

Government will wait for the advice of the special Commission before they decide what to do.

Jobs in Government Service

The Rhodesian Government have said that they will give Government jobs to the people who have the best qualifications and experience regardless of their race.

The Rhodesian Government have also said that they will seek to improve the ways of training Africans so that they can compete on equal terms with people of other races for Government jobs.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

If Britain and Rhodesia end the dispute then Britain will provide up to £5 million each year for 10 years to help improve the Tribal Trust Lands and the African Purchase Areas, and to help to improve education and employment opportunities for Africans. The Rhodesian Government have also agreed to provide more money for these purposes. This money will be in addition to the money now being spent on education, housing and development for Africans.

The British Government and the Rhodesian Government will discuss and agree how to spend the money. They will make the plans and together they will agree how to carry out those plans. They will consider projects for bringing water to the farms; for improving farming methods; for new factories, roads and so on in the Tribal Trust Lands and African Purchase Areas. In education there will be more money for agricultural and technical training; for training teachers and administrators; and for primary, secondary and higher education.

The British Government will want to be sure that what is done will improve the standards of education for the Africans, make more jobs and will help to improve things for the future.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENDING THE DISPUTE

The British Government are willing to end the dispute with Rhodesia if they are sure that the people of Rhodesia as a whole are in favour of accepting the proposed agreement.

The Rhodesian Government must then change the Constitution in the way which we have described and start doing certain other things which they have promised.

The British Government will then ask the British Parliament to pass a law to give Rhodesia independence as a Republic. When all these things have happened Britain will end sanctions against Rhodesia.

Participatory Development and Rural Modernization in Hausa Niger

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The Republic of Niger is a particularly interesting case for students of the relationship between political power and economic modernization.¹ Since independence its government has advocated a rural development strategy called *participation populaire au développement*, which proposes a specific resolution to the dual needs of the state to raise the standard of living while building the power capacity of the national government.² This solution involves "inducing" the rural population to "participate" in development programmes. It is a strategy based both on the Nigerien leadership's analysis of obstacles to rural economic innovation and on its appreciation of the need to modify existing power relationships to ensure the growth of state capabilities. An understanding of the Nigerien modernization strategy should provide considerable insight into the inter-relationships between the two principal needs of many African states today.

Niger's experience with the strategy of "participatory development" is now nearing the ten year mark. It is already obvious that in the past decade the government has been unable to translate its strategy into working field policy. While still officially supporting mass popular participation in development, it has, in fact, shifted to operational development policies which have entirely different political and economic implications.

The shift has been away from "participation" as shared influence in decentralized structures, designed both to produce structural change at the local level and to "develop" individual capabilities, to "participation" as mass involvement without influence in development projects, dictated by technical considerations.³ This shift, it is contended, has resulted from the failure of

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¹ This essay is based on documentary research and field work undertaken in the Republic of Niger from December, 1968, to March, 1970. Field work and data preparation were made possible through a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program. Additional funds for survey research and writings were generously made available by the African Studies Centre of the University of California, Los Angeles. The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance he has received from colleagues at U.C.L.A. and Cleveland State University. The views expressed in the article, however, are solely his own responsibility.

² Nigerien leadership's commitment to a doctrine of participatory development is documented in numerous speeches by top leaders (*Le Niger*, February 5, 1964, August 3, 1968, November 6, 1971, for example) and in the report of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache (OCAM) *Conférence sur la Participation Populaire au Développement: Synthèse des Réponses aux Questionnaires Préparatoires*, Paris: OCAM, 1972.

³ I make a distinction between types of participation based on the distinction made in Peter Bechra and Morton Baratz *Power and Poverty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 206. My "shared influence participation" and "symbolic (non-influence) participation" are part of a more extensive participation classification developed in my dissertation, "Power and Participation in Rural Hausa Modernization", U.C.L.A., 1972.

the "Participatory Development" strategy to adequately reconcile power needs and modernization needs. We can best understand how and why "participatory development" failed by examining the experience of one especially progressive county in Hausa Niger.

A Difficult Setting for Strategic Action

When the government of Hamani Diori took power in 1958 it found itself faced with complex economic difficulties and with extremely little power capability to deal with these problems. The French had governed Niger for nearly half a century, leaving it with less than 220 hospital beds and 30 doctors for a population of well over three million. One Nigerien in one hundred was literate in French and less than 2 per cent of the primary school-aged children were enrolled in schools. Niger's pool of trained bureaucrats was understandably small. The economy was almost entirely agricultural with about 93 per cent of the work force engaged in primary production and less than four per cent of the nation's population residing in "urban" areas of 20,000 or more inhabitants. Although aggregate income figures are unreliable, Niger's estimated \$62 per year per capita income ranked it among the poorest of the generally poor Francophone West African states.⁴ Agricultural productivity was low as the bulk of the population lived on a narrow belt of cultivable land in south-central and south-eastern Niger. As population pressure on this marginal soil increased, traditional practices of fallowing were slowly abandoned and intensive cultivation was not accompanied by the use of modern agricultural inputs to maintain fertility or increase productivity. In this extremely poor country the French had avoided mass starvation primarily through the use of highly coercive grain storage projects and compulsory crop production. Given the obvious unpopularity of these coercive schemes, and the harsh economic realities of rural Niger the new government realized that it must devise a method of increasing agricultural production rapidly.

Yet the Diori government was in an extremely weak position to take decisive action to mobilize the Nigerien rural economy. Diori's PPN/RDA had come to power in 1958 with very limited domestic political support, when the French actively intervened in the 1958 referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth Republic to ensure that Niger would remain in the French orbit. This intervention crushed the governing Sawaba party whose leftist proclamations, and willingness to separate Niger from France in the hope of a possible association with Nigeria, were intolerable to a France acutely aware of its military problems in Niger's northern neighbour, Algeria, and not yet willing to see her colonial empire collapse.⁵ The result was that after 1958 the PPN

4 My economic and social data are drawn from a variety of sources including *Republique Française, Notes et Etudes Documentaires*, No. 2638 (February 26, 1960) and *Republique Française, Secrétariat d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères, Dossier d'Information: Niger, 1968-1969*, Paris: February, 1970.

5 There is a wealth of unpublished documentation in the county archives of Magaria and Matameye to support this interpretation of the political situation of the PPN in 1958-60. For the best published source to date see George Chaffard, *Les Carnets Secrets de la Décolonisation* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1967), Volume II, Chapter V, "La Longue Marche des Commandos Nigériens", pp. 269-332.

ruled with the active support of the French, but with few domestic allies. The bureaucracy and tiny urban working class had been Sawaba's principal base of support. Even the traditional aristocracy had been badly split over the Sawaba-PPN struggle as many of the most powerful Hausa chiefs had been Sawaba supporters for purely instrumental reasons. The PPN's major source of domestic power had to come from its association with the least nationalistic bureaucrats, and the local level commercial class which maintained a virtual monopoly over the rural economy by virtue of its control over agricultural credit, retail sales, and peanut markets. While most of the traditional chiefs found that they could come to terms comfortably with this regime when forced to do so under French pressures, power in rural Niger remained largely in the hands of county and sub-county level political élites, and the PPN's political strengths were simultaneously the source of its most important limitations to reaching the mass of the population. Even if the bureaucracy had been solidly loyal, it was still too small, and too moulded in the colonial tradition of disdain for the villagers to serve as an instrument for economic mobilization.

