

post war multilateral trade system was meant precisely to cater for this situation. The "problems of underdevelopment" that have attracted ever increasing numbers of petty-bourgeois ideologists—themselves contributing to the underdevelopment in the process—should not come to us as a surprise. The objective laws of capitalist development *do not* in the final analysis *obey* the juridical rules that may be constructed in their way. They operate quite independently of these rules and of the will of all those involved. Just as the workers and peasants have to produce for the system on penalty of death, so the system has to expand to its grave. But such death to the system does not come on its own but out of violent class struggles, which are the dialectical result of the evolution of the system. At a certain stage, these existing productive forces come into conflict with the production relations, resulting in a consciously organized social revolution, thus liberating the productive forces from the fetters of capital, and in turn creating conditions for man to liberate himself. There can be no short cut to this dialectical law, as history has shown.

Thus, the existing unequal relationships between the imperialist centres and the exploited Third World peripheries will only be finally resolved through such fundamental change in property relations, a task which the revolutionary petty-bourgeoisie, working closely in alliance with the forces of the workers and the peasantry can bring about. In the meantime the GSP and any new rabbits coming out of the old hats of imperialism must be seen for what they really are: camouflaged channels for the extraction of the surplus from the Third World.

Assessing Local Administrative Capacity for Development Purposes: A Kenyan Case

W. OUMA OYUGI*

The failure to implement development programmes at the local level once they are formulated can be attributed to a number of factors. Among them is the administrative incapacity of the implementing agencies, departments, or people, as the case may be. In this paper we shall be concerned with the analysis of some of the administrative factors that retard the local development process.

The data on which the paper is based were collected between March 1970 and June 1972, and covered the period between 1967 and 1971.¹ The study was conducted in Migori Division of South Nyanza District where A Special Integrated Rural Development Programme had just been initiated. The following departments were included in the survey: Agriculture, Provincial Administration, Community Development and Co-operatives. These departments were chosen for the very simple reason that they are usually the ones with organizational (or personnel) representation at the local level, and also because of the important roles they play in planned development. Data were collected through oral interviews, questionnaires and observation. The findings are discussed below.

The paper begins with an examination of the nature of departmental capacity in the area at the time the special integrated rural development programme was being introduced. This is important because an increase in work load without a corresponding increase in personnel usually leads to administrative incapacitation especially under conditions of full employment in the organization. Whether or not this is always true in rural Kenya is open to debate. For our purpose, however, what we are concerned with in this section is the assessment of whether or not the staffing situation in the selected departments was of the kind and magnitude capable of grappling with the problems introduced by the new programme, one which called for intensive integrated rural development on several fronts.

To begin with, the Department of Agriculture had two Assistant Agricultural Officers (AAOs) in the area (the area covered two administrative divisions) and forty-five extension agents—15 Agricultural Assistants and 30 Junior Agricultural Assistants. This area of about 1,920 sq. kilometres,

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¹ The data used here are from the 'reserve bank' developed when I was in the field collecting data for my Ph.D thesis. This is the first time they have been analysed. I am indebted to the Dean's Committee and to the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi for the grants which enabled me to undertake the study.

with a population of about 25,000 farm families, could not be regarded as understaffed considering the 'national average'. It also had the kind of grade combinations that one usually expects to find at this level of administration.

But what was apparently lacking, on the other hand, was the performance capacity. This can be measured on several dimensions, some of which are: (i) the experience factor, (ii) the level of education, (iii) the training component and (iv) availability of resources. Experience is measured in terms of how long one has been on the relevant job. Taking this as a major indicator, we notice from the table below that most of the extension agents who returned the questionnaires had had long service records in the department.

Table 1. LENGTH OF SERVICE

	Less than							Total	
	1 year	1-2 yrs	2-4	5-10	11-15	16-20	21-25		26-30
Suna	1		1			1	2		5
Kadem				1	2	1	2		6
Kanyamkago		1	1	2	4			2	11
									22

Of the 22 (out of the 45) extension agents who returned the questionnaire all except 4 had over five years on-the-job experience, and 68% had between 11 and 30 years in service. If the length of service is an indicator of the level of experience then most of the staff in the area were experienced workers.

However, experience alone may not tell the whole story. When people are half-educated they rarely make use of their experience in an innovative manner. They are usually routine oriented. Faced with new situations which require creativity, they become functionally immobile. This characteristic was noticed among the junior extension staff in the Department of Agriculture.

