and the operation of the political and administrative institutions as well as the decision-making process at all levels.

As an interdisciplinary forum for discussion it will not only accept articles which integrate knowledge from the various fields of social science but will also accept articles from its various disciplines. The major criteria of choice will be originality, relevance of ideas to the African scene, and contribution to the solution of African problems. A major objective of this journal is to encourage African scholars, statesmen and administrators to contribute their knowledge and understanding of our continent and people to the struggle for African emancipation and progress. Significant interpretations of African events have been monopolized by foreign 'experts'. African scholars must now assume the major responsibility for explaining their way of life and suggesting ways and means of improving it.

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EDITORS

Socio-Economic Insecurity and Ethnic Politics in Africa

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THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The stimulus for this paper is the apparent increase in inter-ethnic hostility in African politics during the past few years.[1] For example, between 1967 and 1970 Nigeria was consumed by a destructive civil war arising essentially out of inter-ethnic animosity. The resultant human and material loss is yet to be fully and precisely reported but the estimates are staggering. While during the 1950s inter-ethnic conflict in the country was characterized by nepotism, corruption, and victimization, as well as intimidation of political opponents or isolated riots as in Kano in 1953, the situation in the 1960s had degenerated to violent repression in the Tiv area, widespread massacre of the civilian population and finally the carnage of a bloody civil war.

In Kenya, the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969 led to violence between the Luos and Kikuyus in Kisumu and Nairobi. And during President Kenyatta's visit to Kisumu later in the year, his escort opened fire on a hostile Luo crowd killing 11 and injuring 78. Thereafter, allegations of oath-taking ceremonies reminiscent of the Mau Mau uprising of the 1950s heightened inter-ethnic tension in the country. In 1970, the inter-ethnic wars in the Sudan and Chad raged with unabating fury. The rise of General Idi Amin to power in Uganda in 1971 was accompanied by a systematic liquidation of the Langi and Acholi ethnic groups within the Ugandan army and elsewhere in positions of

1 The word 'ethnic' is used throughout this paper to refer to all groups which are set off from the rest of the population on the basis of racial criteria, religious identity, cultural attributes, or national or ancestral background but which are not political entities by themselves. It has been used in this manner in: L. Bloom, "Concerning Ethnic Research," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 13 (April 1948), pp. 171-177; D. Glaser, "The Dynamics of Ethnic Identification," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 23 (Feb. 1958), pp. 31-40; M. M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1964); P. Hatt, "Classes and Ethnic Attitudes," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 13 (Feb. 1948), pp. 36-43. It contrasts, for example, with Van den Berghe's use of it to refer only to groups which are socially defined by cultural differences. Cf. P. L. Van den Berghe, *Race and Racism* (NY: Wiley, 1967).
The intention behind its use in this paper is to avoid the term 'tribalism' which, as Desmond Guiry has pointed out, tends to cloud the real issues involved in analysis by enveloping them with what seems to be a primitive and barbarous mystique peculiar to the African. Cf. Desmond Guiry, "The Nigerian Conflict," *Afrasian,* June 1967, and which, as Apthorpe points out, both oversimplifies and mystifies, and conceals rather than reveals the complexities of the phenomenon being analysed. Cf. Raymond Apthorpe. "Does Tribalism Really Matter?" *Transition,* Vol. VII (1968), pp. 18-22. Another reason is to avail oneself of the existing knowledge of similar phenomena elsewhere for explaining communal instability in Africa.

authority and potential influence. Inter-ethnic violence in the country became significant in 1966 and since then has become more intense and its consequences more brutal.

The situation worsened in 1972. Although the civil war in the Sudan ended in March, the unsuccessful attempt of the Hutu majority in Burundi to seize political power in June led to violent reprisals against them by the Tutsi ruling minority. Less than a month afterwards, over 50,000 had died.[2] In September the figure stood at 80,000 with no end in sight to the pogrom. In fact, the killing continued until at least July 1973, and temporarily poisoned relations between Burundi and Tanzania. It went far beyond the massacres which attended the unsuccessful Hutu revolts in 1965 and 1969.

Before the end of 1972, Amin expelled the British Asians of Uganda under rather inhuman conditions and forced many of the citizen Asians to take up life in the villages. The Hutu ruling majority of Rwanda, apparently reacting to events in neighbouring Burundi, descended with vengeance on their Tutsi minority. Again this massacre far outstripped that which followed the Hutu assumption of political power in 1960, the pogrom of 1963, and that subsequent to the threat of the invasion of Rwanda by Tutsi refugees in 1965. During the period 1972-73, militants of the Malawi Congress Party killed several thousand members of the Jehovah's Witness religious sect thereby forcing thousands of others to flee Malawi for refuge in Zambia. The Kapkwekwe crisis in Zambian politics is also a variant of the same inter-ethnic tension. And in 1973 the rumblings of secessionist sentiment were again audible in Zaire.[3]

THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING THEORIES

In the light of these experiences the claim that ethnicity decreases, or is bound to decrease, with increased modernization cannot be successfully substantiated, at least as far as the African continent is concerned.[4] There are

2   This is the official Government figure. Independent sources put the number much higher.
3   This catalogue of events is largely the result of the examination of various periodicals and newspapers for the period 1966-1973.
4   Even outside Africa the persistence of ethnicity is empirically observable in the anti-Castilian activities of the Basques, Catalans and Galacians of Spain; the animosity of the Swiss against immigrant workers of Switzerland, and the demands of the French-speaking peoples of Berne for political separation from the German-speaking elements; South Tyroleans' dissatisfaction with Italian rule; evidence of Breton unhappiness with continued French rule; the resurgence of Scottish, Welsh and Irish ethnicity in the United Kingdom; the religious conflict in Northern Ireland; Wallon-Flemish rivalry in Belgium, French-Canadian separatism in Canada; and racial violence in the USA and UK.
    Theoretically, the same phenomenon has been observed by: Robert Melsen and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXIV (Dec. 1970), pp. 1112-1130; Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61 (September 1967), pp. 717-726; Raymond Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 59 (December 1955), pp. 896-908; John Goering, "The Emergence of Ethnic Interests: A Case of Serendipity," *Social Forces*, Vol. 49 (March 1971), pp. 379-384; W. S. Bernard, "Interrelationships Between Immigrants and Negroes: A Summary of a Seminar on Integration,"

various reasons given for this contention. Apter expected the 'charismatic' leadership of Kwame Nkrumah to be the crucial integrative instrument in Ghana.[5] Others argue for powerful political leaders,[6] strong nationalist movements and political parties,[7] and territorial political institutions[8] as the instruments and new modes of integration.

However, the most dominant theme of this viewpoint is related to the impact of increased urbanization, commercialization and professionalization on ethnicity; that modernization defined in terms of increases in urbanization, schooling, communication and transportation facilities would lead to the integration of diverse communal groups. Probably based on the dichotomous models of Toennies, Maine, Durkheim, Marx, Weber and Talcott Parsons, its contemporary influence is Karl Deutsch.[9] A representative argument is that of Morrison and Stevenson:

> The values associated with modernization—higher income, education, information, and political participation—are increasingly shared by all members of even the most culturally plural nations, and that to the extent that increasing modernization is characteristic of new nations the achievement of these values,

