

OAU Faces Rhodesia

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INTRODUCTION

The unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the white minority regime in Rhodesia poses a major problem for the Organization of African Unity.¹ It is intended in this paper to show that UDI was no accident of history but rather an inevitable outcome of the British colonial policy in the territory. The seizure of power by Mr. Ian Smith did not take the Africans by surprise as has been suggested.² But this paper will be mainly concerned with those factors which constitute obstacles to the OAU initiative in Rhodesia. Thus, the reasons for the limited successes of the OAU, as the main organ for channelling and harmonizing African opinion and the liberation efforts, will form the central theme of this paper.

A general consensus exists that there is a need to bring an end to the supremacist illegal regime in Rhodesia. However, for reasons which will be evident from our ensuing discussion, the African States have either been unwilling or unable to take effective measures to end the Rhodesian rebellion. There is the fact that most African States are economically and militarily very vulnerable; the position of Zambia in this connection is very crucial to the success of any African initiative in Rhodesia. There is also the danger posed by the support the Rhodesian regime might get from South Africa and some Western countries. The African States have not had a long experience in international diplomacy; hence their hasty and sometimes contradictory resolutions. The different approaches to African problems taken by the 'moderates' on the one hand and by the 'radicals' on the other, coupled with a split in the African nationalist movement in 1963, did not help a co-ordinated African approach to the problem. The OAU itself was founded mainly as an instrument for co-ordination and conciliation between and among African States—it was a means of consolidating the newly won independence. And even though one of its aims was the liberation of the remaining dependent African States, this was relegated to the background.

When at last Mr. Ian Smith declared Rhodesia independent, the African States not only found themselves divided but also found the OAU machinery inadequate. They passed resolution after resolution at several of the OAU

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¹ Rhodesia was declared independent on 11 November 1965. According to the figures released by the Office of Statistics in Salisbury on 31 July 1969, Rhodesia has a population of 5,090,000 of whom 4,840,000 are Africans and 230,000 (less than five per cent of the total population) Europeans. See R. Zacklin, "Challenge of Rhodesia", *International Conciliation*, No. 575 (November 1969), p. 23.

² A. Gupta, "The Rhodesian Crisis and the Organization of African Unity", *International Studies* (New Delhi), Vol. 9, No. 1 (July 1967), p. 60.

Assemblies. But their main energies were expended in keeping the issue alive at the international level. They never relented in reminding Great Britain of her responsibilities in leading her colony to independence on the basis of majority rule. The attitude of the British Government on the issue of independence and the use of force in Rhodesia was initially far from clear. The disillusionment with the British policy in Rhodesia on the one hand, and a hope that she might somehow solve the Rhodesian problem on the other, tell the story of African frustration and dilemma.

UDI, AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF BRITISH COLONIAL POLICIES IN RHODESIA

The unilateral declaration of independence of 1965 constituted an open defiance of many resolutions of the UN calling for majority rule in Rhodesia.³ To Britain it was a challenge to her responsibility to lead Rhodesia along the constitutional path towards African majority rule. African reaction was typified by a feeling of betrayal by the British Government and a resolve to end the Rhodesia rebellion by all possible means.⁴ But the unhappy and dramatic event in Rhodesia which has led to the ousting of the lawful regime and the consequent vesting of *de facto* control in a minority racist regime has its roots in the historical and constitutional evolution of Rhodesia.

A referendum was held in Rhodesia in 1922, the object of which was to determine whether the European inhabitants wished to become part of South Africa. The European population in Rhodesia at the time was about 34,000. By a vote of 8,774 to 5,989⁵ they opted to remain separate. Rhodesia was formally annexed to the British Crown on 12 September 1923 and achieved self-government under Letters Patent of 1923. From 1923 until the promulgation of the Constitution of 1961, Rhodesia was a self-governing colony.

The establishment of the Central African Federation in 1953 did not affect this status. If anything it tended to impose Southern Rhodesian domination on the conduct of the Federation and the two other territories: Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). The desire of the European minority to keep the Africans in perpetual subservience and to protect their economic interests explains the bellicose attitude they adopted in order to bring the British Government to their line of thinking. Sir Roy Welensky, then Prime Minister of the Federation, had threatened secession as early as 1957.⁶

Rhodesia had apparently many attributes of statehood. The UN General Assembly had not found it fit to include her in the list of dependent territories contained in the General Assembly resolution of 1946.⁷ She had a High Com-

3 For a discussion of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, see Z. Cervenka, *The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1968), pp. 177-184.

4 *Africa Research Bulletin*, P.S.C., Series, Vol. 2, No. 11 (1-30 November 1965), pp. 408-10.

5 Zacklin, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

6 V. B. Thompson, *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism* (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1969), p. 208.

7 See Resolution 66 (1) of 14 December 1946.

mission in London, as had other independent members of the Commonwealth, and was also regularly represented at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences. She was not only a member in her own right of the Interim Commission of the International Telecommunications Union, but was also a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Despite these factors, which would have qualified her for independent statehood, she still remains a colony. The reason for this is not difficult to find. Britain never relinquished control over her external affairs. She could only act in the international sphere to the extent that the United Kingdom delegated to her powers to do so. This explains why, while remaining a colony, she was able to exercise certain treaty-making powers. It may be pointed out that under the Statute of Westminster 1931 there was Dominion status which applied specifically to the white Dominions of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and Newfoundland. Rhodesia, even though not included in this category, was regarded by the United Kingdom as part of this Empire until the 1950s. Since the purpose of the Westminster Act was to confer independence and sovereignty on the Dominions mentioned therein, it is arguable that the British attitude, in treating Rhodesia as a Dominion, provided an in-built mechanism for secession.⁸

The United Kingdom's reluctance to enforce majority rule in territories with a strong minority white settler regime was reflected in her attitude to a threatened secession by Kenyan white settlers. In 1923 Kenyan white settlers had threatened to revolt and unilaterally declare their independence. The British Colonial Secretary at the time admitted to Cabinet that Britain would be powerless to meet the threat and that neither African nor European troops could be employed against the rebels without some unfortunate consequences. In his view it would be fatal to British prestige in the whole of Africa. Such an action would not only create insecurity for the Europeans in any area of native population, but it was certain to be bitterly condemned in Parliament.⁹

Under the 1923 Constitution certain powers were reserved to the British Government, the most important of which was designed to protect the African population against discriminatory legislation. It was clear that the purpose of the reserve powers was to protect, for what they were worth, the interests of the Africans. As events turned out these powers were never used. The Land Apportionment Act 1930, for example, which is the basis of the Rhodesian social and racial structure, was brought into force without any interference by the United Kingdom Government in spite of the fact that it grossly discriminated against Africans.¹⁰

Under the 1961 Constitution the British Government surrendered the

8 Section 4 of that act provides that "No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that the Dominion has requested and consented to, the enactment thereof."

