

years have been left leaning and constituted threats to the Western economic interests in Africa. The likelihood, therefore, is that the Western powers will do whatever they can to undermine Tanzania and Zambia, the only remaining "radical" states on the borders of Southern Africa.

After Uganda supported Britain on the issue of Southern Africa, Uganda-British relations reached an all-time low following the expulsion of 40,000 Asians holding British passports and the nationalization of seven British firms and 23 tea-estates between August and September, 1972. Close economic ties have now been established with the Arab world and mutual defence agreements have been entered into with Libya and Sudan. Given the feeling of insecurity which now prevails in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam, it would only be natural for greater reliance to be placed on the Chinese. The latter would have strong incentives to maintain the security of the railway and Chinese involvement might well function as a deterrent to Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia if they feel tempted to punish Zambia and Tanzania for giving assistance and sanctuary to guerrilla groups.⁸⁵ It is unlikely, however, that the Chinese will ever allow themselves to become involved militarily in operations so far away from their frontiers.

Finally, it is worth stressing that African élites have so far not allowed themselves to be bound to any one foreign power or group, and that they have changed alliances or emphasis in dependence when it suited them. African politics is a nightmare to game players in foreign chancelleries and defence establishments who expect consistency from client élites.

rule over new peoples." Franz Mitchael, "A Design for Aggression", *Problems of Communism* (January-April, 1971), p. 63. Peter Van Ness also argues that China is not expansionist in any traditional sense: "China, like virtually all major powers, seeks to influence the internal politics of other countries... by providing moral and often material support for... organizations... which are engaged in making revolution against established governments. However, Chinese policy... calls for revolutionaries to rely principally on their own efforts and resources to gain power... thinking conceives of... no proper role for Chinese foreign military forces abroad. To quote Lin Piao, revolution... in any country is the business of the masses... there is no other way." *Mao Tse-tung and Revolutionary Self-Reliance*, *ibid.*, pp. 71-3.

85 Vorster recently declared that, "if terrorists came on to South African soil and attacked South Africans then South Africa had the right to follow them wherever they might go", *Daily Nation*, 6th October, 1971. Zambia has recently bought a Rapier ground-to-air missile system from Britain to improve her defence capability against Rhodesian, Portuguese and South African aircraft which trespass her airspace with impunity.

Africa, China and the United Nations

MOHAMED EL-KHAWAS*

There has been much speculation about Communist China's activities in Africa over the last decade, both with regard to its motives and its impact on the African countries themselves. At first, it was apparent that the Communist government actively supported African struggles for liberation or the overthrow of reactionary governments although, by the 1970s, policy changed as Peking began to seek friendly relations with radical, moderate, and conservative governments alike.¹ Changes have also occurred in the African stance toward Communist China; indeed, many African governments have extended diplomatic recognition to Peking and a number of African nations entered into "friendship treaties" with the Peking government.²

To some observers, Peking's activities on the African continent were motivated primarily by its desire to rally African votes behind the effort to seat Communist China in the U.N. In particular, China's recent policy of pursuing friendly relations with *all* African governments has been seen by many observers as a reflection of the fact that as many African votes as possible were needed for the U.N. effort. That such a policy could meet with success caused considerable alarm among Western diplomats, however, who speculated that, if Peking's efforts did produce favourable results in Africa, the large number of African votes in the U.N. could be decisive in reversing the trend of events in the long-standing China debate.

Such speculation was no longer necessary by 1971, with the historic General Assembly vote recognizing Communist China as the legitimate government of China. It is not immediately clear, however, whether African votes were a significant part of this change. What role did the African countries play in this historic decision and how did they view the China issue? What positions did they take on this persistent controversy? Was the increase in African representation in the U.N. crucial to the final, decisive vote? In order to assess the African role in the outcome of the long China debate, it is important to examine the positions taken by the African countries on this issue

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- Philippe Richer, *La Chine et le Tiers Monde, 1949-1969* (Paris: Payot, 1971), pp. 259-282, 296-303; Richard Lowenthal, "China"; Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 143-203; W. A. C. Adie, "China, Russia and the Third World", *China Quarterly*, No. 11 (July-September, 1962), pp. 209-213; R. B. "China's Impact on Africa—A Summing Up", *Race*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (April, 1964), pp. 79-82; Gilbert Comte, "Peking Shows Its New African Look", *Africa Report* (March, 1971), p. 19
- For the countries which recognized the Peking government by 1970, see Sydney D. Bailey, *Chinese Representation in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations* (Sussex, England: University of Sussex, 1970), ISIO Monographs, First Series, No. 1 pp. 32-33.

during the years prior to 1971 and any changes in position that occurred during the 1971 voting. A review of the U.N. record should also cast light on the impact of China's diplomatic and economic efforts in Africa.

