

# The Changing Role of the Planning Adviser in East Africa

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We have come to realise that there is a gulf between the drawing up of plans, and the achievement of the targets for growth set in these plans. It is perhaps true to say that for the most part, national development plans have remained an expression of ambitions and that the goals in them have hardly been realised. . . Leaders, who felt that their wish for economic development and improvement of the standards of living of their countries could be fulfilled by declarations have run up against the realities of planned development economics.

*From the address by Robert Gardiner to the Second Session of the Conference of African Planners, Addis Ababa, December 4, 1967.*

It is roughly a decade since the three East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have become independent nation-states. By the end of 1974 when Kenya is expected to adopt its third national Development Plan all three countries will have attempted to rationalise the development of their economies through the instrumentality of comprehensive planning over at least a full ten-year period. An important feature of this brief but intensive period of experimenting with planning is the very visible role played by the expatriate planning adviser in the process. It would seem useful, therefore, to begin to examine and appraise the special role of the planning adviser to determine (1) what impact he has on the course of economic transformation in East Africa, (2) the trends and issues most likely to affect the role he has enjoyed, and (3) the contribution he might still make to development work in this part of Africa. This should aid us in gaining a more precise notion of the dependence relationship at a vital centre of decision-making in three East African Governments. Of equal importance, particularly for those interested in participating in some form of development work in this region, is the need to have a clear idea of what the opportunity for planning technical assistance might be in the future in light of evolving trends and shifting demands in this area.

Like the majority of African states, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were affected by the mystique of comprehensive planning at the time of their independence. As Jomo Kenyatta, then Prime Minister of Kenya, boldly asserted in his introduction to his country's 1964/70 Development Plan:

We plan, in order to obtain our goal, to establish new economic institutions and modify old ones, freely choosing our models from the successful economies

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of the world, adapting them to suit Kenya's conditions and, in the process developing new concepts of economic organisation. Ideological labels are no concern to us; the only criterion will be the effectiveness of the institution in achieving greater welfare for all our people.<sup>1</sup>

In contrast to a number of African countries that acceded to independence without experience in any form of planning, the East African states derived some benefit from several planning exercises that characterised British colonial administration. First, there were a series of Colonial Development and Welfare Acts enacted by the British Parliament. Although the first such Act was passed in 1929—which incidentally was primarily aimed at easing the unemployment problem in Great Britain—it wasn't until the 1940s that legislation was passed to deal directly with the social and economic welfare of the colonies through the preparation of ten-year development plans. These so-called plans which were first drawn up after World War II were merely budgetary estimates of public expenditure for select projects without reference to any overall development strategy. A second form of planning might be found in the reports of the periodic royal commissions of enquiry. These reports, such as the *East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report*,<sup>2</sup> usually examined important sectoral issues and recommended on general policy questions without specifically dealing with the implications for public expenditure. Thirdly, another form of planning was carried out on a regional basis through the activities of the East African Common Services Organisation and the various authorities preceding it that were responsible for co-ordinating development projects across the three East African territories. The important difference between these planning devices and the comprehensive planning formula that was adopted at independence is that the former were not developed on any aggregative model of the East African economies in pursuance of a definite development strategy, but were rather tentative financial estimates of a col-

1 Government of Kenya, *Development Plan, 1964-1970*, p. 1.

2 *East African Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955). The terms of reference of this report were as follows:

Having regard to the rapid rate of increase of the African population of East Africa and the congestion of population on the land in certain localities, to examine the measures necessary to be taken to achieve an improved standard of living, including the introduction of capital to enable peasant farming to develop and expand production; and to frame recommendations thereon with particular reference to:

- (1) the economic development of the land already in occupation by the introduction of better farming methods;
- (2) the adaptations or modifications in traditional tribal systems of tenure necessary for the full development of the land;
- (3) the opening for cultivation and settlement of land at present not fully used;
- (4) the development and siting of industrial activities;
- (5) conditions of employment in industry, commerce, mining and plantation agriculture, with special reference to social conditions and the growth of large urban populations;
- (6) the social problems which arise from the growth of permanent urban and industrial populations.

lection of more or less related capital projects. As Professor Dharam Ghai has observed, these projects