The International Migration Review, Vol. 3 (Summer 1969), pp. 47-57; D. Clinel, "Ethnicity: A Neglected Dimension of American History," *The International Migration Review*, Vol. 3 (Summer 1969), pp. 58-63; N. Glazer and D. Moyiniham, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1963); S. Goldstein and C. Goldscheider, *Jewish American: Three Generations in a Jewish Community* (Englewood Cliffe, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1968); A Greeley, "Ethnicity as an Influence on Behaviour," *Integrated Education*, Vol. 7 (July-August 1969), pp. 33-41; R. J. Vecoli, "Ethnicity as a Neglected Dimension of American History," *American Studies in Scandinavia*, Vol. 4 (Summer 1970), pp. 5-23; D. Zochert, "Ethnic Divisions Persist in U.S.," *Chicago Daily News*, 18 September 1970.
5   David Apter, "Political Democracy in the Gold Coast," in Calvin W. Stillman, ed., *Africa in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).
6   Cf. Claude Ake, "Political Integration and Political Stability: A Hypothesis," *World Politics*, Vol. 19 (April 1967), pp. 486-499.
7   Cf. J. S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), especially the Introduction and Conclusion.
8   Cf. René Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-building," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXVI (March 1972), pp. 68-90; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1966); M. G. Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism," *Annals of the N.Y. Academy of Sciences*, Vol. LXXXIII (January 1960), pp. 762-777; Leo A. Depres, *Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guyana* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Pierre Van den Berghe, "Towards a Sociology for Africa," *Social Forces*, Vol. XLII (October 1964), pp. 11-18; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe Ill: Free Press, 1963), and Robert E. Ward, "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan," *World Politics*, Vol. XV (1963), pp. 569-596.
9   Cf. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1953). Although in 1961 he changed his view and saw social mobilization as apt to have a negative impact on assimilation, cf. his "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV (September 1961), p. 501, he nevertheless returned to his earlier optimism concerning the influence of modernization on ethnicity. Cf. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (NY: Basic Books 1969), and Karl Deutsch, "Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues of Political Research," in Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (NY: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 4-5.

or the perception that they are being achieved will help to moderate conflicts based on differences in the values of traditional cultures.[10]

On the contrary, it is becoming increasingly clear that ethnicity has not only persisted in African politics but has intensified.[11] In fact, Hansen's 'Law of the Third Generation' suggests that there is an irresistible tendency toward an increased awareness of ethnicity with the passage of time.[12] Goering's findings support this law. In his sample, 70% of the third generation immigrants in the US, as opposed to 50% for the first generation and 50% for the second generation, thought of themselves in ethnic terms. Thus one component of ethnic consciousness, the awareness or salience of ethnicity, appears most strongly in the third generation.[13] This contradicts the desire of most African leaders to extirpate ethnicity from their national fabric.[14]

There is, therefore, an even greater need to find solutions to the problems which ethnicity poses for national order and stability in Africa. This paper seeks to contribute to the search for such a solution. It rejects the contention that ethnicity is an inherent aspect of social change in all culturally heterogeneous societies, and that neither the disappearance nor a significant amelioration of ethnic conflict is possible. This view which sees the stability of these societies as threatened not by communalism per se but by the failure of national institutions to explicitly recognize and accommodate existing communal divisions and interests, recommends political arrangements which accord to all communal groups a meaningful role in national life and which are able to keep

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10   D. G. Morrison and H. M. Stevenson, "Cultural Pluralism, Modernization and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis of Sources of Political Instability in African Nations," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 1972), p. 90. The following also share the same view: A. L. Epstein, *Politics in an Urban Community* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958); Max Gluckman, "Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa," in I. Wallerstein, ed., *Social Change: The Colonial Situation* (NY: Wiley 1966), pp. 251-264; Robert Bates, "Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, Vol. X (1970), pp. 546-561; Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); James S. Coleman, "The Problem of Political Integration in Emergent Africa," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (March 1955).

11   An increase in ethnicity over time has been observed in: Melsen and Wolpe, "Modernization and the Prospects of Communalism," op. cit; Meyer Fortes, "The Plural Society in Africa," The Alfred and Winnifred Hoernk Memorial Lecture, 1968 (Johannesberg, 1970); Ivor and Rosalind Feierbend and Betty Nevsvold, "Social Change and Political Violence," in Hugh Graham and Ted Gurr, eds., *The History of Violence in America* (NY: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 632-687; J. C. Mitchell, *Tribalism and the Plural Society* (London: OUP, 1960); Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," op. cit.; C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (NY: Harper and Row, 1966); S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1966); Mancur Olsen, jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. XXIII (December 1963), pp. 529-552.

12   M. L. Hansen, "The Third Generation," in O. Handlin, ed., *Children of the Uprooted* (NY: Harper and Row, 1966).

13   Goering, "The Emergence of Ethnic Interests," op. cit., p. 381. He, however, found that in spite of this increase in ethnicity with time in America, there is less inter-ethnic hostility with successive generations.

14   Ethnicity was condemned by the First All-African Peoples Conference. Cf. The Resolution on Tribalism, Religious Separatism, and Traditional Institutions adopted by the All-African Peoples Conference held at Accra, Ghana, December 5-13, 1958.

communal conflicts within manageable bounds.[15] To accept it is to endorse the status quo of inter-ethnic tension, to suggest that the problem is insoluble, or to accept the inevitability of political instability in Africa.[16]

The failure to find a solution is not caused by any inherent characteristics of ethnicity but by an inadequate diagnosis of the problem on the part of the practitioners and analysts of domestic politics. These have been unwilling or unable to investigate rigorously the impact of the nature of the socio-economic and political organization on ethnicity. Parenti recognizes the role of the nature of the political system on ethnicity in the US but neglects that of the socio-economic system.[17] Although economic factors are usually mentioned, until recently, most analysts have tended to deal with them briefly and then go on to emphasize such factors as the religions of the dominant groups, the degree of inter-ethnic racial and cultural differences, ethnocentrism, differences in institutions, the absence of value concensus, and the clarity and rigidity of group definition, or to synthesize or systematize subsets of these.[18] Consequently, as Magubane correctly argues, they tend to treat symptoms as underlying causes,[19] and ignore the causative effects of the socio-economic organization of the societies.

Furnivall's excellent and pioneering work on plural societies, while recognizing that "the working of economic forces makes for tension between groups with competing interests; between town and country, industry and agriculture, capital and labour"[20] fails to move further in the direction of providing an adequate explanation for ethnicity. He emphasizes the effect of

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15   This paraphrase of the viewpoint in question has been taken from Melsen and Wolpe, "Modernization and the Prospects of Communalism," op. cit. Others who explicitly share the same views include C. S. Whitaker, jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," *World Politics*, Vol. 19 (January 1967), pp. 190-217; Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," op. cit.; and Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa," op. cit.

16   On the inevitability of African instability, cf. Edward Feit, "Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria," *World Politics*, Vol. XX (January 1968), pp. 179-193; J. O'Connell, "The Inevitability of Instability," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 5 (March 1967), pp. 181-191; A. Zolberg, "The Structure of Conflict in the New States of Africa," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXII (March 1968), pp. 70-78; A. Zolberg "Military Intervenes in the New States of Tropical Africa: Elements of a Comparative Analysis," in Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military Intervenes* (NY: Sage, 1968), pp. 71-98.

17   Michael Parenti, op. cit., p. 725.

18   Cf. Stanley Lieberson, "A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnic Relations." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 26 (December 1961), pp. 902-910; Philip Mason, *Patterns of Dominance* (London: OUP, 1970); Donald Noel, "A Theory of the Origin of Ethnic Stratification," *Social Problems*, Vol. 16 (Fall 1968), pp. 157-172; R. A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations* (NY: Random House, 1970); P. L. Van den Berghe, "Paternistic versus Competitive Race Relations: An Ideal Type Approach," in Bernard E. Segal, ed., *Racial and Ethnic Relations* (NY: Growell, 1966), pp. 53-69; Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism," op. cit.; P. L. Van den Berghe, "Towards a Sociology for Africa," *Social Forces*, Vol. XLIII (October 1964), pp. 11-18; Leo Kuper, "Sociology: Some Aspects of Urban Plural Societies," Robert A. Lystad, ed., *The African World: A Survey of Social Research* (NY: Praeger, 1965); W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965); Clyde Mitchell, *Tribalism and the Plural Society* (London: OUP, 1960).

19   B. Magubane, "Pluralism and Conflict Situations in Africa: A New Look," *African Social Research*, Vol. VII (June 1969), pp. 529-554.

20   Cf. J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), p. 311.

cultural heterogeneity on the market situation rather than the effects of the market situation on cultural heterogeneity. Similarly, Myrdal provides a useful synthesis in his observation that the interpenetrating and conflicting patterns in a culturally heterogeneous society are not culture patterns in the usual sense of the term, but value patterns made up of sets of valued activities which further both the interests and ideals of groups brought together by economic, political and sociological forces.[21] But he fails to give a satisfactory explanation of the problem because he de-emphasizes the importance of the social structures and the nature of the capitalist organization of the American society.

