

is on its way to becoming a variant of Zolberg's party-state.⁶⁰ In Niger, the party still remains primarily the instrument of local level élites. The bureaucracy has become the primary instrument of national power. These two institutions coexist at all levels of organization in Niger. Neither can eliminate the other. The party maintains enough power to continue its access to village economic and political life. It is a locally oriented machine party, based on clientage. The bureaucracy has undermined the basis of local machine clientage somewhat in specific economic areas, but it has done little to restructure the principles of political association. The growth of bureaucratic power ensures the national government and its departmental and county representatives access to the village, and some capability to command performance. As long as the national élite and its bureaucracy do not seek to alter the basis of political association, the party-bureaucratic state can continue politically. But it is questionable how much modernization it can produce. Niger has yet to find an answer to both its problems. Eventually the failure to do so may spell the end of the party-bureaucratic regime.

A Coalition Theoretic Analysis of Nigerian Politics 1950-66

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Definitions

A Coalition: We define a coalition as any combination of two or more actors who adopt a common strategy in connection with other actors in the same system.

A Coalition of Coalitions: The coalition formed from any two or more coalitions. We can regard a coalition of coalitions as a set formed from the union of any two or more sets. Thus if [P], [Q], then the set [P u Q] will be regarded as a coalition of coalitions. However, in order to avoid the rather cumbersome expression "coalition of coalitions", we shall use the term "coalition" to refer to both a coalition and a coalition of coalitions leaving it to the context to make clear which is meant.

Action-Set—the configuration of action formed by a set of coalitions. Where there is only one coalition in the action set, we shall refer to the structure of action thus formed as a monadic action set. With two coalitions, we have a dyadic action set and so on for an n-adic action set with n-coalitions.

Assumptions: It follows from the definition of a coalition that each pursues a given strategy, the object of which is to maximize the pay-off both to the members of the coalition and to the coalition itself as a collective. The members of a coalition (or at the least, the leadership) are thus rational actors. We define rationality simply in terms of the two axioms of transitivity and indifference.

Transitivity: If xPy and yPz , then xPz .

Indifference: If xly , then xRy and yRx where the relation "R" defines a weak preference relation.

The Model: From the definitions and assumptions, in any triadic action set, it is possible to distinguish eight possible different configurations, depending on the weighting of each coalition in the triad. For the purposes of this paper, "weight" here will refer simply to the numerical strength of a coalition. Of the eight possible configurations of coalitions in the triad, reference in this paper will be restricted to three specific configurations, the coalitions being designated as P, Q, R.

Configuration (a) $P=Q=R$. With equal weights i.e. $w(P)=w(Q)=w(R)$, we should expect [P u Q], [P u R] and [Q u R] to form with equal frequency.

60 Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order—The Party States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966).

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In a rational choice situation, however, where $w(P) = w(Q) = w(R)$, we would expect the solution set to be given by the set $[P \cup Q \cup R]$.

Configuration (b) $w(P) > w(Q) > w(R)$ but such that $w(P) < w(Q) + w(R)$. Given such a configuration, we shall define the coalition $[Q \cup R]$ as the "minimal winning coalition", a minimal winning coalition being the coalition where the pay-offs both to the members and to the coalition are maximized. That $[Q \cup R]$ is the minimal winning coalition has been shown by Riker and there is little point repeating the proof here.

However, though $[Q \cup R]$ is the minimal winning coalition, other coalitions are still possible. Thus, where $w(P) > w(Q) > w(R)$, a $[P \cup Q]$ coalition forming shall be designated a "conservative coalition"; a $[P \cup R]$ coalition, following Caplow, we shall term an "improper coalition". The minimal winning coalition $[Q \cup R]$ we shall term a "revolutionary coalition". This gives us a behaviourally defined set of conditions for using the terms "conservative" and "revolutionary".

Configuration (c) $w(P) > w(Q) > w(R)$ but such that $w(P) > w(Q) + w(R)$. In such a set, with a simple-plurality decision rule, (P) would always win and hence (P) is a dictator.

On a point of clarification. In talking of action-sets and triadic action-sets, it does not follow from this that there needs be three and only three coalitions in the network. There could be n -coalitions in the network, but provided structural relations between the n -coalitions can be expressed in terms of triads and relations between triads, we shall say we have a triadic action-set. In other words, the network is defined in terms of relations between structures of action. The "unit" of analysis is therefore the structure of action, the action-set.

With the foregoing as a conceptual construct, all that is left is the application of the construct to the descriptive data of politics in Nigeria. We start with the general notion of elections.

Though elections, amongst other functions may be said to serve the four primary functions of selection, information, socialization/integration and legitimation, all elections, in competitive system, are not exactly similar either in characteristics or outcome. The recognition of this has led to some elections being regarded as "critical elections", an expression perhaps first used by V. O. Key who defined a "critical election" as one "in which the depth and intensity of electoral involvement are high, in which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power in the community, and in which durable electoral groupings are formed".¹ An objection that has been levied against Key's formulation is that it is doubtful if "relations of power" can be measured at all and that any criterion of "involvement" is likely to pick out entirely different elections from those picked out by the criterion of "new and durable groupings". As a result, it has been suggested, for example, by Riker,² that the "amount of information" available in the system might be

1 V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections", *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17 (1955) (1955).

2 W. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, p. 91.

used as a differentiating criterion on the hypothesis that in a period of critical elections, "the amount of information in the system declines". The amount of information, Riker would suggest, can be judged, or estimated, from the switches in voter alignments, and as he put it,

when voters previously loyal to one party switch to another, information is decreased in two ways: First, by the very act of switching, the changelings destroy information about themselves, for their loyalty to *any* party is in doubt until they have proved it in several elections. Second, the reception of switching voters into their new party may occasion the departure of some of its previously loyal adherents.

Hence, he adds, "substantial switching by one bloc of voters may have a cumulative effect in a series of elections" which would suggest that one has to read back *post hoc* in determining whether one or the other in a series of elections is "critical" or not.

It is not certain that Riker's suggested criterion is any improvement on Key's. But however one takes his notion of the "destruction" of information, both on his and on Key's set of criteria, the 1959 federal election can be shown to be a "critical election". Applying the criterion of the decline of information, the 1959 federal election was one in which large switches of voters took place, particularly in marginal and dissident areas. In the North, the NPC lost some 34 seats to opposing parties through voter realignments, while in the mid-western section of the West, the seats were evenly divided between the NCNC and the AG, though that area had been, before the federal election, and has been since then, a stronghold of the NCNC. And in the East, the NCNC suffered some loss of seats through changing support in the delta areas. On the other hand, were Key's "depth and intensity of electoral involvement" to be applied, and this measured either by the percentage of voter turnout or using some "index of competition" such as that put forward by Pfeiffer,³ the same result follows. Voter turnout in the 1959 election was the highest recorded of any election in Nigeria, while, given the changes in voter alignment, an "index of competition" would show a higher rating than any other election, higher than either the 1954 or 1964 federal elections. A similar result would emerge were one to view the 1959 election in terms of "adjustments in the power relations of the community" but this is discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

But the 1959 election was critical in another, broader sense. First, it was the election to determine which coalition or set of coalitions was to administer the affairs of the independent state of Nigeria, free from the constraints of a supervening colonial authority. Second, the election came at a period when there had been marked changes in the relations between the strategically placed action-set, the federal government, and the other component sets of the network, the regional governments.⁴ Taking the decade 1950-59, the relation-

3 S. G. Pfeiffer, "The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systemic Stability", *American Political Science Rev.*, Vol. 61 (1967).

4 B. J. Dudley, "Federalism and the Balance of Political Power in Nigeria", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. 4 (1966), reprinted University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, reprint series No. 26.

ship between the two sets can be shown to have gone through distinct phases: the first, which covered the period 1950-53; the second, from 1954-58; and the third, beginning from 1958. Where the first phase was characterized by a super-ordinate/sub-ordinate relation between the federal and the regional governments, the second was marked by some measure of equality between the two while the third witnessed return to conditions similar to those of the first. The change from the first to the second came about as a result of changes in the regulative rules of the system. That from the second to the third was the product of economic changes, primarily a fall in the price of primary commodities which adversely affected the revenues of the regional governments and made them more dependent fiscally on the federal government. This entailed that whichever coalition controlled the federal government would be in a position to influence the policies of the component units. And some of these were faced with pressing political problems: for example, the high unemployment rate among primary school-leavers in the Eastern and Western regions. Finally, the election was critical in that it afforded any one of the three first-order coalitions the opportunity of constituting itself a winning coalition. Because previous federal elections had been indirect in one area or the other, this had never been possible. Besides, the regulative rule of representational allocation was, prior to 1959, such that no one coalition could possibly form a winning coalition.

