

in endless anti-guerrilla activities, they can use their economic strength for the same purpose of reducing our independence of action.⁶³

In effect, economic commitment of a non-aligned state automatically reduces the options left for her to manoeuvre and further curtails her ability to judge world issues on their own merits despite the fact that possession of the right to judge world issues still obtains. President Nyerere's honesty about this point is praiseworthy. He states: "The real urgent threat to independence of almost all the non-aligned states thus comes not from the military, but from the economic power of the big states. It is poverty which constitutes our greatest danger, and to a greater or lesser extent we are all poor."⁶⁴

Through non-alignment Kenya has consistently reasserted the significance of the principle of self-determination upon which one nation refrains from overt interference in the internal affairs of another, a principle upheld by both the United Nations Organisation and by the Organisation for African Unity. In the United Nations, Kenya sees a potential forum for international understanding and international peace, as well as a framework for multilateral economic interaction between industrialised countries and the poor states.

Through the OAU she seeks to play the role of an honest broker in inter-African politics and co-operation. This derives partly from her relatively strong economy and partly from Jomo Kenyatta's historical role and continuing personal prestige as one of the founding fathers of the Pan-Africanist Movement. Her commitment to decolonisation in areas of Africa still under colonial bondage is signified by her role in recent negotiations between Britain and Rhodesia to bring about an accepted settlement.

The primacy relative to the security of a nation-state, the demands of economic development and related problems, have intermingled to make Kenya's behaviour in foreign affairs cautious but positive and so far effective precisely because it has paid her substantial economic dividends and given her a seeming or at least a temporary domestic stability.

63 Julius K. Nyerere, *Non-Alignment in the 1970s*, opening address delivered on 13 April, 1970, at the preparatory meeting of the non-aligned states in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (see p. 1).

64 Ibid.

The Demise of UPCYL and the Rise of NUYO in Uganda

AKIIKI B. MUJAJU*

Very few colonies in Africa emerged into independence without mass support. In cases where the colonial administration resisted the rise of African nationalism, as in Algeria where African nationalist resistance expressed itself in violent and well-structured movements, as well as in cases where the transfer of power from the empire to the new state was made conditional on demonstration of popular support for nationalist leaders, a degree of mass mobilisation was an imperative. It was also necessary to have within the colony people who could respond to the mass mobilisation effort.

In Africa, so central is the place of the educated few that no mass mobilisation could ignore the young. The youth are not only mobile, they also understand the language of nationalists because of their exposure to new forces, including Western education on the basis of whose ideas much of the nationalist movement was premised. Because they had vigour, mobility, and an interest in abstract ideas the nationalist parties found it necessary to enlist the support of the active and anxious youth. But while the process leading to independence has always tended to unite people, the post-independence era has tended to be divisive. The youth are active before independence; they work in the mobilisation effort. Do they remain active and respectful of their nationalist leaders after independence?

In this paper I examine an experience which might shed some light on this question. The focus of this paper is on the relationship between two wings of what was one Party: 'The Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC) and the Uganda Peoples' Congress Youth League (UPCYL). I examine this relationship from 1960, when the Party was formed, to 1966 when Uganda experienced a major political crisis. A number of important phases are included in this time span. There are the elections of 1961 and 1962; independence in 1962 and the period after. The analysis will include an examination of the gradually deteriorating relationship between the two wings of the Party, the issues upon which these conflicts were based and the response which the UPCYL aroused as the rift between it and the Party increasingly became evident. An evaluation of the response from the UPC-controlled Government will be attempted, and finally some theoretical observations about the relationship between youth and their political elders after independence will be made.

*Akiiki B. Mujaju is a Lecturer in Political Science at Makerere University, Kampala.

1 The past tense here is important because under the military Government, the UPC along with other parties is now no more.

THE UNITED FRONT

Ever since 1952 when the first nationalist Party, the Uganda National Congress, was formed Uganda political leaders had tried to organise the people and arouse their nationalist feelings. They continued to meet resistance, however, because of a number of factors, including the variety of political and institutional forms which had developed in traditional societies.² And the fact that Britain conceded the possibility of ultimate independence of Uganda as an African, as opposed to a settler or multi-racial, country when it did, was to have serious political implications, for it came too soon to force Uganda's African leaders and the country's diverse peoples to unite against Britain; petty personal jealousies, religious and tribal cleavages became the issues upon which political debates and intra-Party cleavages and splits were based.³ Thus political mobilisation was delayed until the end of the 1950s.

Direct elections had taken place in 1958 in most of the Districts for members of the Legislative Council and in 1959 a Constitutional Committee headed by the Government's own Administrative Secretary, J. Wild, was appointed. The major African political figures in the Legislative Council were appointed to the Committee. The appointment of the Committee aroused a serious controversy especially over the fact that its members were drawn from the Legislative Council.⁴ But it nevertheless indicated to nationalist forces that the time was soon coming when they would have to demonstrate to Britain that they had a hold on society such that they could meaningfully be entrusted with the responsibility of rule. This became even more evident the following year, for then, in 1960, the Constitutional Committee reported, recommending expanding the membership of the Legislative Council and calling it the National Assembly and inter alia, providing for internal self-government. The colonial administration, while rejecting the provision for internal self-rule, agreed to the recommendation calling for an expanded Legislative Council and the holding of popular elections based on universal franchise in 1961.⁵

The prospect of having elections based on popular franchise, organised on the basis of political parties and the ultimate possibility of internal self-rule in which the winning political party would take control of much of the country's affairs, was such a serious challenge to nationalists that problems

2 D. Apter, *The Political Kingdom of Uganda* (Princeton University Press, 1967), and Anthony Low, *Political Parties in Uganda—1949-1962* (London, 1962), come immediately to mind on this subject.