Magubane correctly stresses the role of social structures in his argument that a serious effort to understand African conflicts cannot ignore the ownership of the primary productive forces, and that this means the consideration of the material basis of society, the nature of the social system, the political organization, the structure of social consciousness, the ideological and socio-psychological orientation of the members of the society, views of the ruling classes and various social groups, and the rivalry between the various groupings within the ruling circles.[22] But he does not go beyond this to indicate the dynamics of the social structures which yield ethnicity. Others have analysed these structures,[23] but ignore the importance of social process and are, therefore, partial in their explanation. Of the few who have sought to integrate social structure and social process,[24] the inadequacy of their analyses arises essentially from a total preoccupation with inter-group factors and the resultant disregard for important socio-psychological variables which renders them incapable of providing a realistic basis for solving the ethnic problem; they assume that ethnic differences in themselves prompt the development of the socio-economic stratification which leads to ethnic antagonism.

The excellent work of Bonacich challenges this assumption and suggests that economic processes at the individual level are more fundamental and decisive.[25] The theoretical arguments of this paper supplement her contention, as well as her desire to propound a much needed and developed theory which accounts for variations in ethnic antagonism. Essentially, it sets out to show

21 Cf. G. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (NY: Harper and Row, 1944); G. Myrdal, *Value in Social Theory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958).
22 B. Magubane, "Pluralism and Conflict Situations in Africa: A New Look," op. cit., p. 538.
23 Cf. Geoffrey Bing, *Reap the Whirlwind: The Account of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana from 1950-1966* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1967); Peter Worseley, *The Third World: A Vital New Force in International Affairs* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967); Richard Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration—A Radical Approach," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1967).
24 Cf. Oliver Cox, *Caste, Class and Race* (NY: Modern Reader, 1948), pp. 408-422; Marvin Harris, *Patterns of Race in the Americas* (NY: Walker, 1964), pp. 79-94; Gary Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Robert Blau, "Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt," *Social Problems*, Vol. 16 (Spring 1969), pp. 393-408; Michael Reich, "The Economics of Racism," in David M. Gordon, ed., *Problems in Political Economy* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1971); J. H. Boeke, *The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy* (NY: Day Publishers 1942); Issa Shivji, "Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues," University of Dar es Salaam, Development Studies seminar paper (mimeo).
25 Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 37 (October 1972), pp. 547-559.

that the persistence of and increase in ethnicity are directly related to the nature of the socio-economic organization of society. More specifically, it argues that (a) ethnicity arises from the socio-economic insecurity of an individual in a society with diverse primary or communal groups, and (b) this socio-economic insecurity is directly related to the scope and intensity of socio-economic competition; the extent of economic scarcity in the society; and the degree of socio-economic inequality tolerated by the society. It goes on to suggest that the requisite solution lies in the creation of a socio-economic organization which limits the scope and intensity of socio-economic competition, and encourages a high degree of egalitarianism in socio-economic relations.

ETHNICITY AND THE URBAN SETTING IN AFRICA

In fundamental terms the origin of ethnicity lies in man's attempt to secure enough of the societal resources to maintain at least a subsistence level of existence and if possible an abundance of goods, services and leisure. During the colonial period, Africans had to pursue these goals within the colonial situation. Apart from the bringing together of disparate pre-colonial political entities into one political unit, its dominant characteristics were the influence of active private property[26] and the pervasive dominance of the capitalist mode of production in the national economy. At the same time, African countries became integral but peripheral parts of the advanced capitalist societies.

The consequences of this development for the emergence of ethnicity are clear. In the ensuing international division of labour between the metropole and the African countries, the former specialized in the production of technology and industrial goods while the latter provided the foodstuffs necessary to remedy the deficiency in agricultural production in the metropole; supplied the raw materials and mineral resources needed for industrial activity; acted as an outlet for the increasingly unemployed metropolitan labour force and the underutilized capital; and served as a market for the industrial goods. The colonialist set about reorganizing the socio-economic and political activities, structures and institutions in the colony to ensure that the latter met its own obligations under the terms of this division of labour. He decided what crops were needed from the colony and encouraged their growth. When they were not already being produced in the area, he introduced them from outside. There was no attempt to promote activities, goods and services relevant to habits, needs and taste patterns of the subject peoples.

This forced the local population to migrate to areas of new colonial activity in order to subsist or enjoy an increase in goods and services. In addition, the conservative colonial regimes ensured that the local administration maintained huge surpluses every year whenever possible, even during the 1930-35 economic

26 The concept of active property is used here in the same sense as Dahrendorf uses it to refer to the ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange. Cf. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 3-35.

depression. The demands of the tax collector had to be met and the African, therefore, sold his labour to large plantation estates often long distances from home or migrated to the few urban areas where the meagre wage employment opportunities available could be seized. Often the labour, wage, living and health conditions were appalling. The result was a basic insecurity and lack of self-confidence among the Africans.

Private enterprises tended to concentrate their investments and activities where there was a high-income consumer demand, namely in the few urban areas where most of the high-income groups lived. Colonial governmental policies which equated development with the expansion of this sector of the economy, encouraged and subsidized investment opportunities in it, provided infrastructural facilities at subsidized rates, extended low-interest loans, imposed tariffs to protect its industries, and made some moderate response to labour's demands for better wages and living conditions. In addition, research and development projects were directed towards satisfying the industrial and agricultural needs of this sector. Consequently, few members of the local population could meet their needs for money to pay taxes, buy clothes and other goods, and pay school fees by selling crops and fish or meat in the rural areas. Many migrated to the urban centres for longer or shorter periods to work.

However, as mentioned above, urban life offered very little socio-economic security. There was no guarantee of employment; no provision for care of the old; compensation for sickness or accident was low; and the few existing pension schemes were quite meagre.[27] The results were as Boeke has observed:

> . . . materialism, individualism, and a concentration on economic ends far more
> complete and absolute than in homogeneous Western lands; and a total absorption
> in the exchange and market; a capitalist structure with the business concern a
> subject far more typical of capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called
> capitalist countries which have grown up slowly out of the past and are still
> bound to it by a hundred roots.[28]

Furnivall is correct in his observation that capitalist market forces in tropical colonies acted to create conditions of social atomization. But he fails to grasp the true dynamics of the situation when he suggests that the potential adverse effects of the resultant anomie of the individual were held in check by the twin forces of market relations and colonial domination.[29] Rather, it is the security provided by ethnic group solidarity that provides solace.

Since very limited job, trade and business opportunities and social amenities exist in the few urban areas, it is essentially here that contact between members of different ethnic groups takes place on an extensive and significant scale. In the rural areas inter-ethnic horizontal mobility is hampered by the land tenure system which emphasizes ancestral heritage.[30] Migrant labour to

27 Cf. Max Gluckman, "Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa," op. cit., p. 260.
28 Boeke, *The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy*, op. cit., p. 452.
29 Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, op. cit., p. 306.
30 Cf. *The Royal Commission on East Africa 1953-55*, Cmnd. 9475, Chapter 5;
    Audrey I. Richards, "Multi-tribalism in African Urban Areas," *Civilizations*, Vol.
    XVI, No. 3 (1966), 354-361.

the rural but major cash crop areas provides inter-ethnic contact but this is usually characterized by superordinate-subordinate relations which mute the ethnic factor. It is in the urban area where contact is made on an equal basis that competition which leads to ethnic tension can ensue. Harris has shown that the critical difference in ethnic relations between the deep south, USA and Brazil lies in the fact that in the former, a white yeomanry is in direct competition with ex-slaves whereas in the latter, the Portuguese owners of plantations worked by the ex-slaves were not in any such competition but in a dominant position.[31]

Any significant inter-ethnic contact at the village level is confined to those villages located near the periphery of the ethnic group and those close to the urban areas.[32] Otherwise, inter-ethnic experiences are obtained indirectly from the stories of the urban dwellers who return occasionally to their villages to visit.[33]

