

Malawi: The Birth of a Neo-Colonial State

ATTATI MPAKATI*

EARLY SOCIETIES

The early societies of Malawi, as in other parts of Africa, were characterized by common ownership of land with a system of shifting cultivation to avoid soil exhaustion. Movement into virgin land was necessary and the success of this system was due to the abundance of free land.

Absolute ownership of land by an individual is foreign to African traditional societies. When Malawi was colonized by Britain, all land was the property of the community. The head of each community acted as its banker—collecting food and storing and protecting it for eventual use in the interests of the whole community. In time of disaster, the important men, including the head of the communal society, were morally bound to relieve shortages among the people. Related to the heads' social, economic, and political obligations were the symbolic and spectacular rituals, public works, and ceremonial exchanges with other groups.

As head of the whole community, the chief would allocate, on the basis of advice from his counsellors, a certain portion of land to a certain family. The cultivation rights continued so long as the family made personal use of the land. The traditional African concept of land ownership conflicted with the European notion that the land-owner did whatever he wished with his land—farmed it, leased it, left the land idle, or built on it. Commenting on this distinction in the two systems of land ownership, John G. Pike expressed the view that “. . . many of the Europeans were probably ignorant of the African concept of tenure and it is therefore that little blame can be attached to the European settlers, for they treated the African chiefs as their business equals. . . .”¹

Pike's assumption is quite wrong. In Malawi there was never a time when Europeans regarded the chiefs as business equals: that would have been paradoxical since plunder, subjugation, and conquest were implicit in colonization. Throughout political history, no conquerors ever regarded the conquered

*Attati Mpakati is a Research Fellow in the Department of Economic History, University of Uppsala. In November 1957 he was elected by the Regional Annual Conference of the Nyasaland African Congress in the Central Region as Regional Secretary. He held this position until March 1959 when the Congress was proscribed by the Colonial Authorities. Mr. Mpakati was arrested along with other Congress leaders and sent into exile for detention in Khami and Marandellas jails of Southern Rhodesia and Kanjedja in Malawi. He was released in July 1960 only to be placed under restriction at Kuntaja near Blantyre. Mr. Mpakati left Malawi in 1961.

¹ John G. Pike, *Malawi—A Political and Economic History* (London, 1968), p. 126

as an equal, whether in politics or economics. To give an example of how the British controlled territory by gunpowder, we may quote the Annual Report for 1897 of an acting British Commissioner in Malawi:

In consequence, nearly all our expeditions for 1891 to 1895 were undertaken against various sections of the Yao tribe and their powerful chiefs. The British South African Company had made available a sum of £10,000 a year for providing the police force.²

To quote only a few instances of resistance by Malawi's people, Professor Mitchell recorded that:

As early as 1891, a raid was made on Chikumbu, a Yao Chief, because he and his men had attacked a European coffee plantation in the Mlanje area . . . Captain Maquire was killed in 1891 by Makanjila's men, and shortly afterwards the British suffered a reverse at the hands of Jalasi . . . unsuccessful attacks had been made on Kawinga's stronghold at Chikala . . . in 1893, two contingents, each of 100 Sikhs, arrived, to control the situation . . . In 1894, Chief Makanjila was attacked and thoroughly defeated . . . In 1895, there was a concentrated effort by Chiefs Kawinga, Jalasi, and Matipwiri to oust the British from the Shire Highlands. By 1896 the superior British Militia had completely subjugated the Yao Chiefs who had resisted them.³

No sooner was the country effectively under British control than European immigrants poured in and took the land, especially the most fertile areas of the Southern Region. In the Cholo district alone, two-thirds of the land was confiscated by white settlers. By 1892, more than 1,600,000 hectares of land had been alienated, that being more than 16 per cent of the land area of Malawi. Three-quarters of this alienated area was in the possession of eleven big companies, most based in Scotland. Among them were the Central African Company, African Lakes Corporation, A. L. Bruce Trust and the Church of Scotland Mission which altogether took 500,000 hectares of the most fertile and productive lands of the Shire Highlands.⁴ In the Northern Region, about 1,100,000 hectares were declared a possession of the British South Africa Company.

It is not surprising that Scottish missionaries and capital had followed Livingston, the Scot who allegedly said that he went to Central Africa to try to open a path for commerce and Christ. His efforts were indirectly responsible for the political intervention of the British which culminated in the establishment of the British colony of Nyasaland. The religious interlopers were soon to clash with the indigenous peoples. In the words of Professor Mitchell, "The Yaos, having established themselves in the Shire Highlands of Malawi, came into armed conflict with Bishop MacKenzie and Dr. David Livingston and were later conquered by a British force."⁵

To appreciate how the process of land alienation affected the whole country, we should first realize that under the original system of land tenure

2 Nyasaland Protectorate, *Annual Report of 1897*, p. 12, quoted in J. Clyde Mitchell, *The Yao Village* (Manchester University Press, 1956 ed.), p. 30.

3 J. Clyde Mitchell, *The Yao Village*, (Manchester University Press, 1956 ed.), p. 30.

4 E. M. Konovalov and Y. G. Lipetsi, *Malawi* (Russian ed.; Moscow, 1966), pp. 36-37.

5 Mitchell, *The Yao Village*, op. cit., p. 70

labour was divided according to sex, and the labour force was not then detached from the community as a separate social productive unit. The whole community was a labour unit engaged directly in economic processes, and largely in control of it. Its own inner organizational structure, men and women, children and parents, enjoyed a productive relationship in a democratic sense. Labour was divided for cattle-breeding or agricultural farming. Adult men were responsible for the building of houses, the clearing of new lands, herding of cattle, hunting, fishing, and the care of domestic animals. The men thus took charge of development and, above all, of defence. On the other hand, women were active in agriculture, planting seeds, weeding, and harvesting.

Before the arrival of Europeans there had not been any separation of industry from the living environment. The women, for example, were able to combine their work in the fields with cottage industry. The communal society was self-sufficient and averted the need for commodity exchange between one community and another. It was not an economic necessity under these circumstances to be hired as a labourer. The African communalists only needed to exploit the resources within reach to get the material necessary for subsistence. They could work for themselves for they had no cause to sell their labour (which would enrich a capitalist) so long as they held all the means of production at their disposal, the main one being land.

As the land was expropriated, however, the communal society was destroyed. The concepts of wealth within a communal society with no market economy sharply differed from those of white settlers, who wished to accumulate more despite the fact that they already had money in banks, possessed land, and other property of great value. To achieve that, they first had to deny the potential black labour force the control of its own means of production, the African soil.

Production within the communal society was motivated by absolute necessity, not by profit, for when no community need was in sight that could be met by future labour, the tendency was to stop working. Usually production ceased when domestic quotas were achieved for a certain period. This acted as a built-in limit on output and there was no inherent propensity to evoke continuous work for the sake of accumulation. In economic terms, incentive to produce a surplus was lacking. Such an economic system had the effect not only of keeping the communal societies self-sufficient but also of keeping the consumption pattern within the community uniform. A yearning to diversify or extension of markets could not arise.

The British set out to change that. "The breaking of this self-sufficiency, the destruction of African subsistence agriculture, became a central aim of imperialists' policy, pursued since the beginning of the twentieth century to this very day—for a stable African peasant able to exist independent of European farms and mines is the last thing imperialism will allow."⁶ The British began by issuing certificates of land ownership to give legal recognition to the appropriation of land by Europeans, leaving the African without legal

6 Jack Woddis, *Africa: The Roots of Revolt* (London, 1961), p. 11.

title to his land. Without land, the African could no longer be self-sufficient. This deliberate policy of the British colonial Government aggravated African poverty. Through such ruthless economic persecution the African was forced to go and sell his labour to a white capitalist. As the fertile land left to Africans diminished, the shifting cultivation system disappeared. The social repercussions of such transition were outlined by Marx:

What, then, constitutes the alienation of labour? First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential being; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work he feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague. . . . Lastly, the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that, it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs . . . to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates independently of the individual—that is, operates on him as an alien, divine or diabolical activity—in the same way the worker's activity is not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self.⁷

By 1936, the land unoccupied by the white settlers was declared to be British Crown Land. This brought to five-sixths the Malawian territory held by foreign owners. By 1954 more than 211,000 African tenants lived in this European agricultural sector and 173,000 of these resided in the Southern Region. Of 595,000 hectares controlled by Europeans, only 40,000 hectares were utilized.⁸ African labour was used to farm that fraction during the best season which lasted three months. For the remaining nine months idle land could not be employed productively by the African. The soil was no longer his, and even had it been, he could not employ hired labour like the Europeans because it was the African who served as the source of labour for the settlers' farms. He was destined to be not more than a small-scale peasant, directed to grow certain crops, most often cotton or tobacco (at one time 85 per cent in value of the Malawi tobacco was produced by Africans). The Europeans, who at first specialized in growing tea, later used the allegation that African cotton and tobacco production was too labour-consuming to be profitable if they turned their technology to improving quality and yields. The African peasant was denied such benefits, and therefore could not compete in the open market. As the European sector slowly took up cotton and tobacco production, the African peasant was obliged to accept total dependence on the whites who regulated the market supply. The common characteristic of both sectors was that all products were for export. The aim was to keep Malawi's internal

7 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), pp. 72-73.

8 L. A. M. Kraki Demkina, *Federatsi Rhodesi i Nyasaland* (Russian ed.; Moscow, 1965), p. 31.

market extremely narrow and thereby to create the basis for a mono-cultural economy in which the entire nation's labour force would produce surpluses in a branch that could not be realized on the domestic market and could not be fulfilled by the United Kingdom herself.

This was the beginning of Malawi's economic structure of total dependence on British capital and initiative. It reduced the socially balanced and self-sufficient indigenous people of Malawi to pawns in a market economy which was to disrupt their traditional pattern of work, leisure, and consumption. The problem with a market economy, as Marshall D. Sahlins once wrote, is that "It makes available a dazzling array of products, good things in unlimited quantity and variety, each with its clarion price-tag call A man's reach is then inevitably beyond his grasp, for one never has enough to buy everything Before the judgement of the market, the consumer stands condemned to scarcity, and so to a life sentence of hard labour."⁹

OWNERSHIP, CURRENCY AND EXPLOITATION

One tends to think of ownership and exploitation in terms of complex industrial and mining concerns. There was no industrial development in Malawi. Instead, exploitation was rampant in the agricultural sector. It was not simply that the European sector engaged African farm labour for token wages, but that the white settlers imposed a feudal bond on people who occupied the land by historical and tribal right. Overnight, the Africans were transformed into tenants, obliged to give free labour to an alien landlord in return for the right to reside on land which had been arbitrarily taken from them in the name of a remote sovereign. Their labour was demanded by the landowner at the peak cultivation period, preventing African peasants from cultivating crops for their own families. The cash crops they were instructed to grow on allocated land could be sold only to the landowner at the price dictated by him.

Such arrangements were officially recognized by the colonial government in Malawi under different names, but the differences were only theoretical. In the Southern Region, the system was called *thangata*, which in the local dialect means help, but such assistance was extracted from Africans at a cost of determined anti-colonial struggle. In the Central Region there was a 'visiting' system which implied that the African family would stay only for a limited time. In practice, the estate owner would provide the African with implements, fertilizer and perhaps food and other subsidies to help him with crop cultivation until the end of the season when these 'favours' were to be repaid. Very often they were not, simply for the reason that the price paid by the landowner for the harvest was far too low—so low that it was not only below the market value, but also less than the production cost of the crop.

