

# Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy

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Kenya's relations with the external world have been handled with a great deal of caution uncharacteristic of many African Governments whose activities in external affairs have been openly aggressive on issues concerning decolonisation, non-alignment, and liberation of African territories under racist regimes. The extensive socialisation of African labour during the colonial period that led to the outbreak of Mau Mau in the early fifties was interpreted as a significant movement towards socialist persuasion in her domestic politics, a supposition which was expected to spill over into international relations and make Kenya a member of the international socialist movement. This school of thought interpreted Mau Mau as a socialist oriented peasant rebellion based on mass consciousness evincing concrete social formation and class consciousness. The supposition was, in substance, that the social and economic structure had attained significant social formation with visible classes whose further development would be facilitated by the committed socialist leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, Bildad Kaggia, Oginga Odinga, and others.<sup>1</sup> This trend of thought dominated the period shortly before and immediately after independence in December, 1963. During the first year of independence, however, it became evident that Kenya had not lived up to this expectation for she had adopted an extremely moderate and, indeed, a cautious stance in handling her external affairs. She has effectively maintained a "low-profile" on many of the burning issues in Africa and elsewhere, a style of diplomacy that is best described as *quiet diplomacy*. It is a style which avoids radical aggressiveness which she cannot defend or promote. It is a diplomatic posture which recognises that the uses and functions of foreign policy of a poor nation are to promote economic and social modernisation, tasks which require the devoted services of development diplomats. As Eugene R. Black states rather appropriately:

The development diplomat must fill the gap between the conventional diplomat and the trader and the investor. His aim should not be commercial or strictly economic; but neither should he be concerned with the narrow political objectives which sometimes overburden the regular diplomat. The development diplomat must be a man with a vocation, rather than a man with immediate terms of reference. As an artisan of economic development he should use the

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1 See Donald L. Barnett and Karari Njama, *Mau Mau From Within* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965). Earlier works also tended to give a strong impression that Kenya was bound to establish a socialist system after independence. This supposition was based upon the radical nature of Kenya's colonial experience. These works are, to mention only the most important: Jack Woodis, *Africa, The Roots of Revolt* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1963); Basil Davidson, *Which Way Africa* (London: Penguin, 1964).

tools of economics and other disciplines as best he can to place in perspective, to shed light on and to illuminate the choices before the decision-makers in the underdeveloped world.<sup>2</sup>

But to start with, a few points need to be made clear. In an essay published in 1968, John Howell contends that two major strands run through Kenya's foreign relations: a radical stand in the international arena outside of East Africa and a conservative stance within East Africa. Howell's first argument in support of Kenya's radical foreign policy is that it has greater propensities for creating national consciousness and national integration. He says:

... if at home the concept of Kenya nationhood is to remain elusive, in foreign affairs sovereignty is almost tangible. Kenya can be seen assuming the status of an independent nation and being accorded the formal respect of other well-established nation states. Kenya's leaders, possibly unconsciously, are likely to emphasise the symbols of nationhood in an attempt to consolidate domestic loyalties to the government.<sup>3</sup>

First and foremost, foreign policy integrates best at times of crises, usually under conditions of war or extreme stress. Thus the ending of hostilities usually unravels the war-time basis of solidarity. Radical positions taken by Kenya delegates at international conferences or the mere acts of diplomatic recognition of Kenya by established Governments do contribute very marginally to the alleviation of the nagging problems of integration which depend for solution mostly on the capacity of state institutions to create a meaningful framework for national identification. The people must relate meaningfully to the institutions of the state which must in turn reinforce such public responses or attract support through effective economic and political rewards. This is the crux of the matter which does underline the marginality of foreign policy in an underdeveloped country. As for Kenya, the people have enough difficulty relating meaningfully to existing institutions and are bound to have an even greater isolation from matters of foreign policy. This point must be firmly stated for there is no evidence to show that

The electorate, or at least the party faithful, will be impressed by the international prestige accorded to Kenya by an active role played by President Kenyatta's government in foreign affairs—an impression which is likely to mitigate any disappointment felt with a government unable to offer any immediate panacea to the frustrations of an underdeveloped country.<sup>4</sup>

This statement indicates that the author, Howell, does not fully understand the major forces in Kenya's body politic. First, since political parties don't really function and, as the ruling party's (KANU's) membership between 1962-1969 was uncertain, it must be equally difficult to establish who are "the party faithful" unless one is talking about that small group of parliamentarians that constitute the KANU Parliamentary Group. Second, a careful

2 See Eugene R. Black, *The Diplomacy of Economic Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 24-26.

3 John Howell, "An Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VI, No. 1 (1968), p. 30.

4 Ibid.

study of elections in Kenya from 1957-1969 reveals that foreign policy or foreign affairs have occupied a very low status in the campaigns.<sup>5</sup> Save for the short period of the Kenya-Somalia border disputes, even parliamentary debates show little interest in substantive matters of foreign policy, a fact which demonstrates that most parliamentarians don't fully understand the substance and implications of foreign policy. In what way then does the electorate become sensitised to the essence or conduct of foreign policy when the media for disseminating it, the Party and mass communications, make little effort in that direction? It is also a little puzzling to say that Kenya's electorate "will be impressed by the international prestige accorded to Kenya by an active role played by President Jomo Kenyatta's government in foreign affairs..." for international prestige derives from a whole series of factors, actual capabilities and variables, none of which Kenya commands in her presently underdeveloped status. If anything, Kenya has had to be extremely careful in her external relations. "Furthermore", Howell continues, "the government itself needs an active foreign policy as an outlet for a nationalist energy that is often frustrated at home".<sup>6</sup> The statement creates two problems. First, there is little logical connection, if any, between "a radical" and "active" foreign policy. If by "radical" he means "active" then he should say so, precisely because a radical stance primarily implies a socialist conception and interpretation of international politics, a dimension which has never been an integral part of Kenya's foreign policy. Second, he does not fully explain what he means by "a nationalist energy that is often frustrated at home". As far as we know, the "frustrated nationalist energy" refers to the social thought of the former KANU left-wing, the socialist group which thought that an independent Kenya would develop into a socialist society with maximum state intervention in an economy which is still dominated by foreign interests. When Oginga Odinga said in 1967 that Kenya was run by an "invisible government" he was referring to the control of external finance and pressure on Kenya's domestic policies intended to protect foreign interests which had so far frustrated rapid Kenyanisation of 'the economy'.<sup>7</sup> This is the unresolved domestic debate in Kenya which has little to do with whether or not Kenya materially supports liberation movements in Africa as such support is expected of every member of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). It is true, is it not, that by 1968, when Howell's article was published, the men at "the centre of policy-making" were no longer the old group who had "long-standing commitment and genuine radical persuasions" for Joseph Murumbi on whom the author had put a premium had left public life long before 1968, and Oginga

5 See G. F. Engholm's chapter in W. J. M. Mackenzie and Kenneth E. Robinson, eds., *Five Elections in Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); George Bennett and C. G. Rosberg, *The Kenyatta Election: Kenya, 1960-1961* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Cherry Gertzel and John J. Okumu, "The Little General Election in Central Nyanza, 1966", in C. Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya* (London: Heinemann, 1970), pp. 95-124 and Chapter 3; Jay E. Hakes, "Election Year Politics in Kenya", *Current History* (March, 1970), pp. 160-164.

6 Howell, "An Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy", op. cit., p. 31.

7 Ibid., p. 32. See also Oginga Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru* (London: Heinemann, 1967); and *The Mwananchi Declaration*, the manifesto of the banned Kenya People's Union.

Odinga, as leader of the new socialist opposition party, the Kenya People's Union, was no longer at the "centre of policy-making". On the contrary, Kenya's foreign policy has been cautious from the day she gained her independence. This cautious policy, although active, applies both to East Africa and to the world at large.

In the remaining portion of this article an attempt is made to examine the major factors which have conditioned Kenya's quiet diplomacy. Three major factors have been at play. First, the threat of secession in Kenya's coast and north-eastern provinces alerted her to the primary need to consolidate her boundaries. This implied, amongst other things, settling boundary disputes as advantageously as possible and consolidating the legal boundaries between her and her neighbours. Second, Kenya realised that a good neighbour policy based on mutual understanding between her and her neighbours was a logical step for the security of both her people and territory. Third, a policy of vigorous economic development at home and economic co-operation and cultural exchange with her neighbours would strengthen her position in Africa. These considerations were instrumental in determining how Kenya related to the major powers which provide her with material means of security and economic development. Finally, non-alignment was to remain a major tenet in her foreign relations.

#### CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Kenya's territorial integrity was threatened by two secessionist movements which, if successful, would have reduced her total area to approximately one-third.<sup>8</sup> These movements came into being during the last phase of British rule and one of them based in Kenya's North-Eastern Province (formerly known as the Northern Frontier District) was not settled until 1967. By their very nature, they forced Kenya's political leadership to realise quite early that successful resolution of these problems lay in caution and in co-operation with others. Although her geographical location is relatively favourable particularly due to her access to the world through Mombasa-Kilindini, one of the best harbours in East Africa, the security of her boundaries was one of her most immediate priorities after independence. Establishing the security of her boundaries was not easy, but through treaties and agreements, her geographic boundaries have finally been settled.

Of primary importance was the Kenya-Somalia border dispute which flared up in 1960, the year Somalia gained her independence. It involved attempts by the inhabitants of Kenya's North-Eastern Province to secede at the behest of the Government of Somalia, so as to become an integral part of that country.

The Republic of Somalia, composed of what were formerly Italian and British Somaliland, achieved her independence in 1960, three years before

8 See A. A. Castagno, "The Somali-Kenya Controversy", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, II (1964), passim; J. Drysdale, *The Somali Dispute* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1964); Leonard W. Doob, ed., *Resolving Conflict in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

Kenya became independent in 1963. It is perhaps the only sub-Saharan country where cultural homogeneity amongst its inhabitants creates a distinct feeling of oneness and consciousness of nationhood accentuated by common culture and language.<sup>9</sup> Historically, politicians in Somalia have always sought to "unite all those Somalis now living in French Somaliland, the Ogaden and other Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia and in the Northern Frontier Territories of Kenya now known as the North-Eastern Province".<sup>10</sup> As defined by Somalia, anybody who embraces Somali culture is a Somali and should have the freedom to join ranks with his brethren in the Republic of Somali. According to this definition, Somalis constitute by far the majority of the population of Kenya's North-Eastern Province. In point of fact, bands of Somali nomads move back and forth in this territory in search of water holes and grazing land. Somalia's claim to this territory is based on the fact that since balkanisation of Africa was brought about by European nations during their scramble for Africa, every attempt should be made by African leaders to repair the damage where conditions are favourable.<sup>11</sup> An independent Kenya, a black state, was therefore expected to cede the North-Eastern Province to Somalia since continued holding of Somalis in that territory against their will would constitute 'an imperialist act. On her part, Kenya felt that Somalia was belittling its commitment to the retention of its boundaries as they were during the colonial period. As a matter of fact, Somalia's claim to the North-Eastern Province made Kenya immediately aware of the significance of territoriality and sovereignty. This issue was so real that one of Kenya's earliest efforts as an independent state was to find ways and means of resolving the impasse without military activity, but these efforts failed.

Problems affecting the inhabitants of this area were well understood by Kenya. And even if secession of the territory would enable nomadic Somali herds to move back and forth without undue difficulty it could very easily have given the Maasai, divided between Kenya and Tanzania, an equally strong case for secession for precisely the same reasons connected with cultural homogeneity and feelings of neo-fraternity. Somalia assumed rightly that the Somali population of the territory would be willing to reunite with Somalia if a referendum were held. Thus Somalia pressed hard for the British to hold such a referendum before Kenya became independent as it was bound to strengthen and legitimise Somalia's bargaining position. Accordingly, the British Government agreed to an impartial Commonwealth Commission to investigate the nature of the problem in 1962.<sup>12</sup> The findings clearly showed that the inhabitants of five out of the six Districts in the Province wished to become an integral part of Somalia. Encouraged by these developments, the

9 Doob, *Resolving Conflict in Africa*, op. cit., p. 3; S. Touval, *Somali Nationalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 12; I. M. Lewis, *The Modern History of Somaliland* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 40-44.

10 Doob, *Resolving Conflict in Africa*, op. cit., p. 3.

11 Ibid.

12 Material used in the following four pages is taken from my assessment of the Fermeda Workshop published as Chapter 4 of Doob, *Resolving Conflict in Africa*, op. cit., pp. 57-84; see also Y. P. Ghai, "Independence and Safeguards in Kenya", *East African Law Journal*, III (1963), pp. 181-83.

Government of Somalia increased her material support for the secessionist movement of Somalis inside Kenya, a development which Kenya interpreted as direct aggression and as a threat to her territorial integrity. One of the primary tasks of Kenya was, therefore, to think of immediate ways and means of resolving the dispute short of war. This failed as fighting broke out in the area and continued into 1967. With a war on her hands, a radical foreign policy involving diplomacy by exhortation became a less viable source of the material strength needed to maintain her national security.

The problem became acute in 1961 when the two political parties of Kenya Somalis demanded secession of the North-Eastern Province. Somali nationalists demanded that a plebiscite be conducted by non-African members of the United Nations Organisation after the removal of all Kenyan African troops and police from the area. Between 1961, when the problem first became serious, and 1962, when the Commonwealth Commission was appointed, secession constituted the irreducible minimum for both the Kenya Somali nationalists and the Government of the Republic of Somalia. The Somalis wanted the findings of the Commission to be promulgated before Kenya's independence but the British and Kenya nationalists insisted that the findings be made public following effective transfer of power to Kenya. Because Kenya was about to become independent, the British Government took the view that any negotiation over the issue which involved Kenya and Somalia be carried out between the Governments of an independent Kenya and that of Somalia.

Somalis demanded secession just one month following the release of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta from detention in 1961. One feeble argument for this was that the Hamitic Moslems feared political domination by a Government dominated at the time by the Kikuyu and Luo who fought for independence under the banner of the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Although feeble, the argument is based on the immediate structural realities of Kenyan politics of the period which were dominated by a high degree of ethnic tension and demands by smaller tribes supported by foreign minorities for the establishment of a *majimbo* (quasi-regional) constitution as a protection of minority rights and property. It is, therefore, quite in order to assert that the Somali nationalists were only exploiting a problem which had chronically divided Kenyan tribes into warring political camps. The Kenya African Democratic Union, the main proponent of the *majimbo* constitution, was hesitant to admit that, in essence, their main motive was regional self-government as much as it was a struggle for power. The debates in Parliament in 1961 and 1962 demonstrate the fact that conflict between the Abaluhya and other tribes which supported KADU, and the Kikuyu and Luo who supported KANU was the result of fear of domination by the latter defined strictly in terms of the fact that the Kikuyu and Luo would unequally distribute wealth in the country after independence. This struggle went on throughout the period from 1960 to the end of 1964. For a while, therefore, the Kenya African Democratic Union supported the secessionist United Somali Association to strengthen their case for a regional constitution. This confused the whole issue until the middle of

1961 when it became clear that the Somali nationalists were not asking for regional autonomy within Kenya, but for a right to secede and to become an integral part of the Republic of Somalia. Once the issue became clear, KADU abandoned its brief honeymoon with the United Somali Association for fear of encouraging the dismemberment of Kenya. A point which must be made clear is that both KANU, the majority party, and KADU failed to inspire and to favourably compete with the Republic of Somalia for the loyalty of the inhabitants of the territory which had been very much neglected during the colonial period. Perhaps an early promulgation of a massive and effective development programme for the area would have minimised the desire for secession. The point is that Kenyan leaders were more interested in and pre-occupied with immediate arrangements for the transfer of power. They should in part bear the blame for not having acted at the right time. Thus the Somali population boycotted the 1961 elections as the major parties failed to find willing candidates to stand for seats in Kenya's legislature.

With the announcement on 8 March, 1963, that Kenya had been divided into seven autonomous regions on the basis of the *majimbo* constitution, and that the "Somali-inhabited portion of the Northern Frontier District would become one of the regions", the Republic of Somalia strongly protested against the handing over of Kenya intact to its African Government, without meeting the Somali demands for secession, a statement that implied lack of confidence in an African-ruled independent Kenya, and that further confirmed the fact that the old myth of "cultural superiority" of Hamitic Somali Moslems over Africans, a myth which European colonisers ingrained firmly in the minds of the Somalis, was strongly held. In effect, secessionist demands were partly based on this as they were on other factors discussed above.

