the National Assembly in July 1973 that the strikes and demonstrations were to a large extent due to the failure of the managements to put the Presidential Directive into practice, hence demonstrating very sharply the contradictions that existed in Tanzanian society between the old methods of colonial bureaucracy and the socialist methods of work which were required.

Public Policy-Making and Public Enterprises in Tanzania

GORAN HYDEN*

This article is devoted to the general style of public policy-making in Tanzania.[1] The underlying assumption to the argument put forward below is that in a socialist economy the management of public enterprises cannot be viewed in isolation from the policy-making process within the government bureaucracy and the ruling party, in this case TANU. Thus, in relation to the management of public enterprises, the style of public policy-making takes on the role of an independent variable, directly affecting the management of these enterprises.

It is generally assumed by policy-makers and social scientists alike that development can be attained in developing countries only through some kind of planning. Planning is presented as *the* mode of policy-making. This assumption is well documented in the existing literature on development problems in Africa. Yet, as much of this literature reveals, policy-making practice is far from existing prescriptive models. While this disparity is recognized in a general way, few people seem prepared to draw the inferences that (a) policies can be made in fashions other than planned; and (b) such other modes of policy-making may have benefits that supersede those of planning, particularly given the conditions in poor Third World countries.

Here we shall examine the peculiar type of policy-making that has developed in Tanzania. Emphasizing the need to do things here and now we have labelled it the "we-must-run-while-others-walk" style of policy- making, using one of President Nyerere's many phrases about the dilemmas facing his country in the development race. The style of public policy-making in Tanzania is seen as the product of her ambition; caught in a desperate position on the periphery of the world capitalist system, she wants to break away from that system and take a "short-cut" to a more advanced stage of development. Elements of this policy-making style may be particularly prominent in Tanzania, but no doubt exist also in other Third World countries.

The paper is divided into three parts: first, a review of the planning literature with specific reference to the African experience; then a presentation and analysis of policy-making in Tanzania; and finally, a discussion of the factors which are important for an understanding of policy-making problems under conditions like those in Tanzania.

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Policy-making and Planning in Africa: A Review

Planning is inherently attractive to decision-makers and academics alike because it tackles more explicitly than other modes of policy-making both its temporal and its spatial dimensions. Nobody would deny the value of its long-term perspective and comprehensive scope. It is not a coincidence that there exists virtually no literature on "policy-making" in African countries;[2] all books and articles focus on planning. A few of those who have written generally about public policy-making have discussed the African situation, but only peripherally.[3]

Literature on policy-making and planning usually distinguishes between policy (plan) formulation and policy (plan) execution. Not every writer, however, directs attention to both. Thus there are some who deal primarily with the process of formulating policies; their concern is how to arrive at technically and economically optimal policies and the problems involved in this process. Others pay primary attention to the question of improving policy execution by prescribing or analysing the relevance of various management techniques. In the literature dealing with Africa one can distinguish, with reference both to policy formulation and policy execution, one normative and one empirical orientation, i.e., one dealing with how it ought to be, the other with how it actually is. One can also identify a shift in recent years from concern with policy formulation to policy execution.

There is a third school of thought, however, which tries to integrate the normative and empirical aspects of policy-making, treating policy-making primarily as a behavioural phenomenon. We shall now briefly review these intellectual orientations.

Focus on Policy Formulation

Tinbergen's writing on central, comprehensive planning may serve as a useful starting point for a discussion of models aimed at improving policy formulation, because his ideas had considerable influence on planners in Africa in the 1960s.[4] He starts from the assumption that there is a sovereign political body, which specifies the social and economic objectives of development. Subordinated to this body is a group of planners, who are directly responsible for the formulation of the plan, a process that Tinbergen divides into seven distinct phases:

2 We exclude here the case study approach, which is used to train policy-makers. For the relevance, however, of this approach to the academic discussion about policy-making, see Murray, *The Work of Administration in Nigeria* (London: Hutchinson, 1969). See also A. Adedeji and G. Hyden, eds., *Developing Research on African Administration: Some Key Methodological Issues* (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1975).

3 Y. Dror, *Public Policy-Making Re-examined* (Scranton, Penn: Chandler Publishing House, 1969); R. S. Milne, "Decision-Making in Developing Countries," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, III, 3 (February, 1972); V. Subramaniam, "Dror on Policy-Making," *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, XVI, 1 (1970).

4 J. Tinbergen, *Central Planning* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

1. a general overview of the economy;
2. a preliminary choice of the optimum growth rate, including expected rate of savings;
3. an estimation of the expansion of demand derived from the exepected growth rate;
4. a selection of projects and programmes necessary to satisfy these demands;
5. a survey of manpower and thus educational requirements;
6. revisions of the first five steps in view of incoming data;
7. specification of tasks of the public and private sectors and the means to perform them (public investments, taxes, subsidies, foreign aid, etc.).

This type of planning is often referred to as the "synoptic" mode of problem-solving, and it assumes that planners are economists who can work out necessary comprehensive and aggregate analyses to meet the demand for optimal solutions. It would be wrong to imply that all planners agree with this particular model of planning, but it is a fact that many Western professional economists who went to Africa as planners in the 1960s brought along with them this synoptical ideal in their briefcases. The first post-independence development plans in the three East African countries, for instance, bore many of these features. Tinbergen's ideas were also echoed in one publication on development planning in East Africa.[5] To all these people such planning is a series of definite steps, calculated in a comprehensive and long-term perspective.

The critique directed against this model by practising planners and academics who have analysed planning in African countries ranges from concern about how to incorporate the model with the prevailing patterns of policy-making to the adverse impact of environmental uncertainty. Waterston's critique of the synoptic approach.[6] Killick argues that the model of politics adopted by proponents of comprehensive development planning is in almost all respects in conflict with the actual way policies are made in developing countries.[7] With reference to Tanzania, for instance, both Bienen and Leys view the relative failure of the first Five-Year Plan as caused by the absence of strong political structures in which the planning process could be embedded.[8] Thus, the Plan lacked any concrete political aims. Its three main objectives (to raise per capita income from £19.6 to £45; to be fully self-sufficient in trained manpower; and to raise life expectation from 35-40

5 P. G. Clark, *Development Planning in East Africa* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1965).

6 A. Waterston, *Development Planning: Lessons of Experience* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965).

7 T. Killick, "The Possibilities of Development Planning" (Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, Working paper No. 165, 1974).

8 H. Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); C. T. Leys, ed., *Politics and Change in Developing Countries* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

to 50 years, all by 1980) were determined by the economic models used by the planners. Thus, as Leys says, "In an important sense the 1964-69 plan had no goals; everything it contained was presented as an "implication" of the perspective objectives accepted for 1980; and even these were more categorical than specific."[9]

The situation was not different in Kenya, where the first Development Plan (1964-69) was rushed into existence and later had to be revised for 1966-70. Like the first Tanzanian Plan, it lacked a political profile. To judge from the information provided by Gray in a review of Clark's book, however, Kenyan planners wasted little time on deriving development activities from comprehensive, quantitative analyses of growth targets.[10] Instead they constructed the plan "from bottom up", meaning that it was built on micro-data in respect of the public sector and relevant parts of the private sector. The pragmatic planners found the comprehensive model of planning impractical. Both the Kenyan and the Tanzanian experiences, therefore, show how difficult it was to adopt a sophisticated planning model in a political and administrative infrastructure very different from those of the West. These first experiences also indicated the limitations of the view that planning is primarily an exercise for economists.

