

Later in the book he reiterates points worthy of repeating to a Tanzanian audience, and even to the common lawyer,¹¹⁵ that “unswerving adherence to the law by the courts themselves is of fundamental importance in fulfilling the basic functional aim of the administration of justice—the safeguarding of legality”¹¹⁶ and that “the infringements of socialist legality clearly cannot be justified on grounds of expediency”.¹¹⁷

So far we have dealt with the concept of legality in Soviet Legal Science; the element which distinguishes it from “rule of law” is that of being “socialist” legality. The epithet “socialist” is a condition legitimising the obligation to obey laws and makes the principle meaningful. It directs attention to the content of the legal rules which must serve the interests of a socialist State. The affirmation of a principle of socialist legality in a one-party state such as Tanzania, is dependent on agreement in the Party of fundamentals and their communication to the Executive.

115 Predominating Anglo-American jurisprudence recognises law-making power in judges, e.g., Hart's concept of the “penumbra”, see H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), Chap. 7; J. Stone, *Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), discusses a related theory of “judicial legislation”. References can also be made to Pound, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*, op. cit., Chap. 3, and Cardozo, *The Nature of Judicial Process* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921). The Marxist approach smacks very much of the old theory of mechanical jurisprudence.

116 Ibid., p. 358.

117 Ibid., p. 334.

Economic Differentiation in Ismani, Iringa Region: A Critical Assessment of Peasants' Response to the Ujamaa Vijijini Programme

ADHU AWITI*

PREFACE

My assessment of class differentiation and class struggle in Ismani Division begins in the 1950s when the capitalist mode of production was already established in the area as elsewhere in the country. I discuss neither the hitherto existing mode of production prior to colonial conquest and occupation nor the colonial historical process of establishing the capitalist mode of production. A study of the pre-colonial mode of production of African society, and why such societies were defeated by the colonial forces would be, to say the least, an important scientific contribution towards a correct understanding of present African society and its contradictions. Such a task—I dare say—is the fundamental duty of the African revolutionary intellectuals.

I have not, however, addressed myself to such a monumental and cardinal question in this report which is still in its preliminary stage. I have instead, addressed myself to the current pressing problems of rural development strategy in Ismani Division, Iringa Region. In attempting to analyse such problems, I have avoided the purely technical aspects of rural development. Nearly all the research studies of rural communities have concentrated on the study of rather technical subjects such as livestock development, rural water supply, the uses of extension service, co-operative movements, financing rural development programmes and so on. Those who have carried out such research studies have, to say the least, carefully and wittingly written their reports within the purview of bourgeois liberalism. I object to such an approach and presentation because I consider it to be unscientific.

I have instead attempted—notwithstanding my own theoretical confusion which arises mainly from my petty bourgeois background—to raise what I believe to be fundamental questions facing the rural development strategy in Iringa.

The material used in this report was collected from four ujamaa villages in Ismani, Iringa. Some comrades have made useful comments on the material collected and the method of presentation; friends have also offered useful comments and criticism, and I would welcome more of them for without such discussions and debate it is impossible for anybody to arrive at a correct

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understanding of the continuously unfolding socio-economic formation of a given society.

INTRODUCTION

Ismani Division is located in the middle zone of Iringa District between the highland zone of Dabaga and the lower zone of Pawaga and Idodi. In Ismani the altitude ranges between 4,000 and 5,000 feet. This is the most important area of Iringa District at present since most of the economic activities are concentrated in this zone. The climate is tropical savannah with a fairly high temperature and rainfall lasting from late November/early December until late April/early May. The rainfall, averaging about 25-30 inches annually, is unevenly distributed and is followed by several months of dry weather. Ismani Division is located 10-30 miles north of Iringa town along the Dodoma/Iringa road. It covers approximately 200-300 square miles with a population of about 26,000 during the dry period and 52,000 people during the wet season (1967). The Division is further divided into four administrative units or wards, namely Nduli, Kihorogota, Mazazi and Malenga Makali. The whole area covers approximately 250,000 acres of arable land. Sunflower, beans, cassava and groundnuts are grown but maize is the main crop and encompasses over 80% of the farm economic activities in the area.

Ismani is populated by peasants from many ethnic groups, for example, Wahehe, Wabena, Wakinga, Wangoni, Wagogo and Wanyakyusa. They are settled together as Tanzanians. Swahili is the language commonly used by the entire farming population, Government workers and rural petty traders. There is no dominant culture of one ethnic community, but a mixture of the varied social backgrounds.

ISMANI SETTLEMENT IN THE 1950S AND 1960S

Ismani was an area of new settlement with many migrant farmers coming from all over the country to farm there. Most of them, however, came from the Southern Highlands. Prior to the Second World War, Ismani was sparsely populated by the Wahehe people. In the period prior to early 1950s, before the settlement of migrants in the area, the whole of Ismani was bush inhabited only by wild animals such as elephants, lions, giraffes and antelopes. The reasons why people did not settle in the area before the late 1940s and early 1950s are not quite clear yet, but the following have been suggested by several people we interviewed. First, people did not settle in Ismani because there was no perennial water source for human and animal use. Second, Wahehe peasants occupied land available elsewhere in Uhehe. Third, quite a number of peasants were forced to work on European farms, the Lupa Goldfield and road construction, so there was no immediate cash need to increase the farm size in the native occupied areas. Fourth, livestock keeping was the most important economic activity, but this was mainly concentrated in the Pawaga and Idodi areas which were not thick bush, and where water was available for animal and human use. The perennial water source was supplied

by rivers, including the Little Ruaha and some parts of the Great Ruaha. The area is generally very favourable to livestock, so that even now the main concentration of livestock in Iringa District is in the Pawaga, Idodi and Izazi areas. Apart from the above, one could add that lack of knowledge of how good the soil of Ismani was for maize farming and the general fear of dangerous animals in the area could have been possible factors preventing many peasants from elsewhere in the District from settling there.

Settlement in Ismani began on a major scale only after the Second World War when the colonial policy started to persuade African peasants to earn money through their own agriculture. In the early part of 1949 some African migrants, chiefly those resident in Iringa Township (lorry drivers, former sisal workers, former mining workers, shop-owners, shop assistants and mechanics for bicycle repairs), successfully applied to the *Jumbe*¹ of Ismani area for land. In addition to those migrants coming from Iringa town, there were also a substantial number of migrant peasants coming from the Rungemba and Kiponzelo areas. The new migrant peasants and workers typically asked for an area of land ranging from five to ten acres. Their requests were granted by the *Jumbe* of Ismani. Similarly, there were Government officials working for the Uhehe Native Authority in Iringa who also applied for and were given land. The people who came to Ismani did so mainly because they wanted to farm on a commercial basis. Those who lived in Iringa came to Ismani with money which they had saved from salaries or from trade. When they started farming around 1951 or 1952, they needed labour to work on the farms. At that time there was famine in the central part of the country, including Dodoma, and so they were able to hire Wagogo to work on the farms. The Wagogo workers were sometimes paid wages, but most of the time they were given only food. This also applied to some Wabena and Wakinga workers. There was no ceiling on the amount of land one could use and from the start those people who had some money were able to clear and establish claims to large farms.

After the formality of obtaining land was completed, the migrants could begin to work on the farms. The method of farming used was relatively simple. Trees and bushes were cut down and then burned during the dry season. In the process nothing was left except charred tree stumps and a rich residue of wood ash. There was no tilling of land and seeds were broadcast when it started raining. The Agricultural Field Assistants reported that germination was naturally good as the land had benefited for many years from the growth and decay of grass and leaves, and the potash residue of wood helped to improve further the fertility of the top soil.