3 On this Anthony Low has said: "This [why Uganda people were not aggressive] was emphatically not because Africans in Uganda did not want to become self-governing. On the contrary, it was primarily because they knew they were going to become self-governing." *Buganda in Modern History* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. 202.

4 The controversy was aroused by the fact that at that time the Buganda *Lukiiko* was trying to resist changes involving the expansion of the membership and functions of the Legislative Council without a prior agreement between Buganda and Britain. As a result of this position, the Buganda *Lukiiko* had refused to participate in the 1958 elections and was not, therefore, represented on the Legislative Council from which the Constitutional Committee emanated.

5 See *The Report of the Constitutional Committee* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1960). See also *Uganda Argus*, 25 February, 1960, p. 1.

of creating viable organisations to seize the opportunities provided by these changes assumed a new urgency.

Thus in 1960, after the publication of the Wild Committee report and the Government's views thereon, the Uganda National Congress majority faction led by A. M. Obote and the Uganda Peoples' Union, formed in 1959 and composed of Western and Eastern Region elements, merged to form the Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC). The UPC overnight became the biggest force in the Legislative Council since it brought under it District bosses who had represented their various Districts in the Legislative Council. Many of its leaders were members of the Legislative Council. The Democratic Party was outside the Legislative Council. The UPC and the Democratic Party became the biggest countrywide political forces.

Both of them started organising for the elections which were due in 1961. It was during this period that the interest in youth became evident. The UPC effectively co-opted youth into its ranks, for example, J. Kakonge the founder Administrative Secretary of the Party and after August, 1960, the Secretary-General; he had recently finished his studies in India and had opted not to work for the Government. He was a young man. Many of his colleagues from India joined him in the Party on their arrival. Grace Ibingira who became the Party's Publicity Secretary and Legal Adviser, had also recently returned from studying in Britain. The President of the Party, A. M. Obote, himself was still in his early thirties. Given the availability of these and other educated young people and the needs of the moment, an alliance between the Party per se and youth was quite possible.

Indeed, it did not take the Party long to recognise the importance of youth, for in 1960 they appointed Raiti Omongin who was in his early twenties, to sit on the Central Executive Committee of the Party as a representative of youth. This marks the spontaneous beginning of the idea of youth as a possible political force. For the time being the youth and the Party were part of the same movement, sharing the same agonies and excitements as they stumped the countryside in search of votes. When the UPC lost the election in 1961 both the leaders and youth felt the loss, but since there was to be another election in 1962, preceding independence, the loss of the 1961 election was sufficient impetus for the two groups to continue together and fight the election that was soon to follow.

Moreover, in early 1962, in addition to having a youth representative on the Central Executive, the Party Secretariat decided to appoint an Organising Secretary for Youth, Mr Katabarwa, straight from a high school in Western Uganda. When he resigned later in that year he was replaced by Mr Sebatanda, and the idea of having an Organising Secretary for Youth in the Party's head office had taken root. But it all emphasised the importance of a united front between the old and young as they both faced the important task of activating society and channelling the resulting enthusiasm for popular participation to creative purposes. That was so all through the 1961 and 1962 electoral campaigns. It is important to stress that interest in youth was a spontaneous one, because interest among the young in politics was also spontaneous.

readiness of the old UPC leaders, some of whom were relatively young, to embrace youth made the alliance appear so natural that it hardly occurred to anyone that youth might consider organising themselves much more systematically within the framework of the UPC.

INDEPENDENCE AND THE EMERGENCE OF STRESS

But it was not long after independence (October, 1962) that it became obvious that the alliance between youth and the UPC was not going to be a stable one. There emerged a process of estrangement, initially concealed but nevertheless gathering momentum, until it exploded into the open in 1964. We will now examine this trend of estrangement with reference to a number of major variables, namely the Party's treatment of its Secretary-General, John Kakonge, increasing awareness of youth as a distinct entity requiring a separate organisation, militant nationalism and ideology.

Treatment of Kakonge

First, let us look at the Party's treatment of Kakonge. As Secretary-General, Kakonge had established a record as a tough and able campaigner; he talked the nationalist language which appealed to youth as many of his elder colleagues did not; moreover, in the 1961 elections, when the UPC lost the election because it could not muster enough support in Buganda, Kakonge was the UPC's only leader outside Buganda to stand for and win a seat in Buganda. Besides, his age was much nearer to youth than to the elders of the Party. He was, therefore, closer to the youth than most Party leaders were, and his institutional position, much like Obote's as President, drew him towards as many diverse groups as possible, of which youth was one.

