

A Revolutionary Situation in Southern Africa

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Has a revolutionary situation been created in Southern Africa? To answer this question, we need to define the revolutionary situation in the manner in which the colonial situation has been defined by Georges Balandier;¹ analyse the critical in-puts of a revolutionary situation; and then apply them to the specific cases of the dependent States of Southern Africa.

In the context of Southern Africa today a revolution entails the complete overthrow of the existing system of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Indeed, the removal of all vestiges of colonialism and neo-colonialism, which are an integral part of international capitalism which has exploited African resources for centuries, is the central task of our epoch on the African continent. Colonial capitalism has created economic structures and trade patterns of domination and exploitation throughout the continent. It is very difficult for any State that seeks both political and economic independence to break loose from these structures and patterns. But, a true revolution must destroy these structures, end the system of colonial capitalism, and introduce a new democratic, independent and socialist system. By a democratic and socialist system, I mean one in which at least the major means of production are owned by the State; the economy is centrally planned; and political institutions are controlled by the masses of the people—the workers and peasants. National liberation defined in this way does not mean decolonization in the way we have understood this term in Africa, but rather a fundamental, systemic change.

Having defined the broad goal revolutionaries would preferably be seeking, we can say that a revolutionary situation exists when the significant social forces among an oppressed people have been mobilized and are engaged in a systematic and violent confrontation with the incumbent forces, for the

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1 G. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach," in Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *Social Change: The Colonial Situation* (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1966), pp. 34-61. At Page 54, Balandier enumerates the characteristics of the colonial situation as domination imposed by a foreign minority; domination linking radically different civilizations; a clash between an industrialized and non-industrialized society; maintenance of domination by force; and the "fundamentally antagonistic character of the relationship between these two societies resulting from the subservient role to which the colonial people are subjected as 'instruments' of the colonial power."

The reader should be warned that the white minority regimes in Southern Africa describe freedom-fighters as "terrorists". Newspapers in most Western European countries also use this word. In this article, it appears in direct quotations of statements by white minority regimes, or their supporters and sympathizers. The Portuguese Government and press have dropped it. In a way, the use of the word terrorists neatly divides the opponents and supporters of the liberation struggle.

purpose of qualitative, systemic changes to the existing political and economic order. The mobilization and politicization of the social forces one regards as significant requires what Mao Tse-Tung calls "the weapons of the revolution".² He says ". . . the united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the three fundamental questions for our Party in the Chinese revolution." We can organize our discussion of the current situation in Southern Africa around these three weapons.

I. THE UNITED FRONT

Mao draws a sharp distinction between two types of revolution in the process of transforming colonized Third World countries.³ The first is the national democratic revolution in which all the social strata of the colonized and oppressed people—workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie—unite in a common struggle against an external imperial/colonial power. At this stage the word "people" has a wide application, generally everyone who is opposed to the external imperial/colonial enemy. The second, socialist revolution follows after the complete victory in the first phase. At this stage, the revolutionaries now fight domestic reactionaries, and the national bourgeoisie is now trying to protect its own commerce and industry and its links with international capital.

Broadly-speaking, Southern African liberation movements are still engaged in the first phase—the national democratic revolution. All strata of society that can be involved in the struggle against the common enemy—in this case the settler Governments of South Africa and Rhodesia, the colonial Government of Portugal, and the NATO powers which back them—are being mobilized. However, the establishment of liberated areas in Angola and, especially, Mozambique, in the last few years, has provided an opportunity to some liberation movements to introduce a socialist revolution in those areas. The FRELIMO statement published in this issue recounts the organization of production and distribution of goods on entirely new lines.⁴ The Niassa and Cabo Delgado Provinces of northern Mozambique which have been liberated since 1967, have acted as a shop window for the kind of society FRELIMO would like to build in a future Mozambique.

Establishing liberated areas in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe presents several problems. The terrain is largely open savanna vegetation, and there are no adjacent, secure sanctuaries. More importantly, because of the fragility of the morale of the comparatively mobile settler societies, Governments like Vorster's and Smith's can ill afford to lose control over areas of the country and population. An air of strength and buoyancy has to be maintained, even if the reality points the other way. Consequently, they make maximum use of their air power—the only significant advantage they have over guerrilla forces—and especially the French-made Alouette helicopters, to prevent the

2 M. Rejai, ed., *Mao Tse-Tung on Revolution and War* (Anchor Book, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970), p. 185.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

4 Marcelino Dos Santos, "Address by the FRELIMO Delegation to the Sixth Pan-African Congress" in this issue.

establishment of liberated areas. However, in spite of this effort and expense, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) has established a zone in the north-eastern part of the country where guerrillas have considerable freedom of movement in the Mavuradonha mountain range, and considerable support in the population. Among other evidence of guerrilla infiltration, was the use of FRELIMO-type mortar bombs to attack a camp of South African soldiers near the Mavuradonha mountain range in August this year. The bomb was fired from three kilometres away.⁵ It killed one South African colonel (Mr. Van Der Merwe), and injured twelve other soldiers. Hugo Bierman, Chief Commander of the South African armed forces, who had returned from a meeting with the USA's Vice-President, Gerald Ford, at the time, immediately flew to Salisbury. It was the first time Zimbabwe guerrillas had used such sophisticated and heavy weaponry. Such heavy weaponry can only be moved and used in an area in which guerrillas have considerable freedom of movement.

Who are the 'People' and who is the 'Enemy'?

We have said that the national democratic phase of the revolution should be based on a united front of all strata of society who are opposed to the common enemy, the imperialists and their supporters. In this case the 'enemies' are the four million white settlers in Southern Africa (three-quarters of them in South Africa), and their NATO supporters. A correct identification of the 'people' and the 'enemy' comes from a class analysis of the society, and of the organization of its economy. The question is who appropriates the surplus of labour and goods, how, and when? The continuing division in liberation movements of most countries of Southern Africa, especially in Angola, South Africa and Zimbabwe, stems from an absence of a class analysis of the situation by the leaders of the liberation movements. Situations have arisen where, for example, ZAPU and ZANU have been more at each other's throats in Zimbabwe than at the real enemy. In Angola, freedom may be delayed for several years because the three liberation movements—FLNA, MPLA, and UNITA—are fighting each other, and factions within each movement, especially MPLA, regard each other as enemies. The OAU's Liberation Committee has set up several mediation committees, and used the good offices of Heads of border States to try and promote unity, but without any success. The conference of MPLA militants called in Lusaka recently at the insistence of the OAU, collapsed. Augustino Neto, President of MPLA, announced that he planned to go to Angola where he would call another MPLA congress to seek the people's mandate. He said the Lusaka congress was not called by the movement's leaders but was imposed on them.⁶ The OAU or Heads of State cannot unite movements that have no political will to do so.