Some lessons had been learnt during the 1960s and when Tanzania and Kenya embarked upon preparing their second development plans, the conditions differed in some important respects. In Tanzania, for instance, much greater care was taken to ensure that the plan reflected the political aspirations of TANU. Contrary to expectations, this goal was achieved less through wide participation by political representatives than through the existence of an authoritative political document—the Arusha Declaration—which provided guidance to the planners.[11] This time in a much more direct sense the planners received specific guidance from State House.

The second Development Plan in Kenya (1970-74) differed from its Tanzanian counterpart in that it made no attempt to picture the future Kenyan society that would result from the Plan. The document itself stated quite frankly that political guidance had been very general and the approach adopted, therefore, eclectic. No attempt was made at the kind of "perspective" planning found in the first Tanzanian Plan. It was "down-to-earth", and much effort was put on identifying projects, some of which were assigned already in the Plan document to specific public institutions. As Colin Leys has stated, the Plan was essentially a civil servants' plan.[12] It was presumably not aimed at preventing major policy choices from being made through the "normal" political process. Thus, Holmquist is right when he criticizes the conception of planning which sees the acceptance of the plan as the "big"

9 C. T. Leys, ed., *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, op. cit., p. 267.
10 C. S. Gray, "Development Planning in East Africa: A Review Article," *East African Economic Review*, II, 2 (1966).
11 G. Hyden, "Tanzania's Second Five-Year Development Plan," *East Africa Journal* (October 1969).
12 C. T. Leys, "Kenya's Second Development Plan: Political and Administrative Aspects," *East Africa Journal* (March 1970).

decision which in turn determines the policy outcome.[13] As he states, this conception ignores the fact that fundamental policy decisions are often made during implementation.

While some of the original shortcomings with macro-planning may have been overcome, there is another type of criticism against such planning which still claims validity. Such criticism focuses on the general uncertainty that surrounds planning in developing countries. Long-range commitments of resources become meaningless, and often a burden, if taken seriously, because they reduce adaptability in an undeciphered future. The uncertainties we are referring to are known by planners and policy-makers, but are rarely analysed and usually are treated as "given" or not included at all. This applies to unavoidable natural disasters like drought and flooding, dependence on economic relationships with industrialized countries, fluctuating primary commodity prices, "imported" inflations, monetary instability, etc. All these factors have a bearing on the planning process. Foreign exchange shortages call for capital import restrictions, capital goods prices rise over budgeted levels, crop failures and famine lead to diversion of investment funds into consumption, etc.

The degree of unpredictability and uncertainty surrounding policy-making or planning in most African countries is such that in the mid-1960s one observer, with reference to Nigeria, talked about planning's being conducted "without facts" and under "comprehensive uncertainty".[14] Not every planner and observer would necessarily agree with these rather categorical statements, yet Gray, himself a practising planner, warns that most projects require "detailed feasibility studies lasting up to a decade before anyone can predict within a 50 per cent margin of error whether the cost-benefit ratio will be positive or negative."[15] In view of this uncertainty, some writers like Stigler and Dror insist that data-gathering must not proceed beyond the point where marginal cost is equated with marginal benefits.[16] In each case policy-makers will have to identify a level of "optimal ignorance", a way of resorting to what Simon calls a "satisficing" as opposed to an "optimizing" choice.[17]

Focus on Policy Execution

It would be wrong to create an impression that writers on policy-making or planning make a clear distinction between formulation and execution of policies. Much of what they say applies to both these activities. Yet, in view of the shifting emphasis in the literature, it may be valid to make

13 F. Holmquist, "Implementing Rural Development Projects," in Hyden, Jackson, Okumu, eds., *Development Administration: the Kenyan Experience* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970).
14 W. F. Stolper, *Planning Without Facts* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).
15 C. S. Gray, "Development Planning in East Africa: A Review Article," op. cit., p. 6.
16 G. J. Stigler, "The Economics of Information," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXIX, 3 (1961); Y. Dror, *Public Policy-Making Re-examined*, op. cit.
17 H. A. Simon, *Administrative Behaviour* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957).

such a distinction here, for there is no doubt that in the last five years implentation has been identified as a particularly serious bottleneck. This problem has given rise to an explicit concern with the introduction of more appropriate management techniques. As in the case of macro-planning, ideas borrowed from the frontiers of management science in Western countries have been transferred for implementation in Africa. One of the original sources of rethinking was the symposium on the "crisis in planning" held at the University of Sussex in 1969. At the symposium a team of international planning experts agreed on the need to find more appropriate means of implementing plans and policies in developing countries.[18] Similar ideas were expressed in a separate paper by Helleiner with specific reference to Africa: planning in the 1970s must go beyond growth rates and plan volumes and deal more directly with problems of project implementation.[19]

Other forces contributing to the rethinking have been foreign aid agencies and management consultancy firms. Esman and Montgomery, both closely involved in the administration of U.S. technical assistance, have advocated a "systems approach" to plan execution in view of its "overall detailed identification of interrelated factors in a complex system of action; precise time phasing of related activities and control of operations through the use of modern high speed communication and deporting instruments".[20] The Ndegwa Commission in Kenya, relying on the services of an American management consultancy firm, recommended the adoption of Management by Objectives (MBO) and Organizational Development (OD) techniques in the public service.[21] With specific reference to field administration, it proposed a systems management approach to programme implementation. The Kenya Government has endorsed these views in a White Paper.[22] In Tanzania, the McKinsey consultants, on behalf of the government, have introduced a system of programmed implementation procedures aimed at achieving better control of policy execution under the new system of decentralized administration.

Another proposal of recent years is the integrated development programme. Partly influenced by the experience of India's Intensive Agricultural District Programmes,[23] this kind of area-based programme has come to East Africa in different forms. In Kenya, it has been called the "Special Rural Development Programme". Belshaw and Chambers have developed a systems framework for the management of these programmes, stressing the need

18 M. Faber and D. Seers, eds., *The Crisis in Planning* (Brighton: Sussex University Press, 1972).
19 G. K. Helleiner, "Beyond Growth Rates and Plan Volumes Planning in Africa in the 1970s," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, X, 3 (1972).
20 M. J. Esman and J. D. Montgomery, "Systems Approaches to Technical Cooperation: The Role of Development Administration," *Public Administration Review*, XXIX, 5 (1969), p. 518.
21 Republic of Kenya, *Report on the Commission of Inquiry: Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission* (Ndegwa Commission) (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971).
22 Kenya Government, *Sessional Paper No. 5* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1974).
23 M. Lipton and P. Stretton, *The Crisis of Indian Planning* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

for adequate reporting, continuous monitoring and regular evaluation.[24] In Zambia the proposal has been for "Intensive Development Zones", but delays in the acceptance of the programme suggest some misgivings about the approach in government circles. The integrated development approach has also reached Tanzania, albeit without any fancy epithet. The new system of decentralized administration is area-based and presupposes that the development directors manage an integrated programme for their particular territorial unit (region or district) of administration.[25]

Many African governments, usually on recommendations by outside experts, have introduced a system of programme budgeting (often referred to as the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, or PPBS). In East Africa, the governments of both Kenya and Uganda have been experimenting with programme budgeting in the last three years, and also more recently in Tanzania it has been introduced on an experimental basis. The influential African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), consisting primarily of senior administrators and managers in Africa, devoted much attention in one of its more recent symposia to PPBS and other modern management techniques.[26] On matters like these, including the use of electronic data-processing and computer-based information systems, civil servants and managers are divided. There are some African administrators who are strong advocates of these modern management techniques.[27] The deliberations of the 1971 AAPAM symposium, however, also indicate that there is strong opposition to the adoption of these tools. In this context it is worth noting that in June 1974 the Tanzanian government went as far as prohibiting the use of coumputers in the public sector because they have proved to do "more harm than good".

