

For the future, the OAU must concentrate on giving material and military assistance to the liberation movements who must be prepared to resort to arms if the present efforts to arrive at a peaceful settlement fail. It must also ensure the consolidation of the independence of Mozambique and Angola, because failure to achieve effective Governments in these territories will greatly hamper the liberation efforts in Zimbabwe.

Table 1. DIVISION OF LAND UNDER 1930 LAND APPORTIONMENT

	<i>Acres Approx.</i>
European Area	49,060,000
Native Reserves	21,600,000
Native (Purchase) Area	7,460,000
Forest Area	590,000
Undetermined Area	90,000
Unassigned Area (i.e. unassigned to any race or other category)	17,800,000
Total	96,600,000

Source: J. Barber, "Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion," (London: Oxford University Press 1967), p. 7.

Table 2. FRANCHISE UNDER THE 1961 CONSTITUTION

	<i>A Roll</i>	<i>B Roll</i>
Africans	2,263	10,466
Europeans	89,278	608
Asians	1,231	114
Coloureds	1,308	176
Total	94,080	11,364

Figures quoted in *Southern Rhodesia—Background to Crisis*, by Jane Symonds (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956).

Table 3. IMPORTS FROM RHODESIA

	<i>1965 (millions)</i>	<i>1968 (millions)</i>
Zambia	\$99,507	\$15,544 (first six months)
EXPORTS TO RHODESIA		
Zambia	\$15,317	\$0.736 (first six months)

Source: UN. Doc. S/9252/Add. 1, 13 June 1969.

Nyerere on the Transition to Socialism in Tanzania

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INTRODUCTION

This paper has a limited and specific purpose which is to examine the views of President Julius Nyerere on how Tanzania can most effectively achieve a transition to a socialist society.¹ No attempt is made to study the actual socialist policies of the Tanzanian Government nor the other influences which have determined these policies. The focus will be single-mindedly upon Nyerere's ideas on Tanzania's transition to socialism. The purpose, moreover, is to understand these ideas in their own terms rather than to assess the extent to which they are compatible with other socialist theories of the transition to socialism or to develop those elements within Nyerere's thought which can be made to serve differently conceived socialist strategies.

Nyerere's socialist strategy has not been the only influence shaping Tanzanian policies nor has it alone determined Nyerere's own policy initiatives. Nevertheless, Nyerere's ideas on the transition to socialism were enormously influential in 1967 when the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) reaffirmed its commitment to socialism, and they have continued since then to be a major influence. Moreover, Nyerere has sought a solution to the vexing question of how a society in which there are but very few socialists and no profound class consciousness within either the peasantry or the urban working class can nevertheless be led towards a socialist reconstruction of its institutions. These considerations, in addition to the intrinsic interest which attaches to the political thought of one of Africa's most reflective political leaders, justify I hope, the particular focus of this paper.

Nyerere's strategy for the transition to socialism was a product of the interaction of two sets of ideas: the first his particular vision of a socialist society and the second his perception of the economic, political and administrative constraints within which TANU had inevitably to operate. Socialism, Nyerere said in 1962 and repeated in 1967, is an attitude of mind.² Writing in summary of his socialist faith in 1968, he said "one will not recognize or

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¹ A somewhat extended version of the argument of this paper constitutes the final chapter of my forthcoming, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1965: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy in Tanzania*, which is being published this year by Cambridge University Press.

² See his *Ujamaa, The Basis of African Socialism* (1962) reprinted in his *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), and the text of his address in April 1967 at the University of Cairo, reprinted in his *Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968).

define a socialist society by its institutions or its statements but by its fundamental characteristics of equality, co-operation and freedom".³ These characteristics are encouraged into being by some institutional arrangements and are discouraged by others. Nevertheless, socialism itself remains essentially an attitude of mind. A society, therefore, becomes socialist to the extent that this attitude of mind becomes prevalent and, therefore, influential.

Nyerere had long held that the ethical values of traditional African society were essentially socialist. He saw Africa's special opportunity and challenge in terms of giving a modern expression to these values which would be compatible with a national State and with the development of a modern economy. By 1966 Nyerere had become convinced that Tanzania was drifting rapidly away from these traditional values. This was in part a consequence of a general intrusion of acquisitive individualism. In his view, however, a number of crucial development policies of his Government were facilitating and encouraging this intrusion. Moreover, he saw that these newer and essentially capitalist values were beginning to take hold, in particular amongst political and governmental leaders. By 1966 he was convinced that the transition to socialism must become a central pre-occupation of TANU and the Tanzanian Government. Nyerere had also, by that date, a clear perception of how Tanzania might best be moved towards socialism. His strategy for this transition can be examined under three headings, the promotion of greater equality, the creation of a socialist environment and the enhancement of democratic participation.⁴