The same practice was carried out the following year: maize stalks were burned and seeds again broadcast without any pretence of cultivation. In the

¹ The history of the Wahehe people shows that the whole Hehe nation was under the rule of a single feudal King. Under the King, there was the *Jumbe*—right-hand man of the King. The colonial administration, through the method of indirect rule, used this same Hehe system to rule the Wahehe. Under traditional rule, the *Jumbe* was the authority who allocated land. This method of land allocation was used in Ismani.

third or fourth year as the top soil began to harden it became more difficult to broadcast seeds without cultivation. At this point, because the tree stumps and the roots which had been left made cultivation difficult, the land was usually abandoned and new areas were cleared for farming. This method was preferred because it yielded better results; for example, at that period one acre produced about 12 bags of maize. This was profitable because there was no expenditure on cultivation and the farmers weeded only once and not two or three times as became necessary in the years that followed. The method of shifting cultivation began to make land scarce because those who moved to farm in new areas, abandoning the previous areas where they had started, considered such new areas to be theirs, while it was accepted that nobody could claim the previous areas they had temporarily left. This meant that they could come back to the previous farms while at the same time maintaining the new areas. This is why most of the well-to-do farmers in Ismani owned several plots of land in several villages in the area. But these well-to-do did not reside in the area. As we have indicated, the majority of farmers were migrants from other parts of the District. There were, for example, complaints from the Ismani *Jumbe* that the new migrants paid labourers to work on their farms, but they did not own a house or cattle and did not pay taxes to the *Jumbe*. Because of rapid acquisition of huge land areas without the use of modern methods of farming, and the farmers' method of evading tax payments to the *Jumbe*, the colonial Government was forced to consider introducing more effective measures to control land acquisition in the area.

Specifically, the Native Authority, working together with the District Commissioner and the Department of Agriculture, decided to assert some control over land acquisition. They argued that if there were no controls the widespread practice of grabbing land would lead to severe soil erosion and a rapid decrease in production. The measures to be taken to control cultivation in Ismani were spelt out in a circular letter, written by the District Commissioner to the Provincial Agricultural Officer on 9 June, 1951.

A. Existing cultivators . . . with plough [are to be allowed] a maximum acreage [of] 50 acres per plough [and] a maximum acreage per family/household [of] 100 acres, which may be extended subject to permission of the Native Authority being obtained after consultation by the latter with District Commissioner and Agricultural Assistant.

B. Existing cultivators with hoes [are to be allowed] a maximum acreage [of] 30 acres per hoe [and] a maximum acreage per family/household [of] 50 acres.²

These limits applied to new as well as old migrant farmers. In order to carry out the above measures a Field Officer (Agriculture) was seconded to the settlement "scheme" in 1955. The Native Authority worked out a Five-Year Development Plan³ for the Ismani settlement; the actual expenditure incurred over the period 1953-55 was Shs. 85,336/-. This money was spent

² From the records of the Ismani African Maize Growers' Co-operative Society.

³ I was unable to find the plan document itself. I saw instead secondary references which were unfortunately not complete.

mostly on salary, transport and official travelling expenses for the Field Officer and on a demonstration farm in Ismani.

Attempts to control land-holding and to introduce modern ways of farming did not meet with any success in Ismani. The migrants who came to cultivate maize in the area did not plan to reside there, so considered the area merely as a temporary place to stay and did not have any interest in fallowing methods which would have maintained soil fertility. It was because they considered that the area did not belong to them (since they did not have legal rights of land ownership and land use as such) that they were deterred from considered long-term investment in the area. They were interested in short-term investment that generated immediate surpluses or profit. Some of the well-to-do farmers who owned more than 100 acres during the early 1950s applied for commercial bank loans before independence, but they were refused by the District Loan Committee of which the District Commissioner was the Chairman. They were given many reasons for not being granted loans: for example, that the application form was not filled in well or that it was submitted too late. But the most important reason was that the well-to-do farmers who applied for loans did not have sufficient security and possessed no legal rights to the land they used. Those who bought tractors (mainly secondhand) in this period did so only from the surplus they gained after the sales of crops (the surplus itself, it is worth noting, generated by hired labour).

In the early 1950s, after the milling company Unga Limited established a factory in Iringa, a good number of Asians and Arabs in the town became interested in buying maize from the farmers. There were cases where the Asian merchants made secret contracts and agreements with some influential farmers. They agreed on certain prices but these arrangements were often not fulfilled if there had been good yields because the merchants would argue that there was too much produced and that the prices which they had agreed upon would have to be lowered. In some cases, the contracts between the Indian merchants and the well-to-do farmers were arranged in such a way that the latter would take some foodstuffs on credit which would be used to pay the workers on their farms. This meant that the well-to-do had to sell their produce to the merchant who had provided them with the foodstuffs. This system lasted for one or two seasons only. The richer farmers wanted to sell their produce to the highest bidder, so they abandoned this system as soon as they were able to pay and feed labourers during the weeding periods from their own resources. The Asians, despite the Africans' refusal to have contracts with them, still were able to dominate maize-buying in the whole Ismani area because they had transport facilities to go to the village centres. They were making huge profits. For example, they bought a sack of 90 kg of maize at Shs. 25/- on the farm and sold it to Unga Limited in Iringa Town at Shs. 30/- to 35/-. Sometimes they sold maize directly to millers in Dar es Salaam for even higher profits, even after the transport cost had been deducted.

There were very large price fluctuations at the market centres in the villages. For example, in the morning farmers would receive 20 cents per kg, at mid-day 22 cents, and in the late afternoon 25 cents. The following day, the figures would be reversed so that those people who sold maize in the morning would get higher prices than those who came at mid-day or later in the afternoon. In addition, the clerks at the buying posts understated the actual weight of the produce. The buying clerks were sometimes given money either by Unga Limited or individual merchants to buy maize. The clerks were corrupt to the core. They hired guards who instead of protecting the stocks from being stolen were used mainly to harass people who were complaining that they were underpaid because the scales used were faulty or the officials played tricks with the machines. A lot of people hated the clerks, Asians and others, who exploited the farmers. The peasants said that the colonial Government allowed the clerks and the Indians to exploit them through corruption and harassment. But since their trade was highly profitable, such practices were considered in high circles in Iringa Township as necessary evils to pay for the cost of development in the area. After TANU was started many farmers in the area became members as a sign of protest against the practices of the clerks at the buying posts. In addition, some of the farmers became members of TANU as a more general protest against colonial rule. They wanted *Tanganyika kujitawala* (self-rule for Tanganyika).

The overwhelming majority of farmers soon agreed to form their own co-operative society that would buy their produce and would not treat them as the clerks had done. In 1952, fifty well-to-do African farmers in the area formed the Irmani African Maize Growers' Co-operative Society. When the news of the society's registration was announced, it was greeted with widespread approval in Irmani. People thought that they had found the way to their liberation, and so became members of the co-operative.

The aim of the society was to gain both primary as well as secondary trade margins by buying produce from the farmers and selling it to Unga Limited in Iringa Township. The profit thus secured would be used for the development of the area instead of going into the pockets of individual merchants. The well-to-do farmers also mobilised the entire area to contribute funds for a water development project. They collected one bag of maize from each household as a contribution toward the construction of dams and boreholes to provide water for both human and animal consumption. The leadership for the fund-raising came from the rich farmers who were resident in Iringa Township (indeed it is still the case that all the rich farmers in Irmani, without exception, live in town). They themselves could not know the real water problems which the poorer peasants were experiencing during the dry season.

The water development project was not a success (nor was the co-operative, as we shall see below). The reason for the failure of the water project was said to be lack of funds. There are those who contend that the leadership of the co-operative (1952/53) took some of the money which was raised for the water project and used it to buy their own lorries and tractors.

Such transport facilities were partly used to carry water from Iringa Town to Irmani. The supply of water by rich farmers during the dry season also proved to be a lucrative trade from which the well-to-do small farmers in the villages gained substantial income. These small farmers said that it would have been better if they had formed a local company in which each person would contribute capital, and later the people in the area would pay for the water they used in each village. This method, they said, would prevent people from wasting water! Some of the richer villagers insisted that they contributed the larger part of the funds since each of them contributed two bags of maize instead of one as in the case of poorer farmers. But the poorer farmers were the majority and if each one paid one bag of maize, they as a group must have contributed more to the project than the richer group. Apart from the disagreements arising among the farmers over the water issue, it is important also to add that the colonial Government was not interested in providing water for the people in Irmani. It was left to the post-independence Government of Tanzania to provide water for the people, and indeed by 1968 there was a pipeline supplying water to nearly every village in the area.

