

# Rhodesia after the Pearce Commission Report, 1972

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Successive Royal Commissions have helped in the shaping of British colonial policy. A report on a colonial situation written by independent-minded British judges is believed by the British public more readily than a book written by a journalist or by an academician on the same situation. In the formulation of colonial policy, the policy-makers in Whitehall have had to contend with two conflicting interests within Britain, the humanitarians insisting upon the paramountcy of the interests of indigenous people, and the free trade school (or imperialist-capitalist) favouring white settler interests in order to protect free trade. At certain important times in colonial history, Royal Commission reports have tipped the scales of the argument in favour of humanitarians and against the free traders inside Whitehall itself. The assertions of competing political groups and politicians in the colony itself can be validated or dismissed by an impartial and independent third party after a careful analysis and detailed investigation. For example, one of the most important Royal Commissions to come to colonial Central Africa was the Devlin Commission appointed in 1959. It investigated the causes of disturbances in Nyasaland (now Malawi) and allegations by the colonial government that the Nyasaland African National Congress led by Dr. Kamuzu H. Banda planned to massacre Europeans. The Devlin report dismissed these allegations and described colonial Nyasaland as a "Police State". It shocked British public opinion and strengthened the hand of those humanitarians in Harold Macmillan's government who were calling for self-government in Nyasaland. It also legitimised Dr. Kamuzu H. Banda's Malawi Congress Party. This report discredited the pro-Federation capitalists in Britain and Rhodesia who were eager to maintain a police state as long as they continued to exploit the resources of Central Africa for their own benefit. One of the results of the reappraisal of the policy which followed was the appointment of Iain Macleod, a progressive member of the ruling Conservative Party, as Colonial Secretary. He released Nyasaland detainees then jailed in Rhodesia, brought the state of emergency to an end, and introduced a self-government constitution. These constitutional changes would have taken place in Nyasaland as part of the decolonization process, but they were accelerated at the time by the publication of the Devlin Report.

In 1960, the Monckton Commission<sup>1</sup> reported on the possibility of con-

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<sup>1</sup> CMND 1148, London, 1960: *Report on the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.*

tinuing the Central African Federation, consisting then of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi). The report of this Commission recommended the possible secession of Nyasaland, and, in fact, opened the way for the break up of the Central African Federation. As Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Duncan Sandys (now Chairman of the Africa-wide and multi-national business corporation, LONRHO, and chief spokesman for the free-trade capitalist school) fought hard against both Devlin and Monckton, but the scales had been tipped against him in favour of the decolonization policies advocated by the Colonial Office under the leadership of Iain Macleod. The conflict between the Commonwealth Office and the Colonial Office over Central African policy came to a head over the Zambian constitution early in 1962. Sandys wanted a constitution that would leave the white settlers in power, whereas Macleod wanted one that would transfer power to the United National Independence Party under the able leadership of Dr. K. D. Kaunda. Their differences were concealed in a complicated constitution. Sir Roy Welensky, then Federal Prime Minister, threatened to occupy colonial Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and to maintain the Federation by force. Although Welensky had enough federal troops to do it, he feared having to fight British Police units in control of the local administration. Furthermore, the Devlin and Monckton reports had removed the basis of his Government's legitimacy and undermined faith in the Federation idea in Britain, and elsewhere. The reports also revealed the depth of African opposition to Federation, as well as the justice and strength of their demands for self-government and independence. The African freedom struggle was legitimized in the eyes of the British public; consequently Whitehall could no longer keep African leaders like Dr. K. D. Kaunda of Zambia, and Dr. K. H. Banda of Malawi, locked up in colonial prisons as "agitators" or "saboteurs". Their early release from prisons by the end of 1960 began the rapid processes towards the attainment of independence of Malawi and Zambia, and the break up of the settler-dominated Federation.

#### RHODESIA AND PEARCE

This article will examine whether or not the report of Lord Pearce<sup>2</sup> will have similar or comparable impact on the colonial situation in Rhodesia or Zimbabwe. The Commission, consisting of Lord Pearce and three deputy Chairmen—Lord Harlech, Sir Maurice H. Dorman, and Sir Glyn Jones, the last Governor of Nyasaland—was sent to Rhodesia in January, 1972, to ascertain whether the Proposals for a Settlement<sup>3</sup> agreed between Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, and Ian Douglas Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia in November, 1971, were acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Indeed the agreement was "con-

2 CMND 4964, London, May, 1972: *RHODESIA: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion Under the Chairmanship of Lord Pearce*.

3 *RHODESIA: Proposals for Settlement*. CMND 4835, London, November, 1971, 24 pp. Government White Paper presented to Parliament on November 25, 1971. See Dr. Claire Palley's article in *The Sunday Times* (London), November 27, 1971.

ditional upon the British Government being satisfied that they [the proposals] are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole".<sup>4</sup> This investigation was in keeping with the fifth of the five principles<sup>5</sup> formulated by Sir Alec Douglas-Home himself as British Prime Minister in 1964, as a basis for granting independence to Rhodesia. The five principles were the basis of negotiations between the two governments both before and after UDI—Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11th November, 1965.

At two subsequent meetings on board the *HMS Tiger* in 1966, and *HMS Fearless* in 1968, Harold Wilson, then British Prime Minister, had tried to reach agreement with Smith. On each occasion Smith's Cabinet rejected the terms offered by Wilson, because of the fifth principle. When the Conservative Party came to power in 1970, it was committed even more strongly than the Labour Party to try for a third time to reach a settlement and end sanctions. Sir Alec started negotiations with Smith almost immediately, culminating in his visit to Salisbury in November, 1971. The Commission arrived in Salisbury on 11th January, 1972, to investigate the acceptability of the agreed Proposals for a Settlement.<sup>6</sup> (See Appendix for a summary and explanation of the Settlement Proposals provided to Rhodesians by the Commission.)

In the 47 days between the announcement of the agreement (25th November, 1971), and the arrival of the Commission (11th January, 1972), African leaders had denounced the proposals on the grounds that:

- (a) they took the illegal and racist constitution of 1969 as a starting point;
- (b) African leaders were never consulted;
- (c) they departed significantly from even the five principles of 1964, especially in vastly lengthening the time-scale of achieving parity representation between races in the Rhodesian legislature;
- (d) Rhodesian settlers who have torn up two constitutions in five years cannot be trusted to implement the minor reforms in the Proposals; and
- (e) the Proposals (as well as the five principles) did not provide for *majority rule before independence* or NIBMAR—*No Independence Before Majority Rule*.

More importantly, former leaders of ZAPU and ZANU inside the country banded themselves together in a new united organization, the African National Council (ANC), which quickly became the effective organizational channel for expressing opposition to the Proposals. At the inaugural meeting of the ANC held in Salisbury on 16th December, 1971, the able Chairman, Bishop Abel Muzorwa, said the twin objectives of the new organization were to

call on our people to realize the essential power of unity now, and move on as one people for the sake of achieving our ultimate goal of freedom. To explain,

4 *Ibid.*; p. 11.

5 The five principles were: unimpeded progress to majority rule; guarantees against retrogressive amendment to the Constitution; immediate improvement of the political status of the African population; ending racial discrimination; and that the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. These five principles formed the basis of negotiations between Rhodesian settlers and Britain since 1964. But they were unacceptable to Africans because they did not provide for NIBMAR—No Independence Before Majority Rule.

6 CMND 4815, London, November, 1971: *RHODESIA: Proposals for a Settlement*, p. 24.

advise, and expose the dangerous implications that would result if we accepted the Anglo-Rhodesian constitutional settlement proposals.

He went on to state that in the view of his new national executive, the proposals were "a subtle and vicious device for the recognition of UDI by the British Government—and a sellout of the African majority of the country to the perpetual oppression and domination by the privileged white minority".<sup>7</sup>

The Rhodesian Front, representing white settler interests, accepted the proposals, although their leader, Ian Smith, was criticised by a small group of extreme racists in his party for "selling out the whitemen and Christian civilization to Communism".<sup>8</sup> For their part, British Ministers accepted the proposals as an end to the embarrassing dispute with Rhodesia. British Ministers "expressly disclaimed all hopes of any improvement in the terms or any future help if this settlement fell through and we never gave anybody reason to doubt this" (paragraph 152). A cartoon in a London newspaper, *The Guardian Weekly*, of 27th May, 1972, aptly shows Smith having a sumptuous meal at table and throwing bones to an African on the floor saying: "So you won't accept scraps. Very well, starve." Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, had argued to the House of Commons on 25th November, 1971, that the proposals set Rhodesia on a "new course". He said:

for eight or nine years now the line has been hardening between the races in Rhodesia in a way which is intensely worrying many moderate Africans. Therefore, I come back to what I said before. This is a chance of setting the Rhodesian constitution and the protection of the individual Rhodesian on a new course. I think that the African will benefit from this more than anybody else.<sup>9</sup>

He could not discuss his sellout proposals in terms of majority rule or any challenges to white domination, because the proposals provided for neither. All he could and did argue was that the proposals stopped white Rhodesia from adopting South Africa's apartheid policy at present, and were an improvement on the existing situation. Anxious to be rid of the Rhodesian problem, the British Government had accepted Smith's assessment that Africans would acquiesce in the enactment of this package deal. It was against this background that the Pearce Commission started its two-month investigation in January, 1972. Two of the three deputy chairmen had wide experience in Colonial administration. The twenty-one Special Commissioners sent into the seven provinces of Rhodesia had varied experience in the colonial administrations of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, etc. After two months of diligent and painstaking work in which evidence was collected from 6 per cent of a representative section of the population, the Commission summed up its findings in Chapter 13 saying:

7 Press Statement distributed by the ANC, Salisbury, dated December 16, 1972.

8 See *Property and Finance*, a right-wing Salisbury monthly (January and February issues, 1972).

9 *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Col. 1548, November 25, 1971.