Kenya's stand on this issue deserves further explanation. The Somali population of North-Eastern Province is not the only ethnic group in Kenya that can claim unity and secession on the basis of linguistic and cultural homogeneity and a common history. Take the Maasai as a case in point. Maasailand consists of 41,000 square miles of the eastern portion of the Rift Valley and is occupied by 191,000 Maasai; 15,000 square miles of this territory are on the Kenyan side and are occupied by 88,000 Maasai, and the remaining 26,000 square miles are on the Tanzanian side with approximately 103,000 Maasai.<sup>13</sup> As nomadic pastoralists, their cattle usually remain near permanent rivers during the dry season and are moved to wet-season pastures during rainy periods. The Maasai question, however, differs from the Somali in some major ways. Neither Kenya nor Tanzania have interfered with free movement of the Maasai population across the boundary although precautionary restrictions have been imposed from time to time whenever outbreaks of cattle diseases occur in the herds in one country.<sup>14</sup> As long as this goodwill continues among the leaders of Kenya and Tanzania, the problem of secession does not arise. Between 1960 and 1963 the Maasai leaders who

13 J. R. V. Prescott, *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries* (Chicago: Aldine, 1965), pp. 143-144.

14 *Ibid.*

supported a regional form of government for Kenya demanded the restoration of their land now occupied by the Kikuyu and European settlers rather than secession. The demand was at best an electoral strategy on their part so as to get a fair share of the spoils of independence. They had no desire to secede. And Tanzania, having most of the Maasai population, has made no claim to those on the Kenya side.

The other serious attempt at secession in Kenya was connected with the coastal strip of the former Colony and Protectorate of Kenya (as the Republic of Kenya was known before independence). Here, since 1895, a strip of land ten miles wide was the mainland possession of the former Sultan of Zanzibar and was administered by the British as an integral part of the East African Protectorate and its successor, the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, in return for an annuity. The Protectorate lay between Tanganyika (Tanzania) to the south, and the islands of Lamu, Manda and Patta to the north. The coastal strip includes the valuable ports of Mombasa and Kilindini, Kenya's rail terminus. These ports are Kenya's principal outlets. In early times Muslim Arabs formed the majority of the population of this area. They have now been outnumbered by the Miji-Kenda tribes and migrant members of other up-country tribes many of whom work on the docks.

At the approach of independence the Arabs feared, rather falsely, that they would be discriminated against by an independent African Government and demanded reunion of the coastal strip with Zanzibar where they expected safety under the former Sultan. Had this demand been granted, Kenya would have lost her gateway to the world, and Uganda its most valuable entrepôt port. The Arabs' claim to secession of the coastal strip was in essence a quest for a bill of rights to protect them as a minority. Again, like the Somali population of North-Eastern Kenya, the Arab population had been accorded a position superior to Africans during the colonial period. Thus the dawn of African nationalism and the fact that an independent Kenya would be an African state threatened the confidence of the hitherto sheltered Arab population. They had to be reassured that they had equal rights with any other Kenya citizen, and that their religious freedom and other rights would be preserved within the framework of the Constitution. However, this question was not resolved until after protracted negotiations. Accordingly, Sir James Robertson, former Governor of Nigeria, was appointed to "report to the Sultan of Zanzibar and Her Majesty's government jointly on the changes which are considered to be admissible in the 1895 Agreement relating to the coastal strip of Kenya, as a result of the course of constitutional development in East Africa".<sup>15</sup> From the start, the issue of either autonomy or secession had to be ruled out primarily because of Mombasa's strategic position as the chief port for Kenya, Uganda, northern Tanzania and the Belgian Congo. Second, the territory had been administered as an integral part of Kenya, and the boundaries between the Colony and the Protectorate had not been administratively observed by either the Government or local authorities. Third, the Sultan's

<sup>15</sup> Ghai, "Independence and Safeguards in Kenya", *op. cit.*, pp. 181-83.

sovereignty over this territory was purely nominal and, as Professor Yash Ghai has contended, "the only manifestation of it on the coast of Kenya is his flag, which flies everywhere in the strip".<sup>16</sup> Nebulous as it was, the Sultan's sovereignty was definitely a serious "emotional factor", to use Professor Ghai's shorthand, for the Arabs with which Kenya had to contend. With faith and goodwill, and through negotiations based on the Robertson Report, satisfactory constitutional provisions were made that guaranteed freedom of religion and other judico-religious and educational safeguards for this minority.

This case is in many ways similar to that of the Somalis. Muslim Arabs of the coastal strip saw themselves as subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar, a country which was, at the time, developing towards nationhood. When Zanzibar finally achieved her independence in 1963, it symbolised the same thing to Kenyan Arabs that the Republic of Somalia symbolised to Kenyan Somalis. But, while the Republic of Somalia claimed the North-Eastern Province of Kenya and refused to recognise Kenya's sovereignty over it, the then Sultan of Zanzibar did not demand the restoration of the coastal strip to Zanzibar. During the 1962 Constitutional Conference in London "the representatives of the Sultan said they were not concerned with his abstract jurisdictional rights, and would be satisfied if he could be assured that the institutions and way of life of his subjects [the coastal Arabs] would be safeguarded along the lines set out in the Robertson Report".<sup>17</sup> The Mwambao United Front, a pressure group organised by coastal Arabs, found it hard to accept the Sultan's soft line and eventual agreement, but they received no encouragement from the Sultan and the organisation died a natural death soon afterwards. Had the Republic of Somalia adopted similar procedures and accordingly discouraged the secessionist movement among Kenya's Somalis, constitutional safeguards would have been devised to accommodate them satisfactorily in Kenya although the status of the North-Eastern Province was not similar to that which obtained in the coastal strip. The Republic of Somalia did not take this course and the two countries moved from the conference table to the battlefield in a conflict which cost the Kenya Government \$70,000,000 in unplanned-for military expenditure in the early years of her independence. Thus for more than three years after 1964, Kenya and Somalia were involved in a war of attrition over the North-Eastern Province. When peace finally came in 1967 through the good offices of the Organisation for African Unity and diplomatic relations were restored, the question as to what must be done to make the detente more permanent became the primary preoccupation of Kenya and, presumably, of Somalia. Since then, trade relations have been restored and the volume of trade between the two countries is slowly rising. Besides, Kenya has also signed treaties with Ethiopia to settle her northern borders and with Uganda to settle the Karasuk question.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

## TOWARDS A GOOD-NEIGHBOUR POLICY

The problem discussed above, among others, made Kenya fully aware of the necessity for a good-neighbour policy in Eastern Africa. Her sophisticated infrastructure and economy put her in an advantageous position so far as her capacity to attract foreign investments was concerned. But in spite of this, Kenya was mistrusted by some of her neighbours who had always been fearful of her European-dominated economy that seemed open to greater foreign influence.<sup>18</sup> And her conservative fiscal policy tended, more often than not, to be explained as a function of external influence.

Despite these factors Kenya still occupies a strategic position in East Africa. It is Uganda's gateway to the sea, and provides similar facilities to land-locked Rwanda and Burundi as well as northern Tanzania. Such obvious geographical advantages may not be as significant as they are made out to be, but they do strengthen the negotiating status, even if only potentially, of a country which possesses them. Land-locked states whose import-export traffic goes through Kenya are fully aware of the vulnerability of their economies if adverse conditions were to develop in Kenya. Thus Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi feel the disadvantages of being land-locked and recognise the advantages of a good-neighbour policy in the region as a whole.

The year 1965 marked a watershed for political development in Eastern Africa. The region began to change ideologically by evincing for the first time a strong socialist dimension.<sup>19</sup> First, Tanzania's first post-independence General Election demonstrated the effectiveness of competitive democratic elections within a one-party system. The General Election marked Tanzania's first major intention "to go socialist" in its future planning. Two years later, in 1967, Tanzania's socialist programme became a reality with the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration and TANU's (Tanganyika African National

18 Uganda and Tanzania (formerly known as Tanganyika) were very reluctant supporters of the East African High Commission (now the EA Community) from its inception in 1948. Both feared economic domination from a settler-controlled Kenyan economy which they thought would spill-over into the political sphere. Although the fear was more justifiable during the colonial period, its persistence in the post-independent era means that the structural conditions which created it have persisted. For more detailed treatment of the economics and politics of East African integration, see P. Robson and D. A. Lury, eds., *The Economies of Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 23-78, 316-435; J. S. Nye, *Pan-Africanism and East African Federation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Donald S. Rothchild, *Toward Unity in Africa: A Study of Federation in British Africa* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960). It is true that in addition to ownership of the biggest farms, richest hotels and the most lucrative businesses, Europeans continue to hold key posts in the security and civil services in Kenya. This continuity is an integral part of Kenyatta's policy of non-retaliation against Europeans.