9 See *Duke of Devonshire Secret Memorandum for the Cabinet 14th Feb. 1923* (Copy in India Office, Private File No. 300).

10 Zacklin, *op. cit.*, p. 26. See also Table 1 annexed.

powers of disallowance it had held under the 1923 Constitution and had never used. Instead there was written into the Constitution a Declaration of Rights. In addition, a Constitutional Council was established and charged with the function of examining new laws to ensure conformity with the Declaration of Rights before they received the Governor's assent.¹¹ The ineffectiveness of the Constitutional Council becomes obvious once it is seen that its view could be overruled by a two thirds vote of the Assembly or, in most cases, after six months had passed since an objection was first raised. What is more, the Council had no power to delay money bills or a bill certified by the Prime Minister to be so urgent that delay was not in the public interest. Whose 'public interest'? It is clear from both the 1923 and 1961 Constitutions and the Land Apportionment Act that 'public' interest could only approximate to the interests of the racist minority regime. Furthermore, the money bills and other certified bills over which the Council had no power of delay could be used to perpetrate flagrant derogations of those African interests which the Council had been charged to protect. Discriminatory legislation existing before the 1961 Constitution came into force was preserved. While it was the avowed aim of the Declaration of Rights to ensure the enjoyment of fundamental rights of the individual, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed, Section 70(1)(b) nevertheless provides that nothing done under a law in force immediately before the new Constitution became operative, and continuing in force, shall be held to be inconsistent with the new Constitution. It is no wonder that the Land Apportionment Act, 1930, and the principal security laws which, by any stretch of the imagination, could not have been intended to protect African interests, remained unaffected by the Declaration.

The franchise as under the 1923 Constitution was apparently egalitarian. But because of the property and educational requirements, it did discriminate against Africans. There were to be fifty constituencies and fifteen electoral districts. The Legislative Assembly was to have 65 members. In 1964, out of approximately 94,000 registered voters on the A Roll, 89,000 were Europeans. The Africans on the A Roll were only 2,263 while the Asians on that Roll were just above one thousand. Consequently, the European registered voters on the A Roll were guaranteed a minimum of fifty European members on the Legislative Assembly. The Declaration of Rights can thus be seen not to be worth the paper it was written on.¹²

It was not until 1962 that the UN General Assembly had occasion to reverse its decision of 1946 which did not include Rhodesia as a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of Article 73 of the UN Charter.¹³ By the same resolution which affirmed that Rhodesia was to all intents and

11 Under the 1961 Constitution the Governor's consent is required before a promulgation of the Rhodesian Parliament becomes law.

12 See Table 2.

13 Section 73 of the UN Charter deals with non-self-governing territories and provides that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount. In Rhodesia, while account should be taken of the minority interests, it is the interests of the African majority that must be given pre-eminence.

purposes a British colony, the General Assembly called on Great Britain to take measures to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence. At the OAU Conference at Accra in 1965, the African Heads of State repeated the demand made at the General Assembly in 1962—that Great Britain, as administering power having the sole responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, should take measures to ensure majority rule in the territory. The British Government, thus confronted, found herself in an awkward situation. Her position had always been that Rhodesia was not a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. She also maintained that "convention" prevented her from interfering in Rhodesia's domestic affairs. The dilemma of the British Government is aptly expressed by Dr. Nkrumah:

This racist state is protected from outside pressure because under international law it is a British colony, while Britain excuses her failure to exercise her legal rights to prevent the oppression and exploitation of the African inhabitants, of which she of course officially disapproves, because of the supposed British parliamentary convention. In other words, by maintaining Rhodesia nominally as a colony, Britain in fact gives her official protection to a second South Africa and the European racials are left free to treat the African inhabitants as they will.¹⁴

Dr. Nkrumah's cynicism is well taken. The United Kingdom attitude was clearly that of obstructionism. It was not prepared to allow anybody, including the United Nations, to interfere in Rhodesia. At the same time she found it fit to maintain that she alone was entitled to bring the rebel regime back to the path of constitutionality. Somehow independence was to be granted on grounds negotiated and mutually agreed by her and the Rhodesian regime. The reluctance of Britain to deal firmly with Rhodesia was said to derive from the fact that for forty years she never used the powers to safeguard the interests of the African inhabitants and that in effect these powers became obsolete. It is submitted that the alleged convention was no more than a device primarily intended to shield the British Government from her responsibility in Rhodesia.

At the founding conference of the OAU in 1963 the States represented had passed a resolution of decolonization. While the resolution was in general directed to decolonization in Southern Africa, special mention was made of the impending crisis in Rhodesia. Part of the resolution which was clearly addressed to the United Kingdom was intended to dissuade that country from transferring "the powers and attributes of sovereignty to a foreign minority government imposed on African peoples by the use of force and under cover of racial legislation".¹⁵ It was also affirmed that if power in Southern Rhodesia were usurped by a racist white minority Government the members of the Conference "would lend their effective moral and practical support to any legitimate measures which the African Nationalist leaders may devise for the purpose of recovering such power and restoring it to the African majority".¹⁶ In May 1964 Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, Prime Minister

14 Cervenka, *The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter*, op. cit., p. 176.

15 *Africa Diary*, Vol. III, No. 23 (7 June 1963), p. 1176.

16 *Ibid.*

of Zambia, threatened to break off all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia if it unilaterally declared herself independent.¹⁷ Anxiety was expressed in many other African States about the British attitude in Rhodesia.¹⁸ The African States who had followed the Rhodesian affair, as they had followed the other events in Southern Africa, were thus aware of the potential danger created by the historical and constitutional developments in Rhodesia. Why then were they unprepared and ill equipped to meet the challenge posed by Mr. Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965?

POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN AFRICA

The reasons for the inability of the Africans to cope with the Rhodesian problem are complex and many. In this and the following sections, an attempt will be made to analyse these problems and to see to what extent they offer an explanation for the shortcomings of the OAU in this respect.