5 *The Daily News* (Dar es Salaam), Friday, 23 August 1974, p. 2, "Zimbabwe: Freedom Fighters Offensive".

6 *The Daily News* (Dar es Salaam), Monday, 26 August 1974, p. 2, "MPLA Talks Collapse".

The pressure for unity has to come from inside the oppressed population itself. The three main causes of division and disunity—personality clashes, differences over internal democracy, and ideology—can only be resolved by the internal dynamics of the movement, especially a correct class analysis of the situation. Of course, agreement and consensus should be sought on ideology, and a viable system of internal democracy. Personality differences which always occur in politics should be minimized as far as possible. But, the ability of a movement to handle and resolve any of these sensitive issues does depend on a strong ideological position, based on a class analysis which identifies foe and friend correctly.

Successful United Fronts

Both before and after the assassination of the first President of FRELIMO, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, the movement faced a host of problems that threatened to divide it. Kavandame, leader of one province in the liberated area, defected to the Portuguese; Rev. Uria Simango, the Vice-President, was expelled from the party; and COREMO, the small rival movement, appeared to be making headway from its Lusaka headquarters. However, by a correct analysis of the true enemy of the Mozambican people, and the agents they were using, FRELIMO weathered the storm, and proceeded to open new fighting fronts in Tete Province (1970), Manica-Sofala (1972) and Zambezia Province (1974). The spectacular successes of FRELIMO contributed directly to the military coup in Portugal on 25 April 1974, because the war casualties were mounting, and several roads and railways (including the vital railway from Beira to Zimbabwe) were blocked.

The PAIGC in the new State of Guinea-Bissau weathered similar storms in its 13 years of liberation war for independence. It formed an alliance of four classes—workers, peasants, petty and national bourgeoisie—for the specific goal of expelling the Portuguese. It has now embarked on a socialist revolution, to extend and deepen the reconstruction work started by the late Amilcar Cabral in the liberated areas several years ago.

If the leadership of liberation movements is willing, and basic social classes are identified, it should not be difficult to form common action fronts between organizations such as ZAPU and ZANU, ANC and PAC, MPLA, FLNA and UNITA. The South Vietnamese militants formed the National Liberation Front from three diametrically opposed social groupings—the Communist Party of South Vietnam, the Buddhists, and the Montagnard tribesmen and traditionalists. Although a Communist Party would theoretically be strongly opposed to what Church and tribal authorities stand for, it acknowledged that they represented basic classes of oppressed people, who were equally opposed to the intervention of USA imperialism in the area. In the African context in particular, the drawing together of all fighting forces from all strata of society at this stage, prevents the formation of dangerous and divisive tribal groupings, and the emergence of reactionary leadership in the people's movement. Possibly, the main reasons for the failure of attempts that have been made to form common action fronts in South Africa, Angola and

Zimbabwe have been the absence of a rigorous class analysis, and the absence of a political will to unite all strata of society on the part of the established, but divided, leaderships.

It is not being suggested here that during the national democratic revolution the movement should embrace all and sundry, including agents and provocateurs. FRELIMO and PAIGC would not have made progress without expelling those elements working on behalf of Portuguese colonialists. Agents and provocateurs are not leaders or representatives of any basic social class. There is no question of unity with them. And the case for unity being discussed here arises only in South Africa, Angola and Zimbabwe where existing divisions cut across the established leadership and the basic social classes. In Guinea-Bissau, Namibia and Mozambique the established leadership and the basic social classes are united. Splinter parties such as FLING, SWANU and COREMO, respectively, do not divide basic social classes and established leaders of the revolutionary forces. In such cases, the question of unity does not arise.

II. THE ARMED STRUGGLE ROOTED IN THE PEOPLE

Mao's second "weapon" of the revolution is the army. In a situation of colonial capitalism, supported by a strongly entrenched local settler community such as that found in Southern Africa, the processes of liberation require the very active and practical support of workers and peasants. Because this support must go beyond words and financial contributions, to the laying down of the lives of peasants and workers for the causes of freedom and liberation, the process must be qualitatively different from the freedom movements that sprang up in colonial Africa in the 1950s and 1960s and achieved independence by constitutional negotiation. In the classical colonies, the task of the freedom movement was to disrupt the colonial administration by mass rallies, demonstrations, and occasional strikes. The colonial authority was subject to, and sensitive to, public pressures in the metropolitan country, especially on issues involving large expenditures of money and men against rebellious tribes. The policies of various colonial Governments envisaged a terminal point when independence would be granted, no matter how inadequately defined that goal was. All colonial powers (excepting Britain) were defeated and impoverished by the Second World War. Their attempts to re-establish their empires were opposed and thwarted by vigorous nationalist movements, especially in Asia.

None of these favourable factors operate today in Southern Africa. Instead, and in addition to geographical factors already mentioned, there are many unfavourable factors:

Town planning. During times of internal upheavals, the segregated urban African townships can be easily cut off from food and water supplies, or fenced off, or surrounded by security forces. They can be bombed, if necessary, without doing damage to European property.

The pass system. The rigorous enforcement of the notorious pass system built over many years, and the curfew regulations, make possible the control of the urban population.

Accommodation. Because African workers coming to urban areas are 'visitors' to the European-owned city, all urban accommodation is tied to one's employment. Loss of one means loss of the other.

Administration. The settler administrative system in South Africa and Zimbabwe spreads to all corners of the country, and is based on thorough studies of African customary law and practice.

The police force and the army. This is the main instrument of settler power and repression. It is discussed further below. The rigid administrative controls of the African population, built over many decades, supported by the massive rearmament programme of the last decade all enhance white power.

