

Some workers have developed their present attitudes toward work not because they are inherently against their supervisors; nor is it true that they find pleasure in lying about idly in the offices. The reason is that the managerial-administrative personnel are not in a position to acquire supervisory styles other than the old ones. Because they have been deprived of their sanctioning powers, they too have abdicated their principal role of leadership.

It is clear that in order for us to develop socialist management patterns devoid of commandeerism and bureaucratism, the workers themselves should be aware of their roles and responsibilities and should have a respect for duty. Yet it cannot be hoped that a new outlook and a new commitment will evolve on their own. These have to be imparted. In most socialist countries this is a result of politicization as well as workers' education. In Tanzania, however, Mwongozo was not followed by a clear programme of politicizing the workers in the necessary attitudes. Moreover, given the present strength of the Party's financial and personnel resources and given its work load in other areas, it is clear that the Party could embark on such an undertaking only to a very limited extent.

Because of these limitations, it remains the responsibility of the managerial-administrative leadership, which has been entrusted with the responsibility of running socialist organs of development, to take practical measures of politicizing and educating the workers under their jurisdiction. One could here cite the case of the Urafiki Textile Mill, which has worked extensively in this regard. I believe it is the only one.

Yet, calling on the public service administrative-managerial cadres to champion workers' education and politicization is to beg another question: how qualified and prepared are they to undertake such measures? From one point of view it can be assumed that since most of these men are political appointees, they do understand our ideals and appreciate socialism as a developing strategy, including its emphasis on equality, human dignity and workers' emancipation. From another point of view, however, arising from the short post-Mwongozo experience, the commitment to socialist management styles of a good proportion of the high-ranking public officials is doubtful.

Yet, something must be done, for we cannot hope to rectify the present situation by sitting on the edge and looking on while the problems accumulate; nor can we afford to put up with the present inefficiency if we have to march forward, and march forward we must. The challenge, therefore, calls for immediate attention.

The Effect of Changes in the Tanzanian Public Service System upon Administrative Productivity, 1961-72

GELASE MUTAHABA*

In this paper we shall examine developments in the Tanzanian public service system since 1961 and assess their contribution to overall national development. We should, however, from the outset fix the boundaries of our discussion. First, what do we include under the term, "the Tanzanian public service"? For the purposes of this paper, we shall exclude all personnel who work in publicly owned institutions. We are, therefore, including only the civil servants in the traditional sense, not the many people who presently work in parastatal organizations. Secondly, we are not including Zanzibar; our references are only to the mainland.

In the following discussion we shall first review the characteristic features of the civil service at the time of Independence. We shall then attempt to catalogue some of the more critical changes which have taken place over the past ten years, and finally we shall comment on the contributions those changes have made to national development generally, and to the performance of the civil service in particular.

As in many other former British colonies in Africa, the Tanzanian civil service structure established in the early days of the colonial administration was founded on racial lines. The terms of service for Europeans were different and better than the terms of service for Asians, and the terms of service of the Asians were different and better than the terms of service for Africans. By 1961, however, the system of service based on race had been eliminated as a result of the Lidbury Commission's (1954) recommendation, which stated that grading and salary scales should be based upon responsibility rather than on race. The Lidbury Commission's report had not been a sudden development either, for in 1947 the Holmes Commission had rejected the principle of three separate terms of service, though not the idea of differential salary scales for the three racial groups.

At the time of Independence, the structure of the Tanganyikan public service was based on the Lidbury Commission's recommendations. Having rejected a racial basis for the terms of service, the Commission divided the service into field grades. These were: the Super Scale, the Professional and Administrative grade, the Technical and Executive, the Clerical, and finally the Subordinate Service grade. One feature of this service structure, as

*Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam.

Table I shows, was that the great majority (89%) of the positions were concentrated in the Clerical and Subordinate Service grades. In addition,

Table 1. ESTABLISHED POSTS IN 1961/62 BY GRADES

| | | |
|---------------------------------|--------|-------|
| Subordinate Service | 12,087 | 32.4% |
| Clerical and Analogous | 21,229 | 56.9 |
| Executive and Technical | 2,288 | 6.1 |
| Administrative and Professional | 1,320 | 3.6 |
| Super Scale | 349 | 1.0 |

Source: Adebayo Adedeji, "The Tanzania Civil Service a Decade after Independence," (Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, 1971), p. 3.

the structure did not allow for progressive penetration upwards through the grades. Finally, the incomes in the Super Scale grades were more than 30 times those of the Subordinate Service grades.