Prescriptions for new management tools have often been justified on the basis of the inadequacy of the inherited colonial administrative apparatus, portrayed as being "bureaucratic" and primarily law-and-order-oriented. Nobody would recommend for Africa a total surrender to the demands of bureaucracy that policy-making be only like a regular and steady march. Yet, we agree in part with Leonard that bureaucratization is not always a bad thing, if by that concept is meant a particular form of decision-making with the following qualities: expert, universalistic, professional, depersonalized and routinized.[28] With reference to the administration of governmental activities of a routine nature, there is nothing wrong in arguing for bureaucra-

24 D. Belshaw and R. Chambers, "Programming, Operational Control and Evaluation for Rural Development Plans" (Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, Discussion Paper, 1971).
25 J. K. Nyerere, *Decentralisation* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1972).
26 African Association for Public Administration and Management, *Report of Seminar on Professionalization of Public Administration and Management* (Freetown, 1971).
27 A. Adedeji, "Formulating Administration Reform Strategies in Africa," *Quarterly Journal of Administration* (Ife), VI, 3 (1972); T. A. Akinyele, "The Budget as an Instrument of Management," *AAPAM Seminar Report* (1971); A Fouad Sherif, Electronic Data Processing Systems: Their Potential for Modernization of Public Administration in Africa," *AAPAM Seminar Report* (1971).
28 D. K. Leonard, ed., *Rural Administration in Kenya* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973).

tization if, as often seems to be the case, the qualities mentioned above are not institutionalized. In other fields, however, administrative action can only be routinized, programmed or systematized at the cost of likely failure, because as Schaffer puts it: the emphasis of bureaucratic administration is "on repetition and reiteration rather than on innovation".[29]

The question is whether new management tools aimed at a more integrated and programmed implementation of policies will overcome the problems of "under-bureaucratized" and "over-bureaucratized" administrative structures. Secondly, do the costs (whether direct, e.g. for hiring expensive consultants and training administrators, or indirect, e.g. dislocations caused by the change-over) warrant investment in these more sophisticated management tools borrowed from abroad? It may be too early to offer a categorical answer to these questions. Yet some indicative answers may be given.

As Chege has shown with reference to Kenya, to make departments conform to a standardized code of administrative behaviour through the establishment of specific implementation procedures may be wishful thinking, particularly if the central co-ordinators lack power to enforce these rules; or, as Fernandes points out, there exists an excessive division of labour, causing inflexibility.[30] Non-co-operation and interdepartmental cleavages may also arise as a result of seeking favours from the office possessing ultimate authority on matters of resource allocation. Even if rules are accepted, as the case seems to be in Tanzania after decentralization, the rules and procedures may not necessarily serve their original purpose. This is the finding of Mayer as regards the administration of the Rural Health Centre Programme in Tanzania. One of his conclusions is that the reporting system established under decentralized administration "carries information to people (in the centre) who have little ability to facilitate the implementation of health centre projects at the district and regional levels. Moreover, the information these reports contain does not provide a basis for control of implementation."[31] His conclusion raises the question of the relevant level at which area-based planning can be most effectively implemented. With reference to India, Lipton[32] notes that the districts were too large for effective implementation of integrated and intensified development programmes. The preliminary experience of Tanzania's decentralized administration corroborates this: the district rather than the region lends itself more easily to integrated development programmes.

29 B. B. Schaffer, "The Deadlock in Development Administration," in Leys, ed., *Politics and Change in Developing Countries* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

30 M. Chege, "Systems Management and the Plan Implementation Process in Kenya" (Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, Discussion Paper, 1972); A. J. Fernandes. "Managers, Supervisors, Staff and Subordinates: Is the Line-up Suitable for us?" (Tanzania) *Daily News*, 14-15 July 1974.

31. W. Mayer, "Implementation and Control under Decentralization: Tanzania's Rural Health Centre Programme" (Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, 1974), p. 56.

32 M. Lipton and P. Stretton, *The Crisis of Indian Planning*, op. cit.

Focus on Policy-Making Behaviour

While the first school of thought stresses the "primacy of choice" and the second school the "primary of procedures", the third emphasizes behaviour. Any study of policy-making has to concern itself with how policy-makers ought to behave in order to be effective in the policy-making context. This is the assumption from which Braybrooke and Lindblom start in their extensive criticism of the synoptic or comprehensive model of planning.[33] In their view it represents an ideal which, apart from being applicable only to very simple closed systems, corresponds to no sequence of analytic behaviour within reach of human beings. It is impossible to choose optimal policies because of (a) the problem of determining an unambiguous hierarchy of value preferences against which to judge policy alternatives and (b) the impossibility of scanning all possible consequences of these alternatives. In addition to these logical defects, there are problems of a practical nature that render the synoptic ideal impossible: information is rarely complete or adequate; the cost of analysis, both in time and human resources, is prohibitive, etc. Thus, in the authors' view, this model comes nowhere near the realities of decision-making in organizations. Basing themselves on what they consider the prevailing behaviour among policy-makers, they proceed to offer their own alternative: "the strategy of disjointed incrementalism". Its main features are that policy-makers should

1. consider only those policies whose consequences differ marginally from the status quo;
2. consider only policies which differ incrementally from each other;
3. limit consideration to only a few of the consequences of possible policy alternatives;
4. consider primarily policies which tend to remedy ills;
5. reconsider policies constantly;
6. distribute the process of policy analysis to as many individuals, groups and agencies as possible in society;
7. regard objectives as related to each other through their costs in terms of utilization of scarce resources and hence continuously re-examine ends in the light of available means.

The main benefit associated with this strategy, according to Braybrooke and Lindblom, is that it is possible; it can be used by policy-makers because it is suggested as an "incremental" improvement on the prevailing behaviour among people making policies. It is not utopian; it is a practical way of "muddling through" in complex policy-making situations. We cannot dwell on all the criticisms raised against this strategy; only those of immediate relevance to policy-making in developing countries will be considered below.