The co-operative society which they started in 1952 only operated for the 1952/53 season and then died out. Its death was said to have been caused by cut-throat competition with Unga Limited on the one hand and the individual Asian merchants on the other. The prices were controlled in the first year so they managed to operate throughout that season. The following season, 1953/54, when there was no price control, prices fluctuated nearly every day. The co-operative did not have a big godown in Iringa Town or Dar es Salaam where they could store maize while waiting for better prices. They were forced to sell maize at a loss because they had no storage facilities. They hired the Unga Godown for some time but the charges were high. Unga agreed to find markets for the co-operative and advised them to take their maize to Dar es Salaam. But the prices there turned out to be below the price the co-operative paid the farmers, so in addition to transport costs, they incurred a great loss on the 1953/54 crop and the co-operative society died. These are the reasons given by the rich farmers who led the co-operative movement. But the poor farmers argued that the well-to-do had used the co-operative movement to enrich themselves, since the profits which were gained in the 1952/53 season were neither given back to all the members nor used for the development of the people as a whole.

This was not the end of marketing co-operatives in the area. In 1956, two years after TANU was started, the farmers organised another co-operative. It is this latter one that developed later into the present Iringa Co-operative Union. The functions of this co-operative were purely marketing ones and its leadership again came from the rich and well-to-do farmers in the area. The agricultural workers and poor peasants maintain that the marketing co-operative movement serves not only the relatively wealthy farmers but also the *wataalam* (white-collar workers) in the co-operative offices in Iringa Town.

Despite the difficulties brought on by the price fluctuations of the 1953/54 season, the overall development and the increase in production was relatively

good throughout the 1950s compared with later years. During the early 1950s the yield per acre was higher than in the late 1960s. For example, one acre produced 15 bags of maize, whereas in the late 1960s one acre produced only five bags of maize. Overall, during the 1950s the cost of production was Shs. 60/- per acre whereas in the late 1960s the production costs on an average came to Shs. 120/- per acre. The prices in the late 1940s, and early 1950s were relatively high as compared to the 1960s. In the early 1950s the producer price for maize was about Shs. 35/- per bag of 90 kilograms; in the 1960s prices steadily declined to a low level of Shs. 23/40 per bag. Throughout the 1950s there was a great demand for maize because there was famine in the central part of the country and also internationally as a result of the Korean war.

The rough comparison of the cost of production, yield per acre, and producer prices in the late 1940s and early 1950s on the one hand, and the 1960s on the other, shows clearly that the income of the poor farmers has decreased while the costs of production have been increasing, mainly because of the deterioration of soil fertility and the small scale of the production units. But the few rich and well-to-do farmers who had already amassed a huge land area, employed a large labour force to work on their farms, had access to loans after independence and applied modern methods of cultivation, have constantly increased their income. In general, the development of Ismani as we have outlined it from the time when the large-scale settlement began until 1967 when the Arusha Declaration was adopted (its implementation began in Ismani in the early part of 1970), shows a clear class differentiation between the poor and rich farmers emerging out of the social relations of production in the area. These relations were basically capitalist and not feudalistic or communal in character as we shall show in the next section. At this point, we can say that the process of capitalist development in the area embodied three basic classes—migrant workers and poor peasants on the one hand, and rural and petty capitalists on the other.

CLASS DIFFERENTIATION

In the first section I outlined, using such Government reports as were available and field interviews with elders in Iringa, how the socio-economic formation under colonial rule began, and paved the way for the development of rural capitalism in the whole area. The achievement of what *Mwalimu* has correctly called *Uhuru wa Bendera* (flag independence) did not fundamentally change the general development of rural capitalism. On the contrary, the capitalist strategy of rural development went on until 1967 when *Azimio la Arusha* (Arusha Declaration) was adopted.

In this section I want to show, by using our own field data (still incompletely processed) the magnitude of class differentiation in the Ismani area. My interest in attempting to study and analyse such a cardinal question is to assess the extent of class differentiation and class struggle in the area and

to explore its relation to the goal of socialism and self-reliance which has been chartered by the Party.

For the purpose of such a study we chose four villages—Mkungugu, Kihorogota, Igula and Mangawe—as a representative sample of Ismani villages. The choice of these four villages was determined by such factors as location, population, land ownership patterns, levels of education and the general level of class differentiation. The selection of the four villages to be studied intensively was made after a general survey of 29 villages over a period of two months in Ismani Division.

The first method of collecting information was informal. There were no formal questionnaires, as it was thought these would make communication with the peasants difficult. We instead arranged to talk to small groups and discuss the general history of the village. We asked general questions such as: How did people first come to settle in the village and why did they choose that particular site for the village? What were the methods of acquiring land in the area? Where did most of the people who settled in the village come from? Why did some people possess large farms while others had small farms or sometimes no farms at all? We participated in the manual activities of the villages and regarded this as a necessary method of collecting information from the farmers. Indeed it was through this that most of the people in the village became acquainted with us and were later willing to discuss with us many problems, including those of a political nature. Besides, our research was designed in such a way that in every village we chose for intensive study there was a research assistant who lived in the village for 52 weeks. After we had gathered such general information in the four villages, we then took a stratified sample of households in each village. When that was completed, we started collecting information daily from this household sample in a systematic fashion (the data so collected has not yet been processed).

We studied the four villages for nearly two years, 1970-1972. Two of them, Mkungugu and Kihorogota, were among the oldest villages in Ismani, situated along the Dodoma-Iringa road. Mkungugu⁴ was the last village among the old villages situated along the road to become a *kijiji cha ujamaa* (ujamaa village). This was because the rich farmers holding land in Mkungugu area were vigorously opposed to any ujamaa in the village. But Kihorogota, because of its dynamic character, was one of the first villages to begin ujamaa, even before 11 May, 1971, when land in Ismani was officially expropriated by the ujamaa villages. The last two villages, Igula and Mangawe, were new ones which were settled after the land in the central part of Ismani along the Dodoma-Iringa road was already occupied. Igula was the first village to become a *kijiji cha ujamaa*, doing so in March, 1970. It is known as the pioneer village for ujamaa in the area. Mangawe on the other hand was selected mainly because it is situated in the upper hill area far from the main road and, above all, because it did not possess water at the time we started

⁴ This is the village where the former Regional Commissioner of Iringa, Dr W. Klerruu, was shot and killed by a rich farmer on 25 December, 1971.

our study. But now, due to the efforts of the Party and Government, this village has been supplied with water, to the great satisfaction of the villagers.

The sociological model used here for our analysis of rural class formation is based on the Marxist revolutionary theory of social classes and class struggle. The question basic to our analysis derives from the proposition that the concentration of the major means of production (land, capital equipment, livestock and non-agricultural means of production) in the hands of the rich farmers determines ultimately the social relations in rural society. Thus our division of the producers into three major classes—capitalist and petty capitalist, poor farmers and migrant workers as defined in the text—is based on the analysis of the above variables with land ownership being the most important variable in the overall context of rural society.

Our concern in what follows is, therefore, to measure more precisely the extent of class differentiation in relation to the ownership of the major means of production in the four villages.

We shall start with a discussion of the general data on the economic categories of the Ismani farmers. From the data, it is clear that the distribution of land under crop cultivation in the four villages in relation to the different classes was uneven by any method of measurement. The capitalist farmers are divided into three strata as can be seen from Table 1. The stratum owning from 40 to 99.9 acres constitutes 6% of the total households and cultivates 13% of the land under crop cultivation. Those owning and cultivating between 100 and 349 acres cultivated 19% of the land and constituted 3% of the households. Those who owned over 350 acres constituted 0.01% of the total households and cultivated 21% of the total land under crop cultivation. These three strata represented about 9% of the households, but held 53% of the total land under cultivation. If we consider the purchased land (Table 2) they owned 88% of this, in addition to 28% of the allotted land. Of the existing capital equipment (Table 3) 96% was owned by this group; and they also owned 47% of the cattle and 51% of the sheep and goats. The large-scale nature of farming by these strata leaves no doubt as to its commercial character. They hired a huge labour force on their farms (Table 4); they had credit facilities both from the commercial banks and the National Development Credit Agency (now legally reorganised into the Rural Development Bank); and they owned a good proportion of the vehicles; they used these to transport maize and other crops directly to the National Agricultural Products Board's godown in Iringa Town, thereby getting 35 cents per kilogram of maize, while the poor farmers and petty capitalists sold their maize to the Board through a long chain of Societies and Co-operative Unions, receiving "on the farm" only 26 cents per kilogram. Besides obtaining vast profits from labour exploitation on the farms, these strata also received income from their vehicle transport. During the harvesting the Iringa Co-operative Union hired their vehicles to transport produce from all over the area to the Board's godowns. They reaped enormous incomes from such activities, as some of them told me personally when I interviewed them after the Co-operative Union had convinced the ujamaa

villages (now registered as producer co-operatives) in Ismani to belong to it. (This registration meant that the individual private owners of lorries would no longer be able to transport the produce from the villages which previously had not had a link with the Co-operative Union. But the situation now is that those who are committee members of the Union will still be able to have their lorries hired by the Union to transport the *vijiji vya ujamaa* produce.)