We believe that taking into account the explanation given by the Rhodesian authorities, the activities of those opposing or promoting the Proposals, the distribution of our simplified version of the Proposals and the explanations given by the Commission at meetings and over the radio, the great majority of those who gave us their opinions had a sufficient understanding of the contents and implications of the Proposals to enable them to pass judgement on them. We are satisfied that the Proposals have been fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia. We are satisfied on our evidence that the Proposals are acceptable to the great majority of the Europeans. We are equally satisfied, after considering all our evidence including that on intimidation, that the majority of Africans rejected the Proposals. In our opinion the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the Proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence.

The Commissioners affirm and re-affirm this conclusion throughout the report. Exceptions were two teams of Commissioners in two of the seven provinces—Victoria and Matabeleland North—who said they could not come to a firm conclusion that the people in their areas understood the proposals and that they rejected them.

#### REFUTATION OF SETTLER ASSERTIONS

Britain was anxious to appoint a Commission very early in the Rhodesian negotiations for independence, to examine the assertions and counter-assertions from different racial groups, and to get some sense of public feeling on the issues in Rhodesia. This point was stressed to me by Sir John Johnstone, the last British High Commissioner in Rhodesia, in an interview in London in February, 1968. Harold Wilson made a strong effort to have a Commission appointed in earlier negotiations with Smith on board the *HMS Tiger* in 1966, and *HMS Fearless* in 1968. Britain wanted a substantive document on which policy decisions could be based. The Pearce Report is indeed such a document. It should have a profound influence on public opinion in both Britain and Rhodesia. First, it has refuted some of the assertions on which white settlers have based their whole system of segregation and settler-colonialism. Statements made by European settler leaders like Smith, to the effect that African people are happy with things as they are, have been shown to be either false or ignorant. One of the oft-repeated settler assertions is that the African Chiefs and Headmen support the Government, and that it is they who speak for the majority rural peasantry. Chiefs and Headmen are appointed and paid by the settler Government. They are no longer selected and appointed by tribal elders through traditional methods as in the past. As appointees of a settler, foreign government, they are no longer free spokesmen for their own people. Those who have tried to speak up for their people in the past have been deposed, prosecuted or detained. Furthermore, most Chiefs are uneducated, and therefore cannot cope with complex constitutional questions as the report showed. Douglas-Home and Smith were convinced by the white District Commissioners who are supposed to be in constant and daily

touch with the Africans<sup>10</sup> that Chiefs welcome and endorse the Proposals for a Settlement. It is necessary to quote the report extensively on this point. The report says at paragraph 179:

Before the Commission arrived in Rhodesia the authorities instructed District Commissioners to explain and commend the Settlement Proposals to Chiefs, Councillors and Headmen and we were informed that meetings for this purpose had been held in all districts. It was generally believed in Rhodesia and particularly by the Ministry of Internal Affairs that the Chiefs and Headmen were in favour of the Proposals and therefore that the majority opinion of the tribesmen would also be in favour.

The Council of Chiefs which met the Chairman and Deputy Chairmen in Salisbury unanimously accepted the Proposals as a package, while criticizing certain features such as the franchise qualifications and the failure of the Proposals to deal adequately with the Land Tenure Act and the Government's policy of racial discrimination.

But when the Chiefs met our Commissioners in the tribal areas a somewhat different tale was told as is described in paragraph 101. Some of the members of the Council adhered to their opinion voiced to the Commission at the Salisbury meeting. But others seen either alone or with members of their tribal areas either joined their people in saying "No" or declined to give an opinion.

There are 206 substantive Chiefs, 33 acting Chiefs and six vacancies, making a total of 245. Of these 184 were seen by the Commission. Forty-four accepted the proposals, 87 rejected them and 53 either said that they did not know what answer to give, or abstained altogether from giving an opinion. In addition we received 20 letters from Chiefs, six in favour and 14 against the Proposals. Some of these were reiterating views expressed to Commissioners. Nearly all the 26 members of the Council of Chiefs were seen by the Commissioners as recorded in paragraph 98.

Many Chiefs seemed to be acutely embarrassed by the demand that they should express a political opinion at all. Except in Matabeleland where the majority accepted the Proposals, the majority of the Chiefs with their people rejected them or declined to give an opinion. The Commissioners for one Province stated in their report "...Chiefs did not demur when meetings at which they were present rejected the Proposals. Even in private Chiefs represented their people's view to Commissioners and rejected the Proposals. Only two exceptions to this occurred, both of whom were Senator Chiefs, who publicly did not disagree with their people but privately supported the Proposals". The Commissioners for another Province stated: "The inescapable conclusion is that the African people, whether rural or urban, do not recognize the Chief's authority in matters outside tribal custom and, in as much as most Chiefs rejected the Proposals, this could be a reflection of their real role, as interpreters rather than arbiters of the public will".

The report concludes the chapter on the Chiefs by saying at paragraph 191:

As Chiefs they cannot be said to be political leaders. In fact, the evidence is that some of them and the majority of their people regard their embroilment in modern national politics as a serious embarrassment. They are unsuited for

<sup>10</sup> See article by Hugo Young, titled "Pearce Will Say No", *The Sunday Times* (London), March 5, 1972.

such a role, not only because they are mainly interested in their administrative and traditional duties but also because many of them are insufficiently educated to cope with the intelligent and sophisticated people who are accepted—we feel certain—by a great majority of Africans, particularly in the towns, as the political leaders of the country. A Chief's influence is limited to his tribal area, whereas a political leader or a party claims representation throughout the whole country. In fact, it is common to hear an educated man say that he holds his Chief in great esteem but that his political "leader" is for instance, Mr. Nkomo or some other well-known African politician.

The majority of the Chiefs lined up with their people in the Tribal Trust Lands in the rejection of the Proposals or chose to remain silent.

We understand the deep significance of Chieftainship to be a binding together of the tribesmen into a community and this demands that there should be general agreement throughout their ranks before any important decision is taken affecting the welfare of the tribe. But politics in the modern sense are divisive and thus tend to split tribal solidarity; hence partly the reluctance of Chiefs to speak on political matters and the resentment of many of their people of the Government's policy so involving them.

As *The Times* (London) retorted "the Report reveals just how wrong the Front is about Chiefs, about tribal African ignorance of politics, and about race relations with a wealth of facts that Mr. Smith ought to have had long since from his native affairs officials".<sup>11</sup>

#### INTIMIDATION

The report dealt at length with the allegation in a large dossier produced by the Smith regime that the majority of Africans had been intimidated by a few agitators into rejecting the proposals. The regime argued that during the test of opinion, intimidation of every kind so confounded man's thinking and distorted judgement that opinions expressed to the Commission were likely to be worthless. The Commission regarded this allegation as so crucial to its determination of opinion on the proposals that it appointed two special commissioners to examine it very closely. The report examines allegations of intimidation of Africans by Rhodesian Government authorities and employers of labour in order to secure acceptance; intimidation and pressure upon Africans by other Africans; and the spectre of intimidation and fear generally.

The report concludes that while there was some intimidation, it was small in proportion to the genuine opinions held widely by the people, and it did not alter the verdict. The Commission says it found "a genuine overwhelming 'no'. We ourselves have no doubt from all the facts and circumstances and our own observation that, in spite of the incidents of intimidation, the Africans' rejection by a substantial majority was a genuine expression of opinion" (paragraph 418).

The report says in paragraphs 413-416:

We do not regard the incidents of alleged intimidation, some without substance, some true, some probably true, some possibly true, as part of an overall poli-

<sup>11</sup> *The Times* (London), March 5, 1972, "Rhodesia After Pearce"

tical design. We believe them to be sporadic outbreaks of unjustifiable pressure to compel a minority to consensus and solidarity.

It is very significant that over the country as a whole the checks on individuals and groups who were in our view clearly not being intimidated nearly always confirmed the general trend of rejection. We believe that most of the "Noes" sprang from a genuine, deeply-felt opposition to the Proposals. The reasons for this were many and varied (see paragraphs 310 to 326) as one would expect from many individuals with genuine points of view.