In 1962 when Kakonge could not stand in his own home District, Bunyoro, because there were already established Party men standing in these constituencies, nor in his constituency in Buganda because, as a result of the 1961 Constitutional Agreements, the Buganda *Lukiiko* had the option, which it invoked, to appoint Buganda's representatives to the National Assembly in 1962, his only road to Parliament was to get himself elected to a specially elected seat. Although there seems to have been an agreement to that effect Kakonge was passed over and a number of secondary Party leaders and financial donors were elected to the National Assembly.⁶ In protest, Kakonge ran away to seek solitude in Tanzania (then Tanganyika). He later returned to his post, after pleas by Obote and advice from TANU leaders. What is clear is that things were never to be the same again, for seeds of suspicion between Kakonge and his colleagues had been sown and the years ahead witnessed the progressive alienation of Kakonge from his colleagues

6 A number of UPC leaders who had lost the election and a few Asian money magnets were selected for special elections. For the controversy that ensued, see *Uganda Argus*, 21 May, 1962, p. 2 and 22 May, 1962, p. 1.

then in Government.⁷ The climax came in 1964 when Cabinet and parliamentary leaders, in a show of strength, ejected Kakonge from his post during the 1964 UPC Delegates' Conference in Gulu, Northern Uganda.⁸

As has already been suggested, youth were closer to people like Kakonge than to most other leaders. As Secretary-General, he had had to work with many of them during the campaigns; there was considerable sympathy for him when his colleagues rejected him and progressively youth became Kakonge's major constituency. As such, the UPC leaders' suspicion of Kakonge was logically extended to the league members since they interpreted the Kakonge-league alliance as being against them. The alliance, it must be stressed, was encouraged by the fact that after independence both youth and Kakonge, though Secretary-General of the parent Party, were treated as outsiders in the UPC-controlled Government. The youth-Kakonge alliance, therefore, took the insider versus outsider form. They were both alienated from the major centres of power which had shifted from the Party to the Government.

Search for Organisation

Another area of estrangement which, as will be pointed out, was related to the UPC leaders' suspicion about Kakonge's intentions, concerned the growing feeling among articulate youth leaders that youth, though operating within the umbrella of the larger UPC, needed a distinct organisation. These included the youth who worked around the UPC headquarters as employees, those around Kampala who happened to be members of trade unions, school teachers, clerks and university and high school students. But since the impetus for creating an organisation had to be concentrated somewhere, the organising secretaries for youth, themselves members of the youth group, provided the focus for this movement. P. Kamunanwire, a former employee of a bank in Kampala who was later to leave for further studies in the USA, was the Organising Secretary in 1963 based at headquarters and it was to him that the responsibility of organising this movement fell. But also central was Raiti Omogin who was the contact man between youth and the Central Executive.

A Delegates' Conference of Youth from all over Uganda was arranged to be held at Mbarara, Ankole District, in April, 1963. It was hoped that at this conference a framework for a nationwide UPC Youth League organisation would be set up. Questions regarding the constitution, including the structure of the organisation, relations with the UPC, the age ceiling for the league members—all these were to be resolved by the Delegates' Conference. And broad issues of policy were also to be resolved. But it is important to stress that the attempt at creating a separate organisation was a major departure from past practice which, as already indicated, was one of fusion rather than separation between the two wings in the Party. It is indicative of the changed

7 In fact, even after attempts by the Party President had been made to patch up the rift after Kakonge's return, private sources indicate that in the August, 1962, Party Delegates' Conference there was an attempt to oust Kakonge but that Kakonge had too solid support. This information was gathered from Party officials who wished to remain anonymous.

8 For these events, see *Uganda Argus*, 28 April, 1964, p. 1; 8 May, 1964, p. 1.

circumstances in which Party leaders then in Government were more interested in grappling with the new problems of rule while the youth seemed to be clinging more to the vigour of the pre-independence era.

But the trends toward a separate organisation became a reflection of wider political conflicts. It became obvious that the more youth moved towards the creation of a separate organisation the more they were divided on which group or which Region was to dominate the new structure. In other words regionalism became a factor; however, related to this was the phenomenon of differential levels of education. There tended to be a cleavage among those who had left school and were either unemployed or members of trade unions and most of those who were still at university and other centres of learning. It happened that those who were still at university and at school who were very active in youth affairs were from Buganda and Western Region. Those of the trade union base, and these included Raiti Omongin, were also those who had left school much earlier and tended to be older. Another fact of importance is that except for Raiti Omongin, who had been appointed to serve on the Executive Committee of UPC as a representative of youth most of the vocal UPC youth leaders and those who had served at the head office as Organising Secretaries were largely from the Western and Buganda Regions. Thus Katabarwa, 1962, Sebatanda, 1962/63 and Kamunanwire, 1963, were all from the Western Region. Therefore the question of who was to control the league had some basis.⁹

But this is to mention only the intra-youth political dimension. In fact, youth politics was not operating in a vacuum. There were intra-Party cleavages which were reaching the league. Generally there was fear on the part of the Party of a distinct youth organisation; not only was there the prospect of the organisation getting out of hand and proving difficult to control, there was also the question of whom the organisation was going to support. The warmth between Kakonge and the league members has been mentioned. There was the question of whether the league was going to be Kakonge's front either in regional terms, since Kakonge was himself from the Western Region, or in ideological terms since, as we will show shortly, the league members were becoming ideologically much more articulate and their positions on a number of issues were apparently consistent with Kakonge's. All this became evident as the movement towards a separate organisation gathered momentum.

First, as soon as the date for the Delegates' Conference in Mbarara was set, a Regional Conference of UPCYL members from the Northern and Eastern Regions was organised and was held in March, 1963, a month before the Mbarara Conference. General issues of the Party and of policy were discussed; Party leaders were called to address the conference, and these included the President, A. M. Obote, and the Secretary-General, J. Kakonge.

⁹ There was, in fact, another complicating factor which tended to highlight regionalism and reduce ideology. As most of the youth activists at University (Makerere) and school, tended to be more moderate and rather suspicious of the Indian graduates—Kakonge and a considerable number of those around him were—they tended to be less warm to Kakonge while the Trade Union and school-leaver element headed by Raiti Omongin were the reverse. This lineup was to be crucial in the days ahead as Ibgingira, a British graduate, competed against Kakonge for power.