Political will and motivation. The experiences of the last decade of guerrilla fighting have shown that settler soldiers in South Africa and Zimbabwe have greater motivation and the political will to fight African freedom fighters than colonial groups had or have. In Mozambique, South African and Rhodesian soldiers fought with greater vigour than the Portuguese soldiers.⁷

South Africa's Military Capacity

In the final analysis, the white minority regimes of Southern Africa rely on the economic power and military capacity of the Republic of South Africa. It is the major actor behind the white line, stretching 5,000 kilometres from the mouth of the Congo river on the Angola-Zaire border, right across the continent to the mouth of the Ruvuma river on the Mozambique-Tanzania border. The building of its defence forces began in 1960 after the Sharpeville and Langa massacres, the outbreak of the Maria war in Angola in March 1961, the breakdown of law and order in the Congo (Zaire), the violent demonstrations at Mueda in northern Mozambique, and the violence in Salisbury and Bulawayo in Zimbabwe. South Africa embarked on a massive rearmament programme aimed at increasing the striking power of all branches of its military forces. In 1965-67, it started training anti-guerrilla units, and maintaining what it described as "operation preparedness". In April 1969 an Armaments Development and Manufacturing Corporation was established to manufacture a large variety of armaments in conjunction with French, Italian, German and British companies in the war industry. The theme of the latest (1973) defence white paper⁸ is retaliation against guerrillas and the bases and sanctuaries from which they operate. The clear emphasis is to contain the threat posed by the growing numbers of guerrillas on its borders in particular, and in Southern Africa as a whole. Introducing the white paper, South Africa's Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, said:

⁷ See article by Yoweri Museveni, "Fanon's Theory of Violence: Its Verification in Liberated Mozambique," in my *Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1971).

⁸ *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1973*, presented to Parliament by the Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, in March 1973.

our military posture primarily is defensive and not offensive and we have no intention of engaging in an arms race with any other state or states. We are, however, fully aware of the fact that passive defence alone is inadequate and we are therefore obliged to maintain a significant retaliatory and interdictory capacity.⁹

The retaliatory theme is stressed throughout the paper. It details building of a new communications centre in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia, installation of air-to-air missiles, commissioning of the cactus system, land mine detonating vehicles, torpedoes, acquisition of new ships and equipment, air defence radar and new interceptor aircraft, electronic data processing, new military hospitals, new military training colleges, etc. The ten year programme, 1971-81, is intended to build one of the most powerful military machines on the continent, with massive retaliatory fire power. Large quantities of equipment already exist for seaward, landward and air attacks, and for technical and logistic support. In the three years from 1970-73, South Africa spent 219 million pounds on war equipment alone. The defence budget for 1973/74 stands at 205 million pounds,¹⁰ or 4% of the estimated Gross National Product, excluding several items of functions performed by other bodies and corporations on behalf of the defence Ministry.

Although the South African economy faces a growing balance of payments crisis, it is still strong enough to support a massive war effort. It produces more than three-quarters of the western world's gold and nearly half (in value) of the world's gem diamonds. It has a large coal mining industry and substantial coal reserves. Iron ore reserves exceed 5,000 million tons. Other important minerals produced are copper, platinum (South Africa's production is second only to Russia's), phosphates, manganese, chrome, vanadium and uranium. The three hydroelectric stations in Southern Africa at Cabora Bassa, Kariba and Oxbow, as well as the oil-from-coal plant in Natal, are expected to satisfy the growing need for power. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe are self-sufficient in food. South Africa exports fibre crops—cotton, sisal and flax as well as wool and fruit. Primary production has led to a certain amount of industrial development and manufacturing—iron and steel, chemicals, engineering, ship repairs, automobile assembly and parts manufactures, aircraft, explosives, munitions, small arms, fertilizers, synthetic rubber, plastics, etc.

This military and industrial growth has been made possible by the heavy foreign investments from Britain, America and France, and the borrowing of military technology from West Germany, Italy and Japan—the common element between these three countries is obvious even to a non-historian. Britain is by far the single largest investor and trading partner for South Africa. Its investments are now nearly one billion USA dollars. America is a distant second, but its financial interests are increasing rapidly. France's investment in the armaments industry has risen sharply in recent years. Britain, America and France's bulging economic interests in South Africa's

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

military and industrial complex outlined in the foregoing paragraphs, is the major imperial factor in this sub-continent. It is the obvious explanation for their continued support of the white settler regimes which pursue policies they say they abhor. Western powers also have other vital strategic interests which will be discussed below.

Class Struggles in Southern Africa

The price of this industrial growth and massive rearmament in South Africa has been a sharpening of the class (also racial) struggle at two particular levels. First, the peasantry in rural Southern Africa has been impoverished by the acute shortage of land. In South Africa, the Africans who form three-quarters of the total population, and most of whom live off the land, are restricted to the use of only 13% of the total land area. Land commissions of the South African Government itself have reported to the South African Parliament that scheduled African areas are so overcrowded that they can no longer support the growing African population today, let alone tomorrow. In Zimbabwe, Namibia, and in Angola and Mozambique rural Africans face similar problems of land hunger in varying degrees.

Second, the military-industrial complex of South Africa in particular, and the other white minority regimes as a whole, has been built on the sweat and toil of the five million African labourers in the region. Although denied trade union and political rights, these men are now challenging the system at its most sensitive spots inside these countries. The growing consciousness of the workers is discussed below.

The guerrilla wars are part of the ongoing class (and racial) struggle. From my own experience, most of the militants who form the backbone of the guerrilla wars are men and women who have had work experience in one or more of the major cities and mines of Southern Africa. It is those who have had personal harsh experience on the labour market who perceive most readily the iniquities of the system, and are willing to join in the task of changing it, to the extent of risking their very lives. They do not need ZANU or ZAPU to explain or tell them about inequality or oppression. They know it; they have experienced it. Even among the peasantry scattered in the thousands of villages in Southern Africa, it is those who worked in the cities or mines at some point in their youth, who readily and willingly support the armed struggle. Fanon's assertion that the peasants alone are the revolutionary force in Africa, has not been borne out by the experience of guerrilla fighting in Southern Africa so far. Admittedly most of the fighting has taken place in rural areas, and peasants have been playing an increasingly prominent part in providing food and shelter, and some of them joining in the fighting. But if one defines the peasant as a villager living wholly on subsistence agriculture and rearing cattle for subsistence, they have not been the backbone of the fighting forces.

The historical evolution of the society and the system in Southern Africa has been inextricably interlinked with white racism. The lines of class and

race coincide all along the line. White settlers have used their political and economic powers to reinforce notions of cultural superiority that have become an integral part of the system of domination and exploitation. Consequently, it has been impossible to build any bi-racial class organizations either among the exploited workers, or among exploiting professional or propertied classes, of which the black community has its fair share. Multi-racial trade unions were formed in Zimbabwe in the 1960s, but broke down when white trade unions sided with the employers. In South Africa in the 1920s, multiracial picket lines had also broken down when police promptly arrested the Europeans and charged them for inciting the innocent black workers.