These farmers adopted more modern agricultural methods. Some of them applied manure and others used fertilizers. They started cultivation at the appropriate times in October, and when the first rains of late November/early December began they planted maize. Maize was planted with 16 inches space between seeds. They started weeding two weeks after planting. Some of them had planting and weeding machines. In general, the yields were comparatively higher than those of the poor farmers who could not manage to farm in the modern way. *This first group can be categorised as a capitalist class.* The income they generated from labour exploitation through their monopoly of capital (land, farm equipment, livestock) in Ismani was very large. They were not feudal lords; they earned their living basically from labour exploitation, not from ground-rent. The average annual gross income from farming for those in this group cultivating up to 349 acres was about Shs. 38,248/- whereas those owning over 350 acres earned an average annual gross income of about Shs. 189,000/-. In addition, they received enormous incomes from the ownership of non-agricultural means of production in Iringa Town in the form of restaurants, bars, houses for rent, milling machines, taxis, etc. This wealthy and prosperous class establishment was, as was the admitted aim of the colonial overlords, a factor of political stability in rural areas of immense importance to the future of this country! As a senior colonial official in the Government wrote:

I want to see the emergence from our hitherto undifferentiated African society of a substantial number of rich men... I would like to see them in sufficiently strong financial position to be able to send their sons overseas for education, to afford motor cars, good houses and the like, and I believe that the emergence of such relatively wealthy individuals in the community will provide a stabilising factor of immense importance to the future of this country.⁵

Because of the concentration of ownership of means of production within these upper strata of the capitalist farmer class, their influence in Iringa among the people is also great. This influence is not confined to the rank of the ordinary people whom they mislead, but unfortunately it penetrates into the organs of government, parastatal organisations, the co-operative movement—not even the Party is altogether free from it.

The petty capitalist strata, cultivating between 15 and 39.9 acres, constituted 23% of the households, 30% of the labour force and 29% of the total population, but cultivated only about 28% of land under crops. However,

⁵ Taken from J. Iliffe, *Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971), p. 37.

Table 1—GENERAL DATA ON THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF ISMANI (SUMMARIZED CHARACTERISTICS OF FOUR SAMPLE VILLAGES—MKUNGUU, KIHOROGOTA, IGULA AND MANGAWA)

Classes and strata	No. of house-holds	Acres under crop	Av. acres under crop	Total no. of labour force in house-holds	Av. labour force per house-hold	Total population	Av. no. persons per house-hold	Number of wives of adults	Total no. Children over 14 years	Children under 14 years & wazee over 60
Poor farmers	155	586	3.8	391	2.5	650	4.1	142	297	94
Cultivating 1-5.9 acres	84	848	10.0	274	3.2	472	5.6	99	183	91
Sub-total 6-14.9 acres	239	1,434	6.0	665	2.8	1,122	4.7	241	480	185
Cultivating 15-24.9 acres	49	995	20.3	197	4.0	330	6.7	72	121	76
Petty capitalist	31	995	32.0	149	4.8	262	8.4	48	79	70
Sub-total 25-39.9 acres	80	1,990	24.9	346	4.3	592	7.4	120	200	146
Cultivating 40-99 acres (rich farmers)	19	940	49.4	111	5.8	257	13.5	55	74	37
Cultivating 100-349.9 acres	9	1,366	151.7	37	4.1	70	7.7	15	24	13
Sub-total over 350 acres and	2	1,500	750.0	16	8.0	24	12.0	4	104	60
Cultivating 350 acres and more	30	3,806	126.9	164	5.5	351	11.7	74	104	187
Sub-total	349	7,230	20.7	1,175	3.4	2,065	5.9	435	784	391
Total										890

Table 1—(continued)

Classes and strata	% of total households	% of total acres under crop cultivated	% of total labour force	% of total population	% of total number of wives	% of total number of children over 14 years
Poor farmers	44	8	33	31	33	24
Cultivating 1-5.9 acres	24	12	23	23	23	23
Sub-total	68	20	56	54	56	47
Cultivating 6-14.9 acres	14	14	17	16	17	19
Cultivating 15-24.9 acres	9	14	13	13	11	18
Sub-total	23	28	30	29	28	37
Cultivating 40-99 acres	5	13	9	12	13	9
Cultivating 100-349.9 acres	3	19	3	3	3	3
Sub-total	1	21	3	1	1	3
Cultivating 350 acres and more	9	53	13	16	17	15
Sub-total						

they owned 45% of land allotted by the *Jumbe*. The majority in these strata lacked important farm implements, though in general they owned a good proportion of the ox-ploughs. None of the households in this group owned a tractor. Because they lacked important capital equipment, a substantial proportion of them were forced to let out some of their land to the poor farmers who paid them Shs. 20/- per acre. Typically, the income they received from rent was less than the income received from family and hired labour. Their main interest was to cultivate the land they owned, but because they possessed few farm implements and could not readily get access to credit facilities, they were forced to rent a certain proportion of their land to the poor farmers.

Similarly, a part of their land was generally cultivated by tractors owned by the rich farmers. They made agreements with the owners of the tractors. These agreements were made with the understanding that the land cultivated should be divided in such a way that the owner could use one-third and the tractor owner could use two-thirds as payment for the use of the tractor. The transaction was for only one season, but could be repeated if necessary the following season. The expenditure on production for the petty capitalist farmers was higher than that for the rich who owned their own farm implements. But compared to the poor farmers their expenditure was less since they did not pay rent on land. The annual gross income in a good crop year, for example, for those who cultivated from 15 to 24.9 acres was Shs. 1,901/-, whereas those cultivating from 25 to 39.9 acres earned an average annual gross income of about Shs. 3,004/-. Farmers in this group generally covered their annual family expenditure from their farm income. Besides, a good number of them were engaged in petty trade, such as butchery, retailing, milling and bars, from which they derived some income. The poorer stratum of petty capitalists experienced some difficulties at certain periods of the year in covering their daily necessities from the income they earned from farming. They were actively engaged in productive efforts of their own. They did not in general sell their labour power to the richer farmers. A certain proportion of them, especially those with the largest land-holdings (i.e., 30-39.9 acres) hired labour. About two-thirds of their income was earned by the household labour force, the remaining one-third was earned from labour exploitation. Since there was an average of four people contributing to the family labour force, those households cultivating up to 20 acres of land usually earned their income from the labour of their own family. They did not hire labour, nor did they sell their labour power to the rich peasants. But those owning and cultivating greater acreages hired a good proportion of their labour force, and a good part of their income was received from the exploitation of labour. *These strata can be categorised as mabepari wa kitamaa (petty capitalists)*. Their main aspiration was to become richer, but the reality of the social structure that existed worked against them. Hence, their main source of income was from family labour. Their influence among the people was not as widely spread as that of the rich strata. But the seeds of *ubinafsi* (individualism) had penetrated deeply throughout the entire strata.