The African continent just before and immediately after UDI was pervaded by political instability, some of which resulted in coup d'états. In June 1965, a few months before Rhodesia declared herself independent, Ben Bella, a radical more in tune with radical Africa, was overthrown by Boumedienne. In the Congo, a fortnight after UDI, Mobutu seized power. The fall of Ben Bella and Mobutu's seizure of power in the Congo served as a warning to African civilian rulers that ambitious army officers could threaten their position at home. The result was that they felt more threatened by possible coup d'états in their own countries than by the Rhodesian crisis which for many of them was a remote problem. The following year saw a number of political changes in many parts of Africa: in the Central African Republic (January 1966), Colonel Jean Bokassa deposed President David Dacko; in Upper Volta (January 1966), Colonel Sangoule Lamizana seized power; in Nigeria (January 1966), Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi took control of the coup d'état perpetrated by junior army officers and he was in turn overthrown in August by a group of army officers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon; and in Ghana Lieutenant Joseph Ankrah and Police Inspector J. W. K. Halley, in one of Africa's most dramatic and controversial coups, ousted Nkrumah from power.

Coup d'états apart, there were yet some other political upheavals in some of the African countries which tended to minimize African efforts. Zambia's desire to sever all economic relations with Rhodesia, with which she was economically closely linked,¹⁹ had resulted in a shortage of fuel and other necessary commodities. The instability engendered by Zambia's economic problems was made worse by strikes by both white and African mine workers. The former sought to ensure for themselves security of employment which they felt was being threatened by a rapid Africanization programme at the

17 *Rhodesian Herald*, 5 February 1964.

18 See the editorial in the *Nigerian Morning Post*, 21 March 1964 and a press comment in the *Ghanaian Times*, 19 March 1964.

19 See Table 3.

mines; the latter, on the other hand, demanded increased wages and better conditions of employment as well as speedier Africanization of mine workers. It was also known that some white mine workers were sympathetic to the Rhodesian rebellion. Strong action was thus necessary to prevent the Government from grinding to a standstill. In Uganda the power struggle between Prime Minister Obote as he then was, and the Kabaka, the King of the most powerful Kingdom in Uganda, created prospects of a civil war and led to the removal of the Kabaka as President and his ultimate flight from Uganda. For the rest of his time in office up to 1971, Obote had to contend with Baganda opposition. 1966 saw a split in the Kenya African National Union which led to the formation of a new party by Oginga Odinga, the dethroned left leaning Vice-President of Kenya. The subsequent act of the Government in effectively suppressing any kind of opposition showed the degree of its concern in the matter. It is not surprising, therefore, that the African States became, as a result of these series of crises, more inward looking. The Pan-African posture which would have favoured increased support for the liquidation of the Rhodesian rebel regime was relegated to the background. It seems to the present writer that the coup d'états in Algeria and Ghana had a more profound effect on the African initiative in Rhodesia. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah had from before UDI taken a radical positive stand towards Rhodesian affairs. As early as 1962, Nkrumah had expressed his disillusionment with the British Government's policy in Rhodesia.²⁰ Again in 1963, he had moved a motion in the United Nations against the British intention to transfer armaments to Rhodesia, a resolution which was ignored.²¹ Speaking to the Ghana General Assembly on 25 November, just after UDI, the President said:

If the United Kingdom rules out military intervention by its own forces and is opposed to military intervention by the U.N. or by the O.A.U. the only way the Smith regime can be overthrown is by an internal revolt against the present illegal Government.²²

It was common knowledge that Nkrumah was intending to raise a people's militia for the purpose. Ben Bella had manifested an interest in Southern Africa and was prepared from 1963 at Addis to supply up to 10,000 men to fight for the liberation of Southern Africa.

The Nigerian posture was less militant and tended to be conciliatory. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, while envisaging some form of forceful intervention by the United Kingdom Government, was nevertheless content to leave the initiative in the hands of the latter. The Nigerian position under Balewa was partly explicable on the grounds of the special relation between Nigeria and the United Kingdom and the degree of foreign penetration which tended to constrain her Pan-African politics. It was unlikely, therefore, that the Nige-

20 See above.

21 *Africa Research Bulletin*, P.S.C. Series, Volume 2, No. 11 (1-30 November 1965), p. 409.

22 *Radio Accra*, 25 November 1965.

rian potential would have been tapped. In addition, because of the acute rivalry between Ghana and Nigeria, the two countries were often inclined to adopt different approaches to African problems. Five countries, namely Algeria, UAR, Ethiopia, Nigeria after Balewa and Ghana were potentially capable of intervening actively in Rhodesia. This potential was greatly watered down by the internal African political upheavals already alluded to. UAR had to contend with the Middle East problem. Boumedienne, while professing Pan-Africanism, was becoming more and more drawn into the Middle East orbit. He was certainly less concerned with Southern African problems than his predecessor. The new Ghana regime reversed Nkrumah's policies and proceeded to dismantle the machinery with which Nkrumah waged his active foreign policy. The priority became Ghana's ailing economy. In Nigeria the overthrow of Ironsi and the subsequent civil war precluded the possibility of the Nigerian Government taking any active part in Rhodesia.

The coup d'état which led to the ousting of Nkrumah was to create some friction in inter-African relations. At the conference of the OAU Ministerial Council which met at Addis Ababa on 1 March 1966, a stormy debate arose as to who should represent Ghana. The Council's recognition of the delegation of the new regime—the recognition of the regime itself being deferred—sparked off violent reactions from certain members. Mr. Osman Ba, the Mali Foreign Minister, resigned in protest as first deputy chairman of the conference. Several delegations walked out of the conference and nearly brought it to an abrupt end. Anxiety was expressed by some members that in the steadily deteriorating atmosphere which prevailed at the meeting, further discussion of political matters could easily lead to more delegations leaving the meeting. What would have happened if Mr. Alex Quaison Sackey, the ousted Ghanaian Foreign Minister, had arrived in Addis as expected, is anyone's guess.²³

The African position was further weakened by the detention of the Guinean delegation in Accra on the eve of the conference of OAU Heads of State in Addis in November 1966. Sekou Touré was not going to attend the conference unless the Guinean delegation was released. The Ghana regime insisted that they would not accede to Sekou Touré's request unless he first released Ghanaians allegedly held against their will in Guinea. The Guinea-Ghana conflict almost jeopardized the success of the conference. It took the personal intervention of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, President Tubman of Liberia and President Nasser of Egypt to avert a crisis which threatened the infant organization, and which Africa could not afford in the light of the Rhodesian secession.²⁴

Besides the political instability in Africa and the consequent removal from the scene of radical African leaders who were in a position to act, and Nasser's

23 Mali, Guinea and Tanzania withdrew from the Conference on 3 March in protest against the seating of the new Ghana regime: *Ethiopian Herald*, 4 March 1966; UAR also withdrew on 3 March: *Egyptian Gazette*, 4 March 1966; and Kenya walked out on 4 March for the same reason: *Africa Research Bulletin*, P.S.C. series, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1-31 March 1966), p. 483.