Inter-ethnic contact in the urban areas is reflected in the ethnic composition of many African cities. In 1954 there were representatives of 70 ethnic groups in Luanshya, 55 in Brazzaville, and 30 to 40 in Kampala.[34] The population of Abidjan in 1955 included only seven per cent of the native groups, 11% from groups in the immediate vicinity, 36% from other groups, and 46% from foreign countries.[35] In 1948 the original ethnic group of Bamako accounted for only 25.5%.[36] A high percentage for one ethnic group is exhibited in the 1953 population of Port Harcourt which contained 78.3% Ibos; other tribes included Efiks, Ijaws and Ibibios.[37]

Such contact is a prerequisite for inter-ethnic tension. This point is widely recognized, but most explicitly stated by the proponents of the race-cycle.[38] In other words, the ethnic problem of African politics is first and foremost an urban one. The absence of any significant inter-ethnic contacts (and therefore

31 Harris, *Patterns of Race in the Americas*, op. cit.
32 G. W. Skinner, "The Nature of Loyalties in Rural Indonesia," in Wallerstein,
    Social Change: The Colonial Situation, op. cit., p. 271.
33 Ibid., p. 272.
34 Audrey Richards, op. cit., pp. 256-357.
35 Aristide Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration," *Journal of Modern African
    Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 1967), p. 456.
36 Ibid., p. 456.
37 Howard Wolpe, "Port Harcourt: Ibo Politics in Microcosm," *Journal of Modern
    African Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (October 1969), p. 71, footnote 1.
38 The race-cycle framework was initially formulated by Robert E. Park in his *Race
    and Culture* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1950). Since then others have written about it.
    Cf. Ernest Barth and Donald Noel, "Conceptual Frameworks for the Analysis of
    Race Relations: An Evaluation," *Social Forces*, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 333-348;
    Lieberson, "A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnic Relations," op. cit., pp. 902-910;
    Emory Bogardus, "Rase Relations Cycle, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 35
    (January 1930), pp. 612-617; W. O. Brown, "Culture Contact and Race Conflict,"
    in E. B. Butler, ed., *Race and Culture Contact* (NY: McGraw Hill, 1943), pp. 34-
    47; E. F. Frazier, *Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World* (NY: Alfred
    A. Knopf, 1957); C. E. Glick, "Social Roles and Types in Race Relations," in
    Andrew W. Lind, ed., *Race Relations in World Perspective* (Honolulu: University
    of Hawaii Press, 1955), pp. 243-262; E. N. Palmer, "Culture Contacts and Popula-
    tion Growth," in Joseph J. Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan, eds., *Population
    Theory and Policy* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), pp. 410-415; A. Grenfell. *White
    Settlers and Native Peoples* (Melbourne: Georgian House, 1950). For summaries
    of several of these cycles, see Brewton Berry, *Race and Ethnic Relations* (Boston:
    Houghton Mifflin, 1958), Chapter 6.

conflicts), in the rural areas supports this view. Grey's preliminary study of Ethiopia which shows that increased education positively affects national identification in the rural but not the urban areas provides empirical evidence.[39] Skinner has also observed with respect to Indonesia, that ethnicity is essentially associated with urban centres and villages near ethnically heterogeneous cities.[40]

However, contact per se does not fully account for inter-ethnic tension. In fact, Lindgreen has observed a case of contact without conflict involving the Reindeer Tungus and the Cossacks of Northwest Manchuria. They remain racially and culturally dissimilar and characterized by a general ethnocentric preference for the ingroup, but the conflict potential does not materialize essentially because of the absence of socio-economic competition due to their economic complementarity, as well as the admission by each that the other is superior in certain specific respects, and the existence of shared values and interests.[41] Thus neither contact nor ethnocentricism alone is enough to generate inter-ethnic tension.[42] In Africa two major classes of variables are also significant: the cultural and socio-structural characteristics of the primary groups prior to contact, and the nature and context of the initial contact.[43]

Since, however, the characteristics of the groups are more or less 'givens', the context of initial contact is of greater explanatory significance. The influence of the pre-contact variables is mediated by the structure of initial contact.[44] The most critical factor in this structure is the degree of socio-economic competition involved. M. W. Smith, in his study of the Puyallup of Washington, observes that the complementarity of economic interests between the Puyallup Indians and the early white migrants facilitated a quick and peaceful social interaction. But when other whites came to acquire land and timber, relations became strained.[45] Similarly, the intense competition for land between the Kikuyu and the white settlers in Kenya led to serious tension which has not yet been fully resolved.[46] More convincing still is McWilliam's study of Japanese-Americans which shows that even when no ethnic differences exist, intense socio-economic competition may produce ethnic-like antagonism;[47] and Seelye and Brewer's study of North Americans in Guatemala shows that the degree of cultural contact is determined more by socio-economic opportunities than by attitudinal variables.[48]

Given the capitalistic structures and values of colonial Africa, competition is the most dominant feature of the urban setting. In the face of the extreme scarcity of socio-economic rewards, it could hardly be otherwise. Antonovsky suggests that a discriminatory system of social relations requires both shared goals and scarcity of rewards.[49] Similarly, Wagley and Harris suggest that it is important to know the object of competition; the more vital or valuable the resource over which there is competition, the more intense is the conflict.[50] The net effect of this intense socio-economic competition is individual insecurity regarding its outcome. Wolfe has shown that anomie is directly related to threat of economic deprivation.[51]

Ethnic group affiliation and identity can thus be understood as a mechanism to overcome this pervasive insecurity of the colonial urban setting. The limits imposed on the individual by his biology and the presence of other competitors impel him to seek allies in order to attain some of his goals. Rex recognizes this fact in his criticism of Furnivall for ignoring the extent to which the market system itself produces new group affiliations; and that although it draws people together into a single social system it also divides them into new dynamically related groupings.[52] And Dustin and Davies have demonstrated that the individual is more confident and secure in a group than when alone.[53]

THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC AFFILIATION

When, as in the colonies, the society is not occupationally highly differentiated and the level of class consciousness is low, the individual tends to ally with those who share the same primordial characteristics with him: members of the same nuclear family, extended family, clan, tribe chiefdom, religion, race, culture. Only in such alliances is he confident of mutual trust, useful communication and mutual aid. Rokeach's theoretical argument that social distance between individuals and members of different social groups varies with perceived similarity[54] is confirmed empirically by Brewer's study of East Africa which shows that social distance towards outgroups varies with perceived

39 Robert Grey, "Determinants of National Identification in Ethiopia: A Research Note," *The African Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1973).
40 G. W. Skinner, "The Nature of Loyalties in Rural Indonesia," op. cit., pp. 265-77.
41 Ethel J. Lindgreen, "An Example of Culture Contact Without Conflict: Reindeer Tungus and Cossacks of North-West Manchuria," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 40 (October-December 1938), pp. 605-621.
42 The point about the insufficiency of ethnocentrism is well made in Donald Noel, "A Theory of the Origin of Ethnic Stratification," op. cit.
43 Barth and Noel identify three classes of variables. In addition to the two mentioned here they include the characteristics of the migration of the primary or communal group. While this may be significant in the US it is of no importance in Africa where the ethnic problem is not related to immigration of groups. Cf. Barth and Noel, "Conceptual Frameworks for the Analysis of Race Relations: An Evaluation," op. cit., p. 337.
44 Cf. Ibid, p. 337; Pierre Van den Berghe, *Race and Ethnicity* (NY: Basic Books, 1970); R. A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations* (NY: Random House, 1970); D. L. Noel, op. cit.; Philip Mason, *Race Relations* (London: OUP, 1970); A. B. Riddleberger and A. B. Motz, "Prejudice and Perception," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 62 (March 1967), pp. 498-503.
45 M. W. Smith, "The Puyallup of Washington," in Ralph Linton, ed., *Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes* (NY: Appleton-Century, 1940), pp. 3-36.
46 Cf. Louis Leakey, *Mau Mau and Kikuyu* (London: Methuen, 1952).
47 Carey McWilliams, *Prejudice: Japanese-Americans* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), especially pp. 82-83.
48 H. N. Seeyle and M. B. Brewer, "Ethnocentrism and Acculturation of North Americans in Guatamala," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 80 (1970), p. 154.
49 Aaron Antonovsky, "The Social Meaning of Discrimination," *Phylon*, Vol. 21 (Spring 1960), pp. 81-95.
50 Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris, *Minorities in the New World* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1958), particularly pp. 263-264.
51 Raymond Wolfe, "Effects of Economic Threat on Anomie and Perceived Locus of Control," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 86 (1972), pp. 233-240.
52 J. Rex, "The Plural Society in Sociological Theory," *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X (1959), pp. 116-177.
53 D. S. Dustin and H. P. Davis, "Evaluative Bias in Group and Individual Competition," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 80 (1970), pp. 103-108.
54 M. Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind* (NY: Basic Books, 1960).