Once an African was in perpetual debt, he found himself under total subjugation and servitude. He had no union, could not strike, demand price

⁹ Marshall D. Sahlins, *Tribesmen, Foundations of Modern Anthropology Series* (University of Michigan, 1968), p. 77.

increases or leave the estate. He was driven to that point of political impotence, without a whip, by legal enactments and force of necessity. If he did not work to clear his crop deficit, the landlord could evict his family and prosecute him. Commenting on this kind of coercion, Marx wrote:

Rent in Kind is the prevailing and dominant form of ground-rent. It is furthermore always more or less accompanied by survivals of the earlier forms, i.e., of rent paid directly in labour, no matter whether the landlord be a private person or the state.¹⁰

In the Crown Lands, irrespective of income, an African had to pay poll or hut tax. The District Administration (Natives) Ordinance of 1912 gave the Resident the power to concentrate the native population where necessary, in organized villages of not less than 20 huts, and to disallow the erection of isolated huts.¹¹ The African chief, who was traditionally the symbolic head in his society, was induced to be the tax-collector. In 1918 he received ten shillings for every 300 taxes collected for the colonial power. In 1957, approximately £1,900,000 was handed over in hut taxes. Evidently, the chiefs did the collecting conscientiously for the more villagers they could extract taxes from, the higher their own annuities, and the more Africans who would be obliged to look for paid employment in order to pay their taxes. The chiefs were also said to be responsible for administrative work, maintenance of discipline, apprehending criminals, and so forth. They did not, in most cases, have the consent of their communities to do so.

In the traditional tax of the primitive¹² society, the chief, acting as a kind of banker, used the reserves in a time of dire need only, and then for the equal benefit of everyone in his community. By contrast, the colonial taxation was being used to bribe chiefs and to finance a colonial administration in the interests of exploitation. Relating such a tax to that kind of rent which peasants paid in labour, Marx wrote:

Under direct subordination to a state which stands over them as a sovereign, their rent and taxes coincide, or rather, there exists no tax which differs from this form of ground rent.¹³

During the Second World War, compulsory labour was added to the British exploitation of the African population of Malawi. They were forced to serve in the European agricultural sectors at home and in the military fronts outside Malawi. During the years 1939-1945, more than 30,000 indigenous people of Malawi were serving in an imperialist war,¹⁴ while European settlers who remained in Malawi were able to take advantage of the war situation to compel Africans to labour on their land.

Though a tiny part of the global British Empire, Malawi was exploited

10 Karl Marx, *Capital*, "Genesis of Capitalist Ground Rent," III (1962 ed.; Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House), p. 775.

11 Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Territories* (London: Colonial Office, 1950), Part II, p. 27.

12 I use the term 'primitive' in its economic sense, a symbol of a certain historic stage with its low mode of production.

13 Marx, *Capital*, III, p. 771.

14 *East Africa*, 17 May 1945, p. 875.

not a little, but to the maximum. Any monetary association between a big and a small power tends to act in favour of the first. As in all colonized countries, the currency of the overseas sovereign was foisted on the indigenous people without their wish or consent. The disadvantages are obvious:

- (a) the reserves are kept abroad, together with foreign exchange,
- (b) the colonial country can control expenditure if it wishes.

Britain used this prerogative, during the Second World War for instance, to obtain what were, in effect, interest-free loans.

At that time, military expenditure absorbed a significant part of the Malawi budget. Any economies realized through saving on expenditure, however had to be surrendered to the British Treasury. Accordingly, Malawi refunded at the beginning of 1945, £500,000 sterling, which was three-quarters of the mid-yearly total budgetary expenditure. A further advantage to Britain, especially when she resorted to currency control, was that her colonies could bolster the dollar pool in London.

There are several theories purporting to justify the keeping of national currencies in foreign reserves. Professor R. Triffin considered that:

... most of these countries keeping reserves of foreign currencies pick out the one that appears to be the most reliable; and that happens to be the currency of the leading creditor countries, i.e., Britain in the past, and the United States, primarily, at present.¹⁵

It appears that Professor Triffin views the position as a pragmatic choice. Professor A. Frumkin detects a more traditional tendency:

In the past, the sterling bloc was based primarily on the direct colonial rule of British imperialism, while at present its existence is associated with the continuing considerable role of Britain in the economy, foreign trade, etc.¹⁶

Whatever the theoretical explanation, the total currency dependence of Malawi on Britain has elevated the former direct colonial rule to neo-colonial status. There are several facts to prove this point, but the most poignant is the November 1967 devaluation of Malawi's pound at the time and parity of the English devaluation. The problem of monetary and financial crises must be seen in relation to the overall economic commitments which the Banda regime undertook, especially the export of Malawi's human labour to South Africa and Rhodesia and her pattern of trade which is dominated by reactionary countries. There was no need from an economic point of view for Malawi to devalue in 1967 since its economy was already being slowly infused by revenue from those countries which were not even affected by the devaluation. Similarly, when Britain changed to decimal currency on February 15, 1971, Malawi blindly followed suit. In place of the former pound, she adopted two new units, the *Kwacha* and the *Tambala*. The choice of name of the former is interesting in that *kwacha*, which in Chinyanja dialect (an official language in Malawi) means dawn, once had been a political slogan of both the Nyasa-

15 R. Triffin as quoted in A. Frumkin, *Modern Theories of International Economic Relations* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 198.

16 A. Frumkin, *Modern Theories of International Economic Relations* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 298.

land African Congress and the Malawi Congress Party (the ruling party in Malawi). But it was Zambia which first adopted the name for her currency, to the embarrassment of the Banda regime. But if Malawi had wished, she need not have waited for the British and Zambian initiative to adopt decimal currency. Logically, it would have been economical for Malawi to make the change during the early years of her independence, thus easing accounting problems in the trade transactions with countries of the world other than Britain.

Since the colonization of Malawi by Britain, the communal agricultural system which was destroyed has not been replaced by a highly developed mode of production: it remains half-feudal and semi-capitalist and closely tied to the colonial system of exploitation, keeping the people backward and poor and oblivious to their potential productive and political power.

FEDERAL MEMBERSHIP (1953-1963)

The ten year period in which Malawi formed part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland also consolidated the system of colonial exploitation. The British Parliament in July 1953, enacted laws which forced Malawi into the the federal system of government, the other members being Zambia and Rhodesia. Together they constituted the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, commonly known as the Central African Federation.

While the idea of federation itself is quite a progressive one, in this case it served the political and economic interests of British imperialism. The white landowners in Malawi used the federal structure not only to strengthen their position, but to bring their land policies into line with Rhodesia's, where African people had virtually no land rights.

We have seen that Malawi's economy depended on Britain. During the federal period it came also to depend on Rhodesia. This political and economic enslavement was facilitated by federation. Although the federal structure allowed for division of responsibility between the three territorial Governments and the Federal Government, it also gave the major powers to tax personal income and corporate profits and to levy customs and excise duties to the Federal Government. While territorial Governments retained the right to levy certain taxes on their own account, their share in the federal tax receipts was the major source of income. Under the original contract, federal collections of income were to be allocated among the territories as follows: Zambia, 17 per cent; Rhodesia, 13 per cent; Malawi, 6 per cent. The Federal Government was authorized to retain 64 per cent for its own purposes.¹⁷

Of the three kinds of taxes raising most federal and territorial revenue (company tax, direct income and poll tax, indirect taxes on goods and services), that which claimed the largest contribution from both races was the tax on corporate profits. The simplest arithmetic can show that the copper belt was the financial backbone of the federal fiscal structure. In the financial year

¹⁷ Colin Lays and Cranford Pratt. *A New Deal in Central Africa* (London, 1960), p. 83.

1956-1957, the Zambian copper companies paid £32,000,000 in taxes.¹⁸ Only £11,000,000 of this total was collected by the Zambian Government (through its share of federal tax collections and through its territorial surcharge on corporate profits). Thus, the remaining £21,000,000, the profit which came from predominantly African labour, accrued to other Governments. The Federal Government retained £16,000,000 as its share—a sum amounting to more than 60 per cent of its income tax receipts for that year. Clearly, one territory, Zambia, and one industry within that territory, copper, had made the major contribution to the whole Federation, and especially to the white racists in Rhodesia who dominated it.

While it may be argued that both races help to create the production surplus that is taxed, it may also be said that the tax represents relatively more for the African in relation to his extremely low wages. The African consumer also came to be exposed to the burden of indirect taxation, proportionately high in relation to his limited budget. In the 1955-1956 budget, taxes on low-grade cigarettes, purchased almost exclusively by African smokers, were raised. When customs duties were increased on imported garments in the 1956-1957 budget, the Minister of Finance emphasized that these duties were "aimed at the very cheapest garments."¹⁹ At the same time, prices were rising on consumer goods, and during the federation period hut tax receipts in Malawi were increased by £250,000.

These moves highlight the federal policy of aiming to take money from the pockets of the African people in order to dominate and oppress them.

The scope of this essay does not allow me to analyse the realities of the Malawi economy within the orbit of the Central African Federation since it would require investigating the three economies which formed the Federation (Malawi, Rhodesia, and Zambia). But it is necessary to point out that throughout the federal period, the colonists followed a line of development which was to the advantage of Rhodesia and exploited to the maximum the human and natural resources of the two partner states of Malawi and Zambia. This tendency was particularly strengthened during the last years of the Federation when mounting opposition from the masses, especially in Malawi, prodded capitalists to reap their lucrative profit before the political climate changed.

With the threat of the possible secession of Malawi and Zambia from the Federation to become fully independent African states, all important economic activities and infrastructures were concentrated in Rhodesia. Starting in the first instance with the famous Kariba Hydro-Electric Power Station (a dam on the Zambezi River), it became the systematic policy of Welensky's imperialism to water-down rival projects on neighbouring territory. There were, for instance, economic and technical reasons to favour developing—rather than Kariba Dam—either Zambia's Kafue project or Malawi's Liwonde-Band project for power generation. Political considerations of the federal colonialists, however, outweighed these advantages and, despite the claim that economic

¹⁸ Sir Ronald Prain, *East Africa and Rhodesia* (London), 13 November 1958, p. 331.
¹⁹ "Budget Summary," *Federal Newsletter* (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland), 28 June 1956, p. 10.

benefits would accrue to all three territories, the authorities did not even plan for an electric line from Kariba to Malawi. Other ventures indicating the same bias were the extensions to the steel mill foundry at Que-Que, the establishment of a huge chemical plant for fertilizers near Salisbury, and new machines for copper miners. Indeed, in the light of its function, it would not be rash to suggest that the sole reason the Federation had been created was to strengthen the exploitation of Malawi and Zambia in the interests of the capitalists and settlers of Rhodesia.

If we can take inter-territorial trade as an example, we find that Malawi was always lagging. Imports into Malawi from Zambia and Rhodesia in 1961 were worth £9,000,000 and consisted of textiles, clothes, shoes, and other food products, while Malawi's exports to Rhodesia and Zambia in the same year were worth only £1,500,000.²⁰ The system of exchange within the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland enriched one member, Rhodesia, and robbed the other two member states of human resources and raw materials.