The fact that Kakonge was invited tends to minimise the claim that this conference was held in order to organise the two Regions into a front against the other two Regions. But whether or not regionalism was the motive, the effect of having Northern and Eastern Region delegates meet in Mbale a month before the same delegates met at a National Delegates' Conference in Mbarara was that it increased an awareness of the gap that existed between these two groups.

At the Mbarara Conference itself all the confused lines of conflict became evident. And ironically the conflicts flared up at the end of the conference when the draft constitution was being debated. At issue were two conflicting propositions. There was the proposition that the age limit should be put at 30. This proposition was advanced by the relatively younger youth who were still at school or at university, many of whom, we have suggested, were from Buganda and the Western Regions. The other group suggested 40. It happened that those in favour of 30 as the age limit constituted a strategic majority on the constitutional committee at the conference and their proposal was made a committee recommendation to the conference. It is noteworthy that those who wanted the age to be put up to 40 called for dual membership, that is to say, a person could belong to both the league and the UPC. As it happened, some of them did, in fact, have positions in the Party. Those in favour of 30 called for exclusive membership. The issues were unresolved since the parties to the dispute could not compromise.

The former Mbale delegates who favoured 40 and dual membership suspected the intentions of the Western and Buganda delegates. There were feelings that the Western and Buganda youth were designing a constitution which would perpetuate their dominance by excluding those who had Party positions but also wanted to stand for elections to the league. This included Raiti Omongin who was the champion of the Mbale conference delegates.¹⁰ There was another side of the crisis which was the concern of the old Party leaders about the implications of an exclusive league. Their solution was to raise the age limit to include as many members of the Party as possible and to make the membership of both almost conterminous.¹¹ This would act as a check to the drift of the league towards a distinct entity and away from the Party. Thus the collapse of the Mbarara Conference which broke up with the walkout of the Mbale delegates was a function of factors both internal and external to the position of youth. With this deadlock, the initial attempt at a youth structure failed, and not until late 1964 and early 1965 when they finally agreed to a constitution under very secret circumstances, did youth try again. Meanwhile, conflict continued over ideas.

¹⁰ Raiti Omongin was a member of UPC Central Executive—representing youth but appointed by the UPC leaders. He wanted to stand for league leadership.

¹¹ In fact, Obote himself had called for an age limit of 40 years in a New Year's message in 1964. *Uganda Argus*, 1 January, 1964, p. 1.

Conflict Over Nationalism

It was over nationalism that the clash over ideas initially centred. The UPC was a nationalist party; its driving force was not the transformation of society but the deliverance of Uganda to independence. One might also add that the Party was not even strongly pan-African in terms of a view on African integration. Such was the complex nature of Ugandan society as evidenced by the strange marriage of convenience between the UPC, the most radical and militant of Uganda's parties, and a regional, traditionalist movement Kabaka Yekka (KY), designed to protect Buganda's monarchical institution. Nevertheless, to the extent that the Party tried to appeal to the people on the basis of the rejection of colonialism and the importance of the black man gaining his legitimate power, and to the extent that the major effort was to raise the level of consciousness of the Ugandan people above their parochial interests in the cause of colonised Uganda, the nationalist credentials of UPC cannot be challenged. But precisely because of this and the general mood of the politics of decolonisation elsewhere—neighbouring Sudan in 1956, Ghana in 1957, self-government in Nigeria and Tanganyika—ideas about pan-Africanism and militant nationalism had had some appeal to sectors of Ugandan society, and youth in the UPC was such a sector.¹²

The growing estrangement between the UPC and the league on the basis of nationalist ideas, therefore, was not a clash in terms of values but in terms of the priorities of the moment. The league wanted to ensure that the white business and other communities in Uganda showed respect to those who had been their subjects, and to this end the league, all through 1963 and 1964, made it their task to enforce the display of the Prime Minister's and President's portraits in shops and other business centres. They demanded the removal of the Queen's portrait from the same places to dramatise the retreat of the empire.¹³ They demonstrated against Asians who had been suspected before independence of siding with the imperial administration but after independence continued to have such a strong hold on the country's commerce, and the league demanded the control of such businesses by African Ugandans. They fomented strikes in Asian-owned businesses to dramatise their opposition to such control. When, in two of these strikes, at Boaro and the General Motors Showrooms in 1963, the manager and other employees were roughly assaulted and riot police were called in, the league leaders were arrested; in protest against this arrest, the league invited the Deputy Secretary-General Mr F. Onama who was the Minister of Internal Affairs to the head office for an interview on why he allowed the police to enforce colonial property laws against the league. The Minister was held for an hour, although he adamantly refused to release the youth leaders. In the end, however, after the two leaders had been arrested and convicted for unlawful trespassing and

¹² This appeal, however, does not mean that militant nationalist ideologies had become operational in Uganda as will be suggested later.

¹³ On these developments, see *Uganda Argus*, 11 July, 1963, pp. 5-6; 12 July, 1963, p. 3.

assault, the Government used Executive orders to release the youth leaders.¹⁴

Again in 1963, the league called for the deportation of a British businessman, Mr Hunter, who had described Premier Obote's Addis Ababa speech, offering Uganda as a base for training nationalist fighters, as a threat to foreign investment. Hunter's comment was seen as a symbol of continued imperial control. Most dramatic of all was the league's response to an all-white party at Tank Hill in Kampala where the Kenya independence celebrations were ridiculed, the white man's burden mocked and African life after independence shown as a return to traditional Africa, with sewage systems collapsing and transport facilities degenerating, etc. The league members demanded the deportation of those involved and Obote, himself stung by this development, obliged the youth with a special statement in Parliament while the Minister of Internal Affairs followed up Obote's statement by announcing the deportation of the leaders.