... reflected the priorities of government officials, often of those in the field, but they were in general insufficiently elaborated and were seldom supported by detailed analysis of costs and benefits. It is obvious that a limited exercise of this nature could be adequately carried out by the "traditional" civil service. The planning machinery consequently consisted of a few officials in the Ministry of Finance, and the plan itself was an extension of its traditional function—the drawing up of the annual development estimates of the Central Government. The implementation of these projects was, of course, in the hands of the operating ministries, but the Ministry of Finance did exercise some influence on it through its control of the disbursement of funds and its insistence on the proper use of funds.<sup>3</sup>

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the concept, process and implementation of pre-independent planning in East Africa would be to quote briefly from the introduction to the 1946 *Ten Years Development Plan for Uganda*. This typical plan was prepared by a single development adviser (planner) by the name of E. B. Worthington who described his work as follows:

The plan is mainly concerned with the expenditure of public funds... A development plan is not a blueprint setting out the dimensions of a new structure. It should be regarded rather as a designer's preliminary sketches. Therefore this plan should not persist as the basis for development for more than the next two or three years without revision... since the main factor limiting development is revenue, a new forecast made in a few years' time may increase the number of new measures which can safely be undertaken... A number of colonial development plans from other territories have been examined with the object of taking advantage of good features and avoiding pitfalls... In the financial tables nearly all detail is avoided... No attempt has been made to assess priorities within the framework of the expenditure proposed... My work as development adviser to the Uganda Government has lasted from May to December of 1946, but since this period included two visits to England, partly devoted to other matters the work in Uganda has been crammed into less than four months... The Secretary of State is anxious that there should be in every colonial territory a Development and Welfare Committee... There must be a senior officer of the Secretariat as Development Secretary, with such authority as will ensure action in carrying out and co-ordinating development measures... The fact that I have received much help in no way commits heads of departments or others to agreement with financial allocations or opinions expressed in any part of this [plan].<sup>4</sup>

It was apparent to the political leadership in East Africa that the promises of an egalitarian society with a steadily rising standard of living for all citizens could not be achieved after independence through the fragmentary approach to development that had characterised the economic order during the colonial period. The solution to the problem of fundamentally restructuring their

3 Dharam Ghai, "Machinery of Planning in Kenya", paper presented at Conference on Crisis in Planning at the University of Sussex, 29 June-10 July, 1960, p. 1.

4 Uganda Protectorate, *A Development Plan for Uganda, December, 1946*, by E. B. Worthington, pp. 5-6.



economies could be found only in a more systematic management of the development process. The formula for this task was comprehensive planning.

In Tanzania, for example, comprehensive planning, according to the Minister of State for the First Five-Year Development Plan, Mr A. Z. M. Swai, descriptively meant that

... all the sectors of activity, Public and Private Economic and Social, National and Regional are involved in the development effort and have been assigned objectives, the technical and economic feasibility of which has been checked in advance. ... In the Public Sector the policies for the achievement of targets will be those of direction of effort and of organising the necessary supplies of manpower, finance and materials, while in the Private Sector they will be rather those of instilling confidence in the private investor and creating an economic climate conducive to investment. It is firstly a guide which enables all those involved in the development of the country to play their part to the full in harmony with their fellow citizens to their own benefit as well as that of the community as a whole. Secondly, it is a touchstone for gauging progress in the various sectors of the economy and thus a means of discovering on time any corrective steps that may be necessary to restore balanced development. Finally, it constitutes for the Government a means of assessing the probable consequences of a political or administrative decision on the pace of development.<sup>5</sup>

Besides affording a new scientific methodology, comprehensive planning appeared to offer the surest and quickest route to the realisation of the goals of societies anxious to modernise. By adopting a system of comprehensive planning, a total programme of development could be designed embracing all sectors of the economy. After establishing the aggregative plan strategy the mobilisation of resources and implementation apparatus could be organised with fair precision given the sophisticated techniques for quantitative economic calculations available in the field of planning economics. Such was what the fraternity of planning economists agreed could be done for developing economies, and the East African states, with World Bank urging, readily opted to pursue their development strategies through comprehensive planning.<sup>6</sup>

The adoption of planning policies, however, simultaneously implied the need to import foreign planning advisory assistance in all three East African

5 Government of Tanganyika, *Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1 July, 1964-30 June, 1969*, I, pp. 1-2.