We found it improbable if not impossible that with such a tight security system as that which has existed in Rhodesia for several years, a minority could dominate a majority by intimidation in a few weeks. We have grounds for belief that the African National Council itself was surprised at the extent of its success. We do not think that the African National Council would have obtained so great and so swift a response had they not met a potential desire among a majority of the people for leadership in a rejection of the terms and in a protest against the policies of the last few years. The aggressiveness which led to some intimidation of the minority by the majority arose in part from a determination to grasp the opportunity to speak out which the presence of our Commission afforded. And in part the intimidation sprang from those who wanted to ensure solidarity.

It was our considered view that, had there been no intimidation there would still have been a substantial majority against the Proposals.

The report concludes by refusing to construe the answer as a "yes". "We do not accept that there was ever a moment when a majority on reflection and with some understanding of the Proposals would have answered 'yes' to our Commission. To turn the large majority which rejected the Proposals into a 'yes' vote would, we think, be perverse" (paragraph 406).

The third assertion by white settlers is that the mass of the African people are uneducated, untutored, and so ignorant about the modern processes of Government that they cannot exercise political rights responsibility. It is asserted that Africans are not yet fit to govern a complex industrial country like Rhodesia. The numerous military coups and the breakdown of law and order in independent African states is regarded by white settlers as evidence that independence was granted before the Africans were ready for it.

However, the Commissioners reported that when they arrived in Rhodesia "the country was alive with political activity at the grass roots. It was clear that the Proposals had been widely considered and discussed in many parts of the country" (paragraph 62). In the interviewing the Commissioners found that "the majority of those who gave their opinions in private had an adequate knowledge of the issues and did not require any further explanation. Predictably, the quality of question and discussion in Bulawayo and Salisbury was higher than in the rural areas" (paragraph 206). All the Commissioners, excepting those of Matabeleland North, "concluded that a majority of the Africans whom they met sufficiently understood the basic principles and implications of the Proposals to pass a valid judgement on them" (paragraph 208).

Perhaps the most important finding of the Commission is that Africans deeply distrusted the European electorate and the Government:

Mistrust of the motives and intentions of the Government transcended all other considerations. Apprehension for the future stemmed from resentment of what they felt to be the humiliations of the past and at the limitations of policies on land, education and personal advancement. One African summed it up in saying: "We do not reject the Proposals; we reject the Government." This was the main reason of African rejection at all levels, and in all areas. Few could bring themselves to believe that the Government had changed its policies or that the European electorate on whom it depended was prepared to change its attitudes or its way of life (paragraph 311).

To these reasons must be added the burning desire for national independence and self-determination presently frustrated by settler rule. It is not surprising that while the main reasons for African rejection of the Proposals were political, the European reasons for accepting them were mainly economic. "There was a deep desire [among Europeans] to see the end of sanctions and the return of foreign investment" (paragraph 289). A few of the Africans who supported the Proposals were the highly paid university-trained teachers, and executive types in industry. Of over 2,000 Africans employed in factories and business premises interviewed by one Commissioner, 93 per cent rejected the Proposals, 6 per cent accepted, and 1 per cent were undecided (paragraph 238). The 6 per cent were the highly paid senior clerks. The Smith regime had stressed the economic benefits of saying "yes". Economic sanctions would be lifted, and Britain would offer financial aid to the tune of £50 million over several years as part of the settlement agreement (see Appendix). It was a sign of high political maturity on the part of the mass of the Africans who are ill-fed, ill-treated, underpaid, and many thousands of workers unemployed, to say to both Smith and Douglas-Home "keep your money", we prefer human freedom and our motherland.

Even the Special Woman Commissioner, Miss Freda Gwilliam,

found that many of the women she met, who are [in her own words] usually regarded as being incapable of independent thought on political issues, expressed views they genuinely held. They presented them verbally with conviction, not parrot-fashion, and were able to develop arguments, reply to questions and expand on reasons (paragraph 242).

Miss Gwilliam stated that she was satisfied that African women from whatever background or educational and social level had, with few exceptions, arrived at a rejection of the proposals. In reaching their decision they had been influenced by political implications... but also having the burden of day-to-day responsibility for the family and home, they had often tried to relate the possible benefits of the Proposals to their immediate problems—and had found them wanting (paragraph 243).

The finding that Africans—even women—were well informed on political issues, shows conclusively that settler reasons for denying Africans political rights are both morally bankrupt and plain falsehoods. The falsehoods were

shown even during the two months hearing of the Commission—one minute the Chiefs and rural Africans are the authentic African voice, the next minute they have been intimidated, therefore their views are worthless, and the third they are irresponsible demagogues.

White racism and domination is and has been maintained over the years by repression and brutal force on the one hand, and a systematic falsification of the African position on the other. The settler system of government aims at excluding Africans or their genuine representatives from any participation. No *popular* African representatives sit in Parliament or in any elective office in the state. Without any consultation or consent, representatives of the foreign white settlers daily assert what they think the Africans think, or more appropriately, what they want the Africans to think. Often they quote their cooks and gardeners, although they never discuss serious political issues with these men and women.

#### THE AFRICAN RESPONSE

The Commission say they found

grounds for belief that the African National Council itself was surprised at the extent of its success. We do not think that the African National Council would have obtained so great and so swift a response had they not met a potential desire among a majority of the people for leadership in a rejection of the terms and in a protest against the policies of the last few years... (paragraph 415).

This statement is very important especially when read in conjunction with paragraphs 206-208 where the Commissioners say they found that the Africans were well informed on the broad issues of the political situation. The proposals were presented to Africans on the basis that they would improve the economic position of the African enormously—there would be more schools, houses and more jobs, as a result of the £50 million development loan promised by Britain, and the end of sanctions. But the Africans preferred human freedom, dignity and their motherland to money. A mass of people with a high degree of understanding of political issues, and seeking leadership for protest, creates very favourable objective and subjective conditions for fundamental and systemic change. In the language of revolutionaries, the objective and subjective conditions are ripe for revolutionary action.

The reasons for the growing national consciousness are not far to seek. The day-to-day oppression has been intensified in recent years. The vicious Land Tenure Act introduced concurrently with the 1969 Republican Constitution, threatens thousands of Africans with eviction and deportation from lands they have lived in and farmed for generations. In 1969 Chief Rekayi Tangwena and his people were evicted from their homelands near the Mozambique border in order to make room for a white farmer. They refused to move. In 1970 their villages were over-run by bulldozers, their cattle taken, and the brave Chief himself arrested. But these tribesmen have now taken refuge in the adjoining Inyanga Mountains having refused to move from their

homelands. In 1970 no less than 6,000 families were moved from Chief Gobo's area in the Midlands to Gokwe, an arid district near the Zambezi basin, which is being developed as a large single native settlement or Bantustan. In 1971 more evictions were announced from Epworth and Chishawasha Mission farms, and 2,000 families from Stapleford Forest Reserve. The evictions were suspended as part of the Home-Smith agreement, but they were not cancelled.

It is estimated that 100,000 Africans are unemployed in the urban areas, out of a total African labour force of 700,000. For every dollar earned by an African in employment a European worker earns thirteen dollars, and will have done less work and drunk more tea in the process. In 1969 the entire African population of 5,190,000 people earned 206.4 million Rhodesian dollars as compared with 295.6 million earned by only 230,000 Europeans, and 16,000 Asians and Coloureds.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, 250,000 non-Africans have a higher income than 5,190,000 indigenous Africans. This disparity in incomes, and the fact that the ill-effects of economic sanctions have been passed to an African population that has no political leverage in the system, has led to a rapid deterioration of the economic position of the Africans.

Although the Smith regime has for years run a police state, in 1972 it announced plans to give itself more security powers. Legislation already on the Statute Book gives police and army officers power to detain African patriots without trial, hang freedom-fighters, search people's homes without any warrants and arrest the occupants on any grounds they see fit. The new Public Security Bill will extend some of these police powers to ordinary civilian Europeans in their own areas.

During the visit of the Pearce Commission there were strikes at the British-owned asbestos mine at Shabani, the South African-owned nickel mine at Bindura, the state-owned sugar and fruit growing estate at Hippo Valley, and in the towns of Gwelo, Umtali, and Salisbury. The 267,500 Africans employed in agriculture are the poorest paid; some are paid in kind—food, or just the right to plant a single crop on one acre of land belonging to the white farmer. But the state-owned Hippo Valley pays the lowest of the farm wages—£1 17s. 6d. for a full month of 30 working days. Its wage policy has been the subject of an enquiry by the Labour Department of the regime itself. The next group of the most poorly paid workers are the 50,400 miners. They also work under very poor and dangerous conditions for their health. At both Shabani and Bindura, African workers demanded higher wages and an end of the ticket systems. More importantly, they made political demands as well—representation on Workers' Committees and in Parliament. In the cities of Gwelo, Umtali and Salisbury, the strikes were purely political and widely supported by the mass of the African workers. Workers' demonstrations erupted into widespread riots in which European administrative offices were burnt down, and extensive damage done to European property. Rioting was provoked by police action wherever people gathered to demonstrate peacefully or to meet the Commissioners. Frightened by the solidarity of the

<sup>12</sup> *Monthly Digest of Statistics* (Salisbury: Government Printers, January, 1971).

workers demonstrated at these gatherings, Rhodesian police and army units were not restrained from opening gunfire by the presence of the Commissioners in Rhodesia. During the incidents in which they did open fire on unarmed demonstrators, they killed 31 people, injured over 200, and arrested or detained 1,500 Africans for periods ranging from one to six months. But the broad support of these strikes among African workers showed the growing and high degree of national consciousness attained by both the workers and peasants of Zimbabwe.

