

Hierarchy and Participation in Development: A Case Study of Regional Administration in Tanzania

JAMES R. FINUCANE*

The balance to strike between bureaucratic and participatory norms in organizations is an issue common to many of today's societies. It is directly confronted in those developing countries whose leaders are willing to perceive organizational patterns as a key factor in determining the rate and nature of national progress, and to experiment with organizational roles and designs. Tanzania has been a persistent member of this group. Its current programme of regional decentralization is its most wholesale attempt yet at restructuring in the hoped for direction of both better administration and more participation in decision-making. This article sets forth an analysis of a key administrative role-set in one of Tanzania's eighteen regions as observed on the eve of the present moves toward decentralization. The actual or effective role of a Regional or Area Commissioner has been one of the less well understood elements of Tanzanian government and it is my view that detailed, local level studies are necessary if our comprehension level is to be raised. That our comprehension perhaps needs to be well-grounded is indicated firstly by the decentralization changes now being introduced, changes premised *inter alia* on the notion that the Commissioners must be sufficiently powerful to control sub-centre allocations of Tanzania's limited resources if development is to proceed in more productive and egalitarian directions. This article demonstrates that though this is not a new idea in Tanzania, it is one which diverts quite radically from what has been the actual pattern of administration. Secondly, much of the literature on development politics and administration has stressed the need for political control of bureaucracies, and many developing countries have seen some variation on a political/administrative prefectural structure as helpful in securing this control. Tanzania has been one of the foremost countries in stressing the need for this political control and it is perhaps instructive in a comparative sense to weigh her success in utilizing Regional and Area Commissioners as agencies for politicizing the bureaucracy.

INTRODUCTION

One of the first post-colonial changes of the Tanganyika Government was the replacement of Provincial and District Commissioners with politically appointed Regional and Area Commissioners beginning in early 1962. Such

*James Finucane is a Lecturer in Public Administration at the University of Zambia. During 1968-70 he was a Research Fellow in Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam and a member of an interdisciplinary rural research team.

was the urgency that the government appointed ten Area Commissioners prior to the enactment of the relevant legislation in June, 1962.¹ The new appointees were not given all the responsibilities of their predecessors. In the National Assembly the Minister for Local Government and Administration explained that there had been a separation of the magisterial (to the judiciary) and supervision of local government (to civil service Local Government Officers) functions from those "miscellaneous tasks" which would remain directly under the Commissioners and their executive staff—"things like the organization of famine relief, elections, processing of village development schemes, co-ordination of the Central Government effort, and that vague, but very important function of dealing with the *shauris*, and *shidas* of the general public".²

As political officials at the top of the government hierarchies in their areas, the Commissioners in co-ordinating the efforts of the ministries and in serving as a channel for the flow of complaints and demands were to be agents of participation who would exercise popular TANU control over the bureaucracy. The new Commissioners also became the secretaries of the TANU organization at their respective territorial levels, a move intended to increase the control of the TANU centre over its constituent branches in the periphery.³ Vis-à-vis these local party organizations, participatory elements in the national system which historically had been loosely tied to the centre, the Commissioners were to be agents of the central TANU hierarchy.

Complicating an explanation of the nature of the Commissioners' government/party role as approximating a participation/hierarchy duality is the existence of what might be termed minor strains. In his governmental capacity, which is essentially one of increasing participation, a Commissioner was also expected to mobilize the people for development along policy and programme lines which have been centrally established and in this he was to stand as a representative of hierarchy.⁴ In his TANU capacity, which is essentially one of hierarchy, a Commissioner was also expected to represent the

1 This was pointed out in the Assembly debates. *Hansard*, First Session (Second Meeting), June 6, 1962, col. 75.

2 Ibid., June 15, 1962, cols. 514-515. The formal responsibilities of the Commissioners are listed in Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), (expanded edition), pp. 313-317. Discussion of the post-independence administrative changes can also be found in Stanley Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968); K. W. von Sperber, *Public Administration in Tanzania* (Munich: Weltforum Publishing House, 1970); William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968).

3 Bienen, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

4 The dual nature of a Commissioner's role has been long recognized by Tanzanian leaders. Nyerere, in a 2 February 1962 press conference, described them as "representatives of Government as well as being representatives of the people". Referred to in *Hansard*, First Session (Second Meeting), June 12, 1962, cols. 313-314. The Parliamentary Secretary for Local Government noted that a Commissioner's job was to "keep the pressure on [civil servants] and keep the people's enthusiasm up". *Hansard*, First Session (Second Meeting), June 12, 1962, cols. 313-314.

local party to the TANU centre and to transmit the demands of the people to the "higher echelons".⁵

The colonial role of Commissioner was within the "major territorial-imperial hierarchy",⁶ and though some colonial Commissioners did come to play a participatory role as they represented and protected the interests of their district, the chief impact of the colonial Commissioners was a hierarchical one of penetration. The Commissioners of independent Tanzania, while retaining a hierarchical function as mobilizers, have been charged with the political control of the bureaucracy as well, and thus with ensuring that their role is equally, and perhaps even primarily, a participatory one.

This discussion of the activities of the Commissioners in one region concentrates on what they were doing in 1969-70 in relation to the conflicting pressures upon a role which is intended to be both hierarchical and participatory in its impact. As a preface I make a few observations on the recruitment and tenure of the Commissioners.

With the exception of some of the initial appointments,⁷ the recruitment of Regional and Area Commissioners has not followed a specific pattern other than that they be from outside the region.⁸ Up to February, 1972, the region had had four Regional Commissioners.⁹ Two were manifestly politicians prior to their appointment while the other two were civil servants. The Area Commissioners have more often been on the politician side of the civil servant-politician dichotomy, but the appointment of a traditional leader and one salesman weakens the insights to be gained from such a distinction. In most cases the Area Commissioners have been younger and have had fewer years of formal education than the Regional Commissioners.

Over the period October, 1963 to October, 1971, the fifteen Area Commissioners for the region's four districts averaged 25 months in office, while the Regional Commissioners over the same period averaged 24 months. Two of the Area Commissioners were each in office for five and a half years during this eight year period, a fact which distorts the average and somewhat belies the tendency for Area Commissioners to serve a slightly shorter term (eighteen months if the two are excluded) than the Regional Commissioners.

The structural similarities in their roles have led me to consider the roles

5. The Tanzania Government paper presented to the Fourth Social Welfare Seminar held in East and Central Africa in Dar es Salaam, December 1970/January, 1971, stated: "... at all levels it is the aim of TANU to provide party functionaries or cadres who are expected to 'take down' people's demands to the higher echelons. This transmission line has become very important. ..." The report of the seminar has been published by the Tanzania National Council on Social Welfare and the German National Committee of the International Council on Social Welfare as *The Role of Social Welfare Services in East and Central Africa* (Nairobi: Afropress, 1971).

6 Max Gluckman, "Inter-hierarchical Roles: Professional and Party Ethics in Tribal Areas in South and Central Africa", in Marc J. Swartz (ed.), *Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives* (London: University of London Press, 1969), p. 71. This essay by Gluckman is a discussion and review of the anthropological literature on these conflicting pressures focused on the colonial administrators and chiefs.

7 See, G. Andrew Maguire, *Toward "Uhuru" in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 325-328.

8 This is the general practice in Tanzania.

9 The region was formed in the May, 1963 reorganization.

of Regional and Area Commissioner together, albeit the frame of reference does shift at many points. It should be emphasized, however, that the individuals have been of quite different stature politically: the Regional Commissioners have been national figures, of recognizable achievement prior to their appointments, known personally by the President and ex-officio members of TANU's National Executive Committee; the Area Commissioners have been much lesser figures, men of promise, not necessarily known by the President,¹⁰ and mostly relegated to activities in the periphery both before and after their appointments. Indicative of the lesser importance of the Area Commissionership, the commissionerships of two of the region's districts were each vacant for more than four months during 1969 awaiting the appointment of new officers to replace the transferred former occupants. The pressures on and the functions of the Commissioners are similar, but the differences in the stature of the roles and the individuals who have filled them are considerable.