A second feature of the public service structure was that despite the abolition of racially based service categories, most of the established Super Scale, Administrative and Professional positions were filled by Europeans, while most of the established posts in the Executive and Technical grades were occupied by Asians (see Table 2). Because of the limited educational

Table 2. THE POSITION OF AFRICANS, ASIANS AND EUROPEANS IN HIGHER MIDDLE LEVEL ESTABLISHED POSTS, 1960

| | Super Scale | Admin./ Prof. | Exec. | Tech. | Secret. | Train. |
|-----------|----------------|------------------|-------|-------|---------|--------|
| Africans | — | 200 | 148 | 84 | 1 | 116 |
| Asians | 2 | 577 | 211 | 472 | 9 | 6 |
| Europeans | 271 | 402 | 373 | 486 | 79 | — |

Source: Adebayo Adedeji, "The Tanzania Civil Service a Decade after Independence," op. cit., p. 5.

opportunities open to Africans, there were few Africans with the requisite qualifications to fill these administrative and professional positions. In the case of the Executive and Technical grades, the African could not beat the self-interest of the Asian, even when he did have the qualifications.

A third feature of the public service structure was the integration of political and administrative roles. Civil service appointments were based on administrative and not political criteria. All personnel on the public payroll were civil servants and conflicts which might arise from a political/administrative dichotomy were therefore absent.

Finally, recruitment into the public service tended to be strictly on a merit basis and there was little waste of human resources. This was because the establishment officers were either European or Asian, and they had no

political or social commitment to provide jobs to the Africans, who were employed only when needed.¹

What major changes have been made in the public service over the past decade? First, not too long after the attainment of independence (indeed during the period of Responsible Government) the Tanzanian Government appointed a commission under the chairmanship of A. L. Adu, a Ghanaian senior civil servant, to review the structure of the civil service, including such issues as remuneration, terms of service and the general structure of the service. In its report, the Commission recommended the transformation of the colonial pattern of the civil service into an indigenous structure. This change was necessary to reflect the independent status soon to be attained and to allow for rapid Africanization.² It was suggested that four classes of generalists be established, viz., the sub-clerical, the clerical, the executive and the administrative, and that corresponding classes be created in the technical, professional and industrial sections of the civil service. Aside from the establishment of these classes, the Commission also recommended that there be "uninterrupted penetration between the classes, subject to the attainment of certain standards".

Table 3. PROGRESS IN AFRICANIZATION OF SENIOR AND MIDDLE GRADE POSTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE

| Period Ending December of | Citizens | Others | Total | Percentage Citizens |
|------------------------------|----------|--------|-------|------------------------|
| 1961 | 1170 | 3282 | 4452 | 26.1 |
| 1962 | 1821 | 2902 | 4723 | 38.5 |
| 1963 | 2469 | 2580 | 5049 | 48.9 |
| 1964 | 3083 | 2306 | 5389 | 57.2 |
| 1965 | 3951 | 2011 | 5962 | 66.3 |
| 1966 | 4364 | 1898 | 6262 | 69.7 |
| 1967 | 4937 | 1817 | 6754 | 73.1 |
| 1968 | 6208 | 1619 | 7827 | 79.3 |
| 1969 | 6123 | 1351 | 7474 | 81.9 |
| 1970 | 8043 | 1377 | 9419 | 85.6 |
| 1971 | 9708 | 1015 | 10723 | 90.5 |
| 1972 | 11988 | 745 | 12733 | 94.1 |

Source: Tanzania, Central Establishment Circular No. 2, 1973.

The Adu Commission also recommended that strong measures be taken to Africanize the civil service. This recommendation was followed up immediately by government action. In a speech to the Legislative Council,

¹ This is true in spite of the report by the Adu Commission which observed that the size of the civil service (especially the higher grades) was too big for the Tanzanian economy. There were compelling reasons for the big size of the civil service: the large size of the country, the pattern of communications and the uneven distribution of the population all demanded a bigger bureaucracy for penetration than might have been needed in a place like Kenya.

² Report of the Tanganyika Salaries Commission (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1961), Vol. I, p. 27.

Mwalimu Nyerere, then Chief Minister, outlined the main lines of the strategy to be followed to achieve the goal of Africanization. It became effective immediately that (1) every vacancy arising in the civil service should be filled by an appointment made locally, (2) African candidates should have prior claim to consideration for new appointments; and (3) other candidates should be considered only when no suitably qualified Tanganyikan was available. As we show in Table 3, progress was slow but encouraging.