6 For an analytical definition of planning as understood in this paper we might use Oskar Lange's interpretation that essentially the process

"... consists in assuring an amount of productive investment which is sufficient to provide for a rise in national income substantially in excess of the rise in population, so that per capita national income increases. The strategic factor is investment, or more precisely productive investment. Consequently the problem of development planning is one of assuring that there will be sufficient productive investment, and then of directing that productive investment into such channels as will provide for the most rapid growth of the productive power of the national economy."

Oskar Lange, "Planning Economic Development", pp. 319-320, in Hadley E. Smith, ed., *Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Institute of Public Administration, 1966).

states.<sup>7</sup> In fact, the severe shortage of trained Government economists and the virtual absence of any experienced planners in Government clearly meant that the initial task of defining, organising and effecting the planning process would rest largely in the hands of expatriate advisers. However one might rationalise this situation it was somewhat ironic that almost coincidental with the acquisition of sovereignty these states found themselves deeply dependent upon foreign advisory personnel in as critical an area as economic decision-making. On the other hand, from the point of view of the economic adviser, the early and mid-sixties offered a quite unique challenge to him as a skilful and imaginative planner. During this period, in addition to establishing the planning process, basic policy had to be formulated and the planner was also regarded as the expert analyst in this area. Policy advice was requested, readily given, adopted and in general implemented with varying degrees of success and few major disasters.<sup>8</sup> The excitement and stimulation of dealing with policy issues soon captured the interest of planners and by the late sixties the responsibility of policy adviser was clearly the role many planners arrogated to themselves. At the same time, however, a maturing local political leadership began to assert its rightful policy-making responsibility with less inclination to request or depend upon policy advice from the expert planners. While the result of these opposing trends led to some tension and disillusionment, particularly on the part of the planning advisers, it seems that such a clash was ultimately inevitable. The broad dependency and intimate involvement of outside advisers in matters of policy decision-making could only have been a temporary phenomenon. No Government can safely tolerate, beyond expediency, too close an involvement of outside advisers in its decision-taking process. The need to assert one's absolute autonomy and independence in this area is compulsive, particularly in a country like Tanzania where self-reliance is a driving ideological force behind its development movement.

When one looks back with the benefit of hindsight at the evolutionary role of the economic planner-policy adviser in East Africa it seems clear that a much larger and lasting impact could have been made during the past decade if policy advisory assistance had been pursued within the concept of institution-building. This is not to imply that there were not those who were seriously advocating such a course from the very beginning. It is certainly understandable that a strong bias for providing policy advice would have inspired

7 This paper is concerned with planning as a national function and does not intend to comment directly on regional planning in the East Africa Community. Responsibility for planning in the Community rests with the Economic Consultative and Planning Council in the Secretariat for Common Market and Economic Affairs. Specifically, the Council under the Treaty is responsible for assisting the national planning in the Partner States through consultation and for advising the Community's Authority on the long-term planning of the Common Services. The Economic Consultative and Planning Council has no executive responsibility but provides the instrumentality through which the Partner States are able to plan for the strengthening of their co-operative arrangements and the development of the Community's Common Market.

8 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into a detailed analysis of economic performance in East Africa during the 1960s, Appendices A and B give some interesting comparative data on economic activity and incomes growth in East Africa that might be usefully examined.



economists during the early years of planning development in East Africa. First, in many instances the planning adviser was confronted with a policy vacuum which would strongly attract the able and imaginative economist. Where policies did exist it was plainly evident that even superficial modifications in the newly freed economies could improve general economic performance. Furthermore, when compared to the complicated task of staff training, policy improvement could be achieved much more swiftly and with definite results reflected impressively in rising income. Secondly, from the institution-building side, the availability of able counterparts and the great difficulty and uncertainty in "training" policy-makers were obviously strong deterrents to meeting the institution-building challenge. Finally, the sheer dependency upon the planning adviser for policy advice because of the lack of experienced high level indigenous advisers was also a strong reason why the planner would have been more inclined to provide policy advice than to get mixed up in the local staff development process.

However persuasive and numerous the arguments might be in explanation or justification of the primacy of policy advisory assistance over and distinct from institution-building functions, I am personally not convinced of the validity of this proposition for two principal reasons: (1) that the provision of policy advice and the provision of policy advice in the institution-building framework are not mutually exclusive activities and (2) that the view that policy advice could be provided exclusively and indefinitely is derived from an inaccurate assumption about the applicability of a limited skill to a complicated and fast changing developing setting. It would appear that the reasons already alluded to, which seemingly justified the special emphasis upon policy advisory assistance did not exclude the range of possible institution-building activities in the planning field in East Africa. In fact, both activities should have been jointly and interlockingly programmed. My reason for emphasising this proposition is less a belief that the inherent difficulties in such an approach to providing planning assistance could be easily surmounted than that such an approach constitutes the only sure and long-term solution to a problem that transcends the short-term and marginal gain of having outsiders decide on what a country's national economic policy ought to be.