24 *Africa Dairy*, 5-12 December 1966, pp. 3172-3173. See also Gupta, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

preoccupation with Middle East problems, there were yet some other factors which considerably hampered a united African confrontation with the Ian Smith Government. It is to these factors that we shall now turn.

AFRICAN GROUPINGS AND THEIR DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS

The year 1963 must be considered as a landmark in African history. That year 30 African Heads of State assembled at Addis Ababa determined to increase and consolidate inter-African co-operation in the political and economic spheres. The beginning of 1963 found Africa still divided into two main groupings,²⁵ the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group, a division resulting from a serious disagreement over a number of political questions. A conference organized by the Monrovia Group and which was to take place in Lagos in late January held out hopes of a possible detente between the two. But the organizers of the conference committed the error of not inviting the Algerian FLN which had won recognition from the Casablanca Group. As a consequence, the latter declined to attend. Apart from the issue of the status of the FLN, the OAU members could not adopt a common stand on the civil war which was then raging in the Congo. Even after the inauguration of the OAU the split between the two groups persisted. The leaders of the Casablanca Group, spearheaded by Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana, tended to take a more radical stand on both the question of continental union and the liberation struggle. As against this, the leaders of the Monrovia Group urged a more gradualist and functional approach to the problem of African unity, hence their insistence on the sanctity and inviolability of State sovereignty.²⁶ They were probably motivated by the fear of sacrificing their newly won independence to an unknown and uncertain supranational entity. This entrenchment of sovereignty was clearly an antithesis to wider unity.

This basic difference in approach was overridden by the need for a compromise solution which alone could have ensured the establishment of an all-African machinery which would serve not only as a means of consolidating their newly won independence but also as a vehicle for harmonizing and settling inter-African differences and disputes. It is arguable, therefore, that the immediate cause of the birth of the OAU was the desire to consolidate the *status quo* rather than to initiate the next round of changes as visualized by most fervent Africans. Thus Article III of the OAU Charter reads:

25 The Casablanca Group, formed in January 1961, comprised Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Morocco and the UAR. One of the reasons for its formation was the need felt by these States to provide a counterpoise to the meeting of twelve former French territories at Brazzaville in December 1960. The Monrovia block which emerged in January 1962 comprises twenty African States including Nigeria and the twelve members of the Brazzaville Group. (See Erasmus H. Kloman, Jr., "African Unification Movements", *International Organization* (Boston, Mass.), Vol. 16, pp. 387-404.

26 A. Rivkin, "The Organization of African Unity", *Current History* (Philadelphia), Vol. 48, pp. 193-200. See also *Africa Dairy*, Vol. III, No. 23 (1-7 June 1963), pp. 1179-1183; and Kloman, "African Unification Movements", op. cit.

The Member States...solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:

- 1 the sovereign equality of all Member States;
- 2 non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
- 3 respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
- 4 peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
- 5 unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State;
- 6 absolute dedication to the total emancipation of African territories which are still dependent;
- 7 affirmation of policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

Though the "emancipation of all dependent territories" was listed as an aim of the OAU and in spite of the many declarations of intent in that respect, it does not seem that there was a clearly worked out plan as to how that aim should be realized. In fact there was no agreement as to extent and scope to which the OAU should embark on its policy of liberation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the OAU Liberation Committee, set up in Dar es Salaam, suffered from the beginning from lack of co-operation.²⁷ The extent of the disagreement is typified by the acid criticism levelled against the Liberation Committee by the Ghanaian daily, *The Spark*, which charged that the Liberation Committee:

exceeded its mandate by assuming responsibility for planning the strategy of liberation struggle; surrendered powers at vital points to individual African States without authority;

[has] shown little concern in its budget for the liberation struggle; disregarded secrecy by revealing military intelligence.²⁸

It was also known that Ghana had refused to contribute what had previously been voluntary sums. It took the Cairo Summit Conference of Heads of State in 1964 to decide that all members of the organization should pay to the Committee a compulsory minimum sum based on payments to the United Nations. The activities of the Committee also came up for discussion at the conference. There were sharp exchanges between Nyerere and Nkrumah. Nyerere had taken exception to Nkrumah's criticism of the work of the Committee charged with the liberation and decolonization of Africa, under the chairmanship of the Tanzanian Foreign Minister.²⁹ The limited resources of the Liberation Committee hampered its activities, and, when at the Addis Ababa conference (November 1966) an attempt was made to raise funds for it some members dared to suggest that it be scrapped.³⁰ The conference did

27 M. H. Fargal, "African Unity and Liberation", (M.A. Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1968, Chapter 6. See also Gupta, op. cit., p. 58.

28 *Africa Research Bulletin*, P.S.C. Series, Vol. I, No. 1 (January 1964), p. 12.

29 *Africa Diary*, Vol. II, No. 35 (22-28 August 1964), pp. 1915, 1917.

30 The Tunisian delegation demanded its dissolution on the grounds that money given to the Committee was only used for its own maintenance. *Africa Research Bulletin*, P.S.C. Series, 1966 in general and, in particular, 1-30 November 1966, p. 652.

reject a budget proposed for the Committee. Nyerere walked out in protest and was quoted as saying that he refused to accept sabotage of the committee and was prepared to let it establish its headquarters elsewhere. Later, at a press conference in Dar es Salaam, Nyerere said that African leaders would have to make up their minds "Whether they will give priority to Africa or their associations with their former rulers".³¹ This was an obvious reference to the great degree of dependence of some African Governments which tended to subordinate African interests to those of their former colonial masters. It also illustrated the extent to which some of these powers could interfere in African politics.

The Defence Committee, also known as the Committee of Five, which was hastily summoned in November 1965 to study and report on the Rhodesian situation, could not come forth with any meaningful suggestions.³² While no communiqué was issued at the end of meeting, it was announced that the OAU Council of Ministers would meet at Addis Ababa to discuss immediate steps to be taken on Rhodesia. Nor were matters helped by the rift in the nationalist movement in Rhodesia in 1963.