Table 2. FORMAL EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS

Location	Primary		Secondary		Total
	Lower (Std I-IV)	Upper (Std V-VIII)	Lower (Form I-II)	Upper (Form III-IV)	
Suna	2	3			5
Kadem	2	3		1	6
Kanyamkago	7	4			11
					22

Thus, except for one person, the respondents were all primary school leavers with 50% having less than five years of formal education. These could neither read nor understand official communication in English (the official working language). They depended on the relatively 'more educated' colleagues in preparing their official monthly reports. Since most of the

literature existing on Government programmes, including the new special rural development programme was written in English, inevitably they had difficulties in extracting the information on their own. They depended mainly on the divisional superiors who came and summed it up for them "in a way they understood themselves".

Lack of formal education coupled with the age factor, complicates the matter further; for it means that the staff in question cannot benefit from on-the-job training. As the table below shows, most of the agents were too old to be likely to benefit from any form of on-the-job education or training.

Table 3. AGES OF EXTENSION AGENTS (AGRICULTURE)

Location	15-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	Over 50	Total
Suna	—	2	—	1	2	5
Kadem	—	1	3	1	1	6
Kanyamkago	—	3	2	6	—	11
						22

Only six of the 22 respondents would be likely to benefit from some form of on-the-job education or training; and over 50% were too old and were in fact simply awaiting the fateful day when they would be asked to retire! But even for the young men, there were few functional benefits from the short duration courses that they usually attended. Most of the courses lasted for only a few days, and only rarely for over three weeks. The total picture which emerges in the Department of Agriculture is that the situation which the new programme inherited was too weak to sustain it. We shall now examine the situation in the other departments.

The Provincial Administration which has always been used (both during colonial times and after) as the instrument of penetration and control at the local level, is usually well represented in every administrative unit, from the sub-location to the Provincial level. At the time of the survey, there were two District Officers in charge of the two divisions in the programme area, and a chief and a sub-chief in each of the seven locations and the twenty-two sub-locations respectively. Of the seven chiefs three were formally interviewed. Informal discussions were held with all seven. The data gathered is presented below.

Table 4. INFORMATION OF CHIEFS AND SUB-CHIEFS

Chief*	Age	Length in Service	Level of Education	Existence of Development Committees	Level of Awareness
i	35	6	Std. VIII	weak	low
ii	50	14	Nil	weak	low
iii	40	?	Std. VI	weak	low

*The names of the chiefs and sub-chiefs have been left out. The Roman numbers represent the real people interviewed.

Sub-Chiefs	Age	Length in Service	Level of Education	Existence of Development Committees	Level of Awareness
i	50	4	Lower Primary	weak	low
ii	55	13	None	weak	low
iii	37	4	Lower Primary	weak	low
iv	44	8	Lower Primary	none	low
v	33	3	Std. VIII	none	fair
vi	50	8	Lower Primary	weak	fair
vii	26	3	Std. VIII	weak	fair
viii	40	3	Lower Primary	weak	low

From the table it is apparent that all except one of the chiefs and the sub-chiefs were mature people—a factor which for a long time has been significant in the appointment of these people. Six of the seven chiefs had been appointed after independence, and seven of the eight sub-chiefs had been appointed a year before or after independence. Educationally they were all of primary education standard, with the majority of them in the lower primary education standard, with the majority of them in the lower primary category (Standards I-IV) or less. Only three of the eleven chiefs and sub-chiefs interviewed formally could read and write English satisfactorily.

Thus, we notice that in the Provincial Administration, as in the Department of Agriculture, the level of education of the locational and sub-locational staff was very low indeed. They could not be expected, therefore, to understand on their own, most of the literature then existing on development programmes for which they were being called upon to mobilize the people. That may also explain why the majority (8 out of 11) had a very low awareness of what the special programme was all about.

When asked what their major duties were, almost all of them mentioned "mobilizing the people for development" and when asked "How do you do this?" the answer was invariably "through the *barazas* (meetings) and in the self-help committees". Yet three sub-chiefs confessed that such committees had not been established in their areas, and the remaining five plus the three chiefs, though asserting the existence of the committees, all agreed they were too weak to be of any use. One chief could not even remember whether the locational Community Development Committee in his location had met in the last year or so.