In the 1950 elections, representation had been on the basis of equality between the North and the South—that is, the East and West—giving a triadic action-set of the form $[P=Q+R]$. In addition, the regulative rules prescribed an equality between the components in the share and exercise of executive authority, the effect of which was to create in the strategically placed action-set, two linked triads: $[P^1=Q^1=R^1]$ and $[P=Q+R]$, the former representing the configuration of the executive; the latter, the form of the legislative body. In such a linked form, decision-making is possible only where there is unanimity of opinion. Any social decision rule which departs from unanimity would at one stage or the other lead to a stalemate. Given that the coalitions making up the action-set maintain their respective weights, a stalemate is resolvable only under a dissolution of the set. And this was precisely what became the case when in 1953 the coalitions failed to agree on the date for independence, the southern coalitions $[Q, R]$ or $[NCNC, AG]$ wanting to fix a date for 1956 and the North, (P) or the NPC demanding something less specific.

The 1954 election was held under rules different than those of 1951. First, it provided for direct elections in the East and West, although the North still retained an indirect form. Second, though executive authority was still to be shared on the basis of equality between the three regions, members of the executive were now to be chosen by the winning coalitions. Since the NCNC won the majority of the seats in the West, this enabled it to choose the allocation to the West. The outcome of this was that the NCNC was in a majority in the executive body but a minority in the legislature. The structure of action which this gave could be expressed formally as $[P^1 < Q^1 + Q^2]$ and

$[P=Q+R]$ where Q^1 and Q^2 symbolize the representation of the NCNC in the executive drawn from the East and West respectively. Taking the linked triads together, this gave a veto power to the NPC. With a simple plurality decision rule, though the NCNC could, with its weight, ensure that its proposals were accepted in the Executive, the party was unable to secure such acceptance in the legislature where a negative vote by the NPC would produce a stalemate. Since the NPC and the NCNC collaborated to form the winning coalition making up the federal government, and the NCNC had insisted on choosing the representation from the West on the executive body, the party, by that act, had alienated the AG, the result of which was to create something of a paradox: an AG in opposition to the NPC/NCNC partnership but which nevertheless was prepared to ally with the NPC where necessary to defeat the federal coalition. The net effect of this series of relationships, that between the NPC and the NCNC and between the NPC and the AG was to place the NPC in the position of a *dominant minority* in the executive body and the dominant member in the legislature. Conversely, the NCNC became the *weak majority* in the executive and the least effective in the legislature. The party therefore lost whatever strategic role it might have expected to play from winning the election in the West. Expecting to be the dominant member in the NPC/NCNC coalition, the NCNC became the dependent partner. Since in the NPC/NCNC coalition, either party would seek to maintain an optimal bargaining position, the NCNC could only assure a return commensurate to its bargaining weight if it attempted to alter the structure of bargaining between itself and the NPC. And this it could do by taking the only option open to it, which was to bring the AG into the coalition government, thereby changing the bargaining frame from an essentially diadic into a triadic set. The NPC was not likely to oppose such a move since it would retain the goodwill of the AG. By adopting such a strategy, though the NCNC might not be better off, it would certainly not be worse off. The AG stood to gain by joining the governing coalition while the NPC, on the other hand, was more likely to be worse off in the three party coalition. This bargaining structure was finally arrived at in 1957 when the AG joined the coalition federal government to give a set of linked triads in which $[P^1 < Q^1 > R^1]$ and $[P=Q+R]$, which persisted till the federal election of 1959.

For the 1959 election, the representational equality between the North and the South was removed, the decision having been taken the previous year to base representation on a population basis. With a federal legislature whose membership had been increased from 181 to 312 and a constituency size delimited on a seat/population ratio of 1:100,000, this gave a constituency distribution of 174 to the North, 73 to the East, 62 to the West and 3 to Lagos, a majority of 36 to the North over the combined total of the East, West and Lagos. But since the election was to be direct in all the regions, this hardly mattered. With direct voting in the East and West in 1954, the NCNC had succeeded in winning a majority of the seats in the West though as a party, it was identified with the Eastern region from which it drew the bulk of its support and membership. Moreover, a number of dissident parties

had emerged in the North and had in the regional election of 1956 made significant inroads into NPC support in the North.⁵ Thus though the North had a preponderance of the total number of constituencies within its domain, each of the three first-order coalitions, in principle, had an equal chance of becoming a winning coalition and, given the alliances between the NCNC and the AG and dissident second-order coalitions in the North, both might, in fact, have been regarded as standing a better chance than the NPC. At the completion of the election, however, the NPC won a total of 134 seats, the NCNC, 89, the AG, 73, while independent candidates won a total of 16 seats to give an action-set of the form $[P > Q > R]$ and $[P < Q + R]$. None of the competing parties was a winning coalition though the NPC emerged the "most favoured winning coalition". A coalition of parties was therefore needed to form the federal government. Given the fact that even before all the results of the contest were known, the Governor-General, Sir James Robertson, had called the Deputy Leader of the NPC, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, to "form a government" and also the status of the NPC as the "most favoured winning coalition", this gave the NPC a more than even chance of being a partner in any coalition that was to be formed. But be this as it may, it still left possible the formation of a "radical coalition" of NCNC/AG; a "conservative coalition" of NPC/NCNC and an "improper coalition" of NPC/AG. However, with the electioneering tactics of the AG which had offended the religious susceptibilities of the NPC leadership, an NPC/AG coalition seemed less likely than either an NPC/NCNC or an NCNC/AG coalition while Sir Abubakar, irrespective of the favoured position of his party, had declared that the NPC was quite prepared to become the "opposition" were an NCNC/AG coalition to emerge. The net effect of these possibilities was to reduce whatever advantage might have been conferred on the NPC by the Governor-General's action, leaving the NPC with just about the same chance as the AG of being a partner in the coalition federal government and the NCNC with a more than even chance; where the NCNC had the option of a choice of partners—the NPC or the AG—under the circumstances, the only option open to the NPC was an alliance with the NCNC.

Soon after the results were declared, the AG made approaches to the NCNC with an offer for both to form a coalition to control the machinery of federal government. From the point of view of both parties, assuming that pay-offs were relative to the weights of the competing coalitions, an NCNC/AG coalition would have been "a uniquely winning coalition"⁶ with each party maximizing their individual pay-offs. If each party were behaving "rationally", then an NCNC/AG coalition was to be preferred to an NPC/NCNC coalition, but the NCNC chose to form the latter. (Since an NPC/NCNC coalition not only preserved the respective "power" positions of the competing parties but also entailed the maintenance of the structure of the society, the NCNC can be designated, contrary to what is popularly believed, a conservative coal-

5 B. J. Dudley, *Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria* (London: Frank Cass, 1968).

6 W. Riker, op. cit., pp. 40, 103-4, 255-56 and 265-70.

tion.⁷) In formal terms, the preference of the NPC to the AG would suggest that either the NCNC had been mistaken about what were its "interests", had wrongly miscalculated, or that the party behaved non-rationally. But before such a conclusion is made, it might be useful to distinguish between two preference-principles: *synoptic* preference, that is, "preferable when everything is considered or taken into account"; and *aspectival* preference, or "preferable in point of cost, or convenience, or the like".⁸ (Where the former is concerned with the issue of reasonableness which looks to material issues of appropriateness and correctness in application of substantive criteria and standards, the latter relates to strictly formal issues of consistency.)

In preferring the NPC to the AG, the NCNC justified their preference on the grounds that it was better calculated to serve the interests and unity of the country as a whole, in other words, a synoptic preference. Though the party, and party members, might not be better off aligning with the NPC, this, it was argued, was subsidiary to the more crucial issue of overall unity which, it was thought, would be endangered by an NCNC/AG coalition. Which makes the NPC/NCNC coalition just as "rational" as an NCNC/AG coalition. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to accept the synoptic-preference justification offered by the NCNC. One of the first pronouncements to be made by the leader of the NCNC, Nnamdi Azikiwe, in reply to critics of the NPC/NCNC alliance, was to say his personal "future" had been well guaranteed in the bargaining leading up to the alliance. Moreover, it was accepted by some factions of the party that an NPC/NCNC coalition would yield higher pay-offs in terms of job opportunities for the NCNC than one between the NCNC and the AG. Such a calculation has an *a priori* plausibility granted the presumption of "to the victor goes the spoils" which underlined much of the political process in the country. The North, and therefore the NPC, had fewer people with the requisite educational skills competing for federal jobs than had the West and the AG.⁹ Besides, with the demand for skills in the North itself far in excess of the supply, an NPC/NCNC alliance would amount to more or less giving to the NCNC a monopoly of federal jobs and federal patronage. It is therefore more reasonable to see the justification offered by the NCNC for the alliance as a rationalization of an act based largely on aspectival preference principles.