The table shows that great strides were made over the ten-year period. In 1961 there were only 1170 citizens out of a total of 4452 in the established senior and middle level posts. This was only 26.1% of the total. By December 1972 there were 11,988 citizens occupying senior and middle level posts, which was 94.1% of the total.

The rapid expansion of the civil service was not confined to the senior and middle level classes; it was a phenomenon for the entire service. The public service as a whole more than doubled in size, as Table 4 shows.

Table 4. ESTABLISHED POSTS IN THE TANZANIAN CIVIL SERVICE, 1960-71

| | Total Established Posts | Annual Rate of Growth | Cumulative Annual Increases (1960/61=100) |
|---------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| 1960/61 | 34,603 | — | 100 |
| 1961/62 | 37,273 | 8.0 | 108 |
| 1962/63 | 39,589 | 6.0 | 114 |
| 1963/64 | 39,703 | 0.3 | 115 |
| 1964/65 | 40,994 | 3.2 | 118 |
| 1965/66 | 43,536 | 6.3 | 124 |
| 1966/67 | 48,894 | 12.3 | 133 |
| 1967/68 | 51,538 | 5.4 | 149 |
| 1968/69 | 52,789 | 2.4 | 152 |
| 1969/70 | 54,793 | 4.0 | 160 |
| 1970/71 | 75,626 | 38.0 | 218 |

Sources: *Report of the Tanganyika Salaries Commission* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1961), Vol. I; and *Central Establishment Circular No. 2*, 1973.

From 34,603 employees in 1960/61 it expanded to 76,480 in 1971/72, rising at an average annual rate of 11% during the period. Undoubtedly, the civil service must have absorbed an equally increasing share of government expenditure.

Another important development was the evolution of the political-administrative dichotomy within the public service following the appointment of political ministers and political district and regional bosses. The tight separation of politics from administration was, however, to be short-lived, for in 1964 civil servants were allowed to become members of TANU; and in fact in 1972, legislation was passed to allow them to contest elections without prejudice to their civil service status. From a completely apolitical

civil service, the pendulum had swung to the point at which there was no longer a demarcation between politics and administration.

Finally, there was another important development in the progressive reduction of class differences in the compensation given for services in the civil service. Since 1961, for example, most salary reviews within the civil service have tended to increase the remunerations given to the lower classes without affecting those at the top. Indeed in 1967, salaries of most senior civil servants were reduced by up to 15% following the 1966 student demonstration. Moreover, there has been a considerable reduction in the fringe benefits which are enjoyed by the senior and middle level cadres. There are now no more car loans, house rents have gone up considerably, and taxes have been progressively rising. The net effect of all these developments has, of course, been to reduce the real incomes of persons within these civil service classes. We shall now review the effect these developments have had upon the performance of the civil service.

Have these developments contributed to effective performance in the public service system? The Adu Commission in 1961 recommended the abandonment of the (Lidbury Commission) structure in favour of the new model on the grounds that "it is such a structure that is best able to assist in staff development and also to fit the requirements of independent Tanganyika." The Commission, moreover, had also argued that

such a system creates a ladder by which a suitably qualified civil servant can climb from the bottom of the scale to the top. The system provides a link with the educational system so that the Government can recruit personnel into the service at the various levels at which people emerge from the educational system. Furthermore, it also provides for those who fail to pass the necessary class to class promotion tests to advance to higher grades in their own class...³

Did the adoption of the Adu structure result in progress? Adedeji has argued that the system still falls short of allowing unimpeded mobility as evidenced by the fact that "apart from the period 1961-64, when the urge to Africanize was great, few people have moved between the classes. In fact since 1960 almost nobody has moved from the Executive to the Administrative and Professional classes through inservice training."⁴ To achieve the capacity for maximum upward penetration through the classes, facilities for inservice training ought to be increased far beyond what is presently available.

What about the Africanization exercise? It has been argued that the Africanization of the civil service led to lower productivity, or as Dryden puts it, to "a lowering of standards."⁵ This argument proceeds on the following lines: the Africans had fewer educational opportunities than the Europeans or Asians, and consequently there were few Africans with educational qualifications comparable to those of the Europeans and Asians. Africanizing

³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴ Abedayo Adedeji "The Tanzania Civil Service a Decade after Independence," (Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, 1971), p. 5.