Malawi is an agrarian country producing mainly tobacco and tea. Tea in Malawi accounts for nearly 40 per cent of the income from all agricultural products. Although Malawi tea was of the highest quality, Malawians were obliged to buy within the home market a third grade tea from Rhodesia at high prices. The 'Green Gold' Malawi tea was exported outside the country. Africans received no benefits from this because the tea plantations in the regions of Chipinga-Chola, Mlanje and Blantyre all belong to white settler capitalists and the factories which process tea, tobacco, and coffee belong to the same settlers.

Rhodesia exported to Malawi those products of low quality which could be sold at monopolistic high prices with the aim of strengthening economic and political domination. The federal powers also encouraged the immigration of those types of European who had no qualifications, but took positions as local clerks and typists in the federal administration and other bureaucracies.

Although in the constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland there was no formal limitation to an African becoming a Minister of Parliament, not until after the first seven years of the Federation's existence, in 1959, was an African even nominated to the post of Parliamentary Secretary. This move was undoubtedly made to placate mounting international criticism that the Federation was marching on the same path of apartheid as the South African regime. The British imperialists were anxious to convince the world that the policy of partnership between the races in the Federation was working. It should not be forgotten, however, that the appointment of an African to such a high post was carefully entrusted to a man who could be relied upon to echo European interests.

The federal Prime Minister himself had declared, while debating the laws for the Civil Service, that: "It is unrealistic to imagine that Africans are to have the same rights as the Europeans." In practice, the Federal Civil Services were divided into four categories: the first reserved to Europeans, the second

²⁰ *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 24 January 1965, p. 448.

mainly for Europeans but with provision for an African élite, and the third and fourth for Africans alone. This system existed despite the fact that Chapter II, Statute 40 of the Constitution explicitly stated that no person could be deprived of the opportunity of joining the Federal Civil Services on account of his racial origin.

The Executive Council was composed only of white settlers, the representatives of the reactionary and fascist United Federal Party, whose aim was to eliminate African influence. This Government of settlers enjoyed great support from Britain, which surrendered to them the fate of the 7,500,000 African people. The settlers were given absolute control over them and their resources when the British Government agreed in 1957 to grant full responsibilities to the federalists in all external dealings. The British Government even went to the extent of defending the Federal Government when, in 1959, the House of Commons debated the expatriation of some Labour Opposition members from the Federation as 'prohibited immigrants', concluding that this action was entirely within the competence of the Federal Government.

The Federal Government passed a series of discriminatory laws as a means of completely dominating, politically, economically and socially, the peoples of Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. It is important to know how the people who passed these discriminatory laws came to be in the racist Parliament.

There were two categories of voting rights: an 'ordinary roll' and a 'special roll'. The world was made to understand that this distinction did not depend on race, but the composition of Parliament reveals the racial discrepancy. The Federal Parliament, in accordance with Statute 9 of the Constitution of 1953, was composed of 35 members: 26 Europeans and 6 Africans (2 for each territory) and 3 Europeans as so-called representatives of African interests.

In order to qualify as a voter on the common roll, the voter was required to have a yearly income of £720 (or ownership of property equivalent to £1,500) or yearly income of £480 (property worth £1,000) and so on. In order to qualify on the special roll the voter was to have a yearly income of £150 (property £500) or secondary education. The first elections for the Federal Assembly were held in December 1953. Out of 66,979 voters who registered only 440 were Africans and none were from Malawi.

In July 1957, the Federal Assembly enacted a law to change the Federal Constitution. Under the new constitution there were to be 59 Members of Parliament, 44 Europeans and 12 Africans with provision again for three Europeans to represent African interests in the three territories. Since Africans were allowed no active interest in the Federation at all, it was farcical to expect Europeans to protect that which did not exist. That this situation was created and defended by Whitehall was not only a mockery of democracy, but tantamount to dictatorship because even if there had been an honest effort to consider African interests, there were Africans capable enough to represent themselves. The real problem, though, was not merely that of neglecting to promote African interests, but of a Federal set-up which exploited, dominated,

and seized those interests for the enrichment of white settlers, predominantly in Rhodesia.

This injustice is obvious if one considers the obstacles to African enfranchisement. Given the financial criteria for voting, the number of Africans who could qualify was only a few hundred. In 1958 the average annual income of a European was £1,100, while Africans working in the mines earned about £80 and those engaged in agriculture less than £40. It is obvious, too, that with only 35,000 African pupils attending secondary schools in 1959, for example, even fewer of their elders could meet the educational requirements for voting. These factors allowed the situation to arise whereby the Europeans of the Federation, who were 3.7 per cent of its population, elected 80 per cent of the Federal Assembly. Africans, 95.8 per cent of the population, could hardly qualify to vote as long as the Federation existed. The following table shows how the voters were distributed according to the 'common' and 'special' rolls in the federal elections of November 1958:

Table I—DISTRIBUTION OF VOTERS 1958

Territory	Common registration		Special registration		All voters
	Europeans Asians Coloureds	Africans	Europeans Asians Coloureds	Africans	
Rhodesia	64,092	1,000	176	628	65,896
Zambia	20,413	39	47	53	20,552
Malawi	2,500	—	9	11	2,520
All	87,005	1,039	232	692	88,968

Sources: U.A. Udin, *Federatsi Rhodesi i Nyasaland* (Moscow, 1965), p. 31. For further details see *Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (London, September 1960), especially Chapter 6.

In the above table we can observe that out of all the 88,968 voters only 1,731 were Africans—less than 2 per cent of all voters registered. In Malawi, which led the opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, no voter was on the common roll. Of the 11 voters with special registration, five were the wives of Africans destined to be handpicked by the Federal Assembly for nomination as African representatives.

The birth of Malawi as an independent state started in the conflict between the opposing forces of African nationalism and colonial suppression. It had not been accidental that the first demands of the National Liberation Movement in Malawi had been for absolute secession from the Federation for it was Malawi which supplied the emigrants to man the mines of the other two territories. No comparable productive development took place in Malawi while the Federation existed. Instead, Malawi's debts, poverty, ignorance,

disease and servitude plagued its people until it became clear that such injustice could not continue. The Federation was dissolved on December 31, 1963.

The British claimed that the Federation had been peacefully dissolved; the white settlers in Central Africa accused them of having sentenced the Federation of their own creation to death. But for the emerging African nations, the end of colonial rule seemed to be inevitable and irrevocable because of the conflicting social forces it generated. Economic development under British leadership had been sharply contradictory: the paper profits earned by extraction of raw materials had been expatriated, and little was left for the African workers—underpaid, exploited and isolated from their own families. The only development, if one can call it development at all, was the strengthening of their dependence on white patronage.

If it had been allowed to continue, the disparity between the economic and political potential of Africans and Europeans would have grown to proportions already realized in the Republics of South Africa and Rhodesia. The irony is that the disparity did not disappear, on the contrary, it sharpened further in Malawi with the coming of political independence on July 6, 1964.²¹

POLITICAL STRUGGLE

The growth of nationalism in Malawi was hindered, as in other African countries, by the readiness of the chiefs to be cajoled into signing documents which they did not understand. Chief Kapeni of the Yao, for example, 'sold' more than 3,000 acres for a gun, 32 yards of calico, two red caps, and "other things". With a missionary he also exchanged 26,000 acres for about 1,750 yards of calico. We can only surmise that chiefs like Kapeni looked upon such exchanges in the context of traditional custom where gifts are exchanged as tokens of friendship. They did it in the spirit that, if friends make gifts, gifts make friends. The settlers and missionaries preferred the view that gifts make slaves.

As the class of landless Africans grew, and the colonial government introduced taxation as early as the 1890s in the Shire Highlands to call Africans to work on the estates, the taxation of Africans came to substantially subsidize colonial expenses:

In 1913, more than one million Africans were said to supply about 70 per cent of the annual revenue of the protectorate; they also produced the crops grown by the country's approximately 100 planters, and made life more comfortable for the approximately 200 missionaries and 100 administrators who had effectively become their masters.²²

²¹ The fact that the 6th July was particularly selected to be the date for independence of Malawi is not a coincidence. It was the date when Banda returned home after more than 40 years abroad; this further reflects the egoist tendency of identifying all national achievements to his personal glory.

²² Robert I. Rotberg, *Strike a Blow and Die . . . A Narrative of Race Relations in Colonial Africa*, with an Introduction by George Simeon Mwase (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).

If this point, on the eve of World War I, be taken as the time of transition to the most violent phase in Malawi's racial upheaval and injustice, we may try to sketch in brief the events which contributed to it in the light of national consciousness. It was during this period that John Chilembwe, having established a mission station in his district of Chiradzulu, observed all sorts of injustices done to his people by the colonial administration, European missionaries and plantation owners.²³

In the year of Chilembwe's return, 300 Malawi native troops of the Central African Regiment were sent to the Gold Coast (Ghana) in the British campaign against the Ashanti. Earlier, Nyasa soldiers from Malawi had been used as garrison troops and in many campaigns against rebellious tribal elements in Mauritius, while another contingent had gone to Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) to oppose the recalcitrant Lunda chief, Kazembe. Chilembwe began to protest against African military recruitment. On behalf of those who lost parents or husbands in the Ashanti War, he demanded compensation for the families of African soldiers killed in action for the defence and consolidation of British colonial territory. He objected to the Government's policy of forcing widows of such soldiers to pay tax. But his pleas did not stop the deaths of more than 150 more of Malawi's native soldiers who fought with the British in the 'Mad Mullah' campaigns against Somalis. The Malawi survivors returned to Zomba in 1904.

An old woman had come 80 miles to welcome back her six sons! Standing amid the cheering crowds she saw the troops march past and inquired about her boys. She then learned for the first time that all of them had been killed.

The report, in the journal of the Blantyre Mission, continued with comment:

War has its price of sorrow even for the untutored African who takes his unwittingly in the burden of the Empire. And there still remains the question to be answered: Is it right?²⁴

World War I had begun, and Malawi bordered Tanzania where Germans were recruiting Africans. Chilembwe foresaw the inevitable. Not content to have a million Malawians in servitude to the hundred-odd European planters, two hundred missionaries, and hundred colonial administrators, the British were willing to embroil their African subjects in a colonial dispute, ostensibly with Germans but in reality with black brothers from across the River Songwe. In the action of September 9-10, 1914 on the border at the northern end of Lake Malawi, about 400 rifles on each side were engaged in heavy fighting and suffered heavy casualties in the dense forest around Karonga. The King's African Rifles of Nyasaland lost 60 men, 49 Africans and 11 whites; the German Army of Tanganyika lost 112, more than a hundred being African.²⁵

23 For full details of the Chilembwe uprising see George Shepperson and Thomas Price, *Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and the Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915* (1958 ed; Edinburgh University Press), especially Chapters V and VI.