THE COMMISSIONERS AND THE LOCAL TANU ORGANIZATIONS

At their respective territorial levels the Commissioners are members of the conference, executive and working committees of TANU; the Area Commissioner is also a member of the regional conference and executive committee, while the Regional Commissioner is at times a guest at Party meetings at the district level. In the meetings of these TANU bodies and generally in his relations with local Party leaders, the primary goal of a Commissioner is the hierarchical one of gaining local support for national policies and programmes and convincing the local Party to take initiatives in the directions desired by the centre. In his efforts a Commissioner relies on his persuasive abilities as supported by three types of sanction or resource¹¹—force, material allocations, and influence upon the considerations of higher level leaders—and it is in the context of these sanctions that we can understand the relationship between the local Party and the Commissioner.

The ability of a Commissioner to use force, the ultimate expression of a hierarchical approach to development, relies upon his residual responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. A Commissioner is not a Justice of the Peace unless specifically appointed. He does have the authority to detain individuals for 48 hours and, although the chain of command in such acti-

10 See the official verbatim report of the 1969 TANU national conference, *Majadiliano ya Mkutana Mkuu wa TANU: Taarifa Rasmi*, May 29, 1969, col. 109, Area Commissioners are appointed by the President but are normally sworn in at the Regional headquarters by the Regional Commissioner.

11 The Tanzanian leadership has been consciously attempting to create another manipulatable resource-ideology or normative power. During 1969-70 in this region, ideology was not, however, in a positive sense a factor of any moment. Cf. Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). On the general point of analysing role-sets in terms of resources, see, Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1961), chap. i; and Warren F. Ilchmann and Norman T. Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

vities is often unclear to the participants,¹² to order the police to take actions varying from the closing of bars and banning of types of dress and music¹³ to using the paramilitary field force unit to enforce agricultural regulations.¹⁴ Such measures are, however, seldom brought into play. The use of force is severely circumscribed by a national ethic of persuasion,¹⁵ by an awareness of its often detrimental effect on popular support for leaders and policies,¹⁶ and by the lack of a developed coercive apparatus.

Force, as an expression of a personal aberration or quarrel of an individual Commissioner, as occurred in a celebrated case in 1969,¹⁷ is always a possibility, but the system, with its courts, the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, and the President's admonitions, most often works to discourage its use as a policy instrument.¹⁸ Unless a local leader contemplates an open attack upon a national policy or a Commissioner's method of implementing it, the threat of force is not effective. In the more likely event of local leaders not actively supporting particular policies, in so far as they refrain from public disavowals¹⁹ the possibility of coercive action is remote.

Material allocations, the second type of sanction available to a Commissioner, can be looked at in terms of those controlled mainly by the Government, Party, and cooperatives. As becomes clear in the discussion of the Commissioners' relations with the government bureaucracy in the following section, the capacity of Commissioners to affect government allocations is greatly restricted by the making of almost all allocations in Dar es Salaam

12 The Reports of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry contain notes on cases in which the Regional Administration took action involving the Police with subsequent lack of certainty as to who ordered the action. See, Annual Reports of the Commission for the years, 1966-67, 1967-68, 1968-69, published by the Government Printer, Dar es Salaam.

13 One Regional Commissioner in 1968 ordered all the bars in the regional centre closed after accusing the people of not producing enough cotton because of drunkenness. Within five days all the bars were open again, a fact which the Regional Commissioner thought it "best not to take note of". Interview with Regional Commissioner, March, 1969.

14 In December, 1965, the Field Force was sent into one district to force farmers to use fertilizer and to plant crops.

15 Cf. Clyde R. Ingle, "Compulsion and Rural Development in Tanzania", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, IV, 1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 77-100.

16 The 1965 case referred to in note no. 14, adversely affected popular support for a wide range of development projects and for Regional and Area Commissioners personally. One Regional Commissioner in an interview stated that the lesson learned was that force was not effective in rural development and that were a similar situation to arise again he would not permit its use.

17 In April, 1969, one Area Commissioner ordered the police to detain a taxi driver who was drinking with the Commissioner's estranged wife. Soon after the incident the Commissioner was replaced by a new appointee and later he was appointed Area Commissioner for another district. The case was tried in February, 1970, by a Resident Magistrate who found the Commissioner guilty of wrongfully confining the taxi-driver. In the appeal to the High Court in May, 1970, the verdict was upheld. The police officer leading the prosecution stated that he had been ordered by Dar es Salaam to prosecute another public official in the Region for a similar offence also committed in 1969, but there were no subsequent prosecutions.

18 But, see Ingle, loc. cit.

19 The public nature of the opposition of the two West Lake M.P.s to the Regional Commissioner's way of implementing the ujamaa village programme was probably a key factor in their subsequent expulsion from TANU in 1968. The affair is considered in H. U. E. Thoden van Velsen and J. J. Sterkenburg, "The Party Supreme", *Kroniek van Africa*, I (1969); also, "Report of the West Lake Commission Enquiry", *Sunday News*, October 13, 1968.

rather than at the district or regional levels. It is chiefly the Regional Development Fund and some local government funds which are somewhat at their disposal but which they have tended to be allowed effective control over, with the notable exception of several prestige projects, the control of which remains with the representatives of the ministries²⁰

A Commissioner's control over Party allocations is not very significant. As the Party has grown administratively it has accumulated more rules and regulations concerning the expending of its resources, and these are enforced by TANU's Executive Secretaries (sometimes referred to as Deputy Secretaries) at the regional and district levels. A Commissioner who attempts to use the Party machine to gain leverage over the local leaders discovers that it is not, as it has been described by some observers, an "instrumentality directly available to the Commissioner".²¹ The sorts of resources which constitute the machine—information, money, men—are scarce commodities the expenditure of which is increasingly controlled through centrally issued instructions. The discretionary range of the Commissioners is limited with the use of allowances, transport, files, and offices following procedures which make the Executive Secretary the warrant officer. On several occasions in 1969, when I was present, Executive Secretaries without hesitation rejected written instructions from Commissioners as not being "proper" and refused to comply without specific orders from TANU headquarters in Dar es Salaam.²²

Though a Commissioner's influence in government and TANU allocative process is weak this is not so with the allocations of the large cooperative union in the area which was taken over by the government in 1967.²³ During

20 This is clear from my own research and from Paul Collins. "The Working of Tanzania's Rural Development Fund: A Problem in Decentralization", IDS Communication No. 62, University of Sussex, July, 1971.

21 Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul, "The District Development Front in Tanzania" (mimeo.), Dar es Salaam, October, 1969, p. 12.

22 The general observations in this paragraph depend on interviews with Commissioners and Executive Secretaries in all of the four districts. Two of the incidents which I witnessed involved written requests from Area Commissioners to District Executive Secretaries—one, to provide temporary office space for a university student working with the Rural Research Project of the University College, Dar es Salaam, the other, to assist in accommodating another student from the same project. The third was a request from the Regional Commissioner for cell leader lists to be provided to the project to facilitate the choosing of a random sample for a farm survey. In all three cases, the requests were rejected; in the first one the Secretary claimed the request to use TANU offices was "not proper", in the second the claim was that the Secretary had not been "properly informed" of the project, and in the third, that cell leader lists were confidential and the Regional Commissioner had no authority to disclose such information.

