68	11 July 68
8	Development of the Beef Cattle Industry	FAO	Animal Industry, Game and Fisheries	Jan. 1967	5	2,073,600	1,377,600	696,000	11 Sept. 67	25 Sept. 67	25 Sept. 67
10	Master Plans for Water Supply and Sewerage for Greater Kampala and Jinja areas	WHO	Regional Administration	June 1967	2 1/2	1,119,800	616,800	503,000	11 Oct. 68	25 Oct. 68	25 Oct. 68

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4 Survey and Plan for Irrigation Development in the Pangani and Wami River Basins
 5 Mineral Exploration of the Lake Victoria Goldfield
 6 College of African Wildlife Management, Mweka

* Field work completed

can manage under existing circumstances while remaining flexible enough to respond and accommodate themselves to changes. Their attempt to mobilize their own resources and abilities for national development to whatever extent possible according to their sense of direction and priorities is a cardinal sign of striving for real self-reliance. At the same time they are cognizant of the areas where the country is deficient in capital or skills and, therefore, can use external assistance as a supplement, but not a mainstay, for national development. They can then invite external agencies to advise and assist them in executing suitable development projects, which they will try to utilize fully since they are simultaneously attempting to prepare the necessary infrastructure, manpower and other inter-related prerequisites. When the government leaders approach the UNDP from such a background in the areas where they know that the UN specialized agencies are recognized as having particular competence, rather than just accepting any isolated suggestion, they are more likely to find that its pre-investment activities and training programmes can contribute toward nationally conceived modernization goals and can induce development in other sectors.

The importance in the selection process of government initiative in terms of a development plan and of preparedness with national resources has been borne out by several UN projects. The outstanding examples from this viewpoint seem to be initiated by the government because of a palpable national need. Since they were innovations as far as the country was concerned, the leaders had an especially pressing reason to seek external aid. They then turned to the UN because they wished aid without undue outside influence. They were also prepared to fit the project into their existing structures and institutions. The Tanzanian Government felt, for instance, that the Industrial Studies and Development Centre (Indcentre) would be fundamental for industrial development and, therefore, integrated it into industrial planning and other policy matters. It finds having a staff with internationally recognized qualifications vital to assist it with nationalized and other industries while remaining independent of the predominant British and Asian business firms. The government has assigned it centrally located offices and high-quality counterparts to acknowledge its usefulness. The government also considers the Science Teachers' project essential for future modernization needs and to avert overdependence on expatriates. It has assured that the project will be practicable by establishing it within the University College Science Faculty and by attending to its needs. The government regards the National Institute for Productivity (NIP) as important, moreover, for furthering socialism and productivity and for making Tanzania self-reliant through its emphasis on training labour. It has, therefore, constructed a new building that will enable the project to expand and has offered more than the required number of counterpart personnel.

It is probably significant that while both Uganda and Tanzania are among the most advanced African countries in regard to planning, all of these particular projects are in Tanzania. This is because its government has been especially vigorous in striving to develop rapidly in the directions and ways

it has determined for itself to combat poverty, ignorance and disease and to catch up with its neighbours. It has also been more assiduous, with the assistance of the Resident Representative's office, in lining up development projects—there were eleven UNDP Special Fund projects in Tanzania as against eight in Uganda by mid-1969. Since the leaders of Uganda, which started with a more prosperous economy and more college graduates at independence, have been concerned primarily with the problems of national integration, political survival and other internal political matters, they have not yet made as pronounced an effort to be as innovative or dynamic in economic development. Nonetheless, individual ministries, such as Animal Industry, has proved to be generally efficient and are on par or more proficient than their counterparts in Tanzania. Moreover, as the Ministries of Planning and Finance become more experienced, Uganda might also be able to concentrate more on modernization. It is already aware of the need, despite staff shortages and other problems, to show more initiative and to give greater support to development projects.⁵

The second most desirable initiation method is where the UN specialized agencies or the UNDP suggest projects on pragmatic grounds in light of their general experience with the development process. Such ideas can often work out quite well, but only if UN personnel take care to consult and plan adequately with local government officials to assure their suitability for the country concerned. The beef cattle projects offer a prime example of how a seminal study by the UN, the East African Livestock Survey, in turn has led to beef cattle enterprises in all three East African countries with each one planned in terms of individual national requirements. Uganda was able to contribute actively from the government side because the Vice-President was a trained veterinarian, who headed the special Ministry for Animal Industry, Game and Fisheries. As a result, a potentially productive ranching, research and training scheme has been established in the north. Although livestock policy in Tanzania has a less certain location somewhere in the larger and more amorphous Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Co-operatives, it has been possible to establish a sheep and cattle raising project in the Southern Highlands which has economic possibilities. UN personnel have also been making a careful effort to design a project especially tailored to the needs of modernizing pastoralism in Masailand, Sukumaland and Gogoland.⁶

A third initiation method, which often has less impact for national development and self-reliance, is when the government has a "shopping list" of projects available that they will execute if they find foreign assistance but which they have not carefully integrated for maximum benefit to the country

5 The Republic of Uganda. *Background to the Budget 1968-69* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1968), p. 71, and *Background to the Budget 1969-70* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1969), p. 73.