The farmers cultivating 1-5.9 and 6-14.9 acres constituted 68% of the households, 56% of the total labour force and 54% of the total population, but cultivated only 20% of the total acreage under crops (excluding work as hired labourers) and not all this land was their own. They rented land at Shs. 20/- per acre from the petty capitalists, who owned about 45% of the land allotted, but as already noted did not have sufficient farming equipment to utilise it fully so they let it out annually to the poor farmers. Of the total land cultivated under rent in the 1970/71 season, for example, about 94% was rented by the poor farmers. Because they had to pay Shs. 20/- per acre for rent, their production expenditure was higher than that of the well-to-do who owned not only their own lands but also owned capital equipment. After renting small pieces of land at Shs. 20/- per acre, they hired tractors to cultivate at Shs. 40/- per acre. Most of the time they hired tractors because tractors cultivated deeper and faster, and they preferred this as they always cultivated late in the season. They applied neither manure nor fertilizers because they could not afford them, and because of this land fertility was declining with every passing season. In addition, they cultivated late and could not benefit from the first rain of late November or early December. It is believed from long experience in Ismani that generally those who start cultivating as early as late November and plant before or immediately with the first rain get better results than those who start late as is the case with this class. Therefore, their maize yields average little more than four bags per acre. They sold their produce to the co-operative society at 26 cents per kilogram. The average annual gross income for those cultivating 1-5.9 acres was only Shs. 354/- and those cultivating 6-14.9 acres received an annual gross income of Shs. 945/- only. From their small income from farming, which could not cover the basic material necessities in the household with an average of four persons per family, they were forced to sell their labour power in order to earn their subsistence. *They are the class of poor farmers and part-time workers*. It is this class which forms the bastion of the revolutionary forces living permanently in the area. Their interest lies with socialism and not with capitalism.

THE METHODS OF LAND ACQUISITION AND OWNERSHIP

An examination of the extent of class differentiation brought about through land acquisition and land ownership in the four villages in Ismani necessarily entails an investigation of the land tenure system (see Table 2). There were four methods of acquiring land in Ismani. The first was land acquired through Government allotment by the *Jumbe* (sub-chief) in the period prior to 1962 when the system of chief's rule was in operation. After 1962, the chief's rule was abolished and the Village Development Committee became responsible for allocating land to people in the area. The second method of land acquisition was through inheritance. Thirdly, land was acquired by renting. Fourthly, land was acquired by purchase. A study of the ownership of land under crop cultivation, as shown by the data in Table 2, indicates clearly that land was

without any consideration of soil fertility or distance from the village. There were, however, a few cases where they could pay after they sold their produce, but these were exceptions to the general rule. By paying rent, their production expenditure was increased, and this made it difficult for them to gain more income.

TRACTOR, OX-PLOUGH, AND LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP

The ownership of farm implements among the farmers also follows the same pattern (see Table 3). That is to say, the rich farmers owned more of the capital equipment than the others. Of 207 ox-ploughs, they owned 56. They owned 24 tractors worth Shs. 578,400/-; indeed it was this class alone that owned tractors—the other farmers could not afford to buy them. The rich farmers as a whole owned 96% by value of the capital equipment, and this consisted mainly of tractors and ox-ploughs. (We are not including other capital equipment owned by them as this will be discussed in later reports. Here, we are concerned with farm machinery and equipment only.) Tractors were very important in the central parts of Ismani where land was hard to till during the dry season. Only tractors could easily cultivate deep enough. The ox-ploughs were used but they could not effect deep cultivation. Also, ox-ploughs could not cultivate fast enough, and, as we have noted, since most of the cultivation began relatively late, tractors were thus preferred. Those who owned tractors, besides cultivating their own farm first, also cultivated for the poor and petty capitalist farmers at Shs. 40/- per acre. A few of the rich farmers had started to fully mechanise farming operations (e.g., in weeding and harvesting), but this was still insignificant, as most used cheap labour power instead. However, over three-quarters of the land used was cultivated by tractors and the remaining one-quarter was cultivated by ox-plough. The capitalist farmers originally acquired tractors and ox-ploughs by paying cash. This was true of the period before independence when not a single farmer in Ismani was provided with credit. But after independence, some rich farmers bought tractors and other machinery through credit facilities from the commercial banks as well as from the National Development Credit Agency. In 1970/71, a new tractor cost Shs. 45,000/- while some of the secondhand machines cost an average Shs. 15,000/- each.

In addition, these farmers owned a considerable number of cattle. Of 1,665 cattle in the four villages they owned 791. This was equivalent to 47% of the value of existing livestock. They also owned 51% by value of the goats and sheep. They used cattle both for beef and milk. In every village, they owned at least one butchery. They used to slaughter cattle for sale in the villages. They also sold some of their cattle to the Arabs who owned butcheries in Iringa Town. Still others, who themselves owned butcheries in Iringa Town, slaughtered their cattle for their own butcheries. They gained substantial income from the sales of meat until the Iringa District Development Corporation took over the butcheries in Iringa Township. As far as milk was concerned, they generally supplied local Govern-

Table 3—THE OWNERSHIP OF FARM IMPLEMENTS AND LIVESTOCK

Classes and strata	Farm Implements					Livestock						
	Ox-plough	Tractor	Capital worth shs.	% by value of total held		Bulls	Cows	Capital worth shs.	% by value of total held	Goats	Sheep	Capital worth shs.
Poor farmers	19	—	2,850	0.5	93	111	50,100	12	8	—	320	1
	39	—	5,850	1.0	62	83	35,200	9	77	5	3,350	14
	58	—	8,700	1.5	155	194	85,300	21	85	5	3,650	15
Petty capitalist	39	—	5,850	1.0	97	188	66,700	17	62	18	3,380	14
	54	—	8,100	1.5	138	102	61,800	15	144	7	4,910	20
	93	—	13,950	2.5	235	290	128,500	32	206	25	8,290	34
Capitalist	35	4	65,250	11.0	128	159	70,200	18	179	16	7,960	34
	21	13	198,150	33.0	71	83	37,900	9	94	3	3,910	17
	—	7	315,000	52.0	99	251	79,900	20	0	0	0	0
	56	24	578,400	96.0	298	493	188,000	47	273	19	11,870	51
Total	207	24	601,050	100	688	977	401,800	100	564	49	23,810	100

ment workers and some few petty capitalists who owned *dukas* (shops) in the villages. Bulls were used to pull ploughs, but this was the practice of the petty capitalists rather than the rich farmers who normally used tractors. The local market prices for the cattle were relatively high. The bulls cost Shs. 300/- on the average, cows about Shs. 200/-, goats Shs. 40/- each, and sheep Shs. 50/-. (We obtained the price in the local market at Igula village where cattle are sold at the end of every month.)

The petty capitalist stratum owned 93 out of 207 ox-ploughs worth Shs. 13,950 but little else in the way of production tools. This was equivalent to 2.5% of the value of capital equipment held in the villages. They also owned by value 32% of the cattle and 34% of the sheep and goats. Most of this property was concentrated in Mangawe and Igula villages. This is not surprising, because these were the villages that were settled later and where some of these farmers still owned land. But in the old villages, hardly any possessed ox-ploughs or cattle. They hired tractors or ox-ploughs to cultivate for them. Hoes were generally not used in preparing the land for planting, so we did not consider these important as instruments of labour to be included in our calculations of capital equipment.

The measurement of labour requirements⁷ in the four villages in Ismani shows the extent to which each class and stratum earned their living either through their own toil or through wage labour (see Table 4). The poor farmers, who cultivated a total of 1,434 acres with an adult household labour force of 665, did not need any additional labour to weed their farms. In fact, when we take five acres as representing one labour unit for the whole weeding season we see that there is a surplus labour force of 379 in this class. In other words, these farmers would require an additional 1,895 acres of land to cultivate if their entire family labour force was to be productively utilised. But because of the existing social relations of production, they could not hope to acquire for themselves additional acreage. In the first place, they only owned 4% of the total land purchased, and rented 94% of the land under lease. Since the small income they received from their farms was grossly inadequate to meet their material needs, they were forced to use their excess labour power on the large capitalist farms. They thus earned much of their living through the sale of their labour power. They did not exploit anybody, but were mercilessly exploited by the owners of capital.

The petty capitalists cultivated 1,990 acres of land that required a labour force of 398 persons, but since they only had 346 persons making up the household labour force, they were forced to hire an additional 52 persons. The additional labour they required amounted to 0.7 persons per household. They earned their living from their labour power and from exploitation of others. But the income they received from the family labour force was generally greater than the income from exploitation.