The foregoing was the state of affairs existing at the time the special Rural Development Programme was launched in the area, and there were no immediate changes introduced at the locational level and below to accommodate the new programme. With most of the chiefs and sub-chiefs either illiterate or semi-literate, the level of awareness remained as low as it had been before the programme was introduced. For those who could read and write English, the understanding was not satisfactory either. They depended on the Divisional Officers for most of the information on the programme. With frequent transfers, which will be discussed in the next

section of this paper, continuity was at a minimum, even though numerically the situation looked normal.

The department whose functions overlap with those of the Provincial Administration is Community Development. Like the Provincial Administration, its major duty is mobilization of the people for development. But mobilization means very little unless the mobilizers know 'for what' they are mobilizing, and the interviews revealed that that awareness did not exist. The local staff had heard of the programme but not of its details. They were not in a position, because of the level of education and their status, to know that certain documents existed in which the objectives and principles of the programmes were explained. Above all, none of them could be expected to understand the detailed arguments in the then existing documents² even though their level of education was relatively higher than that of their counterparts in the other departments.

Table 6. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANTS

CDA's	Age	Length of Service	Level of Education	Training	Existence of Development Committees	Level of Awareness
i	40	6	Upper Primary	7 months	yes	fair
ii	30	6	"	14 months	yes	fair
iii	35		"	yes	yes	low
iv	30		"	yes	yes	low
v	28		"	yes	yes	low
vi	30		"	yes	yes	low
vii	25		"	yes	yes	vague
viii	40		"	yes	yes	fair

The table shows that, except for two men, most of the CDAs were relatively young compared to their counterparts in the other departments. Yet quite a number of them, in spite of their age and educational advantages, still had only low understanding of the new programme.

A study carried out by the Nairobi University Institute for Development Studies in 1972 traced the source of this lack of understanding of the programme to the inability of the headquarters officials to communicate effectively with the local officials.³ The CDAs in this case were the victims of this lack of effective communication. Otherwise they seemed very informed about general development problems in the area. Most of them asserted the existence of the development committees but confessed that some of them were not very active. A number of points explained this situation. Firstly, there was only one CDA per location (except two locations which had two each). They were, therefore, unable to keep active all the com-

² I have in mind, for example, the reports made by the University of Nairobi in 1967 and 1968; the proceedings of the Kericho Conference edited by J. Sheffield: *Education, Employment and Rural Development* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967); and the many circulars from the Ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance and Planning.

³ IDS, University of Nairobi, "An Overall Evaluation of the Special Rural Development Programme," Occasional Paper No. 8, 1972.

mittees in the location, especially when one location had several of them (e.g., project committees, sub-locational committees, and locational committees). Secondly, the CDAs lacked any quick means of transport. They depended on the use of their bicycles, for which they had no allowance. Occasionally when the bicycles were out of order they would be stranded for several weeks. In addition, more often than not, salaries were not paid in time. Thirdly, the Provincial Administration people, who could have helped to relieve the pressure on the CDAs, did not themselves show any enthusiasm. They tended to see their role as one of "getting things done" rather than one of "planning to get things done". Because of this, they seemed to prefer the *baraza* to the self-help committees.

This situation did not change with the introduction of the SRDP. The CDAs continued to be frustrated in the payroll of the County Council which at the time was, in fact, bankrupt. Attempts to absorb the CDAs in the Civil Service did not materialize, and have not to-date. So that although the CDAs appear to be better off by way of education, energy and dedication, their enthusiasm seems to have waned, mainly because of delays in being paid and also because of the large areas they have to cover.

The situation was much worse in the Department of Co-operatives. At the time of the study, there was only one Co-operative Assistant covering the two administrative divisions (in the programme area) together with a substantial part of another neighbouring division. This officer was a young man of twenty-five, with four years service in the department behind him. He had just undergone a one year course on co-operative accounting. His major duty, as he explained it, was the supervision and inspection of the accounts of 39 primary societies. Of these only 13 were active and the rest were dormant. These needed revival. To do this the officer needed regular and dependable means of transport. He had none, and was forced to rely on the public services. Often he would be stranded towards the end of the month because of financial constraints. Worse still, there was no transport vote allocated to him. If he chose to spend his own money, it took months before he was reimbursed.

Before the introduction of the programme in the area, there had been no co-operative man on the spot. The area had been run from the District Headquarters some 60 miles away, which means that even prior to the time of the study the societies had lacked close and thorough supervision and inspection of their accounts. Cases of non-payment of wages to society employees and of dues to members were very common. With very little Government control, things got out of hand and this situation was responsible, in part, for the weakening of the co-operative movement in the area. This situation did not change when the programme was introduced. Although it was expected that additional staff would be employed, they were not engaged immediately. There was no vehicle nor staff housing available. This was the situation inherited by the programme. Clearly, there was little hope of progress in the short term.