However, arguments about preference-principles are of interest only to the extent that they provide some measure by which events or actions may be assessed.¹⁰ And they have been introduced here simply to refute, or perhaps more strictly, to question, the claims subsequently made by the NCNC leadership, once the civilian political system collapsed, that they, and they alone, were concerned with the stability and persistence of the system, in contrast

7 For a different view, K. W. J. Post, "The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons—The Decision of December, 1959", in J. P. Mackintosh, op. cit. Ch. 9.

8 Total new enrolment in Nigerian Universities in 1965-66, for example, was North, 275; East, 1180; West, 901; and Mid-West, 111. Ratio of North to East is thus roughly 1:4 as against the ratio of West to East approximately 0.9:1.0.

9 N. Rescher, *Introduction to Value Theory* (Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 79.

10 Obviously they are of interest to anyone concerned with developing a logic of choice and not simply to the extent that they serve action-evaluation functions.

to the leaders of the other competing coalitions who were motivated by value-specific considerations, this being the maximization of party advantage.¹¹ If this was true of any party, it was certainly true of all the parties. The North threatened to break away from the federation in 1950 if their minimum demand for equal representation between the North and the South was rejected. The AG made a similar threat in 1953 in the dispute over the principles of revenue allocation and the excision of Lagos from the West, as did the NCNC and the East in 1964 first, over the disputed census figures, and later in the same year, over the arrangements for the conduct of the federal elections.

But whatever the principle on which the NCNC based its choice, in any "two-person" bargaining framework, the logic of bargaining entails that each seek an optimal bargaining position if its expected pay-off or return from a coalition formed by both is to be maximized. The "logic" of such bargaining can be illustrated by considering exchange transactions between two individuals (P) and (Q), (P) exchanging a commodity (x) which he has for commodity (y) held by (Q).¹² Transactions of this nature are familiar enough in politics. One might even say they make up the "stuff" of politics in which most decisions are arrived at through (A) agreeing to support (B's) programme of road-building, for example, in return for (B's) agreement to support (A's) programme of housing; or (A) agreeing to support (B's) demand for the location of a steel-works in his area on condition that (B) reciprocate by agreeing to some major irrigation project being undertaken in (A's) own territory.


The nature of such transactional exchanges is illustrated by Figure 1 which represents the "preference schedules"—indifference curves—of (P) and (Q) for different combinations of the commodities (x) and (y). (Q's) indifference "map" is rotated and imposed on that of (P) so that the axes of the two "maps" form a box—the familiar "Edgeworth box". (P's) indifference curves are convex to OP and those for (Q) similarly to OQ. Any point in the "box" thus represents a possible distribution of quantities of (x) and (y) between (P) and (Q). In a two-person (P, Q) coalition, agreement on forming the coalition may be said to have been reached when (P) agrees to exchange a given quantity of (x) for (Q's) (y). This initial agreement can be represented by the point (k) within the "box" where (P) holds Oy_1 of (y) and Ox_1 of (x) while (Q) has My_1 of (y) and Mx_1 of (x). It is indicated by the point where an indifference curve of (P) cuts through that of (Q). Further transactions with (P) exchanging (x) for (y) would occur with (P) moving along I_p to the right. With such a move, (Q) is no worse off but (P) is now in a preferred position. Beyond S, the point of tangency between I_p and I_{Q_2} , further exchanges of (x) for (y) by (P) would result in his being less well off, and (Q) worse off. (Q) similarly would exchange (y) for (x) by following the same pattern as (P), that is, moving along I_{Q_1} till T is reached representing tangency

11 See, e.g., *The Problem of Nigerian Unity—The Case of Eastern Nigeria* (Enugu, 1966) and the Series in "Crisis, 1966".

12 The analysis that follows is adapted from Curry and Wade, *A Theory of Political Exchange*, pp. 18-19. For n-person bargaining, see G. Tullock, *Towards a Mathematics of Politics*, pp. 18-35.

between I_{P_1} and I_{Q_1} . With S and T reached, possible equilibrium distributions are then traced out by the line ST which represents the optimal curve for (P) and (Q). The distribution of (x) and (y) on the ST curve at which (P) and

Figure 1
PREFERENCE SCHEDULES



(Q) would ultimately arrive would then depend on their respective bargaining weights, skills and resources. Optimality is secured for both, with neither being worse off, the closer (P) or (Q) approaches the perpendicular bisector of ST. But if (P) is stronger than (Q) in bargaining weight or skills, the distribution of (x) and (y) will be nearer T than S which would make (P) better off than (Q). Conversely, with (Q) stronger, distribution will be nearer S than T and (Q) will be better off than (P).

The foregoing provides a graphical illustration of the principles involved in "two-person" bargaining situations, each person attempting to maximize his pay-off. The conditions are no different, in principle, whether one is dealing with economics, from which the illustration is derived, or politics. What difference there is lies in the fact that in politics, unlike economics, units of exchange are not often measurable which makes it more difficult to determine whether one or the other party is better or worse off as the case may be. This is not to suggest that in politics no measures exist. In the trading of votes or support, it is possible to construct some crude measures; for example, so many acres irrigated as against so many schools per thousand say, of population, as the basis of (P) supporting (Q's) irrigation programme and (Q) voting for (P's) educational development plan. But beyond this there is little to go on. Even then, it is quite possible for one or the other to feel "cheated". Hence it becomes all the more difficult to determine objectively

when one or the other is better or worse off. Since it is always possible for one individual to believe that he could have got more than he actually did get the problem of the expected value from an exchange ultimately resolves itself into one of subjective judgements and estimations. This entails that judgements by others about the relative gains or losses from such transactions must be seen as, and can only be, inferences from the expressed statements and behaviour patterns of the actors involved in the exchange.

In the "two-person" bargaining context, where (Q) is in a less than optimum position, (Q) could either break off, or continue transactions with (P). In an organizational context, the choice would be one of either a continuation of the partnership with (P) or the formation of a new and different coalition with a third member (R). But whether (Q) maintains or breaks the coalition with (P) would depend on the differential returns he expects from pursuing one or the other alternatives open to him. Adapting Downs, we can define the differential which we may term the "current coalition differential"—and express this as:

$[(U_t^{puq}) - k] - [(U_t^{quw}) - m]$ where k and m represent the returns to (P) and (R) respectively. Where the differential value is positive, (Q) would maintain the coalition with (P) but would prefer to break the partnership where the value is negative and be indifferent between forming a coalition with (P) or (R) where the value is zero. Even where the value is positive and (Q) prefers to maintain the coalition with (P), he still has a choice of strategies open to him. Thus, (Q) could either seek to alter the *relations* between the competing members through, for example, improving his own bargaining weight or, alternatively, change the *configuration* of the action-set within which bargaining takes place through either increasing the number of actors by proposing a change in the constitutive rules of the system, or, decreasing the number of actors by eliminating some members of the set. If (P) is in a more preferred position than (Q) in a [P, Q] coalition, uncommitted, members (or players) will want to join (P) thereby further improving (P's) bargaining weight. Thus, given a set of coalitions [P, Q, R, S, T] of which [P, Q, R] are dominant members and (S) and (T) uncommitted, we would expect (S) or (T) to join (P) in the coalition formed by [P, Q] from the sub-set [P, Q, R] were (P) to be in a more preferred position than (Q). This is the familiar "pork-barrel" effect of political bargaining. In theory, (P) will continue to accept additional members till a point is reached where the marginal contribution—the "imputation"—from an additional member is equal to the marginal return or payment made to members. In other words, (P) will increase its bargaining weight until it forms what Riker termed the "minimal winning coalition". In general, this would tend to approximate the size of the bare plurality. Since, however, there can be no precise determination of the imputation derived from the additional member, in practice then, we would expect the minimal winning coalition to exceed the simple plurality size.

The "two-person" bargaining model provides a suitable framework within which we can examine the relations between the NPC and the NCNC. We

can infer as part of the initial "exchange" agreed to between the coalition partners that Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had been Premier of the Eastern region, leader of the NCNC and who had successfully contested the elections to the federal House of Representatives, was to become Governor-General of the federation when it became independent in 1960, and first President when the federation became a Republic. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the deputy leader of the NPC was to remain Prime Minister. One can also surmise that some share-out of appointments to the Boards of federally controlled public corporations, which would give the NCNC a proportion greater than its bargaining weight, was also arrived at.¹³ The NCNC might also have expected that more of its supporters would be appointed to federal jobs. Indications that some such agreement was reached is given by the fact that Azikiwe was immediately after the elections made Speaker of the Senate, the second chamber of the federal government, from where he moved on to become the first Nigerian Governor-General in October, 1960, when the federation became an independent state, while a breakdown of the composition of federal Boards would show NCNC members in a majority.