National consciousness has been aroused by the deteriorating financial and economic position of the African workers and peasants in the country as indicated in the paragraphs above. The tax burden is increasing at the same time as goods and services are becoming scarce for the African working classes alone. Secondly, the painstaking work of political education by successive nationalist organizations in the past decade is beginning to bear fruit. The simple fact has been grasped that the overall economic position of the African worker and peasant cannot improve as long as the present system of government remains. As one African rightly commented "We are not rejecting the Proposals; but we are rejecting the Government". The total rejection of the government was underlined throughout the report. Thirdly, the brutality and rapacity of white rule has helped to awaken African consciousness. In areas of guerrilla activity, police and army units have meted out severe punishments to villagers. The long periods of detention and restriction of African nationalist leaders without trial, executions of freedom-fighters who have been arrested, and the sporadic guerrilla fighting in the Zambezi Valley in 1967-69, have educated the Africans about the nature of colonial capitalism, and what it must take to remove it.

#### BRITAIN'S OBLIGATIONS STRESSED

The Pearce Report has presented Britain, and the ruling Conservative Party, with an acute dilemma. In the 83 years since British occupation of Rhodesia, Britain's responsibility and obligation was to the white settlers. It is the opinion of the elected settler leaders that was supported by Britain in the granting of responsible government in 1923, the creation of Federation in 1952, and the removal of reserved clauses in 1961. White supremacy south of the Zambezi River was assured in the 1920s when Britain decided not to spend a single penny on administering colonies south of the Zambezi, and to place these possessions outside the purview of the Colonial Office. In practice this meant two important things. First, there was no British Minister at Whitehall responsible for Rhodesian affairs, therefore its affairs could not be discussed in the House of Commons. Consequently, British public opinion could not be educated about the oppressive conditions prevailing there. A humanitarian, anti-settler Rhodesian lobby could not develop to counteract the free traders. Secondly, the settlers were allowed to seize increasing control of the vital governmental apparatus. It is the settler control and use of the

state apparatus for the racial benefit of the settlers that has been the decisive factor in the historical development of Rhodesia.

The other British interest of long standing in the area south of the Zambezi is the heavy investment in mining and agriculture. Both South Africa and Rhodesia were colonized in a mad rush for gold and diamonds in the nineteenth century. The Boers and Britons came to blows over the control of the Witwatersrand, and clashed over many other claims. Keeping the revenue and resources of the rich mines in this area in the sterling area is a vital British interest.

The Pearce Report brought these two main interests of Britain into conflict with a third interest—the *African interest*. It asserted as no previous document had done the voice of the indigenous Africans which had been all but ignored in the past. The articulation of the African voice so clearly at this time against the background of a decolonized Africa has presented Britain with an acute dilemma. Why perpetuate oppressive settler rule in Rhodesia? Why deny Rhodesian Africans political rights granted to other Africans at a similar stage of political development? This is Heath's and Douglas-Home's dilemma. As *The Times* (London) stated in an editorial:

The British Government's obligations are perfectly clear. The Commissioners repeatedly found that the African majority had weighed the Proposals, including Britain's £50 million development grant, against continued sanctions with continued British responsibility for Rhodesia, and had elected for the latter. This was a real and valid act of political choice, and Westminster must face it. The Rhodesian Africans will not let us off the hook in return for this type of compromise.<sup>13</sup>

*The Times* concluded that "there is no way in which the responsibility (of Britain) can be shrugged off. Britain must take the Pearce verdict as an inescapable obligation to the weaker party to withhold formal independence. . . ."<sup>14</sup> *The Guardian* (London) also concluded its editorial by saying: "the prime lesson is that any settlement devised in future will be worthless unless Africans, in the persons of Mr. Nkomo, Bishop Muzorewa, and other respected men, are brought into it at the beginning instead of the end".<sup>15</sup>

The official British Government reaction was to accept the Pearce Report, and maintain the *status quo*—the economic sanctions and non-recognition of Rhodesia. The debate in the House of Commons concealed deep divisions within the ruling Conservative Party over Rhodesia. An influential group of Conservative Party M.P.s would like to heed the voice of the Africans and grant independence to Africans under the leadership of the ANC. They argue that giving power to the moderate ANC now would nip in the bud the radical movement developing in the freedom-fighting exile parties. However, to do this it will be necessary to topple the Smith regime expeditiously through

<sup>13</sup> *The Times* (London), May 24, 1972, editorial titled "Rhodesia After Pearce".

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *The Guardian* (London), May 24, 1972, p. 12. Editorial titled "Fiasco in Rhodesia: The Lesson for Next Time".

rigorous economic and financial sanctions. These men appear convinced that toppling Smith would not be difficult once Britain had the political will to do so, and a clearly defined alternative civil order. This view is rejected by Edward Heath, the British Prime Minister, who is basically a Europeanist, and a racist. Heath views Rhodesia in the context of strategic and military questions concerning the whole of Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. His insistence on selling arms to South Africa in complete disregard of African and Commonwealth opinion was based on his emphasis on strategic and military questions, as opposed to humanitarian values. Heath is a strong supporter of massive foreign investment in Southern Africa, especially South Africa. He does not see the dismantling of the white power structures in Southern Africa as the solution to the major problem of Africa. He reinforces his argument by criticizing the way some independent African states are being run. Sir Alec Douglas-Home's position is poised somewhere between these two viewpoints.

In practical terms, any debate in the House of Commons on Zimbabwe is an exercise in futility because the ruling white settlers will not accept any solution that seeks to transfer power to majority Africans, even if they were led by moderates. They rejected the Pearce Report as "the most irresponsible of them [Commission reports] all", and the ANC as an "irresponsible body". Any attempt on the part of Britain to discharge their colonial responsibility to Africans will be regarded as an "irresponsible" act that must be opposed by force of arms.

The settlers in Rhodesia and South Africa have been led by their leaders to believe that they are fighting against the onslaught of Communism. The independence movement that swept through Africa in the 1960s was made possible by communist penetration to the seats of power in Western Europe and America. They (settlers) stand as the last bastion of Western civilization, Christianity, and democracy.

Sir Alec still hopes that Smith could be persuaded to amend the Settlement Proposals in two aspects criticized most sharply by the opposition Labour Party—complete ending of racial discrimination, and a shorter time scale for achieving parity representation. But for the settlers the issue is not one of human rights or parliamentary arithmetic. It is a fundamental conflict between two different governmental systems, and two different classes, cultures, and peoples. A colonial capitalism such as Rhodesia's will not surrender power voluntarily. Unless Britain (which is an essential part of the colonial capitalism discussed in paragraphs below) were willing and able to use its armed force against the settlers in order to impose a solution, no meaningful constitutional change can take place. Britain has made it clear that it will not use force against its kith and kin, and against its own vast economic interests in the area.

If Britain is unable and unwilling to take the only action that would be appropriate, how does it hope to fulfil its colonial obligation? Surprisingly it is now turning to the oppressed Africans for a solution in the forlorn hope

that they could persuade their own oppressors to stop oppressing them. In his Commons speech, Sir Alec said the solution now lay with the "majority of Rhodesians", not the Rhodesian authorities. In the key phrase that must have been carefully studied in Salisbury, he said:

It may be that, on further reflection, the majority of Rhodesians, Africans and Europeans, will decide to choose the way of compromise and to work together for orderly political change. The Proposals still represent a genuine attempt to find a sensible and, in all the circumstances, a just solution of Rhodesia's special problems. The Government feels that plenty of time should be given in which the position can be clarified. And meanwhile, no door should be closed.<sup>16</sup>

He said what he would like to see happen is discussions between leaders of different racial groups inside Rhodesia.