23 *The Report of the Presidential Special Committee into the Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1966), paragraphs 278 and 279, referring to Regional and Area Commissioners and other politicians, records the finding of the Committee that, "while political interference in the co-operative movement has plainly been excessive... in almost all cases the pressures were exerted under the (however mistaken) notion that it was for the good of the country". The not quite clear position of the Commissioners is reflected in Government's response to this report, in which they made a distinction between "interference and necessary intervention; and also between unauthorized politicians on one hand and on the other hand the Minister, Regional and Area Commissioners whose duty may require their intervention. The references to 'political' interference, however, is unfortunate; a better and more appropriate reference could

my eighteen months in the region in 1969-70 there were many allegations of Commissioners "ordering" the cooperative or one of its zonal offices to take specific actions. Most of these were obviously intended to achieve a higher crop production, to increase the number and quality of services to ujamaa villages, and to encourage support for other national goals. A few such "orders", however, were also fairly direct attempts by Commissioners to sanction particular local leaders. Whether these were made possible by the newness and uninstitutionalized nature of the relationships between the Commissioners and the cooperatives will be clearer after more time has passed. For 1969-70 the conclusion would seem to be that the cooperatives provided one of the few sets of resources potentially available to a Commissioner. My own research, however, indicated that these somewhat free resources were also open to manipulation by cooperative leaders and others and that their manipulation required large inputs of time, something that Commissioners generally did not put in.

The third type of sanction available to a Commissioner is the discrediting of local leaders (or their projects) in the estimation of national leaders. Local leaders are aware that as a member of the National Executive Committee the Regional Commissioner participates in discussions leading to the rejection and expulsion of leaders, and that the opinion of Area and Regional Commissioners will be considered in evaluating nominees for elected positions and for appointment to salaried posts in the Party and Government. The national standing of a Commissioner is, however, a resource difficult to measure and of changing value. Though others have drawn attention to the direct access of Regional Commissioners to the President,²⁴ only matters of the most urgent nature can be taken to the President irregularly, otherwise a Commissioner must wait until meeting the President in a scheduled meeting, which for an Area Commissioner may be limited to those occasions when the President visits his District (and there are 61 Districts). Regional Commissioners, with their posts in Dar es Salaam,²⁵ meet the President quite often; one estimated it was ten or twelve times a year at least. These meetings between the President and a Regional Commissioner have been helpful in adding to a Commissioner's prestige and they have been useful in freeing funds for "regional projects", yet local leaders understand the reality that those who have such access are also vulnerable to central disfavour. One Commissioner, after a private meeting with Nyerere in Dar es Salaam, spoke upon his return to the region of the assurance he had been given that he would be in the region for a long time so as to get certain projects well under way. Shortly afterwards he was transferred out of the region, being informed of the move by police

probably have been intervention, by persons in authority, through their incursions into matters which judging strictly by financial results they are not qualified to deal with". *Proposals of the Tanzania Government on the Recommendation of the Special Presidential Committee of Enquiry into the Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1966), p. 17.

24 Cliffe and Saul, op. cit., p. 4.

25 Along with being on the NEC, the Regional Commissioners are ex-officio members of the National Assembly and usually sit on at least one governmental or parastatal board or commission, and are also sometimes on the national committee of one of TANU's affiliated bodies—TAPA, TYL, NUTA, and CUT.

radio thirty minutes before it was publicly announced on the mid-day news broadcast. This experience was widely known and discussed amongst political leaders in the region at the time.

The ability of a Commissioner to bring about the rejection of local leaders by national leaders, while well deserving of calculation, is a delayed sanction. In the short run the few aspects of this resource which a Commissioner can manipulate, such as the excluding of local leaders from tours and the displaying of a disapproving deportment toward them, are not in themselves central disfavour but merely imply it, and depend for their effectiveness on the national and local political standing of the Commissioner relative to that of a local leader within his own organization and, sometimes, nationally.²⁶ Politically it is a difficult situation, especially for the Commissioners at the district level. They most often lack any clearly recognized claim to national stature and district TANU leaders normally have a political base with which the Commissioners are unfamiliar. The expenditure of the unmeasurable and fluid political resources which accrue from national or local political status involves risk to all the parties involved.

The difficulty which Commissioners have in accurately estimating the political risk of a conflict with local leaders and the bringing of their resources into play arises from their stance outside the intricacies of local politics, a problem stemming only partly from the policy of appointing Commissioners to areas other than their own.²⁷ In conversations Commissioners were generally unable to recall the names of elected and appointed TANU officials at the ward level, and in several instances were unfamiliar with Regional and District personalities other than those holding the more prominent positions.

A Commissioner's knowledge of the personalities and issues of local politics would be enhanced by a pattern of personal contacts with local TANU leaders, but the shortcomings in this respect in 1969-70 were apparent. One Commissioner described his position as "isolated", an isolation which he could not very well move to reduce as it might threaten the prestige of the "personal representative of the President" (himself), and in a more immediate way, might be construed as conferring favour upon certain local leaders, disfavour upon others (the Commissioner used the analogy of an ambassador), and have repercussions unpredictable to one with an insufficient knowledge of the personalities and other factors. This is not the feeling of all Commissioners. Two Area Commissioners, both young and somewhat expansive, undertook to meet and engage in informal conversation as many local personalities as

26 The Regional Chairman sits as a voting member of the National Executive Committee, and the regional representative (usually referred to as M.N.C.—Member of the National Conference) sits as a voting member on both the National Executive and Central Committees.

27 One case, in some ways I think instructive, which I observed in May, 1969, was the election of a TANU ward chairman. The Area Commissioner opened the meeting with a few words on the importance of the popular election of leaders and then departed. Three weeks later in an interview he observed that he did not yet know who had won the elections. The ward, which had been as administratively and politically resistant as any to directions from above, I had thought would be an area in which the Commissioner, who has an overall responsibility for mobilization, would have followed closely the changes in the local TANU leadership.

possible. The outstanding example of a concerted effort to broaden contacts was one Commissioner's practice of regularly inviting local leaders and others to his home for extended evenings of casual discussion on local and national problems. The opinion of the Commissioners that their local contacts are insufficient is reflected in one of their decidedly structured approaches to a solution—the arranging of semi-private parties for Commissioners and local leaders prior to the meetings of the district and regional executive committees.²⁸

More formal contacts between the Commissioners and the Party leaders—in development committee meetings (although absenteeism on both sides is high), at Party and District Council meetings—in most months totalled about three or four times for an Area Commissioner and two or three times for a Regional Commissioner who is more often out of the region. In meetings other than the Party meetings the agenda were put together by civil servants and there was not normally any advance co-ordination of positions between Commissioners and the other TANU leaders. Tours, a constant activity mostly at the district level, were sometimes taken in unison reminiscent of the early years after independence. More commonly, one TANU leader from the district or regional level seemed to be considered sufficient legitimation for encouraging support for a local project, and while everybody was often travelling at the same time, they were quite regularly headed in different directions. Area Commissioners appeared to spend more time touring with civil servants than with TANU leaders. This was reinforced by the district TANU chairman's ex-officio chairmanship of the District Council which gave him a series of responsibilities unrelated to the exhortative and mobilizational activities of the Area Commissioner and his tours. The Chairmen spent most of their time in their District Council offices (although in one district the TANU district office since late 1969 has been in the District Council office building); the Commissioners spent most of their time at the District administrative centres; and the TANU offices were left in the care of the District Executive Secretaries. If a Commissioner wanted another TANU personality along on a tour, or at times as a stand-in for the Commissioner himself, it was the District Executive Secretary who was often chosen. Other TANU leaders in the districts usually lived outside the administrative centre and as non-paid office-holders had other interests which required their attention. Tours themselves have had a declining capacity to assist in the creation of personal links. With the improved roads tours are increasingly less arduous and officials rarely stay overnight outside the district or regional centres.