6 Neither country, however, has done as much with the potentialities of the beef cattle industry as Kenya, which of course has benefited from much more intensive experience with commercialized livestock production. Kenya has three inter-related UNDP Special Fund projects in livestock for research, training and production, which are making notable contributions to diversifying the economy and providing exports.

as a whole. This was the predominant situation of the earliest UN projects in both Uganda and Tanzania. On the one hand, the mineral surveys were probably the most useful of such projects since they have been potentially beneficial for economic development through the mining sector, which might indirectly spread its gains through other parts of the economy. On the other hand, the Karamoja Groundwater Survey was undertaken on a completely self-contained and technical basis without consideration even within the one region where it was located for the entire economic, social and political situation of the people living there who are supposed to be modernized by the discovery of more water. Most of the other projects selected on this basis were in between these examples. Although Mubuku and other irrigation efforts were supposed to help national economic productivity and to test methods for the particular area which might be applicable elsewhere, they were poorly planned in terms of government preparation for such transformation projects and in relation to other development opportunities.

The fourth and least desirable type of initiative occurs when the UN specialized agencies try to promote or sell pre-packaged programmes that may not correspond with the government's highest priority needs for development or suit the particular country concerned. Nonetheless, setting up such a project may benefit the institutional and personal interests of the people involved. The agency will probably find willing listeners and supporters in the operational ministry in its field, who want to enhance their importance with the new project but may be unprepared to execute it properly. This appears to have been the case with the Management Training and Advisory Centre (MTAC), which ILO personnel made appear attractive to the Ugandan Ministry of Commerce and Industry, but which proved to be aimed at an unsuitable level of training for the country. While the Centre's generalized purposes of preparing Ugandans for managerial and supervisory posts, providing Ugandan entrepreneurs with advisory services and technical training and assisting in the improvement of these enterprises' organization and operation were sufficiently acceptable to all the people concerned to launch the project, they could not be carried out as originally designed. This resulted in the need to define the actual requirements more carefully (e.g., the Africanization of commerce and industry), and to revamp the means to reach these goals to encourage small industries and management development at levels suited to Uganda.

Several other projects, such as the Small Industries and Adult Literacy schemes, also seem to have been predetermined by UN agencies and not to have been properly fashioned for the recipient countries.

THE PROCESS OF CHOICE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE UN SYSTEM

Once people from the government or the UN have initiated the ideas for several projects, they have to try to agree on which have the highest priorities, especially since the UNDP usually has enough funds for only one or two new projects for each country in a year. The ultimate choices, therefore, will

depend upon economic and technical requirements, but they will also have to receive political support and offer bureaucratic advantages to both their government and UN sponsors.

How a Government Decides

If the economists who write the national development plan for the government had their way, they would undoubtedly base the choice of projects on their economic viability and their suitability for overall goals and sectoral needs. Most economists, however, usually have too partial a view since they tend to think in terms of material goods and structures without giving sufficient consideration to the political and social factors; such as political or ethnic affiliations, administrative capabilities or social attitudes, which determine whether projects will have enough support to be effective.⁷ These aspects receive much greater attention on the whole from top political leaders and civil servants, who, therefore, should make the ultimate decisions about priorities within the boundaries of economic feasibility.

Government and party leaders primarily want to demonstrate to the people that they are doing something for them in order to encourage their allegiance to the Central Government and to promote national integration. At the same time, they are concerned about increasing their own support and security since numerous coups d'état in various new states have brought home vividly the precarious nature of political power. The head of state in particular will probably devote a great deal of political energy just to remaining in power through such strategies as promoting his personality, building an organization, articulating an ideology and using foreign policy.⁸ In addition, he will consider how best to distribute the location and types of development projects as a reward to his followers and to people from favoured groups or regions and as an enticement to recalcitrant areas or voters. He may also try to encourage development efforts to reconcile ethnic or other tensions or to alleviate social problems, such as unemployment in both the rural and urban areas. Through such methods, he will try to show himself as responsive as possible to the demands articulated by the legislative and other representatives of the people. Even though he may desire certain development projects primarily for political and social reasons, however, he will usually have to explain and justify them in economic terms to fit in with the development plan.