The ANC took up the challenge in Douglas-Home's statement by attempting to call a national convention of all political parties in the country. Bishop Muzorewa addressed European public meetings in July, 1972, urging them not to have any fears about African majority rule. The ruling European party, the Rhodesian Front, rejected the proposal, while the moderate Centre Party laid down unacceptable conditions for participation. In the post-Pearce period, the settler government has proceeded to remove all teeth from the ANC. It is forbidden from selling membership cards, collecting money from members and sympathizers abroad, printing any literature, or organizing any meetings. The movement of leaders has been restricted, party workers detained, and property seized. Two party officials—Michael Mawema and Edson Zvobgo—fled the country in August, 1972, just before they were about to be re-arrested and detained for a second term. Therefore, the only organization which could organize the convention has been emasculated. In spite of this, the settler government has taken the very unusual step of recognizing the power of the ANC by inviting its officials to a round of discussions. Lance Smith, Minister for Internal Affairs, had a two-hour meeting in Salisbury with three ANC officials—C. Banana, H. Kachidza, and E. Sithole—in October, 1972. It was the first of four meetings intended to ascertain whether "common ground" existed between the two. For the first time since the Rhodesian Front came to power in 1962, it negotiated directly with representative African leaders. Of course, the Smith regime is trying to persuade or coerce African leaders to change their minds on the proposals. But they will not. To that extent the talks are a futile exercise. However, they do indicate an acceptance of the fact that the Rhodesian problem has to be settled by the people who live there. The white settler government will only sit down to serious negotiations after the Africans and their leaders have shown and proved their mettle in the battlefield. The reasonable success of the armed struggle is a prerequisite to any settlement that would transfer power to majority Africans.

<sup>16</sup> *The Guardian Weekly* (London), May 27, 1972, p. 8, "Rhodesia: Talks Will Go On".



## POST-PEARCE POSITION

Although the Pearce Report will not produce new policies in London or Salisbury, its impact on the total Zimbabwe situation has been profound. First, it has educated British public opinion on the nature and extent of the oppression of the settler system of government. It has discredited the racist Smith regime in the eyes of the British people. In a typical colonial situation such as that which existed in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, the state of public opinion in Britain was a decisive factor as we have discussed earlier. In the special settler situation of Zimbabwe, where the British government has no direct administrative power, the state of British public opinion is only important in preventing a sellout or "dirty deals" with the Smith regime. At present, Britain's rulers have been restrained from granting independence on the terms of the white settlers that simply legalized the UDI. Second, the Pearce Report has maintained the policy of mandatory economic sanctions. The present British government promised the electors in 1970 to end economic sanctions. The withdrawal of the naval patrol in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Beira had already been announced. It is only the condemnation of the Settlement Proposals contained in the Pearce Report that has induced Britain to renew pressures on other nations to honour their obligations on economic sanctions. It has lodged complaints to the United Nations against sanction-busters, and retained the Beira naval patrol for the time being.

Internationally-sponsored economic sanctions failed to achieve the stated objective of toppling the Smith regime by splitting the ruling Rhodesian Front, but they have had their value. As long as Rhodesia remains the target of international sanctions, it cannot receive the legal (*de jure*) recognition it desires from other nations (even its immediate allies). To the settler population, non-recognition of UDI by Western nations is a continual source of worry about their future. It denies the regime the main purpose of UDI—the certainty about the future of white settlement in a dominant political and economic role. The extent to which sanctions have damaged the economy has not been fully assessed. They have ruined the tobacco industry—the mainstay of the economy before UDI—and the sugar industry. Yet, exports which dropped by 40 per cent in 1966-67 have now climbed back to pre-UDI levels. The economy has been diversified but at the expense of considerable domination by the South African economy. Foreign exchange has been very short indeed in Rhodesia resulting in severely limited industrial expansion. The economic damage of mandatory sanctions should not be under-rated. The anxiety of spokesmen of the Smith regime and representatives of commerce and industry to have sanctions removed suggests that they are continuing to have adverse effects on the economy and to stifle political development.

More importantly, the visit of the Pearce Commission to Zimbabwe stimulated African agitation and protest. It provided an opportunity to organize and mobilize African opinion. The ANC leaders seized the opportunity to bury the seven-year-old internecine strife between ZAPU and ZANU, and to form a single united movement. Division and factionalism within the

African nationalist movement was exploited by the government to ban ZAPU and ZANU in 1964, and to undermine their security when the armed phase of the struggle started in 1966. For a period of seven years ZAPU and ZANU devoted as much of their energy to inter-party competition as to their common enemy. Neither the shared injustice and oppression inside Zimbabwe, nor the strenuous efforts of the Organization of African Unity, could bring these movements closer together. Division and factionalism weakened the effort of the African movements to oppose UDI in particular and white rule in general more than any other single factor. Therefore, the ANC's success in bridging this gap is a major achievement. As discussed below, the exiled liberation movements are now following the good example of the ANC. We have already discussed the growth of national consciousness among the African people. Expressions of consciousness and unity shown during the visit of the Pearce Commission are being felt in the growing confrontation between the Government and the Africans, especially in rural areas.

However, while the Pearce Report has educated the British; prevented a sellout settlement at present; maintained the sanctions policy; and aroused African agitation; it has not produced any positive advance towards majority rule. The settlers are determined to maintain the power they have until their power is challenged by a greater power. In the concluding paragraphs of this article, we will discuss briefly the disposition of British power in Southern Africa, and the potentialities of an effective armed struggle by the indigenous Africans themselves.

## DIRECTION OF FUTURE BRITISH POLICY

Although some new factors have entered the debate on Rhodesia, post-Pearce British policy will continue to be determined by traditional British interests in the area of Southern Africa—protection and consolidation of the white settlements, strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, economic interests in South Africa, and defence policy influenced by NATO and America. Supremacy in the Indian Ocean in order to protect trading routes to East Africa, Asia and Australasia has been a major British interest in the area for nearly four centuries. The withdrawal from the "East of Suez" policy of 1967 shifted the focus of the British navy from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea. One of the considerations in this withdrawal was that British interests would be safeguarded by and through the co-operation of its allies in the area, notably Australia, South Africa and Portugal. An American presence has been attracted by the expansion of the Soviet navy into the northern Indian Ocean. It is against this background that the present British Government decided to sell arms to South Africa in 1971, and strengthened the Simonstown Agreement.

Britain has vast economic interests in South Africa and Rhodesia. It has invested £1 billion (sterling) in South Africa, and £200 million in Rhodesia. The gold from South Africa is the staying post for British sterling. South Africa is now Britain's third largest customer, with a balance of trade heavily

in favour of Britain. The lucrative mining and industrial complex of South Africa and Rhodesia is run on British capital, and is very valuable indeed.

Successive post-war British defence white papers stress two issues—the avoidance of involvement in a land war far away from home as the Americans have done in Vietnam; and the importance of a highly mobile striking force. Related to Southern Africa, this policy would mean that Britain would possibly rely on South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal to fight any land wars in Southern Africa, in which her and their interests were directly involved. Therefore military, economic and strategic interests of long-standing suggest that the direction of British policy in Southern Africa will be essentially in support of the white regimes although the rhetoric may point the other way.

Britain's decision to enter the European Economic Community has shifted its vital interests away from Africa and Asia, and from the Commonwealth of Nations. British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, showed that the Commonwealth was no longer an important British interest at the Singapore meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in January, 1971, when he defied Afro-Asian opinion on the issue of selling arms to South Africa. He stressed that his policy will be guided by Britain's national interests alone. The increasing trading, cultural and possibly political links with Europe at the expense of the Commonwealth nations, will reduce what diplomatic influence Africa had on Britain over Rhodesia.

While strategic, economic, and military interests tend to stretch British policy towards embracing Smith and selling out, there are some powerful constraints. One of the important new factors that has entered the Rhodesian debate is the strong anti-settlement position taken by the Nigerian Government. Having recovered from the ravages of the four-year civil war, Nigeria is taking an increasingly important role in African international relations. British investment in Nigeria is now 300 million pounds sterling in the oil industry alone. In contrast, Britain has 200 million pounds sterling invested in a wide variety of industries in Rhodesia. British investment in each of Zambia and Kenya is comparable to that in Rhodesia. When Nigeria insists on a just settlement in Rhodesia as it is doing, and threatens to take action against British interests if African interests are openly and blatantly betrayed in Rhodesia, a capitalist Government like Britain is bound to take notice. It is significant that a British Minister, Richard Wood, was despatched to Nigeria on publication of the Pearce Report to reassure President Yakubu Gowon that Britain was not planning a sellout.

British trade with African states north of the Zambezi now exceeds that with the white regimes south of it. If African states were able to act in concert, or if Nigeria, Zambia and Kenya alone were willing to take joint positive action against British financial and business interests, the British Government would be severely restrained. However, the history of concerted and collaborative action by African states is disappointing. Early in 1966, only nine out of thirty-one states severed diplomatic relations with Britain over its Rhodesian policy. Tanzania lost a substantial British loan. Others, especially Nigeria (under the leadership of the late Sir Abubakar Tafawa

Balewa) reneged on a previous agreement, and virtually killed the issue by referring it to a special Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting.