The frequency with which Commissioners and local TANU leaders consulted and co-ordinated was also indicated by the extent to which they visited each other's offices. In two of the districts the offices of the Area Commissioner and

28 I attended one such party prior to a meeting of the Regional Executive Committee. Several Commissioners present stated explicitly that these parties were necessary for the Commissioners to "get to know" the local leaders especially as other informal methods (drinking in bars, visiting at home) were not always open to a Commissioner.

TANU are about one-half mile apart, and the arrival of the Commissioner at the TANU office is an important event. Messengers and clerks in the TANU offices thought that the Commissioners visited the TANU premises about once a fortnight either for meetings or to hold a political surgery for the hearing of people's complaints and grievances. The TANU District Executive Secretaries thought that the Commissioners came two or three times a week while the Commissioners informed me that they made a point of visiting the TANU district office at least once a day. My own impression, given that the Commissioners were usually out of the district centres ten or twelve working days a month on tours or on visits to the regional centre, and excluding visits which were strictly for the brief passing of salutations, was that the Commissioners went to the TANU offices four or five times a month. On the other hand, District TANU leaders visited the Area Commissioners in their government office only on rare occasions, and, in fact, tended when they did go to the government offices to see the Area Secretaries. The Regional Commissioner's office and the Regional TANU offices were adjacent during 1969-1970 and this made estimates of their contacts difficult. The regional chairman of TANU did, however, accompany the Regional Commissioner on his tours and on public days, more so than was the case with their district counterparts, and it was these tours which consistently brought Commissioners and TANU leaders at all levels together. In this sense it was unfortunate that the Regional Commissioner spent as much time out of the region as in it.²⁹

Except for the Regional Development Committee's sub-committee of which the TANU Regional Chairman is a member, local Party representatives as such sit on no allocative bodies of significance in the region. The local Party itself mainly allocates positions within its own organization and thus Party discussions are often of the type in which a Commissioner's lack of local grounding places him in the position of an outsider. As a mobilizer for development in his area, a Commissioner is concerned with exhortations to support centrally decided policies and programmes, and those projects which appear to conform with the central policies. Ostensible support is rarely withheld by TANU leaders and they faithfully, if not always very urgently, exhort the peasants to work harder and follow national policies. For the Commissioners to require more, for instance for them to insist that the local exhorters do as they are exhorting others to do,³⁰ would raise the possibility of a conflict which, as noted above, involves risk to the Commissioners. In this context "party discipline" is indeed replaced by 'intra-party diplomacy'.³¹

29 N.B.—The national TANU's 1970 annual report admonished the Commissioners for not spending a few hours every month or fortnight at the TANU offices at the district and regional centres. *The Nationalist*, June 8, 1971.

30 The lack of urgency accompanying the leaders' support of the *ujamaa* village policy was the recurrent example. Of the then seventeen regions this region ranked seventeenth in 1969 and sixteenth in 1970 in the officially reported number of *ujamaa* villages, although it had the largest rural population.

31 Cliffe and Saul, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

THE COMMISSIONERS AND THE BUREAUCRACY

The relationship between a Commissioner and the officials of the various government departments is the critical one if he is to increase participation in the political system. As the political head of his area, he must ensure that the civil servants implement policies in a way consonant with broad national goals, and at the same time ensure their responsiveness to the demands of the local people. These two aspects are, of course, at times contradictory, but before a Commissioner can be in the position of choosing between conflicting national and local political pressures, he must be able to control the activities of the bureaucracy.

The term "control" as used here is more encompassing than co-ordination. Co-ordination of governmental activities at the regional and district levels in Tanzania has been recognized as a problem which is intensifying with the growth of governmental staffs and activities. The post-independence improvements in communications between the centre and the periphery re-enforced the tendency for regional officials to make referrals back to their Dar es Salaam headquarters rather than relying upon the arbitration or guidance of a Commissioner to resolve differences amongst themselves. The tension between co-ordination, which is seen as a primary function of a Commissioner,³² and a department's goal of technically correct and independent decision-making has elsewhere been viewed as a conflict between areal and functional criteria of administration, or between generalists and specialists. In Tanzania it has been seen as a conflict between overarching national policies and the more narrow programmes and interests of the individual government departments.³³ The key document outlining the official strategy for the rural development programme of *ujamaa* villages set forth the Commissioners' role in resolving this conflict:

United action from all Government Ministries and public organizations concerned with the rural areas is vital to the whole success of the new approach for the promotion of *Ujamaa* Villages, and the co-operative production units which we hope will be stages on the way to full *Ujamaa* Villages. It is essential that all Ministries put their services, and that of their field staffs, to the promotion of these policies to the maximum extent possible. The fact that this requires

32 Cabinet Paper No. 70 of 1967, "The Promotion and Implementation of Rural Development", the authoritative statement on the administrative arrangements for most of the rural development strategy, stated: "the Area Commissioner's chief role should be that of political inspiration and explanation, and co-ordination of the activities of the Ministerial representatives. Only if he fails in his co-ordination efforts should the matter need to be referred to this Ministry" (for submission to a standing committee).

33 *Ibid.* This Cabinet paper led to the setting up of a Standing Committee on Rural Development Policy, consisting mostly of Principal Secretaries, to solve difficulties and disagreements so that co-ordination would not be "disrupted by Ministerial interests and jealousies". A Ministerial working paper which led to this Cabinet decision observed that one of the "obvious weaknesses of the development system in Tanzania is... the lack of effective joint interests. In most instances members of the District Development Committee are only interested in their own programmes. Also they operate to the advantage of the Ministries rather than to the advantage of the people who are faced with the problems".

co-operation with *Maendeleo* in Dar es Salaam and with Regional and Area Commissioners at a lower level does not imply a loss of control by the technical Ministries; it simply means that there will be a co-ordinated attack for the furtherance of our *Ujamaa* Policies and the transformation of our rural economy. For this policy and this responsibility is not just of, and for, *Maendeleo*; it is a Government policy and responsibility.³⁴

The problem of governmental co-ordination in the regions has been seriously addressed in recent years. The 1968 appointment of Regional Economic Secretaries, and the 1969 appointment of Regional Directors of Agriculture³⁵ and Regional *Ujamaa* Village Officers were attempts to produce a more effective co-ordination in the periphery. The 1972 decentralization or deconcentration of departmental authority to the regions can be viewed as a further step in this direction of a better meshing of the administration. But the need for co-ordination, if it is successfully met, may make more crucial the necessity of political control. As better co-ordination of governmental activities is achieved, the penetrative capacity of the governmental hierarchy will be increased (*ceteris paribus*). A Commissioner, in his participatory role, is charged with ensuring that these co-ordinated activities are directed in particular, politically chosen, directions; in other words, he must not only facilitate co-ordination, he must control it as well. A Commissioner who was successful in co-ordinating governmental activities with a resultant increase in crop production could not, given Tanzania's overarching goals, be regarded as successful unless he also ensured that the increase was generated and the benefits distributed in a politically acceptable fashion.

The Commissioners are of central importance in this control process because in many respects it is they alone who are to judge the political acceptability of governmental actions in the periphery: there are no elected representative bodies at the regional level and the District Councils since 1969 have had little power, and neither the national nor local TANU organization has other representatives in authoritative positions in the government hierarchy outside of Dar es Salaam.³⁶ In this context great emphasis has been laid upon the Commissioners' role as *the* representative of the people in many instances. Thus Cabinet Paper No. 70 of 1967 stated that plans should be "people's" plans and not "official's" plans and that it was the task of the Regional and Area Commissioners to ensure that they were indeed people's plans "where the impetus for this is lacking at the local level".

34 Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969, "The Development of *Ujamaa* Villages", March 20, 1969, paragraph 19.