But the league thought the Government had not gone far enough, and so they arrested an employee of the *Uganda Argus*, Mr Buse, who was suspected of being one of the leaders, kidnapped him to a Kampala suburb, took him to a local market, bought a bunch of bananas and made him carry it to their car. This kind of treatment of a white man in a former British colony was new to both Mr Buse and the watching Africans. At night the house where the party was held was burnt although nobody was hurt. Although there has never been any proof, there is strong suspicion that the league was responsible for this incident.¹⁵

The league, as another dimension of their nationalism, tried to enforce the full status of the Party. Bureaucrats as well as opposition parties had to know that the UPC was the ruling Party which brought independence to Uganda. It had to be respected, and at the Mbarara conference in April, 1963, they called for the establishment of a one-party system to maintain the eminent status of the Party.

There were other incidents when the league was involved in demands for respect for Africa: in the following years demonstrations against embassies, characterised by throwing of tomatoes and eggs at foreign representatives, demonstrations against, and the takeover of, the Kampala Club in Kampala in 1964 and 1965 respectively, the demonstration against Congolese use of American planes and pilots to bomb part of Uganda in 1965 were further manifestations of this nationalistic theme.

But the conflict over these developments was not, it should be stressed, over values, because many UPC members shared similar views on Africa and Uganda. However, there was concern among old leaders about both the timing

¹⁴ The league leaders argued that their involvement in workers' strike action was one weapon in their fight against capitalist exploitation, but what was really at issue was whether aliens would continue to control commerce. See *Uganda Argus*, 28 November, 1963, p. 2; 19 December, 1963, p. 1.

¹⁵ Raiki Omogin and others were arrested and declared to the Court later: "I took this Tank Hill incident very seriously. It was not a question of licence and not a question of maintenance of law and order; it was a question of state defence. . . . I told the police, but some of them were not trying to take notice." *Uganda Argus*, 21 December, 1963.

and the methods the league used. Uganda had never used militant pan-African and nationalist tones before independence; not frequent and sustained violent demonstrations against Britain but negotiations with parochial tribal forces characterised the leaders' style of political mobilisation.¹⁶ The youth were, therefore, introducing a new and unfamiliar political style. Coming after independence when political leaders were more interested in creating order and asserting their authority, the youth style, in particular the arrest of a Minister, was bound to cause consternation. There was the fear that with uncertainty in business, foreign investment could not be attracted. And there was the fear that Kakonge, the radical Secretary-General, was at the centre of all these moves. There was also the suspicion that after 1964 when he was voted out of office, forces sympathetic to Kakonge were responsible for these developments.

Conflict Over Ideology

The league progressively sharpened its ideological stance, and this became another dimension of the conflict. The more the UPC leaders refused to listen to the league the more its discontent increased. In particular, after 1963 when the National Union of Youth Organisations was created, the league saw a plot by the UPC-controlled government to destroy it. This feeling sharpened when, in April, 1964, Kakonge was finally removed from his post and the incoming Secretary-General, G. Ibingira, ejected youth league members from the headquarters and officials of the Party sympathetic both to Kakonge and the league were similarly ejected. Plans to regionalise the league, by which there would be no national youth league but regional bodies coming under the control of regional executives of the Party were advanced. Plans were advanced not only in respect of the league but also in respect of the Party in general as Ibingira attempted to consolidate his fragile hold on the Party after Kakonge's eviction from the secretariat. In the face of all this, the league intensified its attack on the new Secretary-General in particular and the Party in general. The league held a conference in 1964 and at the end of it called for the abolition of private property, called on the Party to define its version of socialism, condemned Western imperialism and referred to the Commonwealth as "a new colonialism and a tool for the plunder of our continental wealth".¹⁷ They described Ibingira as a puppet politician and as an agent of dollar imperialism. This widening gap was publicly demonstrated in January, 1965, at a national, all-Party demonstration against the bombing of the West Nile District of Uganda by CIA-paid pilots flying planes for the Congolese forces. Instead of demonstrating only against Tshombe and the US the league turned the occasion into an additional demonstration

16 The alliance between apparently irreconcilable forces: the UPC and KY is a case in point. On this, see E. Bundy, "Uganda's New Constitution", *East Africa Journal* (June, 1966).

17 Memorandum by Raiti Omogin to A. M. Obote, UPC President on 2 March, 1963, p. 1.

against Ibingira who was described as being worse than Tshombe.¹⁸

The Party and the Secretary-General were stung by these declarations. Ibingira complained that the UPC had never believed in the abolition of private property and suggested that the UPCYL had no right to take an independent political policy "because then, it would be a distinct party".¹⁹ But the league did not relent. Instead they contended that until the UPC defined its socialism they were entitled to define their own. They worked secretly until 1965 when some of the league leaders were dismissed from the Party. The league refused to accept the dismissal and instead met secretly in March, 1965, and agreed on a new constitution which allowed for dual membership and for the age ceiling of 40 years. Leaders were elected, but because of the prevailing circumstances this new structure had to operate underground.