The emphasis on considering policy alternatives in the light of the existing situation rather than a set of independent social values compels the reader to ask whether the "status quo" is such a uniform and tangible

33 D. Braybrooke and C. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963).

thing as implied by the authors. As Dror has noted, in conditions of very rapid social change the concept of "status quo", with which the increments of change may be compared, is really not always clear, and hence the strategy not so operational as it sounds.[34] Milne adds that developing countries wishing to employ incrementalism face a dilemma: lacking the "shared values" which make the method possible in, for example, the United States, they may settle for agreement among a small ruling group. In that event, however, they will be unable to secure the fragmentation and the feedback that are essential to the incrementalist method. Although Braybrooke and Lindblom consider their strategy equally well adapted to policy-making by people anxious for raid change as by people wishing to conserve the status quo, it does exclude at the same time all changes regarded within any particular society as "large" or "important". Thus, as Leys says, "it is certainly not compatible with planned structural change which is what many leaders of poor countries say they want."[36] Leys' main criticism against "disjointed incrementalism" concerns its unplanned character; it is primarily a strategy of adaptation to policies which can be achieved through least cost and effort. In this respect it differs from planning which is characterized by prior selection of targets and the subsequent manipulation of behaviour to achieve them. What distinguishes planned from unplanned behaviour is not its superior rationality in relation to some criterion of economic efficiency, but its specifically purposive character in relation to some predetermined goal, says Leys. An action may be "badly" planned; unplanned activity, guided by intuition or habitual patterns of behaviour, might be more efficient or even more successful in reaching the objectives conceived as targets in the plan. The consequence, however, is less important; what matters is whether the activity is planned or calculated to attain ultimate goals. This point is also supported by Moris, whose notion of "engaged planning" comes close to what Leys advocates.[37]

This approach, then differs from the model of "disjoined incrementalism" by reasserting the broadly sequential nature of planning. It differs from the "synoptic" model by arguing that it is possible to plan without seeking to optimize; that the reasons for planning may be to some extent independent of the desire to optimize.

Criticism against Leys' approach includes the argument that he underestimates the task of achieving planned behaviour in a cultural environment which is either hostile or foreign to the behavioural traits required in planned activities.[38] Another is that he plays down the importance of structural

34 Y. Dror, "Muddling Through—Science or Inertia?" *Public Administration Review*, XXIV (1965).
35 R. S. Leys, ed., *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, op. cit., p. 259.
36 C. T. Leys, ed., *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, op. cit., p. 259.
37. J. R. Moris, "Managerial Structures and Plan Implementation in Colonial and Modern Agricultural Extension: A Comparison of Cotton and Tea Programmes In Central Kenya," in Leonard, ed., *Rural Administration in Kenya* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973).
38 R. S. Milne, "Mechanistic and Organic Models of Public Administration in Developing Countries," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, XV, 1 (1970).

constraints surrounding the policy-maker. Dror, for instance, with reference to developing countries, stresses the constraints imposed by the long organizational and social distance between the units that make policy, that execute it, and that motivate the execution.[39]

Policy-making and Planning in Tanzania

We have seen so far how virtually all publications, whether normative or empirical in orientation, have dealt with planning, while leaving out other modes of policy-making. The same is true for the literature on Tanzania. It is as if planning is at the same time normatively the only acceptable and empirically the only interesting mode. This orientation is understandable: planning is closely associated with socialism, and planning institutions occupy a prominent position. (Note, for example, the existence of various planning documents, the Ministry of Development Planning, the Planning Directorate in the Prime Minister's Office, and planning committees in regions and districts.) Yet, it can be argued that most policy-making in Tanzania has little resemblance with any of the planning models discussed above, whether normative or behavioural.

"We Must Run While Others Walk"

Policy-making in Tanzania cannot be understood without reference to its contemporary political context. As Tanzania is one of the 25 poorest countries in the world and a "late-comer" in the development race, it is understandable that policy-makers have accepted the notion that "we must run while others walk". Their view about the development process contradicts the notion of planning economists that it is a sequence of steps carefully calculated in a comprehensive and long-term perspective. The Tanzanian view is also at odds with the bureaucrats' opinion that development is like a regular and steady march. Furthermore, it goes contrary to the idea that managing development is a matter of "muddling through" at a leisurely speed. Tanzania cannot afford to proceed at a "normal" pace. It would be wrong, however, to assume that Tanzania is running only because some other countries are ahead of her. She is not content with watching the backs of her competitors in the development race without knowing where the race is supposed to end.

The socialist ideology of ujamaa provides a notion of what is conceived by many Tanzanians as the ultimate stage of development in the country. Some Tanzanians, but particularly expatriate observers, talk as if this stage were near and could be brought about primarily by initiating measures taken in more revolutionary countries.[40] Some such measures have been taken, notably nationalization of the means of production, establishment of rural collectivities and introduction of a programme of workers' participation. Yet, given the present low level of the productive forces in

39 Y. Dror, *Public Policy-Making Re-examined*, op. cit.
40 See for example, Uchumi Editorial Board, *Towards Socialist Planning* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972).

the country, their impact has been limited. Thus, the perspective often adopted by President Nyerere that Tanzania still has a long way to go before becoming socialist appears more realistic and, given its approach to policy-making, strategically more correct.

In fact, the very realization that the "ideal" society is a distant goal provides the main rationale for Tanzanian policy-makers to act as if they were "running". With the sense of being involved in a long-distance race, radical policies which break with the past are likely to have a greater impact; i.e. they make people really believe that they are running or even leaping forward.

The policy-making style of we-must-run-while-others-walk has four main features. The first is the urge to do everything and do it at once. Policy-making has little resemblance to Lindblom's "remedial" orientation. It is rather a question of trying to maximize as many social values as possible through a policy which is able to mobilize new resources for its very achievement. This ambition is manifested for instance in the attempt to make the ujamaa programme a "frontal attack" on rural stratification. More recently to emphasize further the same orientation, the village programme has been given a definite deadline: all Tanzanians must live in villages by the end of 1975. This ultimatum has resulted in a number of "operations", aimed at moving people and providing them with necessary social facilities. Thus, the tendency is to load the implementation agencies with a whole set of divergent and often contradictory goals. There is no doubt that this welter of objectives has caused strain on the management in executing agencies.[41]

The second feature is that policy-makers often make decisions without first having obtained full and detailed knowledge of possible consequences of these decisions. They start running and take the consequences as they occur. In this respect they come close to the approach which Hirschman has called "the motivation-outruns-understanding" style of policy-making.[42] Full understanding of what can or cannot be achieved with existing resources is not sought as a precondition for making a policy. Instead, the political decision is made first, often under dramatized circumstances, to produce a sense of rapid advance. In this approach ends are allowed to justify means: the ultimate objective is considered so important that the costs of resources to attain it become a secondary matter.