19 The problem first came to light in early 1964 with the Zanzibar revolution and her union with Tanganyika shortly thereafter. And even earlier than that, talks on the establishment of the Federal Republic of East Africa in 1963 had run into a series of troubles. In July, 1963, Uganda's hitherto positive support for immediate federation changed radically when she intimated that matters of foreign affairs, citizenship, and foreign borrowing be excluded from the list of matters to be given to the federal authority in a federate East Africa. Another difficulty was raised by Zanzibar, the smallest of the East African states, when she refused to change her demand that the federation should be a one-chamber assembly in which all states have equal representation. For Zanzibar, therefore, equality of representation was an irreducible minimum.

Union's) policy on socialism and self-reliance.<sup>20</sup> This had a significant demonstration effect not only on Kenya but on international relations in East Africa as a whole. For no sooner did Tanzania embark on a socialist policy than President Milton Obote of Uganda announced his intention to follow suit. The publication in 1969 of the *Common Man's Charter* and related documents shortly thereafter threatened to isolate Kenya and to complicate the workings of the East African Community Authority which is constituted by the heads of the Partner States, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, and makes the major decisions affecting the workings of the East African Community by unanimity.<sup>21</sup>

In the same year, 1969, a military coup d'état replaced a civilian Government in the Republic of Somalia and immediately announced that it intended to develop Somalia into a socialist state. Kenya had two immediate reactions. First, it was not clear whether the military regime would revoke the terms of the detente which had existed between the civilian Government of Somalia and the Republic of Kenya regarding the disputed North-Eastern Province. The detente had been in effect for approximately two years during which time diplomatic and trade relations had been established between the two countries. Resumption of hostilities was bound to damage Kenya's development plans for the disputed areas. Second, the military regime immediately established cordial relations with the United Republic of Tanzania with which it shared a spirit of co-operation in socialist development. Established essentially as an "observation post", Kenya's mission to Somalia became, once again, involved in a total reassessment as to whether the situation was potentially explosive. The military coup in Somalia was of special interest to Kenya for another reason. The élites in the former civilian Government headed by President Shermake and Prime Minister Egal were well known and trusted by Kenya's ruling élite, especially following the resumption of diplomatic and trade relations in 1967. The development was particularly important because the military leaders in Somalia were less known in Kenya and had themselves not been party to the 1967 agreement which ended hostilities between the two countries. Coupled with the fact that the military regime in the Sudan also flirted openly with the idea of moving the Sudan slowly to the left, Kenya found herself threatened by socialist encirclement, a development which moved her and Ethiopia much closer together than ever before, and closer still to the West, their main source of military assistance.

20 The Union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika, the 1965 General Election in the mainland of Tanzania which established competitive democratic politics within a one-party system, and the gradual movement towards socialism and self-reliance promulgated in 1967 as *The Arusha Declaration and Tanu's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance* came as a shock to Kenya. It became evident that Kenya was unhappy with this trend as the *East African Standard*, a Nairobi-based daily and the then most effective Government propaganda medium, made things appear. If any lessons are to be learned from Kenya's behaviour during this period, they amount to an interpretation that there was an attempt by Britain, working through Kenya, to isolate Tanzania.

21 These matters were later (1968) complicated by President Obote's announcement that Uganda would move to the left, and the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway.

Relations between Kenya and Ethiopia have been cordial because they share a common enemy, Somalia. One of the first treaties independent Kenya signed was a mutual defence agreement with Ethiopia specifying that if the one were attacked by Somalia, the other would go to her aid. This agreement was signed when Somalia stepped up her military activities in Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia and Kenya.<sup>22</sup> As socialist encirclement became a serious concern, relations between Kenya and Ethiopia became not only closer but also provided the kind of atmosphere that enabled Kenya to sign a further treaty with Ethiopia regarding her (Kenya's) permanent northern boundary. In other words, developments discussed above occurred in very quick succession after Kenya's independence when Britain was the only established military ally on whom she could depend. In fact, Kenya has been criticised for continuing to harbour the British military establishment, and for not diversifying effectively the sources of her military aid. Kenya has not been persuaded by these critics, for it was the British military personnel who crushed the army mutiny which broke out in 1964 just two months after Kenya's independence.<sup>23</sup> Right from the start then, a sense of mutual trust developed between Kenya and Britain who continues to be the main source of external assistance to Kenya as shall be seen later.

Kenya became aware of the essence of power in world politics when President Kenyatta was made chairman of the ad hoc OAU Congo Conciliation Commission to mediate the worsening civil strife in the Congo that threatened to turn that country into a cold-war battleground.<sup>24</sup> Many African states demanded that the good offices of the OAU be used to bring about a negotiated settlement. Thus the setting up of the Congo Conciliation Commission under Jomo Kenyatta's chairmanship came about for two main reasons. First, as a newly independent state (Kenya had been independent for approximately nine months when she was selected to chair the Commission), she had not been involved in the old quarrels and ideological divisions in the OAU between the radical Pan-Africanists headed by the late President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and the gradualists led by the late Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria.<sup>25</sup> Both Nigeria and Ghana had been directly involved in earlier military operations in the Congo. Kenya, therefore, presented a neutral factor despite the fact that she had had no prior diplomatic

22 The implementation of this mutual defence treaty depended mostly on whether or not Britain and the United States of America could be counted on to support the effort materially.

23 Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military Intervenes* (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1968); Ali A. Mazrui and Donald Rothchild, "The Soldier and the State in East Africa: Some Theoretical Conclusions on the Army Mutinies of 1964", *The Western Political Quarterly*, XX, No. 1 (1967), pp. 82-96.

24 Howell, "An Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy", op. cit., p. 36; see also the Hon. J. Murumbi's speech delivered before the United Nations General Assembly in 1964.

25 From its inception, the OAU members split into two loosely defined ideological camps militated by a series of difficult questions regarding (a) how quickly and what form a pan-African union should take and (b) whether an African High Command should be established, to mention only two. Thus African states grouped themselves as either radical Pan-Africanists led by Nkrumah or as gradualist Pan-Africanists led by Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa with President Nyerere supporting regional integration as a first step.

experience. Second, Kenyatta, one of the fathers of the Pan-Africanist movement, was thought capable of bringing the quarrelling sides together in the hope of establishing long-term peace and stability. Thus Kenyatta's towering image was a more important factor than Kenya's actual capability.

The Commission was doomed to failure from the start, for in November of the same year, USA-Belgian parachutists were dropped into rebel-held Stanleyville to remove the hostages against a barrage of opposition from African States.<sup>26</sup> Mr. Joseph Murumbi, then Kenya's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, said in the Security Council shortly afterwards that:

It was this support from the United States-Belgian governments which encouraged Mr Tshombe to ignore the resolutions of the OAU and the work of the *ad hoc* Commission. As a consequence of this, fighting became all the more intensified. It is in this context that the tragedy of Stanleyville was born.<sup>27</sup>

The fact of the matter is that the terms of reference for the Commission were relatively extensive. For apart from reconciliation within the Congo itself, the Commission was to look into ways and means of normalising the Congo's relations with her neighbours. Once effected, the basis for an adequate good-neighbour policy would be firmly laid.<sup>28</sup>

After its first meeting in Nairobi the Commission approved resolutions asking all white mercenaries and foreign troops to be withdrawn forthwith from the Congo. Another resolution was passed at the same meeting calling upon particular foreign powers to cease their intervention in the Congo immediately. The Commission then sent a delegation to the Government of the USA to explain the decisions of the Commission. Meanwhile, the Commission attempted desperately to:

...implement the decisions of the *ad hoc* Commission through the use of negotiations and good offices...but this task was made impossible by the intensified military intervention of the United States and Belgium, with the actual connivance of the United Kingdom government, which gave facilities for mounting the military intervention. This intervention, solicited under heavy pressure, in circumstances amounting to breach of faith and in callous disregard of the efforts of the OAU *ad hoc* Commission, unfolded yet another chapter in the loss of thousands of innocent lives, including those of some of the hostages.<sup>29</sup>

Thus the ad hoc Commission was not allowed time or space in which to manoeuvre to complete negotiations with the authorities in Stanleyville for the release of the hostages. One interpretation is that the United States was more concerned with the fall of Stanleyville, a communist stronghold in American conception, than with the lives of the hostages. This is particularly plausible because the former became a top military priority for the United States.<sup>30</sup> In Kenya's view,

26 Howell, "An Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy", op. cit., p. 36.

27 Murumbi's speech to the U.N., op. cit., pp. 1-8.

28 Ibid., pp. 1-8.

29 Ibid., p. 5.

30 Ibid., p. 5.

This is all the more emphasised by the fact that the United States was warned that their planned military objectives would jeopardise the chances of success of the talks and also place the lives of the hostages in grave danger. This warning went unheeded, negotiations were broken off in Nairobi by the United States Ambassador on instructions from Washington, and the military operation was mounted.<sup>31</sup>

Enough has been said to demonstrate how deeply humiliated Kenya was by the events which caused the failure of the ad hoc Commission. In her humiliation, Kenya became persuaded more firmly than ever of the importance of an adequate good-neighbour policy in Eastern and Central Africa. Most importantly, Kenya became convinced that an adventurist, radical foreign policy could not be defended by African states because they lack the power to promote such policies. Thus from the start, respect for territorial integrity, peaceful co-operation and co-existence in Africa and non-alignment in East-West power politics became the cornerstones of Kenya's foreign policy and the foundation of her good neighbour policy.

#### THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL TRANQUILLITY

Kenya has also been very conscious of her vital role as the main beneficiary in East African inter-territorial trade. In 1961 when Tanganyika (now Tanzania) gained her independence, an immediate need arose to find a new basis of co-operation among the three countries, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. As a result, the East African Common Services Organisation was established in 1961 by radically modifying the parent organisation, the East African High Commission established in 1948, to serve the new needs. Its primary function was to co-ordinate common services such as transportation, financial and social services as well as economic relations.<sup>32</sup>

The performance of the East African Common Services Organisation did not satisfy its members especially with regard to the distribution of benefits from the common arrangements. This was partly because there was no specific machinery for ensuring proper management of equitable distribution of benefits. Besides, the concentration of most of the common services in Nairobi, meant that more benefits accrued to her than to her Partner States. Accordingly, EACSO came under severe strains in the early 1960s. This brought about the *Kampala Agreement* signed in 1964 as an attempt to redress some of the problems confronting the less developed partners, especially Tanzania. The agreement was to reallocate

... certain strategic industries which had an inter-territorial significance so as to balance industrialisation and reduce deficits in Tanzania and Uganda in relation to Kenya. The arrangements were short-lived, however, largely because the industries that were allocated to some of the countries (e.g., electric light bulbs and radios to Tanzania) became of interest to all of them and no country could actually be prevented from setting up an industry already allocated

31 Ibid., p. 6.

32 *Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1971*, Part I (New York: United Nations, 1972), p. 197.

to her partners. Furthermore, there was no formal mechanism for implementing the agreement.<sup>33</sup>

Table 1 will demonstrate the trade picture more clearly.

To overcome these difficulties, a further stage in East African co-operation was reached with the signing of the Treaty for East African Co-operation in June, 1967, which created the present East African Community. This came into force in December, 1967, and sought to "strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial and other relations of the partner states in order that there must be accelerated and sustained expansion of economic activities within East Africa, the benefit of which shall be equally distributed".<sup>34</sup>

The treaty made effective provisions for a decentralising system in the structure of the Community. The headquarters of many of the statutory corporations were moved out of Nairobi. Harbours went to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Posts and Telecommunications to Kampala, Uganda, and the headquarters of the Community itself was moved to Arusha, Tanzania. The East African Development Bank was set up in Kampala with a constitution providing for "40% of its annual loans to be allocated to both Uganda and Tanzania, with Kenya getting the remaining 20%".<sup>35</sup> A system of "transfer tax" was also established whereby for a limited period, "Uganda and Tanzania could protect themselves against imports from Kenya of particular products in which they themselves had industries at an 'infantile stage'".<sup>36</sup>

According to the *Kampala Agreement*, countries experiencing a deficit in interterritorial trade were allowed to impose quota restrictions on imports from surplus countries in the common market. Tanzania in particular made immediate use of this provision to impose restrictions on a wide range of imports from Kenya.<sup>37</sup> This slowed down the expansion of interterritorial trade, especially in 1966. Although Uganda used this provision to a lesser extent, she was nevertheless conscious of Kenya's dominant position in the common market arrangement. Kenya's position is further strengthened by a series of factors. Her industrial structure shows more development and diversification, especially in manufacturing, mining and construction, and services. In terms of Gross Domestic Product, mining and construction play an insignificant role but this sector is more developed in Kenya than in Uganda or Tanzania.<sup>38</sup> Comparatively, however, industry contributes more to Kenya's Gross Domestic Product than it does to Uganda's or Tanzania's. Van Arkadi and Ghai state that:

What is most striking, however, is the variation in the degree of agriculture and services. Kenya has a highly developed service sector and, for a country in which the vast majority of the population is still rural, a surprisingly low dependence on agriculture. The contrast with Uganda is sharp. Half of

33 Ibid., p. 198.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.; P. Robson and D. A. Lury, eds., *The Economies of Africa*, op. cit., pp. 352-3.

36 *Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1971*, op. cit., p. 198.

37 Ibid.

38 Robson and Lury, *The Economies of Africa*, op. cit., p. 329.



Table 1—EAST AFRICA: INTERTERRITORIAL TRADE BY COMMODITY GROUPS AND COUNTRIES, 1959 AND 1966

	Kenya		Uganda		Tanzania		Total Interterritorial Trade
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	
	VALUE (1,000 pounds <sup>1</sup> )						
1959	6,560	2,796	2,929	3,704	1,423	4,412	10,912
Foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco <sup>2</sup>	388	1,862	1,342	342	880	406	2,610
Raw materials and mineral fuels <sup>3</sup>	5,284	826	953	2,448	268	3,231	6,505
Manufactured goods and chemicals <sup>4</sup>							
Total <sup>5</sup>	12,232	5,484	5,224	6,494	2,571	8,049	20,027
1966	7,306	3,420	2,755	4,134	1,433	3,941	11,494
Foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco <sup>2</sup>	5,209	2,100	1,430	2,958	936	2,518	7,575
Raw materials and mineral fuels <sup>3</sup>	16,277	5,588	6,245	9,312	2,268	9,888	24,790
Manufactured goods and chemicals <sup>4</sup>							
Total <sup>5</sup>	28,792	11,108	10,430	16,404	4,637	16,347	43,859
	PER CENT OF TOTAL INTERTERRITORIAL TRADE						
1959	60.1	25.6	26.8	33.9	13.0	40.4	100.0
Foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco <sup>2</sup>	14.9	71.3	51.4	13.1	33.7	15.6	100.0
Raw materials and mineral fuels <sup>3</sup>	81.2	12.7	14.7	37.6	4.1	49.7	100.0
Manufactured goods and chemicals <sup>4</sup>	61.1	27.4	26.1	32.4	12.8	40.2	100.0
Total <sup>5</sup>							
1966	63.6	29.7	24.0	36.0	12.5	34.3	100.0
Foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco <sup>2</sup>	68.7	27.7	18.9	39.0	12.4	33.2	100.0
Raw materials and mineral fuels <sup>3</sup>	65.7	22.5	25.2	37.6	9.1	39.9	100.0
Manufactured goods and chemicals <sup>4</sup>	65.6	25.3	23.8	37.4	10.6	37.3	100.0

Source: International Monetary Fund, *Surveys of African Economics*, Vol. 2 (1969), p. 80.

1 £1 = 20 shillings (Kenya, Tanzania, or Uganda) = US \$2.80.

2 SITC categories 0 and 1.

3 SITC categories 2-4.

4 SITC categories 5-8.

5 Excludes SITC category 9.

monetary domestic product in Uganda originates in agriculture, while less than two-fifths is derived from services, whereas in Kenya nearly three-fifths of total monetary product is derived from services and little more than one-fifth from agriculture. Tanzania lies somewhere in between.<sup>39</sup>

Due to the physical relationship between Kenya and Uganda, and because of the development of Nairobi as the main commercial centre for East Africa, the economies of Kenya and Uganda are closely inter-related. Uganda is a major buyer of Kenya's services. Between 1951 and 1958 Uganda showed a "negative net invisible balance with the rest of East Africa of £6.7 million, while Kenya had a corresponding favourable balance of £7 million".<sup>40</sup> Services consumed by Uganda are those mainly concerned with the transportation of her exports and imports via Mombasa, "wholesale profits of Kenya importers distributing to Uganda markets, and commercial and other services supplied to Uganda residents".<sup>41</sup> Apart from all these, Uganda's landlocked position gives her an unfavourable competitive stance in certain areas of her economic activity, especially in services.