It would seem further that the failure to deal adequately with this problem and pursue a resolution of the conflicts inherent in institutionalising the policy advisory service was as much the responsibility of the aid agencies providing planning advisers as of the advisers themselves. In fact, it could be argued that it was foremost the task of the agencies providing advisers to build the design into their own aid strategy plans. However one assesses the blame, it is clear that in the decade since independence in East Africa a very important opportunity has been lost to maximise high level advisory assistance due to the failure to seriously attempt to systematise and institutionalise this process in an effective staff development programme.

In addition to the reconciliability argument it would appear that another important reason why a workable solution should have been found to the policy advisory service-institution-building conflict is the logic that the

feasibility of outsiders providing policy advice from a basically economic point of view would be extremely short lived given the rapid emergence of competing political interests and the dynamic impact of social change in East Africa on economic decision-making. The swift convergence of these forces, already evident by the mid-sixties, indicated a short time horizon for economic policy-making in the relatively unencumbered fashion of the earlier years. Clearly the steadily increasing complexities in which economic decisions would have to be made demanded a broader and deeper understanding of the East African societies than could be expected from most short-term economic advisers. In such circumstances the danger was that technically correct and economically recommendable policies might not reflect what was politically possible or socially acceptable. It was at this juncture that greater responsibility for a more profound assessment of the whole range of forces affecting economic policy would have to be assumed primarily by local experts rather than by foreign advisers. Where this reversal of roles did occur, the chances were raised that adequate consideration would be given to a broader set of important variables affecting policy-making. Where it did not happen one began to witness the accumulation of useless recommendations and sometimes adoption of unimplementable policies with resultant frustration and feelings of ineffectiveness on the part of expatriate policy advisers.

Moving along into the seventies one can now discern three significant shifts in the planning process in East Africa: first, a change in the management of planning; second, a variation in the style of planning; and third, a shift in the politics of planning. In visible contrast to the early sixties when foreign planning advisers dominated planning activities in East Africa, planning is now firmly in the control of local civil servants and political decision-makers. Tanzania was the first of the three countries to achieve this switch-around through its deliberate policy of self-reliance, whereas the process has occurred abruptly and with uncertainty in Uganda, following the overthrow of the Obote Government and the espousal of General Amin's new nationalisation. Even in Kenya, where there are currently some 34 planning advisers in the Ministry of Finance and Planning, effective decision-making is unmistakably in the hands of the chief local planners and the political leadership. The switching of roles between the expatriate planning adviser and the local planners has not occurred without some tension and frustrations. While it might be argued that a somewhat relaxed attitude towards the whole planning process is more in evidence under local planning leadership than formerly, there are no clear indications that the planning activity has deteriorated. This may, in fact, be due to the general lessening in importance and influence of the central planning machinery itself. On the other hand, it may indicate also that many Government planners, now with six to ten years of service in the planning Ministry, do in fact, make up in experience and continuity what their more qualified but inexperienced and short-term expatriate colleagues brought to their work in previous years.

The lack of any clear indication of serious slippage in the planning process is also related to the change in the style of planning. Whereas through-



out the sixties planning was heavily concentrated in the planning Ministries, which in a number of cases had to actually prepare plans for some of the operating Ministries, the process of planning is now fairly diffused throughout the operating Ministries. The proliferation of the planning units in the operating Ministries has had a definite impact on the planning activities at the centre. Certainly the vigorously active operating Ministries with strong executive leadership are not dependent on the central planning Ministries as was formerly the case. Until a *modus operandi* is worked out we can expect a certain amount of tension between the central planning Ministries and the operating Ministries arising from the assertiveness of the more independent-minded Ministries on the one hand and the non-performance of the non-functioning Ministries on the other. It is clear, nonetheless, that after the current transitional period in which the operating Ministries are setting up their planning units, the appropriate relationship between these units and the central planning apparatus will have to be redefined if the latter is to effectively continue as overall co-ordinator of development strategy.