The decision which led to the Arusha Declaration is one case in point. Certain costs were definitely associated with the nationalization of the major means of production in the country, but these were justified by the value attached to achieving a socialist society. In that connection the President said that Tanzania was prepared to accept a lower economic growth rate per annum in the long-term interest of building socialism. A similar case is Mwongozo—the TANU Guidelines of 1971—in particular paragraph 28, which states

41 A. H. Rweyemamu, "The Predicament of Managers of Public Enterprises in Tanzania's Emerging Political Economy," paper presented at the Conference on the Development of African Bureaucracies, Belmont, Maryland, 1974.
42 A. O. Hirschman, *Journeys towards Progress* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965).

that people should be allowed to make their own decisions even if these decisions do not bring immediate tangible benefits to them. Here, then, participation and involvement are ends in themselves, justifying sometimes even "wrong" decisions. Makwetta discusses the monopolization of the khanga-kitenge trade in the hands of *Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania* (UWT) in the same light; and it is possible to add the take-over of privately owned butcheries in many urban areas as yet another example.[43]

The third feature of this approach is the unwillingness of policy-makers to use the past as a source of guidance for the future. Associated with colonial rule, from which the present leadership is seeking a break, the past is to them by and large irrelevant. Dror has identified this inclination as a main feature of policy-making in most developing countries.[44] It is likely to be particularly strong in Tanzania, however, which wants to demonstrate its break with the past in very explicit terms. Policy-makers in Tanzania therefore, are not always trotting on familiar grounds, but make frequent dashes into the unknown. The assumption is that the right policies cannot always be chosen from the realm of what is presently known as feasible in economically rational terms. The key to a given problem is not always found where there is light; it may be hidden in the dark. Thus the task of the policy-makers becomes, in Hirschman's terms, that of "zeroing in" on a new policy which would otherwise have been ruled out by the conventional criteria of rational calculation. One case in point is the policy of co-operative development in recent years. When in the mid-1960s the co-operative movement in Tanzania experienced a serious management crisis, the solution adopted by the government to this problem was not primarily to achieve gradual improvements from "within", as had been suggested by the 1966 Committee of Enquiry, but rather to go for more far-reaching structural changes as outlined in the policy of ujamaa village development.

The fourth feature is that officers in the public sector operate in a context where public expectations constantly tend to exceed what can actually be achieved by the role incumbents. This fact is bound to create a sense of insecurity among many public servants, a sense which is reinforced by the frequent transfers of officials, both upwards, sidewards and, albeit less frequently, downwards. The President, who makes most top appointments in the public sector, seems to expect that this very state of insecurity will yield productive results, because officers will be anxious to seek more security through good performance. In this respect the Tanzanian strategy differs from the findings of those such as Blau that initiative occurs only with job security.[45] It is more in line with the views of Gunder Frank who argues that "over-defined roles", i.e. where role expectations cannot be satisfied by role incumbents, often produce positive results.[46]

43 J. Makwetta, "Problems of Involving UWT in Retail Trade" (Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, 1974).
44 Y. Dror, *Public Policy-Making Re-examined*, op. cit.
45 P. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1955).
46 A. Gunder Frank, "Administrative Role Definition and Social Change," *Human Organization*, XXII, 4 (1964).

The Rationale of the Tanzanian Approach

The act of planning boils down to an attempt to pre-empt surprise and to protect against the unknown. We have seen how the models of planning used in the context of policy-making in Africa have been very ineffective in terms of pre-empting surprises, often because the factors causing uncertainty are beyond the control of the policy-makers. We have also seen how Tanzania, rather than relying on the known past, has developed a policy-making style which allows it to move into the unknown in search of solutions to its problems. This particular approach can be justified on other grounds than the relative failure of comprehensive planning in Africa.

It may be useful to return to the development race analogy. When Tanzania is attempting to run while others walk, she is not, like Filbert Bayi, proceeding on a smooth and well-paved track. Running in this context is more like a rough cross-country race where the problems not only are unknown, but all the time are pressing themselves on the competitors. Tanzania, like most other developing countries, does not have its development problems, so to speak, at arm's length. Hers is a constant fight against heavy odds, with little or no breathing-space. Bogged down by these obstacles, she rarely has time to plan the next move. Under such circumstances it is not only natural but also justified if policy-makers abandon the disposition of routinization, extolling the values of efficiency and rationality and being geared to results that are measurable, and instead seek refuge in the more romantic and youthful risk-taking of ideological spontaneity. President Nyerere's emphasis that development depends on people rather than on things and his notion that people learn while doing (cf. the mobilization of senior public servants to participate in the Ntomoko self-help project in 1973) are both manifestations of this orientation. As Kunz has pointed out in this respect there exists a close affinity between Tanzania and China.[47] More than any other country, China has "rationalized" the use of extra-rational factors in politics. Guided by the belief that praxis is the source of knowledge and consciousness, Chinese leaders, notably Mao Tse-tung, have carried out a number of rectification campaigns, the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution being the most well-known manifestations.[48] There is no doubt that these mass campaigns have caused disorder, but—one likes to add—it is creative disorder, as the campaigns have clearly released productive forces through the people's own efforts. There is reason to agree with Green that China's historical circumstances are in many respects (revolutionary experience, government organization, tradition of public work, social discipline) different.[49] Yet the strides ahead achieved through reliance on ideological spontaneity in China may well serve as a relevant guide to Tanzania where the routinizing tendencies of

47 F. Kunz, "Notes on Some Aspects of Tanzania's Contribution to Comparative Politics" (Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, 1973).
48 F. Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).
49 R. H. Green, "Relevance, Efficiency, Romanticism and Confusion in Tanzanian Planning and Management," in this volume.

planning and administration easily have a crippling effect on the development efforts of the people.[50]

Hirschman, basing himself primarily on policy-making experiences in Latin America, argues for a similar style, although on different grounds.[51] In his view, it is called for because of the uneasy combination of the pressing nature and the low understanding of problems that often characterize policy-making in developing countries (including Tanzania as we have seen above). To try out widely different policies, i.e. to make moves into the unknown, may be useful when understanding is low. Similarly, when feedback information of policy outcome is poor, mistakes may have to be of large proportions to make policy-makers find time and resources for effective corrective action. Hirschman concludes that this problem-solving style with its characteristic jumps from one policy to another becomes harmful only if it is persisted in after knowledge about the problem has accumulated and progress made in attacking it. Thus, it is not the "optimizing" orientation of the planner, but rather the commitment to realizing an idea or a social value, that is important.

Chambers provides evidence which corroborates Hirschman's ideas.[52] The Mwea Irrigation Scheme in Kenya, which started under circumstances of almost unbelievable ignorance of physical, technical and economic aspects, became a success story, partly because of the bold initiatives of the policy-makers and partly because of effective follow-up. It goes to show, as Chege underlines, that inadequate pre-planning need not always lead to faulty implementation as it is supposed to do.[53]

In this context it would be wrong not to mention Landau's thesis that redundancy and duplication can also be important instruments for ensuring greater reliability in policy-making under circumstances of uncertainty.[54] Complex organizations whose work is particularly uncertainty-bound, like services, hospitals and fire brigades, require redundant or spare resources that can be mobilized in the case of emergency. And this does not apply only to such organizations. There are many who argue, for instance, that unspent budgetary appropriations are not a waste, but an asset which can be exploited to satisfy sudden demands arising out of the uncertainty surrounding policy-making. Tanzania has experienced this situation, not the least during the last year when priorities have had to be rearranged following rising oil prices and imminent famine. Duplication and overlap are also advantageous to policy-makers in developing countries. Organizations ensure reliability by creating several mechanisms which can substitute for each other should one fail. The search

50 G. Tschannerl, "Rural Water Supply in Tanzania: Is Politics or Techniques in Command?" Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, Dar es Salaam, Paper No. 52, 1973.
51 A. O. Hirschman, *Journeys towards Progress*, op. cit.
52 R. Chambers, *Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
53 M. Chege, "Systems Management and the Plan Implementation Process in Kenya," op. cit.
54 M. Landau, "Redundancy, Rationality and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap," *Public Administration Review*, XXIX, 4 (1969).

is not for perfection but reliability. Industries in Tanzania which are dependent on electrical power get their own generator in case of power failure in the TANESCO-operated system. Even in the policy-making structures, duplication is considered appropriate. Thus at district, regional and national levels, party and government committees overlap and duplicate each other to ensure that policies are made along socialist lines.