35 The Regional Directors of Agriculture were to have increased authority over local expenditures. This has been reported as being 15 per cent of recurrent expenditures contained in votes such as upkeep of station, travel allowances, etc., D. B. Jones, "Rural and Regional Planning in Tanzania", paper presented to the Conference on Comparative Administration in East Africa, Arusha, Tanzania, September 25-28, 1971.

36 Recently there have been some arguments made in favour of a regionally elected representative body. See, A. Rweyemamu, "The Preconditions for Regional Planning: The Case for a Viable Institutional Framework", paper presented to the Conference on Comparative Administration in East Africa, Arusha, Tanzania, September 25-28, 1971.

The instruments available to a Commissioner for effecting this control are few. Force is not a realistic alternative. Civil servants are at least superficially malleable to the legitimate demands of a Commissioner for time, information and deference, and they do not indulge in controversial public statements. The material allocations which affect the civil servants personally are either centrally controlled by their own ministries (promotions and, usually, leave), or by civil servants at the district and regional levels (housing, travel and subsistence allowances). Central regard for a civil servant, manifested in letters in a personal file, transfers, and promotions, whose career is normally to be within his own department, relies upon the approval or disapproval of other civil servants in his ministry or, occasionally, of the Administrative Secretary. In fact, to the extent that control has been exercised over the activities of the technical departments and their civil servants by individuals not within their own ministries, it has been the Administrative and Area Secretaries, and not their Commissioners, who have been the most effective.³⁷

The Administrative and Area Secretaries are considered the most senior civil servants in their areas, and all governmental communications to, and most often from, the Commissioners pass through their offices.³⁸ As chairmen of the housing committees at their respective levels, the secretaries have been adamant in refusing to allow the Commissioners influence in the allocation of official accommodation; with the severe chronic shortage of housing, especially at the regional centre, and consequent jockeying amongst departments and officials for accommodation, this is a considerable power.³⁹ The secretaries also can, and do, write confidential letters for inclusion in an officer's personal file and this undoubtedly has a bearing on the secretaries' relationships with the other civil servants. Perhaps the most potent instrument open to the Administrative Secretary, and through him the Area Secretaries, is the authority to communicate directly with an officer's Principal Secretary to complain about an individual's performance. Such communications have had the effect of immediately producing explanations and apologies from the officer concerned.

Within the administrative process at the regional level the position of the Administrative Secretary is enhanced by his role as the effective executive officer of the Regional Development Committee's Sub-Committee.⁴⁰ This is the primary co-ordinating body, and it is also the focus for decision-making

37 The relations between the Commissioners and these Secretaries, and even more so their relative positions vis-à-vis the civil servants, has been one of the more neglected areas of Tanzania administration. Bienen devoted several pages to it but they are largely concerned with formal structuring. The more analytical piece by Cliffe and Saul devotes one line to this topic. See, Bienen, op. cit., pp. 317-20; Cliffe and Saul, op. cit., p. 4.

38 This communication procedure was formally agreed to by the Cabinet in May, 1966. Also, it was made clear that all communications from the centre to the region would pass through the Administrative Secretary.

39 The Administrative Secretary in the region studied sat often as a one-man housing committee. In several instances he was able to prevent or delay officers who had been specifically requested by the Regional Commissioner from coming to the region by taking the stand that no housing was available.

40 At the district level this role was shared between the Area Secretary and the Executive Officer of the District Council who was the Secretary of the District Development Committee.

on the expenditure of the Regional Development Fund, that is, the bulk of the development funds allocated at sub-national level. The Administrative Secretary in this region was able to issue decisions as to who should sit on the committee and on the acceptability of agenda proposed by other regional heads. He also sits as the chairman of the Regional Development Committee in the absence of the Regional Commissioner, a task which garners recognition and deference from the other regional officers. He is the only civil servant with a private washroom and its "executive key".

In one sense, an Area or Administrative Secretary is indeed helpful to a Commissioner—he sees to it that actions and expenditures are legally proper, he is almost always in the office thus providing a continuity which an often absent Commissioner cannot,⁴¹ and he prepares and carries out much of the work of correspondence, agenda preparation, and miscellaneous tasks, including deputizing for the Commissioner at official functions and listening to grievances of the public, in which Commissioners have not been able or inclined to involve themselves. Theoretically, this allows the Commissioners time to deal with TANU and to inspire and enthuse the masses. For a Commissioner's goal of controlling the officials, however, this position of the Secretary can present an added difficulty in that he becomes the sole link between the Commissioner and the civil servants. He is aware of (and often present at) meetings of other officials with the Commissioner and is informed in a general way of what transpires.

To the extent that a Commissioner is a line superior of the central government officers in his area, the Administrative or Area Secretary is the link through which this authority is exercised. The nature of this linkage varies and the most accurate way to perceive a Secretary in this regard is as an intermediary with fluctuating amounts of influence. Most interestingly, in certain cases the Secretaries have been able to disregard the orders of the Commissioners. One instance in particular is instructive in a study concerned with increasing participation. On several occasions in 1970 the Administrative Secretary informed me of his opinion that the Regional Development Committee was "too political", with the politicians giving sometimes "embarrassing speeches" on things about which they "knew nothing". Later, he informed a government official (who remarked to me on the matter immediately afterwards) that there were only two "socialists" in the Region, naming two individuals. The following month, one of the two "socialists" was asked by the Regional Commissioner if he would sit on the Regional Development Committee. He agreed, and the Commissioner instructed the Administrative Secretary to put his name on the list. The Administrative Secretary delayed and finally refused, telling me later, in response to a question, that he had decided that the committee was already too large and that it was better not to add another participant. The Regional Commissioner did not pursue the matter.

⁴¹ The Regional Commissioners who are often out of the region are aware that this leads to perhaps a too great dependence on the Administrative Secretary. (Regional Commissioner's interview.)

The Secretary, is however, more than just a communications linkage or intermediary. He is at the same time the only direct adviser to the Commissioner. Since independence, the Secretaries have served as the sole staff officers of the Commissioners and they have retained a monopoly of the provision of general advice⁴² to the Commissioners.⁴³ This is most apparent when it is done in confidential letters to the Commissioner from his Secretary in which evaluations are made of the proposals of the advisers and technical officers, letters which the specialists do not normally see and which can, at times, contradict their advice.

The establishment of two positions in 1968-69 was partly intended to strengthen the position of the Regional Commissioner by creating in his office a "kitchen cabinet" of civil servants who would be his personal advisers concerned with issues which overlapped the interests of single departments. If successful these moves would have limited the Administrative Secretary's role as the Commissioner's hitherto general adviser. One, was the appointment in early 1969 of the first Regional Ujamaa Village Officer, a former District Co-operative Officer, to assist the Commissioner in the co-ordination of the various programmes of the several ministries which were to be working toward the setting up and support of ujamaa villages. He was to "work directly under, and to, the Regional Commissioner".⁴⁴

In his first year in the position, however, the Ujamaa Village Officer did not work at all closely with the Regional Commissioner. In practice he worked strictly through the Administrative Secretary who vetted his requests, very important in the context, for transport, his use of travel and subsistence allowances, and the reports which he forwarded to the Regional Commissioner, appointments with whom were made through the Administrative Secretary. He did not become an adviser to the Commissioner on ujamaa village affairs.⁴⁵

The other appointment intended to strengthen the position of the Regional Commissioner was the posting in late 1968 of a Regional Economic Secretary to the region. The decision to appoint Economic Secretaries to the regions evolved from several strains of thought of which it will be helpful to distinguish two. The first was a desire to increase the effectiveness of central planning,⁴⁶ initially by improving the information-gathering process in the

⁴² Another group of officials who are potentially general advisers to a Commissioner are those from Rural Development (*Maendeleo*). In practice, however, they work under the Administrative Secretary. This also holds true for the Rural Development Officer (Local Government) in his role as Secretary of the RDC Subcommittee and adviser to the Regional Commissioner on District Council affairs.