Moratorium on China Debate: 1951-1960

As early as 1950, the African states were confronted with the dilemma of deciding which government had the right to represent China in the U.N.: the newly formed Communist government in Peking, or the Nationalist government in Taipei, which previously held China's seat. To recognize one, it was necessary to exclude the other since neither government would concede that China had been split into two Chinas or that a new state had been formed.³ The U.N. deliberations on the issue were complicated further when the problem was turned into a cold-war contest. The Soviet Union favoured the People's Republic while the United States supported the Nationalist regime (now confined to Taiwan) and resisted all attempts to recognize the newly created Peking government.

Africa itself was, at this time, *tabula rasa* with regard to the China controversy. African nations held no strong views toward either the Communist or the Nationalist government, although they did agree that any debate on China would probably place an intolerable strain upon the U.N. Therefore, from 1952 to 1955, Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia (the only countries representing Africa in the U.N. at the time) voted with the majority of the Assembly in each successive session to postpone consideration of the issue, on the basis that the time was inappropriate for its discussion. In doing so,

Table 1—THE AFRICAN VOTE ON POSTPONEMENT OF THE DISCUSSION ON CHINA: 1952-1960

Year and Session	FOR		AGAINST		ABSTAIN		ABSENT		Total No. of Members
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
1952 VII	3	(100%)	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
1953 VIII	3	(100%)	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
1954 IX	2	(67%)	—	—	1	(33%)	—	—	3
1955 X	2	(67%)	—	—	1	(33%)	—	—	3
1956 XI	3	(43%)	2	(29%)	2	(29%)	—	—	7
1957 XII	3	(38%)	4	(50%)	1	(12%)	—	—	8
1958 XIII	2	(25%)	4	(50%)	2	(25%)	—	—	8
1959 XIV	1	(11%)	5	(56%)	3	(33%)	—	—	9
1960 XV	1	(4%)	9	(38%)	14	(58%)	—	—	24

3 Herbert W. Briggs, "Chinese Representation in the United Nations", *International Organization*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (May, 1952), pp. 192-209; *United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly* (xvii), Plenary, 1,159th meeting, 26th October, 1962; (xviii), Plenary, 1,242nd meeting, 16th October, 1963; (xx), Provisional A/PV. 1369, 8th November, 1965; (xxvi), Provisional A/PV. 1976, 25th October, 1971.

they sided with the United States, whose policy throughout the 1950s was to put off debate on the issue indefinitely.⁴

African support for this delaying tactic began to erode in the years following the Bandung Conference and, by 1959, fifty-six per cent of the African states voted in opposition to the U.S. proposal (see Table 1). A contributing factor for some delegations was that their governments had extended diplomatic recognition to the Peking government and had come out in favour of its participation in the U.N.⁵ This was the case, for instance, with Egypt and Morocco, who changed their votes from "yes" (a pro-U.S. stance) to "no".

Another factor in the changing African position was the increase in African representation in the organization, particularly after 1958. Consequently, such states as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and the Sudan added their votes to the pro-Peking side. As shown in Table 1, opposition to the U.S. stand began to gain momentum after the African membership in the organization had increased. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the vast majority of the new African members initially refrained from taking any position and abstained on the voting, most likely because their China policies had not yet crystallized. In 1960, fifty-eight per cent of the African membership abstained from voting, the highest mark in the entire period. Most of the abstentions came from countries of the African and Malagasy Union.