The issues at stake were clear. The more the league was harassed, the more it became conscious of the Party's failings and its ideological confusion, and the more the league members were convinced of the rightness of their cause, and the more deference became irrelevant. This trend was also facilitated by the fact that after the creation of NUYO, those who had belonged to the league as a way of exerting pressure on the political system to provide employment left, so that the league retained those whose belief in it was based on its being a viable organ of popular participation as well as on abstract ideas. It was more difficult for this harassment to intimidate the residual league members into silence and capitulation. But the UPC, whose assumptions were nationalistic and, consequently, ideologically heterogeneous, could hardly view these events with less than alarm.

RESPONSE FROM THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

As already suggested, the demonstrations by the league, confrontation with the police, the arrest of the Minister of Internal Affairs—all these alarmed some people. The business sector was uncertain and restive. There were suspicions that the league was fomenting strikes, not only in business but also in the schools, and expatriate teachers were hostile; their hostility was highlighted later in a comment by Professor Castle who said: "It is somewhat discomfiting, nevertheless, to be told by Youth Wingers and other irresponsible persons to go home, as sometimes happens."²⁰ To political leaders who placed a heavy premium on expatriates, this kind of comment and the charge of irresponsibility was bound to be taken seriously.

18 The association of Ibingira with Western and dollar imperialism was increased by the spirit of intrigue which had swept across the political plain in the country in the wake of conflicts about Kakonge's departure and Obote's trips to Eastern Europe, during which period Ibingira and some of his fellow Ministers made adverse references to communism and its threat to Uganda. There were rumours that Ibingira had obtained money from the USA to aid him in his Party reorganisation plans, etc. See T. Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda: the Buganda Question", in Castagno and Butler, eds., *Boston University Papers on Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

19 *Uganda Argus*, 5th September, 1964, p. 5.

20 E. Castle, *Growing up in East Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 221.

The KY and DP parties were equally alarmed. The Mengo Government, controlled by the Kabaka Yekka Party, then still in alliance with the UPC at the centre, expressed deep concern at the league's tactics and "deplored the hooliganism" of the same.²¹ The opposition Democratic Party was even more vocal since some of the activities the league employed were designed against it. In Parliament in 1963, for example, the Government faced a barrage of questions about the league and the arrest of a Government Minister by the league because of the Minister's activities in his official capacity. During a debate on the estimates for the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1963, this concern was cogently demonstrated. One Democratic Party MP asserted:

Those Youth Wingers, some of whom are the contemporaries of our fathers and grandfathers, carry these instructions [from UPC leaders] with a zeal that have become the embarrassment to the civil servants in social gatherings, bars, anywhere. They have taken on the responsibility of the Special Branch. They have become the police of police. They have become the counterparts of Hitler's Gestapo.²²

The MP, Mr Okello, struck a familiar and, to the Party, a worrying note: the league was not acting alone; it was acting on instructions from the Party leaders. The question was, who was instructing them? And this was the most worrying question. The leader of the Opposition, Basil Bataringaya himself asserted:

Mr. Speaker, I am very serious on this [the affairs of the League]... surely the Youth Wing, be it DP or UPC or KY Youth Wing is not primarily concerned with looking for political offenders and bringing them to justice... Mr Speaker, we cannot go on like this. Let us face the fact that these Youth Wingers, if they are not stopped in good time, are going to be very difficult to handle because other political parties are going to organise their Youth Wingers to meet the UPC and the result would not be good.²³

The threat predicted by Mr Bataringaya did not take long to materialise, for shortly after this the DP youth league announced the formation of vigilante groups for the protection of DP leaders against attacks by the UPCYL.²⁴ Concealing the ambivalence among the UPC about the league, Onama denied that the UPCYL was terrorising people but was quick to suggest to Parliament that "nobody was above the law be they UPC or DP Youth Wingers", and advised MPs to report to police those who "would like to go around to intimidate the people". He further asserted that "we shall take a very big pair of scissors and trim their feathers off their wings so that they do not fly at all".²⁵

The UPC was, in fact, already sharpening its pair of scissors and it took the form of the creation of an alternate organisation—the National Union of Youth Organisations (NUYO) in Uganda. Thinking that the youth league

21 *Uganda Argus*, 26 March, 1963, p. 3.

22 *Parliamentary Debates*, Second Series, Vol. 15 (1963/4), p. 687.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 666.

24 *Uganda Argus*, 22 July, 1963, for statement by Z. Ogola, DP Youth Wing Press Officer.

25 *Parliamentary Debates*, p. 698.

was getting out of hand because of unemployment among its members who were seeking refuge in towns and who were assumed to be the target of Kakonge's magic powers, the UPC created NUYO as an answer to the unemployment crisis and to force youth to leave the towns and return to the countryside. In the end youthfulness was to be demonstrated by joining NUYO and undergoing its rigorous training programmes.²⁶ Intended as a co-ordinating non-political body, NUYO was supposed to incorporate all existing youth organisations and had such objectives as to create nationalism and patriotism and engage youth in rural development efforts. But the initial emphasis was placed on total discipline, symbolised by demands for "drills from 5 a.m. to 8 a.m. and drills again". All these were to be organised under the umbrella of a Government Ministry, the Ministry of Culture and Community Development, which supervised the affairs of NUYO in order to facilitate the depoliticisation of youth as well as to exercise strict control of their activities.²⁷ This was made necessary by the Government's intention to destroy the league.