Pre-participation Development, 1958-61

In the face of these adverse political and economic conditions the PPN attempted to devise a strategy for reconciling the need for dramatic rural modernization and the need for consolidation of domestic political position and building increased national capability to integrate the political system and to direct it. Its initial choice was revealing. Its strategy appears to have been to allow the local aristocratic and commercial élites to retain their control over the markets and the only agencies of rural modernization which the French had created, the pre-cooperative societies (*Sociétés de Prévoyance* and *Sociétés Mutuelles de Production Rurale*). These pre-cooperative societies were permitted to distribute seed loans and credit mainly on the basis of local patronage, and by 1961 the Hausa area pre-cooperatives were hopelessly in debt.⁶ Major agricultural programmes like the promotion of the ox-drawn cultivator virtually ceased in this period, and short-term credit served only to enrich the local élite and consolidate its position. At the same time, however, the Diori regime had decided to build up the political infrastructure and to try to create a mass based, hierarchically controlled *Parti Unique* with the capability to reach down into the villages to mobilize farmers, and to unify the nation. The party would have two political functions. First it would provide a structure in which local level élites could operate, and hopefully be controlled by national party structures. It would provide channels of communication between Niamey and these local élites permitting their "education". Secondly, it would create a mass organization at the village level which would

6 This policy becomes obvious from a reading of the correspondence in the archives of the Société Mutuelle de Production Rurale of Magaria County, including a letter of the Minister of Economic Affairs and Planning, Amadu Aboubakar of February 18, 1958, a letter from President Diori to the Sous-Prefets of December 11, 1960, and a letter from Magaria Cooperative Director, Haido Mahamane, to the Minister of Rural Economy of March 31, 1962. All these can be found in Magaria County Archives.

permit the mobilization of grassroots support by involving villagers in symbolic party activity without giving them any real influence. There was no suggestion that the party should become a democratic institution or that political opposition should be tolerated outside the structure of the party. Niger, in the words of national leaders, was simply too politically immature to tolerate opposition.⁷ This structure was to be its agency of maturity by generating power for the central government. In addition to its political functions the party organization was entrusted with activities which had economic implications. It was given the task of organizing "human investment" projects to generate capital for planned growth. In addition to organizing non-voluntary collective work projects in villages the regime sharply increased taxes on farm families, and instituted new forms of indirect taxation such as the national lottery (*Tombola Nationale*) and the National Loan (*Emprunt National*) without explanation and with near universal farmer lack of comprehension. The party organization was to collect these funds and funnel them on to Niamey.

It is not clear that in the period 1958-61 the Diouri government had a rural modernization strategy at all. The activities of political infrastructure creation may have simply been the desperate efforts of the élite to consolidate its position against continual Sawaba challenges. However, if we view this combination of political and economic activity as a development strategy we may summarize this strategy in terms of the following factors which seem to be relevant to rural development policy-making:

Power—The goal of this strategy was to increase the power of national leadership by integrating local élite political machines into a national party. The creation of mass party structures would serve to pressure local élites to orient themselves to national issues and would increase national access to villages.

Role of Participation—Participation would take place on two levels. In villages, attention to national symbols and activities would strengthen the national orientation of villagers. Local élites would participate not only symbolically, but with influence in the national political coalition, and would thereby come to validate the national arena. Mass structures on the other hand would serve to limit the autonomous power of local élites.

Type of Development and Development Obstacles—If this strategy foresaw any economic development it was the increase in rural production through better manpower use and the generation of capital for non-agricultural sectors through coercive mobilization of savings. Neither purpose required fundamental changes in villagers' attitudes or behaviour, only the creation of adequate structures of power to integrate action.

Value Considerations—The preferences of the regime still favour highly

7 Hamani Diouri interview in *Croissance des Jeunes Nations*, No. 12 (June, 1962), pp. 14-15, and statement in *Afrique Nouvelle* (August, 1960), by the Minister of Public Works, Kaziende.

unequal development by maintaining the local economic élites. There is little evidence in this strategy of "Third World modernization ideals."⁸

Whether or not the party-human investment system was intended to be a solution to economic modernization as well as political consolidation, it became clear within a few brief years that it could do neither job in rural Niger. Village committees were largely paper organizations building upon a network of pre-independence clientele relations. Villages remained largely in the hands of local élites and town chiefs who considered themselves the servants (*bara*) of traditional sector chiefs. While new village party titles did become the source of internal political struggles in some villages, these struggles neither reflected a broadening of local level participation, nor were they tied to any national issues. More often village party titles were simply absorbed by the families of town chiefs and were used to consolidate their already tight relationship to local élites.⁹ The "human investment" activities of these party committees, moreover, were viewed by villagers with resentment as a continued form of the colonial *corvée*. The principal manifestation of collective party activity, the peanut party field was viewed by villagers as "the government's field", and as a simple continuation of the repressive "commandant's field".¹⁰ The party house was quickly assimilated in the minds of villagers to the property of the town chief.¹¹ Not only did party activities fail to generate a sense of mass participation in a national task, but the limited economic benefits of these projects, the revenues from party fields, for example, seldom got beyond the local level party élite. Nor did the national government find that the creation of village level party cells substantially improved the quality and volume of communication possible between the national leadership and villagers.¹² In short, the strategy of creating an instru-

8 The notion that there is a consistent set of "modernization ideals" has been developed by Gunnar Myrdal in his *Asian Drama* (New York: Pantheon, Random House, 1968), Vol. I, pp. 54-70. For Myrdal these include economic rationality (planning), raising the standard of living, social and economic equalization, creation of a new man with "modern attitudes".

9 My observations on the reality of village level party organization are based on my own study of southern Matameye county and are supported by the work of Ralph Faulkingham, "Political Support in a Hausa Village", unpublished doctoral dissertation in anthropology, Michigan State University, 1970, and the work of Serge Viguier, *Credit et Cooperation à Tibiri* (Paris: Bureau d'Etudes Cooperatives et Communautaires, 1969), p. 17. These observations deviate somewhat from those of French researcher Guy Nicolas, "Circulation des Richesses et Participation Sociale dans une Société Haoussa du Niger", Bordeaux, mimeograph of unpublished Doctorat du Troisième Cycle, 1967, p. 35. He indicates that most often the party head was a more "progressive" man than the chief, representing a different faction in the village. Nicolas' observations may have been based mainly on large towns.

10 Nicolas, "Circulation des Richesses", p. 35, and Guy Nicolas, "Etude des Marches en pays Haoussa," unpublished report of a mission, 1964, mimeograph.

11 This was clearly the case in the villages I studied in southern Matameye and the appointment of a new town chief would generally be accompanied by the building of a new "party house", sometimes in rivalry to the old chief's "party house", as was the case in El Dawa town.

12 The complete lack of information on the part of villagers about the nature of the National Loan (*Emprunt National*) is an excellent example of how the government failed to penetrate the villages with important messages. Villagers in the one village intensively studied expressed the belief that the National Loan was simply a form of tax paid to the local notable (Kaoura), who they assumed would use the funds for his own purposes.

ment of mass mobilization via the party failed to improve the power position of national leadership and to produce any rural modernization.

Induced Participation as a Modernization Strategy, 1962-1972

By 1962 it was clear that coercive mobilization could not be accomplished through a party network which, particularly in Hausa Niger, remained the tool of local élites, serving local clienteles. It was also clear that these local élites would be necessary to give the new government a stronger bargaining position in external markets and a better opportunity to modernize farmer production. Finally, the Diiori government was becoming increasingly aware that it had a stake in rural modernization or at least in a real improvement in the farmer's standard of living. Persistent Sawaba appeals to the rural population based on the economic situation and a noticeable increase in "peasant discontent" associated with coercive mobilization threatened long-term stability.¹³ The response of the regime was to search for "a policy of development to win the confidence of the population".¹⁴

They were not without suggestions. In fact, from 1958 through 1962 Niger had been visited by a series of United Nations, International Labour Office, and French Cooperation experts who had outlined a development strategy which would obtain strong foreign aid support.¹⁵ They recommended that Niger develop its rural economy through the promotion of intensive production methods which would diversify crops and increase productivity. This approach would require that farmers receive considerable training to acquire new skills and, given the limitations on agricultural extension personnel, this training would have to take place in pilot areas or "islands of modernization". In addition, they recommended that the administration of these pilot areas and the promotion of actual farm innovations be the responsibility of the farmers. This would enable Niger to promote change far beyond the capabilities of its technical bureaucracy. Finally, these experts advised that modernizing rural production had to be a global matter involving every aspect of the rural community, and could not be treated as a strictly technical matter as "the community rejects modifications which it cannot assimilate alone". If the farmer was to modernize his production and raise his standard of living, in

13 I collected many Sawaba political tracts published clandestinely in Niger, or circulated from outside Niger. One widely circulated tract was "La Lutte du Peuple Nigérien pour l'Indépendance Nationale", Bamako, January 15, 1961, Bureau Politique du Parti Sawaba.

14 Yves Goussault, *Interventions Educatives et Animation dans les Développements Agraires* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), p. 110.