Liberation movements in Portuguese colonies have consistently asserted that they are fighting a colonial war and not a racial war. A few white Portuguese have participated in certain phases of their armed struggle. But this has not been possible or noticeable in Namibia, South Africa or Zimbabwe. Indeed white participation in the African struggle during the peaceful constitutional struggles of the 1950s was one of the factors that contributed to the division in the African nationalist movement in South Africa and Zimbabwe. It would appear that the evolution of racism as a State doctrine in the large corpus of discriminatory legislation titled apartheid in South Africa, or separate development in Zimbabwe, has made cultural racism assume the status of an independent variable in those societies. To put it another way, racism cannot simply be removed by the removal of colonial, capitalist, economic and political structures that nurture it, although that would be an essential first step towards its removal or amelioration.

Workers' Political Consciousness

A marked increase in national consciousness among workers and peasants—the vast majority of the 40 million indigenous Africans in the subcontinent—has manifested itself in recent years. The year 1972 opened with a well organized general strike of Namibian workers. SWAPO (the South-West Africa Peoples Organization) infiltrated organizers into the ranks of the trade unions as far back as 1970. As in South Africa, it was the iniquitous contract (forced) labour system that sparked off the mass walkout. This system ensures regular supply of cheap labour to employers, especially as the labourers are supposed to earn only small wages to supplement their rural earnings. In Katutura, the black ghetto compound outside the capital city of Windhoek, 5,500 men went on strike on 12 December, 1971—the first major walkout of the great strike. Within a week 12,000 workers at a dozen industrial centres were out on strike. By mid-January 1972 the number of strikers reached 20,000. They demanded the end of contract labour, or “*odalate*” (which means “chains” or “wire”) in the language of the Ovambo, the largest tribe in Namibia. Heavily armed units of the South African armed forces and the police failed to force the workers to return to work or to recruit fresh labour from places as far as Lesotho, Mozambique and Malawi. The striking Namibian workers beat up those migrant workers flown in to maintain

essential services. In any case as long as those workers who knew the jobs remained on strike, it was very difficult for new migrant workers to man the essential services. Even the units of the armed forces could not maintain essential services without the minimum of support from the Namibian workers. Desperate attempts to break the strike by arresting the SWAPO leaders among the Ovambo, and intimidating workers who normally manned essential services, also failed. By the end of January the South African Government was forced to negotiate with the strikers, and to make some concessions. The Namibian economy was faced with total ruin. The concessions were small but the point had been made that the Namibian workers could organize themselves successfully within and against the system.

In January and February 1973, industrial workers within the Republic of South Africa itself also used the strike weapon against the racist segregationist regime. Some 60,000 black workers in the industrial complex of Durban-Pinetown-Hammarsdale downed their tools to support and strengthen their demand for higher wages. About 150 firms in all, covering the whole spectrum of secondary industry, were affected by the strike. Again the armed forces and the police could neither break the strike nor maintain essential services. The South African Government had to negotiate with the strikers and accede to some of their demands. Organized strikes were reported in different cities of South Africa throughout 1973. As a result, the average monthly wages for Africans crept up to £48, a rise of 19.4% in a year; this average is still £7 below the urban poverty datum line. On the other hand, inflation led to a 20% increase in cost of food alone. The growing movement to form black trade unions, although they are not recognized by the Government, as well as the international pressure and publicity about low wages paid in South Africa, have added fuel to the fires of the strikes.¹¹

A radical South African student organization (SASO) has emerged among black students in the segregated Bantu universities. Barred from entering the European universities, and forbidden to join the multiracial student union (NUSAS), black students have organized their own movement and initiated a programme of action with far reaching political implications. In 1972, three of the five Bantu universities were closed following student demonstrations organized by SASO. The SASO leader was forced to flee the country, but was finally shot and killed in 1973 in Botswana by agents of the South African Government. Rural South Africa has been seething with discontent as population pressure has steadily increased on the 13% of the total land area reserved for 17 million black people (80% of the total population). Govan Mbeki's description of the Pondoland uprising¹² in 1963, and recent tensions in the so-called Bantustans, especially the Transkei and KwaZulu, show acute land hunger. Chiefs Kaiser Matanzima and Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Ministers of the Transkei and KwaZulu Bantustans respectively, have been pressing the Government for more land.

11 For a more extensive discussion of the strikes in South Africa and Namibia, see "Case Studies in African Labour Action in South and South West Africa" in this issue.

12 Govan Mbeki, *South Africa: The Peasant Revolt* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964).

In Zimbabwe, as in South Africa, oppression has been intensified in recent years. The vicious Land Tenure Act introduced simultaneously with the 1969 Republican Constitution, has been used to evict thousands of Africans from lands they have lived in and farmed for generations. In 1969, Chief Rekayi Tangwena and his people were evicted from their homelands near the Mozambique border to make room for a white farmer who wanted a second farm. They refused to move. In 1970 their villages were overrun by bulldozers, their cattle taken and the brave chief himself arrested. These tribesmen have now taken refuge in the adjoining Inyanga Mountains having refused to move from their homelands. In the same year no less than 6,000 families were moved from Chief Gobo's area in the midlands to Gokwe, an arid district near the Zambezi basin. In 1971 and 1972, more tribesmen were moved. In 1974, more than 80,000 tribesmen from Zimbabwe's north-east "war zone" (Centenary) were moved to "protected villages" away from areas infiltrated by guerrillas.¹³ Another 60,000 villagers from the entire Chiweshe reserve—a barren, mountainous area only 50 miles from Salisbury—were removed into protected villages similar to the "strategic hamlets" used by Americans in South Vietnam. Two of the three chiefs in the area, Negomo and Chiweshe, were arrested. A third chief, Makope, was arrested earlier in the year. The regime's intention was to create "no-go" areas in which police will have the right to shoot any Africans on sight. Indiscriminate shooting of innocent civilians has been reported by Bishops of all churches and by others. The real reason for moving villagers from their home areas was that ZANU guerrillas had established schools, clinics, courts, and administrative centres which the villagers were beginning to use. In 1971, FRELIMO established such centres in the neighbouring territory of Mozambique, in the District of Tete which adjoins Centenary District.

Several strikes were reported in various cities of Zimbabwe early in 1972 during the visit of the Pearce Commission, especially in the midlands town of Gwelo, and the mining towns of Shabani and Bindura. Workers in the two main cities, Salisbury and Bulawayo, stopped work and rioted for several days. They demanded higher wages and political representation. Waves of strikes and disturbances have continued ever since. In August 1974, two men appeared in a Salisbury court charged with recruiting workers for ZANU in the single men's hostels in Salisbury. They had been recruiting workers for several months.