THE PROMOTION OF EQUALITY

The most important conclusion to which Nyerere had come by 1967 was that greater economic and social equality were essential to an effective transition to socialism. By 1967 he viewed the wide income differentials in Tanzania between the masses and those in middle and senior ranks in Government and the Party as a major and immediate obstacle to an effective socialist strategy. High incomes earned by a few arouse envy and generate hostilities that are socially divisive. They cause ordinary peasants and workers to concentrate upon the private accumulation of wealth as the primary way to improve their livelihood. This not only undermines communal values, it is also profoundly misleading for, in a country as poor as Tanzania, "the goal of individual wealth is an unrealistic goal".⁵

In 1967, at the height of the excitement following the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere told a gathering "Some countries believed they could only develop by having a middle class and they measured progress by the number of

3 In his introduction to *Freedom and Socialism*, op. cit., p. 23.

4 For reasons of brevity, a fourth component to this strategy, the maintenance of self-reliance, is not discussed here. It formed an essential part of the strategy but was, I believe, largely a product of nationalist sentiments rather than socialist ideology.

5 Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, op. cit., p. 341.

people in the middle class. We shall be a nation of equals".⁶ That was the ideal, that was the target: a Tanzania which would develop as a nation of equals, sharing fairly amongst the whole people the benefits of whatever economic development was achieved. The strategic question was how to move to that situation from a present in which the bureaucracy and the political leaders constituted an elite whose level of income was vastly superior to the income of ordinary citizens. One answer to this question which recurs in Marxian writings on Tanzania is that Nyerere ought rapidly and thoroughly to have subdued 'the politico-bureaucratic bourgeoisie' or indeed even to have replaced it.⁷ To do this, it is argued that he ought to have more vigorously mobilized the workers and peasants and heightened their class consciousness in order thereby to secure a political base for the proposed assault upon the bourgeoisie. This in turn would have required that Nyerere bypass most of those in senior positions in the Party and the Government because both these structures were badly infected by capitalist aspirations. He would have had to build up a new ruling cadre of ideologically committed men and women, drawn from the radicalized section of the petty bourgeoisie, that is, from the very group which advocated this strategy.

This strategy was in fact advocated by one member of the special TANU Conference in March 1967. Kasella Bantu, one of the small number of articulate Marxists in TANU, proposed a radical programme of action: severe salary cuts, nationalization of all property, the use of the TANU Youth League rather than the Government or the Party to promote and enforce the policies and the rapid development of an ideologically committed vanguard.⁸ Nyerere immediately rejected this strategy. "It would make us adventurists and opportunists not revolutionaries" he said. "We cannot go 'full-speed' into socialism. Where are the leaders for 'full-speed' socialism?" He returned to this question again. The Arusha Declaration was not, he said, an attempt immediately to be socialist. "It was, rather an attempt to remove capitalist tendencies and interests in our leaders". Or again, "the Declaration is an attempt to cultivate our leaders to a socialist programme".⁹

Nyerere was attempting something that was the very opposite of an effort to change the values and behaviour of a society by moral exhortation and legal coercion. He was acting on the belief which he had long affirmed, that traditional African values were communal and that these values were still a reality for most Tanzanians. Perhaps the most important section of the Arusha Declaration was that dealing with the leadership rules which required all leaders in the Party and the Government to adhere to a rather high-minded set of prohibitions that denied them the right to employ labour, to rent housing to others, to receive more than one income, to own shares in a company or to serve on the board of any private company. These

6 *Tanzania Standard*, 11 February 1967, p. 1.

7 This latter position is taken, for example, by I. Shivji in *The Silent Class Struggle* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1973), p. 39.

8 Tanganyika African National Union, *Majadiliano ya Mkutano Mkuu wa TANU* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), Cols. 90-95.

9 *Ibid.*, Cols. 102 and 106.

rules were an attempt to provide a modern and relevant application of the older traditional values. Nyerere did not see them as imposing a morality which was not accepted. They were the enforcement of an ethic that was still part of the values of the society. It was an ethic that was being rapidly replaced in the towns, amongst the leaders and within the Civil Service by an aggressive acquisitive individualism. Nevertheless, even in these groups he hoped that the older values could still be tapped so that these sectors of society also would accept the ethical validity of the rules. He stressed that the abuses which the rules would prohibit had only just begun to appear. He was reminding leaders what was expected of them rather than trying radically to change the conduct of large numbers. Nyerere developed this point at a press conference in 1967:

I think the chances are that all leaders will surrender their personal possessions and remain leaders. The atmosphere in Tanzania is extremely difficult (for them to do otherwise). It is almost untenable for a leader to prefer personal possessions to leadership. And in any case they haven't got very far. . . what some of them have done is to whet the appetite a little bit. One little house—when you built the first house then your intention was to live in it yourself, and then suddenly you said, "why not rent it out"? And now you are making plans for a second one. This is not good but it is the temptation we have stopped. It was really a lot more temptation than fulfilment. . . . This was the right time. Had we delayed, you would discover two years from now that our leadership has become rather entrenched in the accumulation of personal property.¹⁰

Nyerere was thus hopeful that the leaders would accept the Arusha Declaration. The bureaucracy and the political leaders were not so far removed from the lives and values of ordinary Africans that they were not responsive to socialist ethics. If these leaders were not too much abused or their incomes too suddenly and too drastically slashed they could still be 'won over' to a socialist commitment. It was ideas of this nature that underlay the belief that the leaders could be "cultivated to a socialist programme".

Political realism also compelled Nyerere to reject the radical strategy. He felt that there was no possible basis for the immediate imposition of radical egalitarian policies. He did not have the popular support nor the cadres to enforce such policies. Moreover, in his judgment the country could not do without the skills, the experience and the education of those in the middle and upper ranks of the Party and the Government. A total assault on their privileges would have severely alienated them before they could be replaced. Tanzania had no choice but to follow an evolutionary path.

We shall become a socialist self-reliant society through our growth. We cannot afford the destruction of the economic instruments we now have nor a reduction in our present output. The steps by which we move forward must take account of these things. Our change will be effected almost entirely by the emphasis of our new development.¹¹

¹⁰ From the transcript of a press conference on 4 March 1967, in the author's possession.

¹¹ *Freedom and Socialism*, op. cit., p. 325.

A few months later he made the same point. "We must equalize income as we make our total wealth grow".¹² Nyerere had thus taken the hard-headed decision that a major initiative to redistribute incomes would be more disruptive to the economy and to the polity of Tanzania than they could be expected to bear. Svendsen, who was soon to be Economic Adviser to President Nyerere, commented:

Social and economic efforts must have a fair chance to bring results. The worst enemy of any socialist policy is bad economic performance. It will not help a group of political leaders, a party or a country that there is a high level of political consciousness if this does not also mean economic results in the form of a better life for the population.¹³

Thus, despite his conviction that wide income differentials constitute a major barrier to the achievement of socialism, Nyerere decided that Tanzania had no choice but to follow an evolutionary policy. That policy has not been a sham. Salary scales for middle and upper level employees were held without upward revision for a 13 year period in which there was to be a series of increases in the minimum wage and in the lower wage scales more generally.¹⁴ In addition, personal income taxation has increased significantly in the higher brackets and a variety of fringe benefits such as heavily subsidized housing, car loans and particularly long vacations have been abolished. As a result, the ratio of the purchasing power after direct taxation of the top Civil Service salaries compared to the minimum wage has fallen from an estimated 80:1 in 1960 to 16:1 in 1971 and to 11:1 in 1974.¹⁵ This is still a sizeable ratio but the fall in this ratio over a 13 year period is dramatic, especially as it has entailed a fall in real income for many senior Civil Servants.¹⁶

This strategy involves an effort to walk a narrow path between a too vigorous equalizing policy which would undermine morale and produce declining efficiency if not more forthright obstruction, and a too timid policy which might result in an entrenched and self-perpetuating new political and

¹² In his speech, "After the Arusha Declaration", to the TANU National Conference, October 1967, *ibid.*, p. 403.

¹³ Knud Erik Svendsen, "Socialism in a Poor Peasant Country", in Idrian Resnick, ed., *Tanzania, Revolution by Education* (Arusha: Longmans of Tanzania, 1968), p. 86.

¹⁴ Finally, in 1974, modest overall increases were granted to offset, but only partially, the results of an expected significant rise in the cost of living. Even these overall increases were weighted in favour of the lowest income groups. They gave a Shs. 100/- increase in the minimum wage per month but put a Shs. 300/- ceiling on the maximum increases in the highest brackets.

¹⁵ These estimates were given to the author in June 1974 by Reginald Green, until recently Economic Adviser to the Treasury. They include fringe benefits.