The Ministry created an infrastructure from the lowest level of administration: they appointed youth organisers at the Ministry headquarters; youth assistants at District headquarters; and youth leaders at county and sub-county levels. These were civil servants paid by Government, but the initial intention was to turn youth league activists into candidates for these appointments. There was also a parallel structure, NUYO itself, which was given a semblance of voluntarism. Voluntary membership was provided for, there were county NUYO general meetings and executive committees appointing people to higher level bodies, corresponding with the hierarchy of state administration up to the headquarters level. But, at the top, the Minister appointed six members of the NUYO Council. The Government officers in charge of youth were to be advisers of NUYO and because the Government provided the funds, training and other facilities, their power tended to be final. The bureaucratic lag increased the power of the state official. The Government organised the youth, the draft constitution and the founding general meeting. All these emphasised the central role of the Government and the negative instinct which propelled NUYO into existence. Over the years NUYO has tended to divest itself of these negative and destructive instincts. Of late, interest has centred on providing skills and other activities which would make the rural areas more lively, and therefore provide an answer to the growing body of unemployed school-leavers. Producer groups and sector resettlement schemes have been established although most of them are still in experimental stages.

ADEQUACY OF GOVERNMENT'S ALTERNATIVES

There are at least two ways of assessing the adequacy of the NUYO alternative. One is to look at NUYO's capacity to deal with the larger issue

26 In fact, this was explicitly stated by Mr Adoko Nekyon, Minister of Planning and Economic Development. See *Parliamentary Debates*, Second Series, Vol. 28 (1963/4), p. 2014.

27 The helplessness of the NUYO elected leaders at the hands of the state officials was emphasised to me by Mr Mpira, the National Chairman of NUYO in an interview on 26 September, 1971.

of encouraging developmental attitudes demonstrated by a return to the countryside and engagement in rural development programmes; the second is to examine the extent to which NUYO provided an answer to the immediate problem of what the Party considered to be overpoliticisation of youth.

With regard to the latter, it may be noted that NUYO was created in April, 1964. But in March, 1965, the league was still the political system's most sensitive problem. The creation of NUYO, in fact, propelled the league to greater ideological sharpness. It is evident that the demise of the league occasioned by the emergence of NUYO in 1964 was partial. Admittedly some of its members agreed to serve as youth organizers or youth assistants in NUYO; that was one way in which NUYO was intended to draw league leaders and supporters to itself. Many in the rural areas partook of the allowances accruing from the construction of community centres, which as a matter of policy, was made a semi-voluntary activity involving NUYO members. Those who undertook this activity formed that part of UPCYL which wanted employment. The allowances, though small (Shs. 2/- per day) were sufficient attraction for this semi-voluntary activity. But it was wrong to assume that everybody wanted employment because some league members were already employed. Young teachers, clerks, bus conductors in rural and urban areas, students in schools, either were league members or sympathised with it; for them, NUYO'S allowances had no material meaning. People like Raiti Omongin, the long-standing league leader, refused offers of employment by the Government because they were committed to the league. Thus the period from July, 1964, to March, 1965, when the league became a refuge of dissident UPC elements saw the same body becoming not only the largest ideological wing of the Party but also the section from which came the greatest criticism of the Party policies and the demand for a denition of the Party's version of socialism. It is against this background that the attempt at decentralising the league must be viewed.

As the core of the league resisted the NUYO thrust and sharpened its ideological focus, the Party became more aggressive. It became even more restive because, after the launching of NUYO in 1964, Kakonge, who had been seen as the force behind league activities, was removed from his post in the hope that after his removal more UPC youth leaguers would swing to the new Party officials and willingly go along with NUYO. But instead, large sections of youth attempted to persuade Kakonge to launch a new party;²⁸ when he refused they were alienated from him although many understood his situation. They, therefore, took the view that they were suddenly transformed into custodians of the Party's ideological purity since many considered the new Secretary-General as the ideological antithesis of both Kakonge and their league. That is one reason why they took up the matter of organisation very seriously once again and in 1965 managed to

28 I have dealt with some of these experiences in "Youth in Africa, Is it the Problem or a Symptom?" USSC Conference Paper, University of Nairobi, 1972. See also Jean Claude Williams, "The Congo", in D. Emmerson, *Students and Politics in Developing Countries* (New York: Praeger, 1968).

establish an institutional machinery. However, for obvious reasons, it had to work underground.

Sensing this development, the Party bosses, led by the new Secretary-General, called for the abolition of a national league and the creation, instead, of regional organizations which would come under the control of UPC Regional Executives. But it needed viable Regional Executives to control the militant and highly articulate league, otherwise national conflicts would only be transferred to the regional levels. And the league was all too aware of the target of these moves. But what is important is that the attempt at this reorganisation, intended as a consolidation of power by the new Party officials, was a recognition of NUYO's inability to deal adequately with the UPCYL.

But even in the long run and within a broader perspective of events, the negative element in NUYO's assumptions had given it problems despite attempts to shift its emphasis to creative purposes. Because non-UPC youth groups such as the Democratic Party youth league, and voluntary youth organisations suspected the Government's role in it, they were reluctant to join NUYO and the hard core league members were hostile to it. Consequently, NUYO never acquired the co-ordinating role which it was originally supposed to assume. Instead, it has confined itself to limited numbers, operating on limited projects with the aim of providing a demonstration effect. For example, by 1970, NUYO membership stood at around 30,000 although there is an average of 80,000 primary school-leavers per year, only about 15% of whom can find places in higher and vocational institutions. To the extent that NUYO has failed to acquire the universality for which it was intended, it has again proved an inadequate alternative.