But whatever the initial agreements reached, it soon became clear that the NCNC felt that the party was less favourably placed than its partner, the NPC. Dissatisfaction may have started with the negotiations, begun in 1960, preparatory to the promulgation of the Six-Year National Development Programme (1962-68). This, when the plan was released in 1962, showed, for example, that a good proportion of federal sponsored projects, on which the government expected to spend a total sum of £670 million was to be located in the North. Though the East, the NCNC's territorial base, was the most industrially developed part of the whole federation, it nevertheless still needed increased employment opportunities if growing unemployment in the region was not to become a major political problem. Agricultural land in the East, according to an FAO report, was the poorest in the federation. This had led to increasing migration of peoples from the rural to the urban areas in search of gainful employment. The problem of poor agricultural lands had been exacerbated by a high density of population, higher than in any other part (excluding Lagos, the federal territory) of the federation. The difficulty which this posed had in the past been met by the emigration of Easterners—particularly the Ibo people of the region, the chief supporters of the NCNC—to other parts of the country in search of employment. Many had gone into commerce and in the North, for example, had come to dominate the middleman trade of that region. But beginning in 1954, and more particularly since 1958, the governments of the other regions had become increasingly concerned with reserving employment opportunities—and trade—in their areas of jurisdiction to the local population. By 1960, therefore, it was becoming obvious that if the demands of the population in the East were to be met, more

¹³ See, e.g., the allegations made in "White Paper on the New Political Alignment in Western Nigeria" (Western Nigeria Official Document, No. 1 of 1964) originally prepared by Yoruba members of the NCNC. Also, "A Rejoinder to Dr. Ikejiani's Statement on Recent Accusations of Tribalism in the University of Ibadan" (NNDP Bureau of Information, Ibadan, 1964).

employment opportunities *within* the region had to be sought. By 1963, for example, urban unemployment in the East was roughly one in three, higher than in any other region apart from Lagos. But as against this, much of the federal finance for plan requirements was expected to come from the export of petroleum and the East produced two-thirds of the total Nigerian production of crude oil. In 1959, cocoa, palm oil, palm kernels and groundnuts—(including oil and cake) Nigeria's traditional exports—contributed about 70.0 per cent of the total value of exports while petroleum accounted for only 1.7 per cent. By 1965, however, the share of petroleum had risen to 25.9 per cent while that for the traditional exports had fallen to 51.6 per cent.¹⁴ From the 5,000 barrels per day production figures of 1958 (=0.25 mn tons per year), output had risen, before the outbreak of civil war in 1967, to 50,000 barrels per day (=25 mn tons per year) and but for the disruptions brought about by the war, was expected to have risen to 35 mn tons in 1969, 50 mn tons in 1970 and 80 mn tons in 1973 when from the cumulative output from 1969-73, the federal government would have earned in revenues, a total sum of £N650 million. Tables 1 and 2 give export figures of oil from 1958 to 1966 and the place of oil in the structure of domestic exports in Nigeria.

The growing importance of petroleum in the finances of the federation can be seen from another perspective by comparing the net inflow of private capital into oil and non-oil sectors of the economy. In 1964, the proportion of net inflow of private capital into oil and non-oil sectors was (in £N mn) 18.1:44.9. In 1965, this had changed to 17.4:19.6 and in 1966, the year before the outbreak of civil war, the comparable figures were 28.9:6.0.¹⁵ Table 3 summarizes the effect of petroleum on the Nigerian Balance of Payments for the years 1964-66.

That the NCNC thought itself worse off from the coalition is indicated by the following statement issued in 1964 by the NCNC controlled government of Eastern Nigeria:¹⁶

Take a look at what they (i.e. the NPC) have done with the little power we surrendered to them to preserve a unity which does not exist:

Kainji Dam Project—about £N150 mn of *our money* when completed—all in the North;

Bornu Railway Extension—about £N75 mn of *our money* when completed all in the North;

Spending over £N50 mn on the Northern (*sic*) Nigerian Army in the name of the Federal Republic;

Military training and all ammunition factories and installations are based in the North, thereby using *your money* to train Northerners to fight Southerners;

Building of a road to link the dam site and the Sokoto cement works—£N7 mn when completed—all in the North;

14 H. M. A. Onitiri, "External Trade and Payments and Capital Flows", paper presented to the Conference on National Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria, March 26, 1969.

15 Ibid.

16 Quoted from Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics*, pp. 557-58.

Table 1—CRUDE OIL EXPORTS OF NIGERIA

Year	Quantity in mn tons	Value in £N mn
1958	0.244	0.978
1960	0.827	4.408
1962	3.367	16.738
1964	5.782	32.056
1966	18.945	91.972

Source: L. Schatzl, *Petroleum in Nigeria* (NISER, Ibadan).

Table 2—BALANCE OF TRADE 1966 £N MN

Domestic Exports	Value
Cocoa	28.3
Groundnuts	40.8
Crude Petroleum	91.9
Raw Cotton	3.4
Palm Products	33.3
Rubber	11.5
Tin and Columbite	16.6
Timber	5.8
Other	46.1
TOTAL	277.7
Re-exports	5.4
TOTAL	283.1
Imports	256.3
Balance of Trade	+26.8

Source: Nigerian Economic Indicators.

Table 3—OIL AND THE BALANCE OF TRADE

	1964	1965	1966 (£N mn)
Crude Oil Exports	32.0	68.1	99.9
Oil Companies' Visible Imports	—11.7	—13.5	—19.5
Net contribution to the balance of visible trade	20.3	54.6	72.4
Net contribution to balance of total trade	—7.0	18.2	14.5
Net contribution to the inflow of foreign capital	18.1	17.4	28.9
Net contribution to B/P on current and capital account	25.1	35.6	43.4

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos. Abstracted from Table 10 of H. M. A. Onitiri: External Trade and Payments and Capital Flows, paper presented to the Conference on National Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria, Ibadan, March 26, 1969.

Total on all these four projects about £N262 mn.

Now they have refused to allow the building of an iron and steel industry in the East and paid experts to produce a distorted report.

There are two points of significance in the statement. The first is the use of the possessive "our money". Not only does this suggest the identification of oil revenues with the East, but read in conjunction with the phrase "a unity which does not exist" indicates both the claim to some separate identity and a revaluation of strategic goals. The revaluation can perhaps be better illustrated by an account of the general orientation of the NCNC, an account which would further validate the argument already made that in preferring the NPC to the AG, the NCNC made the choice not on synoptic-preference principles as it claimed, but on aspectival-preference grounds.

In 1953 the NPC and the AG formed the two champions of a more decentralized federal structure, the NCNC, in opposition, had argued against this, demanding instead a rather more centralized framework of government. The two contending positions were reflected in the proposals put to the Commission of Revenue Allocation which was set up in that year to examine the fiscal implications of the constitutional changes then being advocated. The AG wanted revenue allocated between the component units of the federation on the basis of "derivation". With cocoa as the principal revenue earner, this would have made the AG and the West the best off of the three regional governments and the West had threatened to break away were its demands not met. At the same time, the AG had demanded that more powers over welfare functions be left to the regional governments. Unlike the AG, the NPC and the North wanted revenue allocated on a per capita basis which would have favoured the North with its larger population. Like the AG, the NPC had put forward proposals for more devolution of governmental powers. The NCNC and the East, on the other hand, being fiscally worse off, wanted revenue allocated on the basis of needs, taking a position, with regard to the functional division of powers between the federal and regional governments, that was "left" of the AG. This position the NCNC had maintained in 1957 when another commission on revenue allocation was instituted consonant with the further changes in the constitution then envisaged. Over the decade 1954-1964, it has been estimated that following from the fiscal arrangements agreed to, the North may have lost some £0.5 mn annually to the East.¹⁷ In 1964, however, when the prospects of oil had made the East the more favourably placed government in the federation, the NCNC now found it no longer needed the federal structure it had long championed.¹⁸ When another commission on revenue allocation was set up in 1964, the NCNC, in its memorandum, argued in favour of a "loose" federal structure, a position somewhat similar to that of the NPC in 1953. Thus, whereas in 1953 the NCNC had been protagonists of a more centralized system of government,

17 O. Teriba, "Nigerian Revenue Allocation Experience, 1952-65. A Study in Inter-governmental Fiscal and Financial Relationships", *Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies*, Vol. 8 (1966).