The movement divided into two groups: the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) led by Mr. Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. The following years saw attempts by the OAU to reconcile the two parties and, indeed, the OAU deserves praise for its considerable efforts in this direction.³³ ZAPU's position was that it was the original movement and that if ZANU wanted to unite it should dissolve itself and return to ZAPU's ranks without any preconditions. By the end of the decade, the OAU had almost succeeded in bringing the two contending parties together. But even the formation in late 1971 of The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI),³⁴ composed of militants from both ZANU and ZAPU, was disputed by both ZANU and ZAPU branches. An attempt to create a Joint Military Command by ZANU and ZAPU resulted in the signing of joint protocol in May 1972 at Mbeya in Tanzania by the leaders of the two parties.³⁵ It was intended that all aid was thenceforth to be channelled through the Joint Command, and the fighting cadres of FROLIZI and the Joint Military Command still claimed to represent Zimbabwe,³⁶ and it was later decided to aid the two groups from funds allocated to Zimbabwe although it was made clear that this should not be construed as a recognition of FROLIZI. Thus a decade of negotiations had failed to achieve a single military command under a unified political organization. The result was

31 Ibid.

32 The Defence Committee including UAR, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Nigeria was formed in October 1965 to follow up the resolution relating to Rhodesia of the Assembly of Heads of State held at Accra in October 1965. See *Africa Research Bulletin*, P.S.C. Series, Vol. 2, No. 10 (1-31 October 1965), p. 378.

33 For a discussion of the OAU's attempt to reconcile ZANU and ZAPU and the difficulties it encountered, See Fargal, "African Unity and Liberation", op. cit., pp. 178-186.

34 *Africa Research Bulletin*, P.S.C. Series, Vol. 8, No. 10, (1-31 October 1971), p. 2264.

35 *Africa Diary*, Vol. XII, No. 20 (13-19 May 1972), p. 5965.

36 *Africa Diary*, Vol. XIII, No. 16 (16-22 April 1973), p. 6435.

that disunity and confusion reigned in the ranks of the Rhodesian freedom-fighters imposing a great cost on the OAU's scarce resources and, of course, a disadvantage to the liberation struggle.³⁷

The coup d'état of 25 April 1974 which toppled the Portuguese fascist regime, and bringing in its wake the prospects of independence for the former Portuguese territories, did finally create an atmosphere conducive to the unity of the warring Rhodesian liberation movements. Independence for Mozambique would mean that Rhodesia would have extensive borders with a State unlikely to be her ally as the old fascist Portuguese regime had been. With the prospects of the war of liberation being intensified and the security of Rhodesia being more and more threatened, Smith has at last—even though still equivocating—decided to talk to the leaders of the majority in that country. Thanks to the initiative of President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda of Zambia a united front of the liberation movements has been forged under the leadership of the African National Council (ANC) led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. They must have realized, or been made to understand, that at the present stage of the Rhodesian struggle a united front was a minimum to be achieved if anything was to be gained from the proposed constitutional talks with the rebel regime.³⁸

As late as 1966 the African States had different ideas as to how the Rhodesian problem should be solved. At the Commonwealth Conference in Lagos the Nigerian Prime Minister, who had assembled the conference with the approval of the British Government, advocated a peaceful settlement.³⁹ In the view of the Sierra Leonean delegation “mere economic sanctions were not enough”. If the United Kingdom would not use force, Sierra Leone would demand that force under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter should be used.⁴⁰ It seems that the OAU was more concerned with preventing UDI rather than working out a strategy for dealing with the rebel regime in case secession occurred. Thus the OAU brought pressure upon Britain through the UN and several Commonwealth Conferences to prevent UDI. While on the one hand relying on Britain to solve the problem, and on the other pledging to give effective political and military support to the nationalists, the OAU failed to take a long-term view of the problem.

OAU FACES THE REALITY OF THE RHODESIAN CRISIS

When it became obvious to the African States that Mr. Ian Smith was bent on declaring Rhodesia independent, the need to devise concrete measures to avoid the consolidation of such illegal seizure of power dawned on them.

37 It is arguable that the basic reasons for the failure of the OAU to reconcile ZANU and ZAPU were grounded on tribal and personality conflicts. It was not therefore the objectives or strategy that were at issue. See *Africa Diary*, Vol. III, No. 16 (16-22 April 1973), p. 6435.

38 An agreement was reached between ZANU and ZAPU in December 1974. See *Africa*, No. 42 (February 1975), pp. 10-15.

39 *Nigerian Morning Post*, 12 January 1966. See also Thompson, “Africa and Unity”, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

40 *West Africa*, 15 January 1966.

At the conference of the OAU Heads of State⁴¹ held in Accra in October 1965, African States called on Britain, *inter alia*, to abrogate the 1961 Constitution; to call a constitutional conference to be attended by the representatives of the whole people of Rhodesia with a view to agreeing on a new Constitution; and to ensure the release of political leaders and other detainees. By the same resolution Member States agreed that they would use all possible means, including the use of force, against any unilateral declaration of independence and that they would extend strong support to the African Zimbabwe people to establish rule by the majority in their country. They also agreed in principle on measures to be taken in the event of a negotiated independence. These were:

- 1 Refusal to recognize the new Rhodesian Government.
- 2 Continued efforts to reconcile the two African nationalist parties—the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union and the Zimbabwe African National Union with a view to forming a Government in exile and extending to it, financial, political, diplomatic and military assistance.
- 3 An emergency meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers to consider further action including the most effective means of involving the United Nations.
- 4 A call to African members of the Commonwealth and other African countries to reconsider their relations with Britain and bring the utmost pressure to bear on the British Government.
- 5 Generally, to treat Rhodesia like South Africa and Portuguese African territories in applying such measures as an economic boycott.

A Committee was formed including the UAR, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Nigeria in order to follow up the Conference's resolution.⁴²

This gave the impression that the OAU had at last decided to wrest the initiative from Britain. The resolution notwithstanding, the African States still hoped that Britain would somehow prevent the declaration of independence for they urged Britain “which is the ruling authority originally responsible for the present situation in Rhodesia. . . to take all necessary measures including the use of armed force for the restoration of the administration of the territory”. When, on 11 November, UDI came they were left without plans. Following the unilateral declaration of independence, Nigeria and Tanzania initiated a move to convene a meeting of the OAU Committee of Five which was charged by the OAU conference of Heads of State at Accra to advise on what line of action should be taken, should Ian Smith seize independence. The meeting was content with “urging for pressure on the United Kingdom as a means of implementing the resolution of the Heads of State”.⁴³

Another meeting of the Committee called for 6 December to draw up plans for the use of force, met with opposition from certain African States. They did not see what could be achieved by such a meeting if the African

41 The entente members refused to attend the OAU conference at Accra, apparently on the grounds that Nkrumah was carrying out subversive activities against them. It may be that they did not like Nkrumah's ambitions to become the leader of Africa.

42 *Egyptian Gazette*, 25 October 1965.