One fact which all three East African Governments have realised after a decade of experience with comprehensive planning is that central planning cannot be successfully carried out and implemented from the centre, except perhaps through the unacceptable use of police power. From an economic point of view past experience has shown that the central planning apparatus is incapable of effectively dealing with programme development on a regional basis, in part because of the inadequacy of essential planning data, difficulties in communications and the impossible task of managing local programme development from afar. In the last few years it has become equally apparent that for political reasons it is no longer possible to concentrate planning at the centre. It might be useful to emphasise here the centrality of politics in planning in East Africa because it has not been adequately considered or understood. Failure to deal with the political factor is failure to consider one of the essential ingredients in the planning process. Examining recent experiences with development planning has even prompted some observers to caution alarmingly about the obstacle politics plays in the development process in Africa generally. Going back deep into the "cultural focus" of African societies, Professor Uchendu has asserted that the primacy of politics in African tradition constitutes a severe limiting factor on the whole development process. Thus he observes:

Polity primacy orientation helped traditional African societies to achieve social stability at the expense of sustained economic growth and development. Available evidence suggests that polity primacy orientation is an important input which cannot be ignored in any analysis of the socio-cultural factors affecting the growth and development of traditional and modern African economies. Like religion and other forms of secular ideology, the orientation to polity primacy has certain payoff or opportunity costs which should be assessed, no matter how crudely.<sup>9</sup>

9 Victor Uchendu, "Polity Primacy and African Economic Development", p. 629, in the *Proceedings*, University of East Africa, Social Science Council, 5th Annual Conference, Nairobi, 8-12 December, 1969.

The response to the growing political demand for a larger local involvement in the planning process has been met by several apparently serious moves to institutionalise planning at the Regional, Provincial and even District levels. While Kenya and Uganda are still developing the machinery and organising the training programmes for Regional and District planning officers, Tanzania formally created a programme of decentralised development with the adoption of *The Decentralisation of Government Administration (Interim Provisions) Act*, effective 22 July, 1972.

The heart of the new Tanzanian experiment is the establishment of a national system of Regional Development Committees and District Development Councils with broad responsibility for planning and implementing development locally. The Regional Development Committees are empowered, "to consider, advise upon, formulate and implement development projects affecting the whole of the Region; to advise upon and assist in the implementation of development projects undertaken in respect of any District within the Region by the District Development Council of that District".<sup>10</sup> In similar fashion the District Development Councils have been made responsible for "planning and implementation of projects and programmes affecting agriculture, public health, education, commerce, industry, promotion and development of ujamaa and co-operative movements, natural resources, public works, water and land development within the District for which it is established".<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, every District Development Council is required to establish a District Development and Planning Committee with responsibility for "formulating projects and programmes for consideration by the Council and supervising the implementation of the projects and programmes approved by the Council".<sup>12</sup> It is obviously too early to speak about appraising the Tanzanian experiment in decentralising planning and it is quite evident that such a scheme will not become firmly established and operational without serious problems and setbacks. What is clear, however, is the realisation on the part of the Tanzanian political leadership of the shifting politics of planning and its strong commitment to the success of this new programme as is evidenced by the assignment of top civil servants and political cadres to serve as Directors of the Regional Development Committees and the provision for direct funding of the committees' development programmes.

My remarks have thus far emphasised the vanishing role of the planner-adviser as we have known it in East Africa during the decade of the sixties. Personally, I welcome this trend, which is basically altering an unacceptable, but expedient dependency relationship between national Governments and external technical assistance, and I believe too much time has been spent trying to propose new arguments to justify continuance of this old order. The implication of this analysis is not that there is no longer any need for outside competent assistance in the planning field in Eastern Africa. To the contrary,

10 *The Decentralisation of Government Administration (Interim Provisions) Act*, 1972, p. 374.

11 *Ibid.*

12 *Ibid.*, p. 375.



there will be a need and place for able skilled technicians from outside East Africa for some time yet, but I think the form and kind of assistance should be tailored to fit a new reality. The concept of the planning adviser, the generalist economist who could become an expert transportation planner and policy adviser in Kenya or Tanzania after six months and in the meantime prepare numerous ad hoc memoranda on various other subjects which can and should be prepared by local planners, is clearly passé. Such technical assistance is ultimately of marginal value to the country receiving it and can no longer be justified by donor agencies on a purely cost-returns basis.