¹⁶ This fall in real income has been due to cost of living increases, particularly since 1971, to the salary cuts, ranging from 3% to 20% introduced in 1968, and to tax increases. These were at first largely offset by promotions. However, in recent years many senior officials have had to adjust to a falling standard of living. Green estimates that a person in the same senior post from 1967 to 1973 would have experienced a 25% fall in his living standards. Salaries in the Kenyan Civil Service were, on the average, 25% higher than in Tanzania (*Wages and Salary Policies of the East African Community*, Geneva: United Nations Development Programme, 1974). As the Tanzanian minimum wage exceeded the Kenyan the differential between the salaries in the higher brackets in Kenya and compared to Tanzania must have been very significantly higher than 25%.

bureaucratic class. There is clearly a risk that in fact this narrow path does not exist and that the strategy will generate discontent and declining morale in the Civil Service and spark a downward spiral of inefficiency, lethargy and corruption. For this reason a strong and popular TANU is important both as a check to any political expression of elite discontent and also to provide an overall climate of opinion in the society which would in turn influence the mood of potentially restless TANU leaders, Government officials or army officers. For this same reason, a number of questions relating to administrative organization, personnel policies and managerial practices become singularly important because they are variables which influence the morale, the commitment and the efficiency of the Civil Service.

The strategy which TANU has followed since 1967 in pursuit of a more egalitarian society has its obvious risks. However, the original decision still seems defensible. These risks were very likely less than those involved either in permitting the full entrenchment of a bureaucratic and political elite or in a strategy which would have sought to move much more rapidly to a more egalitarian society at a time when Nyerere lacked the political base for such a policy and when such a policy might have generated widespread and severe discontent within a strata of society whose skills and whose co-operation were still essential to effective government and continued economic development.

THE CREATION OF A SOCIALIST ENVIRONMENT

It had been implicit in Nyerere's position in 1962 that when modern socialist institutions were introduced in Tanzania they would be quickly accepted and supported by a large majority of the population. This followed from his conviction that traditional communal values were still widely influential and were, in their essence, socialist. The point has already been made that by 1967 Nyerere felt that acquisitive individualism was rapidly undermining the force of these traditional values.

This judgment explains many of Nyerere's socialist initiatives since that date. Nyerere sensed an urgent need to create a more socialist environment in order thereby to check the otherwise growing influence of selfish individualism and to draw the people towards socialist values. The leadership rules, for example, can be seen as an effort to embody in law a consensus, which Nyerere felt was still widely shared, that no one should live off the labour of others. The rules were an attempt to stabilize the public acceptance of this socialist value before it was further eroded.

The significance which Nyerere attached to creating institutions in which socialist attitudes might develop and socialist relationships become established shows itself in a number of important initiatives which he has taken in recent years. These have included the creation of works councils and workers committees in all sectors of the economy, and a major decentralization of govern-

ment.¹⁷ These initiatives are similar in purpose to Nyerere's earlier interest in democratic participation in the co-operative unions and in the trades union. The workers committees, the works councils, and the District and Regional planning and development committees created under the decentralization programme are attempts, as were the earlier initiatives in regard to the co-operative movement and the trade unions, to achieve meaningful mass participation within structures that will encourage broader and more responsible attitudes and aid the development of social relationships and a work ethic more appropriate to a socialist society.

These various socialist initiatives all involved socialist measures which were likely to be widely popular. However, once Nyerere had become convinced that acquisitive individualism threatened to become widely prevalent in Tanzania, he had to come to terms with the possibility that some basic socialist initiatives might, at least initially, be opposed by a majority of the people. Glickman, writing on the basis of research conducted in 1962, had concluded that Nyerere's thought at that time offered few barriers to the authoritarian conclusion that "men must be forced to be free".¹⁸ This judgment seemed harsh at the time. Nyerere's scepticism towards elites and the character of his ideal society were powerful and sufficient restraints upon any authoritarian potential in his thought. The logic of his position by 1967 might seem to have pushed him towards a more authoritarian stance. He had clearer and surer ideas of what he felt was necessary and desirable for Tanzania. He was also admitting the possibility that the people's communal values had been corrupted so that many might not initially recognize that a socialist initiative was in their interest. Was Glickman's judgment therefore more premature than wrong? Was Nyerere by 1967 ready to accept coercion as a necessary feature of the transition to socialism?

Nyerere did not take this position in 1967 and has not since assumed it. His thought continues to exhibit the same tension as previously between what might be called its leadership strand and its democratic strand. Nyerere does not rule out, and, indeed, on occasion he has ordered, Government actions which are unpopular but which he feels are very evidently necessary. For any moral person in a position of authority, this is, in fact, an unavoidable duty. Whatever one's commitment to democracy, most people would surely accept that a political leader cannot take the position that a Government on every occasion must only do that which it knows will be immediately acceptable to its people. What then restrained Nyerere from a fully self-confident assertion

17 No effort can be made here to assess the initial consequences of these initiatives. What is important for the argument is that they were very much Presidential initiatives in the first instance and that they constituted an integral part of a coherent socialist strategy. This judgment is confirmed by one of the ablest scholars presently writing on Tanzanian affairs, Helge Kjekshus, in his concluding chapter to the excellent volume *Socialism and Participation, Tanzania's 1970 National Elections* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1974).