⁷ Weeding of maize is the most labour consuming factor in maize production; the measurement of labour requirements is, therefore, based on the number of people needed for weeding in the area.

Table 4—LABOUR REQUIREMENTS

Classes and strata	Number of households	Number of labour force	Acres total	Labour force requirements of each stratum and class* (cols. 3 ÷ 5)	Labour surplus or deficit† per household (col. 6 ÷ col. 1)	Labour surplus or deficit, Total (col. 2-col. 4)
Poor farmers	155	391	586	117	1.8	274
Cultivating 1-5.9 acres	84	274	848	169	1.3	105
Cultivating 6-14.9 acres	239	665	1,434	286	1.6	379
Sub-total	49	197	995	199	0.04	2
Petty capitalist	31	149	995	199	1.6	50
Cultivating 15-24.9 acres	80	346	1,990	398	0.7	52
Cultivating 25-39.9 acres	19	111	940	188	4.1	77
Sub-total	9	37	1,366	273	26.2	236
Capitalist	2	16	1,500	300	142.0	284
Cultivating 100-349.9 acres	30	164	3,806	761	19.9	597
Cultivating 350 acres and over						
Sub-total						
Total	349	1,175	7,230	1,445	0.8	-270‡

* Assuming 5 acres can be weeded per labourer each agricultural season under the techniques prevailing in Ismani.

† Deficit (indicated by —) must be made up by an equivalent amount of hired labour, largely from the surplus strata.

‡ The theoretical minimum number of labourers which must be 'imported' from beyond the four villages.

The rich farmers cultivated 3,806 acres of land that required 761 labourers to weed the whole area productively. But the total family labour force amounted to only 164. Therefore, they hired an additional 597 labourers from the poor stratum and from places outside Ismani. On an average each household in this group hired 20 persons to weed on their farms, with the two largest farms hiring 142 labourers each. Considering the fact that these farmers do not in general participate in the productive activities on their farms except when supervising the work, the labour force attributed in our calculations to family labour is in practice to some extent hired labour. Our figures on the labour force required by the rich farmers are, therefore, if anything an underestimation. Further, besides hiring a huge labour force on the farm, they also needed additional workers for their butcheries, milling machines, cattle-keeping, buses and lorries, etc.

The conditions of employment were very poor. The workers laboured for long hours each day for a mere Shs. 1/33 and were subjected to harsh discipline by *wanyapara* (supervisors) on the farms. These workers were divided into two categories, the *vibarua* (daily paid) and the seasonal semi-permanent workers. The *vibarua*, who were mostly local poor farmers, were paid in goods such as maize flour, grains, meat and some *pombe* (drinks), or in cash on the day of work if they finished the task given to them on a given day, a task which was customarily equivalent to one-fifth of an acre.

The semi-permanent workers, generally migrants from outside Ismani, were paid Shs. 480/- at the end of the season. In addition, they were given *posho* (maize flour) for their daily subsistence. The rest of the food, they had to get by themselves. They ate mostly *mboga za majani* (vegetables). Besides this the rich sometimes slaughtered cows, bulls, sheep or goats for the workers during the weeding period. The workers had to take the meat on credit which was to be repaid at the end of the season and this arrangement was also made with respect to *pombe*.

The prices of anything a worker took on credit were not known to the worker until the end of the season. Only the rich farmers knew at what price they sold meat, *pombe*, blankets, shirts, shoes or other things to the workers. The rich were the ones who kept the records. As a result of such arrangements, some of the workers, in order to pay their debt to the master, ended up with huge deductions from their wages. Others, after paying their debts, remained with only enough money for transport back home. Those who were left with something more than the fare home were sometimes paid only half the amount and were told that they would be paid the rest at the end of the following season. Such was the fate of the workers in Ismani. But since there were no better alternative job opportunities elsewhere, they were forced to work for the Ismani *mabepari*.

Those in the migrant worker class who came to Ismani were recruited from several places in the south such as Njombe and Mbeya. In the areas where the workers were available, the rich farmers made arrangements with certain people to become agents for labour recruitment. Those agents were

paid a commission. The majority of the workers so recruited were young people.

Despite such arrangements, labour was scarce. The *mabepari* of Ismani expanded their acreage with every passing season and the total number of workers needed each season was very large. The poor earned on the average only Shs. 562/- per year followed by the petty capitalist stratum which earned Shs. 2,328/- per year. The income earned by the poor farmers was not sufficient to cover their ever-rising costs of living. They, therefore, had to sell their labour power in order to keep body and soul together. The petty capitalists, however, did live on their income from farming. Some of them experienced difficulties getting enough food during the weeding period, but in general they easily complemented their income from trade. They also received income from the ox-ploughs when they were hired for cultivation by the poor farmers. The capitalists did not themselves participate in productive labour, but enjoyed life from income earned through labour exploitation. They lived well. The figures on production also show the same trend, the rich registering up to 69% of the total production, and the poor 13% of the total production, with the middle stratum contributing the remaining 18%.

In summing up, we can say firstly that the means of production were concentrated in the hands of the rich farmers and the capitalist class of Ismani; through this, they controlled the socio-economic relations and moulded the general political thought of the entire rural community. For the rich not only monopolised more than half of the land under crop cultivation, they also monopolised the ownership of capital equipment and livestock.

Secondly, they made use of and applied, to a great extent, scientific methods of farming. This was possible mainly because larger scale farming more easily allowed application of modern farming methods. There is also the possibility that, with the larger operation, the cost of production declined. Neither the poor farmers nor the middle (petty capitalist) stratum could afford to make use of modern scientific methods of production. This was mainly (in the case of poor farmers) because of lack of sufficient land as well as equipment. But the petty capitalists were not able to use modern scientific techniques because of lack of capital.

Thirdly, the rich farmers had access to credit and loans from the banks, especially after independence. They sold their maize produce directly to the Board and received higher prices than the poor and petty capitalist farmers who sold their produce to the Board through the long chain of marketing co-operatives which meant larger deductions from their income. These farmers could neither obtain credit loans nor sell their produce directly to the Board in order to get higher prices for the maize produce.

Lastly, the rich farmers earned their living solely from income generated by hired labour. They did not participate in production. They were the *mabepari* (capitalists) not *makabaila* (landlords) as is generally assumed by

Table 5—ESTIMATED PRODUCTION AND INCOME

Classes and strata	Total Acres	Maize Production (kgs)	% of total maize produced and sold	Total (shs.) gross income	% of total income received	Number of households	Average gross income per household (shs.)
Poor farmers							
	586	210,960	5	54,850	4	155	354
	848	305,280	8	79,372	6	84	945
	1,434	516,240	13	134,222	10	239	562
Petty capitalist							
	995	358,200	9	93,132	7	49	1,901
	995	358,200	9	93,132	7	31	3,004
	1,990	716,400	18	186,264	14	80	2,328
Capitalist							
	940	676,800	17	236,880	19	19	12,467
	1,366	983,520	25	344,232	27	9	138,248
	1,500	1,080,000	27	378,000	30	2	189,000
	3,806	2,740,320	69	959,112	76	30	31,970
Total	7,230	3,972,960	100	1,279,598	100	349	3,667

both the political leadership and some political writers and commentators. The rich farmers did not lease out any part of their farm for rent. In short, the mode of production (though containing within its fold certain elements of precapitalist social formations) was basically that of capitalism under an export-oriented regime. It is a capitalism of the neo-colonial type that is generally found in underdeveloped countries whose economic structures are appendages of the imperialist world system.

Precisely because the Tanzanian economy, as elsewhere in the "third world", is an appendage of the imperialist world economic system, the capitalist and petty capitalist in Tanzania cannot really develop into a full-fledged national bourgeoisie as such. The international bourgeoisie cannot allow them to construct an independent national capitalist system since that will not serve the interest of international monopoly capital. Thus the capitalists and petty capitalists in Tanzania are in the international context simply elements of the petty bourgeoisie. If the internal class contradictions in the rural areas are to be analysed fully, this understanding of the overall position of the Tanzanian economy in relation to international monopoly capital must not be forgotten. Nevertheless, since our focus is upon the nature of the class struggle within Ismani, particularly as it affects the application of the policy of *ujamaa vijijini*, a treatment of the implications of this broader perspective has been explicitly put aside for presentation in a later study.