18 See, e.g., extract from the Memorandum by the Eastern Nigeria Government to the Committee on Revenue Allocation (The Binns Committee), 1964.

by 1964, it had turned almost a half circle, now assuming a stance more or less diametrically opposed to its position a decade earlier. This is not to suggest that the NCNC is more aspectivally oriented than the NPC or the AG. What would seem to follow, however, is that the NCNC is more adept at masquerading its preference-principles under synoptic guises.

The other point of note in the statement is the reference to an iron and steel industry. The desirability of setting up such a complex involving the investment of some £N30 mn had been examined in the discussions on the Six Year Development Plan. It would seem from initial exploratory studies that some proposal to locate such a complex in the East was made. This would have entailed utilizing coal from the Enugu fields and iron ore from the Lokoja area of the North. Besides the other arguments in favour of a site in the East, the location would have provided an additional boost to the declining coal industry which was being forced to cut down employment as a result of the fall in the demand for coal. However, disagreements arose between the NPC and the NCNC over the appropriate location site. For one thing, the North raised an objection to having ore from its area removed for processing in another region. A compromise was then suggested to have the complex split into two plants; one located in the East, the other to be sited in the North. Whatever may be the arguments for or against such a compromise solution, the interest here is not with the economics of the location but with the bargaining involved in the exchange between the two coalition partners, the NPC and the NCNC and what emerges from the exchange is the sub-optimal bargaining position in which the NCNC found itself.

From the graphical illustration of transactional exchange involved in a "two-person" bargaining model, it was shown that confronted with sub-optimality, a disadvantaged collectivity could improve its bargaining position either by breaking away from an existing coalition or by attempting to increase its bargaining potential. Congruent with this generalization, the NCNC, we would expect, could therefore adopt either of the two options open to it. But by 1961, the former—breaking away from an existing coalition—was, in fact, no longer an option available to the NCNC. As we have been led to expect from the model, uncommitted members were encouraged by the NPC's more than optimal bargaining position to seek its membership. Thus, by 1961, the NPC, through such accretions, had become a winning coalition. In terms of the terminology and symbolism we have been using, this meant that the configuration of the dominant action-set had changed from one in which $[P > Q > R]$ and $[P < Q + R]$ to one where $[P > Q > R]$ and $[P > Q + R]$. Therefore to have broken from the coalition it formed with the NPC would only have resulted in the NCNC being worse off than it was in maintaining the coalition, a point which was sharply brought out when the NCNC contested the figures of the 1963 population census with the NPC. Though the NCNC had been exercised by the dispute over the figures sufficiently to seek action before the Federal Supreme Court, nevertheless, it refrained from taking the one political step which it could have taken to demonstrate its unwillingness to accept the gross returns of the census:

breakaway from the coalition government formed with the NPC. From the NCNC's point of view, the disadvantages involved in maintaining the NPC/NCNC coalition were still to be preferred to the advantages that might accrue from an NCNC/AG coalition. This left the NCNC with strategies directed at improving its bargaining weight. This it could do through (a) eliminating some members of the action-set: for example, through converting a triadic action-set into a diadic set; (b) increasing the number of members in the set—in other words, altering the configuration of the set from, say, a triadic to a tetradic action-set; (c) maintaining the configuration of the set while seeking to achieve a redistribution of weights between the members; or (d) combinations of any of these.

In 1961, the NCNC, it would seem, decided to pursue the first of these several strategies. From the May, 1961 regional election in the North, the NCNC had found that dislodging the NPC in the North might prove totally impracticable. Though it had expended large sums in support of its ally, NEPU, the latter had even lost some of the seats it had gained at the 1959 federal election. A party committee set up to investigate the causes of the poor performance of the NCNC and its ally in the regional election came to the conclusion that the NPC's electoral tactics in the North were such that in the "foreseeable future" no party could reasonably expect to compete effectively with the NPC in its governmental domain. Hence, if the NCNC sought to compete with the NPC, it would have to do so through seeking to eliminate the AG in the West, which as the voting figures suggest, had the weakest electoral support in the federation. Besides, as will be shown presently, internal conflicts within the AG were at the point of causing a split in the party's ranks, thereby further weakening overall support for the AG.

The NCNC made its first move when later in 1961, the party leader and premier of the East, Dr. Michael Okpara, made a public statement to the effect that law and order "had broken down" in the West. He then called on the federal authorities to declare a "state of emergency" in the West and have the government of that region "suspended". There had been minor disturbances in a few towns in the West, a product of the internal conflicts in the AG, but nothing certainly amounting to a breakdown of "law and order". Okpara's demand was therefore allowed to pass unnoticed. But then the AG itself played into the hands of the NCNC. In 1962, the internal divisions within the party came into the open and during the elections to the federal executive committee of the party, a split occurred between the party leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and his deputy, Chief Samuel Akintola who had succeeded Chief Awolowo as premier of the West when the latter resigned that office to contest the 1959 federal election.¹⁹

The dispute between the two leaders may be ascribed to a difference of opinion over the *strategic orientation* of the party. Put differently, the difference can be expressed as one of what should constitute the system-boundary of the party. Where Chief Akintola argued that the interests of the AG would

be better maximized if party boundaries were left congruent with the regional domain of the government, Chief Awolowo argued the contrary, demanding that party boundaries be extended beyond the confines of the governmental domain. To appreciate the difference between the two men, it might be necessary to take a broader look at the economic system. It is generally agreed that between 1950 and 1955, the GDP of Nigeria grew, at constant prices, at an annual average rate of about 6.0 per cent. From about 1955, however, it would seem that a decline set in, the rate of growth falling to about half that of the 1950-54 period. Taken in conjunction with a population growth rate of about 2.5 per cent per annum, this meant a net growth rate of just about half of one per cent. To this must be added a rise in the level of prices, a rise which outstripped the rate of growth of the economy. An inescapable consequence of this was the increasing disaffection among the urban working population, which was reflected in demands for higher wages and compounded by rising unemployment. These were conditions which were obviously susceptible to political exploitation since it was not unlikely that economic dissatisfaction might even outweigh the hold of traditional sentiments and loyalties. But the leadership of the parties was not only tied to those from the culture areas from which their main support was drawn, it was also restricted to the élite of these areas, thus giving to the various parties a distinctive élite-profile which was scarcely calculated to appeal to a cross section of the disaffected urban proletariat. It required little imagination therefore to realize that any party which wished to capitalize on the growing economic alienation of the urban population would have to recreate for itself a different party image. The University dons, the intellectuals, whom Chief Awolowo called upon in 1958 for advice, had come to this conclusion. As party "Leader"—and Premier—Chief Awolowo decided to follow the suggestions of his advisers but not without having to override the objections of some of his lieutenants. In 1959 then, younger men, of a supposedly more radical temperament, were brought into the executive committee of the party as a first step in refashioning a new party image for the AG. It was on this basis that the party contested the 1959 elections—and lost. The AG lost in that, though it had won a majority of the seats in the West, and made some significant inroads in the North, nevertheless, and contrary to the expectations of the leadership, the AG had been unable to win enough support to constitute itself a "winning coalition". But more important, the attempt to extend the systemic boundaries of the party had cost it a place, it would seem, in the federal coalition. (The AG had offended the NPC by the methods it used while campaigning in the North.) This, not unexpectedly, was taken by the more conservative elements of the party leadership as proof of the failure of the new "policy" of the party. They also took the failure as reinforcement of their contention that the better strategy was for the AG to maintain and consolidate its party-boundaries and from that point to seek to join a "winning coalition". Not only then had the new directional change in party orientation cost the party a place in the federal coalition—and therefore a loss of federal

19 For a somewhat different interpretation, Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, Ch. 10.

patronage, it had also led to a dissipation of scarce resources, resources which could have been hoarded and more judiciously expended to secure the maximum possible returns.

But the differences did not stop there. Underlying the differences in strategic orientation was another, that of *value-orientation*, or, in other words, of ideology. Ideology is a response to strain, arising from an inability, from lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located. This was in effect the position in which the AG found itself in 1960. The attempt by the leadership to find a more "usable model" emerged as the promulgation of a new ideology, which it proclaimed as "democratic socialism". This meant a change from the earlier slogans of "Life more abundant", to something less inchoate, more egalitarian and redistributive; a move from a freely competitive market economy to a more planned, centrally managed and state directed economic framework. But such a value system was hardly likely to win the acceptance of the economic élite who had provided the financial prop to the party, the bosses who had always constituted the top leadership of the party, for as Chief Akintola was later to parody the new ideology, democratic socialism would amount to no less than "one man, one car, one house, one wife and one *agbada*" (a traditional form of Yoruba dress).