15 See particularly the reports of the Bureau pour le Développement de la Production Agricole (BDPA), "Stude de la Modernization Rurale dans la Vallée de la Komadougou", written by A. Guinard, Paris: BDPA, 1958; and the Secretariat d'Etat aux Relations avec les Etats de la Communauté, "Organisation de la Modernisation Rurale du Niger", by Dutilleul, Bugeat and Goussault, Paris: 1961; and Yves Goussault, "Les Animateurs des Villages dans les Zones Aménagées de la République du Niger", Paris: Secretariat d'Etat aux Relations avec les Etats de la Communauté, 1961; United Nations, "Le Développement Communautaire au Niger", Niamey: July, 1961, Report of the Mission of Hardy Wickwar.

their view, he would have to modernize his entire life, and his community would have to change with him. "Agriculture", they insisted:

isn't only a combination of techniques, but a way of life... [and] the diffusion of modern methods of cultivation implies a general and often deep evolution of individual and community mores.¹⁶

These suggestions were persuasive to the PPN leadership for a number of reasons. First, they really had little information about the rural economy on which to generate alternative propositions. Second, these analyses were backed by Niger's major aid donors. Third, while these methods implied that the state would have to intervene in a whole range of rural changes, they offered the possibility that farmer self-administered training and innovation diffusion would be inexpensive and would vastly increase the power capability of the regime to promote rural development while offering the regime an opportunity to link villagers into a network of national policy.

But if this was an attractive possibility for rural development, the Diiori government had to face a series of difficult problems as to how such self-managed growth could be produced and controlled, and as to how it would relate to the power needs of the state, and to the existing structure of power. On the village level the problem was difficult enough. How could villagers be made more receptive to agricultural innovations? How could their attitudes toward the bureaucracy be altered? Past experiences had conditioned farmers to view outside intervention as wholly beyond the scope of their influence. Bureaucrats either provided farmers with agricultural materials (seeds, plants, food grains, and modern farm inputs) as gifts, often given more for social than economic reasons, or they coerced farmers to participate in mobilization projects which farmers saw as purely exploitive. In either case they denied the farmer any responsibility over his fate, and the farmer viewed the government with deep suspicion. Similarly the view which bureaucrats had of farmers was hardly conducive to their dealing with self-managing local units in a non-authoritarian service-oriented fashion.

At the county level, important economic and political problems had to be resolved. Local élites, linked to foreign trading companies, monopolized the local level economy by virtue of their control over credit and marketing. If local farmers were to form viable self-managed economic units they would have to have greater control over these vital economic functions or they would be unable to form any capital and finance modernization. The local élite monopolies also posed severe problems of national economic coordination as many of the commercial leaders of the Hausa area were less interested in Niger's balance of payments and contractual trade agreements with external factors than they were in maximizing their own profits through unofficial trade with Nigeria, made possible through special arrangements with customs officials.

In addition, because these local élites still controlled the rural economy they

16 Dutilleul, *et al.*, "Organisation de la Modernisation Rurale", p. 3.

had little interest in seeing Niamey gain greater access to villagers who formed the basis of their economic enterprises. The efforts to nationalize the party had shown only too well that the economic power of local élites was inextricably intertwined with continued political decentralization. This meant that a good many of the development problems of the Diiori regime were structural ones, not simply questions of farmer or bureaucrat attitudinal change.

Popular Participation—Induced Participation

To resolve these two sets of interconnected problems, PPN leadership officially opted for a strategy of popular participation in development. This strategy provided for a method of reorganizing economic and political relationships in Niger from the national capital to the village level.¹⁷

At the local level the problem was to release the creative, innovative power of the peasant mass and to harness its energies to national economic objectives through peasant participation in development programmes. But, given the suspicion and mistrust which characterized village attitudes toward government programmes in general, how could his participation be secured? The answer was a strategy of "induced" or stimulated participation. Inducement would work in two ways. First the government would have to prepare villagers for participation in development programmes by altering their attitudes. Once farmers were receptive to involvement and responsibility for local level development the state could economize greatly in its development efforts while achieving far superior results. Second, this peasant participation would have to be structured and institutionalized to guarantee its survival. The structuring of villager participation would involve not only local level organization, but adequate linkages to the national élites. Together these mechanisms would not only provide for vastly improved farmer modernization, but for the growth in national level access to the village, with diminution of the power of intermediary level notables. Inducing peasant participation would mean both behavioural and structural change for modernization.

To perform these two inducement functions the government decided to create two new institutions. First it would create the Human Development Service (Animation, or Human Promotion) whose job it would be to prepare villagers for involvement by affecting attitude changes.¹⁸ One interesting aspect of the Animation doctrine was the belief that villagers could overcome their suspicions and fears, and could develop perspectives on possibilities for a better life only if the individual were truly placed in a situation of responsible decision-making. Animation designed a kind of group therapy programme to

17 The best official statement of the broad development strategy is the *Perspectives Decenales*, 1964-1974, Niamey, 1964

18 The Nigerien animation theory is best discussed in the writings of IRAM advisers. See Rolland Colin, "L'Animation et le Développement dans la République du Niger", *International Review of Community Development*, Vol. 17/18 (1967); Colin, "Animation, Participation des Masses et des Cadres au Développement", *Les Dossiers de Tendances*, No. 12 (January, 1965); Colin, "Le Niger", Dossier—ATECO (Paris) Number 1 & 2 (November, 1968). It is reiterated in the *Perspectives Decenales*, pp. 88 ff. and 350 ff. and in Diiori's speech on the *Perspectives, Le Niger*, February 5, 1964.

generate these attitude changes by virtue of decision-making role playing. This would improve the farmer's personal self-confidence or "efficacy", as well as his satisfaction with a regime which actively solicited his opinions. The Animation Service would work not only with farmers, but also with bureaucrats whose attitudes would also have to change if villagers were ever to have real responsibility. The therapy method was designed to bring peasants and bureaucrats together to discuss common development programmes in order that both would emerge with altered attitudes.

The second set of functions of the inducement process would also be initiated by the Animation Service. It would begin creating new structures of participation linking into national institutions. The therapy sessions would initially produce a network of village "animators" who would in turn carry the development debate back into their villages under the watchful guidance of the Animation Service. As the village worked through these problems its basically consensual political process would guarantee the eventual "animation" of the entire village. Then, when the villagers began to attempt development solutions, they would rapidly realize that many problems could not be resolved in the village framework and would be receptive to proposals that villages form village groups (*Regroupement de Villages Animés*—or RVA). These village groups would begin a process of democratic politics, electing representatives to external political arenas, and delegating newly undertaken responsibilities to members of the group. Eventually the para-political structures would serve as the basis for a genuine administrative restructuring of the countryside into rural communes with real autonomous local power.¹⁹

Once Animation had begun the process of participation inducement, the second government institution could begin to give content to the local structures. The cooperative would help farmers to organize their economic activities in such a way that they could begin attacking their development problems directly, by collective capital formation, investment in agricultural and social equipment, collective wholesale marketings, and even cooperative retailing of basic consumer commodities.²⁰ Collective production might follow as a logical outcome. The cooperative would become the basic unit of economic reform in all major areas of rural life, and would gradually become more and more self-managing and more and more responsible for diffusion of modernizations. The cooperative would build from the village unit (GMV—or Village Mutual) toward village sections—exactly paralleling the Animation RVAs. These cooperative sections would benefit from the experience with democratic decision-making in the RVAs to become real economic decisional units. They would in turn be constituent parts of a cooperative, which would group a number of sections into an economically viable unit for peanut marketing and other collective functions. As these new developmental cooperatives replaced the authorization colonial pre-cooperatives (the *Sociétés de Prévoyances* and the *Sociétés Mutuelles de Production Rurale*) the entire relationship between

19 *Perspectives Decenales*, p. 353.

20 For the Nigerien cooperative strategy, see *Perspectives Decenales*, p. 192 ff. and p. 350, as well as Diiori's speech of February 5, 1964, and K. A. Mariko, "Qu'est-ce que l'UNCC", Niamey, June 1968, mimeograph.

the technical service bureaucracies and the cooperatives would change. They would develop from a relationship of compulsory administrative direction to a more nearly equal relationship between development partners in which contractual or negotiated obligations would be the basis for linking technical services to the needs of the communities.²¹

In the theory of the induced participation strategy, there would be three steps. The step of Animation, the step of Economic Production, and the step of Self-Management. Without Animation the other two steps could not be possible as farmers and bureaucrats would refuse to participate. Without the concretization of Animation in specific economic structures, Animation might well lead to uncontrollable villager discontent.²² Together these institutions would lead to both economic modernization and the release of substantial peasant political power which could be mobilized by the national élite for development and national integration.