THE FORMATION OF VIJJI VYA UJAMAA

A very important day for the exploited poor farmers and agricultural workers in Ismani was 11 May, 1971. This was the occasion on which Mwalimu Nyerere, at Igula *kijiji cha ujamaa*, declared that the land in Ismani belonged to the people of the area as a whole. This declaration was greeted with general approval and support by those oppressed sections of the people. They said that they had been redeemed from the clutches of capitalism. From then onwards, they declared, they would follow the Party and Mwalimu through to the end of the struggle. That they approved of the President's speech cannot be doubted, for earlier that day the *ujamaa* villages memorandum which they read to Mwalimu complained bitterly against the *mabepari* and *makabaila* who opposed *ujamaa*. These latter argued that *ujamaa* was not for them. They had nothing to gain from it and declared that their land could not be taken from them by *ujamaa* villages. They said then that those who wanted to start *ujamaa* in Ismani were day-dreaming, because Ismani belonged to the *wenyeji* (inhabitants). The idea of *ujamaa* was foreign to them. By implication this meant that if some people wanted to start an *ujamaa* village, they had to start on land which did not belong to anybody.

That is how things generally stood throughout Ismani before 11 May, 1971. In this struggle between the possessing and dispossessed classes the poor farmers and workers already scored some victories over the rural bourgeoisie by founding seven *vijiji vya ujamaa* in Ismani. But none of these villages had sufficient land to cultivate because the rich who owned land were

bitterly opposed to the policy of *ujamaa vijijini* and to the mobilisation efforts. In Kihorogota *kijiji cha ujamaa*, for example, there were 126 registered members who did not possess any land but were interested in working and living together. Because they did not possess any land in the village, they were forced to look for a place to cultivate, and so they asked the ward executive officer to provide them with a farm. The ward executive officer took the *wajamaa* to a piece of land five miles away from the village. This land was not owned by anybody. The *wajamaa* cleared the bush for about seven days. The people started complaining about the distance. They said that it took them three hours to walk to the farm and back to the village. Women among them complained that it was impossible to walk as much as five miles and still be able to perform their daily domestic activities, including caring for children. They wanted *ujamaa* right in their village. In Mangawe *kijiji cha ujamaa*, there were about 175 registered members, but they were only provided with 15 acres of land and the same situation applied to Myanjaro, Chamdindi and the other three *ujamaa* villages.

Towards the end of 1970 and the beginning of 1971, it was already clear that the overwhelming majority of poor farmers and workers, together with a good proportion of petty capitalist farmers, wanted to start *ujamaa* villages, but the principal problem then was where to get land on which to farm collectively. As we have indicated already, none of the seven *ujamaa* villages which had started before 11 May possessed enough land to cultivate. The *wajamaa* waited anxiously for a decision on the day when they would have access to the land in Ismani. When Mwalimu visited Igula *kijiji cha ujamaa*, the pioneer village for the *ujamaa* movement in Ismani, on 11 May and gave a timely explanation of TANU and Government policy on land, he said that where a *kijiji cha ujamaa* existed, it must be given enough land before any could be made available to private individuals. He further emphasised that *ujamaa* villages would be mapped out and given enough land for the following season. He concluded by declaring that anyone on the land so measured would either have to join the *ujamaa* villages or leave and settle wherever he wished to open new lands.⁸ This statement was made at a public meeting which was attended by members of all the rural strata in the area, and the Regional and District Party and Government cadres.

From that day onwards, the class struggle in Ismani entered a decisive stage, a struggle between the *wajamaa* flushed with this victory and the rich farmers who were defeated in their aims on that day. These capitalists opposed the policy of having their land taken by the *wajamaa*. But the latter, who lost nothing by joining the villages, supported the policy of collective farming, collective living and collective distribution of output according to amount of labour power exerted productively. By July, 1971, there were already 21 new *vijiji vya ujamaa* formed making a total of 29 in Ismani Division. Why was it possible for such a rapid development of the *ujamaa* movement to take place in Ismani where capitalism had gained such strong roots in the socio-economic structure of the rural society?

⁸ *The Standard* (Dar es Salaam), 12 May, 1971.

The fundamental factors that contributed to a relatively rapid development of the *ujamaa* movement were two-fold. First, the nature of the social structure which embodied within its fold class differentiation and class struggle for socialist transformation of rural society where the material conditions of the poor and middle strata would be improved and developed further.

The second factor was the dynamic leadership of the former Regional Commissioner, Dr Klerruu, a man (though not a Marxist) who feared neither death nor intimidation by the Ismani *mabepari*, as was the case with other Government cadres at both Regional and District levels. His example of exposing the capitalist exploitation of labour at the mass village meetings, his participation in the physical labour with *wajamaa*, were revolutionary shining examples that are not easily equalled by other leaders of equal status. Through his participation in physical labour he aroused and mobilised the workers and poor and middle peasants around the *ujamaa* programme. In addition, he disclosed the evil nature and structure of Government bureaucracy by exposing some bureaucrats who were not only unsympathetic to the aspirations of the poor and middle strata but who were openly hostile to the feelings and aspirations of the workers and peasants. In waging and spearheading such a struggle, he managed to win an overwhelming number of poor and middle strata for the *vijiji vya ujamaa* movement.

To this extent the *ujamaa* village movement is not only a movement of the poor peasants to work and live collectively and share their products according to the amount of labour productively invested, but to a great extent it is a movement of the poor people struggling for democratic rights and socialism based on the concept of self-reliance.

But can it be said, given the present nature, structure and leadership and the Party and Government in the whole Region, and the ways of mobilisation efforts, that the *vijiji vya ujamaa* movement will be able to transform the capitalist mode of production to that of a socialist mode of production?

The Mobilisation for Ujamaa

The mobilisation efforts for the formation of a *vijiji vya ujamaa* movement in the whole area was spearheaded by Party and Government cadres at both Regional and District levels. The methods used to implement the Party programme of *ujamaa vijijini* took the following form. First, the Regional and Area Commissioners with the help of Regional and District Chairmen of the Party, M.P.s and other Party functionaries took the leading position in the mobilisation of the people to start *ujamaa* villages. Secondly, the Party and Government leadership used various forms of persuasion, explaining to the farmers the advantages of collective working and living on the one hand, and the disadvantages of individual working and living on the other. The most important and essential method of persuasion used by the leadership was promising Government material aid once the people decided to start an *ujamaa* village. Such Government aid, they said, consisted of tractors, ox-

ploughs, livestock, fertilizer and food. In addition, each member would be guaranteed about three acres of land to use for producing foodstuffs. The leadership also promised essential services such as an extension officer, a medical aide and a community development officer, and improved water, roads, a hospital, schools and even electricity. Other political, economic and technical services in the form of help to members in drawing up farm production plans were promised during the mobilisation campaign.

Third, the mobilisation campaign took the form of promising farmers that, once they started *vijiji vya ujamaa*, they would be able to sell their produce directly to the National Agricultural Products Board and not through the marketing co-operative movement, since the latter was a middleman and existed only to exploit the producers. This was repeated at every meeting during the mobilisation campaign and attracted the attention of the people.

Fourth, a new and vigorous campaign has lately been launched to register the villages as producer co-operative societies, so that they can gain legal ground for access to credit facilities from the Rural Development Bank. The whole mobilisation campaign was carried out with the aim of implementing socialism and self-reliance.