43 *Africa Research Bulletin*, P.S.C. Series (1-30 November 1965), p. 395.

States had not followed up their decision to break off diplomatic relations with Britain. It was also considered incomprehensible that those States which had not severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom had assembled to discuss the issue of the use of force in Rhodesia.⁴⁴

As to the question of severance of diplomatic relations, it was not agreed whether the Council of Ministers which took the decision had a mandate to bind the States represented. It was also contended by some members that the decision to sever diplomatic relations also implied withdrawal from the Commonwealth by those members of the OAU who belonged to that 'club'. What did happen was that only a few States broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and there was no withdrawal from the Commonwealth. The refusal to withdraw from the Commonwealth could be explained partly on the grounds of the economic benefit it provided and the unwillingness of the African members to lose such benefits. The failure to achieve unanimity which could have provided an effective leverage for the OAU must have exposed the weaknesses inherent in the OAU structure and constituted a threat to African solidarity.

The African States realized early that sanctions would not work and demanded the use of force. Mr. Wilson, the British Prime Minister, speaking at a press conference in Zambia, said that Britain never ruled out the use of force in appropriate circumstances, provided it was understood that this would be "for the purpose of restoring law and order and not for the purpose of changing the Rhodesian constitution".⁴⁵ While it was clear from subsequent events that Britain never intended to use force in Rhodesia, the declaration gave the impression that if there was internal civil strife she would intervene. The Zimbabwean liberation movements have been waging wars for some years in Rhodesia, and Britain has not intervened. On the contrary, she has left the 'restoration' and maintenance of law and order in the hands of Mr. Smith's Minister of Justice, Law and Order. There also seemed to be a misunderstanding of British intentions by African States. Britain, it would appear, was prepared, once the illegal regime was brought to heel, to grant independence to Rhodesia on the basis of progressive advancement to majority rule. The African States, on the other hand, have always called for an end to the rebellion and immediate majority rule.

The vacillation in African attitudes towards the issue of liberation is exemplified by the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, issued by Heads of State from East and Central Africa and subsequently adopted by both the OAU and the United Nations. The Manifesto has been said to throw "out an olive branch of conciliation and negotiation" while not compromising principle and the use of force where peaceful methods fail.⁴⁶ The document's conciliatory tone was partly aimed at reconciling different African approaches to the issue

⁴⁴ *Africa Research Bulletin*, P.S.C. Series, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1966), p. 442.

⁴⁵ *Africa Research Bulletin*, P.S.C. Series, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1966), p. 453. See below.

⁴⁶ N. M. Shamuyarira, "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa", *The African Review*, Vol. I, No. 1 (March 1971), p. 77.

of liberation and partly intended to appease Western vested interests. The effect of the manifesto was to alienate the liberation movements, and it failed to change Western attitudes, the West giving priority to their economic interests in Southern Africa.

By 1970 another divisive element was to appear in the ranks of the OAU members. This time it was the question of dialogue with South Africa that divided African opinion. The conservative forces headed by President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast were for dialogue. The initial limited success scored at the Council of Ministers Conference in June 1971 was crowned, thanks to the initiative of General Gowon of Nigeria and the quiet diplomacy of the Ethiopian Emperor, by a categorical rejection of dialogue with South Africa by a majority of African States when the Heads of State met in Addis Ababa in June of the same year.⁴⁷ The effect of the OAU resolution on the Lusaka Manifesto has been aptly put by Professor Yashpal Tandon:

The 1971 resolution of the OAU by rejecting the dialogue strategy unequivocally and *in the name of the Lusaka Manifesto*, stamped the document finally and unalterably as an anti-dialogue instrument".⁴⁸

It is not surprising that at the Conference of Heads of State of East and Central Africa held in Mogadishu in October 1971, it was concluded that armed struggle was the only way to liberate Southern Africa. Ironically what had started off as a disintegrating element provided occasion for achieving a Pan-African front and apparently killed the issue of dialogue once and for all. The coup d'état of 25 April 1974 which overthrew the Portuguese fascist regime seems to have altered this fragile Pan-African posture. There are reports that Vorster is seeking detente with black Africa. Africa must act in unison and must tell Vorster that there can be no detente until there is a fundamental change in both his internal and external policies.

But apart from the divergent views of the Africans, there were the problems of the attitude of the British Government on the use of force and the effectiveness of sanctions. There were factors which militated against the use of force and the effectiveness of sanctions. Britain feared that the use of force might set in motion uncontrollable events in Southern Africa. While Britain was prepared to send a military force and an air force to Zambia, Mr. Wilson said in a broadcast: "British troops should not be permitted to join in any offensive operation in Rhodesia unless there was a Rhodesian attack on Zambia".⁴⁹ Government sources in Lusaka said that the main British condition for the dispatch of planes and men of the Royal Air Force was that Zambian chief airfields at Ndola, Lusaka and Livingstone should be under British operational control. This would make it difficult for military transport planes of other countries to use those bases. Britain had also said that British air units might be withdrawn if any OAU force tried to invade Rhodesia or

⁴⁷ For an interesting discussion of the dialogue issue, see Y. Tandon, "South Africa and the OAU: The dialogue on the dialogue issue", *MAWAZO*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (December 1971), pp. 3-15.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴⁹ *East African Standard*, 3 December 1965.

if African saboteurs crossed the boundary. Britain hoped by this move to forestall any African initiative based in Zambia. Even after the withdrawal of British troops, there seemed to be little military action on the part of the Africans. There were a few guerrilla incursions.

Rhodesia is situated between Zambia on the north and South Africa on the south; it is bounded on the east by Mozambique and on the west by Botswana. The country most affected by the sanctions policy is landlocked Zambia, largely because of its geographical position, but also because of the trade patterns developed during the colonial era when the Zambian economy was largely dependent upon Rhodesian and South African business, the Rhodesian transport system from ports in Mozambique and South Africa, and Rhodesia's sources of coal, coke and electrical energy. The implementation of sanctions by Zambia against Rhodesia would involve not only a diversion of its trade from Rhodesia, but also rerouting its import-export traffic from the railways through Rhodesia.⁵⁰ In the circumstances she could not cope without economic help from outside. It was hoped, however, that Zambia would be able to find alternative routes. The combination of the railroad being built by the Chinese and the road linking Zambia and Tanzania, offering access to the sea through the port of Dar es Salaam, has made this dependence of secondary importance. If anything the closure of the border between Zambia and Rhodesia on 9 January 1973 would seem to have deprived the latter of an important source of revenue.