#### THE ARMED STRUGGLE

However, the ultimate and decisive constraint on British policy is the fear of a racial bloodbath, or in other words, the armed struggle. Sir Alec draws cheers from both sides of the House of Commons when he speaks passionately about the fearful prospect of black and white armies marching against each other across the Zambezi River. Therefore, in real political terms the ultimate deterrent to a sellout or a pre-condition for a programme that would produce majority rule is the ability of the Africans to rebel against the system. In Rhodesian history, Britain has always given the settlers a completely free hand, subject only to the condition that the policies they pursue should not provoke the indigenous Africans to war as this would draw both expenses and unfavourable publicity in London. Indeed, the only previous occasion when Britain insisted on radical policy changes in Rhodesia with respect to African land and cattle was after the 1896 bloodbath. In 1972, the position is still essentially the same. Britain would and could only insist on a policy programme of majority rule if Africans demonstrated a determination to resist minority settler rule with violence and armed force. Heath will be anxious to avoid another Ulster in Rhodesia. And the settlers will only contemplate giving up or sharing power when they can no longer hold it. What are the prospects of a successful armed struggle in Rhodesia?

In military terms at present, the settlers are confident of staving off any serious guerrilla threat to their hold on political, military and economic power. Lewis H. Gann, a theoretician for the racist regime, states in a recent article that the white regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa need not fear the guerrillas. He said:

The total partisan [guerrilla] strength in Zambia and Tanzania, however, remains small. Worse still, from the guerrilla's point of view, the partisans are politically fragmented. The defenders on the other hand, form a united bloc. The guerrillas cannot even think of expanding the war unless they first build up effective parallel organizations underground and liquidate the government intelligence networks. Both tasks are currently beyond their grasp.<sup>17</sup>

The current facts in the guerrilla movement do not support Gann's conclusions. In the first place, FRELIMO guerrillas have intensified their war against the neighbouring territory of Mozambique and are now posing a serious threat to the Rhodesians and South Africans. Traffic on the main road between Salisbury and Blantyre in Malawi has been cut in several places by FRELIMO mines. Cars using this road usually need police protection. On the eastern Rhodesian border, FRELIMO has killed several Rhodesian and South African

<sup>17</sup> *Africa Report* (Washington, USA), February, 1972, p. 17. "No Hope for Violent Liberation" by Lewis H. Gann. He takes a general anti-guerrilla stand on the basis of distorted history in his recent book, *Guerrillas in History* (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1971).

soldiers. In October, 1972, Ian Smith visited Portugal to discuss how to form a common front against freedom-fighters on the Mozambique/Rhodesia border. Several Rhodesian soldiers have been killed by FRELIMO fighters on the border in recent months. Roads and rail links to the sea are threatened. Although Rhodesian and South African forces are helping Portuguese troops, they have both failed to halt the advance of FRELIMO guerrillas in Mozambique.

On South Africa's own doorstep in January, 1972, Ovambo workers went on strike in Namibia—South West Africa—and succeeded in paralysing all industry for several weeks. The ability of the Ovambos to organize themselves effectively against the South African police state, has led directly to the South African Government's agreement to the appointment of a UN Commissioner for Namibia. It is now conceivable that South Africa will be pushed out of Namibia quicker than defenders of white racism and supremacy such as Lewis H. Gann predicted.

Guerrilla fighting which started in Zimbabwe on December 21, 1972, was so successful and so extensive that by May, 1973, it had claimed 13 lives of security officers, five white farmers, and generally created a serious security situation in North-Eastern Rhodesia. The regime's Defence Minister, John Howman, drew the attention of Parliament to the fact that security forces were fully engaged on three sides of the border, covering no less than a thousand miles of bush country. Prime Minister Smith described the situation in North-Eastern Rhodesia as so serious that it would take several months before the security forces could bring the situation under control.

According to press and radio reports, the success of the 1973 guerrilla offensive in North-Eastern Rhodesia was due to the assistance the forces of ZANU had received from FRELIMO in neighbouring Mozambique where the latter movement virtually controls the adjacent Tete Province. The second factor was the significant participation of peasants in the guerrilla offensive. This fact was underlined by the regime's arrest of over 200 people in the Mount Darwin District alone, the closure of schools and shops in Chiweshe District, and the arrest of prominent Chief Makope and leading Headmen in Mount Darwin. FROLIZI guerrillas complemented the ZANU offensive in the North-Eastern District, by engaging security forces in areas south of the railway line such as Wedza, Umvuma, Umtali and Enkeldoorn. By May, 1973, ZANU guerrillas were reported to be active in an area covering some 50,000 square miles, or nearly a third of the country.

The importance of the Centenary area offensive in North-Eastern Rhodesia was the readiness shown by the peasantry there, and their traditional leaders, to participate in the armed struggle. Press reports say they did not hesitate to fight against the white settlers once arms and ammunition were brought within their reach. This attitude followed many months of painstaking political education but also many years of Police brutality and Government repression. Rhodesia will not be liberated by the relatively few partisans in exile as Gann suggests, but by the massive armed revolt of peasants and workers inside the

country. Press reports suggest that the Centenary area fighting is the beginning of this massive revolt.

#### ZIMBABWE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

The first and continuing task of Zimbabwe's liberation movements is to unite all the partisans and fighting forces. The population in Zimbabwe is united under Bishop A. Muzorewa's ANC. The areas of ZAPU-ZANU co-operation were vastly extended at a reconciliation meeting convened by the OAU in Lusaka in March, 1973. The essential point is that the process of uniting all Zimbabwe partisans has been started, and should be completed soon. However, there is a real problem in finding a formula for unity acceptable to groups of fighters and leaders who have been divided for many years. The best formula is the formation of a "united front" encompassing all classes and groups that agree to fight the national war of independence. The "front" should not be confused with a political party which expresses the interests of one particular class which has formed it. The "front" is by nature and definition a conglomeration of diverse classes, interests, and groups. The very successful "front" of the Vietnamese liberation movement consists of the Communist Party of South Vietnam, the Buddhists, the Montagnard tribesmen, and many other less important groups. It is no mean achievement to get political groups with such different ideologies and purposes to fight together, under one command, one political structure, and one organization. Neither FROLIZI nor the Joint Military Command have succeeded in finding a formula under which all Zimbabwe combatants and militants could fight together as one people. Most of the "united fronts" formed by liberation movements under the aegis of the OAU have failed to stand the test of time because the participating organizations had no clear concept of a fighting "front", and solutions had been imposed on them by the OAU. Imposed solutions cannot stand the internal stresses and strains of a liberation movement.

A second imperative is a clearly defined ideology. The Rhodesian situation is very complex. The country is run by a local capitalist class among the white settlers. Those with great influence on the Government are the Chambers of Commerce in the four main cities, the Chamber of Mines, the Associated Industries of Rhodesia, and the Rhodesia National Farmers' Union. These economic associations virtually determine the policy of the settler government. But those who run them are either representatives of South African mining and farming interests, or British industrialists and capitalists. In the political sphere, Rhodesia's constitutional position is very ambiguous, ranging from a British colony to a self-governing dominion. Britain's wide-ranging interests confound the confusing situation. A liberation movement fighting such a complex international structure should be clear in its own mind what it is fighting for and against. Essentially the fight is against the system of colonial capitalism, whatever its origin. As FROLIZI states in its Manifesto "the abolition of existing colonial-settler bourgeois property relations, the

complete overthrow of the bourgeois state, exploitation, as well as the system's links with imperialism, is therefore the focus of the national liberation and democratic revolutionary movement".

Zimbabwe's liberation movements are in the process of radically changing their styles and methods of work. For example, the dynamic relationship between leaders and guerrillas, and guerrillas and the population, are taking new turns. The leadership should be an integral part of the fighting forces; and the fighting forces be an integral part of the Zimbabwe population. Obviously, implementing such basic principles of a revolutionary movement entails a radical departure from the known styles and methods of previous liberation movements. These fundamental changes taking place in Zimbabwe's liberation movements will have a profound and positive effect on their performance in future.

A liberation movement that is united, ideologically clear, and effective, is the ultimate and real answer to the Rhodesian problem. When such a movement emerges, the white settlers and Britain will negotiate with it more seriously than they attempted to do after the Pearce Report. The main point of difference between now and then will be that the African leaders of an effective liberation movement will be negotiating from a position that is much stronger than the present ANC or ZAPU/ZANU/FROLIZI.

The effectiveness and the power liberation movements are able to muster in Southern Africa is only part of the total liberatory process. They control only some of the factors. Indeed some of the vital factors are controlled by other people especially the Governments of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana and the Organization of African Unity. Even the most dynamic revolutionary movement must depend for the greater part of its success on the powerful support of neighbouring independent African states. It is they that must provide sanctuary and transit facilities. To do this effectively, and continuously, the commitment to the war must be regarded as their own national interest. Most of the successful wars of liberation were supported by a powerful and committed neighbouring state. The Zambian and Tanzanian Governments are deeply committed to the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe, but most African states in the OAU are not. They neither contribute to the OAU Liberation Fund, nor provide freedom-fighters with transit facilities through their territories. Weaponry and other military hardware have been procured from socialist countries; but effective use has been severely limited by the hostile attitudes of some independent African states. It may be too much to expect a high degree of commitment to liberation in an essentially dependent, neo-colonial continent. But until the liberatory struggle is regarded as an integral part of the continuing search for genuine independence by African states too, it will not reach the levels demanded by the situation.