Of course, the success of the "induced" participation strategy would be dependent on the outcome of two processes. First, the national élite would have to ensure that decentralized mass organizations augmented rather than limited its developmental and political capabilities. If the mass-based animation and cooperative structures were designed to ascend toward the national government, the UNCC and Animation professional bureaucracies, the national administrative services (*Prefets* and *Sous Prefets*) and the administrations of other development services such as Agriculture, Health, Education, and Animal Husbandry, would descend toward the village level carrying guidance and control. This process of controlling decentralization has been one of the most difficult to identify in the official plans, as European advisers have been urging Nigerien politicians to permit substantial autonomy at the local level by eventually dissolving the UNCC and Animation professional bureaucracies, and permitting instead the development of federations or unions of mass organizations which would set overall cooperative policy in negotiation with national policy-makers.²³ Yet there is not the slightest indication in the speeches and writings of Nigerien national political figures that they would be willing to see the mass organizations grow this powerful. PNN leaders view them much more as instruments of national mobilization whose mechanism compels substantial local influence devolution, but which must be kept within the overall guidance of Niamey.

The second process is far more complex. It involves diminishing the power of existing local and intermediary élites who stand as barriers to cooperative collective economic organization, to local influence broadening, and to the

21 République du Niger, Commissariat General au Développement, Promotion Humaine, "Rapport d'Activité du Service de la Promotion Humaine", July, 1968, p. 10.

22 République du Niger, Ministère de l'Economic Rural, Bureau Central de l'Animation, "Propositions pour un Programme d'Animation au Développement", Niamey, June 1964, p. 15.

23 This idea is a crucial part of the animation strategy as developed in an early work by Yves Goussault, "Intégration Structurelle des Masses Africaines au Développement", Diplôme Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Université de Paris, 1964 (unpublished) and appears in a recent document by French UNCC adviser, Marcel Lancelon, "Elements pour une Organisation du Secteur Cooperatif et Mutualiste", République du Niger, UNCC, Niamey, 1971, p. 52.

linkage of the village level to Niamey. It seems quite apparent that this strategy of development implies considerable political conflict as local élites would certainly see the erosion of their control over village politics and local level economics as a direct threat to their power. At the village level Nigerian planners did not believe that this would create a problem as they expected villages to find consensual solutions to modernization problems based on the supposedly low economic and political differentiation of the village and on its "cooperative" tradition.²⁴ But as for intermediary level élites versus national power and rising mass-based organization it seems logical that the Nigerian national political leadership understood, as did French experts who advised them,²⁵ that induced participation would mean radical political change. How could they hope to bring about this radical change?

Their answer was that by combining the pressure of induced peasant participation with a series of national structures, reinforced by national bureaucracies and administrators, they could greatly limit the power of county level élites. To begin the process they created a series of "mixed-capital" economic enterprises to assure better national control over external and internal commerce. These enterprises were certainly designed to give the state the upper hand in setting prices and conditions of trade. They created SONARA to monopolize the export of peanuts and established a National Stabilization Fund to help regulate international peanut price fluctuations. While SONARA still left most of the internal peanut trade in the hands of private stocker organizations it became clear by the mid-1960s, that the government planned to turn a progressively higher share of internal peanut purchasing over to the cooperatives, with 50 per cent of the internal trade to be controlled by cooperative markets by 1970. To support the transfer of marketing to state administered agencies the Diiori regime created the *Banque de Développement* whose essential function would be to supply short term credit to finance cooperative peanut trade. These actions were reinforced by the creation of TRANSCAP which was given a monopoly on trucking of export peanuts. Furthermore, to gain power in the area of retail trade the government created COPRO-NIGER, the Popular Pharmacies and the Nigerian Builders to give private merchants price competition in basic food and

24 Rolland Colin, "De la Tradition à l'Evolution consciente: Vers le Développement Authentique en Milieux rural", *Développement et Civilisation*, No. 28 (December, 1966), and Guy Belloncle, "Pedagogie de l'Implantation du Mouvement Cooperatif au Niger", *Archives Internationales de Sociologie de la Coopération et du Développement*, No. 23 (January-June, 1968), p. 52, and *Perspectives Decennales*, p. 192.

25 Much of the public discussion of the political consequences of the strategy is couched in terms of a simple populist formulation which envisions little problem from the rural élite but in a number of speeches by top Nigerien officials and in numerous documents by European advisers we can detect a two class analysis in which the struggle is between the traditional ruling class (*sarakuna*) and the rural mass (*talakawa*). See Diiori, *Le Niger*, February 5, 1964, "Our Rural Masses Need to be Emancipated and Politically Educated", and J. Tottee "L'Animation", a paper presented to the Seminar on Nutrition and Agricultural Diffusion, Niamey, July, 1963, p. 9, by the former head of Animation Service in which it is stated that "Technical and political decisions should no longer be made by the traditional authorities or administrators but by the peasants themselves".

clothing, medicines, and building materials.²⁶ Finally, Diiori created several national committees to coordinate these technical efforts, and to provide them with strong political support. On a technical level a Permanent Committee on Rural Development was created to coordinate technical perspective and to work out joint actions. This notion eventually led to the reorganization of county and departmental field bureaucracies into integrated teams. Both of these actions were designed to reduce the tendency of technical services to form bonds with specific clienteles at the local level, and to consider intra-administerial politics as more important than Nigerien politics and Nigerien development. On the political level the National Committee on Human Promotion was created to mobilize top party, bureaucratic and other political forces into an agency which would set policy and provide political support for it. The government attempted to coordinate these various agencies and committees not only by creating official ties, but by appointing overlapping leadership. Boubou Hama, for example, was at once President of the National Assembly, Director of the UNCC, and Head of the BDRN while playing important roles in other development agencies as well. When it became obvious that the National Committee on Human Promotion was an unwieldy structure Diiori established the *Commissariat Général au Développement* as its Permanent Secretariat, and this agency responsible only to the office of the President, became the key coordinating device for the Planning Service, Animation Service, and Cooperative Service.²⁷

While constructing these national economic and political structures to limit the power of county élites, the Diiori government also planned to create a network of consultative counsels to link popular organizations to the bureaucratic decisional arena at every level. At the county level it created a county council of "popularly" elected representatives. These councils were designed mainly to provide a forum for villager expression, and to strengthen the channel of communication between the county bureaucracy and the villages. A second county institution, the consultative committee, was to provide popular input into the planning process by advising administrators on county programmes and budgets, and by acting as the local agency for the decentralization of national plans. A similar institution was created at the Departmental level. Finally, the National Assembly could serve as a similar instrument of popular expression through mass participation in the election of delegates. Presumably, as animation and cooperative organizations proceeded to structure villager participation, these organizations would become increasingly potent in county and supra-county political processes. Meanwhile, each of these institutions would serve to foster a sense of popular involvement in modernization decisions. Summarizing the induced popular participation development strategy, we may say that:

26 Goussault, *Interventions Educatifs*, pp. 109-110. See Boubou Hama's statements in *Cahiers Presence Africaine*, "Colloque sur le Socialisme Africain", Dakar, 1962, Paris, 1963, p. 55 ff., and interview in *Jeune Afrique* special issue on Niger, September 4, 1967, p. 39.

27 Goussault, *Interventions Educatifs*, pp. 11, 121 and my interviews in Niger with former Commissioner of Planning, Lucien Bayle and Guy Belloncle.

Power Considerations.—The strategy was an attempt to augment the power of the national élite by creating guided popular structures of participation which would limit the power of the pre-modern local level élites. Hence we may say that it was a strategy of power centralization through "decentralization" of participation to the masses.

Role of Participation.—"Participation", both as symbolic support and as influence sharing would open the farmer to economic change and to taking responsibility for his own modernization, while reinforcing the political structures of the state.

Type of Development and Development Obstacles.—Rural development is seen as changing the farmer's entire mode of life by making him an active participant in global modernization. Production increases should result, but more importantly the capability of farmers and bureaucrats to deal with developments should grow. Barriers to modernization are the attitudes which farmers and bureaucrats hold, and the structures which reinforce these attitudes.

Value Considerations—are mainly those of modified African Socialism—the desirability of collective, equalitarian development expressed by Nigerien leaders in an effort to keep in step with other African states, and the humanitarian socialist values of French advisers like the IRAM consultants, who dominated French assistance programmes to Niger in this period.