The President and other leaders are usually also concerned with modernization itself both because they want to enhance the living conditions and reputation of their own country and because they must indicate some positive

7 See Anthony H. Rweyemamu, "Managing Planned Development: Tanzania's Experience", and other articles in *Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania*, edited by Hadley E. Smith (London and Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1966), and Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), especially Chapter 8, on the planning process in Tanzania. No comparable work exists for Uganda.

8 W. Howard Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969).

changes to the people if they want to remain in office. But everyone may not want to accept modern ways that contradict traditional patterns. Pastoral tribes in remote areas of Uganda and Tanzania, for instance, have been resisting the abandonment of their traditional cattle cultures in order to live a sedentary agricultural life. The leaders have to try, therefore, to explain economic policies in political and social terms that will appeal to the specific group being asked to change just as they must try to justify their politically motivated decisions in terms of economic development.

Various individuals within the operational ministries, promoting projects in their sectors may also have special concerns which go beyond the acknowledged economic justifications. Both ministers and upper-level civil servants want to increase their influence and standing through enlarging their domains. They can achieve these aims through administering more projects which will bring more funds and staff members under their authority.

Each ministry will press, accordingly, for greater resources in its development sector from the President or Prime Minister and, if they exist, from the central planning agencies. In Uganda these include the Planning Commission and the Ministries of Planning and Economic Development and of Finance. In Tanzania the central bodies are the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning and the Treasury. These central planning agencies, however, have not always proved strong enough to overcome the influence of individual operational ministries. In fact, the actual choice of projects in many cases may depend as much on the political and personal strength of the minister as on objective development criteria.

Whether foreign aid from the UN or other sources is available to finance the projects is also vital. Consequently, ideas that might be of doubtful economic soundness or priority may be executed because external resources are obtainable. This situation certainly predominates when the government has only a list of projects to offer around to donors, as was the case in both Uganda and Tanzania in their earlier years. Since the availability of foreign aid usually continues to be an important consideration in carrying out development plans, it can often skew the direction of the entire development strategy.

The lack of sufficiently experienced staff members to prepare projects and integrate them into the development plan also impedes the emerging nations, although the situation is improving.⁹ Since they often cannot evaluate projects adequately before they are executed, they become more prone to accepting the donor's preferences. As a result, "some dubious schemes are implemented at the expense of other economic projects for reasons such as the availability of foreign aid or trained and experienced staff".¹⁰

9 The Republic of Uganda. *Background to the Budget 1969-70* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1969), p. 73.

10 L. M. A. Nyakaana and Davis Stanton, "Agricultural Planning in Uganda", in *Agricultural Planning in East Africa*, edited by G. K. Helleiner (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 51.

The UN Selection Process

Foreign aid donors obviously choose the projects they will support for other than purely economic and social development reasons. The UNDP, however, claims to be more likely than bilateral donors to sponsor projects on the basis of their development potential. The UN's decisions are officially responses to the government's priority requests for projects that are thought to be capable of contributing directly to economic and social progress. Other criteria the UNDP considers essential are that projects be integrated into overall national or regional development efforts and that they be co-ordinated as closely as possible with other development aid. They must also be "designed, whenever appropriate, for progressive transfer to the participating governments: and 'free from political interference' of any kind".¹¹ Although these are supposed to be the primary criteria, the rivalry among the UN agencies may also have a significant influence on the decisions.

Members of the various agencies often try to promote their programmes without considering whether the projects advocated are what the country needs most or can absorb best. They may press their case at the top level since the major emphases for UN programmes are decided at international conferences, the UNDP Governing Council and Inter-Agency Consultative Board meetings, or ECOSOC and General Assembly sessions.¹² They hope to prove the essential nature of their programmes and thereby to increase the appropriations for their activities. Often they can count on support from the ministers of corresponding fields (e.g., FAO and Agriculture; WHO and Health). UNESCO and WHO, for instance, have tried to find new justifications for their specialities in economic development terms which would have a greater appeal than traditional social welfare reasons. They have then received backing from national ministers in international conferences they have sponsored in their own respective fields before appealing to the UNDP or General Assembly. Some agencies apparently continue to try to enlarge their programmes even though they have already reached the limits of their administrative capacities.

Special missions or the regular regional or country representatives from the various agencies also contact the national ministries within their sectors and suggest or sell standard projects they have ready.¹³ They promise in effect that they will supply international experts who can handle the actual

11 United Nations Development Programme, *Pre-investment and Productivity* (New York: United Nations, 1967), p. 20.

12 For ECOSOC decision-making, see Walter R. Sharp, *The United Nations Economic and Social Council* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969).