But, on the whole, sanctions have, in fact, failed, thanks to South Africa,⁵¹ Portugal, Japan⁵² and the United States among others which continue to trade with Rhodesia.⁵³ One would have expected the African States to have worked out a plan to help offset the worst effects of the sanctions policy on the Zambian economy. Nor did they put forward any concrete plans for military aid to the nationalists in Zambia. Zambia, being the most exposed, was very reluctant to go all the way with African plans.

THE OAU ATTACHMENT TO RESOLUTIONS

Given that Britain has failed to use force in Rhodesia, what prevents the African States from taking the only 'possible' step that can bring down the Rhodesian regime? And why do they insist upon passing resolution after resolution knowing that all they can achieve is 'ineffective sanctions'?⁵⁴ A close

⁵⁰ See Table 3.

⁵¹ See Dr. Verwoerd's address to the South African National Party meeting on 12 November 1965. (*Rhodesian Herald*, 13 November 1965).

⁵² At the 10th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU in Addis Ababa in February, Japan was severely criticized for what the Africans regarded as her contribution to the failure of sanctions against Rhodesia. See *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), 23 February 1968.

⁵³ The United States is interested in chrome from Rhodesia. See A. Eyinga, "Double Jeu en Rhodesie", *Africasia*, No. 8 (16 February to 1 March 1970), p. 17.

⁵⁴ Even after the declaration of Rhodesia as a republic on 2 March 1970, Britain was still satisfied with limiting international action to 'non-recognition' and continuing mandatory economic sanctions. See *International Herald Tribune*, 4 March 1970.

look at the African political scene as well as at its military capacity, will supply the answers.

The first reason is that they realize their military weakness. It is true that Africa, immediately after UDI, had a high proportion of military regimes, and that the number has increased ever since. It did not seem, however, that they could have matched the military might and efficiency of Rhodesia at that time.⁵⁵ Because Rhodesia is landlocked and can only be approached from Zambia (or by dropping troops) she can concentrate her forces on the Zambian front to resist the invasion and have enough air capacity to strike back. When Mozambique becomes independent there will be more access to Rhodesia.

Because of the divergence in the African approaches to the Rhodesian crisis one could not envisage a Pan-African army, and, even if some of the more radical States were prepared to send their forces to fight in Rhodesia, they probably would not be able to wage a sustained war. Be that as it may, it may be contended that if some African troops had struck soon after UDI they could have caused enough commotion in that country to invite British intervention. However, also to be taken into account is the possibility of active intervention from outside. In this connection, it is not clear to what extent South Africa is prepared to aid Rhodesia militarily.⁵⁶ On the other hand, the prevailing opinion in South Africa that the survival of Rhodesia is inseparable from the ultimate survival of South Africa might push her to give active military support to Rhodesia. But South Africa is not unaware of the fact:

that the crisis, now that it has been escalated into an international dispute, will inevitably embroil South Africa in a world wide trade war. This significant public expression of feeling which has been gaining ground in government circles also reflects the awareness of the basic rule in the conduct of Foreign Policy—self interest.⁵⁷

One may proffer two main reasons why the OAU has expended so much energy on passing resolutions at the several conferences, and raising the issue of Rhodesia at international forums (UN and Commonwealth Conferences). Firstly, Africa since 1963 has seen a lot of turbulent upheavals. There have been coups and counter coups. Because of the basic instability in many of the African countries, States had to adopt a Pan-African posture by professing adherence to the OAU. By this, it was hoped that they would direct attention away from their internal problems and in so doing be able to maintain themselves in power. Hence despite the divergences between practice and

⁵⁵ See Cervenka, *The Organization of African Unity and its Charter*, op. cit., p. 189. The total strength of the armed forces of the OAU is 480,000, but if Northern African States and Ethiopia are excluded the figure drops below 200,000. Rhodesia's military strength represents 3,400 regular soldiers, 900 regular airmen, 6,400 police and 28,500 reserve police. The Rhodesian Air Force comprises a squadron each of Hawker Jets, Vampire Fighters, Canberra bombers, and Provost helicopters. And the Rhodesian armed forces are highly efficient. These statistics are as of October 1968.

⁵⁶ South Africa has, in fact, been accused of helping Rhodesia to fight nationalist infiltrators. See *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), 23 February 1968.

⁵⁷ *The Star* (Johannesburg), 24 December 1966. See also B. Crinin, "Lébauche d'un révisionisme", *Jeune Afrique*, No. 707 (27 July 1975), pp. 28-29.

profession, African Governments loudly proclaimed their indignation over Rhodesia. Secondly, it may be maintained that the Pan-African posture of the OAU members and their readiness to adopt a position which was very critical of the British Government, provided an excuse for their inaction.⁵⁸ This tactic was well expressed by Kenya's former Vice-President Murumbi, at the close of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in 1966 when he said that although they had not achieved all that they had hoped for at the conference, the fact that the African, Asian and Caribbean delegates stood firm, enabled them to extract from Mr. Wilson some concessions and admissions.⁵⁹

It is also conceivable that the attitude of the African States which placed a premium on the sanctity of sovereignty may have weighed in the minds of African statesmen. Since they were so concerned with safeguarding and consolidating their sovereignty, they could not interfere in Rhodesian affairs which were in effect a matter within the sovereign authority of the United Kingdom.

One hoped that the Africans might change their 'tactics' in time. But the declaration of Rhodesia as a Republic on 2 March 1970 has brought yet another outburst and a call on Britain to bring the regime to an end by 'all possible means'.⁶⁰ In the Security Council debate Britain asked for the discussion to be limited to 'non-recognition and sanctions'. The USA has also voted against the use of force. What we saw was a series of 'closures' of missions which should not have been there in the first place. Rhodesia still rides the storm and will continue to do so unless Africa acts.

CONCLUSION

What has the OAU achieved? Given the limitations, the OAU is ill equipped to cope with a conventional warfare with Rhodesia; Africa is economically vulnerable and cannot on its own give Zambia the economic support she needs to offset the worst effects of sanctions. She has had to fight against South Africa, Portugal, Britain and some other countries both with respect to the use of force and the extent of economic sanctions. While some OAU members, notably Algeria, Egypt and Nigeria have acquired highly efficient armies as a result of their war experiences, it would seem that the OAU should direct its efforts in assisting the liberation movements to wage effective guerrilla warfare rather than attempting a direct intervention. One could certainly take an example from the experience gained in the liberation wars against the Portuguese fascist regime. The liberation movements were able to defeat the 'superior' Portuguese army backed as it was by her NATO allies. The prospects of independence for Mozambique in the near future would certainly justify this approach. The reconciliation of ZANU and ZAPU and their mer-

58 See Gupta, "The Rhodesian Crisis and The Organization of African Unity", op. cit., p. 63.

59 *Africa Diary*, Vol. 6, No. 42 (10-16 October 1966), p. 3082. With prospects of independence for Mozambique, South Africa might be prepared to sacrifice Rhodesia in return for better relations with Africa. See also Gupta, op. cit., p. 63.