Mozambique workers were on strike for months in several sectors of industry in 1973/74. By September 1974, goods had piled up at the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques, and the economy had been severely crippled. Unemployment was widespread; rice and sugar were in short supply; and the transport system severely disrupted. This situation was aggravated by the release in September of over 100 former DGS agents (security police of the

13 *The Star* (Johannesburg), Saturday, 12 January 1974, p. 10, "80,000 Moved from Borders".

Caetano fascist regime) from the notorious Mashava Prison,¹⁴ who immediately went underground. It was later reported that some of them were stirring up white, urban terrorism, and had made contacts with former Congo mercenaries in South Africa and Rhodesia. Following a long colonial period of economic stagnation, downright exploitation, and mismanagement, the Mozambican economy has little to offer to the Mozambican worker. Several thousands of able-bodied Mozambicans are forced to go and work in Rhodesia and South Africa every year. One hundred thousand Mozambicans are recruited each year to go and work in the gold mines of South Africa in return for cash payment by South Africa to Portugal at the rate of fifty Tanzanian shillings per person, and the use of the port at Lourenço Marques for half the export goods from the Transvaal. However, Mozambique workers inside and outside their country have shown growing political consciousness. Goods have been piling up at the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques as a result of persistent waves of strikes throughout 1973 and early 1974. The Portuguese administration was forced to contact the underground units of FRELIMO in an attempt to persuade them to call off the strikes. Luanda, the capital of Angola, has also been the scene of a wave of strikes that left over 200 people dead, and paralysed the port and the city.

Combinations of repressive anti-guerrilla measures by the white minority regimes, the accumulation of exploitation over several years which has resulted in the pauperization of both the peasantry and the workers, and the patient and painstaking organizational work by the liberation movements over the last decade, have built up a marked consciousness among the indigenous people of Southern Africa.

The Strength of the Liberation Movements

The strength of the liberation movements lies in their ability to organize and mobilize the 40 million indigenous people. They are the key to the success of the revolution. If they are organized and mobilized, no power can defeat them. The massive rearmament of South Africa, and the striking power it has built up, is of no avail when matched against the determination of a well-organized and mobilized people. If the people are supporting the revolution, the guerrillas quickly disappear among them, and the massive fire power of the incumbent enemy forces is rendered useless. Even a decision to exterminate the entire population in a district or region would not wipe out a revolutionary spirit.

But organizing and mobilizing the people is not an easy task. Several critical variables have to be brought to bear. The articles in this volume raise some of these. One factor that has been borne out by the experience of Southern Africa is the importance of political education. The political educator who goes into villages and towns without arms to discuss and communicate with the peasants and workers is a far more dangerous guerrilla than the one

14 A Lourenço Marques newspaper, *Noticias*, reported on 10 June 1974 that 206 prisoners died in torture chambers in Mashava Prison including Messrs. Z. Manganhela and Jose Sidumo, both well known Christians.

who pulls the trigger. The clashes between Rhodesian security forces and armed, even uniformed, guerrillas, in the first phases of the guerrilla fighting in the mid-1960s, were far less effective than the Centenary phase. The pattern of positional warfare gave decided advantages to security forces that could call on air support and ample supplies of ammunition. But the infiltration of political educators into Centenary, and their integration with the peasantry several months before the first shot was fired, tipped the scales in favour of the guerrillas. Pressed by his Parliament to explain why the security forces could not "clean-up" Centenary, Prime Minister Smith reported that the problem was that guerrillas were masquerading as peasants,¹⁵ and some had infiltrated the working labour force on European farms. He accused guerrillas of cowardly tactics of laying landmines and disappearing into the local population, instead of standing up like men to fight the security forces. But, that is how a guerrilla should fight, bearing in mind the superiority of armaments and logistics on the side of the security forces. In 1973 Smith said in a mood of desperation that Rhodesia was now getting a new and more dangerous guerrilla who was not interested in fighting the security forces but in winning the hearts of the "poor and innocent" villagers. South African journalists who toured Centenary in February 1973, described the strategy used by ZANU guerrillas as "intelligent, ruthless, and efficiently carried out."¹⁶ The central feature of this strategy was simply increased political education.

In Namibia, SWAPO infiltrated and organized political educators a full year before the great strike of 1972.¹⁷ Because of the existence of liberated areas in Portuguese colonies, political education work has been going on for some time, especially in Mozambique. Indeed, it is the realization of the importance of political education in both liberated and unliberated areas, that is marking the turning point in the armed struggle. Successful political education requires patience and understanding of the practical problems of a peasant or worker, as well as demonstrating a genuine concern for finding solutions to those problems. The successful political educator does not preach long ideological treatises, but rather discusses the problems facing a peasant—such as land or cattle—and relates them to the broader issues. In this process, both the guerrilla and the peasant/worker educate themselves and each other about their country and its people. In so doing the liberation movement strikes deep roots in the society and its people. In seeking solutions to these practical problems, it begins to establish its own social, political and economic institutions. After all, the difference between negotiated independence and liberation is that in the latter case, the movement establishes its own governmental and administrative institutions during the struggle.

III. THE PARTY'S THEORY AND IDEOLOGY

Mao's third weapon is the Communist Party. None of the eight liberation movements operating in Southern Africa describe themselves or can be

15 *Outpost* (Johannesburg), February 1973, pp. 3-6, 28-30, an on-the-spot report on Centenary war zone, titled "Innocent at the Sharp End".

16 *Ibid.*

17 See "Case Studies in African Labour Action," in this issue.

described as a communist party. In fact everyone of them would reject this designation, insisting that they intend to adapt Marxism-Leninism to their own situations, in their own way, and at their own pace. On the other hand, liberation movements are not ordinary political parties in the sense that the word "party" is known and used by social scientists today. Liberation movements use violence to achieve their political objectives, and they are committed to the complete overthrow of the existing political system. Ordinarily, a party seeks power by peaceful means, within the existing political system. As liberation movements are neither communist parties, nor political parties, I shall refer to them in this section simply as liberation movements.

The central question we should examine here is the ideology of the movements. To what extent are they guided by Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory, which Mao regards as important? More specifically, what is: (i) the role of the people; (ii) the ideology of the leadership; and, (iii) their attitude to imperialism?