The Evolution of Development Policy in Matameye County

Matameye county is an administrative sub-division of Zinder District incorporating some 77,000 people mainly of Hausa, and Hausa Beri-Beri origin. Even before independence it was regarded as one of the wealthiest, most promising regions of the country, and it has become a "pilot" region for every programme which the Diiori regime has considered implementing on a nationwide scale. Matameye was the first county selected for the new "popular participation development strategy". It received authorization to begin an animation programme in 1962 and by 1963 the programme was well underway. By 1966, the county was considered completely "covered" by the animation network. In the same year Matameye became the first county to begin a women's animation programme. The first cooperative markets were established soon after animation began in the Matameye towns of Dan Barto and Kwaya, and these were endowed with COPRO-Niger retail stores and were integrated into the newly created SONARA marketing board system. The reform of the UNCC cooperative system (the New System) designed to make it more participatory and self-managing first took place in Matameye, and the reform of the bureaucracy designed to create integrated services (the *Action Intégrée*) was first tried in Matameye in 1966. In addition, Matameye county was a "pilot" area for new health programmes, including the village pharmacy scheme, and adult literacy programmes. These facts indicate that although Matameye was in no way typical of what was going on in the rest of Niger where limited resources prevented the promotion of simultaneous

nationwide programmes, it should have been indicative of how the induced participation strategy would work, and of what might be expected in other regions of the country.

Within Matameye county the distribution of programmes was very uneven. In fact, although Matameye was "covered" by animation, and although its markets were entirely under cooperative control by 1969, the Animation Service had only enough resources to work intensively in four of the village groups in the county. Recognizing this fact, I decided to base my research on a comparison of typical villages in the county with the villages of one of the most intensely treated village groups. My comments on the evolution of development policy in this county are based on what happened primarily in the exceptional villages where a real effort was made to implement the participatory development strategy.

Pre-independence Matameye

Prior to independence Matameye county had undergone as intensive a programme of rural development as any county in Niger. The French had created an experimental agricultural station in the southern-most town, Dan Barto, an experimental farm station in Magaria, and a centre for the promotion of ox-drawn cultivation equipment in Tassao, near the traditional capital of the county, Kantche. Very limited efforts were made to promote agricultural products like seed dressings and fertilizers and the plan to diversify county production by encouraging irrigated garden cultivation almost amounted to nothing due to the dearth of extension agents and to the failure to spread scarce materials beyond the narrow clientele of agricultural agents. The principal agency of agricultural development was supposed to be the pre-cooperative Rural Production Mutual Society (SMPR). This organization was a typical "cooperative without cooperators", as membership and dues were compulsory for all farmers and herdsmen of the county, but all decisions were made by a council of appointed "native" leaders and representatives of the colonial administration, and, in the case of the Kantche mutual, and that of Magaria-Matameye counties, these leaders were entirely composed of traditional aristocrats, many of whom had ties to the local commercial élites.²⁸

There were essentially two types of agricultural programmes undertaken by the colonial administration before independence. The first involved coercive mobilization of rural resources for colonial objectives—the collective grain storage programmes and the enforced cultivation of manioc are the most obvious examples. They did effect the mass of villagers who had absolutely no influence in their content or administration, but who were expected to comply from a fear of punishment. The French justified these programmes not in terms of development or modernization, but rather in terms of famine control. Administration was mainly the responsibility of the colonial administration and its agents, but many of the agents responsible for programme

²⁸ The archives of the SP and SMPR(DR) of Magaria and Kantche identify the personnel of these groups in meeting minutes.

enforcement in Matameye county were themselves members of the traditional Hausa élite.

The peanut cultivation programmes were a hybrid of coercive methods and demonstration techniques. They were initiated in the mid-1930s to stimulate the large-scale production and sale of peanuts, a crop already being cultivated and commercially traded by many Hausa farmers. While the French administrators claimed that they had "introduced" peanut cultivation to ward off villager starvation, the true motivation seems to have been the desire to further monetize Hausa society in order to tax the population to pay for costs of colonial service and the search for a method of shifting the existing monetization of Hausa farmers from Anglo-Nigerian trading networks, to franc zone trade.²⁹

Peanut development programmes were initially to be classical demonstration projects with prices and market goods used as incentives for production. But as the French found it politically and economically expedient to close the Nigerian border trade routes in the late 1930s, coercive techniques began to play a larger role in peanut crop promotion. By the time of World War II, farmers were being forced to produce fixed quotas of peanuts under penalty of physical punishment, and villages were held collectively responsible for these quotas. Peanut development, then, became a coercive policy when non-coercive incentives failed to produce the desired results.³⁰

After the war peasant attitudes toward peanut production improved, especially after the great famine of 1949 in which many farmers had saved their families by diversification in peanuts. But the government continued to use the indirect coercion of high cash taxes to ensure continued large-scale peanut cultivation. In addition, with the rise of nationalist politics, attacks on the colonial administration from both RDA and UDN-Sawaba elements intensified. The Sawaba victory in 1957 led to demands that all coercive programmes cease, and that the pre-cooperative mutuals be democratized. In Magaria and Kantche, however, Sawaba appeals that these pre-cooperatives promote the interests of the "poorest elements in the rural population" went entirely without effect.³¹

A second type of colonial rural programme was especially manifest in the 1950s. It involved non-coercive diffusion of new techniques to a selected clientele. These programmes had, as one objective, the reinforcement of existing status differentiations, and the further development of individual differ-

²⁹ Edmond Séré de Rivieres, *Histoire du Niger* (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1965), p. 268; Nicolas, *Circulation des Richesses*, pp. 162-166, reveals the degree of pre-colonial monetization of Hausa Matameye county. See also in Nicolas' work, pp. 210-216, 233-234.

³⁰ Cercle de Magaria, Report of Tournee, J. Escher, July 20-August 1, 1943, and Report of the Third Quarter of 1938. Both reports are found in the archives of Magaria County. I am indebted to John Collins, professor of government at Amadu Bello University, for his comments on pre-independence peanut cultivation. His study on Magaria county markets entitled "Political and Economic Change in Rural Hausaland: A Study of Peanut Markets and Cooperatives in the Magaria Region of Niger", is in preparation for the Ph.D. at the School of Advanced International Studies.

³¹ Djibo Bakary, "Letter to all SMPRs", August, 1958, in the SMPR file in the Magaria archives, Republic of Niger.

entiation and the growth of a middle-class. Under these programmes members of the traditional aristocratic élite, many of whom were linked to the commercial élite in Matameye, received the lion's share of agricultural extension programmes, especially benefiting from the introduction of relatively expensive ox-drawn cultivators. The same privileged relationships were maintained for aristocrats and their clients in seed dressings, and fertilizers.³²

Post-Independence—The First Phase, 1960-1963

As indicated above, very little happened in the way of rural development programmes in Niger from 1958 to 1962. Matameye county was no exception. The county still had only one agricultural agent and one *moniteur* for 65,000 inhabitants,³³ and the pre-cooperative societies of Kantche and Magaria were run entirely by the chiefs, who had distributed credit as patronage and run up sizable bad debts for both mutuals. Given the inadequacy of county administrative personnel it is hardly surprising that both the Plan of 1961-63 and the Intermediary Plan were but paper documents in terms of actual country-wide programmes. The only rural activities which did operate were the party efforts to extract local capital. Since the party in Matameye had the strong backing of the Chief of Kantche, Amadu Issaka, and had further support from some of the biggest merchants in Matameye (Malam Kaila, Kaoura, and El Hadj Mamani) it could penetrate the villages with ease. However, its local level activities were used only to strengthen its own base.

The Era of Participation in Matameye

In 1962 when the Diiori government decided to do something about rural development, it was natural that Matameye would be selected as a test case. Expert reports in 1961 had identified the possibilities for modernization in the southern part of the county.³⁴ Therefore the first element of the participatory strategy, the Animation Service, began to work in the county in early 1963. The fact that animation began so early in Matameye may have been to the detriment of the animation programme for national policy on the participation strategy was not clearly established until the publication of the Ten-Year Perspectives in the spring of 1964. Nevertheless, Matameye was the area where animation was supposed to prove its worth.

At first Animation ran into a number of unforeseen difficulties. The first Animation director was a European who understood relatively little about Matameye affairs, and while he succeeded in beginning the process of village recruitment of 'animators', this recruitment took place without adequate political preparation.³⁵ Naturally the county PPN immediately perceived

32 I base this statement on my interviews in Matameye and on my study of the purchasers of ox-drawn agricultural equipment. Of those individuals who purchased equipment prior to 1960, 42 per cent were titled by heredity or clientage (*mai-gari*) and an additional 23 per cent were considered religious leaders.

33 Dutilleul, op. cit., pp. 1-3.

34 Dutilleul, op. cit., and Goussault, "Les Animateurs de Village".

35 Much of my data here is based on interviews and research in the archives of the Animation Service of Matameye county and Zinder department.