60 There have already been calls in certain British quarters to recognize Rhodesia, for example, in *The Spectator*, 7 March 1970.

ger under the ANC would help a co-ordinated and effective use of the OAU resources.

It must be emphasized, however, that the unity of the different forces must go beyond a mere political unity. There must be a sustained commitment to military struggle should the rebel regime fail to comply with the demand for African majority rule before independence. In this respect it must be pointed out that the apparent willingness of the Rhodesian rebel regime to discuss how to bring an end to the Rhodesian crisis and South Africa's efforts to persuade her to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian problems should not be allowed to dampen the revolutionary zeal of the liberation movements. The genuineness of Ian Smith has yet to be proven, and the fact that South Africa has failed to withdraw her forces from Rhodesia gives rise to doubts as to how serious she is that there should be a settlement. South Africa should be reminded that detente with independent African States is not enough. There should also be some detente between the apartheid regime and the African majority in that country.

Zambia, which could have offered an ideal hopping-off ground for an armed incursion into Rhodesia, at least immediately after UDI, has been unwilling to expose herself without proper guarantees. The fact that Zambia has, since the closure of the border in 1973 and the opening of new transit routes to the coast, greatly minimized her dependence on Rhodesia, means that she can now take a stronger stand against Rhodesia. It is probable, however, that in spite of this change of circumstance Zambia would still prefer that the Rhodesian crisis be peacefully resolved since she would be an obvious target in the event of a large-scale armed conflict in Southern Africa.

The African States may be economically vulnerable but the increase in volume of Western investments in Africa north of the Zambezi could be used as a leverage against those countries which have continued to give economic support to South Africa and Rhodesia. This requires a Pan-African posture to be effective. But given the penetration of foreign interests in Africa and the consequent dependence of African States, a united African posture in this respect is not likely to be achieved.

African States immediately after UDI had little experience in 'diplomacy', hence their ineffective and sometimes contradictory resolutions. This explains their hasty action in deciding to break off diplomatic relations if Britain did not bring an end to the Rhodesian regime within 'a few weeks'. They have, however, gained considerable experience over the years in dealing with both intra-African and international problems. They should be able, given a proper perception of African interests, to use diplomatic pressure to ensure that Rhodesia does not become independent before majority rule is established.

The OAU has, despite its shortcomings, built, for what it is worth, a consensus of opinion in Africa, namely the need to bring to an end the present Rhodesian regime. Outside Africa, she has succeeded in persuading Britain and the world community, with some exceptions, to impose economic sanctions on Rhodesia. No country has yet recognized Rhodesia. But in order to achieve the latter objectives she has had to resort to the UN machinery.

For the future, the OAU must concentrate on giving material and military assistance to the liberation movements who must be prepared to resort to arms if the present efforts to arrive at a peaceful settlement fail. It must also ensure the consolidation of the independence of Mozambique and Angola, because failure to achieve effective Governments in these territories will greatly hamper the liberation efforts in Zimbabwe.

Table 1. DIVISION OF LAND UNDER 1930 LAND APPORTIONMENT

	<i>Acres Approx.</i>
European Area	49,060,000
Native Reserves	21,600,000
Native (Purchase) Area	7,460,000
Forest Area	590,000
Undetermined Area	90,000
Unassigned Area (i.e. unassigned to any race or other category)	17,800,000
Total	96,600,000

Source: J. Barber, "Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion," (London: Oxford University Press 1967), p. 7.

Table 2. FRANCHISE UNDER THE 1961 CONSTITUTION

	<i>A Roll</i>	<i>B Roll</i>
Africans	2,263	10,466
Europeans	89,278	608
Asians	1,231	114
Coloureds	1,308	176
Total	94,080	11,364

Figures quoted in *Southern Rhodesia—Background to Crisis*, by Jane Symonds (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956).

Table 3. IMPORTS FROM RHODESIA

	<i>1965 (millions)</i>	<i>1968 (millions)</i>
Zambia	\$99,507	\$15,544 (first six months)
EXPORTS TO RHODESIA		
Zambia	\$15,317	\$0.736 (first six months)

Source: UN. Doc. S/9252/Add. 1, 13 June 1969.

Nyerere on the Transition to Socialism in Tanzania

CRANFORD PRATT*

INTRODUCTION

This paper has a limited and specific purpose which is to examine the views of President Julius Nyerere on how Tanzania can most effectively achieve a transition to a socialist society.¹ No attempt is made to study the actual socialist policies of the Tanzanian Government nor the other influences which have determined these policies. The focus will be single-mindedly upon Nyerere's ideas on Tanzania's transition to socialism. The purpose, moreover, is to understand these ideas in their own terms rather than to assess the extent to which they are compatible with other socialist theories of the transition to socialism or to develop those elements within Nyerere's thought which can be made to serve differently conceived socialist strategies.

Nyerere's socialist strategy has not been the only influence shaping Tanzanian policies nor has it alone determined Nyerere's own policy initiatives. Nevertheless, Nyerere's ideas on the transition to socialism were enormously influential in 1967 when the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) reaffirmed its commitment to socialism, and they have continued since then to be a major influence. Moreover, Nyerere has sought a solution to the vexing question of how a society in which there are but very few socialists and no profound class consciousness within either the peasantry or the urban working class can nevertheless be led towards a socialist reconstruction of its institutions. These considerations, in addition to the intrinsic interest which attaches to the political thought of one of Africa's most reflective political leaders, justify I hope, the particular focus of this paper.

Nyerere's strategy for the transition to socialism was a product of the interaction of two sets of ideas: the first his particular vision of a socialist society and the second his perception of the economic, political and administrative constraints within which TANU had inevitably to operate. Socialism, Nyerere said in 1962 and repeated in 1967, is an attitude of mind.² Writing in summary of his socialist faith in 1968, he said "one will not recognize or

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¹ A somewhat extended version of the argument of this paper constitutes the final chapter of my forthcoming, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1965: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy in Tanzania*, which is being published this year by Cambridge University Press.

² See his *Ujamaa, The Basis of African Socialism* (1962) reprinted in his *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), and the text of his address in April 1967 at the University of Cairo, reprinted in his *Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968).