Liberation movements of Southern Africa are anti-imperialist for a variety of reasons. First, there are few regions in the world where imperialism has been so naked and open in manifesting itself as in Southern Africa. Since Cecil John Rhodes and Lord Milner in South Africa, with the support of Lord Cecil Salisbury and Joseph Chamberlain in Britain, provoked the Anglo-Boer war at the turn of the century for the purpose of annexing the gold mines of Johannesburg, the history of the entire region has been one of a search for minerals, and Britain's hegemony based on settler political power. For a century or more, British imperialism backed and supported settler power. Second, Britain's abandonment of native interests south of the Zambezi river (in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa) left the African leadership with no constitutional alternatives. Third, since the wars of liberation started ten years ago, the movements have had to rely almost entirely on socialist powers, especially Russia and China, for arms and armaments. Few Western nations have offered even humanitarian aid such as bandages and medicines although the World Council of Churches and some Scandinavian countries have recently offered substantial aid. At the same time, Britain, USA and France have been increasing their total investments in South Africa. NATO powers as a whole and West Germany, Italy, Japan and France in particular, have increased investment in South Africa's growing military industries for the production of armaments. Fourth, the armed struggle itself identifies the enemy, and the friend. When combatants and villagers are hit by NATO bombs, the enemy has exposed and identified himself in that act. Similarly, when the much-awaited landrover finally arrives in the remote jungle, carrying weapons made in China and Russia, the friend also identifies himself at the only level that matters for the freedom-fighter. For these reasons, and especially the direct link between imperialism and the settlers, the liberation movements have had to take a strong anti-imperialist position.

The deaths of Eduardo Mondlane, first President of FRELIMO, and especially of Amilcar Cabral, first General Secretary of the PAIGC, removed

the two men who were building strong theoretical foundations for the struggle in Africa. The framework of their analysis was both Marxist-Leninist and Fanonist. They were intellectuals leading movements that were socialist, and whose supporters were drawn from the peasants and workers. More importantly, they practised socialism in their style and methods of work both in the liberated areas, and in the work of the movements generally. Socialism is an attitude of mind and an approach to problems that can and should be practised in the life and work of the organization all the time. A truly socialist liberation movement begins practising socialism wherever it is.

It is largely the practise of socialist methods of criticism and self-criticism, and analysis based on the class interests of individuals and groups that enabled the two movements to survive the confusion that followed the assassination of both men, and also not to be hoodwinked by the Portuguese coup of 25th April, 1974. FRELIMO has survived several crises, especially the 1967 defection to the Portuguese of Kavandame, who was first leader of the liberated province of Cabo Delgado, and the unceremonious resignation of the Vice-President, Uria Simango, in 1969, soon after the death of Eduardo Mondlane. More importantly, it was FRELIMO that gave other liberation movements and African Governments a succinct and accurate analysis of the coup in Portugal, only two days after the event. At a time when the liberation movements in Angola and some African Governments were rushing into print in praise of Portugal, FRELIMO re-affirmed its opposition to colonialism, and stated clearly that

Any attempt to elude the real problem will only lead to new and equally avoidable sacrifices. The way to solve the problem is clear: recognition of the Mozambican people's right to independence. If, however, the objective of the *coup d'etat* is to find new formulae to perpetuate the oppression of our people, then the Portuguese leaders are warned that they will face our firm determination.¹⁸

The statement identified the enemy as colonialism, and not the Portuguese people; it rejected racialism of any kind; and equally rejected Spínola's Lusitanian federation, and his earlier notion of a "democratic colonialism"; but it stood firm on completing the process of liberating Mozambique, and urged all supporters of the liberation struggle to "remain vigilant in the face of any manoeuvres aimed at blocking the process of our total liberation. . ."

Other liberation movements do not have this strong ideological position. They pay lip-service to socialism, but tend to be guided by pragmatism and nationalism in their styles and methods of work. Certainly, socialism is not reflected in the day-to-day work of their movements or in the way they handle crucial problems. Generally, the leaders hide behind the notion that questions of socialism are better resolved when independence has been won, and the leaders are free to deliberate on them. In the meantime, the leaders do not countenance criticism or self-criticism; and some of them encourage tribalism and regionalism within their organizations. The perpetual divisions in several

18 Statement issued in Dar es Salaam, dated 27 April 1974.

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liberation movements are maintained because the leaders neither encourage criticism and self-criticism nor accept democratic socialism. In the absence of such a debate, the breakdown in internal democracy, and the personality clashes that often occur in politics are never repaired satisfactorily or resolved. The current failure of Angolan leaders to forge a common front that could negotiate with Portugal is a national tragedy for that country. No criticism and self-criticism could take place within the four factions and three movements. Tribalism and regionalism are rife, and now mark the major contours of the division. With a weak and deeply divided movement, the largest number of entrenched white settlers, and large mineral and oil resources, Angola poses a serious problem to the Portuguese Government and to Africa.

The "Mass Line"

The role of the 40 million Africans of Southern Africa in the liberation struggle was secured by the nature and dynamics of the struggle itself. Because the leaders and the fighters needed the peasants and workers, both as combatants to increase the manpower of the liberation movements and as a cover for the guerrillas (Cabral has said "our people are our mountains"), strenuous efforts were made to reach the village, the farm, and the factory. For example, Smith accused ZANU guerrillas of using witch-doctors in infiltrating the north-eastern part of the country.¹⁹ Anyone who knows the belief systems of Shona-speaking people, or who has read accounts of the 1896-7 war,²⁰ will know the central role spirit mediums (so-called witch-doctors) play in Shona political and military institutions. In August 1974, two ZANU men appeared in court charged with recruiting freedom fighters in the single men's municipal hostels in Salisbury. These municipal hostels house the poorest paid workers in the capital. The majority are migrant labourers from Mozambique. Two incidents, the movement of villagers into protected villages already discussed, and the general growth and swelling up of the guerrilla movement show that ZANU is organizing the mass of the people at the grassroots level.

Although the liberation movements are following what Mao calls the "mass line" in terms of organization, there is still no concrete evidence that the interests of the masses will be secured when the liberation movements come to power. There is no evidence or guarantee that States that are being liberated through the armed struggle will be ruled by the workers and peasants, who have paid with their blood for that liberation. The supposition that independence achieved after a bloody liberation war will be qualitatively different from that won by constitutional negotiation, has not been borne out by the experience of Algeria or Kenya. It is still possible for a very conservative nationalist movement and leadership to seize power after a long and bitter liberation war. The prospect of this kind of development

19 *Outpost*, op. cit., February 1973, p. 4.