Animation as a threat and accused it of attempting to establish an alternative party. This view was reinforced when animation sensitivity sessions describing how the PPN works as a democratic structure coincided so poorly with farmers' views of the PPN that they began to raise questions.³⁶ Early county level animation reports insisted that the party cooperate with Animation, but recognized that the county party leadership was "poorly educated and informed" on the national development strategy. In addition to party difficulties a boiling conflict with Dahomey during this period made farmers fearful that Animation was recruiting them for military service.³⁷ As a result, in many cases only the most expendable villagers were nominated to become animators. These naturally had little influence on fellow villagers when they returned from training sessions.

Without the strong national party support for which local and national Animation officials pleaded, Animation soon found itself politically isolated. The second Matameye county Animation chief, the first Nigerian to fill the post, quickly understood his options. Either he had to push for radical structural change without open support from Niamey, or he had to reconcile Animation with the existing power in Matameye and attempt to change it from within. His choice was to reassure the traditional élite by bringing it into the animation process.³⁸ Traditional nobles and sector chiefs (*masu-komfani*) were used to help in the recruitment of animators. Palace guards (*dogari*), often the same individuals who had traditionally come to demand taxes of villages, conveyed messages for the Animation Service. Despite the fact that some subsequent Animation administrators personally attempted to deal with villagers in a non-authoritarian manner, it is difficult to see how the Animation Service could have been sharply distinguished from the party it was meant to democratize.

In 1969 and 1970, I conducted extensive interviews with farmers in the Matameye area to determine the extent of their participation in the new instruments of rural development. The answers which they gave were both quantitative and qualitative. The common expression used to describe a meeting with governmental officials was "they gave us advice" rather than "they asked our advice", often followed by the expression, "how can simple peasants (*talakawa*) refuse what the authorities want?" Almost half of the farmers interviewed in three highly "animated" villages could provide no information on what the role of an animator was, and well over one-third could not remember how the village animator had been chosen. The position had acquired so little importance six years after its creation that two-thirds of the respondents expressed no interest in seeking this position if it were available. These figures were even more discouraging for the villages, which had been theoretically "animated" but which had had little direct contact with the Animation Service. In one such village (Kourfuna) the village chief ex-

36 J. Tottee, "L'Animation", pp. 2, 10-11.

37 I base many of my observations on Animation in Matameye on depth interviews with former Animation directors for Matameye including notably Ousman Katzelma and Harouna Amadou.

38 Interview with Ousman Katzelma, February 17, 1970.

pressed the view that while he sent his teenage son to attend meetings, he hadn't the vaguest idea what he was supposed to be doing. During the period of field observation I had occasion to observe Animation meetings in villages of intensive activity. The vast majority of these meetings consisted of exhortations to pay taxes, send children to school, buy or use farm products, or respect health practices. There was little in these meetings that could be construed as the solicitation of villager opinion, or the building of the villager's self-confidence to make his own decisions. Animation had failed to create the basis of a "dialogue" between the farmers and the government.

Within the village, Animation sometimes created conflicts. Despite the view of foreign experts that the Hausa village was a unit of social solidarity based on consensual relationships, it soon became evident that no one "animator" could represent an entire village, as villagers were divided into factions of unequal power.³⁹ At times the animator role went to a rival of the town chief producing sharp conflict as the animator attempted to strengthen his position by invoking the support of the animation administrators. More often the title of the animator was simply absorbed into the dominant village faction—the family of the town chief or of the highest titled person in the town. Only rarely did the animation system produce "new men" of substantial influence. These were most often animator delegates "representing" village groups (RVA). They also sought to strengthen their power by allying with county level administrators. The most notable case in the county was that of one animator who gained widespread prominence for his work in helping recruit other village animators. He was able to strengthen his position first by allying with the European Animation director, and then, when the traditional aristocracy was brought into Animation programmes, by allying with the county administrator. His case is interesting because he employed a classical Hausa patronage method of advancement, rather than new principles of participation. It is also tragic because as his administrative patrons were rotated to new posts, he remained to face the enmity of the traditional élite. Animation did little to close the gap between the powerful (*masu-iko*) and the common people (*talakawa*).

The only thing which can be said about the Animation network is that it did vastly increase farmer symbolic "participation" in extra-local affairs, if we define symbolic participation as political information reception and cooperative election attendance. Symbolic participation was substantially higher in three villages which underwent intensive "Animation" ($Y=1.7$, $N=132$) than in a comparable neighbouring village which underwent only light contact with Animation programmes ($Y=1.2$, $N=35$).

If successful animation was considered a pre-condition of successful cooperative organization Matameye's cooperatives had little chance of being real instruments of political participation and self-managing economic units. At first "cooperatives" were formed with the sole purpose of marketing

39 Guy Nicolas, "L'Animateur Vu par les Paysans", in *Analyse Sociologique et Méthodes de l'Animation en Pays Haoussa du Niger*, Paris: Institut de Recherche et d'Applications des Méthodes de Développement, August, 1968.

peanuts. These market cooperatives were severely criticized by Animation administrators who recognized the threat that they posed to the formation of more comprehensive "development cooperatives" as the strategy had suggested.⁴⁰ The marketing cooperatives were a far cry from the cooperative which had been envisioned in the plan. In fact, they consisted of small groups of individuals who contributed a cooperative share (part social) in return for the right to market dividends, and to agricultural credit. The cooperative share quickly became confused with downpayments of 10 per cent on agricultural equipment so that each cooperator had a different share in the cooperative. But all members expected to obtain economic returns on their investments. Some cooperative members hoped to carry on a peanut marketing trade in which they could gain profits by buying farmers' peanuts in the field and then selling them at the cooperative scale under the member's card. This would enable the member to gain a dividend of 3 to 5 per cent on total sales in addition to price differentials. Other cooperators apparently saw the 10 per cent downpayment as easy credit and believed that they could realize enormous profits by selling equipment for cash and investing capital realized in other ventures. Naturally the first farmers to take advantage of these opportunities were already the best off economically.

It was relatively easy for traditional notables to control these "marketing cooperatives" even after the basis for selection of cooperative officials was changed from appointment to "election". The creation of the first two cooperatives in the county at Dan Barto and at Saouni reflected the struggle between traditional forces more than it did a popular involvement in cooperative decisions. Dan Barto cooperative subsequently became the virtual fief of El Hadj Barde who was not only elected cooperative president but also controlled three of the market's six weighers. Saouni, on the other hand, enjoyed as decentralized an influence process as would be observed in the county as no single notable had sway over the area hence leaving the politics of this cooperative open to smaller notables with more limited influence bases. Even in Saouni, however, there was no semblance of popular participation in market offices or in market decisions as only one of the weighers could be labelled a "new man" without either distinguished status or affluence. As a rule farmers expressed a preference for wealthier market officials who would be less tempted to make personal use of cooperative funds, and who would be more capable of repaying them if the temptation became too great. The net result of these developments was that the cooperatives neither established the basis for broadening economic power or organizing it in collective patterns nor did they begin the process of political decentralization. In addition to having cooperative decisions restricted to the notables, some of the most important decisions were made entirely outside the cooperative by administrative edict. When the UNCC decided not to pay peanut dividends to cooperators who had used their memberships for commercial enterprises, even the self-selecting cooperators of this period were disillusioned. By 1965,

40 Report of Departmental Animation Director Chevillard, internal note 929/cc 5.1.65 (January 5, 1965) in Zinder Animation archives.

there were only 11 small groups of individual farmers constituting the "marketing cooperatives" of the entire county.

These marketing cooperatives were viewed by the government as short-term expedients as they were obviously antithetical to the strategy of participation. Once the strategy had become clearly defined the Diiori government moved to create a new system of cooperatives which could establish a participatory dialogue between the people and the government. The question, however, was how could the government create mass-based cooperatives when Animation had failed to penetrate the village and change attitudes leading to a felt need for such structures? Even the voluntary members of the marketing cooperatives seem to have been disillusioned with administrative intervention and broken promises. The answer of the Diiori government was ironic and indicative of what had happened to the notion of participation. If peasants were unprepared to become involved in cooperative life, the administrative would simply make the decision for them by edict. Although UNCC officials have since attempted to portray the creation of the "new system" as a "participatory act" in itself,⁴¹ the reality is better reflected in the report of the UNCC departmental agent who said that "the new system obviously came from the outside, and while the animation session of February, 1966 attempted to guide and lead farmer reactions, it was definitely directive... the UNCC gathered farmer opinion and decided for them on the basis of simplification and centralization."⁴² Following these preparatory meetings, Peace Corps volunteers were used to explain to villagers in the cooperative sectors of the county that they were now all members by definition of village cooperative mutuals and would be collectively responsible not only for the future loans of village cooperatives, but for bad debts of the "marketing cooperatives" members from their villages.⁴³ To ensure that village cooperatives would guarantee the loans villagers would be required to sell their peanuts at a single village group scale and dividends from these sales would be attached for payment of loans. In effect, then, the poorer farmers who had not participated in the marketing cooperatives were told that they had to pay for the bad debts of those who had benefited from the system.