And there is a more general failure, a failure that was caused by a misperception of events. NUYO was premised as anti-politics and anti-ideology. It was based on belief in the supremacy of development. But it forgot the value of motives; it sought to make digging respectable in a society whose educated wanted to work in offices! A major attitude change of this kind cannot be brought about by merely directing people to return to the land; they have to be inspired. The act of inspiring is essentially a political rather than purely economic matter. To succeed, therefore, NUYO required politics to give meaning to its emphasis on development. Its motive of rendering the league impotent denied it the support of those who were suspicious of the UPC's policies as well as those who, given appropriate circumstances, would have been its greatest inspirers. It should not be surprising that the failure of NUYO in this direction was followed by National Service proposals which were a feature of an ideologically inspired "move to the left" strategy.

In terms of the broader strategy the Party employed to deal with the UPCYL, therefore, it can be safely stated that, even though the creation of NUYO deprived the league of some of its employment-oriented members, and, to that extent, brought about its demise, it nevertheless made it possible for the league to depend on its core which was more likely to agree on ideology. The analysis does suggest that this was a factor in making the league a progressively more important ideological centre. Going underground

may be described as demise, since the league could not then openly operate and make its voice heard publicly as it had done in the past. And this was a function not of NUYO as such, but of the emergence of a new Secretary-General and the chaos created by the new officials' attempts to create a new basis of support among youth and in wider UPC, with the resulting splits among UPC ranks and the creation of rival youth groups. But working underground, far from denoting demise could be seen as a new strategy which, in fact, afforded the league an opportunity to operate a more articulate countrywide movement. Needless to say, its membership had to be limited by the political environment. In fact, in a significant way the league as a movement was destroyed by the 1966 crisis when almost everybody in the country had to take sides. Many of the league members swung to Obote's side as the latter tried to deal with a man who, as the Secretary-General of UPC, had terrorised them. In later years, Obote swung to this radical constituency, as he attempted to move left of much of his own Party. Some came back to the Party fold, other remained apathetic, while still others formed a relatively unsuccessful Vietnam-Uganda solidarity party which was banned in 1969 in the wake of the attempt on Obote's life.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we may now put Uganda's experience in a broader theoretical perspective. It is clear that the pre-independence harmony between the Party and youth gradually crumbled after independence. This was not unique to Uganda. Almost everywhere, independence and revolutions have been characterised by the phenomenon of yesterday's friends and today's critics. The nationalists and the revolutionaries register the support of the anxious and energetic youth in the mobilisation for freedom. The youth have the energy, the interest in abstract ideas and have fewer institutional constraints on them than older generations. They are, therefore, a logical constituency for the mobilisation effort. After the victory, the requirements of creating a viable polity and stable authority force these leaders to demobilise society. The pre-independence mobilisation basically creates an anti-authority disposition in society because mobilisation, being change-oriented, seeks to introduce a new standard and basis of legitimacy by questioning the old basis of legitimacy. But not always do the successor Governments fulfil the conditions for the new standard of political legitimation, for in order to fulfil it, the promises which change-oriented leaders made to the society have to be delivered. But the post-independence state often has neither the cash nor the personnel to do all they promised to do. The clash between the youth who invested so much in the movement, who feel the enthusiasm for change most, but who are nevertheless excluded from the spoils of power and also from the positions where they could actualise their hopes on the one hand, and the politicians who are often tamed by the responsibilities of rule on the other, is part of a general contradiction between the imperatives of mobilisations and the concomitants of demobilisation. The clash between the Uganda

Peoples' Congress-controlled Government and the league illustrates this contradiction. And Uganda's experience can be highlighted by events in the Ivory Coast where youth-Government relations have been very ambivalent and hostile.

But this is not to suggest that all revolutions and all nationalist regimes face this contradiction between the requirements of authority and the logic of mobilisation. Where the mobilisation was based on nationalistic assumptions but lacked durable ideologies about the transformation of societies and the importance of continued popular participation especially in viably organised political parties, as in Uganda, Kenya, Zaire, etc., independence has tended to herald greater contradictions between the era of popular politics before independence and the succeeding era. Here, the Party faces internal problems. Fragmentation becomes a possibility largely because there is no longer some coherent unifying programme around which the Party can adhere, and as a result, the internal divisions of the Party become a reflection of the debate and conflict among conflicting interpretations of the meaning of both the Party and independence. Popular politics becomes suspect, and enthusiasm for mass mobilisation also begins to die down.

In situations where the nationalist party succeeds in giving itself a new, invigorating role in the post-colonial political system, the more politically oriented youth in the ruling Party tend to maintain greater respect and support of the leaders.²⁹ This is largely a function of the unity of the ruling Party which, being based on an agreed political programme or ideology, acquires an alternative unifying force after the departure of the colonial establishment. In this case, there is not a sharp break between the popular politics before independence and the period after because the Party sees independence not as an end, but as a means of facilitating broader changes in society. The experiences of TANU in Tanzania, PDG in Guinea, and CPP in Ghana illustrate this point. In short, and in this context, Uganda's problem was that Uganda was too regionally heterogeneous and ideologically fragmented to agree on a new basis of social transformation, while Britain was too willing too soon to grant independence to Uganda to provide the target against which all these divisions could have found a compelling unity. In the circumstances, the UPCYL became a thorn which had to be removed.

²⁹ The best example here is Guinea. See Victor D. Du Bois, "Guinea", in J. S. Coleman and C. Rosberg, eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 209-10.