## APPENDIX

# Britain and Rhodesia Settlement Proposals — an Explanation

BRITISH COMMISSION ON RHODESIAN OPINION

We, who are members of the British Government's Commission, wish to tell you about the proposals for the future government of your country. After telling you what these are, we shall ask you whether you accept them. If you do accept, then the present dispute will end and Britain will declare to all the world that your country is now independent. If you do not accept, then things will continue as they are at present and how this will turn out no one can easily say. We will explain all this more clearly so that you can understand and decide. It is for you, the people of Rhodesia, to say whether you accept or reject the proposals. Britain will agree to what the people of Rhodesia as a whole may decide.

These are the proposals:

1. Rhodesia will become an independent country.
2. The British Government will give up its claim to make laws for your country.

### THE PROPOSALS

#### *The Government*

If these proposals are accepted by you and are brought into force then your Government will be formed like this:

There will be as now a President who is the Head of the country, and two Councils—the House of Assembly and the Senate. Together they will make up Parliament which will make the laws.

#### *The House of Assembly*

The House of Assembly is very important because it will choose the Prime Minister and the Government.

In the House of Assembly there are now 50 European Members and 16 African Members.

At present the Europeans who have the right to vote choose all the European Members of Parliament. Africans who have the right to vote elect some

of the African Members but Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors also choose some of the African Members.

If you accept the new proposals, the total number of African Members chosen in various ways should in time equal and then outnumber the European Members. The African Members could then choose the Government. They could make new laws and change old ones. They would control the Government. All this cannot happen at once and we cannot say how many years it will take. But it will come about by steady steps.

### *Choosing Members of Parliament*

There will be four ways to choose Members of Parliament for the Assembly:

1. Those Africans whose names are on the *African Lower Roll* will choose eight Members as at present. Their numbers will not increase now. But they may increase in the future. We will explain this later.
2. *Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors* sitting together in various places as they do now will choose eight other African Members. Later on there will be more.
3. The Europeans who are registered on the *European Roll* will vote for 50 European Members as at present.
4. There will be a new *African Higher Roll* with the same rules as the European Roll. Africans who are able to vote on this roll will elect African Members of the House of Assembly. As more Africans register their names on this higher roll so the number of African Members of the Assembly will increase. We will explain this later.

### *The African Lower Roll*

The present rules will be widened so that more people will be able to vote. If you are a Rhodesian African—either a man or a woman—and if you can show that you earn or own something substantial and are educated or are of a certain age or standing, then you can apply to be registered to vote. You can have your name registered on the Lower Roll if—

1. you have been earning \$50 a month for the last two years or you own a house, building, farm or land worth \$1,100  
or
2. you are over 30 years old and you have been earning more than \$36 a month for the last two years or own a house, building, farm or land worth \$800  
or

3. you have finished a primary school course and are over 30 years old and you have been earning \$25 a month for the last two years or own a house, building, farm or land worth \$600  
or
4. you have been at a secondary school for two years or more and you have been earning \$25 a month for the last two years or own a house, building, farm or land worth \$600  
or
5. you are a kraal head with at least 20 heads of families.

Not many women can earn so much money or own so much property. But wives can also claim to vote if their husbands can vote and if they themselves have been to primary or secondary school for the time laid down in these rules. Only the first wife can claim to vote in this way.

You must register first before you can vote. A Government Officer can help you to register, if you wish. If you are registered you can vote for one candidate.

There will be a number of candidates for the four places in Matebeleland and for the four places in Mashonaland. Candidates for these eight places in the Assembly must be registered voters.

### *The African Higher Roll*

This is the new roll which will be made if you accept the proposals. It is very important.

You can register your name on the African Higher Roll if you are a Rhodesian African—man or woman—and if—

1. you have been earning at least \$150 a month for the last two years  
or
2. you own a house, building, farm or land worth \$3,600.  
or
3. you have been at secondary school for at least four years and you have been earning \$100 a month for the last two years or own a house, building, farm or land worth \$2,400.

Wives can also claim to vote if their husbands can vote, but they must have been to secondary school for four years where this is part of the rules. Only the first wife can claim to vote in this way.

A person who wishes to be a candidate must himself be registered on the African Higher Roll.

*Increase of African Members*

The increase in the number of African Members will depend on the number of voters registered on the African Higher Roll. The more voters who register the greater will be the number of African Members. This will come to pass as more Africans successfully complete secondary education and obtain better-paid jobs. But they must register their names on the Higher Roll.

At present there are about 90,000 Europeans whose names are registered on the European Roll. They elect 50 Members of the House of Assembly. This number of Members will not increase even if the number of European voters increases.

At present there are 16 African Members of Parliament. The voters on the African Lower Roll elect eight. The Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors choose eight. In the future there will be more Members whom the Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors choose and new Members whom the voters on the African Higher Roll elect. This is how it will happen:

Twice a year officials will count the number of Africans who are registered on the African Higher Roll and the number of Europeans who are registered. In order to increase two African places the number of Africans registered must always be an additional 6 per cent of the total number of Europeans registered at that time. At the present time—

1. if about 5,500 Africans are registered on the Higher Roll there will be places for two more Africans in the House of Assembly
2. if there are about 11,000 Africans registered then there will be places for four more Africans
3. if there are about 16,500 Africans registered then there will be places for six more Africans.

This will continue until there are as many voters registered on the African Higher Roll as on the European Roll and as many African Members in the Assembly as Europeans.

New Members will be elected in two ways. Voters on the African Higher Roll will elect the first two new African Members. Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors will choose the next two African Members. When another two places become available for African Members the voters on the Higher Roll will elect them and the Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors will choose the next two in their turn. This will continue until there are 34 more African Members in the Assembly which, together with the 16 present Members, will make up 50 in all—equal to the number of Europeans.

*Members Chosen by Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors*

When this time is reached and there are equal numbers of European and African Members, there will be eight Africans elected on the African Lower

Roll, there will be 18 elected on the African Higher Roll and there will be 24 chosen by the Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors. At this time the African voters on the Lower and Higher Rolls together will have to make a choice.

They may agree that the Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors shall continue to choose 24 African Members. Or they may agree that these seats be abolished and replaced by 24 more elected members.

Parliament may decide to reserve up to six seats to represent voters on the African Lower Roll. If not, then voters on the African Higher Roll will elect all these 24 Members. A majority in Parliament must pass these laws which must include a majority of the 50 African Members then in the Assembly (8 elected on the Lower Roll, 18 on the Higher Roll and the 24 chosen by the Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors).

*The Common Roll*

The new Constitution will arrange for 10 new places to be made in the Assembly. This will happen at the next General Election after the numbers of African and European Members become equal. The Constitution will say that all the European voters and all the Africans on the Higher Roll will vote together on a Common Roll for 10 members to fill these places.

But before this comes about there will be a Commission to find out whether the people of Rhodesia want some other arrangement. The Commission will have equal numbers of Africans and Europeans under someone with the experience of a Judge. They cannot delay but must make their report within one year. Whatever the Commission may suggest only Parliament can make a change. If Parliament does not decide to make a change, then the 10 new places will be added at the next Election as provided in the Constitution.

As time passes more Africans will be able to vote on the Higher Roll and they will come to outnumber the Europeans. They will then be able to win the bigger share of these 10 new places. When this happens there will be more African Members than Europeans in Parliament and they will be in a position to choose the Government.

*The Senate*

So far all that we have told you is about the House of Assembly. There is also the Senate. Its powers are not so wide as the Assembly. No change will be made in the numbers of the Senate and it will remain as it is now, that is—

1. 10 Europeans chosen by European Members of the House of Assembly
2. 10 African Chiefs—five from Matabeleland and five from Mashonaland chosen by the Councils of Chiefs
3. 3 named by the President.

*Change in the Constitution*

It will not be easy to change the most important parts of the Constitution or the law about elections. For a change to be made three things must happen:

1. In the House of Assembly two-thirds of all the Members must vote for the change
2. In the Senate two-thirds of all the Members must vote for the change
3. Until there are as many Africans in the House of Assembly as Europeans, a majority of the African Members and a majority of the European Members in the Assembly must each separately agree to the change.

Unless these rules are obeyed there can be no changes in the following matters:

1. The new arrangements for the House of Assembly
2. The numbers of Members of the House of Assembly
3. The ways in which the Members of the House of Assembly are elected.
4. Who can register to vote
5. Who can be a candidate for election
6. The way in which Chiefs, Headmen and Councillors choose some Members of the House of Assembly
7. The rule for changing financial qualifications for voting to take account of rising prices
8. Arrangements affecting a declaration of Emergency
9. The Declaration of Rights.

The Rhodesian Government has said that during the first three years of the Constitution, or until the first two additional Africans have taken their places in the House of Assembly, if this is earlier, they will not make or support any important changes in the Constitution.

## THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS

*Declaration of Rights*

When the British Government have given independence to other countries they have also given a Declaration of Rights. This Declaration protects everyone who is not breaking the law from unjust interference. This Declaration itself becomes part of the law of the country.