18 Harvey Glickman, "Dilemmas of Political Theory in an African Context: The Ideology of Julius Nyerere", in Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno, *Boston University Papers on Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

that he and his Government would use what force was necessary to establish the institutions of a socialist society? Why did he not accept that coercion might initially be necessary to overcome the consequences of a corrupting individualism, while expecting that as people lived under the new institutions they would gradually return to socialist ethics and free themselves of capitalist motivations?

I do not believe that this has been the position taken by Nyerere. He has rejected it, in lesser part because he has recognized that neither the Government nor TANU has the power to impose socialism on a reluctant people. He has also recognized that neither the Government nor TANU has the power to impose socialism on a reluctant people. He has also recognized that an increase in central control often intensifies and entrenches opposition to a policy rather than overcoming the initial hurdles to its acceptance.¹⁹ However, his rejection was far more than merely tactical. He has remained powerfully sceptical of the morality of this whole line of argument. He has never made the assumption that his socialism is objectively or scientifically correct.²⁰ What authoritarian potential there may be in his commitment to socialism has not been reinforced and rationalized by this particularly reassuring assumption. He has been as impatient with such pretensions in recent years as he had been 10 years previously. For example, he told a TANU Conference in 1967 "The delegates here come from the people and are responsible to them. It is impossible for us at this meeting to take over their responsibilities or to act as if we had some God-given right to force goals of our choosing upon the people".²¹ Two years later he told Parliament:

Nor can we lead a country as if it were a Church with the priests and bishops choosing and rejecting each other as leaders without the believers having any chance to choose or to throw out their leaders.²²

Nyerere continued to recognize that the establishment of socialist institutions does not assure the triumph of socialist values. A State which has fully nationalized its industries and its trade can as easily be a tyranny as a capitalist State. Nyerere rejects the idea that the achievement of socialism might be a two stage affair, the first part of which can be accomplished by an elite. For him it has always been an unacceptable paradox to suggest that the people might need to be coerced into a socialist society. "A people cannot be developed: they can only develop themselves".²³ Nyerere's rejection of an authoritarian imposition of socialism thus rests finally and perhaps most fundamentally upon a profoundly felt conviction that in statesmanship no great thing can be accomplished without the people.

19 Nyerere argued both these points in his opening speech to the special TANU Conference, March 1967, *Majadiliano ya Mkutano Mkuu wa TANU*, op. cit.

20 See, for example, his rejection of this line of argument in *Freedom and Socialism*, op. cit., pp. 14-17.

21 Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, op. cit., p. 367.

22 Nyerere, *Freedom and Development/Uhuru na Maendeleo* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 186.

23 This quotation is from one of Nyerere's most thoughtful policy papers, "Freedom and Development". It is reprinted in his *Freedom and Development*, op. cit., pp. 58-71. The quotation appears on page 60.

THE ENHANCEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

Increasing democratic participation is the final essential component to Nyerere's strategy for the transition to socialism. It is an argument that needs to be carefully examined. Nyerere has never seen himself as a cypher, whose role is simply to transpose the wishes of the people into laws and Government actions. His populism has not been a simple judgment that the people are always right. Neither has Nyerere seen his primary function as that of finding effective and lasting compromises between the main interest groups in Tanzania. Such a conception of democratic leadership is a product of economically developed plural societies. It is inappropriate in countries such as Tanzania which still lack the institutions and the skills which would make it possible for their peoples to lift themselves from their present extremely low living standards without strong leadership. These societies need more than the provision of services, the maintenance of law and order, and the negotiation of working compromises. They need new enthusiasms, new capacities for collective action, a new receptivity to innovation and a new attitude towards work. They need new political institutions and wider loyalties, and a more acute awareness of the international dimensions to the continuance of their poverty. They are, to put it briefly, societies that need to be transformed. They are societies which need leaders who can see a way forward for their people, who can define that path in terms that will win the understanding and support of ordinary men and women and who can lead them towards it.

Nyerere is one such leader. He sees himself as the leader of a people that is groping its way forward towards a better future. He is not just the servant of his people. He has always been a leader with strong convictions about his people's needs. Nyerere has been, above all, a teacher, a *mwalimu*. He is a teacher of a special sort. He is a teacher of morality. However, Nyerere is not just a *mwalimu*. He is *mwalimu-in-power*—a moral teacher who is also a political leader with a great deal of authority and power. He has not needed to confine himself to teach by example and by precept. He has been able to manipulate the circumstances of politics, in order to lead his people to moral perceptions which as yet it only imperfectly comprehends. His purpose has been to bring Tanzanians to an increasingly profound commitment to pursue a democratic and socialist society.