While I propose no final design of what useful technical assistance in planning ought to look like in East Africa in the immediate future, I would like to suggest that it be built around two precise propositions: (1) the provision of executive management and professional development training within the planning apparatus and (2) the provision of highly competent expertise to work within the planning Ministries on special, precisely defined research subjects related to plan development.

There are several reasons why it would seem desirable for aid-giving agencies to place greater emphasis upon in-service training in the area of executive management and professional development. First, the problem of managing the planning process and developing able project and programme managers constitutes one of the most serious obstacles to plan implementation throughout Eastern Africa. The fact that most planners recruited into the planning Ministries are young university graduates with very narrow academic specialization means that generally speaking they are ill-equipped to deal with the problems of organisation, management and control that are essential to effective planning. This is particularly true now when the planning process is becoming more and more dispersed through the operating Ministries and at the Regional and District levels. If chaos and breakdown are to be avoided, the planning Ministries will have to assume a greater and more professional leadership role in organising and co-ordinating this diffused planning process. The importance of technical assistance to this problem is that it could help organise and provide the kind of in-service training in executive management that might develop this capability within the planning apparatus.

Similar in-service training programmes aimed at enhancing the professional development and technical skills of the planning service would also be a part of the training function of a reoriented technical assistance programme. However well trained a first degree holder in general economics who joins the planning service may be, he is hardly a ready-made planner. While a B.Phil. in development economics or M.A. programme may better qualify him for planning work, it is doubtful that either approach is more effective in producing a planner than a well worked out and rigorously executed in-service training programme. Such a course concentrating on analytical techniques and problem-solving methodology and using real projects as cases could possibly be a much surer way of producing a planner. One important dividend of developing an in-service training scheme is the on-going intellectual stimulation it could provide to the young and inexperienced planner.

A strong argument in favour of donor agencies adopting a definite training interest in management and professional development within the planning field is the virtual assurance that this much-needed assistance can be effectively delivered. The techniques and principles of management training and project analysis are skills and expertise that are readily available and immediately employable in a clearly defined and accepted training programme. The more important and convincing reason, however, for emphasising this training function is the institution-building benefit and lasting impact it might have on the planning machinery of the Governments of East Africa. However one might regard the notion of institution-building, it does imply an attempt to achieve permanency, continuity and self-reliance, all of which might be considered requisite elements in planning in volatile and rapidly changing societies.

The second shift in technical assistance that might be usefully explored is towards the provision of highly competent experts to work within the planning Ministries on special, precisely defined research subjects related to plan development. The aim of this kind of assistance would be to raise the selectivity of foreign recruitment to ensure that only qualified specialist personnel would be brought in to undertake highly technical assignments. The form of this work would be primarily designing and carrying out special research projects within the Ministry on key issues and problems related to national development strategy. An attractive feature of this design is that it would help to develop a capability within the planning apparatus to pursue research of fundamental importance that is directly responsive to the needs of planning.

Apart from being a feasible and at the same time acceptable task for foreign assistance officers, the development of a highly competent research capability could be one of the most important contributions possible to development planning in East Africa at this time. For in addition to re-examining the form of development planning carried out during the past decade, the East African states, as most of Africa, must also begin to reassess critically more fundamental questions of development strategy itself. The generally disappointing economic performance of the first development decade and more recent clear indications of an unstable and changing international economic order, raise grave doubts about economic development strategy that is based primarily on the creation of investable surpluses from expanded export-oriented agricultural economies. Whether or not the slow rate of development should be attributed to structural or functional problems there is a growing feeling that more authentically African development strategies have yet to be designed. As one African commentator has observed, "if we look at the record of African countries over the past ten years, we see them seeking desperately to contain the demands of economic growth and alien technology within a social and political structure partly borrowed and partly invented, which are seldom reinforced by indigenous tradition".<sup>13</sup>

13 M. O. Ibezim, "Planning for the Future Economic Challenge", *Africa*, No. 16 (December, 1972), p. 29.



At the same time Britain's entry into the European Economic Community and the consequent effect upon Commonwealth trade preferences plus the growing attitude of *dégage* in the United States increases the pressure for urgent reappraisal of development strategy for the three East African states. To re-examine basic strategy functions will require new and more penetrating analyses of the structural and institutional bases of the East African economies. An obvious implication of this kind of research is that it will have to involve not only economists, but sociologists, political scientists and legal experts as well. The hoped-for result would be the establishment of a rich resource of information and analyses within the planning Ministries themselves. Such a resource could create the atmosphere and data basis for imaginative planning. Hopefully it would also stimulate the kind of creative initiative and innovative thinking so important for evaluating and remodelling development strategy.