It is important to note that it was during this time that Communist China began to pay much attention to Africa. Between 1958 and 1960, the Peking government launched a campaign designed to sway the newly independent African states to its side and away from the Soviet Union, its competitor for Third World leadership. In order to appear more radical than the Soviet leaders, China strongly supported Africa's struggles against colonialism and racism; it provided much help to the revolutionary movements in Algeria and Cameroon; it also extended large financial credits and grants to selected African states, particularly those states (such as Guinea, Ghana and Mali) who were known to be anti-Western and likely to take public stands friendly to Peking. In addition, China began to use personal diplomacy through the invitation of Africans to visit Peking. Such Chinese contacts with Africa increased sharply throughout these years; for instance, the number of African delegates visiting Peking jumped from eighteen in 1958 to eighty-eight in 1960.⁶

A number of Western observers have argued that this new diplomatic offensive was to a significant extent aimed toward gaining support for Peking's side in the stalemated U.N. debate on China's representation. Particularly after 1960, and the sizeable increase in African representation in the U.N.,

4 Sheldon Appleton, *The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United Nations* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1961), p. 55; Lung-Chu Chen and Harold D. Lasswell, *Formosa, China and the United Nations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 7-8.

5 See the statement of Mr. J. B. Wmamba of Zambia, UN. GA. OR. (xxi), Plenary, 1,475th meeting, 23rd November, 1966.

6 Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China* (Berkeley, California: University of California, 1970), pp. 40-55.

it was evident that a large and unified bloc of African votes could be decisive in forcing the U.S. to abandon its tactic of delaying the debate on China. It was also clear that the U.S. might need a new strategy soon if it wished to continue to forestall discussion of the issue.⁷

Important Question: A New Tactic

In 1961, the standard American manoeuvre of postponing the debate was finally abandoned, and the African countries were confronted with a new U.S. procedure, which also was aimed at delaying, if not blocking, Communist China's seating. The U.S. delegates now argued that any proposal to change China's representation should be considered an important question, requiring a two-thirds majority for passage, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter. With this move, a pattern was established for the decade of the 1960s: the U.S. repeatedly introduced an important-question proposal into each season's debate; in turn, the proposal's endorsement kept the Assembly from reaching any decision. Consequently, the Nationalist representatives continued to occupy China's seat in the U.N.

The procedural arguments thereby raised on the China issue engendered major differences among the African countries. They could not agree about whether the issue ought to receive a simple or a two-thirds majority or whether the issue primarily dealt with the expulsion of a member state or instead with the correction of the representation of China.⁸

The Union of African and Malagasy States (UAMS) was in general agreement with the American position. Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey and Togo, for instance, thought that the question was too important to be treated in "... an undiscerning and partisan spirit",⁹ and that its solution should have the support of a substantial majority of the members of the Assembly because "... the impact of our decision on international affairs is incalculable".¹⁰ This view was shared by the French-speaking African countries, who had followed France's lead in establishing diplomatic relations with the Nationalist regime (with whom fifteen African states had diplomatic relations by 1963).¹¹

Overall, however, these arguments never swayed more than fifty-five per cent of the African countries at any one time during the entire period, 1961

7 R. H. Shackford, "U.S. Faces Defeat Next Year in the U.N. Fight Over Red China", *Pittsburg Press*, 11th October, 1960; Harold M. Vinacke, *United States Policy Toward China*, report prepared by the Centre for the Study of U.S. Foreign Policy, University of Cincinnati, Occasional Papers, No. 1 (1961), pp. 35-36. A similar view was expressed in the Conference on China Policy held at the University of Cincinnati, 1st-3rd December, 1960. Cf. Robert C. Byrd, "Should the United States Change Its China Policy?", U.S. Senate 86th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 105, Part 8 (8th June, 1959), p. 10131.

8 UN. GA. OR. (xxi), Plenary, 1,473rd meeting, 22nd November, 1966; (xx), Provisional A/PV, 1370, 9th November, 1965; (xvii), Plenary, 1,162nd meeting, 26th October, 1962; (xvi), Plenary, 1,076th meeting, 12th December, 1961.

9 See the statement of Dr. Robert Ajavon of Togo, *ibid.*, (xxi), Plenary, 1,471st meeting, 21st November, 1966.

10 *Ibid.*, (xxvi), Provisional A/PV, 1976, 25th October, 1971.

11 For the countries which recognized the Nationalist government, see George T. Yu, "Chinese Rivalry in Africa", *Race*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (April, 1964), pp. 41-42.