Because of her predominant position in interterritorial trade in East Africa, Kenya is said to have a vested interest in the maintenance of the East African Community. Indeed, Kenya has been most cautious in handling stresses and strains in the relations between her and her sister Partner States. And where necessary, she has always served as an honest broker as she did when President Amin of Uganda refused to sign the East African Community Appropriation Bill in retaliation against President Nyerere's adamant refusal to do business with the military regime in Uganda.

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

Kenya is an economically dependent country and experiences a definite "backwash effect" or increased inequality in international trade as a result of deterioration of the terms of trade for underdeveloped countries. And despite positive steps in economic planning she continues to show a wide gap between "internal expenditure and internal annual revenue since independence". Wallerstein has contended that this deficit derives from "educational expansion, expansion of wage-earning opportunities, welfare and infrastructure. All four were part of a package of promises of the nationalist movement. The government was expected to assume primary, often exclusive, responsibility for providing all four".<sup>42</sup> The following table will emphasise the point effectively.

It is true that independent Kenya has experienced significant strides in her domestic performance. For example, African salaries have risen (but with an adverse effect reflected in the fact that in 1968/69, 60% of annual revenue was devoted to personal emoluments of public servants excluding

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., p. 330.

41 Ibid.

42 Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Range of Choice: Constraints on the Policies of Governments of Contemporary African Independent States", in M. P. Lofchie, ed., *The State of the Nations* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p. 23.

Source: IMF, *Surveys of African Economies*, Vol. 2 (1969), p. 182.

1 Includes purchases of land under the Land Settlement Scheme of K Shs. 47 million in 1962/63, K Shs. 85 million in 1963/64, K Shs. 75 million in 1964/65, K Shs. 18 million in 1965/66.

2 Includes U.K. Government grants under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme and U.K. loans to finance Kenya's share of pension and compensation payments to retiring expatriate officers.

3 Includes K Shs. 20 million from Mainland China.

4 Includes an estimated amount of K Shs. 100 million from the National Social Security Fund.

	1961/62	1962/63	1963/64	1964/65	1965/66	1966/67
Total external sources	254	272	410	410	288	227
Domestic borrowing: proceeds of government stock issues	6	—	—	20	16	154 <sup>4</sup>
Net changes in Treasury's cash position	30	-36	-46	-60	78	—
Changes in Treasury's foreign assets	-10	-36	-46	-60	78	—
Changes in Treasury's cash position with the banking system	-45	31	41	-83	—	—
Other	-25	-11	-13	-55	119	-10
Net increase (—) or decrease	—	—	—	—	—	—

Table 2 (Continued)

	1961/62	1962/63	1963/64	1964/65	1965/66	1966/67
Current budget	790	880	934	995	1,155	1,319
Revenue	904	967	1,081	1,138	1,285	1,296
Expenditure	114	87	147	143	130	23
Development budget	22	14	32	40	11	8
Revenue	143	188	282	272	304	402
Expenditure <sup>1</sup>	-121	-174	-250	-232	-293	-394
Development budget deficit	-235	-261	-397	-375	-423	-371
Financing	100	52	102	96	49	57
External sources	—	6	78	54	43	44
U.K. grants	100	58	180	150	92	101
U.K. loans	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total current budget	100	58	180	150	92	101
Development budget	48	76	86	70	47	10
U.K. grants	—	4	6	26 <sup>2</sup>	4	3
Other grants	88	108	118	108	79	48
U.K. loans	18	26	20	56	66	65
Other loans	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total development budget	154	214	230	260	196	126

Table 2—KENYA: FINANCING OF BUDGETARY OPERATIONS, 1961/62-1966/67 (In millions of Kenya shillings)

the police and the armed forces) and employment and share of total wages and salaries of Africans have risen while employment and share of total wages earned by Europeans have declined. As Jacob Oser states:

...employment of Europeans in public service fell from 5.6% in 1959 to 2.5% in 1965, while employment of Africans rose from 87.4% per cent to 93.1%. At the same time, the share of wages paid to Europeans fell from 36.8% to 16.1%, while the African's share rose from 43.0% to 70.4%. During the same period, in private industry and commerce, European employment fell from 6.5% to 4.6% and African employment rose from 80% to 82.1%. The Europeans' share of total wages and salaries decreased from 36.3% to 28.1%, and the Africans' share increased from 33.7% to 43%.<sup>43</sup>

Kenya's major accomplishment has been in agriculture. Here, from 1961 to 1965 approximately 1,094 European farms containing 1,421,257 acres were bought by the Kenya Government with British help at a cost of £12,600,000. By the end of 1965 approximately 35,000 families were settled on these plots. Although difficulties have arisen in many of these schemes, agricultural output has increased admirably. In spite of planting limitations imposed by the international quota agreement, coffee production rose 67% in 1965. During the same period, "tea production also rose 67%, and sisal 23%. Wheat sales increased 46%; rice 241%; pyrethrum, 29%; and sales of cattle for slaughter, 11%".<sup>44</sup>

These strides have been significant particularly for domestic political consumption and President Kenyatta has consistently made repeated references to them in his speeches.<sup>45</sup> Yet her balance of payments for the same period, 1963-1966, experienced a large trade deficit mainly as a result of deterioration in terms of trade for her primary commodities. And despite large net inflows of official capital, it is estimated that balance of payments "recorded overall deficits of \$6.4 million in 1963 and \$7.8 million in 1964, chiefly because of large private capital outflows".<sup>46</sup> The situation improved substantially in 1965 following the extension of stringent exchange control measures to sterling area countries besides Tanzania and Uganda. But in 1966 she showed a large deficit in her current account resulting from a rather rapid increase in trade deficit and a "decline in United Kingdom grants following the slowdown in land purchases under the land settlement programme".<sup>47</sup> Imports continued to rise at a much higher rate (14%) than exports (11%) and created a trade deficit of \$66.9 million compared to \$54.1 million in 1965.

43 Jacob Oser, *Promoting Economic Development* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 168.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 173.

45 President Kenyatta quoted these figures religiously on 12 March, 1966, during the Limuru Conference, when the KANU left-wing confronted him with the allegation that Africans had made little advancement towards the control of the country's economy. He pointed with pride at the Provincial Administration which had been fully Africanised by 1966. For details, see Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and J. Okumu, eds., *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970).

46 International Monetary Fund, *Surveys of African Economies*, II (Washington, DC, 1969), p. 205.

47 *Ibid.* The reader is warned that the statistics presented in these papers are incomplete and should be read with some caution.

Table 3—KENYA: DRAWINGS AND REPAYMENTS ON LONG-TERM LOANS RECEIVED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, 1963-65 (In millions of pounds<sup>1</sup>)

Drawings from	1963	1964	1965
Germany	1.2	1.4	—
IBRD	0.5	0.2	0.2
IDA	—	—	0.2
United Kingdom			
Commonwealth Development Corporation	—	0.1	0.1
Exchequer loans	7.2	7.7	8.5
Other	—	0.2	0.1
United States	—	—	2.5
Other	—	—	0.2
<b>Total drawings</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>11.8</b>
Repayments to			
IBRD	—	0.2	0.2
United Kingdom			
Commonwealth Development Corporation	0.1	0.1	0.1
Exchequer loans	0.3	6.4 <sup>2</sup>	0.5
Other	0.1	0.2	0.2
<b>Total repayments</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>1.0</b>

Source: IMF, *Balance of Payments Yearbook*, Vol. 18 (1961-65).

<sup>1</sup> £1 = K Shs. 20 = US \$2.80.

<sup>2</sup> Includes cancellation of interest-free loan amounting to £6.1 million.

Besides, Kenya's foreign debt increased consistently after independence partly due to the implementation of the development plans and partly because of a marked reduction in United Kingdom grants due to the slowing down of the land settlement programmes. As it was recently put:

Out of the total outstanding debt, about £41 million is in long-term development loans received from the UK Government and bearing interest rates of 5½% to 7%, about £32 million in funded debt raised on the London Capital market, £4.8 million in U.S. P.L. 480 aid, and £2.8 million in loans from Germany maturing in 1977 and bearing interest rates of 3% to 4½%. The balance represents long-term loans from the World Bank (£1.8 million) and from various UK development corporations. The market value of sinking funds maintained in London to finance the debt raised there on the capital market amounted to £10.0 million at the end of June, 1966.