⁵ S. Dryden, *Local Administration in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 120.

the civil service had to be undertaken with what was available—the African personnel who had less education than the vacating Europeans and Asians. There is no dispute about that fact: in 1968 only 20% of the officers occupying Administrative officers' positions had a university education, despite the fact that the scheme of service for that grade provided that an administrative officer should preferably possess a recognized degree.

There is no dispute either about the fact that there is presently an increase in irresponsibility and inefficiency within the civil service. Is this necessarily due, however, to the filling of such positions with poorly trained Africans, or are there other explanations? We would suggest that there are other explanations. Most of the jobs performed by administrative officers are repetitive and need practice rather than a high level of education. Such jobs can be performed by a non-graduate as effectively as by a graduate.

In fact, we can argue that non-graduates are actually better suited to administer and promote development since there is less of a socio-cultural gap between them and the Tanzanian general public. Since most of these people perform jobs which need constant contact with the public, such people are in a better position and should be more effective than graduates.

A more valid explanation for the reduced level of administrative productivity, in my view, may well be the misallocation or misplacement of manpower.

One other change is the great increase in the number of public service personnel. Why has the service undergone such a rapid expansion and what have been the payoffs, if any? Is the increase an indication of a rapid expansion of government activities, is it a fulfilment of Parkinson's Law of the multiplication of work and staff, or is it a manifestation of other sets of variables?

It is true that the scope of governmental activities has increased greatly since Independence, partly to meet the need for improved public services and partly because of the government's increased involvement in areas which were previously left to the private sector. Between 1964 and 1969 the share of the public sector in the G.D.P. rose from £2.5 million to over £10 million. To some extent, therefore, part of the numerical increase in civil servants must have been caused by the expansion of the public sector.

But this explanation is insufficient, since the figures of personnel we have presented relate only to the public service in the traditional sense of the term, i.e. the civil service. The 75,000 people employed by the public service does not include workers in parastatals. We have to look elsewhere, therefore, for an explanation.

Is the phenomenon explainable by Parkinson's Law and therefore a manifestation of the bureaucratic tendency to multiply unless kept under control? This might be a partial reason, since the expansion has many times been through the device of making so-called temporary appointments. But then have the Treasury and the Central Establishment not tried to keep this trend under control? Adedeji suggests that civil service expansion was a political necessity in order to keep men gainfully employed. This is not

a very convincing argument—the Manpower Planning Unit in Tanzania has been one of the most effective in Africa, and to that extent the politicians are not to blame.

The explanation lies in the fact that the people who are supposed to take charge of restricting unlicensed employment are the major culprits. They have relatives—cousins, brothers and sisters—looking for jobs. They cannot support them for too long on the incomes they are left with after taxes, so they do what seems the most logical thing to do: have them placed in a job either in their institution or in the institutions of their friends. This development looks strange, but it is very rational and logical. It was not previously done in the colonial civil service because Africans had no opportunities to do so, and the Europeans had no obligation to help the unemployed African.

This argument takes us to the other development: the tireless efforts by the government to reduce the gap in real incomes between the senior civil servants and the lower cadres. Despite the obvious benefits of this exercise, the measures have in my view been the major cause behind the negligence, poor attitude and low productivity of the senior civil servant. The removal of car loans, for example, has meant an increased use of government cars by senior civil servants for private businesses. People are saying, for example, that since the rise in the price of petrol, most government senior civil servants have also increased their reliance on government transport. These days few senior civil servants spend extra time—time beyond the call of duty—in their offices. Unless, therefore, measures are taken which deal with such problems, we shall always pay a higher price for every hour put in by a civil servant. The answer does not necessarily lie in increasing the benefits; greater political education might solve the problem. The fault lies in doing nothing about it.

Finally, given the fact that civil servants can stand for election and that we have little demarcation between policies and administration, are the political roles within the government relevant? Can they not effectively be replaced by TANU roles? Cannot the role being played by ministers be played by the principal secretaries? With respect to the regional and district levels, should not the commissioners be dispensed with? The regional and district directors could provide administrative leadership, while the elected TANU functionaries could provide the political leadership. The elimination of many of the redundant positions would save the country a considerable amount of money which it needs badly for development.

Our discussion has focused only upon personnel and staff matters, but this should in no way make us oblivious to the fact that the noted poor performance by the public service is due to other factors as well. Structural and environmental factors also affect the level of performance by the public service, but we do not have time to raise such issues here.