The creation of the "new system" of cooperative organization in Matameye was indeed ironic. In theory it was to have been the instrument by which the induced participation system would flourish. It would create a new spirit in which peasants would be treated as being "capable of organizing themselves and of taking charge of their own affairs."⁴⁴ It would be the "greatest dose

41 See, for example, Promotion Humaine, Rapport Activité, November, 1968, "Département de Zinder", Part 1.

42 Dominique Gentil, "Un An Après, Ce que Pensent les Paysans du Nouveau Systeme", Bureau d'Etude et d'Evaluation, Promotion Humaine, March, 1967, p. 1.

43 Reports of Peace Corps Volunteers Speth, Edwards and others found in the Peace Corps archives, Niamey.

44 Guy Belloncle, "Une Experience d'Animation Cooperative au Niger", *Archives Internationales de Sociologie de Coopération*, No. 21 (January-June, 1967), p. 70. Belloncle paints a somewhat different view of the reality of cooperatives in 1966. Many of the indications of problems are noted but can be found even in this piece by the architect of the 'new system'.

of democracy [Niger] ever had"⁴⁵ by creating local institutions for peasant influence and participation in cooperative political and economic decisions. Market and other cooperative officials would be elected by and responsible to the farmers. Farmers directly and through their representatives would determine their own economic arrangements, and manage the peanut markets. These new opportunities to participate would help to transform peasant mentality. Yet the "new system" was created by a thinly disguised authoritarian bureaucratic process which confirmed villager beliefs in their own powerlessness. New system decisions had been made by bureaucrats who believed that without these technically sound decisions the cooperatives would inevitably fail.⁴⁶ But by denying the villagers any influence in the creation of the new system the planners in Niamey admitted that Animation had failed to prepare them for cooperation. They began the process of abandoning the strategy of induced participation in favour of change directed by the bureaucracy.

Created by administrative fiat, the "New System" cooperatives continued to be made by county and departmental UNCC staffers. In 1969 and 1970, for example, the meetings of cooperative sections were supposed to determine salary scales for elected market officials, and the use to which peanut profits would be put. These decisions were clearly made in Niamey and Zinder by UNCC bureaucrats for the sake of administrative ease, despite the express contrary wishes of a number of cooperative sections. The Niamey UNCC officials also decided to allocate the undistributed dividends of the earlier "marketing cooperatives" to the construction of cooperative warehouses, even though the Saouni cooperative and others like it had decided that the funds would be used for other purposes. The discipline of peanut weighers and section observers was assumed by county and sub-county cooperative agents without any consultation of cooperative members. And, of course, the major economic decisions of cooperative life—purchase prices and marketing conditions for the peanut trade, credit terms and commodity availability, decisions on the operation of Cooperative stores—were all made by the national government in Niamey with little information on local conditions.

These administrative decisions left the "new system" cooperators with only very limited forms of "participation". Newly elected cooperative officials were given responsibility for performing jobs correctly, section observers were made responsible for collecting outstanding debts of village mutuals, local cooperators and their representatives were expected to attend informational meetings in which they had no real influence. Cooperators or their representatives were

45 Peggy Anderson, "New System in Niger", *Africa Report* (November, 1968), pp. 12-17. Her report reflects the kind of optimism that Belloncle and others were conveying to outsiders about the success of the Matameye county operation.

46 The most important decisions were made by Guy Belloncle in Niamey who based his decision for the collective village-wide responsibility on his experience in Senegal and on the need to design a technically sound credit mechanism. See his "Problèmes du Credit Cooperatif à l'Agriculture Africaines Traditionnelles", *Archives Internationales de Sociologie de Coopération*, No. 17, pp. 23-44. The view that Belloncle made his decision on technical criteria is supported in the notes of Peace Corps volunteers who met with him in June, 1966, to discuss the implantation of the 'new system' in Matameye.

expected to attend elections which had generally been pre-determined by caucus of local notables or by the preference of the UNCC bureaucrat. As in the Animation system the only participation which increased markedly was symbolic, non-influence involvement. By 1967, UNCC advisers were reporting that the villagers understood the basic principles of the "new system",⁴⁷ that they were censoring corrupt weighers and forcing bad debtors to pay their overdue agricultural loans.⁴⁸ They were also reporting a heightened sense of farmer self-confidence in their ability to control market conditions. The bet that peasants could manage their own affairs, had been won, they said.⁴⁹ These statements had little correspondence to the reality of conditions in Matameye county as I observed them. Farmer efficiency in market situations was low. While villagers did not consider it legitimate for the weigher to short weight their peanuts they felt powerless to do anything about it. Only three of the 69 farmers we randomly interviewed in the Saouni market could verify the scale reading and nearly all farmers felt unable to contest the weigher's statements despite the fact that nearly all of the villagers had an approximate idea of their peanut crop's weight from measurements made at home.⁵⁰ As for weigher use of cooperative funds for personal purposes, this had not become a disqualifying factor as far as farmers were concerned. Even when weighers were unable to repay their "advances" from cooperative funds and when entire cooperative sections were denied portions of their peanut dividends, weighers were returned to office.⁵¹ In some cases where UNCC officials demanded that they be excluded, some weighers were not re-elected at first, but many were returned to office by the end of the third year. Cooperative members still expressed a preference for wealthy, high status weighers because they believed they would be generous with gifts to sellers and other market officials. By 1970, El Hadj Barde still controlled his three scales in the Dan Barto cooperatives, and Saouni weighers were still exclusively notables. The only difference was that the new system had produced a new pattern of notables which was more evident at Saouni than at Dan Barto. At Saouni the weighers and market officials who were not notables by virtue of their own wealth and status were notables by virtue of their special clientele relationships with Matameye bureaucrats.⁵² At Dan Barto weighers continued to be linked to more traditional aristocratic patronage. The decisions which remained to be made by cooperatives then, were made almost exclusively by notables rather than by "representatives" of the population. All that the "new system" had accomplished in Matameye was the broadening of the

47 Gentil, op. cit., p. 16.

48 Belloncle, "Pedagogie de l'Implantation", p. 69.

49 Dominique Gentil, "La Participation des Populations à la Gestion des Cooperatives Arachidières, Campagne 1967-1968", Union Nigerienne de Crédit et de Cooperation, Service de la Cooperation, Zinder, May, 1968, p. 1.

50 Based on my study of three sections of the Saouni Cooperative during the fourth to sixth weeks of the 1969-1970 peanut market. We used random samples interviewing every third cooperator coming to these three scales.

51 This was observed during the Saouni market elections of 1970.

52 The President of the Cooperative was a client of the county UNCC agent and one of the most controversial weighers was a client of the county Animation Service head.

clientage principle of association. It had done virtually nothing to replace it with a principle of universal association.

Paralleling its failure to bring about political change was the failure of the "new system" to broaden the economic base of Matameye county. Instead of encouraging the spread of modern agricultural innovation the UNCC system had all but stifled the possibility of the average farmer taking risks. In villages which had involuntarily assumed the burden of bad debts from the earlier cooperative scheme new credit was blocked until village peanut dividends paid off the debts. Since most of the debtors were either high status persons in the village, or people who, while belonging to the old cooperative, had never been village members to begin with, the mass of villagers had little interest in paying off the debts of these individuals through their dividends, and many of these villages simply dropped out of the UNCC system and sought alternative ways of marketing their peanuts and of obtaining short-term agricultural credit. In other villages the fear that unforeseen misfortune might cause a single individual to deny his entire village including his friends, kinsmen, and in-laws, their peanut dividends operated to curb demands for credit. Where long-term investment credit was granted it followed the same pattern as had the pre-colonial schemes. Credit for equipment was granted to individuals, not to rural collectivities as had been the plan. It was also given disproportionately to high status individuals as my study of ox-drawn cultivation equipment purchasers revealed.⁵³ At the local level the UNCC had failed to create the economic basis for a change in the structures of power.