The servicing charge on Kenya's outstanding foreign debt was estimated to total about £5 million in 1966 while for the following five years it is expected to average about £7 million annually, or about 9% of total estimated exports for 1966 [see table].<sup>48</sup>

Kenya became independent in the first development decade which saw the first (1964) and the second (1968) conventions of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD. During this decade, great efforts were made to show the patterns of aid and trade problems which faced the underdeveloped countries and to give some concrete suggestions for their

48 IMF, *Survey of African Economies*, op. cit., p. 208.

Table 4—KENYA GOVERNMENT PUBLIC DEBT, 1960-66<sup>1</sup> (In millions of Kenya Shillings)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
As at June 30							
External debt	890	1,036	1,154	1,308	1,370	1,544	1,722
Internal debt	368	348	354	352	352	364	368
Total	1,258	1,384	1,508	1,660	1,722	1,908	2,108
Total sinking fund at market value	94	104	106	134	158	181	200
Service charges							
External debt			{ 62	72	82	86	} 154
Internal debt		68	{ 20	20	22	40	
Total	56	68	82	92	104	126	154
Less receipts of interest on government loans and repayments	56	68	82	92	104	126	154
Net cost	22	30	34	36	40	56	49
	34	38	48	56	64	70	105

Sources: International Monetary Fund, *Surveys of African Economies*, Vol. 2 (1969), p. 184.

<sup>1</sup>Excluding short-term borrowing.

solution.<sup>49</sup> The decade was to bring about a new spirit of co-operation among rich and poor nations with particular concern on the part of the rich for the economic difficulties of the poor. At both conferences, there were resolutions seeking to improve market accessibility and to better international commodity agreements with a view to raising and stabilising prices for primary products, including preferential entry into richer nations for manufactured goods from the underdeveloped states.<sup>50</sup> The balance sheet of the decade leaves a lot to be desired. Although the aims were based on the assumption that trade was better than aid, it was not clear at the time that scarcity or shortage of managerial talent, foreign exchange, and other scarce resources would raise the cost of production very markedly in the underdeveloped states.<sup>51</sup> This is particularly significant when even the scarce resources have to be imported from the rich nations at high prices. Due to this particular bottleneck, argues Professor Helleiner, "trade would be better than aid only if it (aid) does not constitute a net addition to the overall resources available for the country's (recipients) uses, whether it comes in terms of machines, skilled manpower or food".<sup>52</sup> He further points out that where aid constitutes a net addition to the recipient's available resources then it would be more profitable to the recipient in that it would reduce some of the difficulties that arise from fluctuation of primary commodity prices. Perhaps only grants and gifts which carry no interests or stipulation as to their use fall into this category. Helleiner describes this tragic development as follows: "Many nations have learned too late that loans must be paid with interest. It is a tragic fact that on loan account alone, the underdeveloped world is now paying to the developed world more than it is borrowing—the capital flow so far as loans are concerned, has already reversed itself".<sup>53</sup>

What then is the balance sheet of the Development Decade? In 1964 and 1965, as cases in point, per capita income in industrial countries rose by approximately 5% and 4% respectively while in the underdeveloped world the figures show a rise of only 3% and 2% in the same period. Between 1963 and 1966, exports of underdeveloped countries rose by 6% per year. If external debt servicing requirements of the poor countries are deducted, states Helleiner, the remaining export value

... free for use in purchasing imports rose at about 5% per year. Unfortunately, import prices were not remaining unchanged but were rising on average, at about 2% per year. This means that an average underdeveloped nation's purchasing power on world markets rose on average by about 3% per year since 1963. This has been obtained in the face of substantial price reductions for these nations' exports. The World Bank's primary commodity price index for low and medium income primary producers showed a decline in this period

49 Speech delivered at the 1968 Convention of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in New Delhi by Kenya's Minister for Finance and Planning, the Hon. Mwai Kibaki; G. K. Helleiner, "Trade, Aid and Nation-Building in Tanzania", a lecture delivered to the East African Academy, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (1967), pp. 1-6.

50 G. K. Helleiner, op. cit.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

of 2% per year. It was estimated that if petroleum and other mineral producers are taken out, agricultural price index fell by approximately 4% per year. . . . Export performance has not hit the desired target, 5% in growth, in order to achieve the objectives of the development decade although there has been substantial increase in the volume of exports.<sup>54</sup>

It was evident in 1968 that Kenya was adversely affected by these trade difficulties in spite of the fact that she had successfully diversified her agricultural base by producing a wide range of tropical and temperate products. Her economy is inherently capable of more growth and her development plan provides for the expansion of cash crop production in conjunction with a massive land settlement programme. Apart from production of food grains, the plan aims at developing a diversified and intensive system of agriculture especially in animal husbandry, dairying, meat production and poultry as well as commercial crops for industry and for export. Despite this admirable effort, the real problem described above still remains, that is, that without stable prices at remunerative levels for Kenya's agricultural products in the world markets it will be difficult to realise the objectives of the development programmes which have been launched. Mr Mwai Kibaki, Kenya's Minister for Finance, described the situation very aptly in 1968:

By virtue of its contribution to my country's national product, as well as employment and foreign exchange earnings, agriculture will remain for many years to come the most important sector in its economy. During the decade 1954-1964 agriculture contributed almost 40% of the Gross Domestic Product; 1.2 million out of a total of 1.6 million families earn their living from agriculture and animal husbandry; and almost 65% of our total exports are composed of agricultural and allied products.

In spite of this fact, we still find that our major agricultural exports such as coffee, wheat, maize, tea, pyrethrum, and wattle, are subject to trade barriers, disguised and open. This type of trade barrier must be removed urgently. . . .

We are a small country, and even though we are mainly an agricultural country there is not one commodity produced in Kenya in quantities to have any impact or influence on world commodity prices. Nor is there any chance of our being able to affect world prices if we increased our production three or four fold. This being the case, we are entirely at the mercy of fluctuations in commodity prices in our major export markets for our bread and butter.<sup>55</sup>

This state of affairs makes the case for industrialisation relatively attractive. But industrialisation depends on investment for which there is a severe competition among underdeveloped countries and which results in their being left at the mercy of foreign investors who,

. . . with their bargaining power, are able to squeeze concessions which, in the long run, only contribute to capital outflows. The private investor justifies hard bargaining on his part by indicating the high risks he takes. I do not want to justify political instability, but it is clear that the so-called instability is only generated through lack of opportunity, poverty, and widespread unemployment.<sup>56</sup>

54 Ibid.

55 The Hon. Mwai Kibaki, Speech to 1968 Convention of UNCTAD, p. 4.

56 Ibid., p. 7; T. J. Mboya, *The Challenge of Nationhood* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 241-252, 266-278.

The point made here is significant for it is true that the price paid to attract investment capital, domestic or foreign, has often turned out to be more expensive than the amount of capital actually attracted. There is another equally pertinent dimension to this problem, that is, that the small volume of investment that does get made goes hand in hand with demand for a high return rate. This is the only way such investments are induced. Jacob Oser, who made an assessment of average dividends on common stock for 28 East African companies listed on the Nairobi stock exchange, found that their average dividend on common stock

. . . was 13.5% of market value in 1965. In the United States dividends for the 500 common stocks included in Standard and Poor's index averaged an annual 3.1% of the market price during the same month. Here [USA], investors are satisfied with a much lower dividend return because they feel secure and they expect capital gains on the value of the stock. In Nairobi, stock prices are depressed because a much higher dividend return is required to attract investment.<sup>57</sup>

In the face of this, Kenya continues to cultivate Britain as her major source of economic and technical assistance. Between 1963 and 1972, Britain aided Kenya to the tune of £250 million.<sup>58</sup> There were 3,609 technical assistance personnel (TAP) from abroad in September, 1971, of which 2,130 or 59% were supplied by Britain (see Table 5).<sup>59</sup>

Dependence on Britain for the bulk of economic and technical assistance has been defended on the following grounds. First, diversification of aid by country of origin increases the number of "turn-key" projects and creates problems of management and marketing for the products once the projects have been taken over by the Government.<sup>60</sup> Second, the presence in Kenya of a vast number of machines from diverse industrial states creates difficulty in maintenance and servicing especially when spare parts are not readily available.<sup>61</sup> It is said that this is why Kenya turned down a £16,000,000 Russian loan in February, 1966, despite the fact that she had signed an agreement in respect of that loan. The loan which was to be spent on the Kano irrigation scheme, the building of a powerful broadcasting station, a sugar factory, a cotton textile mill, a fish cannery, and fruit and vegetable processing factories, was turned down because, so argued Kenya, the Russians stuck to their requirement that local costs of their aided projects be financed by the importation of Russian goods.<sup>62</sup> Kenya found this unacceptable. There is also a political interpretation. It is that Russian aid was refused as a first step in

57 Oser, *Promoting Economic Development*, op. cit., p. 213.

58 *The Washington Post*, 7 January, 1973, p. 20. The figure is based on what has been made public and is on the conservative side of the total volume of British aid.