Table 2—THE AFRICAN VOTE ON THE U.S. IMPORTANT-QUESTION RESOLUTION

Year and Session	FOR		AGAINST		ABSTAIN		ABSENT		Total No. of Members
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
1961 XVI	14	(50%)	8	(29%)	4	(14%)	2	(7%)	28
1965* XX	11	(31%)	21	(58%)	3	(8%)	1	(3%)	36
1966 XXI	16	(42%)	19	(50%)	3	(8%)	—	—	38
1967 XXII	19	(50%)	19	(50%)	—	—	—	—	38
1968 XXIII	22	(55%)	17	(42%)	1	(3%)	—	—	40
1969 XXIV	20	(50%)	19	(48%)	1	(3%)	—	—	40
1970 XXV	18	(45%)	20	(50%)	2	(5%)	—	—	40
1971 XXVI	16	(40%)	19	(48%)	5	(12%)	—	—	40

* No vote was taken on the important-question resolution between 1962 and 1964.

to 1971 (see Table 2). In fact, there was considerable opposition among the African delegates to the American important-question proposal. Led by the Casablanca group, this opposition was at its peak in 1965, when fifty-eight per cent of the African membership voted against the U.S. position.

These members criticized the way the issue had been deliberately enveloped in a procedural mist. Congo (Brazzaville) denounced the U.S. "... campaign of systematic denigration of China and a policy of obstruction",¹² while Ghana warned of the dangerous precedent being set up by which any revolutionary governments might find their credentials unacceptable.¹³ They insisted that the issue was merely a question of credentials, and that an unauthorized representative might be expelled, but not a member state *per se*. Further, because the issue was a routine procedural matter concerning verification of credentials, it should be settled by only a simple majority.

Despite such opposition arguments, the U.S. important-question resolution was endorsed by the Assembly year after year, thus setting up stringent guidelines for any change in China's representation. Even so, the fact that the issue was at least debated in each session after 1961 meant that the Assembly, including African members, could discuss the substantive points in the argument over China. The issue generally created a divisive and conflictful atmosphere during each ensuing session's debate.

Albanian Resolution: Frustration and Division

By 1961, the African states were directly confronted with the hard question they had wished to avoid, that is, which one of the two Chinese governments was entitled to represent China in the U.N. For the most part, arguments centred around the so-called Albanian resolution, which asked for the immediate removal of the Chiang Kai-shek clique and the seating of the Chinese

12 See the statement of Mr. Adrien Bakala of Congo (Brazzaville), UN. GA. OR. (xxi), Plenary, 1,472nd meeting, 21st November, 1966.

13 *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1961, p. 127.

Communist delegation. As can be expected, the African voting records after 1961 reveal sharp divergences of opinion on how the issue might be settled.

Opposition to the Albanian resolution stemmed mainly from the African countries who continued to recognize Nationalist China as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people. Among these countries were members of the Monrovia group, who were quite suspicious and distrustful of Communist China. They opposed China's attempts to capture the leadership of revolutionary elements in Africa and, specifically, charged that Peking instigated and directed subversive activities in such countries as Burundi, Cameroon, Congo (Leopoldville), Kenya, Niger and Rwanda. These African governments were quite angry that China was training, equipping and financing dissident groups within their own countries. In acts of apparent retaliation, five African countries (Burundi, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Ghana and Tunisia) broke off diplomatic relations with Communist China by 1966 while Kenya expelled Chinese diplomats during the same period.¹⁴ As a result, these nations insisted that they could not support Communist China's admission to the U.N. until Peking ceased its intervention in their own internal affairs. This position was reflected in the statement of President Ahmadou Ahidjo (Cameroon), when he said:

... China fosters the Cameroonian rebellion and thus we cannot speak out in favour of its admission to the U.N. because it does not fulfil the fundamental conditions prescribed in the Charter.¹⁵

In addition, Peking's diplomats were barred from ten member states of the Common Organization of African and Malagasy States (OCAM), most notably including the Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Senegal. All ten member states subsequently joined with the U.S. in voting to retain Nationalist China in the U.N.¹⁶ They insisted that Peking was not qualified for U.N. membership because it had never accepted the obligations of the Charter and was not a peace-loving nation. They also argued that the Peking government should be expected to comply with the organization's rules and mitigate its belligerency *before* being admitted to the U.N.