The emerging situation in the four key departments at the point of

contact with the people is thus one of weakness in many respects. These weaknesses could be alleviated to some extent by the divisional leadership, but even at this level things were not all that favourable. We have already pointed out that several factors may combine to define the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a particular administrative department. Among them are experience, level of education and training, and availability of resources. These factors were not as obviously important at the divisional level as they were at the locational level. While not denying altogether that they may have been significant in explaining the situation at the divisional level, it should be stressed that there was one factor—frequent transfers of divisional officers—that was particularly detrimental to the smooth administration of development and to the provision of effective guidance of the locational staff by the divisional officials. This point is analysed in some detail in the following pages.

In their 1969 Rural Survey Report, Heyer *et al*⁴ noted that the rate of transfer of Government officers was so high that it could be considered a threat to successful national development efforts. Since that time, the subject has been widely discussed in Kenya. But nobody has shown empirically how it affects the administration of development programmes. It is my intention to do this in the following two sections.

Of course, nobody will deny the negative effects implicit in frequent transfers. A Government servant is a learner in the sense that he has to know the area and its people before he himself can effectively begin to teach them what to do and how to do it. Sometimes the going may become rough and the learning period may take a little longer. If this administrative gestation ('adgestation') period is frequently interrupted, a situation arises in which some officers become perpetual learners without putting their "knowledge" into practice. Thus, at the time he is about ready to be of some use to the people, he receives his letter of transfer. As this becomes institutionalized in the Government system, a situation arises in which the contribution of the Government machinery becomes marginal at best.

If an administrator is continually on the move, it becomes even more difficult to assess his effectiveness. This in itself has a negative implication for the national administrative system because it will be difficult to judge the total capability of the national administration for development. In a situation such as this no accurate assessment of the (qualitative) development of the administration is possible.

Sometimes frequent transfers without any clear explanation or cause may demoralize an officer. What naturally follows from this is lack of administrative commitment to an area, which in turn may lead to an officer doing work of very low value or sometimes even not working at all. There was a known case where a Government officer, upon receiving

4 J. Heyer, *et al*, "Rural Development in Kenya, a Survey of Fourteen Districts." (University of Nairobi, 1969), and published in 1971 by the East African Publishing House.

his letter of transfer, first reported 'sick' and then spent the remaining 2 weeks "writing a handing over report". This particular Government officer was being transferred out of the area very much against his will and for no explicable reason, and there are many other cases like this one.

A high rate of transfer also has a potentially disintegrative effect in that it does not provide any opportunity for a group of Government officers at one particular administrative unit to stay long enough in the area to forge a working relationship with one another. Some officers may have the feeling that they have nothing to gain from co-operating with their colleagues because they will be leaving very shortly anyway. The significance of co-operation, especially at the divisional level, becomes all the more critical as one realizes that there are some departments which have more resources than others—resources which, if there is co-operation, and hence co-ordination of activities, could be shared without the officer in question forgoing anything. Let us visualize a situation in which one department, say, Agriculture, has a chronic shortage of petrol and the other department, say Community Development, has a sufficient supply. The situation might arise in which the Agriculture man might wish to arrange to call on some of his farmers every time the Community Development man goes out; or they might organize joint visits where their contributions are complementary (e.g., visit to a self-help cattle dip). That kind of co-operation is not likely to be achieved if one officer feels that "I am after all only here for a couple of months". Co-operation is likely to be obtained when there is a sense of collegueship and a feeling that "one day it will be my turn to ask for help".

In a society which is already committed to planned change, frequent transfers for Government officers become even more harmful. The availability of sound and accurate decisional premises which must continue to flow in the process of planning (which is viewed here as a continuous process) is likely to suffer as a result of frequent changes of staff. The availability of accurate planning data depends mainly on the full understanding of the data sources by the transmitting agency or unit. If an officer is not fully aware of what happens below him, he is apt to turn to a junior subordinate for the relevant information. The reliability of what the junior man communicates depends on the kind of information sought. If the information reflects on the work of the junior staff, chances are that it will be inflated. We are all familiar with the protective character of every bureaucrat, i.e., he will, more often than not, not pass over to his superiors any information that may adversely affect his relationships.⁵ The chances of accurate determination of the quality of information received from the subordinates are improved if the officer stays long enough in the area and therefore knows both his source of data and the transmitting unit.