⁴³ One Area Commissioner, in describing the job of his Area Secretary, distinguished between administration (and he listed the specific duties of the Secretary) and "advising me on all the things which my office handles". Interview, March, 1970.

⁴⁴ Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969, "The Development of Ujamaa Villages", March 20, paragraph 20.

⁴⁵ This is a conclusion from a reading of the relevant files, observations and interviews.

⁴⁶ This decisional strain has a longer history than the second, popular participation, strain. Most importantly, the first strain had earlier brought Devplan officials to the region. In June, 1965, during a state visit to France, the President requested experts for Devplan. In February, 1966, two agricultural specialists from a French aid agency arrived and were assigned to an Economic Zone (consisting of four

periphery and later, by producing regional and district plans which were implementable and which were within the framework of a national plan. This line of thought was essentially a product of the professional and technical desires of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning (Devplan).⁴⁷

The second strain, and of particular interest here, was the desire on the part of the President and other political leaders to increase popular participation in the planning process. The first Plan's regional documents (not that they were necessarily taken into account when the national Plan was being put together) had come almost entirely from civil servants.⁴⁸ The appointment of Economic Secretaries to the regions was initially and primarily intended to alter this lack of popular inputs at the regional and district levels by strengthening the position of the Regional Commissioner.⁴⁹ The Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning, after a consultation with the President in April 1968, reported in a memorandum to his Ministry, the reasoning and instructions of the President:

It is essential to involve the masses in future planning and implementation of development projects. To this end you are required to re-examine the present machinery for planning and implementation of projects with a view to decentralising authority. As an immediate step you are asked to provide a Planning Officer to each Regional Commissioner.

At a further meeting with the President that April the Devplan Minister, accompanied by seven of his senior officials, was instructed to post to the regions "economic advisers to the Regional Commissioners". Shortly afterwards the first group of Regional Economic Secretaries were selected, trained,

regions) with instructions to draw up a plan for the region which I studied. They decided to concentrate on one district and in July, 1966, produced a plan for that district. It was largely a compilation of information and was not taken into account during the national planning process. See, also Robert Chambers on "Planning without Implementation" in his, "Planning for Rural Areas in Africa: Experience and Prescriptions", *The African Review*, I, 3 (January, 1972).

- 47 During 1968 there were several attempts by Devplan officials to define regional planning. Although no formulation was authoritatively accepted, the apparently least controversial one within Devplan itself indicates their emphasis on the technical strain: a regional plan was to identify "the various localized development efforts which in view of the available resources will more productively contribute to the realization of the national development objectives".
- 48 The following was the description of one section of the "plan" submitted by the region as described by the Administrative Secretary, the Regional Community Development Officer, and the Deputy Regional Secretary of TANU in a 22nd November, 1963, letter to the Director of Planning: "The plan as presented below gives what can be done by the Water Development and Irrigation Division rather than what is wanted by the people. The programme could be later fitted to the requirements of the people as these develop, without much affecting it." See, also, Gary Karmiloff, "Regional Plan Implementation: Tanzania's Experiment", *East African Economics Review*, I, 2 (June, 1965), and, R. C. Pratt, "The Administration of Economic Planning in a Newly Independent State: the Tanzanian Experience, 1963-66", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* (March, 1967), pp. 30-59.
- 49 The 1967 setting up of the Rural Development Fund was also devised to increase participation, although this was somewhat obviated at first by the need for central approval of all projects over 50,000 shillings and later fairly well disregarded with the deconcentration of decision-making to the RDC sub-committee (which is in effect the regional team) and the central promulgation of very specific guidelines on the sorts of projects eligible for funds.

and posted to the regions.⁵⁰ The Regional Economic Secretary for our region took up his post in November, 1968.⁵¹

During this seven-month interim the Presidential emphasis on increasing the involvement of the "masses" in the planning process was superseded by Devplan's continuing desire to strengthen *central* planning through full-time, regional planning officers. In fact, the training programme for the new Secretaries was itself used as an information gathering process by the central planners who needed project data from regional officials. The timing of the posting was such that there was only one month in which to produce the regional plan for consideration in the national process,⁵² an impossible task, and when it was produced in June 1969,⁵³ the final version of the Second Five Year Plan had already been completed.⁵⁴

It was not, however, only the timing which made any effective regional contribution unlikely. The Secretaries' "terms of reference" had specified that the preparation of regional and district plans was to have priority.⁵⁵ And the Cabinet had in 1967 decided that as it was impossible to devise lower level plans unless the broad national economic directions were specified, the planning ministry was to produce "guidelines" for the District Development and Planning Committee. In spite of these indications, Devplan officials took the position, which they were able to maintain throughout the planning process, that if regional and district level investment intentions were divulged, it "would be embarrassing if later cuts were made or projects rephased".⁵⁶ Consequently

- 50 P. Raikes, P. Lawrence, D. Warner, and G. Saylor, "Regional Planning in Tanzania: An Economic View from the Field", E.R.B. (Restricted) Paper 68.8, Economic Research Bureau, University College, Dar es Salaam, January, 1969, contains some notes on the training and establishing of the Regional Economic posts. The training included a trip to the regions which was variously described as being to "assist the Regional Development Committees work out regional plans", "extensions of the two-week orientation course" and "stocktaking exercises". It should be noted that the Devplan Minister was very sensitive about criticisms from Area and Regional Commissioners that Devplan was formulating another "official's" plan and he had earlier ordered his Principal Secretary to take steps to "correct this impression". The contradictory descriptions of the training of Economic Secretaries reflects the desires to both improve central planning and to have a people's plan.
- 51 The first Economic Secretary was replaced in mid-1969. His successor still held the position as of December, 1971, although since September, 1971, he was on study leave.
- 52 Devplan had ordered that all regional plans were to be submitted by the end of December, 1968.
- 53 By which time it was styled a "report on regional planning" and was described in the Economic Secretary's covering letter as a listing of "some of the projects submitted by the Districts for implementation during the second Five-Year Plan", which, with "a careful look" one would realize did not contain information "detailed enough for a clear project evaluation".
- 54 Late in May, 1969, the Plan had been "explained" to the TANU national conference, and it came into effect on July 1, 1969. See the speech by the President to the conference which is reproduced in Vol. 1 of the Plan.
- 55 The initial discussions within Devplan on the "terms of reference for Regional Economic Secretaries", emphasized that the drafting of regional and district plans was urgent. The other functions, broadly referred to as "orientation" and "appraisal and review" were considered of secondary importance. The official statement on the priority of the Secretaries' task of drawing up plans was made by the Devplan Principal Secretary in October, 1968.
- 56 This position was formally taken in a January 15, 1968, meeting held at Devplan headquarters of officials from six ministries on the implementation of the Cabinet decision. For the 1971-72 Annual Plan the situation was apparently the same with regional officials learning of regional allocation only *ex-post*.

the Regional Economic Secretaries were not given the information which would have made possible lower level planning. Their role in the planning process then became one of investigating and reporting to the central planners on implementation, a role which somewhat duplicated the reporting procedures of the other departments. With a shortage of travel funds, with a very limited access to other departments' files, and lengthy absences from the region on official duties of an *ad hoc* nature, the Regional Economic Secretary up until my departure in July 1970, had not been able to take up this reportorial role very extensively. It is interesting in this regard that when the Regional Commissioner appointed a three man team to report on the progress of all projects funded with Regional Development Fund monies, in April 1970, the Economic Secretary was not amongst them.