dissimilarity to the ingroup,[55] and by Brislin's study of nine ethnic groups at the University of Guam.[56] This is also reflected in the tendency of ethnic town dwellers to live apart wherever the housing policy permits it,[57] and their marriages to be confined to members of the same ethnic group.[58]

The unit chosen for alignment at any time and place varies with the nature of the units in competition. Within the extended family the nuclear family alignment prevails; in the clan, the extended family; in the village, the clan; and in the city ethnic group alignment dominates group affiliations. As the level of social relations widens from the extended family to the city, the unit of group affiliation shifts from the nuclear family to the ethnic group. However, at each higher level there is a mixed bag of alignments including units at lower levels. For example, the relevant alliances in the city are focused around the nuclear family, extended family, clan, village, district, and ethnic group. Each competes with equivalent units: clan with clans, village with villages and ethnic group with ethnic groups.[59] Therefore, for national politics ethnic group affiliation is the most relevant and significant form of alignment. And this is usually dominant in the urban area.

The most significant all-inclusive alliance which the individual enters into in order to ameliorate his insecurity and increase his capacity for socio-economic competition is the urban-based and ethnic group-wide voluntary association.[60] Gluckman[61] and Wallerstein[62] have observed the major role which these groups play in the lives of the African urban dweller by offering socio-economic security. In most cases, however, these alignments are not formal in nature; the individual does not join any voluntary association. It is a question of mutual identification on the part of the relevant individuals. The resultant sense of identity, feeling of solidarity and increased power for socio-economic competition provide the needed security. It provides a buffer for new entrants into the cities and for those who find themselves in difficulty there by ensuring

55 M. B. Brewer, "Determinants of Social Distance Among East African Tribal Groups," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 10 (1968), pp. 279-289.
56 Richard Brislin, "Interaction Among Members of Nine Ethnic Groups and Belief Similarity Hypothesis," *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 85 (December 1971), pp. 171-179.
57 Cf. P. C. Gutkind, "Urban Conditions in Africa," *The Town Planning Review*, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (April 1961), p. 11.
58 Cf. J. C. Mitchell, "Aspect of African Marriages in the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia," *Human Relations in Africa*, Vol. XXII (1957); A. Izzett, Family Life Among the Yorubas in Lagos, Nigeria," in A. Southall, *Social Change in Modern Africa* (London: OUP, 1961), pp. 305; Peter Morris, *Family and Social Change in an African City* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961).
59 This tendency for communal groups to be the basis of alignments even at the very local level has been observed by Audrey Chapman Smock in her "The N.C.N.C. and Ethnic Unions in Biafra," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1969), pp. 21-34.
60 Cf. R. L. Sklar, "The Contribution of Tribalism to Nationalism in Western Nigeria," Wallerstein, *Social Change: The Colonial Situation*, op. cit., pp. 290-300; Abner Cohen, *Customs and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); I. Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa," in Harry Eckstein and David Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), pp. 665-670.
61 Gluckman, "*Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa*," op. cit., p. 259.
62 I. Wallerstein, "Voluntary Associations," in Coleman and Rosberg, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, op. cit., pp. 318-339.

mutual aid and leadership, providing for common welfare, security and credit, and offering a basis for links with the rural areas.[63] Heightened socio-economic frustration is a crucial element in the motivational complex leading to ethnic identification.[64]

A feeling of both belongingness and rejection becomes the basis for distinguishing individuals in the city and at the national level. Under these circumstances, each member of X ethnic group fears that he is regarded as an X by any member of Y or Z ethnic groups and would therefore be discriminated against by them in the struggle for the scarce socio-economic resources. He believes that he can expect preference from any member of X in a position to help him; and perceives it to be in his interest to promote the activities of all Xs in competition with Ys and Zs. If any X or Z does not favour his own kind he gets no preference from his kind in return, and no one of the other groups would give him preference over their own people. As a result, anyone who gets outside the system of ethnic preference is lost.[65] This tends to reinforce the individual's identification with his ethnic group in a society where few people are confident enough of their own ability to survive and prosper to advocate a merit system of hiring and promotion, and where most prefer the security of at least being able to rely on exploiting ethnic preference whenever and wherever this is possible.

As this happens, members of an ethnic group tend to look more and more towards their group for support. The consequent intra-group cohesion acts to further separate it from the other ethnic groups. Members begin to develop common experiences in relation to the others and, therefore, a common history, tradition and interest. Under these circumstances further conflicts of interest increase their social distance in economic affairs, security consideration and ideology. If ethnic group lines coincide with regional geographical boundaries, the resultant territorial cohesion acts to convert ethnic group boundaries into cultural, economic and, just before secession, military barriers. In this regard, the history of ethnic politics in Nigeria is illuminating.

One of the consequences of this increased individual identification with the ethnic group and the resultant increase in intra-group cohesion is the intrusion of inter-group dynamics into the ethnic scene. In his concept of 'antagonistic cooperation' Sumner notes the tendency for inter-human hostility to be aroused by competition for desired but scarce values such as satisfaction of economic needs, high status or sex partners.[66] Deprivation is the source of this hostility towards competitors. And, as Dollard observes, it is the inability to recognize the existence of this factor that accounts for the failure of many attempts to solve the ethnic problem.[67] Within the ingroup, however, and especially during

63 Audrey I. Richards, "Multi-tribalism in African Urban Areas," op. cit., p. 360.
64 Joseph S. Himes, "A Theory of Racial Conflict," *Social Forces*, Vol. 50 (September 1971), p. 54.
65 Cf. Okwudiba Nnoli, "The Nigeria-Biafra War: A Political Analysis," in Joseph Okpaku, ed., *Nigeria: The Dilemma of Nationhood* (NY: Greenwood, 1971), pp. 124-125.
66 Cf. W. G. Summer, *Folkways* (NY: Dover, 1959).
67 Cf. John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959).

competition with outgroups, inter-individual hostility is usually met with a united hostile front by all the other members through the process of socialization and, if necessary, is forcibly suppressed.[68] But as Young observes, the internalized restraints against hostility are relaxed at times of group rivalry which stresses economic competition in order to permit hostility towards the outgroup.[69] According to Brown such hostility is again socially legitimate against the outgroup when there is an actual threat to the dominance of the ingroup.[70] The ingroup accepts rivalry manifestations as legitimate modes of keeping the outsider in his place.