24 See *ibid.*, p. 143.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 233.

Chilembwe then protested in a long, famous letter published in the local *Times*, and concluded thus:

... Let the rich men, bankers, titled men, storekeepers, farmers, and landlords go to war and get shot. Instead the poor Africans who have nothing to own in this present world, who in death, leave only a long line of widows and orphans in utter want and dire distress are invited to die for a cause which is not theirs ... We leave all for the consideration of the government ... and hope that things will turn out well and that the government will recognize our indispensability, and that justice will prevail.²⁶

John Chilembwe was killed in the 1915 Nyasaland uprising together with many of his followers. His death inspired in the people the determination, courage, and patriotism to spark fresh resistance to foreign rule and imperialism. It was as Nelson Mandela submitted in defence of himself and others accused in the Revonia trial in 1964:

The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices—submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom.²⁷

That time had come to Malawi, too. The myth of Chilembwe lived on and the National Liberation Movement was conceived. That it waited for another world war to pass before giving birth to the Nyasaland African Congress can be accounted for by the policy of the Government in recognizing the principal headman as the only authentic voice of the African people.

The initiative was taken in 1924 by Frederick Gresham Njilima, son of Duncan Njilima who had been executed for his part in the Chilembwe rebellion, writing on behalf of the South Nyasa Native Association to the Chief Secretary of the Phelps-Stokes Educational Commission which was at the time visiting Malawi:

[We are] aware of the fact that education in Nyasaland is in a lower stage than that of any other British possession. [We take] this opportunity of assuring [you] that every member of this body is ready to support and to follow [you] to better this condition.²⁸

By 1933 there were no less than 15 different associations to keep the few educated Nyasas contentedly occupied in debate according to the British conventions of the day. Their constitutional approaches could not be turned into a genuinely popular mass movement towards radical change since their membership was limited to the educated élite. The result was that when the first meeting of the Nyasaland African Association was convened by J. F. Sangala in January 1944, it issued a memorandum which unconsciously echoed the standpoint of Chilembwe before World War I:

26 *Nyasaland Times* (Blantyre), 23 April 1914. The full text is reprinted in Shepperson and Price, *Independent African*, op. cit., pp. 234-235 and in Robert I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

27 Nelson Mandela, *No Easy Walk to Freedom* (London, 1965), p. 169.

28 Robert I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, op. cit., p. 119.

. . . In conclusion, we beg to state that we have served loyally in any war which His Majesty . . . has asked our boys to serve and we think this is the time that we should ask for justice [so] that our boys and girls may enjoy the freedom of being part and parcel . . . of a British Empire. We cannot go on allowing our country becoming a labour centre for the neighbouring territories. We must have justice done . . . We ask you to give us the right to speak for our people, be it in the Mission Councils or in the bodies that govern our country . . . We have paid the price and it must be compensated accordingly . . . It is not a question of being ungrateful but seventy years of patience is a very long time to wait.²⁹

The Nyasaland African Congress was inaugurated in October 1944. The various associations were automatically incorporated into the Congress, which undertook to "agitate and advocate by just and constitutional means against any discrimination." They elected Levi Mumba as the first president, and other office bearers were leaders of the same associations: J. F. Sangala, Charles Matinga, Charles Mlanga, Lewis Bandawe, L. S. Makata. The Congress, in turn, created other affiliated associations—the women's movement, trade unions and chiefs' councils.

The task before the Congress was to distil the political consciousness for the transition into a mass liberation movement capable of fighting for its freedom. With the onset of further oppression under the Federation, the first part was achieved, but Congress was still not capable of creating a revolutionary strategy, nor of finding a leader in its own ranks to head the struggle. It was at an emergency conference that Congress resorted to the idea of importing a leader, and in early 1957, Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda who had lived 40 years in the United States, Britain and Ghana was officially invited to return to his country and assume its leadership. The fact that he abandoned his 'business' in Ghana to return home in July 1958 when called upon was interpreted by many as a selfless act and proof of his patriotism. Others maintained that no true patriot would sit idly waiting for a letter of invitation. Masauko Chipembere criticized Banda as a 'foreigner' who, having been absent 43 years, did not have the knowledge of the Malawi people and their aspirations to be a good leader.³⁰ The view that a revolutionary leader might emerge only after an extremely complicated and close contact with his people is akin to Marx's concept that the educator must be educated.

The people of Malawi could not wait. They resorted to spontaneous and sporadic violence in the last months of 1958 while Congress urged a peaceful policy and the police shot at random. By early 1959 the colonial Government could not control the situation, the Governor admitting that his administration was on the point of abdicating its responsibility unless it was reinforced. European territorial forces of 6,000 men were then mobilized in Rhodesia.³¹ On March 3, 1959 the colonial Government declared a state of Emergency and banned the Nyasaland African Congress under the orders of the Governor, Sir Robert Armitage.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 191.

³⁰ H. B. Masauko Chipembere, *My Malawian Ancestors* (mimeographed; August 1969), p. 3.

³¹ Lays and Cranford, *A New Deal in Central Africa*, op. cit., p. 83.

Under the Five-Year Economic Plan which was due to end in three months, airports had been improved for such a contingency and large military planes were able to land. As mass arrests were made, these aircraft flew detainees to the Rhodesian jails of Khami (Bulawayo) and Marandellas (near Salisbury). The recent port extensions on Lake Malawi allowed the ship *Ilala*, to berth at Nkata Bay to take on prisoners who were ferried from Karonga to Chipoka.

As the arrests were made of more than 1,300 members of the Nyasaland African Congress, from its president down to local branch chairmen and active supporters, Africans clashed with the Armed Forces and the Police. Many arrests were brutal³² and troops, flown in from Rhodesia, were used "to cow the population in troublesome areas" by employing a good deal of physical violence on villagers rounded up for interrogation.³³ Fifty-one deaths were officially reported and by mid-August 1959, 134 Africans had been convicted and sentenced for periods ranging from six months to ten years for their actions during the Emergency.

In its report to the British Government, the Devlin Commission stressed the popular basis of the demonstrations against the Government, stating that it was not even open to question. Politicians, chiefs, and peasants in the crowds with their sticks and stones were, in the opinion of the Commission and of virtually all observers present during the Emergency, united against the Federation and in support of the Congress.³⁴

The political maturity of the Malawi masses is borne out by the overwhelming response to the formation of a new movement, the Malawi Congress Party, to replace the banned Nyasaland African Congress. Within two days, 2,000 members were enrolled. By the end of 1959 there were 15,000, and in early 1960 one-sixth of Malawi's population, 500,000 people, were registered supporters.

What was remarkable in this was that without military organization, which was denied them, the masses had nevertheless dealt the blow that awakened world opinion. Denouncements from such state leaders as Nkrumah (Ghana), Nehru (India), Nasser (United Arab Republic), Toure (Guinea) and Nyerere (Tanzania) were unequivocal. Political prisoners, the president of the Congress Party, Dr. Banda, and others must be released and then the people of Malawi should be allowed to decide their own future, said these leaders.

Malawi gained independence in 1964. Half a century had passed since John Chilembwe's letter published in *The Nyasaland Times* posed the question: ". . . We ask the Honourable Government of our country which is known as Nyasaland, will there be any good prospects for the Natives after the end of the War?"

Yet the war to liquidate colonialism in all its manifestations, economic, political and cultural, was not over. Foreign hands, black and white, continued

³² *Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances* (Devlin Commission), CMD 814 (London, 1959), paras. 187-189, 191-196.

³³ Ibid., paras. 275-276.

³⁴ Ibid., paras. 40-43.

to meddle with Malawi's resources. Her labour and minerals could not enrich the masses, for between them and the old colonial interests stood the relics of the bureaucratic and ineffective Congress, and the Party which superseded it soon decayed into a corrupt and privileged élite under Dr. Banda's leadership. Today, Malawi is a typical example of a neo-colonial state.

NEO-COLONIAL ECONOMY

Malawi's people fought for political independence as a means of transforming the country's colonial economy into a pattern which could benefit the majority. As the move to self-determination was spreading throughout Africa, Britain realized the necessity of relinquishing her colonies and of finding another means to exploit Africa's resources. This came to be known as neo-colonialism, and in Malawi it is rampant. Of the many definitions of the term, probably that of Nkrumah, himself a victim of neo-colonialism, is the most revealing:

. . . the state which is subjected to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trapping of international sovereignty. In reality its economic power and thus its political policy is directed from outside . . . The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed country . . . The rulers of neo-colonial states derive their authority to govern, not from the will of the people, but from support which they obtain from their neo-colonial masters.³⁵

When Britain opened discussion on a constitution for Malawi, the leaders of the Nyasaland African Congress were still in prison. Though the Party had advocated a peaceful policy during the disturbances, there were indications that its president would in the future face opposition to his moderate line. The press seized the opportunity to project Banda as a hero of his people, and called for his release from detention in Gwelo Prison. It is possible that his premature release was premeditated, for when Banda emerged into the limelight, and while he participated in preliminary negotiations with the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr Ian Macleod), the other leaders of the Congress Party were kept in confinement five months more.

There were five groups participating in drawing up the Constitution of Malawi: the Colonial Office, headed by the Minister of State for the Colonies, the colonial Government in Malawi headed by the colonial Governor, the white settlers headed by Michael Blackwood with the Nyasaland division of Welensky's United Federal Party, the Malawi Congress Party headed by H. K. Banda and a very small group called the Liberation Party headed by T. D. T. Banda. The document which emerged from this Constitutional Conference held in London in November 1962 included the following items:

1. Financial measures and measures affecting the Public Service may not be introduced into the Legislative Council without the consent of the Governor in his discretion.

35 Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London, 1965), Introduction

2. The Governor has a general reserved power to legislate by certifying that any bill introduced into the Legislative Council has been passed, whether or not it has been submitted to the vote or received the support of the majority of the Council.
3. The power to assent or refuse assent to bills is exercised by the Governor in his discretion and he may reserve any bill for her Majesty's pleasure.
4. Her Majesty may disallow any law enacted by the Nyasaland Legislature.³⁶ As expected, Welensky sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who had said he would require to be satisfied that the necessary experience in working the constitution had been gained before recommending a further advance. He concluded:

We can now only wait and see how reasonably Banda and Malawi interpret the conference undertakings. They have not got off to an auspicious start with Banda's interpretation of the conference as meaning the break-up of the Federation.³⁷

Welensky and his settlers were somewhat suspicious of contacts between Banda and Macleod. Once United Federal Party settlers in Malawi asked the Colonial Secretary if he had formed any opinion about Dr. Banda and "was he likely to adopt a more moderate outlook?" According to Welensky, Macleod replied "that he had not hitherto met the Doctor, but from reading his speeches he had concluded that he was a vain little man . . . and he had not previously understood, and was astonished to discover that Banda was completely ignorant about the economic aspects of government."³⁸

In an interview with the right-wing West German newspaper *Die Welt*, Banda revealed his thinking on how to elicit funds for the underprivileged nations from Europe:

I think it is not only Germany that does that. The British, too you see—their enemies shout and, when their enemies shout, in order to win them they give them plenty of money . . . [To] those of us who do not shout, you do not give us much because you take us for granted. That is the trouble. It is not only the Germans. The British, too, and I would tell the British Government that to their face. Those of us who are their friends are quiet and are not shouting at them, and they give us very little. But those who shout and denounce them, they give them thousands.³⁹

Even without 'shouting', in 1964 Malawi received £10,250,000 from Britain, representing 65 per cent of the annual budget. In addition to a fixed £3,000,000 annual grant, Britain had invested £6,400,000 and cancelled £750,000 owing on a previous loan of £800,000. Malawi cannot survive without loans; Banda once told an annual conference for the Southern Region of the Malawi Congress Party: "No loan, no Malawi."