In 1961 there was a Declaration of Rights in your Constitution. Then the Courts protected these rights and people could go to the Courts to ask for protection. Once the 1961 Constitution came into force the Courts could

over-rule any new law which broke the Declaration of Rights. It would cease to be a law.

The 1969 Constitution also had a Declaration of Rights. This was less strong than the old one because people could not go to the Courts to ask for protection.

Both the British and the Rhodesian Governments have agreed to restore the power of the Courts to protect your rights under the Declaration. To do this the Constitution will be changed and there will be a new Declaration of Rights very like the one in the Constitution of 1961. If the Courts find that any new law breaks the rules of the new Declaration, then they can say that such a law has no power. The Courts cannot deal with existing laws. But a special Commission will examine the existing laws. We will explain their work to you later.

What are these rights?

1. If you have done no wrong in the eyes of a court you have a right to be free
2. If you have a right to property this right cannot be taken away without the power of the law
3. You have the right to follow any religion you may believe in and to think your own thoughts
4. You may go to lawful meetings and say peacefully what you feel or think.

The Declaration and the Courts seek to protect these and other rights. In all these things, of course, you must obey the law—you have no right to use violence or to harm the rights of others, or to damage their property. People who break the law will be punished under the law. The new Declaration of Rights will not prevent a future Government in Rhodesia declaring another Emergency if the country is in danger but it will limit the period of the Emergency more strictly.

The new Declaration will not prevent the Government from detaining people without trial who would otherwise threaten the peace of the country but it will give more protection to the interests of detainees. The new Declaration of Rights will also check any extension of racial discrimination in the future.

We have not tried to tell you everything in the Declaration of Rights. It is very long. It is written in the language of the Courts. It is not easy to read. To understand it you need the help of men with special training in law.

When we see you, we and our Commissioners will explain the Declaration of Rights to you, and will consider any questions which you may ask.

*State of Emergency*

If the Government have declared an Emergency, then the House of Assembly must be asked to approve this. At present this approval must be

renewed every year. In future the Assembly must renew its approval every nine months so that the Government cannot use the special powers for longer than is really necessary.

The Rhodesian Government say they want to do away with the present Emergency as soon as possible. Unless there is new trouble which they do not now expect they plan to end the Emergency as soon as sanctions against Rhodesia come to an end.

#### *Rhodesians who have left Rhodesia*

A number of Rhodesians have left Rhodesia. If Britain and Rhodesia settle their dispute these people will be free to return. If they have not committed a crime against the law the Rhodesian Government will not penalise them. But if any person returns who has committed a criminal act against the country, then the Rhodesian Government may take that person to court.

#### *Detainees*

There are now 62 persons who are still in detention. If these proposals are accepted and there is an end of the dispute a Judge of the Rhodesian High Court assisted by others, as at present, will examine whether they also can then be released. Someone appointed by the British Government, after agreeing with the Rhodesian Government, will attend the cases to watch what is done. The authorities must carry out what the Judge and the others decide. The hearing of these special cases will start as soon as possible after our Commission have finished their work.

### RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

#### *Special Commission*

If the British and Rhodesian Governments settle the dispute between them, the Rhodesian Government have promised to take steps to end discrimination between races in Rhodesia. This will take time.

First there will be a special Commission of three men appointed to examine all the present laws which make for racial discrimination. The special Commission will also look at:

1. The rules made under the law
2. The ways in which the Government carry out these laws and rules.

The special Commission is to care for the interests of all the people of Rhodesia whatever their race or tribe.

The special Commission will be independent. The British Government and the Rhodesian Government will together agree on the selection of the three men. One of them will be an African.

When this special Commission have finished the work of examining the

laws they will produce a report. This report will be printed for all people to read. The Rhodesian Government have said that the report of the special Commission will be very important and that they will bring to Parliament and support any changes in the law which may be needed to do what the special Commission recommends. There is only one exception to this. If they see that there are over-riding considerations which any government anywhere would have to take into account, then they cannot promise to do this.

We have already explained that the work of the special Commission will be to examine all the present laws which make for racial discrimination. They will look closely at the law and working of the Land Tenure Act. They will consider many important matters, including the following:

1. At present African lawyers and doctors and others with professional qualifications cannot freely work in European areas unless they are employed by Europeans. The special Commission will examine these rules.
2. At present Africans cannot freely visit European areas to attend schools and hospitals for all races. The special Commission will examine these rules.

#### *Land*

For people who live by farming, land is an important possession. This is true for Africans and for Europeans. Because land and its use are so important to people as a whole the special Commission will examine how land use can be controlled. They will try to suggest a fair way of sharing the land and its use between Africans and Europeans according to the needs. It may be possible to set up an independent Board to find answers to land problems when they arise.

The Rhodesian Government say that at the present time there is still land both in the Tribal Trust Areas and in the Purchase Areas which Africans could use. The Rhodesian Government say that under the present law more land can be made available for African use. They will make this land available when it is needed. The British Government have agreed that if the dispute is settled they will provide money to help to improve the land at present being used by Africans. They have also said that if new land is set aside for Africans they will provide money to help to improve the new land. The Rhodesian Government have said they will do the same thing.

The Rhodesian Government have made a promise about present arrangements. They have promised that while the special Commission is carrying out its work of examining the law relating to racial discrimination they will not move any Africans from the Epworth and Chishawasha Missions. This matter will be settled after the special Commission make their report. The Rhodesian Government have said that they may move some Africans living in forest or park areas who should not be there but that for the time being they will not move African tenants living in other areas. The Rhodesian



Government will wait for the advice of the special Commission before they decide what to do.

### *Jobs in Government Service*

The Rhodesian Government have said that they will give Government jobs to the people who have the best qualifications and experience regardless of their race.

The Rhodesian Government have also said that they will seek to improve the ways of training Africans so that they can compete on equal terms with people of other races for Government jobs.

### DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

If Britain and Rhodesia end the dispute then Britain will provide up to £5 million each year for 10 years to help improve the Tribal Trust Lands and the African Purchase Areas, and to help to improve education and employment opportunities for Africans. The Rhodesian Government have also agreed to provide more money for these purposes. This money will be in addition to the money now being spent on education, housing and development for Africans.

The British Government and the Rhodesian Government will discuss and agree how to spend the money. They will make the plans and together they will agree how to carry out those plans. They will consider projects for bringing water to the farms; for improving farming methods; for new factories, roads and so on in the Tribal Trust Lands and African Purchase Areas. In education there will be more money for agricultural and technical training; for training teachers and administrators; and for primary, secondary and higher education.

The British Government will want to be sure that what is done will improve the standards of education for the Africans, make more jobs and will help to improve things for the future.

### ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENDING THE DISPUTE

The British Government are willing to end the dispute with Rhodesia if they are sure that the people of Rhodesia as a whole are in favour of accepting the proposed agreement.

The Rhodesian Government must then change the Constitution in the way which we have described and start doing certain other things which they have promised.

The British Government will then ask the British Parliament to pass a law to give Rhodesia independence as a Republic. When all these things have happened Britain will end sanctions against Rhodesia.

## Participatory Development and Rural Modernization in Hausa Niger

ROBERT B. CHARLICK\*

The Republic of Niger is a particularly interesting case for students of the relationship between political power and economic modernization.<sup>1</sup> Since independence its government has advocated a rural development strategy called *participation populaire au développement*, which proposes a specific resolution to the dual needs of the state to raise the standard of living while building the power capacity of the national government.<sup>2</sup> This solution involves "inducing" the rural population to "participate" in development programmes. It is a strategy based both on the Nigerien leadership's analysis of obstacles to rural economic innovation and on its appreciation of the need to modify existing power relationships to ensure the growth of state capabilities. An understanding of the Nigerien modernization strategy should provide considerable insight into the inter-relationships between the two principal needs of many African states today.

Niger's experience with the strategy of "participatory development" is now nearing the ten year mark. It is already obvious that in the past decade the government has been unable to translate its strategy into working field policy. While still officially supporting mass popular participation in development, it has, in fact, shifted to operational development policies which have entirely different political and economic implications.

The shift has been away from "participation" as shared influence in decentralized structures, designed both to produce structural change at the local level and to "develop" individual capabilities, to "participation" as mass involvement without influence in development projects, dictated by technical considerations.<sup>3</sup> This shift, it is contended, has resulted from the failure of

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<sup>2</sup> Nigerien leadership's commitment to a doctrine of participatory development is documented in numerous speeches by top leaders (*Le Niger*, February 5, 1964, August 3, 1968, November 6, 1971, for example) and in the report of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache (OCAM) *Conférence sur la Participation Populaire au Développement: Synthèse des Réponses aux Questionnaires Préparatoires*, Paris: OCAM, 1972.

<sup>3</sup> I make a distinction between types of participation based on the distinction made in Peter Bechra and Morton Baratz *Power and Poverty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 206. My "shared influence participation" and "symbolic (non-influence) participation" are part of a more extensive participation classification developed in my dissertation, "Power and Participation in Rural Hausa Modernization", U.C.L.A., 1972.