Most of the African nations opposing the Albanian resolution favoured Nationalist China which, unlike Peking, had not threatened their national security or independence. They insisted that, although its area of control was greatly reduced, it did not in any way justify its expulsion from the organization nor alter its legitimacy to represent the Chinese people.¹⁷ Thus, it seems that, for a number of countries, Peking's training of African revolutionaries had backfired to some extent; it had instead contributed to increased support for Taipei among moderate and conservative African governments. Taiwan's relative success was largely due to its ability to use personal diplomacy and

14 Emmanuel J. Hevi, *The Dragon's Embrace: The Chinese Communists and Africa* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), pp. 62-63 and 97-113; Larkin, pp. 125-140; UN. GA. OR. (xxvi), Provisional A/PV. 1976, 25th October, 1971.

15 Hevi, p. 111.

16 *Africa Report* (March, 1971), p.20.

17 See the statement of Mr. Louis Rakotomalala of Madagascar, UN. GA. OR. (xxi), Plenary, 1,473rd meeting, 22nd November, 1966.

foreign aid without any overt ideological campaign or expansionist overtones. Unlike Peking, its technical assistance programme was highly selective, rendering services in the areas of agriculture and fishery. The programme actually encouraged a good number of African nations to support Nationalist China's position in the U.N. In fact, several countries (e.g., Libya and Dahomey) changed their votes in favour of the Nationalist stance after they began receiving technical assistance from the Taipei government.¹⁸

On the other hand, support for the Albanian resolution (and consequently for Peking) primarily came from non-aligned nations, including Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia, many of whom were active in the debate and in lobbying votes for the seating of Communist China in the U.N. These progressive or radical governments were increasing their relationships with the Peking government at all levels and, in particular, welcomed China's material aid to their own support of revolutionary groups in neighbouring African countries where reactionary priorities still held sway. Inspired by their drive for Pan-Africanism, they were willing to work closely with the Chinese as long as it furthered their aims of liberating the African continent of the last remnants of colonialism and racism.¹⁹

Many of these nations felt that Communist China was kept out of the U.N. primarily because the U.S. had been able to rally enough votes for its procedural device.²⁰ They also argued that the issue was being misconstrued; that it was not a matter of the admission of a new member (since China had been a founding member of the organization), but instead was a question of correction of the representation of a member state. They stressed that Article 3 of the Charter stipulated that U.N. members are states, not governments, and that China had undergone a change of government in 1949 which was long overdue for recognition. In addition, they argued that the obligations of membership could be carried only by governments which, in fact, possessed the power to do so.²¹ This view was upheld by the U.N. Secretary-General in 1950, when he stated:

... Where a revolutionary government presents itself as representing a State, in rivalry to an existing government, the question at issue should be which of these two governments, in fact, is in a position to employ the resources and direct the people of the State in fulfilment of the obligations of membership.²²

In this case, since the Peking government was in control of the mainland of China, having 750 million people under its jurisdiction, it was clearly the *de facto* government of China.²³ The fact that the social and political structure

18 Michael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy After 1963: The Maoist Phases", *The China Quarterly*, No. 36 (October-December, 1968), pp. 93-113; Yu, pp. 42-46.

19 Dick Wilson, "China's Economic Relations with Africa", *Race*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (April, 1964), pp. 61-71; Ghana's Ministry of Information, *Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa* (Accra-Tema: State Publishing Co., 1966).

20 UN. GA. OR. (xvi), Plenary, 1,015th meeting, 26th September, 1961.

21 *Ibid.* (xi), Plenary, 579th meeting, 15th November, 1956.

22 *Ibid.*, (xvi), Plenary, 1,070th meeting, 4th December, 1961.

23 See the statement of Mr. J. W. S. Malecela of Tanzania, *ibid.*, (xxi), Plenary, 1,471st meeting, 21st November, 1966.

of China had changed should not have affected its international identity nor its right of membership in the U.N. Several states, including Egypt, Ghana, Libya and Uganda, had changed their social and political systems since the U.N. began, but this change had no effect on their international status or their right to be represented in the U.N.²⁴

Yet, whatever the arguments, the result was always the same: whenever the Albanian resolution was put to a vote, it was solidly defeated, with countries lining up rather predictably on one side or the other according to cold-war allegiances. As shown in Table 3, the African countries were noticeably divided on the vote: between a quarter and a half took the American position on the substantive voting while the Peking supporters also gained between thirty-two and fifty per cent of the vote.