36 *Report of the Nyasaland Constitutional Conference*, CMD 1887 (London, November 1962), p. 14.

37 Sir Roy Welensky, *Welensky's 4000 Days* (London, 1964), p. 206.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 192.

39 Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda in an interview with Hans Germani, a correspondent for *Die Welt* and published in a press release issued by the Malawi Embassy in Bonn, No. 2/68, Ref. PUB/3/37.

The planned budget deficit in 1964 was £4,255,000.⁴⁰ In 1966, when Malawi became a republic within the Commonwealth of Nations, the planned deficit was about £5,500,000. By 1968, deficit spending had reached such proportions that Malawi sought about £17,000,000 in loans, obtaining half from the International Development Association, a fifth from Britain, and the rest from West Germany, Japan, and Denmark.⁴¹ Development was such that Malawi was committed to continuing to depend on foreign aid, so that economic take-off could not be in sight, let alone economic independence. In Tanzania this danger was foreseen in the Arusha Declaration:

It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know only too well that our country is poor. It is equally stupid, indeed it is more stupid, for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of our poverty through foreign financial assistance rather than our own financial resources We are mistaken when we imagine that we shall get money from foreign countries, firstly, because to say the truth we cannot get enough money for our development and, secondly, because even if we could get it, such complete dependence on outside help would have endangered our independence and the other policies of our country.⁴²

An outstanding example of the influence potentially wielded through private foreign investment is that of the British-owned Booker Bros. which virtually dominates the trade sector of Malawi through its subsidiary Kandodo. The fact that the Malawi Government holds a controlling share in Kandodo is not a safeguard against foreign influence. The role of a state sector in any economy depends on the structure and composition of the political party in power. Having a one-party system closely identified with one-man rule, Malawi had a state sector which, rather than serving community interests, acted as a guarantee of commercial protection and reciprocal trade for the foreign participants. Overseas companies solicited state shareholding. Such principles apply to the operations of the Malawi Development Corporation (M.D.C.), a limited liability company with its share capital of £1,100,000 held entirely by the Government. By the end of 1969, M.D.C. investment was provisionally estimated at £2,140,000, an increase of £466,000 on the previous year. During 1969, M.D.C. also extended its interest in tourism, and the projected cost of improving park facilities and hotels on the Lake Malawi foreshore was £385,000. The M.D.C. also took a controlling interest in the Development Finance Company of Malawi Ltd. (DEFINCO) which in 1969 raised £560,000, mostly from abroad. This was invested mostly in Portland Cement (Malawi) Ltd., The Leopard Match Company (Malawi) Ltd., and Amalgamated Packing Industries (Malawi) Ltd. which started in 1970.⁴³

Looking at the management of such companies, which still employ many Europeans, it is noticeable how little changed is the neo-colonial climate apart from outward appearances of civility and integration with staff. The purpose, allegedly, is to promote efficient production within the new political deploy-

⁴⁰ The Economic Intelligence Unit, No. 48 (London, 1964).

⁴¹ E. M. Kononov and Y. G. Lipetsi, *Malawi*, op. cit., p. 75.

⁴² *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance*, (Dar es Salaam: Publicity Section, TANU, 1967).

⁴³ Standard Bank, *Annual Economic Review, Malawi* (Special issue, May 1970), p. 10.

ment of power, but the danger of such integration of workers within the institutional processes engendered and directed by exploitation has been noted by the French philosopher Sartre as follows:

The worker exhausts himself in producing a car and in earning enough to buy one; this acquisition gives him the impression of having satisfied a 'need'. The system which exploits him provides him simultaneously with a goal and with the possibility of reaching it.⁴⁴

Nowhere was this more obvious than in the mines and factories of Rhodesia and South Africa where more than 60,000 Malawians were working in 1965. The fact that they remained there in conditions of slavery after the independence of Malawi is indicative of their cash inducement to work, just as they did for the original settlers under European domination. This system is being perpetuated by the failure of the Government to develop alternative employment in Malawi. To bridge her budget deficits and embark on a road to self-sufficiency and industrialization, Malawi must exploit the water resources of Lakes Malawi, Chilwa, Chiuta, and the Shire River and the mineral deposits now left in the ground. Such projects would accelerate economic growth and in the industrial sector create more jobs for jobless Malawians who have experience in the mines of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Zambia. This would effectively curtail the exodus of Malawi labour power to those countries. Instead, the Malawi Government contributed £62,500 as 38 per cent of the cost towards a United Nations Development Programme labour statistics unit at Blantyre which aims to analyse the earnings, savings, skills and period of repatriation of Malawi's migrant workers.⁴⁵ They are of two categories: those whose contracts were arranged by the Malawi Government, and those who travelled on their own to seek independent employment.

Table 2—DISTRIBUTION OF MALAWIAN MIGRANT WORKERS

		1956	1960	1965
Rhodesia	Contract	11,057	6,762	3,935
	Non-contract	39,701	29,662	17,903
	Total	50,758	36,424	21,838
Republic of South Africa	Contract	13,980	25,981	39,023
	Non-contract	1,536	2,630	291
	Total	15,516	28,611	39,314

Source: *Compendium of Statistics (Malawi Government, 1965)*, p. 8.

The economic advantages of labour export to the racist regimes of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia are:

⁴⁴ John-Paul Sartre in an interview with Rossanda Rossana published in "Masses, Spontaneity, Party," in *Socialist Register*, ed. by Ralph Miliband and John Saville (paperback ed., 1970), p. 238.

⁴⁵ "Malawi Boosts Human Export," *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), 26 February 1969.

1. Labourers from a low income country like Malawi will accept wages below ruling rates but above minimum wage scales in Malawi.
2. The arrival of ready-made workers represents a saving in social services for the racist republics since such costs as education, pensions and health, are borne by Malawi.
3. Families of migrant workers stay in Malawi, thereby remaining a social responsibility of the Malawi Government, and relieving the racist republics of the costs of social infrastructure such as housing, schools, hospitals and transport.
4. Immigrant labour contracts are short-term, lending more flexibility to the racist republics' African labour supply.

The political windfalls from labour export accrue to both sides:

1. The readiness of Malawians to accept lower wages than the Africans of South Africa and Rhodesia has a depressive effect on their ability to organize around economic issues. The white regimes therefore see the Malawi immigrant labour as an instrument to neutralize the working class of their own countries.
2. The short-term contract does not allow time for the Malawians to become integrated or initiated into local African politics, and they are segregated into camps where tribal identity is encouraged to keep the Africans divided and easily controlled by the white regimes.
3. The Malawi Government is relieved of the political embarrassment and possible consequences of widespread unemployment clogging the already swollen Malawi labour market.
4. Malawi is able to use the export of her labour force as collateral in gaining concessions in trade and spectacular gestures such as the £25,000,000 grant from the Republic of South Africa to pay for shifting the Malawi capital from Zomba to Lilongwe.

The cost of co-operation within the sterling currency zone of Africa is high for Malawi. There are arguments that the Malawi Government gains the foreign exchange earnings remitted by migrant workers to their families in Malawi, and that sum is considerable since well over 80,000 Malawians work in South Africa alone. It is estimated that in the years 1968-1971 the migrant sector as a whole contributed about £2,500,000 annually in foreign exchange earnings.⁴⁶ However, the propensity to consume luxury commodities retailed through European or Asian owned businesses is so high that it virtually cancels out the inflow of foreign exchange so far as the African community is concerned. In fact, it would not be rash to suggest that it is that community, the people of Malawi, who suffer the repercussions, rather than benefits arising from the sale of their labour. They are denied the opportunity of working directly for their own nation and of being with their families, and by sacrificing that opportunity and contributing to the property of racist regimes, they indirectly hinder the struggle of Africans elsewhere against apartheid.

Not only was the revolutionary spirit of Africans under white oppression

⁴⁶ Ibid.

and labour exploitation watered down by the presence of neutral Malawians under Government sponsored contracts, but in Malawi itself the Congress Party actively discouraged opposition to European interests. This first became evident from the confusion the Congress Party caused in its appeals for calm when the masses rose against Welensky's regime. This betrayal of the uprising weakened the Congress Party's bargaining position when Banda began negotiations from within Gwelo Prison on the new constitution. It was not coincidence that put heavy debts incurred during the Federation period onto the newly independent Malawi. While the number of Malawi labourers working abroad did decrease between 1960 and 1965 (many having abandoned their jobs within the Federation) the number of those working in the Republic of South Africa during the same period increased by 37 per cent, almost all of them working under controls arranged by the Government. It is obvious that no change in this policy is envisaged by the present Government since the labour survey undertaken with United Nations aid is charged with making projections of the expected labour force over a 10 to 15 year term and to assist in the administration of migrant labour schemes.⁴⁷ That Malawi under the Banda regime is being sold into a future of foreign dependence and debt has been clearly evident since the beginning, when on the eve of the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, she accepted the burden of the federal arrears, and Malawi's share of federal loans was £12,008,000.⁴⁸

The financial problems of Malawi continue with the shuffling of loan documents. Nobody knows when, how, and who is able to repay. In 1964 Malawi received £400,000 from the white racist regime of Rhodesia. But in the 15 months ending shortly after the First Five Year Plan had elapsed, external loan agreements had been signed by the Government for a total of more than £11,000,000, with an average interest rate of three per cent and average repayment periods of more than 34 years. Reporting this to Parliament in March 1970, Aleke Banda, who held the portfolios of finance, information, broadcasting and tourism, added that there were other loan agreements under negotiation. The planned expenditure for 1970/1971 was nearly £42,000,000, of which more than £19,000,000 was to be payments on development, the rest being on recurrent account. For the 15 months beginning January 1971, Britain was to give a development loan of £3,350,000; to meet the cost of constructing a tarred road from Blantyre via Chikwawa to the Mozambique border, Portugal was prepared to loan up to £2,500,000. Other benefactors were Denmark and West Germany. All the loans were considered to be on soft terms, with repayment of capital spread over 25 years at interest rates not exceeding four per cent.⁴⁹ At the same time, a Rhodesian newspaper concluded that the £200,000 grant voted in the Rhodesian Parliament during the 1970/1971 financial estimates to a "friendly African state" would most likely be Malawi.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ The Economic Intelligence Unit (London, May 1964), p. 13.

⁴⁹ *Malawi Embassy Bulletin* (Bonn: Embassy of the Republic of Malawi), 17 February 1970.

It has been suggested that the neo-colonial policy of Malawi is a product of her economic problems and that she has no choice but to bow to the minority regimes. This argument is not valid. The economic problems often arise from the expenses of upholding the regime by diverting foreign aid for military and police reinforcement and, above all, for technocrats' salaries, prestige projects and presidential palaces. It is impossible in these circumstances, with a leadership perpetuating itself and a heavy budget deficit, for Malawi to achieve any meaningful economic development. Her whole system of planning is geared to that of the neo-colonial powers—Britain, West Germany, South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia.

As an independent state, Malawi has the right to obtain aid from the socialist countries. While it may be true that some other African states have suffered under Soviet aid motivated by Soviet imperialism, there is no reason why this should affect economic relationships with smaller countries of the socialist camp. The credit is arranged directly between governments, enabling the recipient to strengthen the state sector of the economy and to change the inherited colonial economic pattern by laying the foundations for socialist reconstruction while making the task of planning easier. If Malawi is to struggle effectively to reduce her deficit and embark on a road to self-sufficiency and industrialization, she must be prepared to accept such aid.