In doing this Nyerere has been willing to use the opportunities which are his as President to set the stage for decision-making, to influence its timing and to define the issues in ways that will increase the likelihood that the people will decide along the lines he feels are necessary. He did this, for example, to win TANU support for a form of one-party State which was acceptable to him and he did it again to assure formal TANU support for the ujamaa villages. These two major decisions and many minor ones illustrate that Nyerere has used great political skill to win TANU support for decisions which he has felt were needed.

He has guided and he has manipulated, in addition to merely teaching and advocating. For some, perhaps, this will mean that he is not a democrat.

But in a society that needs transformation someone must strive to define the society's needs for it. In a society in which national political institutions are still imperfectly structured and inadequately rooted in the life of the society, strong leadership may be the only way in which a national consensus can be obtained on essential issues. To be a political leader in such a society, is, perhaps, inevitably to be open to the charge of elitism. More important, therefore, than any discussion of whether Nyerere exhibits such paternalism towards his people (which he surely does) is a consideration of the techniques which he is willing to use, as well as those which he will not use, to win his people to his perception of their needs.

It is not what distinguishes Nyerere from the pure populist or from the liberal democrat that is important, so much as what distinguishes him from the ideological authoritarian. This, the more important distinction, rests upon his continued insistence that democratic participation, including popular electoral participation, is an essential feature of the transition to socialism. The authoritarian socialist takes an instrumental view of participation, valuing it to the extent that it will contribute to the achievement of socialist objectives as these are identified by a committed and ideologically sound elite, a "benevolent leadership" to use John Saul's flattering phrase. In contrast to that position, Nyerere regards democratic participation as intrinsically valuable and strategically essential.

Democracy, however, has not been easily achieved in Tanzania. There has been a persistent tendency towards oligarchy and authoritarian rule. There have been cultural barriers to overcome before the people are likely to assert their rights against the leadership. The institutions of constitutional democracy with which Tanzania began its independence were inappropriate to a society whose national integration was not yet firm. They were also unsuited to the closely integrated socialist society which TANU hoped to develop in Tanzania. As a result, Nyerere has long searched for institutional forms of democracy which would be appropriate to Tanzania's needs and consonant with its values. The democratic one-party State was but the most important of the initiatives in the period covered by this study which issued from that concern.

Nyerere has continued to seek ways to make democratic participation and control effective in Tanzania. He has seen Parliament, even after the 1965 constitutional changes, fail to become a significant instrument of policy-making, policy-review or public accountability. He has seen local representative councils flounder ineffectively in the area of local government. He has seen electoral processes in both the Party and in Parliament produce representatives who quickly pursue interests that are separate and different from those of the people. Under these pressures, his ideas on democratic participation have grown complex and more sophisticated. In particular, three ideas have acquired more prominence in his writings in recent years and have had significant influence upon policy.

First, Nyerere, like so many thinkers whose concern with participation is genuine, has returned to the importance of government at the local level. At one point, for example, he spoke of his longer term vision of Tanzanian life in

terms of "rural economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the good of all and which are inter-locked so that all the different communities also work together in co-operation for the common good of the nation as a whole".²⁴ This was not a casual fantasy. Two of Nyerere's most important Presidential initiatives since 1967, the ujamaa villages and decentralization are, in part, an expression of this interest.

Second, Nyerere has come in recent years to see wide income differentials as an important obstacle to the effective operation of democratic institutions. The point involved has not only been that those with much more economic power are likely to dominate the political process. It is also, and perhaps more important, that when those with political and government power have significantly higher incomes than ordinary citizens, they are likely to constitute a 'new class'. Greater equality between ruler and ruled is an important restraint upon such a development. If ruler and ruled are of the same class, if the leaders are truly of and with the people in their daily living, then Government is more likely to be responsive to popular needs. Greater equality is thus not only a desirable social objective, it is also an important aid to effective democratic government. The Arusha Declaration's rules, to give a specific policy application, even though they proposed to exclude from political and public office any who offended them, were nevertheless an expression of a commitment to democracy rather than a limitation upon it. The rules enforce an ethic that is widely accepted. Because they lessen the risk that leaders will develop interests which will conflict with those of the ordinary voters, they can legitimately be seen as an aid to effective democracy.