Table 3—THE AFRICAN VOTE ON THE ALBANIAN RESOLUTION TO SEAT COMMUNIST CHINA

Year and Session	FOR		AGAINST		ABSTAIN		ABSENT		Total No. of Members
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
1961 XVI	9	(32%)	8	(29%)	11	(39%)	—	—	28
1962 XVII	13	(41%)	16	(50%)	2	(6%)	1	(3%)	32
1963 XVIII	11	(36%)	16	(52%)	3	(10%)	1	(3%)	31
1964 XIX	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1965 XX	18	(50%)	9	(25%)	7	(19%)	2	(6%)	36
1966 XXI	17	(45%)	16	(42%)	5	(13%)	—	—	38
1967 XXII	16	(42%)	18	(47%)	4	(10%)	—	—	38
1968 XXIII	15	(38%)	19	(48%)	6	(15%)	—	—	40
1969 XXIV	18	(45%)	20	(50%)	2	(5%)	—	—	40
1970 XXV	19	(48%)	16	(40%)	5	(12%)	—	—	40
1971 XXVI	26	(65%)	14	(35%)	—	—	—	—	40

It should be noted that African support for the seating of Peking increased somewhat between 1968 and 1970 (see Table 3). It was in 1970 that, for the first time, a simple numerical majority of the Assembly voted to support the Albanian resolution. Because of the two-thirds rule, the vote did not carry, yet it was a significant milestone²⁵ as an omen for the next session. If this same voting coalition could be maintained until the next session's debate, the U.S. important-question resolution might be defeated, which had been the main obstacle to past efforts to settle the issue. As Mr. A. Doak Barnett predicted:

... It is now widely—and probably correctly—assumed that, in the absence of a viable alternative to the Albanian resolution, the trend of the past two years will not only continue but will probably speed up. One can expect, therefore, that if the United States attempts to stand pat, the result—probably within the next two years—will be the seating of Peking and the expulsion of Taiwan.²⁶

24 Ibid., 1,475th meeting, 23rd November, 1966; Hans Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1950), p. 76.

25 See the statement of Mr. M. Yazid of Algeria, UN. GA. OR. (xxv), Provisional A/PV. 1913, 20th November, 1970.

26 A. Doak Barnett, *A New Policy Toward China* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 83-84. Michel Oksenberg, "The Strategies of Peking", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October, 1971), pp. 15-16.

The 1971 Vote: Milestone Decision

At the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the China debate opened in a new atmosphere, primarily because of sudden and dramatic improvements in the Sino-American relationship, whose climax was the planned visit by President Nixon to Peking, scheduled for February, 1972. The familiar U.S. procedural proposal and the Albanian substantive resolution were both introduced but a new dimension was added when the U.S. broke with precedent and also introduced a substantive proposal calling for dual representation of both Chinas in the U.N., that is, retention of Taiwan in the Assembly and the seating of Communist China in both the Assembly and the Security Council.²⁷

Several African countries supported the new American proposal, out of the belief that Nationalist China should not be denied representation in the U.N. as the price for opening the door to Communist China. Nevertheless, the proposal was criticized by the pro-Peking elements as another American manoeuvre.²⁸ The African states who rejected the American proposal (particularly Algeria, Congo Brazzaville, Tanzania and Zambia) insisted that the Assembly must settle once and for all the question of which government had the right to represent the Chinese people and state. They also reminded the Assembly that Peking was firm in its refusal to join the U.N. as long as Taiwan continued to be seated in the organization.²⁹

The new U.S. "two Chinas" proposal quickly became buried in arguments but, nevertheless, the proposal and the new U.S. policy toward China had significantly broken up the old approaches and alignments on the issue. Partly in consequence, when the important-question resolution was put to a vote, it was defeated for the first time.³⁰ By a margin of only four votes, the Assembly finally and dramatically reversed its long-standing position and rejected the need for a two-thirds majority on the substantive voting.

Several African members had changed their positions on this procedural vote. Altogether, nine countries changed voting position as compared with the previous session, resulting in a net loss of two African countries from the U.S. side. Four countries—Botswana, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo—dropped their support of the American position, while two other African countries (Chad and Ghana) shifted to pro-U.S. votes. This net loss of two votes followed a similar decrease for the previous session (see Table 2). The new Assembly atmosphere thus had shaken up old commitments and choices among the African delegates; there was only a moderate overall effect, but it was clearly away from the U.S. stand on the issue.