Given the failure of the UNCC "new system" to promote economic change and agricultural modernization, the bureaucrats began to experiment with programmes based solely on "rational" technical decisions, totally apart from the collective induced participation scheme. One such programme was the *Equipe Charette* devised by a European adviser to the Departmental Agricultural Service. Initially the scheme was to promote the sale and use of ox-drawn farm equipment through intensive demonstrations in farm communities.⁵⁴ Farmers were to be convinced of the economic profitability of equipment through the technical formulas presented:

- (1) The solution to all your problems, is, in the adoption of modern farming methods.
- (2) To better satisfy your needs, to earn more money, the only good methods are those which I have shown you.
- (3) Progress is equal to seed dressing, plus selected seeds, plus fertilizer, plus agricultural equipment.⁵⁵

53 Based on my study of 27 pre-independence and 37 UNCC system purchasers of ox-drawn equipment. Under the UNCC 46 per cent of the purchasers were titled and an additional 16.2 per cent were religious leaders. See footnote 32.

54 On the *Equipe Charette* see "Rapport d'Activité du Service de la Promotion Humaine, 1967-1968", November, 1968, Section on Matameye. My comments are based on interviews with the project's designer, M. Gautier, in Zinder.

55 Service de l'Agriculture, Département de Zinder, "Pedagogie-Equipe Charette", (N.D., 1969?), Part 3, "Hypotheses Techniques", an unpublished report in five parts on how to promote the new programme.

As a demonstration project, however, the *Equipe Charette* scheme failed, for precisely the reasons which Animation theorists had prophesized in urging a participatory development scheme. Farmers were suspicious of the programme. Equipment worked well only upon occasion, making for unconvincing demonstrations.⁵⁶ Finally, even when demonstrations were convincing, sales were poor as the scheme did nothing to promote collective investment or to assure that the most progressive, innovative farmers would be involved. Given these facts, the bureaucrats turned to less voluntary methods. When villagers did not display an interest in turning out for *Equipe Charette* demonstrations, they were effectively ordered out. Although one Animation agent who accompanied the demonstration team objected to threatening the villagers, he also wrote that the party in Matameye should be informed of the fact that some town chiefs were not preparing their people adequately for the demonstrations, and that action should be taken against such chiefs.⁵⁷ Then, when villagers gathered they were asked to select four pilot farmers to participate in the scheme. These were generally selected on the basis of being the most affluent, rather than the most potentially innovative. Finally, when the pilot farmers refused to buy the equipment after the demonstration, the bureaucrats ordered them to use the revenues they obtained from the demonstration fields for downpayments.⁵⁸ In this way the sale of ox-drawn equipment soared in the regions chosen.

As for the representative institutions by which villagers could participate in extra-local political decisions, these have been a great disappointment. Delegates to the County Council have been selected by county party leaders. During the first election for Council in 1962, villagers selected their preferred candidate—a town chief from a rather small village. This decision was overturned without comment by the Party Committee in Matameye in favour of an affluent trader who had cultivated good connections. The subsequent election for County Councillor (1967) was never held as the Matameye Party Committee appointed an affluent El Hadj who was also made town chief through administrative and party help. Since the consultative committee is constituted from County Councillors, it is pointless to talk of it as an agency of mass participation. In 1969, when this study was undertaken, the Matameye consultative committee consisted of the wealthiest merchant in Matameye town, a bureaucrat who was a close confidant of the *Sous Prefet* and who made a show of his loyalty to national as opposed to local PPN leadership, and a leader of the old guard Matameye PPN.⁵⁹ This committee accurately

56 Unpublished technical reports by M. Gautier, Zinder Department of Agriculture, 1970, and Animation Service reports for Matameye county. See report of Adamu Koussary, November 26, 1968, in Archives of Matameye Animation Service.

57 See reports of Adamu Koussary, Matameye County Animation Service, reports of June 13 and June 27, 1968.

58 Interview with Zinder Department Agriculture Chief Moussa Saley. This system has been called the "Champs d'accompte".

59 I base these observations on interviews conducted in Matameye in January and February of 1970. The merchant was El Hadj Mamani, the bureaucrat was Issa Abdulayhi and the old PPN local level leader was El Hadj Namaganga.

illustrated the situation of power in Matameye, and amply revealed the fate of the strategy of "popular participation".

Conclusion

The choice of rural development strategies must necessarily be based on a number of complex considerations. But the most crucial consideration for developing states must remain the degree to which that strategy reflects and deals with political imperatives as well as modernization needs. Value preferences, concepts of development, analyses of obstacles to development and other considerations are of little importance if a modernization strategy cannot afford the state the political power it requires to survive and to grow in capability.

Niger's development strategy—the strategy which we have called "induced popular participation in development" provided a formula for building political power while encouraging economic modernization. Both goals would be accomplished by the stimulation of mass participation, and by the linking of this participation to national structures. However, the strategy implied a radical transformation of local political structures and specifically the reduction of power of important locally based PPN coalition elements through a combination of national economic action and grassroots political action. The formula failed. It failed because the regime was unable to provide the power necessary to create a genuine instrument of rural attitudinal change and structural organization. The first step in releasing the potential dynamism of the rural masses implied a shift in the basis of political association which was readily apparent to local level élites. When these élites resisted, and made their special appeals to Niamey, the entire system collapsed. The Diiori government could not have its strategy of inexpensive self-managed modernization without the political implications of the strategy. It was unprepared to deal with these.

Although Animation had failed to prepare the way for structural change, Niamey was fairly successful in affecting the changes in economic relationships at the national level, largely because French Aid technicians saw that if Niger were to eventually become less dependent on French assistance its peanut production would have to become more competitive. These economic reforms did weaken somewhat the economic power of county élites. At the same time, strong external support enabled Niger to develop a more powerful bureaucracy, and the UNCC was the most favoured of the bureaucratic agencies. This enabled the bureaucracy to begin to penetrate village society by administrative means where it had been largely unable to do so by induced participation strategies. The "new system" which was intended to mark the beginning of real peasant participation in economic life, instead marked the rebirth of selective administrative modernization.

Niger, as viewed through the evolution of rural modernization programmes,

is on its way to becoming a variant of Zolberg's party-state.⁶⁰ In Niger, the party still remains primarily the instrument of local level élites. The bureaucracy has become the primary instrument of national power. These two institutions coexist at all levels of organization in Niger. Neither can eliminate the other. The party maintains enough power to continue its access to village economic and political life. It is a locally oriented machine party, based on clientage. The bureaucracy has undermined the basis of local machine clientage somewhat in specific economic areas, but it has done little to restructure the principles of political association. The growth of bureaucratic power ensures the national government and its departmental and county representatives access to the village, and some capability to command performance. As long as the national élite and its bureaucracy do not seek to alter the basis of political association, the party-bureaucratic state can continue politically. But it is questionable how much modernization it can produce. Niger has yet to find an answer to both its problems. Eventually the failure to do so may spell the end of the party-bureaucratic regime.

A Coalition Theoretic Analysis of Nigerian Politics 1950-66

B. J. DUDLEY*

Definitions

A Coalition: We define a coalition as any combination of two or more actors who adopt a common strategy in connection with other actors in the same system.

A Coalition of Coalitions: The coalition formed from any two or more coalitions. We can regard a coalition of coalitions as a set formed from the union of any two or more sets. Thus if [P], [Q], then the set [P u Q] will be regarded as a coalition of coalitions. However, in order to avoid the rather cumbersome expression "coalition of coalitions", we shall use the term "coalition" to refer to both a coalition and a coalition of coalitions leaving it to the context to make clear which is meant.

Action-Set—the configuration of action formed by a set of coalitions. Where there is only one coalition in the action set, we shall refer to the structure of action thus formed as a monadic action set. With two coalitions, we have a dyadic action set and so on for an n-adic action set with n-coalitions.

Assumptions: It follows from the definition of a coalition that each pursues a given strategy, the object of which is to maximize the pay-off both to the members of the coalition and to the coalition itself as a collective. The members of a coalition (or at the least, the leadership) are thus rational actors. We define rationality simply in terms of the two axioms of transitivity and indifference.

Transitivity: If xPy and yPz , then xPz .

Indifference: If xly , then xRy and yRx where the relation "R" defines a weak preference relation.

The Model: From the definitions and assumptions, in any triadic action set, it is possible to distinguish eight possible different configurations, depending on the weighting of each coalition in the triad. For the purposes of this paper, "weight" here will refer simply to the numerical strength of a coalition. Of the eight possible configurations of coalitions in the triad, reference in this paper will be restricted to three specific configurations, the coalitions being designated as P, Q, R.

Configuration (a) $P=Q=R$. With equal weights i.e. $w(P)=w(Q)=w(R)$, we should expect [P u Q], [P u R] and [Q u R] to form with equal frequency.

60 Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order—The Party States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966).

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