There are many observers, for example Adedeji, who express reservations about Hirschman's approach on the grounds that it is wasteful.[55] The notions of wide swings in policy and see-saw movements are contrary to the prevailing notions of development as "integrated", "balanced", etc. Yet, the idea of "unbalanced growth" is supported not only by Hirschman. This approach is given strong support, for example, by Tibor Scitovsky in his analysis of "pecuniary externalities".[56] Under his scheme, additional investment in industry X will cheapen its product, causing the surplus of those industries using X's products as inputs to rise. These surpluses call for expansion and investment in X. Thus, in a series of see-saw activities this process is carried out until a balance is reached. Such an approach is not necessarily based on bungling and blundering. As Streeten says, it points to the limitations of the conventional notions of rationality.[57] Imbalance can be the inevitable result or even a necessary condition of progress.

In addition, the prevalence of "overdefined" roles may have its positive effects. The gap between ends and means of roles surrounded by excessive expectations may generate enterprise and initiative, so sorely needed in countries anxious to enjoy rapid social and economic progress. Such situations give the incumbents a substantial range of discretion and permit innovation and adaptation. Gunder Frank's conclusion, not very different from that of Hirschman, is that if only there is a single desired direction of change, and it is known, reliance on excessive role expectations is appropriate for countries like Tanzania that try to lift themselves by their bootstraps or run while others walk. Such discretion may not only help to combat the dangers of routinization but also facilitate making new policy moves.

The Problems of the Approach

Thus we can see that there are powerful ideological, political, economic and managerial reasons for Tanzania's peculiar style of policy-making. Yet its full value is not realized because people are not prepared to accept its implications. For the ordinary bureaucrats who wish to march at a steady pace in well-organized columns, it is too youthful and energetic. To management consultants it is wasteful and chaotic. Even politicians may be reluctant to recognize its positive value because it does often entail taking one step backward and this pause may give "budding capitalist elements time to

55 A. Adedeji, "Formulating Administration Reforms Strategies in Africa," op. cit.
56 T. Scitovsky, "Two Concepts on External Economies," in Agarala and Singh, eds., *The Economics of Underdevelopment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
57 P. Streeten, *The Frontiers of Development Studies* (London: Macmillan, 1972).

entrench themselves".[58] Such fears, however, are not valid if we are talking about policy-makers who know the ultimate goal (a socialist society). "Two steps forward and one backward" or see-saw movements may in fact be an inevitable consequence of the style of policy-making that Tanzania, in the name of socialist development, has adopted. And there is nothing wrong in that as long as the policy-making activity has a purposive character in relation to predetermined goals. Extra-rational factors in policy-making can be rationally exploited.

Few policy-makers in Tanzania have accepted the above implications. Urged by their pressing problems and by their desire to catch up, and liberally supplied with recipes communicated to them by the advanced countries of both East and West, these policy-makers, as Hirschman has warned, are only too ready to believe that they have achieved full understanding and to act on the basis of such a belief. As Milne stresses, radical policies may in these circumstances easily become a refuge from awful actual alternatives.[59] The point is, however, that whether the result of optimizing planning or the product of political judgement by a trusted leader like President Nyerere, policies need some sort of follow-up. Information about what really happens at the stage of implementation has to be fed back—by officials or by ordinary people—to the policy-makers ultimately responsible for the development of the country. This process is necessary to ensure that policy-making does not become a question of two steps forward and three steps backward. Yet, there is evidence to suggest that the feedback process is often very ineffective. Information produced is too incomplete to make it possible for the policy-maker to assess the progress of a given policy. This failing creates a "blessing in disguise" in that policy-makers are often forced to make personal on-the-spot visits to various projects. One case in point was the decision in October 1974 to send the whole Central Committee of TANU to assess for itself the problems people have experienced in the process of moving into "planned" villages. Less fortunate is the tendency for policy executors to feed policy-makers with information that the latter wish to hear. This false sense of subservience reduces the ability of the executors to recognize on their own the ends-means conflict arising in any policy implementation. Thus little thinking, if any, goes into such questions as to how implementation can be accelerated or in any other way be made more effective, and what consequences various decisions on such matters would have.

Information indicating problems does of course reach the policy-makers every now and then, but as many newspaper interviews have shown, not everyone is prepared to make responsibility and act in a constructive manner. Many policy-makers become problem-dodgers rather than problem-solvers by throwing the difficulty back on someone else or by blaming it on circumstances beyond their control. Substitution of blame-passing for problem-solving is,

58 S. S. Msuya, "Tanzanian Planning and Management: A Review" (Tanzania) *Daily News*, 20 May 1974.
59 R. S. Milne, "Decision-Making in Developing Countries," op. cit.

as Green points out in this volume, far too common among public institutions in Tanzania.

Plan implementation procedures and reporting systems were introduced by the McKinsey consultants with the aim of improving evaluation and control. This strengthening of the formal government structures, however, may not necessarily suit the policy-making style adopted in Tanzania. Both Moris and Collins have expressed general reservations about increasing the importance of the formal channels of communication in a situation where a policy-making style which is more entrepreneurial or "debureaucratized" prevails.[60] Mayer provides some evidence to corroborate this.[61] According to him, the new system for reporting and the new plan implementation procedures tend to have the effect of routinizing matters which ought not be subject to routine treatment. For example, financial and physical progress reports from individual rural health centre projects are fed into the system but at no level do they lead to any follow-up. This problem seems to arise from a conflict between the demands of routine administration of the government and effective management of development projects. No single person or group of officials seems to have direct responsibility for the various projects. Finally such responsibility is vested in the development director, but he has little time to concern himself with the projects, as he is preoccupied with running the organization and taking care of the contacts with the political authorities. Furthermore, according to Mayer, the warrant-holder (who, by the way, is not always the officer in whose functional area of activity the project falls) is not effectively a manager.

Two years after decentralization was first introduced, the existing situation appears to be far from the task-oriented management style based on informal groupings of officers according to major projects that for instance Luttrell has advocated.[62] Von Freyhold also shows that many decisions which were previously made by local politicians or technical officers have been moved into the "safe" realm of the development committees at higher political and administrative levels.[63] All in all the evidence suggests that the new decentralized administrative system has increased its capacity to start new projects, but the actual management of these projects is still problematic. Executive capacity still remains a scarce resource.[64]

60 J. R. Moris, "Managerial Structures and Plan Implementation in Colonial and Modern Agricultural Extension: A Comparison of Cotton and Tea Programmes in Central Kenya," op. cit.; P. Collins, "The Working of Tanzania's Rural Development Fund: A Problem in Decentralisation," in Rweyemamu and Mwansasu, eds., *Planning in Tanzania: Background to Decentralisation* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1974).

61 W. Mayer, "Implementation and Control under Decentralization: Tanzania's Rural Health Centre Programme," op. cit.

62 W. L. Luttrell, "Villagization, Cooperative Production and Rural Cadres: Strategies and Tactics in Tanzanian Socialist Rural Development" (Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, 1971).