The outcome of the two sets of differences, of value and strategic orientation, was the split in the party leadership in 1962, with one segment supporting Chief Awolowo and the party "ideologues", the other, Chief Akintola. The various moves and counter-moves by both factions, such as the attempt by the Awolowo faction to remove Chief Akintola from the Premiership of the West and the counter-action by the latter in seeking judicial action to prevent his removal from office, came to a head at a meeting of the regional legislature in which open fighting between the contestants took place with the NCNC members seemingly supporting the Akintola faction in the brawling.

Where Okpara's 1961 demand for the declaration of a state of emergency had gone unheeded, the federal coalition now seized on the fighting in the West's legislature to carry out that demand. A state of emergency was declared, the government "suspended" and an Administrator, responsible to the federal government, was appointed to administer the affairs of the Western government. Under the emergency administration, a commission of enquiry was appointed to investigate the affairs of six statutory corporations of the government and steps were taken to create another unit within the West. In 1963, this became the Mid-West region, which had been a dissident area of the West. The new region immediately came under the control of the NCNC whose weight in the second chamber of the federal legislature was thereby increased, from 12 in a chamber of 44 members to 24. While the emergency was still in force, Chief Awolowo and a number of his lieutenants were arrested on charges of felonious treason for which they were tried. Most of them were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. With the imprisonment of Chief Awolowo, it seemed the AG was almost on the point of going out of existence, precisely what the NCNC had wanted.

The emergency lasted for six months and when it was finally lifted, Chief Akintola was reinstated Premier of the West, his faction of the AG renaming itself the United Peoples' Party (UPP). With the NCNC, the UPP then formed the new government of the West. In place of the essentially diadic structure of the West's legislature, there emerged after the emergency, a triadic set of NCNC/UPP and AG. Given time, it was not unlikely that the NCNC might have developed into the dominant party controlling the government. This, in effect, would have led to a bipolarization of politics in the country. But more significantly, it would have placed the NCNC in a position to challenge the NPC. This requires some explanation. Under the regulative rules of the system, new governmental units—or regions—could be created if (a) a resolution to that effect was brought before the federal legislature and was approved by a two-thirds majority of the members; (b) a similar resolution was passed by a simple plurality in at least two of the three regions making up the federation; (c) the region from within which the unit was to be created approved of the creation of the unit; and (d) not less than 60 per cent of those present and voting in a referendum in the area in which the unit was to be created voted in favour. These were the rules under which the Mid-West was created in 1963. But with the creation of the Mid-West, a new rule became operative. While (a) and (d) remained in force, (b) and (c) could be superseded by (e) that a *majority* of the existing units, by a simple plurality vote approved a resolution demanding new units to be created. Thus, were the NCNC to gain control of the government of the West, it would have been in a position to move a demand for the creation of more units in the NPC controlled Northern region. Controlling the East, Mid-West and West as it would then do, such a proposition by the NCNC would have satisfied (d) and (e) but not (a) since it was highly improbable that the NPC would have voted in support of such a proposal while the NPC's vote would be necessary to satisfy rule (a). Were the demand to be for new regions in the North as was more than likely to be the case, a negative vote by the NPC could then have been construed by the marginals and dissidents of the North as a refusal to grant them institutional parity. The result would have been a loss of support and consequently of bargaining weight for the NPC and conversely, a gain in support and bargaining weight for the NCNC. Since it was highly probable that the NCNC would make such a move, the NPC could only forestall the NCNC through preventing that party gaining control over the government of the West and thereby achieving bipolarity. And this the NPC could do only if it sought to break the alliance between the UPP and the NCNC. With the relationship between the UPP and the NCNC in the West paralleling that between the NCNC and the NPC within the frame of action set by the federal government, a breach between the UPP and the NCNC was not too difficult to achieve. The NPC offered to ally with the UPP which the latter accepted, and given the backing which the NPC provided, the UPP, with Akintola as Premier, was in a position to issue an ultimatum to the NCNC members of the legislature: the members should either join the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) into which the UPP had been converted;

or, those of them in Akintola's cabinet would be removed from office and the alliance between the two parties severed. And had the NCNC members not complied, Chief Akintola could either have (i) attempted to keep his party in government by forming a coalition with AG members of the Assembly (there had, in fact, been various attempts to reconcile the two groups—Chief Akintola's UPP and Chief Awolowo's AG); or (ii) failing that, demanded a dissolution of the Assembly. While it was far from certain that the NNDP would have been re-elected in sufficient numbers to form the government, it was also most unlikely that all the NCNC members would equally have been returned and for most, if not all, of these, the loss of a seat in the Assembly, and therefore of the income from being an elected representative, would have been too high a cost to incur. Thus, though in issuing his ultimatum Chief Akintola was taking a calculated risk, he did so guessing correctly as the outcome subsequently showed that the probability of acceptance was higher than that of rejection.

It might be well to reiterate that references to the NPC, NCNC, AG, or UPP and so on are not to the "total collective", the organizations which these symbols denote, but rather "shorthand" expressions for "leaders of the NPC, NCNC, etc", the latter expression being roughly equivalent to "NPC members of the legislative assemblies of the governmental units of the federation" and like expressions for the different organizations denoted. Thus interpreted, it becomes clear from the foregoing, that politics in Nigeria, as in some states, is not about *alternative policies* but about the *control over men and resources*. It is therefore incorrect to see politics in Nigeria, as in the other states of Africa, as simply "tribalism"—the competition of one "tribe" against the other. It would be impossible, for example, to understand political processes in the West in such terms.

The emergence of the NNDP not only meant a breach between the leadership of the NCNC in the West and the "parent" NCNC; it also prevented for the time being at least, the bipolarity which the NCNC sought to achieve. Nevertheless, another opportunity was to be open to the NCNC, if not to alter the structure of the bargaining set, certainly one in which a redistribution of "weights" might be possible. This was the census of 1962. Since representation was based on population, the greater the population within a party's governmental domain, the better the chances, given the tendency for voters to support governing parties, of a governing party improving its bargaining weight. The tentative results of the census, given by the Chief Census Officer, Mr. Warren, showed that by 1962, the figures for the North had risen from the 1952-53 figure of 16.8 mn to 22.5 mn, an increase of about 30 per cent. The corresponding figures for the East showed an increase of 71 per cent, from 7.2 mn to 12.3 mn and those for the West (which included at this time the Mid-West) rose by 70 per cent, from 6.0 mn to 10.2 mn. Lagos in 1962 was given a total of 0.675 mn, an increase of about 152 per cent over the 1952 total of 0.267. On the UN's criteria for assessing demographic changes in Africa, Mr. Warren suggested the figures for the North were what might be expected as reasonable but concluded that those for the East were very

likely to have been inflated. Without giving the overall totals, the Federal Minister responsible for the census announced the findings of the Census Commission to the members of the federal House of Representatives.²⁰ The NCNC members objected to the conclusions of the Commission. Dr. Okpara, the NCNC leader, even though five of the divisions of the East had recorded increases varying between 120 per cent and 200 per cent, proclaimed that his government was going to abide by the figures for the East, while he criticized those for the North. In the confusion over the figures, verificatory exercises were then decided upon, with the agreement of all the governments. These when completed showed that:

In the North, of 175 constituencies, 99 passed (the tests), 76 failed of which 49 failed all tests;

In the East, of 73 constituencies, 53 passed, 20 failed, of which 5 failed all tests;

In the West, of 47 constituencies, 20 passed, 27 failed, of which 10 failed all tests;

In the Mid-West, of 15 constituencies, 8 passed, 7 failed, of which 3 failed all tests.

Though Lagos had three constituencies, no verificatory tests were made there. For Dr. Okpara, however, the figures which emerged from the tests were such that "the inflations disclosed are of such astronomical proportions that the figures . . . taken as a whole, are worse than useless".²¹ But in stating his objections to the "verified" aggregates, Dr. Okpara directed his attention to the North, ignoring the West where more than 50 per cent of the constituencies failed the tests. The tentative results had shown the North as having less than 50 per cent of the total population, whereas the verified figures gave the North an advantage of just over 3 per cent. Obviously then, Dr. Okpara's tactic was directed not simply at increasing the bargaining position of the NCNC, but also at possibly decreasing that of the NPC. But since the verified figures turned out to be unhelpful in this respect, they were to prove totally unacceptable to the NCNC and the government of the East which that party controlled. In rejecting the new figures, the NCNC left the NPC no alternative but to have a new count which the federal government agreed upon. In 1963, therefore, a new census was undertaken, but this showed results hardly different from those obtained through the verification tests. The two sets of figures are shown in Table 4.