Instead, it has become the policy of the Malawi Government to crush any move towards a collective economy. The cooperative societies which had grown strong under African management during colonialism have been dissolved. The Nkhotakota rice cooperative, one of the oldest and best organized, was among those which disappeared and the Nkhotakota people, whose lives and culture had been closely connected with this cooperative industry for many years, were left in poverty, misery and starvation, the prey of foreign exploitation.

A more recent example of the Congress Party's policy was the dissolution of MARTA (Malawi African Road Transport Association) by President Banda in February 1970. MARTA was a transport company owned and run by Africans who contributed their own vehicles to improve the transportation of agricultural produce from Lilongwe and other districts in the Central Region to the nearest railway station of Salima. It was a cooperative in which each member received a return according to his input. MARTA completely broke the monopoly of transport by British, Italian, South African, and Portuguese companies which repatriated their profits realized in Malawi. Rather than encourage MARTA, President Banda feared its success as a source of opposition to his regime, and he banned it on the pretext of mismanagement.⁵⁰ The dislike he personally has for anything remotely associated with communism is derived from his life in and admiration for the West. This is reflected in his readiness to rally to European interests, even at the expense of the welfare of his own people.

The development and economic ties of Malawi are inextricably bound to

50 H. Kamuzu Banda, speech as reported in *Malawi News* (Blantyre), 17 February 1970.

the European-dominated regions. The relationship with Rhodesia which began during the time of the Central African Council and was consolidated by the Federation, has not begun to wane since the unilateral declaration of independence by Salisbury. In fact, the trade balance still tilts very much in Rhodesia's favour.

Table 3—BALANCE OF TRADE BETWEEN MALAWI AND RHODESIA

	(Millions)		
Exports	1967	1968	1969
Rhodesian exports to Malawi	5.3	5.2	5.1
Malawian exports to Rhodesia	0.6	0.7	1.2

Source: Standard Bank, *Annual Economic Review* (Malawi, May 1970), p. 11.

In the case of the Republic of South Africa, the neo-colonial policy takes a different twist. It is South Africa's aim to try to improve relations with independent African states, very often in the form of technical assistance. In this way, the Malawi Government, including the security branch, police and military, is infiltrated by white South Africans. An Afrikaaner was seconded to the position of chief information officer in Malawi. The staff of the Malawi embassy in Pretoria were Europeans, headed by a former British civil servant, P. A. Richardson.⁵¹ South African strategy was revealed in an editorial of the South African *Financial Gazette* of May 10, 1968:

We must build more bridges and less forts. The might of our armed forces are not enough to shield off hostilities still being built up against South Africa in some African states. We must build more bridges into Africa. In Malawi we have virtually spanned a bridge into the heart of Africa.⁵²

The building of a bridge into Malawi is very apparent from the exchange visits between the two countries. The most historic⁵³ one is that which President Banda paid to South Africa in 1971; he was the first African leader to do so. Although Banda claimed that his visit was merely a matter of contacts, the fact remains that his visit to South Africa necessitates his playing to the tune of South African racists in view of the economic aid which Malawi receives to build prestige projects. On the contrary, the South African Nationalist Government viewed this action as a triumph of its outward policy. Commenting on this point, John Miller, reporting from Pretoria, stated that:

51 The Richardson drama is quite clear. While working to convince Vorster about Banda's intentions, his overall mission seemed to be to guarantee the supremacy of British imperialism over the southern African area. After his mission, Richardson declared "... I have done my job." He continued "... I have strongly recommended to Dr. Banda that my post be filled by an African." Banda (as expected) took Richardson's advice (especially when his plan to pay a visit there was in the offing) and appointed Joe Kachingwe as an African Malawi Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa though he had previously experienced racial discrimination while a junior member of the embassy staff in Pretoria. *The Star* (Johannesburg, Weekly Air Edition), 5 June 1971.

52 *Financial Gazette* (South Africa), 10 May 1968.

53 *This is Malawi* (Malawi Government Printer), I, No. 5 (September 1971).

The visit is considered to be a breakthrough for the Nationalist Government's "outward policy" of befriending black African states, although Dr. Banda has said his policy is to "kill apartheid with kindness". . . .⁵⁴

The policy of dialogue is in fact unpopular in Malawi and other African states. Madagascar, for instance, has been a good lesson to South Africa, where the new Government of General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, which took over after the collapse of the old regime of Philibert Tsiranana, declared through its Foreign Minister, Lieutenant Commander Didier Ratsiraka that Madagascar was cancelling the convention under which South Africa was to build a five-star hotel on the island of Nossi-be.⁵⁵

The reaction following Madagascar's popular revolution was regarded in South Africa as a great setback for the South African outward policy. The Foreign Minister Dr. Hilgard Muller is quoted as saying: "I don't know what to do. . . . We have made progress in many fields. I will have to see how this could be affected including whether certain contracts can still be met."⁵⁶ Mr. Japie Basson, the United Party's chief spokesman on foreign affairs, described the snub to South Africa as a very serious setback. "It is a very bad sign for the whole dialogue movement and I am inclined to think that we can now write it off completely," he said. He concluded that the hopes that Madagascar would play a key role in the defence of the Cape sea routes, now looked "forlorn". He described it as "very sad" that South Africa had been rebuffed by "a neighbour strategically placed in our own area."⁵⁷

When Malagasy decided to break all official links with South Africa Professor William Kleyhans of the University of South Africa immediately interpreted it as "a major" setback for the "outward looking policy."⁵⁸ It is therefore not surprising that South Africa, according to *The Star*, is worried that the popular demands in Madagascar for the release of political prisoners (jailed by Tsiranana) may include the anti-dialogue militants like the former Vice-President Mr. Resampa and others like Mr. Mona Jaona.⁵⁹

That this policy of dialogue between South Africa and Malawi is paying off is evident from the economic, political and military agreements which have been signed between the two countries. In March 1967, the Republic of South Africa concluded a trade agreement with Malawi—its first with an independent African state. By the terms of the agreement, Malawi granted preferential tariffs to all South African goods imported into Malawi in exchange for a South African guarantee to admit, duty free, 500,000 lbs. of Malawi tea each year.⁶⁰ South Africa agreed to finance part of the 70 mile rail link to Nacala, and contributed £25,000,000 towards the cost of shifting Malawi's capital.⁶¹

54 John Miller reporting in *Daily Telegraph*, 17 August 1971.

55 *The Star* (Weekly Air Edition, Johannesburg), 24 June 1972.

56 *Ibid.*

57 *Ibid.*

58 *Ibid.*

59 *The Star* (Johannesburg), 27 May 1972.

60 "Introduction to Malawi," *New Left Review*, No. 45 (September/October, 1967), p. 83.

61 "Malawi: Neo-Colonial State," *Tricontinental*, No. 64 (Limited ed., Havana), July 1971, p. 31.

Unlike South Africa and Rhodesia, which have no border with Malawi, Mozambique has frontiers in common with Malawi in the east, south, and south-west. This geographical situation has become a cornerstone of Malawi's foreign policy. Scholars of African affairs often use this to justify her cooperation with the Portuguese colony. This argument is invalidated by the fact that there are other countries in Africa which have no direct access to the sea (Botswana, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Niger, Zambia, for example) which have not been obliged to surrender their independence as Malawi has virtually done to Portugal. The territorial exchange agreement signed between Malawi and Portugal gives the right of access to the Indian Ocean in exchange for the right to use Malawi territory for military manoeuvres. That liberty was used by Portuguese security forces in early 1966 to bomb a peaceful village in the Mponda district; seven Malawian citizens were killed. Malawi was unable to claim that there had been violation of territory because the terms of the agreement invalidated any protest Malawi might have made to the United Nations and the Malawi Government instead chose to ignore the public outcry.

Malawi has diplomatic relations with Portugal at consulate level at present. The Malawi diplomat in Lourenço Marques is himself Portuguese, as is one of the political advisors to President Banda, and many of the businessmen, security officers, and constructors. Malawi's identification with Portuguese policy is at the expense of betraying the national liberation war being waged in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau. The freedom fighters of FRELIMO, if found on Malawi territory, are handed over to the Portuguese authorities for execution.⁶²

The Republic of Malawi has also identified herself very closely with countries with expansionist territorial policies and programmes which make them active satellites of American imperialism. These states are Israel, Nationalist China (Taiwan), South Korea and South Vietnam. As is well known, the United States, State Department viewed the anti-colonial struggle in the early 1960s as a threat to the United States' interests in Africa. The satellites were used to encourage the policies of neutralism and non-alignment and to mask dependence and western control. The role of Israel is perhaps the most indicative of this.

The late Arnold Rivkin, an economist who headed the African Research Project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and later went on to a key role at the World Bank, was one of the first Americans to set out publicly the assumptions which underlay the United States' decision to take advantage of the convergence of interests between the United States and Israel on the African front. Writing in the American journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1959, Rivkin said that Israel's moderate form of socialist development could serve as an important example to developing nations revolting against the West. "The Israel model," he declared, "may well prove to be a sort of economic 'third force'."

62 *Ibid.*

The same author outlined the means by which the United States could support Israel's penetration:

Israel's role as a third force might also be reinforced by imaginative use of the third country technique. A free world state wishing to enlarge its assistance flow to Africa might channel some part of it through Israel because of Israel's special qualifications and demonstrated acceptability to African nations.⁶³

It is therefore not surprising that Israeli instructors helped to set up the Malawi Young Pioneers movement, a paramilitary organization of about 700 members. Given powers beyond the police, the Young Pioneers are used as shock troops to crush opponents of the Banda regime. Also, it was Malawi's President Banda who was the first African leader to pay an official visit to Israel, only a year after the six days Arab-Israeli war of 1967. The Zionists honoured him by creating a Banda Scholarship for Malawi students of medicine in Israel. In addition, cooperative and labour officials are trained on short Israeli courses to return to Malawi to lead workers who cannot strike.⁶⁴ And it was immediately on his return to Malawi from Israel in 1968 that Banda claimed the Eastern Province of Zambia and the Southern Region of Tanzania as belonging to him.

It was not through Israel alone that the United States was able to align Malawi's policy with her own. The Nationalist Chinese regime is recognized by Malawi and has sponsored agricultural aid to grow rice in Malawi, in conformity with the United States' policy of countering the influence of the People's Republic of China in Africa.⁶⁵ President Banda, a strong opponent of communism, paid an official visit to Taiwan in 1965. He has publicly declared that, if he had sufficient funds, he would be prepared to dispatch an army to fight shoulder to shoulder with American soldiers in support of the puppet administration of Thieu-Ky-Huong of South Vietnam.

Any attempt to change the neo-colonial orientation of Malawi will meet strong opposition, even sabotage, both on the domestic front and abroad. A political movement away from the traditional defence of private enterprise and ownership of the means of production would damage the relationship with the sources of finance on which Malawi depends. In that circumstance, a government would be confronted with the dilemma of choosing to carry out a socialist programme at one stroke, or to abandon it for fear of failure. The late Oskar Lange once wrote that "any government intending to introduce socialism in a capitalist economy must go through resolutely with its socialization program at maximum speed". Any hesitation, any vacillation and indecision would provoke the inevitable economic catastrophe. "Socialism," Lange continued, "is not an economic policy for the timid."⁶⁶

63 Arnold Rivkin, *Africa and the West* (Praeger, 1961), p. 89.

64 Africa Research Group, "Israel: Imperialist Mission in Africa," *Tricontinental*, No. 15 (Havana, 1969), p. 39.

65 *New York Times*, "Taiwan—Not Peking Winning New Friends in Asia," 25 December 1968.