59 John Nellis, "Expatriates in the Government of Kenya", p. 8. This paper was presented to the Canadian Association of African Studies, February, 1973, held at Carleton University from 16-17 February, 1973.

60 Mboya, *The Challenge of Nationhood*, op. cit., pp. 269-272. The late Tom J. Mboya was until his assassination in July 1969, Kenya's Minister for Economic Planning and Development.

61 Ibid.; Jacob Oser, *Promoting Economic Development*, op. cit., pp. 220-21.

62 Ibid.

Table 5—TAP BY DONOR—SEPTEMBER, 1971

Donor	Number	% Total
Australia	2	0.05
Britain	2,130	59.00
Canada	92	2.60
Denmark	157	4.40
Finland	13	0.40
Ford Foundation	11	0.30
France	10	0.30
Friedrick-Ebert-Stiftung	17	0.50
Germany (West)	85	2.40
India	3	0.08
Israel	3	0.08
Japan	77	2.10
Netherlands	162	4.50
Norway	147	4.10
Rockefeller Foundation	26	0.70
Sweden	88	2.40
Switzerland	9	0.20
U.N.D.P.	160	4.40
U.S.S.R.	15	0.40
U.S.A.	369	10.20
W.H.O.	29	0.80
Yugoslavia	4	0.10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,609</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: John Nellis, "Expatriates in the Government of Kenya", *op cit.*, pp. 8-9.

the process of cleaning up Kenya's political and economic institutions of socialist influence which had developed around the former Vice-President Oginga Odinga, Bildad Kaggia, former Assistant Minister of Education, and Jaramogi Achieng Onyango, former Minister of Information and Broadcasting who was instrumental in building Kenya's broadcasting services after independence. This finally led to the Limuru Conference held the following month, 11-13 March, 1966, at which the KANU left-wing was forced out and into forming a new socialist political party, the Kenya People's Union. This development came as a result of tremendous pressure from Britain and the United States who financed the expensive party conference. Potential Russian influence was a threat to the entrenched British farming, commercial and industrial interests which control the country's economy and determine the direction of its development especially in the private sector. The urge, the desire to protect British interests in Kenya is stated to be an integral part of the "golden handshake", a set of agreements that together constituted the price of independence. These peculiarly close relations with Britain are further reinforced by mutual trade interests, the continuation of a similar outlook in the administrative apparatus—the civil service which now looks more like the colonial civil service at its peak of control—and a similar outlook of the armed forces of the two countries which has also been instrumental in preventing Kenya from diversifying its sources of armed forces' aid. There are,

therefore, no major distracting clashes of interest to the partnership between Kenya's governing élite and Britain.

#### THE PROBLEM OF NON-ALIGNMENT

In theory, non-alignment is the guiding principle in Kenya's external relations. Defined as non-commitment to the world's dominant ideological blocs, and the preservation of the right and ability to judge world issues on their own merit without undue external influence, the principle and practice of non-alignment have more often than not clashed, especially when the realities and dictates of economic development lure an underdeveloped country into alignment. For Kenya, it can be stated defensibly that the pattern of her trade and aid suggests the existence of relatively strong economic and military ties with the West. And, although she maintains smooth diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China, she has consistently been very reluctant to receive substantial economic or technical assistance from these countries. Thus if the general pattern of external private and public capital inflows is in part an indicator of the general ideological preference of Kenya's governing élite, then Western capitalism has a lot to do with its pragmatic orientation to the practice of non-alignment. Kenya's position seems to be that it is possible to be economically aligned but ideologically non-committed on cold-war issues. For although she is not capable of much influence in international power politics, it is convenient for her to assert her ideological independence of either bloc, and to insist that her sovereignty entitles her to make judgements on world issues in accordance with her own aspirations, needs and circumstances. It is at one level a quest for reciprocal friendship with all nations on condition that these nations want her friendship if friendship does not entitle a major power to choose enemies or friends for her. In other words, while she maintains economic, cultural and other ties with one or the other of the major powers, she must guard against entangling herself in agreements, military alliances and pacts that limit her freedom of action in international affairs. Further, her commitment to non-alignment rejects military bases belonging to ideologically committed nations on her soil, and insists that any mutual defence pact between her and a major power must not disable her from developing her internal material power and strength upon which her own security depends. At another level, then, Kenya's non-alignment seems to derive from a recognition of the basic weakness characteristic of all non-aligned countries which, in terms of the constitutes of power, are a power vacuum. It is in effect a theoretically defensive mechanism for, as President Nyerere of Tanzania has put it, it is not military attack or intervention that is a threat to a non-aligned state but the kinds of military influences which are brought to bear upon such a state as a result of its economic weakness. He says:

... the truth is that this economic weakness very often enables the big powers to impose their will without using military strength at all. With much less difficulty to themselves and less danger of getting themselves bogged down

in endless anti-guerrilla activities, they can use their economic strength for the same purpose of reducing our independence of action.<sup>63</sup>

In effect, economic commitment of a non-aligned state automatically reduces the options left for her to manoeuvre and further curtails her ability to judge world issues on their own merits despite the fact that possession of the right to judge world issues still obtains. President Nyerere's honesty about this point is praiseworthy. He states: "The real urgent threat to independence of almost all the non-aligned states thus comes not from the military, but from the economic power of the big states. It is poverty which constitutes our greatest danger, and to a greater or lesser extent we are all poor."<sup>64</sup>

Through non-alignment Kenya has consistently reasserted the significance of the principle of self-determination upon which one nation refrains from overt interference in the internal affairs of another, a principle upheld by both the United Nations Organisation and by the Organisation for African Unity. In the United Nations, Kenya sees a potential forum for international understanding and international peace, as well as a framework for multilateral economic interaction between industrialised countries and the poor states.

Through the OAU she seeks to play the role of an honest broker in inter-African politics and co-operation. This derives partly from her relatively strong economy and partly from Jomo Kenyatta's historical role and continuing personal prestige as one of the founding fathers of the Pan-Africanist Movement. Her commitment to decolonisation in areas of Africa still under colonial bondage is signified by her role in recent negotiations between Britain and Rhodesia to bring about an accepted settlement.

The primacy relative to the security of a nation-state, the demands of economic development and related problems, have intermingled to make Kenya's behaviour in foreign affairs cautious but positive and so far effective precisely because it has paid her substantial economic dividends and given her a seeming or at least a temporary domestic stability.

63 Julius K. Nyerere, *Non-Alignment in the 1970s*, opening address delivered on 13 April, 1970, at the preparatory meeting of the non-aligned states in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (see p. 1).

64 Ibid.

## The Demise of UPCYL and the Rise of NUYO in Uganda

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Very few colonies in Africa emerged into independence without mass support. In cases where the colonial administration resisted the rise of African nationalism, as in Algeria where African nationalist resistance expressed itself in violent and well-structured movements, as well as in cases where the transfer of power from the empire to the new state was made conditional on demonstration of popular support for nationalist leaders, a degree of mass mobilisation was an imperative. It was also necessary to have within the colony people who could respond to the mass mobilisation effort.

In Africa, so central is the place of the educated few that no mass mobilisation could ignore the young. The youth are not only mobile, they also understand the language of nationalists because of their exposure to new forces, including Western education on the basis of whose ideas much of the nationalist movement was premised. Because they had vigour, mobility, and an interest in abstract ideas the nationalist parties found it necessary to enlist the support of the active and anxious youth. But while the process leading to independence has always tended to unite people, the post-independence era has tended to be divisive. The youth are active before independence; they work in the mobilisation effort. Do they remain active and respectful of their nationalist leaders after independence?

In this paper I examine an experience which might shed some light on this question. The focus of this paper is on the relationship between two wings of what was one Party: 'The Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC) and the Uganda Peoples' Congress Youth League (UPCYL). I examine this relationship from 1960, when the Party was formed, to 1966 when Uganda experienced a major political crisis. A number of important phases are included in this time span. There are the elections of 1961 and 1962; independence in 1962 and the period after. The analysis will include an examination of the gradually deteriorating relationship between the two wings of the Party, the issues upon which these conflicts were based and the response which the UPCYL aroused as the rift between it and the Party increasingly became evident. An evaluation of the response from the UPC-controlled Government will be attempted, and finally some theoretical observations about the relationship between youth and their political elders after independence will be made.

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1 The past tense here is important because under the military Government, the UPC along with other parties is now no more.