But though the two sets of figures were more or less the same, it is not without some interest that it is only in the units controlled by the NCNC that increases, though insignificant, were recorded. If the verified figures were unacceptable, it was unlikely that the 1963 figures, scarcely different, would be. The NCNC therefore rejected them and attempted through legal action before the Federal Supreme Court to have the census invalidated, but this

²⁰ Debates of the federal House of Representatives, December 5, 1962, cols. 2734-6.

²¹ For more detail, Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 547-49; 551-56.

turned out to be a failure. Short of having another census, which might just as likely be "worthless" from the NCNC's point of view, and since neither the NCNC members of the federal coalition or the other governmental units

Table 4—CENSUS RETURNS 1962 AND 1963

Region	1962	1963	Increase (+) or Decrease (-)
North	29,777,986	29,758,875	-19,111
East	12,388,646	12,394,462	+ 5,816
West	10,278,500	10,265,846	-12,654
Mid-West	2,533,337	2,535,839	+ 2,502
Lagos	675,352	665,246	-10,106
TOTAL—NIGERIA ...	55,655,821	55,620,268	-33,553


followed the East in rejecting the 1963 figures, the NCNC and the East were therefore faced with a *fait accompli*. Feeling balked at every turn, the NCNC decided to enter into an electoral alliance with the AG for the federal election of 1964 which was then approaching. By 1964 then, the NCNC found itself an electoral ally of the AG to which it was opposed at the legislative level where it was in partnership with the NPC. The result of allying with the AG was to create two very broad sets of competing alliances: on the one hand, there was the NPC/NNDP alliance which for the election styled itself the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and on the other, the NCNC/AG/NPF which became the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The NPF or the Northern Progressive Front arose from the union of the two dissident parties in the North, the Nigerian Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC.) Since the NNNDP did not seem to have much electoral support, the division, for all practical purposes, meant an electoral bipolarity, the effect of which is illustrated graphically in terms of distributions of opinion.²² The total volume of opinion—or information—is, of course, a multi-dimensional complex. But for the immediate purposes, attention will be confined to a single dimension thus giving a bell-shaped distribution curve. The number of voters is measured along the ordinate axis and opinion clusters along the abscissa.²³ Figure 2 represents a unimodal distribution indicative of the dominance of some single issue. In a colonial context, such an issue could be taken to be that of independence. Figure 2

22 Opinion costs and distributions are treated in greater detail in G. Tullock, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-99.
 23 The following is based on A. Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-138. For a criticism of such spatial models, D. E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition", *APSR*, Vol. 57 (1963). Whatever the difficulty in the use of such models, they do serve a "heuristic" function in helping to demonstrate the simple "logic of competition"—see G. Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism", in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, 1966), and B. Barry, *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy* (London: Collier—MacMillan, 1970), pp. 136-46. Spatial models should therefore be seen as aids to explanation rather than as explanations.

might therefore be regarded as representative of opinion distribution in Nigeria, between say, 1938, when administrative devolution—the creation of the three "administrative" units—was introduced, and 1950, when the "MacPherson Constitution" was promulgated.

Figure 2

Unimodal Distribution Indicative of Single Issue Dominance




Since all competing parties seek to mobilize maximum support to become winning coalitions with a unimodal distribution, competing parties would be obliged to adopt moderate party strategies, the effect of which would be to drive them towards some median point such as that represented by (A) in the figure, which contains the largest cluster. Suppose there were two competing parties (P) and (Q) both aware of a distribution such as that shown by Figure 2. (P) would be sure to lose support in an election were it to pursue strategies aimed at mobilizing clusters to the left of its given position. The same argument would hold for (Q) if it was oriented to the right of its own position. Both parties would be able to maximize their support if they attempted to modify their position with (P) perhaps moving to take position (P¹) and (Q) moving to (Q¹), as close to A as they could possibly get, but not close enough to be in a position identical to A. For were (P) to move to A, (Q), if it were not to lose, would of necessity have to do likewise and there would then not be two parties but a single party. If both had to remain separate and distinct and offering competing policies for there to be a choice, they would therefore move towards A but stop short of A, to (P¹) and (Q¹) respectively. Both parties therefore would have strong incentives forcing them towards positions close to the centre where there is a preponderant majority of voters, a movement which imposes the need for consensus, P¹ Q¹ being closer together than PQ.

We can contrast the unimodal distribution with a "many peaked" distribution such as that represented in Figure 3. The overlap in the distributions is to be taken as indicating some degree of agreement amongst voters and leaders on certain issues—for example, in Nigeria, the "agreement" which might be thought to have existed up until 1959 that each of the dominant

Figure 3

"Many Peaked" Distribution



parties should confine party boundaries to the domain of the governmental unit they controlled, and further, that some voters are indifferent between voting for one party or the other, the way a particular voter votes then being given by the existing "current party differential". Figure 3 can, in fact, be taken as representative of the distribution of opinion in Nigeria between 1951 and 1960 when the country became an independent state. The same arguments as in Figure 2 apply. Both (P) and (S) would have to move to the right and left of their given positions to maximize support, with (P) moving towards B and (S) towards C. (Q) and (R) both have a choice of either moving towards B or A in the case of (Q), A or C in that for (R). As an example of this, reference might be made to the discussion above of the conflicts over the strategic orientation of the AG. But as in Figure 2, the effect of a "many peaked" distribution is to create the necessity for some degree of moderation. In Figure 3, for example, this is shown by the fact that the distance between P and B is greater than that between Q and B.


Figures 2 and 3 may be taken to represent situations of single and multi-party systems respectively (2 strictly indicates a high degree of consensus which may, but need not, be congruent with the single-party format). But both represent situations in sharp contrast to that of bipolarity, represented by a bimodal distribution in Figure 4.

Here, neither (P) nor (Q) have any incentive to take positions to their right and left respectively, in other words, to move towards some median point

such as that indicated by A, since to do so would cost either of them the support they have. Hence both would have to take extreme positions, (P) taking up position (P¹) to capitalize on the support between B and P; or it could take its position at B which has the largest cluster of voters, or even move to (P²) to maximize support from both the right and left of (P²). (Q) would follow precisely the same strategy as (P) if it expected to maximize support for itself and hence would be encouraged to move to (Q¹), C or (Q²) as the case might be. But with each move that both (P) and (Q) make, they are forced to move farther apart, taking more and more extreme positions: (P² Q²) is farther apart than BC and BC than (P¹ Q¹) which in turn farther apart than (PQ). A possible—and expected—outcome of bipolariza-

Figure 4

Bimodal Distribution



tion would be the resort to violence and an escalation of such violence as competing parties take a more and more extreme position. This would tend to rule out the chances of effecting change through the accepted regulative rules of the system and hence change, and by implication a halt to bipolarity, would be brought about only through the intervention of exogenic forces.

The "fit" of Figure 4 with the situation in Nigeria from 1964 is more or less complete. By allying with the AG and announcing that were UPGA to win the federal election that coalition would release the jailed AG leader, Chief Awolowo, thereby giving the impression that the imprisonment of the AG leader was due to the machinations of the NPC, the NCNC succeeded in bipolarizing political opinion in the federation, the contest between the NNA and the UPGA being made to take the simple form of a North versus South conflict. The fact that the South, that is, the East and West regions (and the Mid-West) was more socially and economically developed than the North and the employment of such highly emotive expressions as "the feudalistic North", "Hausa/Fulani imperialism" (or "Hausa/Fulani domination") in UPGA references to the NPC and the North, all tended to give some semblance of reality to the simple North versus South dichotomy. The decline into violence and increasing anarchy and the intervention by the military can perhaps be best described by a series of phases.²⁴

Phase One: represented by the various moves and counter-moves by competing parties; the formation of alliances and the mobilization of resources

²⁴ The events summarized are described in detail in Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 545-609

and opinion ending in bipolarity. This corresponds to the period 1963 and the end of the first half of 1964. This stage was described above.

Phase Two: contestants begin to take positions and select issues creating stereotypes of each other. For example, UPGA portrays the NNA as "feudalistic" and oriented at establishing a "Hausa/Fulani" hegemony, NNA counters by ascribing to UPGA the image of a corrupt, self-seeking collectivity which seeks to monopolize status positions in the society, of demanding more than its "share" of the political goods available. The first outbreaks of sporadic violence occur. In Figure 4 this stage is indicated by the movements of (P) and (Q) to (P¹) and (Q¹) respectively and would correspond to the period July 1964, to November 1964.