13 On the problem of UN specialized agencies selling projects, see R. G. A. Jackson, *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System* (DP/5) (Geneva: United Nations, 1969), Vol. I, p. 10, and Vol. II, pp. 73-74, and Lester B. Pearson (Chairman), *Partners in Development* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 216. Although Sharp (cf. footnote 12) indicates that selling has been reduced, pp. 149-50, Jackson gives evidence that this is still a problem. That bilateral agencies are also guilty of this tendency is indicated by Maurice Domergue, *Technical Assistance: Theory, Practice and Policies* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 79.

operations, although some time in the future, nationals will take over. The immediate advantage for the ministry, meanwhile, is to enhance its status and resources compared with others in the country. If the minister agrees to the usefulness of the project for national development or for political purposes, he will then urge its promotion to the government. At the same time, the assurance of foreign assistance will strengthen his case.

The mutual reinforcement of the UN specialized agencies and the operational ministries has created serious co-ordination problems for the UN Resident Representative in each country, just as it has for the central planning agencies. The Resident Representative, however, lacks the authority the head of state has to make final decisions and to keep sectoral interests subordinate to broader development needs. Although ideally the Resident Representative is supposed to help integrate UNDP assistance within the development plan, in practice his actual role in dealing with the specialized agencies has been weak because of the lack of official authority to adjust appropriations or to direct desirable changes.¹⁴ He also cannot rely on firm backing from UNDP headquarters since it, too, lacks strong executive powers.

The constant need to satisfy personal and institutional interests has made it difficult to assure a real concern and a broad perspective for the entire development process. President Nyerere has indicated:

One of the most difficult things to secure from a government composed of different Ministries is a co-ordinated and co-operative attack on a particular problem. Each Ministry or department seems to regard the others as its rivals to be appeased or called upon when this is inevitable, but generally to be ignored. I have found the same tendency between the different Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. . . . Frequently indeed they all set up separate offices which appear from the outside to have the minimum working contact with each other.¹⁵

Since the selection process often reflects the political influence and skills of various individuals and institutions in both the government and the UN system, rather than the objective economic criteria of the development planners, the projects chosen are not always well co-ordinated to reflect the priorities of the development plan. The long time required to make the choices, moreover, and the frequent delays in implementing them may decrease the usefulness originally attributed to the various endeavours. On the other hand, if the decisions were not flexible and responsive to different interests and groups, the plan might be ignored altogether. It becomes obvious, accordingly, that planning must be a continuous, co-ordinated process.

14 See Jackson, Vol. II, p. 96, and Gerard J. Mangone, "Field Administration: The United Nations Resident Representative", *United Nations Administration of Economic and Social Programmes*, edited by Gerard J. Mangone (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 176-77.

15 Julius K. Nyerere, "McDougall Memorial Lecture—FAO", *Freedom and Unity* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 237.

Why Projects are Not Selected

Would other possible choices have been more useful? This is difficult to judge since so many factors are involved. It is possible, however, to examine the reasons why projects are not selected.

The most basic cause for the government or the UNDP to decline a project is its technical or economic impracticality. It may require capital or manpower that are plainly unavailable, or it may be unable to obtain proper infrastructural support. For example, the Master Plan for Greater Kampala and Jinja suggested by a UN official was completely unfeasible because the grand scale on which it was conceived would have required an impossible number of African counterparts. Another UN specialized agency proposed for Makerere University College in Uganda, a faculty, and then a department, of forestry, which required an unrealistic amount of funds and students. In instances such as these the country may indicate that it is unprepared for a project or the UNDP may diagnose this to be the case. The project may also not appear to have a catalytic or multiplier potential for investment or manpower.

Whether or not the project receives high government priority is also important. It may be unacceptable because it does not accord with the prime targets set in the development plan. It may also lack the support of an important official who will push it through government councils. This may be because the minister of the particular sector is less dynamic or influential than his colleagues. It may also mean that the project has been unable to arouse the enthusiasm of any minister because it is unclear whether it will really help him appreciably to increase his authority. Alternatively, the project may be unable to count on direct support from anyone since it has not been definitely assigned to any particular ministry. While it is difficult to obtain concrete examples, one instance of a project that has lacked support, at least partially, because it has been unclear which ministry or UN agency would have it, has been the Occupational Health and Hygiene Institute in Uganda, which could fit into either the Ministry of Health or Labour and either WHO or ILO.