63 M. Von Freyhold, "The Government Staff and Ujamaa Villages," Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, Dar es Salaam, Paper No. 23, 1973.

64 R. Chambers, "Executive Capacity as a Scarce Resource," *International Development Review*, XI, 2 (June 1969).

The dominance of the political and administrative leaders in the regions has also manifested itself in relation to the newly formed regional trading companies, on whose boards this category of people have great influence. In many cases it has been difficult for them to distinguish between their official political or administrative roles and that of being a board member. Many decisions, therefore, have been difficult for the management of these companies to implement. This system of letting politicians and senior administrators in the regions have representation on the boards of these companies, however, offers the advantage of exposing these people to the hard tasks of running public enterprises, an exposure which hopefully in the long run will result in a better understanding between those who administer and those who manage the state sector.

The defence of various attributes associated with the Tanzanian style of policy-making like "creative disorder", "two steps forward, one step backward", "see-saw movements", "duplication", etc., has not been put forward here as an expression of the trial-and-error legacy of pragmatic English empiricism, but in the specific context of socialism and self-reliance, the cornerstones of Tanzania's development strategy. Nor are we saying, like Lindblom, that means should be allowed to take precedence over the ends. Yet, the notion that the past is wholly irrelevant is gradually losing its validity as new states in Africa gain experience from development strategies and projects chosen by themselves. Van Rensburg has shown how the mistakes made in a development project in Botswana served as valuable sources of inspiration for future action.[65] In a situation where full information is not insisted upon *before* policies are made, greater understanding must be built up *in the process* of implementation. If the ultimate objectives are known, this should not be reduced to a matter of "muddling through"; whatever remedial action is taken, it is not done with reference to the status quo only.

The ujamaa village programme is a case in point. Everybody knows now that it has been difficult to promote collective ownership of land in many such villages at this early stage of development. Hence, the government has began to change the policy somewhat: instead of ujamaa villages with collective ownership of the land, one initiates "planned" or "development" villages with *bega kwa bega* (co-operative block) farms. Nobody would seriously suggest because of this change that Tanzania has abandoned its policy of socialism. It is rather a matter of the taking two steps forward and one backward—but without losing track of the overall goal.

The case of the now defunct State Trading Corporation (STC) draws attention to another related problem arising out of this style of policy-making: the strong attachment that develops towards the original initiative. Despite the fact that the STC, due to overcentralization (caused in part by recommendations of the McKinsey consultants), lack of manpower and prevailing demoralization among staff, was unable to serve the public, it was allowed

65 P. Van Rensburg, *Report from Swaneng Hill* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 1974).

to continue existing because it had been founded as one of the pillars of the new socialist policies after 1967. Thus, it took an unduly long time before permission was granted by the political authorities to reorganize the state-controlled distribution system. In the years which have passed since the reorganization of the STC, however, the principle that "small is beautiful" seems to have gained acceptance in policy-making circles. Decentralization and the breaking up of large-scale organizations in the parastatal sector have become the order of the day.

We have all the time argued that we-must-run-while-others-walk is the predominant style of policy-making in Tanzania. It is so common that many policy-makers apply it even when it is not very applicable. Even non-pressing problems are taken up in this predominant fashion. Because of the attractiveness of the style itself and the perception of new directions which it may offer, overenthusiasm in using the style has been common. Individual politicians, administrators and managers have interpreted general policy statements in their own way, creating the impression that their main concern is to legitimize their own position in a dramatic manner. In some cases, they have drawn criticism from the mass media. For example, in November 1974 when the Ministry of Agriculture issued a circular to all schools that each pupil must cultivate a one-hectare farm, the editorial comment of the *Daily News* (14 November) included the following sentence: "The whole thing seems to be a product of someone who merely wants to appear to be working." The unfeasibility of the whole proposal was too obvious.

This overenthusiasm has at least two effects. It tends to make policy-makers more inclined to start new projects or programmes rather than to care about and improve existing ones. The other effect is that projects or programmes are often initiated against such high odds that their chance of success (without great cost to someone else) is very remote indeed. The take-over of butcheries in the urban areas has failed or succeeded only at the cost of drastically increased prices for the consumers.

It must also be recognized that some problems have arisen from the prevalence of "over-defined" roles in public institutions. The gap between desired goals and institutionally prescribed means has not always been productive. It would be expecting too much that all senior administrators and managers, reared in a bureaucratic tradition, would seize the many challenges implied in a situation of "over-defined" roles. For those who have failed, it has become only too apparent that they have been "promoted to their level of incompetence".[66] Others feel under-rewarded. They believe that the government, as they say in Kiswahili, *imewapiga kilemba cha ukoka*, i.e. has given them heavy responsibilities without commensurate rewards. There are also those managers who try their best in an "over-defined" role but who fail to convince colleagues and subordinates that they possess the right qualities and qualifications for the post. This has happened in a few cases where the officers concerned have risen to leader-

66 L. J. Peter, *The Peter Principle* (London: Pan Books, 1970).

ship of the organization from the lower ranks in competition with others, and has given rise to jealousy and accusations of nepotism, etc. One example is the workers' lockout of their new managers in NATEX in April 1974.

The Role of Power and Planning in Development

It should be stressed at this stage that neither in this account of policy-making in Tanzania nor in the more general introductory pages have we condemned the use of planning for development. What we have argued against is the "over-inflated" belief in the concept. Planning is an integral part of any genuine development process, but the degree to which it can be successfully applied will vary from one society to another. Planning, whether defined as the desire to optimize or as purposive behaviour in relation to pre-set goals, is likely to be more successful in more advanced industrial countries than in developing, primarily agricultural societies. The reasons are not difficult to find: a higher degree of control by man over his physical and social environment, as well as the prevalence of complex functional interdependences which cannot be solved without some form of planning.

Paradoxically, however, both policy-makers and social science analysts have been particularly anxious to advocate planning for developing countries where chances for its success appear particularly limited. Even this tendency can be understood. As Pusic puts it, planning to most people is "the reasonable alternative, the rational quest for a social optimum; reducing, by conscious action, uncertainty inherent in human affairs; substituting, in the end, the management of things for the government of men".[67] It holds out the prospect of solving most problems encountered by man. The value of planning is not denied by anybody, not even those who want "to do everything and do it at once". In fact, they may well be, as Chege argues, the strongest ideological proponents of planning.[68]

Thus, it is recognized that because of its ideological attractiveness, planning will remain on the minds of policy-makers and analysts alike in developing countries. Yet, it should be realized that in most of these countries, and particularly in Tanzania, the most important factor in the policy-making process is not planning but power.