66 Oskar Lange, *Economic Theory of Socialism* (1938) as quoted in "The Policy of Transition," *Monthly Review* (January 1971), pp. 40-41.

EXTENDED NOTE ON BANDA-ISRAELI-ARAB RELATIONS

Dr. Banda has on many occasions denounced Arabs perhaps on behalf of Zionism. In order to cover himself, he has compared the settlement of Europeans in Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa to the actions of the Arabs in North Africa, especially the atrocities committed by the successive reactionary Arab regimes in Khartoum against the black population of the southern Sudan.

The hijack drama of a South African Airways Boeing 727 on 24 May, 1972 has in fact revealed his whole attitude to Arabs. The two hijackers, said to be of Lebanese nationality, were tricked into letting their hostages escape and left alone in the plane at Chileka. According to *The Times* of London, Malawi was authorized by South Africa to blow up the 'whole package' of aircraft and ransom money if necessary, together with the hijackers.⁶⁷ The two hijackers identified as Foad Kamil and Abou Yatghi are perhaps the last Arab nationals to enter Malawi. The Malawi Government has extended a blanket ban on all Arab nationals. According to the *Johannesburg Star*, "Kamil's wife was among those to feel the effects of this ban when she tried to get into Malawi to see her imprisoned husband. She got as far as Nairobi from Beirut before learning that she would not be allowed to enter Malawi. Yatghi's lawyer brother also tried unsuccessfully to get an entry visa." The paper quoted Banda as saying: "An extradition treaty was in force between Malawi and South Africa".⁶⁸ Kamil and Yatghi were each sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment with hard labour in September 1972.

DOUBLE CRISIS

While the term 'economic crisis' indicates a failure in economic growth, the term 'political crisis' may be interpreted as a turning point rather than failure. It has more the semblance of a social crisis, which Scott Nearing defined as "a moment when a group of human beings, living together, find it difficult or impossible to continue their accustomed associations."⁶⁹

In the first days of September 1964, just less than eight weeks after Independence, Malawi experienced a moment of political change, a change characterized by some as a 'counter revolution'. During this political change, President Banda dismissed three of his most able Ministers: O. E. Chirwa, Q. C. (Minister of Justice); W. M. K. Chiume (Minister of Foreign Affairs); and the late Augustine Bwanausi (Minister of Development). The response to this was that three other key men resigned in sympathy with their colleagues. They were the late Y. K. Chisiza (Minister of Home Affairs), W. Chokani (Minister of Labour), and H. B. M. Chipembere (Minister of Education). Since it appears not to have been an ideological dispute, it may better be described as the Malawi Cabinet crisis rather than as the Malawi political

67 *The Times* (London), 26 May 1972.

68 *The Star* (Johannesburg), 24 June 1972.

69 Scott Nearing, *Monthly Review* (September 1970), p. 60.

crisis. The failure to forge a united action against Banda as a consequence of their leaving their posts is so surprising in itself that it is necessary to give a short account of the drama in what, in effect, was a 'double crisis'.

The original disagreement is said to have concerned the Skinner Report which recommended, among other things, the pegging of salaries of African civil servants and the imposition of a sum of threepence as a medical registration fee. In his demand for a vote of confidence in a special session of the Malawi Parliament, Banda claimed that the four cornerstones on which the Malawi Congress Party, the Government and the state of Malawi were built had now broken down. These cornerstones he described as unity, loyalty, discipline and obedience.⁷⁰ He accused his Ministers of plotting to overthrow his Government and assassinate him in cold blood. He reported that the Ministers attacked him on the threepence charge for hospital fees, on Africanization and on the Skinner Report. On the external scene they attacked his policy in relation to Rhodesia, Portugal, Formosa, the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China.

Banda correctly assumed this opposition by his Ministers as a vote of no confidence in his leadership as the then Prime Minister. Addressing himself to the Ministers, he said: "You say that I am wrong in charging tickies in hospitals. You say I am doing the wrong thing by not Africanizing immediately . . . Then I have to resign. Now." But to the surprise of everybody, including Banda himself, they all refused to allow the man they opposed to resign. Instead, they called for his continued leadership of Malawi.

Later, Banda accused the Ministers of hypocrisy, revealing that:

In 1962 I went to Lisbon—Kanyama Chiume was with me . . . He did not say anything about going to Lisbon; he was then a prominent member, an impersonator, but he didn't say anything about that . . . and, moreover, even when I went to Nacala, when I came back I gave dinners, the Portuguese were there, our Ministers were there, they enjoyed dinner with the Portuguese who handled them. They never said a single word.

In their defence, the former Ministers put their arguments not only apologetically but without a grain of socialist argument. Chisiza ended his speech thus:

If you [House of Parliament] believe that I am a traitor by pointing out what I consider to be pin-pricks, in my view, with a view to going ahead and building our nation, then brothers and sisters, I am ready to hang this minute.⁷¹

Chiume said:

We have all been called Communists . . . even the Prime Minister himself . . . I have faith that the Prime Minister has had such long experience, such a lot of education that he can stand up to the machinations of any Communist.⁷²

70 H. Kamuzu Banda, *Hansard* (Zomba), 8 September 1964. It is traditional for puppet regimes, within the limits of their commitments to safeguard foreign capital, to rally the working class with slogans of unity and stability as a means of preventing them from being conscious of their class.

71 Yatuta K. Chisiza, *Hansard* (Zomba), 8 September 1964.

72 W. M. Kanyama Chiume, *Hansard* (Zomba), 9 September 1964.

Bwanausi said:

There [East Africa] I noticed the extent of Africanization. . . . Whatever happens there is bound to have some influence, some impact on our country.⁷³

Chokani said:

Some members of this House have complained that some of the civil servants are still capricorns [stooges] . . . many people are forgetting to point out that certain of the Europeans who opposed us—men who were directors of man-power in 1959—are possibly now, men who are trying to rule us. This must not happen in the post-dependence period.⁷⁴

Chipembere said:

I wish to assure the Ngwazi also that I will remain loyal to him. . . . I came from Malindi happily; I will return to Malindi happily. I will not organize against the Ngwazi as he has been suspecting.⁷⁵

Chirwa said:

I will go home and explain to the people of Nkhata Bay what has happened . . . and if Ngwazi wants to throw me out completely from the House, or from any other position which I hold, I accept it . . . we are under his discipline.⁷⁶

The aura of reverence which surrounded Banda, venerated in song and praised even by his Cabinet dissenters in Parliament during the crisis, is difficult to explain. He had been remote from the political and social struggle of his people which began long before his birth. While their blood soaked the soil of Malawi, Dr Banda absorbed the culture, conventions, and customs of the West, as he himself has said:

By culture, race, origin, background, I am an African, Mchewa [his tribe] . . . by education I belong to the West. I admire the Europeans in the West—the British, the Americans, the French, the Germans . . . I like them all.⁷⁷

While his affection for Europeans allowed him to excuse their reflections upon his capability, Banda could not tolerate criticism from his countrymen. In October 1970 he was host to his former political adversary of the federation period, Welensky, who had tried to forestall independence. The former Colonial Secretary responsible for the constitution, MacLeod, who died the same year, was mourned officially in Malawi and is honoured by a street in his name at Zomba, though the same man had earlier expressed his opinion that Banda was "ignorant about the economic aspects of government." The Europeans did not cause Banda trouble. But a decision so trivial as the threepenny medical fee was sufficient to put his Cabinet in ferment. That the dispute was personal rather than ideological is borne out by the failure of the others involved to seize the initiative at the opportune moment when Banda proposed to resign. That they did not immediately find a successor among themselves serves to show that, in principle, the politics of Banda were acceptable to those whom he fondly described as his "rebel Ministers" a term they

73 A. W. Bwanausi, *Hansard* (Zomba), 9 September 1964.

74 W. Chokani, *Hansard* (Zomba), 9 September 1964.

75 H. B. Masauko Chipembere, *Hansard* (Zomba), 9 September 1964.

76 O. E. Chingoli Chirwa, *Hansard* (Zomba), 9 September 1964.

77 H. Kamuzu Banda, *Hansard* (Zomba), 20 December 1968.

seemed to accept as one of distinction. It was not that they could not countenance Malawi's development as a capitalist country. The Cabinet members all shared the same economic ideology that Malawi be built into Western alliances. It was on the point of with which nations Malawi ought to be aligned that their opinions differed. The six Ministers who left the Cabinet thought that open dealings with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal would reveal their willingness to cooperate with Europeans too well, a position embarrassing for a newly independent African nation to defend at conferences of the Commonwealth, the Organization for African Unity and the United Nations. This group favoured direct dealings with the great powers of North America, Europe, and the United Kingdom, for in this they would not lose prestige before their friends in Africa. Most of the members of the group had attended short courses and study tours in the United States before their country's independence and had returned very much impressed by the material wealth of America.

Banda and two of his tribesmen in the Cabinet, Msonthi and Tembo, had decided, on the other hand, that the allegations of fascism against Portugal and racial discrimination in South Africa and Rhodesia were less important than the fact that these countries were seeking alliances in Africa. In fact, it would have been difficult to deny that the power of the Malawi state was not already centred on the triangle of Pretoria, London and Lisbon and that these same countries, if not discouraged, would continue to exploit and dominate Africans from the Malawi capital. The fact that Britain did not use the Cabinet crisis to her own advantage by siding with one of the parties to the dispute, but instead made the Governor General an impartial mediator, is evidence that neither Banda nor the rebel Ministers were a threat to the British economic interest in Malawi.

Both parties to the dispute, however, dramatized its elements in their personal interest. Banda accused a Chinese Communist diplomat in Tanzania of having bribed the Ministers. No doubt Banda hoped that such an allegation would court support from the West in general, and especially from South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal in the form of direct aid in defence against agitators, allegedly Communists. For fear of being classified as Communists, the rebels, with the exception of one, felt obliged to flee Malawi, despite the fact that they had often denounced communism from the same political platform as Banda himself. Then, having assumed the role of refugees, they switched to socialist slogans to enlist personal sympathy from some of the progressive African states.

Since the crisis of 1964, Banda has proved himself, as Andrew Ross described him in his brilliant article "White Africa's Black Ally" as "... a tribalist, destroyer of a nation," and

... resembles the worst side of a Tshombe in his willingness to lean on white colonist support, whose relations with the Portuguese Government are closer than anyone would have dreamed possible for an African leader⁷⁸

78 Andrew Ross, "White Africa's Black Ally," *New Left Review*, No. 45 (September/October, 1967), p. 87.

Despite this, as often occurs when a man assumes leadership of a new nation, Banda came to be looked upon by the masses as a kind of saviour or redeemer from the bondage of colonialism. Such leaders have every chance to discourage this way of thinking but it suited Banda's purpose to rekindle the remnants of feudal relationship as related to tribal habits and chieftainship and to encourage privilege similar to that enjoyed by former bureaucrats of the colonial civil service.