Dollard is, nevertheless, correct in identifying two types of hostility in inter-ethnic relations: direct aggression and indirect aggression.[71] In direct aggression, intense competition and the resultant deprivation and frustration lead to pervasive insecurity, and out of this insecurity stems the hostility and aggression which are designed to restore a balanced situation. The individual or group imposing the frustration and inciting the hostility is identified and the aggressive response capable of controlling it is meted out. This is illustrated by competition for white man's jobs in towns in Southern USA where whites hostile to competing black workers use political and other measures to limit the competition.[72] The same point is reflected by the riotous attacks against the invasion by Southern USA negroes into the Northern employment facilities of East St. Louis and Chicago.[73]

In the case of indirect aggression, the cause of the aggressive response is not the victim of hostility. The aggressive response cannot be directed at the individual or group that caused it because of danger connected with this course of action. It finds a substitute. Hostility to a member of the outgroup is more fully actualized in direct than indirect aggression because of the lack of ties and inhibitions towards him.[74] This would tend to make ethnic prejudice more vehement even without the admixture of displaced aggression. Many times, however, the victim of direct and indirect aggression coincides to further exacerbate inter-ethnic hostility. Difficulties within the ingroup caused by one of its members tend to be displaced onto the traditional outgroup rival or rivals.[75]

Thus it is clear that in periods of socio-economic stress arising from the scarcity of jobs and other resources as is the case in the urban setting of colonial and post-colonial Africa, ethnic prejudice is a result of the rational motive of competition. In other social situations the irrational motive may play a more important role.[76] As Alexander correctly points out, ethnic prejudice

68 Cf. John Dollard, "Hostility and Fear in Social Life," *Social Forces*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (October 1938), p. 16.
69 Kimball Young, *Social Psychology* (NY: Dover, 1930), p. 474.
70 Fred Brown, "A Social-psychological Analysis of Race Prejudice," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 27 (1932-33), pp. 365-367.
71 John Dollard, "Hostility and Fear in Social Life," op. cit., pp. 18-19.
72 John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, op. cit.
73 Cf. Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago* (Chicago, 1922), esp. pp. 1-71.
74 John Dollard, "Hostility and Fear in Social Life," op. cit., pp. 19-21.
75 Fred Brown, "A Social-psychological Analysis of Race Prejudice," op. cit.
76 Cf. Frantz Alexander's discussion of "Hostility and Fear in Social Life," *Social Forces*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (October 1938), p. 27.

arises from the psychological paradox reffected in Sumner's 'antagonistic cooperation'.[77] Ingroup members in urban Africa are still hostile to each other; they have not abandoned their individual interest and the corresponding hostile aggression towards each other. They have only renounced a part of their hostile impulses directed against each other probably primarily out of utilitarian motives because life in the group increases security. This basic utilitarian factor is reinforced by sentiments arising from actual or putative kinship ties between the ingroup members. The important fact, however, remains that these cohesive ties are permanently countered in colonial and post-colonial countries of Africa, and in general in capitalist societies by disruptive forces of antagonism. Everyone remains nearer to himself; the identification of the group members with each other is only a partial one. Egotistic interests remain the most powerful motives and are only somewhat mitigated by group solidarity. "Insecurity leads to corruption and communalism, and these in turn often worsen the insecurity"[78] and consequently intensify inter-ethnic hostility.

THE GROWTH OF INTER-ETHNIC HOSTILITY

Inevitably, identification with an ethnic group leads to an identification with a certain political party as the best representative of the interests of the ingroup. Politics is after all the highest stage in the struggle for scarce, valued resources in a society. The Kabbaka Yekka in Uganda, Action Group, National Council of Nigerian Citizens and the Northern People's Congress in Nigeria, the Balubakat Party in pre-1965 Zaire, and the Kenyan People's Union in Kenya became identified with one ethnic group or another. Thus the individual's search for socio-economic security finds an expression in politics. And inter-ethnic hostility spills over into the political arena. This is particularly the case in Western-type parliamentary democracies where candidates for political office are not chosen for their commitment to the nation but can promise all manner of socio-economic rewards to their ethnically conscious constituents. Parenti has observed that in such systems, ethnically salient candidates tend to emerge and persist because of the political gains likely to accrue from appeals to ethnic sentiments; and their presence acts to ensure the persistence of ethnicity in politics.[79]

As ethnic consciousness thus increases in scope and intensity, the socio-economic and political atmosphere becomes charged with tension. Those ethnic groups hitherto dormant in the socio-economic competition are galvanized into action. This polarizes the society into subnational ethnic cultures further separated in terms of identity and loyalty. The only significant point of contact among them is the market place and this is increasingly characterized by inter-ethnic conflict. Under these circumstances the ethnic factor assumes a self-fulfilling and self-sustaining dynamic of its own. Ethnic hostility, loyalty and

77 Ibid., pp. 27-29.
78 J. O'Connell, "The Inevitability of Instability," op. cit., p. 190.
79 Cf. Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," op. cit., p. 725.

identification are passed on to successive generations through the process of socialization. The media of socialization such as the family, press, and private as well as public conversation are infected by the ubiquitous malaise of ethnicity that prevails. Consequently, even when the inter-ethnic competition is reduced, there remains the problem posed by the internalized dimension. It is even doubtful that, in the presence of such internalized sentiments, socio-economic competition along ethnic lines can be minimized in a capitalist society or any other type of socio-economic and political organization which tolerates a high degree of inter-human inequality, because the individual is daily reinforced in these sentiments by the salience of socio-economic competition, the original cause of the ethnic identity.

This internalized aspect of ethnicity accounts for the persistence of the phenomenon in such socialist States as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Although ethnic identification has diminished as a result of a reorganization of the societies, it has not been eliminated. The effects of socialization tend to take a long time to wear off. However, with the extirpation of the original base for this epiphenomenon it is only a question of time before it is completely overcome. In any case ethnic conflicts do not disturb the socio-political order in these systems as they do in some of the advanced capitalist States previously cited, largely because of the relative absence of socio-economic insecurity at the individual level. And unless the problem of this insecurity is first solved, there is no hope of ever eliminating the internalized dimension of ethnicity.

Socio-economic insecurity is related to the inequitable allocation of resources in the society. A higher degree of inequality diminishes the certainty of a reasonable share. Fear of being confined to the bottom of the receiving ladder forces the individual to seek the security provided by ethnic solidarity. This fear is reinforced by the attitude to social relations which accepts such inequality as inevitable, and sanctions it. Similarly, the private ownership of the means of production together with the centrality of the profit motive, characteristic of economic enterprises in capitalist societies, gives rise to exploitative relationships which also encourage inequality in social relations. The resultant struggle of individuals and groups not to be consigned to the bottom of the ladder of inequality has anti-social effects. Competition rather than cooperation predominates in human interaction. And hostility is the dominant feature of this competition. In such systems the persistence of ethnicity is assured.

Another significant factor which is related to socio-economic insecurity is the extent of socio-economic scarcity in the society. If the societal resources are extremely limited, then inter-ethnic competition for them is very keen. Where, as in the African countries, the Gross Domestic Product is not increasing rapidly, the demands of one group for a larger share of the 'national cake' entails a smaller share for some other group. This explains to a certain degree the difference in the intensity of ethnic hostility between the affluent and less affluent nations of the world with similar socio-economic organizations and heterogeneous ethnic composition. In this regard growth in the distributable pool of resources in the African States has not been encouraging. The result is

a steady increase in the intensity of the socio-economic competition in the urban areas as the rate of urbanization far outstrips the availability of socio-economic opportunities in the urban centres.

Between 1961 and 1971 thirteen African countries recorded increases of three per cent per annum or more in GDP per head; in at least fourteen others the rate of growth was less than one per cent a year; and in eight of these countries it declined.[80] Mabogunje has observed that, given the absence of any serious programme of rural rehabilitation in Africa, the present massive out-flow of population from the rural to the urban areas is bound to continue into the 1970s; and given the existing emphasis on import-substitution industrialization, and capital intensive industrial technology, the proportion of the urban migrants that can be absorbed into gainful employment over a long period of time is diminishing.[81] Meanwhile, available evidence points to increasing unemployment in the urban centres of Africa. In Freetown it increased from 10.6% in 1960 to 14% in 1966 and 15.5% in 1967.[82] In Nigeria urban unemployment between 1966 and 1967 stood at eight per cent compared with one per cent in the rural areas; and out of urban unemployed 70% were in the age group 15-23 years which constitutes only 25% of the labour force. Of the unemployed, 21% had been unemployed for six months to a year, 26% for a year to two years and 23% for over two years.[83]