We now turn to the reaction of each strata of the rural producers to the mobilisation campaign. The view of the rich farmers towards the Party policy of *ujamaa vijijini* has all along been negative. They are, from the material and ideological point of view, opposed to the policy. They say *ujamaa* is for the poor, lazy, and crippled who need welfare programmes. *Ujamaa* is not for those *ambao waliotangulia kushika ardhi* (the first people who owned land). They openly opposed the policy at the outset. But after 11 May, 1971, they changed their strategy. They now vainly peddle the idea that they support the Party but do not want to be forced to join *ujamaa* villages, and in fact, the majority of this group have not joined. At present, they live in Iringa Town. If one meets them in private, they seriously express their feelings about their farms which were taken by the villages. They are not reconciled to the fact and still seriously hope to get their farms back. Some of this group left some of their wives to stay in Ismani to work with the *wajamaa*; others have joined the villages but do not work themselves, instead they pay money for the day's work or send some people to work for them so that they get their labour day recorded accordingly. At the time of weeding, they said that the *wajamaa* would not weed well because they are lazy and ignorant but on the contrary, this did not prove true. At present (May, 1972), they say that before the maize is harvested they will burn it while it is still in the farm, but this threat is now well-known and necessary measures have been taken to deal with it. For example, in every village there are five guns. The *wajamaa* have been trained by the police to use them to protect their property. So even this threat is not likely to be carried out. The rich tell the poor peasants that the *ujamaa* farms are not the property of the people but that of the Government. They say that the Government could not spend so much money on the villages if it did not own the farms. This is one of the more serious allegations that the capitalists have made against the Government. Some less well-to-do farmers

who have heard of such charges raise some doubts about the ultimate intention of the Government. At the present time, the rich farmers want Ismani to "walk on two feet next season". That is to say, they want the private sector of farming to go hand in hand with that of *ujamaa* collective farming. This will be yet another test. But it should be added here that a good proportion of the Government technical cadres at the Regional and District level favour the idea that Ismani should walk on two feet. In short, the rich farmers are opposed to the Party policy because they see no material gains in it for them. Like the upper stratum of the petty capitalist farmers, their opposition has been lately expressed not in the open, but in secret gatherings.

In general, even before the active mobilisation campaign was launched, they rarely attended mass meetings in the villages. But if by chance they did attend meetings called by Party and Government cadres, they did not speak; instead they hired poor farmers or petty capitalists to say something which they wanted said. They could not say it themselves because they were afraid of revealing their stand openly before the people. They complain against the Government by saying that the Government these days is one which confiscates property and also makes a lot of propaganda in the schools, newspapers and radio programmes. They listen to radio programmes from certain neighbouring countries and say that Radio Tanzania is full of propaganda, but they also say they like to listen to its programme *Mazungumzo Baada ya Habari* (Discussion after the News) because it gives them some ideas of what to expect and think next. When I interviewed two of the rich farmers about their view of *ujamaa*, one of them looked at me and said: "You are a young man, go and talk to my sons about *ujamaa* and not to me." *Ujamaa* to him was for the young people not the *wazee* (old people). When I asked him why he said that, he replied honestly by saying: "*Sisi wazee, tumeonja matunda ya unyonyaji. Hatutaki kujiunga na kijiji cha ujamaa. Hatutaki kulazimishwa kujiunga na kijiji cha ujamaa.*" (We old people, we have tasted the fruits of exploitation. We do not want to join an *ujamaa* village. We do not want to be forced to join an *ujamaa* village.) This statement expresses the feeling of the majority of farmers in this group. This also shows clearly what their political position is in relation to the policy of *ujamaa vijijini*. They are, as we have suggested above, opposed to that policy.

The views of the middle strata or petty capitalists about *ujamaa vijijini* are mixed and confused. There are those who support the policy but doubt whether it will really succeed. There are those who oppose the policy but do not dare to express their views in the open. They secretly oppose the policy by saying: "*Hatutaki kulazimishwa kujiunga na kijiji cha ujamaa.*" (We do not want to be forced to join an *ujamaa* village.) And they add, "*Kijiji cha ujamaa kinarudisha maendeleo ya nyuma.*" (The *ujamaa* village is taking us backwards.) But, at the same time, when they see some Party cadres at meetings they shout the slogan "*Vijiji vya Ujamaa Hoyee! TANU Hoyee! Siasa ya Ujamaa Hoyee! Azimio la Arusha Hoyee!*" in support of *ujamaa*.

Also, when they are among poor farmers and workers at public meetings they appear to be revolutionary. But at private houses and at bars they oppose the poor farmers for accepting the idea of equality saying it is impossible for people to be equal. But then they add, "*Unyonyaji sio kitu kizuri*". (Exploitation is not a good thing.) Their political views which correspond to their economic position show that under the capitalist system, their lot was steadily sinking and disintegrating, with the majority of them entering into the class of poor farmers. The economic decline of their strata was inevitable under the capitalist system, as we have noted elsewhere. In political terms, the petty capitalist farmers are less revolutionary as compared to workers and poor farmers, but they are revolutionary relative to the richer capitalist strata. It is important that their political position be studied and clearly understood by the Party if ujamaa is to succeed in Ismani. The majority of the leadership in the villages in Ismani come from this group. It should be understood too that individualism is still strong. A carefully planned political method of agitation, propaganda and organisation based on the contradictions in the area is necessary in the implementation of the Party policy. This group has to be mobilised still more, ideologically, politically and organisationally together with the workers and poor farmers for the successful implementation of ujamaa.

The political view of the workers and poor farmers about the Party policy is quite clear. They wholeheartedly support the President, Party and ujamaa. They say that if other Party and Government leaders were as committed to socialism in practical terms as Mwalimu then Tanzania could easily become *taifa la ujamaa* (a socialist nation). They say that they are opposed to *ubepari na ukabaila* (capitalism and feudalism) and *wataalam* who use their office to order the people about in the villages. They make up the truly revolutionary classes as compared with the petty capitalists. They demand a complete change of the present economic base and the Government and administrative structure. They feel that the present structure of society has given more *madaraka* (status) to men in the offices who are not themselves producing any material wealth. They add that, such *madaraka ndiyo fumbo ya kupiga wanyonge* (officials use their office as the stick for beating poor people). In short, the poor farmers and workers struggle against two basic contradictions, the contradiction between the poor and rich farmers on the one hand and the contradiction between the poor farmers and the present Government structure on the other hand. But the struggle they wage against the *mabepari* and the establishment has been, to say the least, unscientifically guided by the Party. The whole *vijiji vya ujamaa* movement in Iringa can be said to be a reform movement for spontaneous change. The Party needs to think seriously about the political methods of guiding the *vijiji vya ujamaa* movement in Ismani area. Without the Party's political support for the poor farmers and workers, it will be impossible for them to forge ahead with the struggle for socialism and lay its material foundation in Ismani. To sum up, the political stand of each stratum of rural producers in relation to the Party and Government mobilization campaign is clear. The capitalist strata are stubbornly

opposed to the programme while the poor classes wholeheartedly support the programme. The petty capitalist strata falling in between the two should also be mobilised for ujamaa.

CONCLUSION

The first question which arises is whether the transformation of the villages into socialist villages where there is no exploitation of man by man can gain its material base without confronting the rich capitalist farmers. The position which the rich strata hold in institutions such as the co-operative movement is still very strategic for their continued success. Similarly, because they still own certain other important means of production (tractors, milling machines and lorries) they will exercise a very powerful influence among the poor farmers and workers. This is so because the latter are politically unconscious of their class strength as producers of the material wealth.

The second question which arises is whether the ujamaa villages can really attain socialism and self-reliance when the Party and Government cadres' mobilisation campaign mainly stressed the material incentive in the form of Government aid. This has led most of the poor peasants to regard their own productive efforts as ineffective and, therefore, to rely on Government aid for almost everything. This means that the Party and Government cadres, far from carrying out an ideological and political mobilisation campaign to raise the political consciousness of the Ismani farmers, have in effect fallen back on the easy way out, promising material incentives as the sole basis for transforming the villages into socialist units.

The transformation to socialism of the rural capitalist economy of Ismani requires, in our view, a clear understanding from the standpoint of the socialist world outlook of what socialism and self-reliance means. For the development of socialism through the methods of self-reliance presupposes the maximum utilisation of existing local resources, both material as well as human, and the realisation of their potentialities. If such methods were to be followed, then the first question is that of changing the economic base and its roots of social exploitation, and the institutions dominated by the rich strata. If such a radical step were to be taken, then concomitantly the poor classes and the petty capitalists have to be liberated from economic exploitation, political suppression and social backwardness into a *conscious* political force for the socialist development of the entire rural society.