That the Economic Secretary's contribution to the planning process was negligible need not have obviated his intended role as an "economic adviser to the Regional Commissioner". Indeed, there was a need for the Commissioner to have broad analyses undertaken of the on-going and suggested projects of the various ministries and to thus have an independent source of economic advice to counter-balance the "localism" of the departments. As it happened though, the Economic Secretary was put in the position of reporting to the Commissioner and to Devplan through the Administrative Secretary. This was something more than the normal "through" procedure; as the Administrative Secretary explained to the senior regional officials prior to the economist's arrival, the Regional Economic Secretary was "under the Administrative Secretary".⁵⁷ In practice this meant that the economist's advice to the Commissioner was evaluated by the Administrative Secretary, before being passed on, and thus the Commissioner remained with only one adviser—the Administrative Secretary. The effects of an Administrative Secretary's advice on technical matters was often decisive. For instance, the first assignment given the new Regional Economic Secretary in July 1969, by the Regional Commissioner was to appraise the viability of a government-financed farm and trades training workshop and to recommend whether or not a bridging loan for which they were applying should be granted. After a month's work the Economic Secretary, in a lengthy report, supported the scheme's application. In a confidential letter of which the Economic Secretary was not informed, the Administrative Secretary briefly advised the Regional Commissioner not to grant the loan (it would have come from the RDF monies and thus the Regional Commissioner was the decision-maker) on the basis that the scheme was uneconomic—with no further explanation given. The Regional Commissioner decided not to support the loan application, and, as he had himself been only recently appointed to the region, appears to have relied upon the Administrative Secretary's advice.

The notion that the economist might be a general adviser to the Commissioner on economic affairs, thus increasing the Commissioner's capacity to judge and hence control the technical departments seemed to be disregarded

57 This was stated in a paper of October, 1968, which was circulated to the regional departmental heads by the Administrative Secretary.

by the Commissioners. They treated the Economic Secretaries as fairly junior line civil servants under the Administrative Secretary, and by the Economic Secretaries themselves who thought that it was better not to get involved and who, appreciating the authority of the Administrative Secretary, thought it well advised not to compete with him.

The claim that I am making here that an Administrative or Area Secretary is in a position more powerful than his Commissioner vis-à-vis the civil servants should not be put too dogmatically. Aside from the fact that my focus has been limited to one region, during the two years that I was either visiting or living there, at the regional level there was only one Administrative Secretary.⁵⁸ And although I did have the opportunity of observing his relationships with two different Commissioners, of observing numerous counterpart pairs at district level, and of reading files which indicated relationships between earlier Secretaries and Commissioners, I would hedge on any conclusion until I have seen reports of other regional pairs in action.⁵⁹

To argue too strongly on this point would also divert from an understanding of the more general structuring of the political administrative process within which a Commissioner operates, namely, that most funds are allocated centrally and no officials, political or civil service, at the regional level have any great impact at stages other than implementation. The only exceptions to this which have been of some importance are the District Council funds (and since 1969 these have depended largely on central government subventions)⁶⁰ and the four per cent of development expenditure which is allocated to the Regional Development Fund (RDF).⁶¹

The RDF has provided some leverage for the Regional Commissioners. In this region, however, they have devoted their attention to "regional projects" such as large farms and settlements and a motel. The Commissioners have been successful in diverting RDF funds to these large projects, and sometimes in raising other central government funds as well, for instance, for a game reserve and the TANU regional headquarters building. Each one of the four

58 The Administrative Secretary had completed Secondary School, attended a technical college, passed the Administrative Law Examination, and had done a nine-month course at an American university. He was an Assistant District Commissioner/Magistrate after independence, and subsequently served as an Administrative Secretary in another region and as a Principal Assistant Secretary in Dar es Salaam before he was appointed Administrative Secretary for the region studied. He is, in short, a highly qualified and experienced civil servant.

59 Between October, 1963, and October, 1971, there were four Administrative Secretaries for this Region and four Regional Commissioners over the same period, for three of the districts there were fourteen Area Secretaries and ten Area Commissioners. (I exclude one of the districts as since mid-1968 it normally had two Area Secretaries.)

60 Well before the 1969 Budget speech which announced the removal of some 80 per cent of the revenue sources of the District Councils, there was a realization on the part of the Commissioners that the Councils' days as a source of development funds which might be influenced were limited. A Devplan official in February, 1968, noted that one Regional Commissioner thought the Government had decided "to bury the District Councils or at least to have them dealing with only recurrent expenditure". A Regional Commissioner as the "proper officer" of the Councils might in some ways have been able to influence their activities but in this region the Commissioners used their influence over the Councils mainly to get them to contribute to schemes which were classified as "regional projects".

61 Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

Regional Commissioners since 1963 spent a large part of his time on one or two of these "regional projects", all of which qualify for the label "prestige project" or "façade". After 1967 they did not become decisively involved with the allocation of the bulk of the RDF monies which were left, in effect, to the civil servants sitting on the RDC sub-committee.⁶²

The attempts to increase the participatory capacity of the Regional Commissioner through the development of a staff of personal advisers have been, in the case of this region, ineffectual. Other attempts have been made to increase this capacity by strengthening the Commissioners as heads of a line ministry in their own right. The Presidential Circular on Ujamaa villages emphasized that the Commissioners were *Maendeleo* (Rural Development) officials.⁶³ Then, in July 1969, the Divisional Executive Officers throughout the region were replaced by Divisional Secretaries.⁶⁴ The Divisional Executive Officers had been District Council employees reporting directly to the Council's Executive Officer. The new Divisional Secretaries were to be in positions similar to that of the Commissioners (in fact, in some of the preliminary discussions the references were to "Divisional Commissioners"), that is they were to be the Divisional Secretaries of TANU and political heads of government in their areas. They were to be responsible directly to the Area Commissioner. The change was seen as bolstering the Commissioners who had hitherto been regarded as having no line officials under them in the rural areas.⁶⁵

62 This is clear from a reading of the extensive report on the expenditure of RDF monies in the region for 1968-69 and 1969-70 which was compiled by a three-man committee appointed by the Regional Commissioner. It was produced in April, 1970.

63 "It is the responsibility of *Maendeleo*, working through the Regional Commissioners' and Area Commissioners' offices . . .", "the officers of *Maendeleo*, including Regional and Area Commissioners . . .", "the role of *Maendeleo*—which of course includes the Regional Commissioners and Area Commissioners . . ." Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969, "The Development of Ujamaa Village", March 20, 1969, paragraph 12.

64 I interviewed two of the three Divisional Secretaries in one district in March, 1970, and five of another district's six Divisional Secretaries in April, 1970. One was in his late 20s, one in his early 40s and the five others were in their 30s. All had at least eight years of education, two had been TANU branch secretaries and more recently Divisional Executive Officers prior to their appointment, three had been teachers, one an Assistant Divisional Executive Officer, and the other had worked in both government and private public relations and personnel positions. All were from the general area to which they were assigned. Before taking up their posts they had been trained for nine months at a National Service camp, at Kivukoni College, Dar es Salaam, and at an Agricultural Training Institute. My impression was that they all considered themselves to be good administrators with modern ideas and, to a lesser extent, politicized. They seemed to combine elements of both "red" and "expert", with the accent on general administrative expertise.

65 It can also be observed that individual ambitions and protocol dilute the line relationship between Regional and Area Commissioners. The following case is instructive: The Administrative Secretary was asked by a regional officer if the Regional Commissioner would officiate at an opening ceremony while touring a district in February, 1970. After checking with the Regional Commissioner the Administrative Secretary confirmed the arrangements with the regional officer and asked him to inform the Divisional Executive Secretary in the area. This was done. On the day, three regional officers and some one hundred people awaited the Regional Commissioner, who did not appear. A messenger sent by the Area Commissioner informed the people that the Area Commissioner should have been informed earlier and as he was not he was cancelling the Regional Commissioner's

During their first year in the field, the Divisional Secretaries found their positions to be almost anomalous. With TANU not organized on a divisional basis, with few governmental resources to expend, and no development funds to allocate at their level, the Divisional Secretaries were largely restricted to exhortative tours. They themselves and TANU and government officials at the district level expressed puzzlement over their role and their relationship with the Area Commissioners and the District Council.⁶⁶ There was confusion even as to the Divisional Secretaries' place in the Administration, with most considering themselves as much under the District Council and its Executive Officer, as under the Area Commissioner, both of whom they addressed communications to directly (and it was more often the Executive Officer) depending upon the issue. They were not, in their first year, operating as intended as line officials directly responsible to and supportive of the initiative of the Commissioners.

SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Commissioners in this region were not able to significantly lessen the dominance of the bureaucracy in favour of increased political participation in economic and political decision-making at the district and regional levels. In fact, it would seem that certain factors—e.g., the gradual build-up of ministerial staffs and programmes in the regions and district, and better communications with Dar es Salaam—have worked, over the first decade of independent Tanzania, to reduce the ability of Commissioners to participate effectively. Their official position as TANU secretaries has served mainly to make this phenomenon more difficult to perceive. Partly this is because they have not come to be a part of the local TANU organizations to the point of being a possible focus for the input of popular demands. More generally, however, the weakness of the role of a Commissioner has been a result of, (a) the

visit to the opening. The next day the Administrative Secretary informed me that "technically" the Commissioner was within his authority that it was now realized that the Area Commissioner was "touchy", and that although the Regional Commissioner was annoyed the "milk had been spilt" and there was no sense in carrying the matter further.

66 Interviews with the Divisional Secretaries. In August, 1969, six weeks after the Divisional Secretaries took up their post, a TANU District Chairman, in an interview, observed: "Their work is not properly defined. Even if you ask them what their responsibilities are they cannot tell at all." Also in August, 1969, District Executive Secretary of TANU in another district interviewed on the same point, responded: "I do not know. We have not received a circular describing the duties of the Divisional Secretaries." When I interviewed a TANU Executive Secretary and a District TANU Youth League Secretary together on this, in May, 1970, they thought the Divisional Secretaries had an "official" tie with TANU, but not a "working" one; it was their impression that the Divisional Secretaries were "most of the time" working for the District Council. In all the districts the only officials who expressed certainty about the position of the Divisional Secretaries were the Area Secretaries, who thought that they were under the Area Commissioner "through" the Area Secretary. At the Morogoro meeting of the Association of Rural Local Authorities in Tanzania, September 1-2, 1969, many questions were asked as to the duties and authority of the Divisional Secretary. All except the Assistant Commissioner for Local Government and Rural Development claimed to be befuddled. The minutes of this meeting (mimeo.) are a clear explanation of what the Divisional Secretaries should have been doing.

highly centralized process of resource allocation tending to sectoral and departmental rather than areal inputs, and national rather than local priorities, and, (b) the Commissioners' lack of a sufficient stock of sanctions which they might wield with respect to the civil servants who are nominally under them. The civil servants have been largely controlled by their own departments and it is to these departments which they have looked for guidance and career advancement; with respect to the Commissioners, the civil servants have been chiefly induced not to give the appearance of being uncooperative or obstreperous.

What did the Commissioners do during 1969-70? In the region studied they devoted most of their time, and energies to exhortative tours in support of central policies and programmes and to the supervision of prestige projects in search of central approbation. There has been tremendous pressure from the central government and Party for them to have their areas produce politically acceptable achievements and this has undoubtedly been a key factor in their opting, in those instances where they had some allocative power such as the Regional Development Fund, for these large scale, visible projects rather than for a maze of small projects none of which might be found worthy of central recognition.⁶⁷ The Commissioners also listened to complaints and grievances, but certainly not as much as would seem to have been intended by the initial parliamentary descriptions of their functions. Nor were they the most important *Bwana Shauris* in the rural areas; the Administrative and Area Secretaries, and the Executive Officer of the District Council each spent much more time in dealing with individual citizens and groups and their problems.⁶⁸

The Commissioners for the most part then were agents of the hierarchy, especially of the government hierarchy, attempting to mobilize the people to follow central directions. Only marginally, if at all, had they increased participation either by exerting TANU control over the bureaucracy or by representing the interests of the people of their area in the national allocative processes.⁶⁹

Organizationally one of the more interesting features of the role of the Commissioners has been the attempt in recent years to create a staff of personal advisers to the Regional Commissioner. The conflict between area and function, generalists and specialist, or, in Tanzanian terms, between co-

67 The central pressures on or orientation of one Regional Commissioner in 1970 led him several times to telephone the offices of *The Nationalist* in Dar es Salaam to "order" them not to publish certain feature stories which had been filed by the local reporter of the newspaper. The stories, which were not published, concerned prestige projects which had taken much of the time of the Region's last three Regional Commissioners, and which were experiencing difficulty in staying alive financially.

68 These Secretaries were always, during my time in Mwanza Region, much busier and more difficult to see than the Commissioners. The latter, by sharp contrast, appeared to have an exceptional amount of free time when they were in the administrative centre. They seem to have been almost underemployed.


69 Rolf E. Vente, *Planning Process: The East African Case* (Munich: Weltforum, 1970), p. 149, writes: "... the Regional or Area Commissioner is to ... deal with the ... implementation of decisions already taken, but ... his influence upon the concrete working out of the decision itself is limited."

ordination for the attainment of national goals and "ministerial interests and jealousies", was attacked by posting Regional Ujamaa Village Officers and Regional Economic Secretaries to the regional centres with the intention of their becoming something along the lines of a Regional Commissioner's office or department. The rationale behind the establishment of these posts, most explicitly in the case of the economists, was to increase the participation of the masses in the planning and implementation of development projects by strengthening the position of the Regional Commissioner.

The setting up of these posts was not an innovation in the wider sense; that is, other governments⁷⁰ have employed, at times with good results, the principle of using "expert" staff members to support the capacity of a political official to control the "localism" of the civil servants in the regular departments. In this region, however, the experiment was not during my time there proving successful. The Regional Commissioners were not provided with a staff which was as free as possible from loyalty to specific departmental interests and programmes, and which instead was loyal to a Commissioner's goal of achieving broad national objectives and able to advise him competently on the relationship between departmental programmes and projects and the national goals and policies. Rather, the Commissioners remained as they had since independence with a single direct adviser, the Administrative Secretary.⁷¹ Advice to the Commissioner from the Ujamaa Village Officer and Economic Secretary was channelled, as were most communications between department heads and the Commissioner, though the Administrative Secretary who appended his own evaluation, sometimes in confidential letters to the Commissioner which the intended "adviser" was not permitted to read.

70 Franklin Roosevelt's rationale in creating what was to grow to a "President's Department" was that: "he wanted to enhance his own capacity to rule". Richard E. Neustadt, "Approaches to Staffing the Presidency: Notes on FDR and JFK", *American Political Science Review*, LVII (December, 1963), pp. 855-863. Also, Theodore C. Sorensen, *Decision-Making in the White House* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), especially at pp. 70-71: "The parochialism of experts and department heads is offset in part by a President's White House and executive staff. These few assistants are the only other men in Washington whose responsibilities both enable and require them to look, as he does, at the government as a whole. Even the White House specialists—the President's economic advisers or science adviser, for example—are likely to see problems in a broader perspective, within the framework of the President's objectives and without the constraints of bureaucratic tradition."

71 This is somewhat true even when committees are set up to look into important regional economic matters. They are usually chaired by the Administrative Secretary, e.g., the three-man April, 1970, committee to look into RDF project spending and the seven-man March, 1971, committee to look into crop transport.



Map 2.
Principal Growth and Development Schemes Reviewed
in the Tanzam Highway Study Tanzania