Similarly, Beshir has observed that the growth rate for the different levels of education in Africa was higher during the period 1960-1965 than in 1965-1969.[84] The average annual growth rate for primary education was 6.3% in 1960-1965 and 4% in 1965-1969; for secondary education the figures were 13.1% in 1960-1965 and 9.4% in 1965-1969; and for higher education it was 10.7% and 3.8% respectively.[85] At the same time, African countries have been experiencing a steady and high rate of urban growth. Up to 1950, 9% of the total African population lived in localities of 20,000 and more. By the 1960s, out of 38 African countries, only 15 had less than 10% of their population in such localities, nine others had between 10% and 20%, another eight between 20% and 30%, and seven had over 30%.[86] Between 1947 and 1955/57, urban population in Zaire grew at a rate of 5.9%, while the national population grew at 2.4%, between 1948 and 1962 the urban population of Kenya increased at 6.6% while the total population grew at 2.9%; the equivalent figures for Zanzibar and Pemba between 1948-1950 are 4% and 1.2% respectively.[87]

80 UN Economic Commission for Africa, *African Economic Indicators, 1972* (NY: UN, 1973), p. 6.
81 Akin L. Mabogunje, "Population Growth and Trends and their Consequences for Development in Africa," a paper presented at the Conference on Development Strategies in Africa in the 1970s held in Arusha, Tanzania, September 1973, p. 11.
82 Cited in ibid., p. 11.
83 Cited in ibid., p. 11.
84 M. O. Beshir, "Educational Reform for Development," paper presented at the Conference on Development Strategies in Africa in the 1970s held in Arusha, Tanzania, September 1973, p. 15.
85 Ibid., p. 16.
86 Mabogunje, "Population Growth and Trends and their Consequences for Development in Africa," op. cit., pp. 6-7.
87 William Hanna and Judith Hanna, *Urban Dynamics in Black Africa* (Chicago: Aldine and Atherton, 1971), p. 21.

This urban population explosion in the face of diminishing socio-economic resources leads to greater insecurity and therefore increasing inter-ethnic hostility.

As this antagonism increases in intensity, the possibility grows for the emergence of an inter-ethnic conflict spiral. This arises, for example, when X group correctly or incorrectly perceives itself threatened by group Y. There is a high probability that X will respond with threats or hostile action which acts to elicit a hostile and 'defensive' reaction by Y. Thereafter X's original perception of danger and threat is confirmed and will further increase its 'defensive' activity. Soon the exchanges between the two are caught in an increasingly intense spiral of self-confirming hostile suspicions, actions and expectations which opens the possibility of inter-ethnic violence.[88] It is no longer a question of excluding outgroup members from jobs and the enjoyment of various social services but of ruthlessly eliminating them in violent pre-emptive actions. The history of inter-ethnic tension in Nigeria between 1964 and 1967 is illustrative of the nature and consequences of this process of escalation.[89] The overall effect is the intensification of inter-ethnic hostility.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN EGALITARIAN FORM OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

It is clear from the foregone analysis that socio-economic insecurity of the individual is decisive for the emergence, persistence and growth of ethnic identification and the consequent inter-ethnic hostility in Africa. Therefore, no solution to the problem of ethnic politics on the continent is likely to succeed unless it successfully grapples with this insecurity. That a solution is possible is clearly demonstrated by Seeyle and Brewer's study of North Americans in Guatemala which shows that with a greater increase in socio-economic security there is a corresponding decrease in identification with the ethnic ingroup.[90] Glasser's and various other studies also observe that inter-ethnic contact in an egalitarian socio-economic situation dampens the adverse effects of the ethnic factor.[91] These two sets of studies strongly suggest the possibility that an egalitarian form of socio-economic organization may be the answer to the adverse effects of ethnic politics in Africa.

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88 Conflict spirals have been discussed in detail in Robert North, Richard Brody and Ole Holsti, *Some Empirical Data on the Conflict Spiral*, Stanford University Study of Conflict and Integration, monograph, October 1963; Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Pittsburg: Boxwood, 1960); Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960). Although these deal essentially with international relations, the principles apply to all forms of intergroup relations.

89 Cf. Okwudiba Nnoli, "The Nigeria-Biafra War: A Political Analysis," op. cit., pp. 118-124.

90 Seeyle and Brewer "Ethnocentrism and Acculturation of North Americans in Guatamala," op. cit.

91 Cf. Glaser, "The Dynamics of Ethnic Identification," op. cit., pp. 31-40; D. M. Wilner, R. P. Walkey and S. W. Cook, *Human Relations in Inter-Racial Housing* (Minneapolis: University of Minesota Press, 1955); I and E. Division, "Opinions About Negro Infantry Platoons in White Companies of Seven Divisions," in G. E. Swanson, J. M. NewComb, and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology*, revised edition (NY: Holt, 1952), pp. 502-506.

When the individual no longer has reason to fear unemployment, old age, and dim prospects for the education of his children, his socio-economic insecurity greatly diminishes. Such a situation is possible in a society characterized by free and compulsory education for all children of school age until the end of the secondary level, free university and other post-secondary types of education for those willing and intellectually able to benefit from them, free medical services that are efficient and readily available to all the members of the society, guaranteed and compulsory employment for all able-bodied adults, social security benefits for adults who cannot work, and cheap, if not free, decent housing for all families, as well as reasonable wages and prices for work, goods and services in the society. The greater the approximation to this type of society the greater the security of the individual.

In Africa a capitalist form of socio-economic organization is incapable of providing the requisite security to overcome ethnic identification. Even assuming that African States can increase their productive forces within a capitalist framework to create capitalist Welfare States, which is extremely doubtful except for countries like Nigeria and Libya with vast and rich natural resources, they would only overcome that aspect of the problem arising from scarcity. That dimension caused by socio-economic inequality would remain. The increase of ethnicity in wealthy capitalist States such as USA, Canada, Britain and Belgium confirms this. In any case, under conditions of low private capital, characteristic of most African States, any attempt to satisfy the welfare needs of the population within a capitalist framework would mean an immense sacrifice on the part of the national and relevant international bourgeoisie, particularly with regard to their expectations of immediate returns on investment. And funds for the implementation of such a welfare policy must come from taxes. First, the necessary tax policy is likely to induce capitalists not to invest in the economy thus jeopardizing the most significant base of the capitalist economy. Second, when total income is not large so that average income is relatively low, a progressive income redistribution policy will not increase the welfare of the poor very much while taxing the rich rather heavily. A consequence is the transfer of potential savings into consumption, as well as the frustration of the means and will of the rich to engage in economic expansion, assuming that this was their inclination which is not always the case.[92] It is unrealistic to expect private capitalists to operate under these conditions. For them to do so would involve a measure of altruism which is not usually associated with capitalist enterprises whether foreign or national. Under the circumstances only a State which monopolizes the means of production, distribution and exchange can undertake such a welfare policy.

More important is the inadequacy of capitalism as a strategy of national progress out of the quagmire of African underdevelopment. As Clive Thomas[93]

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92 Cf. Osvaldo Sunkel, "Some Notes on Development, Underdevelopment and the International Capitalist Economy," paper sponsored by the World Law Fund as part of the World Order Model Project, p. 26.

93 Clive Thomas, "The Transition to Socialism: Issues of Economic Strategy in Tanzanian-type Economies," Economic Research Bureau paper, University of Dar es Salaam, and later presented to the East African Social Science Conference held in Nairobi, December 1972.

and others[94] have correctly argued, the present condition of underdevelopment in African-type societies arises essentially from the internationalization of the social system of capitalism and the consequent dominance of foreign ownership of the local means of production, distribution and exchange. These are complemented by various forms of socio-cultural, economic and political dependency which initially sustained this process during the colonial times and which have since become independent of the ownership and legal factors. The overall consequence is a distortion of the local economy which is reflected in the divergence of the pattern of domestic resource use and domestic demand, coupled with a limited psychological freedom of the indigenous population to comprehend the capacity of the masses to master their environment. Prerequisites for development, therefore, include the elimination of the dominance of foreign ownership of the major economic resources, and a radical transformation of the local economy to ensure a convergence of domestic resource use and domestic demand. On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly evident that local capitalists of African societies do not have an overriding interest in ending dependence and promoting a radical transformation of their social and economic structures resulting from that peculiar, complex and lopsided pattern of development inherited from colonial times which is the basis of national underdevelopment.[95] They cannot be expected to do this unless they misjudge their interests. These are not deeply antagonistic to those of the foreign enterprises and, therefore, cannot generate the kind of momentum likely to break dependence. Both seek security for the system based on private ownership and against a radical socio-economic transformation of the economy. On the other hand, even if national capital is able to assert its independence of foreign capital it is unable to generate the kind of force required for the growth of the productive forces while maintaining its private nature. First, as a result of the underdevelopment of the national economy, national private capital is quite small. Under the circumstances a very high degree of coordination is necessary to ensure a reasonable and positive impact of capital on the economy. The State may, of course, act as the agency for ensuring the necessary coordination. But the degree of control likely to produce the desired effect would be such as to vitiate the essence of the free enterprise economic system conducive to the functioning of private capital, even under