5 However, Herbert Simon has pointed out that there are times when this information may be released anyway, i.e., when the decision the boss makes depends on it and there is the fear he will find out the true version in the end. *Administrative Behaviour* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 163.

Since planning is viewed as an on-going activity, an officer who has not stayed in one area long enough may not be able to comprehend what transpired before he came. We alluded to this earlier when we talked of 'adgestation period' (defined as that period which an administrator needs before he can begin to discharge his duties efficiently and effectively). In planning, the officer must understand the decision-making process that led to the establishment of this or that project. He needs to understand the relationship between his department and the other departments and between them and the centre, in the context of overall development. This is the only way that he can grapple with the difficult planning decisions that, increasingly, are faced by every administrator. Frequent transfer is bound to leave a vacuum.

Increasingly, the integrated nature of planning in Kenya is becoming institutionalized. Departments of Government are from time to time being called upon to sit together to draw up development programmes. This calls for collegueship and understanding among the various departmental heads. Frequent transfers, as we have pointed out, will inhibit the attainment of that goal. There are times when a relatively senior officer is transferred to another area as a disciplinary measure. On arrival he may choose to have nothing to do with the system already established. I am reminded of a relatively senior officer who was transferred to an administrative unit against his wishes. While in the area, he was invited to all the development committee meetings in his capacity as a department head. He chose to have nothing to do with them. He later told me in an interview that sitting around a table in conference with his "temporal colleagues" would have entailed too much condescension on his part!

The foregoing observations help to illustrate the problems implicit in frequent transfer of Government officers. As the case study will show, the problem is more critical in some departments than in others. It was in an attempt to assess the impact of such transfers that the study was undertaken.

Planning for local development is a responsibility that the planning statutes have given to the provincial and the District Development Committees. An assessment of the impact of frequent transfers for Divisional development must, therefore, bring these administrative units into focus. The study looks at the frequency of transfers at the Provincial and District levels

Table 7.

	Province	District	Division	Location
Provincial Administration	2	2	10	Constant ⁷
Agriculture	3	2	2	"
Comm. Development	3	3	5	"
Co-operatives	3	3	4	Nil ⁸
Veterinary	3	3	3	Constant

6 The initial survey of the SRDP was carried out on behalf of the Government by J. Heyer, J. Moris and G. Cowan in 1967, as a forerunner to the 1968 survey.

7 No change.

8 Staff not in existence.

and below, but it concentrates on the Division and below. The survey dates back to 1967 when the SRDP planning started.⁶

Transfers between 1967 and 1971 for the five key departments are listed in the table above. The figures represent the number of departmental heads serving during this period.

The analysis of these figures must begin by determining what is the acceptable length of time an officer should remain in an area before he is transferred. To do this 14 Provincial, District and Divisional heads of department were asked what they considered a reasonable length of time an officer should remain in an area. Most of the fourteen argued that a Government officer needs up to one year to understand his field of administrative unit and that it is only in the second year that he can become effective in the area. Local planners I talked to also suggested that as far as possible an officer should remain in an area for at least two years unless the transfer is in the interest of the officer (e.g., promotion). An IDS evaluation report⁹ also recommended a period of at least two years.

Accepting a two-year minimum as our base point we can say that transfers during the period 1967-1971 do not seem to have been a problem at the Provincial and District levels. With the PC, the DC and the DAO in their posts for an average of 2½ years and the rest for an average of 1 year and 8 months, that could not be considered a case that warranted alarm. However, the picture was different at the Divisional level where a District Officer stayed in the area for an average of six months, a Community Development Officer for an average of 1 year and a Co-operative Officer for 1½ years. A further analysis of the "Divisional development front"¹⁰ is made below.

At every administrative unit of the Kenyan Government, the Provincial administration is assumed to be the key integrative department on matters which affect the area. On matters of collective planning at the Divisional level, for instance, it is the District Officer that takes the initiative to form and convene the development committees. In Migori, between 1967-1970, effective leadership was noticeably absent. DOs came and went—staying for an average of six months each time. They had no opportunity to get to know the place and its people. Throughout the first planning period (June 1968-December 1969) no meeting was held at the Divisional level. In fact a Divisional Development Committee as such did not exist. Nobody had stayed long enough in the area to even think about it. When, early in 1970, an enthusiastic economics graduate was posted to the area as DO, he managed to get the Divisional team meetings going. But he remained in the area for only three months and after his departure it took almost another six months before what had during his time become routine monthly

⁹ Robert Chambers, "Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) Report No. 2 of 1970," (IDS, University of Nairobi, 1970).