Finally, Nyerere has increasingly stressed the importance of the Party as the structure that is closest to the people and most representative of the people. In contrast to TANU, Parliament is an aloof and distant institution while the Government, however led, is always to some extent a power that is outside of and over the people. TANU leaders, during the struggle for independence, were in close harmony with the ordinary citizens. That closeness can be recreated. The Party must strive to be the organized voice of the people. "When we argue for the sovereignty of the party I want us to mean by this the sovereignty of the people".²⁵

Parliament has not become an adequate instrument for the democratic control of Government policies and the political leadership. If the democratic purposes of the 1965 Constitution are to be realized, TANU must itself become more democratic. This has, in fact, been one of the most important of the issues to which Nyerere has devoted his time, particularly in the years between 1965 and 1969. Quietly but effectively the Party's competence as an organization was greatly strengthened. Then, in 1968 and 1969, Nyerere, as President of TANU, effected a democratic revolution within TANU. The main

24 Julius Nyerere's "Socialism and Rural Development", reprinted in *Freedom and Socialism*, op. cit., p. 348.

25 In an interview, June 1974. This paragraph relies, in part, upon Nyerere's explanation of his views in that interview. He also discusses the role of the Party in his introduction to *Freedom and Socialism*, op. cit., in particular on pp. 30-32.

components of the parliamentary electoral system were transplanted into the Party. A wide range of posts, including much of the membership of the Party Conference, the National Executive Committee, the Central Committee and the Regional Party Conferences and the District and Regional Chairmen are now filled through an election process which includes the same four stages as the national elections. There are now nominations, a preliminary ranking of candidates by a local Party gathering, the scrutiny of the list of candidates, the selection by a superior Party organ of 2 candidates for the final election, and, finally, voting on these two candidates by a more representative electorate. These reforms have significantly increased internal democracy within the Party and are an integral part of the strategy developed by Nyerere for the transition to socialism.

One development might seem to contradict this view that Nyerere's socialist strategy has involved a move towards increased democratic participation within the Party. This is the power which the National Executive Committee or the Central Committee have to veto candidates for election to the National Assembly and to any of the important elected positions within TANU. Certainly, if this power were used to secure a close conformity to a detailed ideology it would quickly transform TANU into something close to a vanguard Party. One can only say that this does not appear to have happened yet, despite the support for such a development from Marxists and from authoritarians in the Party who have long supported developments that would confirm and consolidate their hold on power. The democratic traditions within the Party, the mass support for meaningful elections, and Nyerere's continuous championing of democratic controls have held in check this particular authoritarian development.²⁶

There are few elements in Nyerere's political thought which are repeated more insistently and more forcefully than the conviction that there can be neither socialism nor the beginnings of a transition to socialism without democracy. These brief quotations illustrate this:

The people must make the decisions about their own future through democratic procedures. Leadership cannot replace democracy, it must be part of democracy; Socialism is not an alternative to political democracy; it is an extension of it. . . . Socialism means the extension of political democracy to include economic democracy;

The people's freedom to determine their own priorities, to organize themselves and their own advance in welfare, is an important part of our objective. It cannot be postponed to some future time. The people's active and continued voluntary participation in the struggle is an important part of our objective because only through this participation will the people develop.²⁷

26 Marxian analysis is, of course, not intended to reinforce oligarchic tendencies within the Party. We are, however, talking of an area of political practice where the slippage between intention and reality can be very great. If the effort were in fact made to convert TANU into a vanguard Party the result might very well be the full entrenchment of a political oligarchy free of the encumbrance of the existing democratic constraints, an oligarchy which utilizes a socialist rhetoric without real commitment to it.

27 These quotations are from three separate statements by Nyerere between 1968 and 1971. They appear in Nyerere's *Freedom and Development*, op. cit., pp. 66, 179 and 333.

These quotations are each from a different major Presidential statement made between 1968 and 1971. They could be matched by others equally unequivocal. Their meaning is clear. Democracy is an essential feature of the transition to socialism.

But what if the practice of democracy threatens an important socialist measure or is but an occasion for the voicing of inconsequential or even divisive interests? In 1965 Nyerere had given this reply:

If the people did make a mistake, it is their right to do so. . . . It is arrogance for anyone to think that they can choose on behalf of the people better than the people can choose for themselves.²⁸

Five years later his position had not really altered:

I know that there are, even in Tanzania, some beliefs that periodic elections are dangerous. It is said that they give to the enemies of our people and of our political system an opportunity to sow confusion: it is said that they could be used to destroy our unity; that they could be used to get rid of good leaders and replace them with bad leaders. . . . I myself am aware that periodic elections do bring these dangers. Yet I am quite unable to see what we can put in their place.²⁹

Nyerere could see nothing to put in the place of democracy because, as he went on to explain, "only while there is this kind of securing opportunity for choice . . . are we, their representatives, forced to overcome our indolence or our selfishness and serve them to the best of our ability".³⁰