State capitalism. In fact, the difference between such State intervention and an outright takeover of economic activities by the State would be negligible. Second, it would be necessary for private capital to increase the size and integrity of the national market by experimentation with and introduction of new taste patterns relevant to the natural or unmanipulated demands of the vast majority of the population. Under the conditions of low capital this would mean immense sacrifices by the national bourgeoisie, particularly with regard to their expectations of immediate returns on investment. The radical transformation of the structure of demand and supply that is involved, as well as the demands for satisfying the basic social needs of the population, would necessitate investments whose profits are neither guaranteed nor predictable, and which, if possible, can accrue only in the very long run. It is unrealistic to expect national capitalists to operate under these conditions. Finally, the low level of national capital adversely affects the incentive system in capitalist enterprises. The usual incentives of high wages and numerous fringe benefits of an economic nature cannot be sustained. Since the workforce does not have any directly visible stake in the private capitalist enterprises it is difficult to imagine other kinds of incentives which would enable the workers to increase productivity to a level necessary for economic viability. Private capitalists do not monopolize State power and as such cannot use coercion as an instrument for increased production. Consequently, it would be impossible to drastically improve the productive forces of the nation. Even assuming that national capitalists are able to develop the productive forces, and create an independent, integrated economy in a way that promotes State monopoly capitalism based on highly developed productive forces similar to that in the advanced capitalist countries, there are serious obstacles to their continued success in building national wealth. As Szentes has observed, the emergence of monopoly capitalism in the advanced capitalist countries took place at a time when the exploitation of foreign countries was possible.[96] The changed international political and economic situation makes it highly unlikely that the newly born, State monopoly capital will get a place in the vastly shrinking sun of international exploitation. And if its growth and power rely exclusively on internal sources of exploitation this would cause unbearable internal tensions and create an extremely unstable social order.[97]

Thus theory, as well as the abortive attempts of the national bourgeoisie, where such attempts are observable at all, to eliminate the dominance of foreign capital, proves the weakness or unwillingness of this class in the struggle, and, therefore, suggests that the only available hope lies in control of the means of production, distribution and exchange by the State.[98] However, development policy which begins and ends with nationalization cannot solve the problem of underdevelopment. It may merely give rise to State bureaucratic capitalism: the use of State capital by a managerial elite in a manner which conforms to

94 Cf. J. Jalée, *The Pillage of the Third World* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1968); T. Szentes, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (Budapest: Akademia Kidao, 1971); W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972); A. G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1969); P. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1968); F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: Penguin Books, 1967); Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea* (London: Stage I, 1969), C. Bettelheim and P. Sweezy, *On Transition to Socialism* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1971).

95 Cf. Samir Amin, *The Class Struggle in Africa*, Africa Research Group reprint (ARG: Cambridge Mass., n.d.); Samir Amin. *L'accumulation à l'echelle mondiale* (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1971); Samir Amin. *L'Afrique de l'Ouest bloquée, l'economique politique de la colonisation 1880-1970* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1971); R. H. Green, "Review Article—Anatomy of Two Assessments: Pearson, Jackson and Development Partnership," *The African Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (September 1971), pp. 137-147.

96 Cf. Thomas Szentes, "Status quo and Socialism," comments on Shivji's paper: "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle," paper presented at the East African Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, 27-31 December 1970, p. 22.
97 Ibid., p. 22.
98 Ibid., p. 23.

the ethos, values and dynamics of private capital. For countries which emerged from colonial domination and whose early post-independence period was dominated by colonial structures, attitudes, norms and ideas, the interests of the bureaucratic elite and those of foreign capital are not necessarily incompatible. During the colonial times the bureaucracy was dependent on the metropole for ideas, expertise and solutions. And when independence came the bureaucratic elite emerged as one of the greatest beneficiaries of the inherited privileges. They would, therefore, oppose any transformation likely to erode their privileged positions. Their reward is an easy access to the national surplus and the life style of conspicuous consumption that goes with it.[99] On the other hand, the pressure of the vast underprivileged workers operating in the public enterprises is capable of ensuring that the management elite remains true to the national interest of eliminating economic dependence, overcoming underdevelopment, and in general catering for the welfare interests of the vast majority of the population. This is possible because workers of the underdeveloped countries represent one of the major segments of their national societies whose interests are deeply antagonistic to those of foreign capital. The inherited colonial institutions dominated by foreign capitalist enterprises represent the unjust exploitation of their labour and the neglect of their socio-economic needs. They have a personal interest in overthrowing these institutions and replacing them with others in which State enterprises adjust their priorities against luxurious and prestigious goods and projects which cater primarily for the high-income groups, and in favour of the more dynamic, self-expanding and industry-generating projects relevant for servicing the interests of the vast majority of the population. In another respect, since the national effort for radically transforming the society and mobilizing national resources against underdevelopment entail immense sacrifices, the pattern of distributing these becomes crucial. The granting of more and more privileges to those nearer the economic, political and military seats of power creates a very destabilizing potential for the national leadership;[100] and is likely to lead to the immobilization of the human resources of the vast majority of the population.[101] The only meaningful alternative is an egalitarian-democratic policy which is capable of mobilizing the popular energies at an increasingly high level of national consciousness, and of focusing mass pressure on the national Government and bureaucracy in such a way as to ensure their continued dedication to the cause of national economic independence and socio-economic transformation.[102] Thus nationalization must go hand in hand with an egalitarian-democratic policy in order to ensure national economic independence and the growth of the productive forces. Far from being passive in this process the masses must actively participate in these national tasks and

99 Cf. John Saul, "The Political Aspects of Economic Independence," paper presented at the African Regional Meeting of Directors of Development and Research Institutes, Nairobi, 1-4 February 1971, p. 5.
100 Szentes, "Stauts quo and Socialism," op. cit., p. 24.
101 Cf. Ragnar Nurkse, *Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries* (London: OUP, 1953).
102 Cf. Saul, op. cit.

serve to hold the fort against any attempt by the leaders to shrink back from their accomplishment.

Therefore, the dimensions of ethnicity arising from inequality and scarcity in the African States merge into each other. Whereas the problem of ethnicity in the advanced capitalist societies concerns a reorganization of the societies along egalitarian principles, in Africa it is related to both inequality and scarcity. This explains the greater incidence and more destructive nature of inter-ethnic hostility in Africa than in those other nations where the problem of scarcity is minimal. But until these two dimensions are eliminated, ethnicity is bound to persist and increase in intensity. And for the African countries an egalitarian-democratic form of socio-economic organization is the only remedy for the two ills. Equality is extremely difficult under severe conditions of scarcity; and abundance in Africa is (except for a few mineral-rich States) inconceivable outside a high degree of equality. Under the new conditions, the basis for the accummulation of wealth disappears and, therefore, the desire to acquire it. Consequently, one no longer sees others as a threat to one's socio-economic security previously assessed in terms of the magnitude of the accummulated wealth. Competition yields to cooperation as the dominant mode of life. At the same time, wealth is devalued as an instrument for social stratification, which then leads to the abolition of conspicuous consumption and its anti-social effects on competition. The net effect of all these is a significant amelioration, if not elimination, of socio-economic interpersonal and inter-ethnic hostility. Thus the major constraint against inter-ethnic harmony in Africa is the unwillingness of African leaders to adopt a policy of nationalization and a subsequent egalitarian, democratic framework for the allocation of socio-economic resources.