Until now planning Ministries in East Africa have theoretically looked for research support to the university research bureaux and major donor studies such as the recent ILO unemployment study in Kenya.<sup>14</sup> The results of this arrangement are very uneven and the long-term prospects for significant improvement are not encouraging. As regards the research bureaux, in my more cynical moments I tend to despair that a direct and systematic involvement in Government research will ever be academically acceptable. Perhaps a university research bureau should not be bent that way after all. The problem of the major donor studies is somewhat different. While these agencies have quite successfully produced general country economic surveys there is some scepticism about the coherence and translatability of studies like the recent ILO study on unemployment in Kenya which involved 62 full-time, part-time and consulting experts and was carried out over a two-month period. One of the major problems with these kinds of very valuable and massive studies is that they are hardly digestible. In any event, planning Ministries could not commission such studies on every subject nor could they regularise the planning process around such undertakings.

One real value of an in-Planning Ministry's research capability is the solid basis it could provide for policy and programme decision-making and for ridding planning of the "ad hocism" that disproportionately characterises it in East Africa today. This new level of planning will only be achieved if policy-makers and planners can have the benefit of the best possible in-depth analyses of the factors and variables affecting national incomes, employment levels, taxes, industrial development potential, foreign aid, educational expansion, agricultural development and so on. And the only place that this flow of information can be systematised is in the planning Ministry itself.

<sup>14</sup> Reference here is to the 600-page study which was published in November, 1972, entitled, *Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya*. This massive volume which is similar to the ILO employment strategy surveys for Colombia and Sri Lanka proposes a far-ranging set of recommendations to achieve income equity in Kenya, including a freeze on higher income brackets, a minimum income policy, a reinvigorated family planning programme, more intensive use of labour in industry, a national small-scale industries programme, tax reform, educational reforms, more thorough screening of foreign private investments and greater selectivity in accepting foreign aid.

In the decade and a bit since independence has come to East Africa, commendable economic progress has been achieved and much of this is due to the judicious use of some form of comprehensive planning in all three states. Looking to the period ahead one sees modifications of the old constraints on the planning process and new challenges which require shifts of varying degrees in the form and uses of planning in the immediate past. It seems logical that shifts in the form and uses of technical assistance in the planning field would also be appropriate at this time. At least this subject needs urgent exploring if the future performance of technical assistance will match or significantly improve on its earlier contribution to development planning in East Africa during the sixties.



APPENDIX A  
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST: CURRENT PRICES

Year	East Africa									
	Tanzania			Kenya			Uganda			
1968	5,190	258	913	62	6,423	4,154	246	351	5,104	1,211
1969*	5,437	268	974	67	6,746	4,551	309	347	309	1,211
1970*	6,054	292	1,025	88	7,459	5,104	347	129	129	1,211
1968	1,764	173	180	62	2,179	1,211	129	139	129	1,211
1969	1,834	179	192	67	2,272	1,286	139	157	139	1,286
1970	1,908	191	203	88	2,395	1,424	157	174	157	1,424
1968	1,646	57	521	—	2,224	1,327	69	274	69	1,327
1969	1,630	59	539	—	2,228	1,444	74	265	74	1,444
1970*	1,733	63	569	—	2,365	1,567	86	328	86	1,567
1968	1,780	28	212	—	2,020	1,616	99	122	99	1,616
1969	1,973	30	243	—	2,246	1,821	96	114	96	1,821
1970*	2,413	38	248	—	2,699	2,113	104	150	104	2,113
1968	1,845	784	144	150	4,154	2,462	150	114	150	4,154
1969	2,422	726	145	150	4,551	2,731	150	114	150	4,551
1970*	2,731	784	144	150	5,104	3,044	150	114	150	5,104
1968	1,797	269	272	104	1,797	1,797	269	104	104	1,797
1969*	1,734	252	269	104	1,734	1,734	252	104	104	1,734
1970*	2,751	836	854	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,690	1,690	1,690	140	1,690	1,690	140	114	140	1,690
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1970*	2,751	2,751	2,751	140	2,751	3,044	140	114	140	3,044
1968	1,734	1,734	1,734	140	1,734	1,734	140	114	140	1,734
1969*	1,734									