There is on this issue a key divide which separates the socialist whose primary commitment is to an ideology (however much he feels that this ideology reflects the true interests of the people) and the socialist whose primary commitment is to the people themselves as they now are, warts and all. No State can achieve its communal objectives without relying upon political, administrative and technological 'experts'. Yet to rely upon 'experts' is to risk oppression by these 'experts'. Some socialists would seek to minimize this risk primarily by an emphasis on ideology, arguing that if the 'experts' are ideologically well-trained and the leaders form a committed socialist vanguard, then the risks will be minimal. At this divide in socialist thought, Nyerere takes, instead, the democratic path. He would prefer to run the risk of the people misusing their power than the risk of a "benevolent leadership", abusing its power. He would minimize the risk of oppression by the 'experts' by assuring as best he could that they were not so well rewarded as to constitute a separate class and that they were electorally answerable to the people. "All of us", he has said, "everywhere, have to wage a constant struggle to support the supremacy of the people. We have to be constantly vigilant to ensure that the people are not used by the individuals to whom they have entrusted power".³¹ This constant vigilance is to be directed at least as much

28 Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, op. cit., p. 91.

29 Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, op. cit., pp. 184-185.

30 Ibid., p. 186.

31 Ibid., p. 37.

towards the potential political 'new class' as towards the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Nyerere has never supported the argument that TANU should become a vanguard Party, that is, a Party which would be a closed Party of committed socialists, admitting to its elite membership only those whom it feels are committed to its doctrines. This has never been Nyerere's position. His reason is simple. A vanguard Party would need to be a Party of angels and "we are not angels".³²

The fact that Nyerere hopes for an increasing number of committed socialists within the leadership of TANU in no way means that he is in effect advocating a vanguard within a mass Party which would be little different from a vanguard Party within a mass society. The difference is, in fact crucial. In the former case the leadership would not be a closed elite but would be open to anyone in the Party who could win the confidence of his fellow Party members while the people themselves would have a structure, the Party, and a process, the elections, through which to assert their rights and to exercise a final control upon the leadership. For Nyerere, all of this is particularly relevant to the transition to socialism for in that transition the power of the State is likely to increase and the risk of oppression or at least the potential for it, will therefore be greater. "State ownership and control of the key points of the economy can, in fact, lead to a greater tyranny if the state is not itself controlled by the people, who exercise this control for their own benefit and on their own behalf".³³ Democracy, in consequence, including the recurrent election of leaders in free elections, is thus an important component of his political strategy for the transition to socialism. It has been on the basis of this strategy, with its emphasis on greater equality, on national self-reliance, on the building of socialist institutions and on increased democratic participation that Nyerere has sought since 1967 to guide Tanzania in civil peace and without external entanglements to a socialist transformation of its still developing economy and society.

South Africa's Africa Policy Reconsidered

KLAAS WOLDRING*

In this article the intention is to discuss South Africa's Africa policy as the all-important aspect of her foreign policy, its historical perspectives, its complexities, its motivation and its failure to achieve the objectives sought in 1967. It is, of course, true that any State's foreign policy is a function of its domestic policy. Secondly, it is an accepted axiom that a State's foreign policy is dependent on its national power, as determined, among other factors, by its industrial and military capacity, resources, geographical position, population, the level of that population's development and internal stability.

Unrevealing as they are as general principles, these two relationships hold true for South Africa as well. There are, however, complicating factors with each of these relationships in the case of South Africa, factors which have been grossly underestimated by the South African regime, from their own point of view to their detriment, and exposing the poor quality of their judgment. The first one is that foreign policy in South Africa is a function of white domestic policy, i.e., Apartheid-Separate Development, a system completely rejected by Africans everywhere. The second one is that, although industrially, militarily and in terms of resources, South Africa is the most powerful State in Africa, the basis of that power is shaky in the African setting because (a) it rests in large measure on African labour and co-operation, and (b) white power is continually subjected to international pressures and threatened by denial of markets on account of the domestic racial policy. To be effective, power must be accepted and recognized. Exclusive white power is less and less accepted internationally and is in danger of *de facto* de-recognition.

The decisive rejection of the Africa policy by most African leaders, although most consistently by those of Central and East Africa, together with other, internal and external factors, e.g., strikes by African workers, the resumption of guerrilla warfare against Rhodesia and, recently, the dramatic changes in Portugal, have led to the adoption by Pretoria of what may euphemistically be called a concessions policy. These events also seem to have stimulated Mr. Vorster and other Cabinet Ministers, notably Botha, to engage in more frequent and more regular dialogue with the so-called 'homeland' leaders. It is plain that the Africa policy phase had been considered necessary before it occurred to the white leadership of South Africa that internal changes had to be effected if there was to be a degree of acceptance of offers of aid, loans and technical expertise. Judging by the several previous attempts to create the impression that internal changes were on the way, it would be naïve to expect that the concessions are to be followed by any far-reaching reforms.

³² In an interview, June 1974.

³³ *Freedom and Development*, op. cit., p. 179.

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