An extension of this conception of power transformed the youth wing of the Malawi Congress Party, the Young Pioneers, into an armed force under the direct control of the President, who is their Commander-in-Chief. The President may order them employed in support of the Security Forces, but their control, which was originally entrusted to the commanders of the Security Forces by a series of acts passed in 1965, came into his hands. While the acts provide that the Young Pioneers shall, when acting in support of the Security Forces, be subject to the disciplinary code of the Police Force, they receive their instructions from the President or a person appointed by him, and are not entrusted to the body provided for by the Police Ordinance but "to such officers as the President shall from time to time determine." When acting in support of the Security Forces, the Young Pioneers have "all the powers, duties, and protection of a Police Officer acting in the execution of his duties."⁷⁹

The most disturbing feature was introduced by the Young Pioneers (Amendment) Act of December 1965, which inserted the following section into the Principal Acts:

10 A.—(1) No police officer may effect the arrest of a Young Pioneer without prior consultation with the person for the time being commanding the Young Pioneers concerned . . . (2) No person who has been lawfully arrested by a Young Pioneer in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by this Act shall be released from custody on the order of a Police Officer without prior consultation with the person for the time being commanding the Young Pioneers in the District concerned.

This legislation creates what is in effect a private army under the direct and exclusive control of the President. Both before and after the enactment of the Acts, allegations were widespread, and confirmed from numerous and reliable sources, that Young Pioneers were guilty of large-scale intimidation, violence, robbery, and rape. The new powers gave them immunity from arrest and freedom from any form of control whatever save that of the President who had shown himself to be none too scrupulous about the methods used in defeating his political opponents.

Banda has publicly spoken of being prepared to kill as many as 50,000 Malawians to enforce his personal rule; as he put it; "It is war and not football." On December 19, 1964, at Lilongwe, he told people to arrest any strangers who appeared in their villages and to report them to the Congress Party. He said that the villagers were not to be satisfied with statements from

79 "L'ine" narrable—Dr. Hastings Banda Par Aquino de Braganca," *Africasia*, No. 5 (Afrique Noire), 12 December 1969, p. 24.

the police that there was not evidence upon which to arrest a stranger. "Investigate every strange face . . . I do not want anyone to run away just because there is no evidence."⁸⁰ On September 13, 1965, at Blantyre, he urged people to be on the lookout for fugitives returning to Malawi and to arrest them without waiting for the police. "If they resist arrest, do something to them. I don't care what you do to them." He also called for the arrest of people harbouring fugitives, saying: "If he resists, do something to him—they are animals you know—no beating about the bush."

As a consequence, at least hundreds and presumably more than a thousand political detainees are under indefinite arrest without trial. The people live in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation while Government supporters commit a wide range of offences, even murder, free from the risk of prosecution.

Of the rebel Cabinet Ministers, this much is known: despite praise, promises and private missions to beg mercy and forgiveness of President Banda, they all felt their lives to be in jeopardy. Only H. B. Masauko Chipembere could contemplate remaining at home at Malindi in the Fort Johnson district, the others having already fled across the borders into Tanzania and Zambia. They failed to give united leadership to the people that the Congress Party feigned to represent, despite the activities of the military wing, the Young Pioneers Movement, which served to weaken the mass and to subordinate and suppress any political awareness not conforming to that of its leader. Thus it was that Chipembere found himself placed under restriction at his home and prevented from addressing meetings.

It is not an exaggeration to say that in September 1964 before Malawi had concluded military pacts with South Africa and Portugal, the moment had been ripe for a socialist revolution in Malawi. But the only action stirred up in response to the Cabinet Crisis was that Chipembere, followed by some of his most ardent supporters, finally escaped from surveillance into the bush, at Fort Johnston. Their aim of liberating the peasants could not be accomplished because they lacked political and ideological direction of the kind that could give a theoretical dimension to their struggle. Chipembere left for the United States for treatment of his diabetes. The fighting continued under the military leadership of Medson Silombela until his capture by Malawi Security Forces in the autumn of 1965. He was placed on trial for murder.

The Penal Code had already been amended to provide a mandatory death penalty for treason as newly defined under the Act passed on April 28, 1965 and made retroactive to January 1, 1965, i.e., before the date of an attack on the town of Fort Johnston by a liberation army under the leadership of Masauko Chipembere.

In the course of the trial of Medson Silombela, the President twice stated publicly that Silombela was clearly guilty and 'would swing' in public. He caused an amendment to be made to the Penal Code authorizing public executions. In February 1966, after his appeal had been dismissed, Silombela was hanged in the prison compound in the presence of about 400 people.

80 *Africasia*, No. 5 (*Afrique Noire*), 22 December 1969, p. 24.

While it cannot be suggested that the verdict of guilty in this case was a wrong one, or that it was influenced by Dr. Banda's statements, it is clearly highly prejudicial to the independence of the judiciary if a leader of a country publicly condemns a man who is on trial before the verdict is pronounced; such conduct is said to be punishable as contempt of court in many common law countries.

When Chipembere was in the United States of America, he announced the formation of a political party called the Pan African Democratic Party of Malawi, in short, PDP. Returning to Tanzania, he found his former colleagues divided. At the Pangale Refugee Camp of Malawians (near Tabora), one group followed the late Yatuta K. Chisiza, the other was loyal to Chipembere. The Chisiza group was known as the Saigon group (an allusion to Vietnam tactics), the other as 'Washington' (with reference to Chipembere's inauguration of PDP there). In fact, there was no ideological difference between them.

Yatuta Kaluli Chisiza was shot dead on October 12, 1967 by Malawi Security Forces at Mpatamanga Bridge near Blantyre while leading an armed liberation group into Malawi.⁸¹ His heroic determination to go and fight Banda had been in vain. There was not to be a popular uprising. Eight others who were captured were found guilty by the Malawi High Court and were executed in early 1969.⁸²

The procedure which the Chisiza group had followed is that of the *foco* system, a pattern of revolution applied by Major Ernesto Che Guevara (who died in Bolivia the same year as Chisiza). It seems to be increasingly unworkable under current conditions of capitalism. Whether we, the people of Malawi, have learned any lesson from these defeats, and such setbacks as the tragic death of Augustin Willard Bwanausi in exile,⁸³ is difficult to say. Certainly, however, the propaganda image of Banda's invincibility has won more credence. There is everything to suggest that the policies of Banda have taken root in Malawi.

When I spoke to Chipembere in 1967 in Dar es Salaam about problems of liberation, I had the impression that ideological orientation was for him the issue which could split any future government of Malawi. Yet, while aware of this, he felt obliged to establish to his party's satisfaction his Malawian ancestry, this having been thrown into doubt by the fact that his parents and grandparents had lived outside Malawi.⁸⁴ That such an irrelevancy could be used to discredit a leader distracts attention from problems of increasing

81 The casualties on the part of the Government are said to have been considerable. The (unofficial) information leaking out of Malawi and confirmed by one Government official who must remain anonymous was that there were about 200 Government troops killed and over 100 Young Pioneers whose widows or dependents receive monthly salaries and were told that their husbands or sons had been sent abroad for further training.

82 They were G. Bonongwe, Tomango Chidawati, Suwedi Masamba, James Kamanga, M. Moyo, G. M. Mwakawanga, M. L. Mphwante, Harris Phombeya. Killed with Chisiza were C. J. L. Mwachimba and F. Mwalyambwile.

83 A former Minister for Development who died in a car accident on November 30, 1968 in Zambia where he was charged with the responsibility of PDP affairs by the Central Committee. Two comrades also died in the crash.

84 H. B. Masauko Chipembere, *My Malawian Ancestors* (mimeo.), August 1969, p. 17.

importance, the biggest being the continued exploitation of Malawi resources for the benefit of overseas lords.

Where the contest continues between foreign colonialism and Malawi nationalism politics are conceived in negative terms. The Malawi masses were not given time to sort out the destiny of their own victories and have been forced into a position where they are unable to make positive decisions. This has encouraged the regime to pretend that all that it does is done in the name of the people. This is possible due to the oppressive and totalitarian nature of the Banda regime on the one hand, and the ignorance of the great mass of the population on the other. Left in ignorance of how to manage efficiently and independently their own raw resources, the people of Malawi are at present ill-equipped to lead their own development. The guidance given them by the existing leaders who bow to foreign influence is the worst possible because it perpetuates the parasitical colonial practice of participating in local development only at the price of extracting exorbitant earnings abroad.

How long the people of Malawi can continue to tolerate their state, cheated of their proper returns, is impossible to say. What is needed among all Malawians is the ability and conviction of John Chilembwe to rise to "strike a blow for a socialist victory."⁸⁵ Without such ideas, our people will be condemned to suffer injustice in silence, since the greatest enemy of justice is ignorance itself.

The Employment of Foreign Consultants in Tanzania: Its Value and Limitations

PETER E. TEMU*

In Tanzania, the use of foreign consultants has been much in evidence in the Civil Service since Independence (1961) and in various parastatal organizations since the Arusha Declaration (1967). In any developing country their role has to be seen in relation to manpower needs. Tanzania has set 1980 as its target year for attaining self-sufficiency in high-level manpower, save for a few highly specialized skills.¹ Already, the country has moved a long way from the day when on the eve of Independence a World Bank visiting mission reported that it was "still necessary to employ mostly European typists".² Judged by the trend of localization in the Civil Service since Independence, the broad manpower target seems to be within reach: for example, at the end of 1961, local officers occupied 26 per cent of senior and middle-grade posts; by the end of 1970, the figure had risen to 85 per cent in an establishment that had more than doubled in absolute size.³

However, the picture is somewhat less bright with regard to specific manpower categories especially the professional ones requiring scientific skills and expertise. It is envisaged, for example, that at the present rate of population growth of 2.7 per cent per annum, some 1700 doctors will be needed by 1980 in order to attain the modest⁴ target of one doctor per 10,000 people. Yet by the end of the Second Five Year Plan (June 1974) we expect to have only about 300 local doctors and it is unlikely that an additional 1400 will qualify within the remaining six years unless enrolment of Tanzanians in medical schools increases dramatically.⁵ The same holds true for engineers, agronomists, surveyors and accountants—the attainment of self-sufficiency by 1980 seems improbable, at best.

If these were the skill categories where foreign experts and consultants were mostly in evidence the matter would be perfectly understandable if still unsatisfactory in the current situation. Unfortunately this is not so. The record shows that the majority of foreigners working in Tanzania are in managerial and advisory posts involving major decision-making with far reaching political

*Peter Temu is a Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam.

- 1 *Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July 1969—30th June, 1974*, Vol. IV: "Survey of the High and Middle Level Manpower Requirements and Resources," (Dar es Salaam, 1969), p. 1.
- 2 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Economic Development of Tanganyika* (Johns Hopkins, 1960), p. 193.
- 3 *The Economic Survey 1970-71* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), p. 113.
- 4 The ratio of one physician per 10,000 of population is regarded as modest because it is still way below the ratio of one physician per 1000 of population which is typical of the developed countries. Indeed, many of them have ratios which are much lower than this.
- 5 *The Economic Survey*, op. cit., p. 114.

85 Chilembwe is said to have used the words "strike a blow and die" in a speech to his liberation army on the night of the 1915 uprising. See Rotberg, *Strike a Blow and Die...*, op. cit.