## APPENDIX B

## PER CAPITA INCOME CHANGE 1957-1971

	Total gross domestic product	Total population	Per capita income	Yearly change in per capita income
	U.S. \$ Million	Million	U.S. \$	%
1957 Kenya	576.54	7.43	77.59	—
Tanzania	435.46	8.76	49.82	—
Uganda	410.84	6.20	66.26	—
East Africa	1,412.65	22.39	63.09	—
1958 Kenya	582.68	7.65	76.16	-1.8
Tanzania	439.68	8.92	49.29	-1.0
Uganda	411.06	6.36	64.63	-2.4
East Africa	1,433.43	22.93	62.51	-0.9
1959 Kenya	601.41	7.88	76.32	+ 0.2
Tanzania	467.26	9.08	51.46	+ 4.4
Uganda	416.47	6.51	63.97	- 1.0
East Africa	1,485.14	23.47	63.27	+ 1.2
1960 Kenya	631.40	8.1	77.95	+ 2.1
Tanzania	518.28	9.2	56.33	+ 9.4
Uganda	425.88	6.7	63.56	- 0.6
East Africa	1,575.56	24.0	65.64	+ 3.7
1961 Kenya	629.16	8.4	74.90	- 3.9
Tanzania	541.80	9.4	57.63	+ 2.3
Uganda	437.92	6.8	64.40	+ 1.3
East Africa	1,608.88	24.6	65.40	- 0.3
1962 Kenya	683.48	8.6	79.47	+ 6.1
Tanzania	586.32	9.6	61.07	+ 5.9
Uganda	438.48	7.0	62.64	- 2.7
East Africa	1,708.28	25.2	67.78	+ 3.6
1963 Kenya	725.76	8.8	82.47	+ 3.8
Tanzania	639.52	9.8	65.25	+ 6.8
Uganda	493.08	7.2	68.48	+ 9.3
East Africa	1,858.36	25.8	72.02	+ 6.2
1964 Kenya	787.64	9.1	86.55	+ 4.9
Tanzania	672.56	10.0	67.25	+ 3.0
Uganda	569.52	7.4	77.00	+12.4
East Africa	2,029.72	26.5	76.59	+ 6.3
1965 Kenya	805.56	9.4	85.69	- 1.0
Tanzania	669.20	10.2	65.60	- 2.5
Uganda	627.76	7.6	82.60	+ 7.3
East Africa	2,100.25	27.2	77.21	+ 0.8
1966 Kenya	1,064.56	9.6	110.89	+29.4
Tanzania	762.16	10.4	73.28	+11.7
Uganda	652.96	7.7	84.80	+ 2.6
East Africa	2,479.68	27.8	89.19	+15.5

## APPENDIX B (Continued)

	Total gross domestic product	Total population	Per capita income	Yearly change in per capita income
	U.S. \$ Million	Million	U.S. \$	%
1967 Kenya	1,118.88	9.9	113.01	+ 1.9
Tanzania	796.88	10.6	75.17	+ 2.5
Uganda	694.12	7.9	87.86	+ 3.6
East Africa	2,609.88	28.5	91.57	+ 2.6
1968 Kenya	1,237.32	10.2	121.30	+ 7.3
Tanzania	1,035.72	12.3	84.20	+12.0
Uganda	912.24	8.1	112.62	+28.1
East Africa	3,185.28	30.4	104.77	+14.4
1969 Kenya	1,333.36	10.9	122.32	+ 0.8
Tanzania	1,068.20	12.6	84.77	+ 0.6
Uganda	1,047.20	9.5	110.23	- 2.1
East Africa	3,449.04	33.04	104.38	- 0.3
1970 Kenya	1,447.04	11.2	129.20	+ 5.6
Tanzania	1,152.48	12.9	89.33	+ 5.3
Uganda	1,186.92	9.8	121.11	+ 9.8
East Africa	3,787.84	33.9	111.73	+ 7.04
1971 Kenya	1,591.80	11.7	136.05	+ 5.3
Tanzania	1,218.56	13.2	92.31	+ 3.3
Uganda	1,304.24	10.1	129.13	+ 6.6
East Africa	4,114.60	35.0	117.56	+ 5.2

Source—The East African Community's *Economic and Statistical Reviews*.