20 T. O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7: A Study in African Resistance* (London: Heinemann, 1967).

has, indeed, been increased by the patriotic nationalism that has been, and will continue to be, the main muscle of the armed struggle.

As future Southern African Governments and societies are bound to be constructed and shaped by the armed struggle going on at present, it is important that patriotism and nationalism be transformed into a revolutionary nationalism. Again, the only way to broaden patriotic nationalism into a revolutionary nationalism is through practice. As all strata of the oppressed people are engaged together in a meaningful struggle, their respect for each other deepens, and tendencies to individualism and superiority are cast away. However, the critical input in ensuring the continuation of the revolutionary nationalism after independence has been won, is the leadership. A leadership committed by conviction to a radical solution is important and decisive, especially in Africa, in safeguarding the interests of the masses.

IV. IS AFRICA A STRONG ENOUGH REAR?

Crucial factors in a war of liberation are (a) a sanctuary, and (b) a strong rear. A sanctuary on the borders of the target State is absolutely necessary for re-grouping, re-organizing, and planning, as well as training recruits, healing the sick, and preparing publicity material for political education.²¹ A strong rear in the form of a super power and a strong world-wide movement that supports the aims and objectives of the liberation movements are important instruments. The FLN in Algeria, and the NLF in South Vietnam needed Tunisia and North Vietnam respectively, as immediate sanctuaries, and the Soviet Union and China for arms and ideological support, as well as the world-wide anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist movement for solidarity and weakening the moral authority of the imperialist-colonial power. Furthermore, for a liberation war to succeed, it must get significant support or sympathy from the population of the incumbent power. Without in any way detracting from the victories of the oppressed people of Algeria and South Vietnam, it can be said that some of the most significant battles in those conflicts were won in Paris and Washington. Imperialist wars waged far away from home, whose links with the perceived national interest by the common man are tenuous at best, are usually very unpopular. Opposition to them can be aroused fairly easily in the liberal domestic societies of Western Europe and North America as casualty figures rise. Is Africa a strong enough rear for the wars of liberation in Southern Africa?

The border States of Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire and Congo (Brazzaville), provide public and private sanctuaries of various kinds for the liberation movements. The vital role they are playing cannot be overestimated. But, as the wars advance deeper into Southern Africa, these States face the prospect of retaliatory attacks. The Uhuru Railway linking the port of Dar es Salaam to the Zambian copperbelt has been sabotaged in a number of places in the last four years. Nearly a hundred Zambians have lost

21 For the importance of sanctuaries see "Guerrilla Sanctuaries," an article by Major G. R. Christmas of the USA army, in *Infantry*, a journal of the US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia (May-June 1973), pp. 24-30.

their lives in the Zambezi river valley in 1971/72 as a result of landmines planted on Zambian roads by Rhodesian and South African security forces. Two very important Zambian bridges—a road bridge at Luangwa river on the road to Malawi, and a railway bridge on the Benguela railway to Lobito Bay in Angola—were once blown up. Oil tanks near the copperbelt town of Ndola were also blown up in 1967. Sabotage and retaliation has and is taking place. The South African Government's defence white paper of 1973, which has already been referred to, sets out future defence policy as "involvement in support of Southern African States," and selective "retaliation on those States which harbour sanctuaries for guerrillas."²² The South Africans now boast that their "security forces now know more about insurgency today than do the guerrillas themselves," and that when they do retaliate

the operation must be planned and carried out in the minutest detail; the best equipment must be used to make sure that the action succeeds and that those who carry it out return safely; intelligence must be absolutely accurate and reliable; retribution must be aimed at specific persons and/or installations; . . . the attack must be carried out with deadly accuracy, with the greatest circumspection, but also with the greatest heroism; the possibility of a negative result such as a counter-attack, the wrath of persons who hold different views, or the possible loss of the support of friends must be given thorough consideration.²³

South Africans say time is on the side of the guerrillas; therefore they cannot afford a Vietnam-type "protracted conflict of low intensity and the refuge of neighbouring countries," with "sanctuaries that enable the insurgents (guerrillas) to retain the initiative and to force the target country to commit large numbers of security forces to guard duties by creating tensions along extensive stretches of its borders".²⁴ The solution South Africa sees is Israeli-type pre-emptive attacks.

Can Zambia, Tanzania, Zaire and Congo (Brazzaville) face these attacks and possibly counter-attack? In anticipation of these developments, these countries have vastly increased their expenditure on defence and increased their striking power. They have all bought unspecified numbers of MIG 15 and MIG 17 fighters. Tanzania proudly displayed 21 of them for the first time at the *Saba Saba* celebrations in July 1974. Zambia has a squadron of both bombers and fighters, and at one time wanted to purchase ground-to-air missiles from Britain. The defensive position of these border States is now

- 22 The *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1973*, p. 2. The aims of the defence policy of this white paper can be summarized as (a) Preparedness; (b) Maintaining a presence in the threatened spheres (Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and Rhodesia); and (c) Maintaining a credible deterrence. See "Security Problems in Southern Africa," by Commodore R. A. Edwards, in *Paratus*, a magazine of the South African Army, Vol. 24, No. 6 (June 1973), pp. 3-8.
- 23 Brigadier-General Johan Fourie of the Defence Force headquarters in Pretoria, South Africa, addressing a symposium on "Political Violence and Revolution," at Postchestroom University. Speech reported in *Die Transvaler*, the Afrikaans newspaper, in Johannesburg, 25 August 1973, p. 7. See report on the same page titled "Police Minister Sees Time on Side of Terrorists," a speech by Jimmy Kruger, deputy Minister of Police, to the same symposium.
- 24 *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1973*, op. cit., p. 2.

much stronger than it was when the guerrilla fighting started. If left completely to themselves and the guerrillas, provided South Africa is also left completely to itself and its satellites, there is little doubt that they would win. Admittedly, South Africa could do considerable damage to persons and property in Israeli-type pre-emptive air attacks, but it would still be engulfed by growing resistance within its borders and near its borders.