On the UN side, projects may not be approved because the specialized agencies might not yet have convinced the UNDP secretariat, the Governing Council or ECOSOC of the importance of certain types of projects for development. The UNDP may also lack sufficient funds to execute all the projects the government has requested, which have also secured the approval of the Resident Representative, the secretariat and others who comment upon them.

The external environment can also affect the choice of projects in two ways. First, the government may withdraw a project request after it has circulated a proposal to several donor agencies besides the UNDP and has found a more ready response from a bilateral donor. This can occur because the UN often takes several years to determine a project's suitability. The officials feel that they need the time to check properly on the project's

feasibility, but frequently the government people believe that the process is too slow and bureaucratic. Many of the bilateral agencies, of course, also exhibit the same dilatory tendencies. Examples of a bilateral donor's taking on projects that the UN had been considering for Uganda include Norway's supporting a more reasonable forestry programme at Makerere than originally projected, Japan's sponsoring an Industrial Vocational Institute, and Great Britain's assisting the Co-operative College. In Tanzania the Netherlands agreed to survey the Kilombero Valley hydroelectric project.

Second, the regional factor can affect national possibilities since occasionally several states, such as the three members of the East African Community, compete for a UN project that will serve all of them. In such a case two of the three may be disappointed. The UNDP may feel, furthermore, that supporting a particular request would unnecessarily duplicate the facilities of a similar project in a neighbouring country as the available staff and students could fill only one such institution in a region. While all three East African states, but especially Uganda and Kenya, wanted the Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics, for example, Uganda was able to put up the strongest case so that the Governing Council approved the Ugandan project in January, 1969. In another instance, although Uganda and Tanzania had expressed the desire for assistance with new faculties of engineering, both found difficulties in obtaining support partly because the UN already contributes to the Faculty of Engineering at the University College, Nairobi, and to the Kenya Polytechnic.

The government and the UN may discard the declined projects, especially if they have been rejected on the grounds of economic or technical feasibility or of potential contribution to development. Alternatively, they may defer others because of insufficient priority or financial constraints. These possibilities will then remain in the "pipeline" until the government decides to give them preference or the UNDP finds that it has enough funds to execute them.

CONCLUSIONS

The leaders of the new states have often become frustrated by their need to depend upon external advisers and development funds. They have invited expatriate planners to write elaborate development plans, in part to attract foreign aid donors who require an integrated approach to development. Unfortunately, the earliest of these plans in Uganda and Tanzania, even when they have been comprehensive, have usually proved too abstract and too far removed from the actual political process on the national, regional and local levels to be implemented fully. At the same time, external donors have not always proved as receptive to the suggested offers as hoped. This has led President Nyerere and other leaders to stress the importance of greater self-reliance both in determining the country's national goals and priorities and in raising resources to finance development.

Greater self-reliance is also necessary in the selection and implementation

of development projects, particularly those receiving assistance from abroad.¹⁶ The ultimate choice of development projects sponsored by the UNDP or other international aid agencies should lie not with the donors, nor with expatriate planners, but with the national leaders. It is up to the head of state to take a broader view than the bureaucrats, technicians or politicians who advise him. Even the international aid officials, who are supposed to be disinterested, are likely to be influenced by their own institutional and personal interests. The head of state, therefore, has to balance what he hears from the economists and other advisers with his political sense of what will be acceptable to the various groups and individuals within the country and then convince others of the correctness of his choices, whether in economic development terms for the planners or in consonance with traditional and modern values and attitudes that make sense to people from various communities within the society.

At the same time the leaders must be responsive to the people. Awareness of this need has been much more evident in the determination of the second plans than the first ones. Nonetheless, even in the formulation of the later plans, particularly in Tanzania where there has been a greater concern with popular responses, the representatives to the legislative assembly and the party leaders could react to the planning decisions only once they had been formulated and printed by the planning ministries. Their reactions, however, should affect the subsequent modifications of the plans, at least in Tanzania where the second plan is to be re-examined every two years or so.

It is clear, therefore, that unless the expatriate planners and the other participants in the selection process demonstrate awareness of political and social considerations, as well as economic criteria, even a technically well-conceived project may prove useless. On the other hand, experience in Uganda and Tanzania, as in other countries, has shown that money and modern technology alone cannot produce development, but neither can political motives without sound economic planning. Thus national leaders and international aid officials in both multilateral and bilateral agencies have to make greater efforts to find the proper balance between rational economic thinking and responsiveness to political demands and social requirements.

16 See my article, "UNDP Technical Assistance: The Promotion of Self-Reliance in Africa", *The Journal of World Trade Law*, IX, 2 (August, 1971), pp. 316-18, and my future book-length study of the most significant considerations for both selection and implementation.