Phase Three: conflict between contestants is intensified and demonstrative actions taken. UPGA, for example, decides to boycott the federal elections and the NNA insists the election must be held. Members of the electoral commission from the East, Mid-West and Lagos resign from the Commission. Ultimatums are exchanged and a crisis develops. This stage may be marked as that in which both (P) and (Q) move to B and C respectively and it covers the period from December 1964, to the middle of January 1965. The boycott of the election by UPGA turns out to be incomplete. In the areas where contests took place, enough NNA members are returned to "win" a majority of the seats in the federal House of Representatives. But the President of the Republic refuses to appoint the deputy leader of the NNA, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister, thus creating a constitutional crisis. Both the Prime Minister and President make a "play" for the loyalty of the armed forces and the army decides to back the Prime Minister. Members of the judiciary—the Chief Justice of the Federation, the Chief Justice of the High Court of the East and the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice—intervene, seeking a formula for reconciliation. A general formula is found which provides, amongst other things, for the formation of a "broad-based government"; elections to be held in areas where there was a boycott; "disputed" constituencies to be re-contested and a promise made to review the constitution—the regulative and constitutive rules—of the system. A temporary resolution of the constitutional crisis is achieved but the basic bipolarity remains.

Phase Four: contestants take stock of their respective positions and "achievements" while contemplating new strategies. Exchanges take place and new formulae are sought as the practical implications of the compromises made during the previous stage are examined. This stage marks the *critical threshold* in the relationship between the contestants, and covers the period from mid-January 1965, to the end of July 1965. Should no acceptable compromise be found, then the critical threshold will have been crossed and further escalation of conflict expected.

Phase Five: the inability to find the grounds for any long-term solution leads to the implementation of the new strategies developed in the preceding stage. Contestants attempt to eliminate some members of opposing coalitions

such as the attempt of UPGA to eliminate the NNDDP, which the NNA counter by an attempt to remove the AG as a competitor; these actions lead to an escalation of violence. UPGA supporters kill Northerners, mainly Hausa traders in kola nuts, in places like Shagamu, a town in the Ijebu District of Western Nigeria. This stage covers the period August to the end of October 1965.

Phase Six: violence degenerates into near anarchy as others, largely drawn from the anomic strata of the society such as the urban unemployed, the lumpen *proletariat*, decide to "cash in" on the violence which was let loose in the preceding period. This covers the period beginning in November, 1965, and extending to mid-January 1966. During this period, some NNA members are forced to flee their homes in the West for places like Dahomey. Some move to the North. Such "migrations" are common from the West, but a handful also move between the North and the East. In the main, NNA members move either into the North or out of the country while UPGA members move from the North to the West and East. Farms, residential and commercial houses are set on fire and burnt; travelling within the West becomes exceedingly precarious and dangerous; food supplies in the towns grow short as communications are disrupted and prices rise to give further cause for disaffection and violence.

Phase Seven: this overlaps to some extent with the preceding stage but is distinguished analytically by the fact that it is the stage when plots and counter-plots of coups are hatched, resulting in a "destruction of information" and therefore extreme uncertainty. Uncertainty is removed when one of the plots is put into effect and the army, or sections of the army, intervenes. A group of young soldiers, led by a handful of majors, lead a coup which results in the overthrow of the civilian regime, the handing over of political power to the Head of the Armed Forces and the establishment of military rule.

The collapse of any regime invariably prompts attempts at explanation. The Nigerian case has been no exception, and various explanatory factors—or "models"—have been offered. It is not my intention here to provide any exhaustive review of these several attempts, only to make some comments on a few of the more prominent ones. The first is that which seeks to attribute everything to some mono-causal factor, such as "tribalism" or "corruption."²⁵ "Tribalism" is a very vague concept and those who appeal to it often fail to define precisely what they mean by it. Nevertheless, in the Nigerian case, even tribalism must be seen as an over-simple explanation. First, it is, in fact, incorrect to describe the Hausa-speaking peoples as a "tribe". To do so would be just as misleading as it is to call the Slav-speaking peoples a "tribe". Secondly, to explain the collapse of the Nigerian political system in such terms as "tribalism" is to ignore the extreme cultural heterogeneity of the society. Such explanations, without exception, refer all politics to the competition between the Hausa, the Ibo and the Yoruba as if these three groups exhaust all the groupings within the society. Thirdly, tribalism, if seen as the expression of some emotive sentiment, as it is seen by those who employ it,

25 See, e.g., W. Schwartz, *Nigeria* (London, 1968).

in itself demands an explanation. For example, it is assumed that the Yoruba-speaking man, in acting politically, does so from this perception of himself as a "Yoruba", but it is left unexplained why he should do so. Why should not such an individual have acted from perceiving himself as an "Ekiti" for instance? However, the crucial weakness of such explanations lies in the fact that if "tribalism" is taken as behaviour which proceeds from the sense of a unique identity, of belonging to a uniquely differentiated collectivity, it will be recognized that such behaviour is to be expected only during periods of uncertainty, that is periods when normally expected reactions by individuals become unpredictable (within the limits of any behaviour being predictable). To offer an explanation which reduces everything else to "tribalism" is therefore to subsume all action under uncertainty and this is plainly not the case.

Other mono-causal explanations of the collapse of civilian rule in Nigeria can be similarly criticized. The search for an explanation in terms such as "corruption" or the effects of "colonialism" simply leaves unexplained as much as it explains. Like "tribalism" they are exaggerated over-simplifications.

An explanation which cannot be dismissed so simply is that which places its focus on the "Marxist" notion of contradictions.²⁶ Instability and collapse are then said to derive from certain "basic" contradictions inherent in the society. The "contradiction" between centralism and regionalism; that between the exercise of "economic" and "political" power; between parties wanting to consolidate their hold on a specific region and wanting to solicit support from other regions; and between leadership strata—these and others are regarded as "basic". It is not exactly obvious why some of the "items" listed should be regarded as "contradictions". Why, for example, should the question of the delimitation of party boundaries—reference may be made to the AG—be taken as a "contradiction" and not as a case of determining which party strategy would be best calculated to obtain optimum return? Moreover, a number of what are regarded as "contradictions" have existed in the society since colonial times. Hence to refer to them in explanation is to leave unexplained why the system collapsed *when* it did. In other words, why 1966 and not 1964 or 1965? Why a specific time? A Marxist might regard the last question as an irrelevance. For him, what is important is the existence of "contradictions" which must of necessity, at some time or the other, lead to an implosion of revolutionary violence. But even Marxists make a distinction between "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic" contradictions and see in the former the primary, that is causal, forces of change.²⁷ Until the "principal antagonistic contradictions" have therefore been spelled out, it must be concluded that the schema of an explanation expressed in terms of "contradictions" has barely been outlined.

This is not to suggest that all such explanations are worthless. It is simply that where they are not misleading, they are inadequate.

26 R. L. Sklar, "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 3 (1965).

27 Mao-Tse-Tung, "On Contradictions", *Selected Works*, Vol. 1 (Peking, 1965).

Culture Change Theory and the Study of African Political Change: Some Problems of Relevance and Research Design

JAMES R. SCARRITT*

INTRODUCTION

The time has come, I believe, when it would be fruitful to attempt further systematic generalization in the study of African politics. Students of this subject certainly want to explain, with the maximum possible precision, the kinds of political changes which have taken place since independence, and this implies comparison between African countries. How have major political institutions changed their structure and functions? In what sense are they becoming more African? Where do new political and legal forms come from? What has been done to foster national unity? To what extent do African countries implement various aspects of socialist economic policies? In questioning the possibility of arriving at valid generalizations concerning these and similar questions, one might easily point to the extensive gaps which undeniably exist in our basic factual knowledge of African politics. How can valid generalizations be developed from an inadequate data base, it may be asked. In response, I would point to the mutually facilitating relationship which exists between theory building and data gathering, and to the rapid expansion of available data in the last few years. When research recently completed or presently in process is taken into account, the available data become sufficient to allow for at least a preliminary testing of some propositions. If these are shown to have some validity, the theory of which they are a part can then serve as a guide in gathering further data. New data will, in turn, almost certainly lead to modification in theory. Without some theoretical guidance, however, it is difficult to know when our data are "complete".

In examining political change in Zambia in the immediate post-independence period, I have found it useful to employ propositions from culture change theory integrated into a common conceptual framework.¹ Space limitations do not allow a full discussion of the intellectual origins of this approach here.² What is important for present purposes is to point out that the concept of culture used here is broader than that employed in the "political culture"

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1 This application will be found in my *Values and Power in Emerging Zambia* (forthcoming).

2 The intellectual bases of the approach are discussed in my *Political Development and Culture Change Theory: A Propositional Synthesis with Application to Africa* (Beverly Hills and London), Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, III, No. 01-029 (1972), pp. 5-14.