The real problem is that Southern Africa will not be left alone. South Africa's long-term strategy to involve NATO powers, and especially the USA, is bearing some fruits.²⁵ Realizing it could not win the war alone, it has sought to involve NATO in the Southern African wars of liberation on the following grounds: presenting the guerrillas as communists fighting for Russia or China; the strategic importance of South Africa at the confluence of the Indian and Atlantic oceans; the economic value of South African minerals (outlined earlier), and those of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia which are also considerable; and, the strategic importance of the Cape route for shipping oil from the Middle East and foodstuffs from Asia. It is estimated that the Cape route carries 60 per cent of the oil requirements of Western Europe, and about 25% of all its total foreign trade. These figures will be drastically reduced by the re-opening of the Suez Canal, but the bigger tankers will still have to go via the Cape. The density of shipping on the Cape route at present is 22 ships per 100 miles, compared with 28 to North and South American ports, and 39 to Mediterranean ports.²⁶ Finally, they harp on the threat posed by the presence of *twenty* Russian naval vessels in the Indian Ocean (January 1972), where Britain has nearly 500 military and commercial vessels,²⁷ and other Western European powers about as many. It appears that NATO, and especially President Gerald Ford, has been impressed by this argument. Consequently, in 1972 NATO instructed its Supreme Commander, Atlantic, Admiral Ralph Cousins to study the extension of operations southwards beyond the Tropic of Cancer in order to protect the Cape route. Ford told, his first press conference as President that he favoured going ahead with expanding the naval base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, and increasing the USA presence in the Indian Ocean.²⁸ Britain and the USA have been developing a naval base at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago since 1971. Britain also maintains Addu Atoll in the Maldives, and has a Royal Air Force Station there. These two forward bases are supplied and equipped from the main base at Simonstown, near Cape Town, in South Africa. As Ford was speaking, nine

- 25 See UN report quoted by Andrew Wilson in *The Observer* (London), 19 May 1974, p. 1, "NATO Plans to Protect African Cape Route". The NATO report authorized NATO's Supreme Commander, Atlantic, Admiral Ralph Cousins, to study possible operations in Southern Africa in October 1972.
- 26 "The Security of the Southern Oceans—Southern Africa The Key," report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, on Wednesday, 16 February 1972, especially contributions of Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles M. P. (p. 2), and Captain R. Hart (pp. 4-5), giving statistical information on the shipping industry.
- 27 *Ibid.*
- 28 *The Daily News* (Dar es Salaam), Friday, 30 August 1974, p. 2, "Diego Garcia Base: U.K. Considers US Request".

British warships were arriving in Cape Town to take part in joint exercises with the South African Navy on 4th September, 1974, under the terms of the Simonstown Agreement of 1955. Under this agreement, Britain resumed the sale of arms to South Africa in 1971.²⁹

On the existing evidence, it appears quite probable that America alone, or possibly with NATO, will be drawn into the Southern African war on the side of the white settlers, or South Africa specifically. However, Ford will be cautious not to involve America in another Vietnam. Therefore, support for South Africa may be limited to logistics and weaponry only. But that will be enough for South Africa. She will be contented with suspending the isolation, and being included in Western defence strategy. In that eventuality, the American and British navies in the Indian Ocean would be used by the South African navy and air force as a jumping off point for retaliatory attacks on guerrilla bases in the border States of Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, and especially, a free and independent Mozambique. South Africa's retaliatory posture will be put to full use in the last ditch stand on Zimbabwe, and USA-UK naval and air power in the Indian Ocean harnessed to strike guerrillas in the rear, and harass a FRELIMO Government in a free Mozambique. That is the pattern emerging from the events of the last year.

The OAU as a Possible Rear

If American, British, and NATO participation were increased considerably beyond the present supply of arms, the border States could no longer provide an adequate rear base by themselves, as they would be liable to attacks from their rear as well. They would have to rely on the willingness of the two socialist super powers, China and Russia, to threaten the USA; and on the preparedness of the OAU States to threaten the economic interest of America, Britain and the EEC countries in independent African States.

In spite of the massive propaganda in the West and South Africa about communist designs in Africa, the fact still remains that Africa has been a low priority area for China or Russia. There is little or no trade between them and African States, and a huge language barrier. Tanzania is trying hard to promote trade with China as a way of paying back the huge loan for the *Uhuru* railway, but Britain still remains its largest single customer. While Russia and China may increase their aid and arms supplies to both liberation movements and the radical border States, it is unlikely that they would be willing to become deeply involved in a hot war in an area so deeply penetrated and situated close to Western Europe's defence system, and so far from their own bases and areas of vital interests.

Although the battlecry of national liberation has been the single and strongest unifying factor for OAU States for the last ten years, the African States have not been able to unite militarily in any significant way. There are innumerable problems. African States could not form a strong enough military rear for the Southern African struggle. The imperial drive of the

²⁹ See President Nyerere's strong denunciation of this move in the pamphlet "South Africa and the Commonwealth," January 1971, Dar es Salaam.

USA and NATO powers towards the Indian Ocean area could not be stopped or reduced by the combined diplomatic efforts of the 42 weak and comparatively small States in the Organization of African Unity alone. African States could not take combined military action for a variety of reasons, especially the defence agreements and neo-colonial relationships most of them still have with former colonial powers now in the EEC. But there are still a number of initiatives within their reach which could be decisive if they had the political will. First, they should continue to give financial and material assistance to the Liberation Committee of the OAU, in order to strengthen the Liberation movements. Although the management of the Committee has come under severe attack from time to time within the OAU, and the majority of African States do not pay their contributions, it should be pointed out that over the past ten years it has remained the main, and the most important, dependable single source of financial support for the liberation movements. Had the OAU not provided a channel for armaments and weapons, the liberation movements would have been involved in a much stronger dependency relationship with the socialist powers who provide most of the arms. When the history of the liberation struggle is written by African freedom-fighters themselves, the crucial role played by the Liberation Committee will be put in its proper perspective.

Second, OAU States could impose effective economic sanctions on NATO powers, America, and Britain for their role in Southern Africa. The unity demonstrated by Arab States during the oil crisis of 1973, and by the OAU States in their negotiations with the EEC, and the effectiveness of Nigeria's threat to Britain during the Pearce Commission hearings in Zimbabwe,³⁰ are examples of possibilities in this area. The total investment of these powers in the OAU States is much greater than their investments in the white south. Accepting the argument that their actions are motivated by their economic interests, they should respond to a credible threat to nationalize their holdings in OAU States because of their policies towards Southern Africa.

Third, there is a military capability in the bigger African States like Nigeria, Ethiopia, Algeria, and Egypt, to give assistance and air cover to the States on the borders of Southern Africa. The combined military capacity of these four States alone compares favourably with that of South Africa, but their total energies are being absorbed by internal problems. In these circumstances, the guerrillas of Southern Africa have to be completely self-reliant in the full knowledge that the rear is weak compared to the incumbent forces.

³⁰ See my article "Rhodesia After the Pearce Commission Report, 1972," *The African Review*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1972), pp. 467-497.