The relative importance of power as compared to planning can be illustrated in many ways. Socialist development in Tanzania is viewed as possible only if the power of TANU is extended to as broad a sector of the political system as possible. TANU is doing this by extending the party and government apparatus to reach farther down into the society and further out into the distant regions. It is also extending its domain by making rules in spheres of human activity hitherto untouched by politics in the country. Many of these efforts are made in the spirit of we-must-

67 E. Pusic, "Power, Planning, Development," *Development and Change*, I, 1 (1969), p. 21.

68 M. Chege, "Systems Management and the Plan Implementation Process in Kenya," op. cit.

run-while-others-walk. Whether it is a matter of getting people to dress in a particular manner, of making them cultivate a minimum acreage or of making them abstain from excessive drinking, what is required is power—in combination with ideology—rather than planning. One of the reasons why these development policies have not always been successfully implemented is that policy-makers have been afraid of relying on the use of power. There are different reasons for this. One is that in most African countries, power, whether in the society at large or in organizations, is thought of primarily in terms of the monopolistic use of available coercive instruments. Furthermore, it tends to be regarded as a zero-sum game, i.e., in any power game the winner gets everything, the loser nothing. These attitudes are quite understandable among people in the new states who have experienced colonial domination. To ordinary people "power" is a word with negative—certainly ambivalent—connotations; the use of power by someone over another usually means some uncomfortable change to the latter. Among policy-makers power is often portrayed as the antithesis of planning. It has sometimes been contrasted to the more democratic approach to problem-solving prevalent in African societies prior to colonization.

In Tanzania, the policy of ujamaa has been based on two principles running contrary to institutionalized power. One is that Tanzania's peasants and workers will want economic progress and will sustain that progress through their own efforts as soon as they have been shown its advantages. The other is that changes must and will come about democratically, that is in response to the "felt needs" of the ujamaa villagers who will somehow be able to participate in the planning for a better life for all. The ideological aversion against power and the inability to apply it can in many cases also be explained with reference to the relative ease with which most African governments came to power. As Zolberg has pointed out, Africans had to destroy relatively little in the process of achieving political monopoly in their countries.[69] On the whole, their task was relatively easy because they did not have to subvert a generalized public conscience into acquiescence; as Zolberg maintains, none had ever been brought into being. Thus, it can be argued that the discrepancy between intent and actual result in the development process in many African countries can be blamed on two factors: an excessive belief in planning as *the* mode of policy-making; and reluctance to apply power (viewed as a zero-sum game) in a systematic and methodical fashion on others.

The importance of power is particularly well illustrated in relation to the various kinds of "operations" that are the products of Tanzania's policy-making style. They usually amount to concentrating available resources on a particular task or project, using the Party as the spearhead and chief mobilizing agency. Motivation is allowed to outrun understanding, and this discrepancy leaves in its wake a number of unresolved ends-means conflicts

69 A. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1966).

which can only be solved in conflicts of power between the different individuals and implementing agencies involved. These "operations" take the thrust of the development efforts away from the routinized system of administration and allow planners and technicians to come in only at a later stage. Both Mwansasu and Weeks have observed that decentralization may have strengthened the power of the civil service in relation to the people.[70] To judge from the outcome of "operations" there is no reason to doubt this. In fact, it may be argued that these recent "operations" indicate that Tanzanian policy-makers have accepted—albeit in some cases rather panic-strickenly—the importance of power. It should also be anticipated, however, that in the process of implementing the goals of the "operations" there are bound to arise other power conflicts, notably between politicians and administrators and between different categories of administrators. In the interest of development these conflicts have to be resolved, and only power can achieve this.

Very often, however, people engaged in the same task are reluctant to get involved in open confrontations with colleagues or superiors and prefer to withdraw even valid professional arguments in favour of "peaceful coexistence" with other officers. Thus, power is not applied openly to resolve a substantive conflict but applied silently and less effectively from the point of view of policy-making.

This reluctance to engage in open power conflicts is understandable in a social context where the application of power is viewed primarily in terms of a zero-sum game. In such situations the question of taking a definite side in a substantive conflict cannot be separated from its wider social and political implications. Taking sides is easily misinterpreted as disloyalty and disobedience in societies like Tanzania where power is primarily used as a tool of integration and mobilization. This situation is likely to remain as long as the level of development of the productive forces is low and the process of rationalization in society, leading to a more effective use of power over nature and over oneself, is still in its initial phase.

Power over nature is essential, because only through its realization can man increase his extraction of resources for development. In a situation where the notion of *shauri ya Mungu* (it is all up to God) still prevails to a large extent, the importance of this aspect of power is easily forgotten. To be sure, the *siasa ni kilimo* (politics is agriculture) campaign is a manifestation of the Party's intention to change this situation. Yet, the meagre results of this campaign also illustrate the problem of increasing people's consciousness about the importance of human power over nature.

Power over oneself is equally important. When Leys talks of "purposive" or "planned" behaviour he is essentially referring to man's power to control himself. Men with such power are prepared to forgo certain desirable things in the interest of other more important things. The existence, for instance,

70 B. Mwansasu, "Power to the People," (Tanzania) *Daily News*, 16 April 1972; S. Weeks, "Debureaucratization: What is it?", Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, Dar es Salaam, Paper No. 66, 1973.

of the leadership code, the anti-corruption squad and the campaigns against drunkenness testify to the relative absence of such power in Tanzania.

What explains much of China's success in its development efforts is the widespread consciousness of these two power aspects. The stress on power over nature (illustrated in the parable of the old man who wanted to move the mountain) and power over oneself (manifested in puritanical behaviour) is likely to facilitate a more constructive exercise of power also in relation to other men. Participation and self-criticism in communes or factories become possible when these things are realized and their importance recognized.

Conclusions

Two conclusions can be drawn from the analysis above. The first refers to the relative role of planning and power in Tanzanian policy-making. The second concerns the relationship between the prevailing policy-making style in Tanzania and the management of its public enterprises.

Accepting Leys' definition of planning as purposive behaviour in relation to pre-set goals which are collectively evaluated and redefined at regular intervals (rather than the definitions by economists stressing optimalization of nationally defined goals), it is clear that planning so defined *can* be accommodated in the prevailing policy-making style in Tanzania. Yet, it is likely to be a long-term process. As long as the policy-makers' perception of power over nature and over oneself remains vague and unapplied in the day-to-day running of their life and work, any planning which rests on the application of rationality will be of limited practical utility. Instead, power, defined as the influence exercised by one group of men over another, becomes the key policy-making resource. Whatever planning model exists will be used by competing individuals or groups to secure their preferred policy outcome. The planning model, in the midst of such conflicts, cannot be regarded as an independent variable. In relation to man's social environment, therefore, it is power rather than planning which serves the all-important purpose of reducing or pre-empting uncertainty. We wish to conclude that Tanzania's policy-making style can be seen as a product of at least three prevailing social and economic circumstances: the low level of development of the productive forces; the scarcity of resources in relation to felt needs; and the determined aspiration at the official level to reduce the dependence on the world capitalist system. The extent to which the policy-making style contributes to a change in these circumstances is difficult to say at this point. We have argued that it has both its rationale and its problems. To reduce the latter it has to incorporate, at least at its "tail-end", a certain does of rationality.

This is where Tanzania's public enterprises may be able to make a contribution. More than most other institutions in society these enterprises have to accept the principle of rationality in their operations. If it is accepted that an injection of rationality into the policy-making process is desirable for the purpose, for example, of a more effective resolution of ends-

means conflicts at the stage of implementing national policies, then public enterprises must be viewed as key institutions in terms of achieving this objective. Given the tendency towards an overambitious use of the policy-making style of we-must-run-while-others-walk, however, it is likely that this objective can be attained only through struggles of power with other groups, notably politicians and administrators. The burden that the management of these public enterprises have to carry along with them in these struggles is the image of being defendants of bourgeois values. These constraints cannot be overlooked in a country like Tanzania which considers itself in transition to socialism.