27 Barnett, pp. 57-59; Earl C. Ravenal, "Approaching China, Defending Taiwan", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October, 1971), pp. 44-58; Jerome Allen Cohen, "Recognizing China", *ibid.*, pp. 30-43; UN. GA. OR. Annexes, A/8442, 17th August, 1971, and Provisional A/PV. 1976, 25th October, 1971.

28 *Ibid.*, (xvii), Plenary, 1,162nd meeting, 26th October, 1962; (xxi), Plenary, 1,475th meeting, 23rd November, 1966.

29 *Ibid.*, 1,472nd meeting, 21st November, 1966; (xxvi), Provisional A/PV, 1976, 25th October, 1976.

30 *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, Vol. 8, No. 10 (November, 1971), p. 60.

Defeat of the important-question resolution meant that the Albanian resolution needed only a simple majority for passage, which it had already gained in the previous session. Many African nations, seeing the writing on the wall, now changed their votes. Altogether, seven countries shifted their voting positions, all in a direction favourable to Peking. Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Togo switched from "no" to "yes"; Botswana, Cameroon, Senegal and Tunisia changed from abstention to affirmative, with no abstention recorded among the African votes.³¹

Overall, the Albanian resolution received a landslide victory, with a majority that approached the two-thirds it no longer needed. By a vote of seventy-six to thirty-five, with seventeen abstentions, the China debate was concluded as the General Assembly finally agreed to "... restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China..." and to expel the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek.

Summary and Conclusion

For several years, African states had found themselves embroiled in the question of China's representation, a major source of controversy in the U.N. Their situation was further complicated by the way the issue was tainted from the beginning by the bitterness and animosities of the cold-war conflict. In the early years (when they were few in number) the African nations in the U.N. appeared to be united behind the U.S. efforts to postpone the debate on China. However, from 1956, opposition to the procedural tactic began to gain momentum as more African states joined the U.N. membership and as non-alignment was taken up by some African governments. By 1960, only one of the twenty-four African states voted in favour of the American proposal to put off the discussion. It should be noted, however, that fourteen of the twenty-four nations (mostly new members) abstained, as they apparently needed more time to examine the issue before taking a stand.

From 1961, the Africans failed to work out a unified stand on either the U.S. important-question resolution or the substantive Albanian resolution; with few exceptions, the number of countries voting "yes" differed from the number voting "no" by only one, two, or three countries. Their failure to develop a unified stand was largely due to ideological diversity within the group, particularly between the Monrovia and the Casablanca groups.

The voting records reflect a three-way division among the African states on the issue. The first segment (heavily comprised of the Monrovia-group countries) consisted of nations who did not recognize Communist China and opposed its admission to the U.N. The number of these nations was relatively stable throughout the 1960s, although somewhat due to increases in U.N. membership that offset changes made by earlier members. The second segment mainly included non-aligned nations who had extended diplomatic recognition to Communist China; the number of these African countries also remained

31 UN. GA. OR. (xxvi), Provisional A/PV. 1976, 25th October, 1971.

relatively stable. The third segment consisted of the nations who wanted to avoid any entanglement in the controversy and who thus preferred to abstain from voting. This segment, often made up of newly independent nations, fluctuated somewhat in size between sessions.

On the whole, however, it is clear that neither Peking nor Taipei was completely able to swing African votes to its side. Throughout the 1960s, the African countries were quite divisive on the voting and neither side showed any significant overall gains. The only sizeable shift occurred with the substantive vote in 1971, which came about as a result of the major changes in U.S. policy on the issue and the inevitability of the resolution's passage, once only a simple majority was necessary.

Yet, although the African countries failed to develop a single cohesive policy on the issue, the record does suggest that Africa had some influence on the final outcome of the controversy. On the decisive procedural vote in 1971, for instance, only about half of the African nations voted against the U.S. proposal, yet, these nineteen "no" votes amounted to almost a third of the fifty-nine Assembly members who, together, defeated the U.S. proposal. So too, Africa's net shift toward Peking by two countries on this decisive vote also contributed to the U.S. defeat, since the vote was extremely close, decided upon by a margin of only four votes. Thus, by the sheer weight of numbers, African countries may have contributed to the final outcome of the issue, although on the whole it must be said that their role was not great. If both Peking and Taipei had hoped to win a favourable General Assembly decision on the issue as a result of their diplomatic and financial efforts in Africa, it would generally seem that both sides had been disappointed.