¹⁰ The term is borrowed from L. Cliffe and J. Saul, "The District Development Front in Tanzania," *The African Review*, Volume 2, No. 1 (June 1972), pp. 65-104.

meetings met again. In fact this particular officer was so adversely affected by his abrupt transfer that for weeks he stayed in the station doing almost nothing. A mobilization meeting he had planned to address the week he was told of his transfer had to be cancelled.

The frequent transfers in the Department of Community Development also affected the programme adversely. A very enthusiastic and energetic lady assistant CDO was transferred out of the area without even the Provincial Community Development Officer being warned in advance.¹¹ The second set of mobilization seminars she had been organizing for the programme after a very successful first set in May 1970, had to be delayed for one full year.¹² This transfer was made at the time a foreign planning team (Swedish International Development Agency and FAO) was just arriving in the area to begin their work. They missed the experience (however short) of this officer. And even after her transfer, it took two months before her successor reported for duty.

The successor, though enthusiastic and energetic, did not possess the tact and the persuasiveness which had made his predecessor popular in the area. He tried to push self-help committee leaders around before he got to know the 'politics' of the area well. He clashed with local politicians whenever he addressed a gathering. He became so unpopular that within months he was on his way out too—apparently at his own request. This is an example for an officer not taking enough time to get to know the area and its people before exerting his authority, i.e., the importance of the adgestation period was ignored.

The situation in the Department of Co-operatives was equally bad. The area did not have an officer until June 1969. Prior to that it had been run from Homa Bay (the District Headquarters). The newly posted officer stayed in the area for only six months before being transferred. His successor stayed for only three months, and for the next four months the area had no co-operative staff. In fact the situation in this department was as bad as that in the Administration. The frequency of transfers, coupled with lack of means of transport, made this department one of the weakest in the area. The officials of the co-operative societies lacked both training and supervision. There were cases here and there of farmers being cheated and their money being embezzled by society officials. Payments were not made in time and farmers were forced to queue for days at the society offices waiting for their money.¹³ Naturally, this had a very demoralizing effect on the farmers. It is not surprising, therefore, that between 1970 and 1971, 26 of the 39 registered societies were not functioning.

Our (transfer) chart shows that there were no transfers at the Locational level throughout the 1967-71 period. This is not uncommon, and one major factor contributes to it. Generally, Locational staff operate from their homes because there is no accommodation for them at the Locational centres.

¹¹ Interviews with CDO and PDCO, 1970

¹² She was transferred in May 1970 and the seminars took place in 1971.

¹³ I witnessed such an occasion at Oyani F.C.S. on the Migori-Kisii road (S. Nyanza).

During the period under study, a number of attempts were made to transfer some Locational and sub-Locational agricultural staff but the persons thus affected had to return to their own communities because there was no accommodation at the new stations. The development activities of the Locational staff, therefore, do not appear to have been affected by the transfer factor.

An attempt has been made in this paper to show empirically that administrative capacity in one Kenyan sub-District was too weak to sustain any conceivable development programme. We have traced this weakness to (i) inadequate experience, (ii) lack of resources, (iii) lack of proper education and training and (iv) frequent transfers.

These findings are not unique to Migori. The problems are the same throughout the country. The unhappy picture emerges as one reads the substantive chapters of the National Development Plans. Special studies have also been carried out by working parties and groups of individuals which have also established the existence of some of the problems we have identified in this paper. Since the problems seem to be national rather than local, the solutions must be found within that context.

Book Review

Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom, by Leonard T. Kapungu (New York: Orbis Books, 1974), 177 pp.

JAMES MUTAMBIRWA*

Dr. Leonard Kapungu has written a remarkable book on the explosive racial situation in Southern Rhodesia. In his very first paragraph he warns: "Rhodesia is destined for a bloody confrontation between the white settlers, who exclusively enjoy political and economic power, and the Africans, the indigenous people of the land, who for more than eighty years have seen all their basic rights eroded. Such a confrontation is inevitable. . . ."

Since April 1966 the Africans have been waging a guerrilla war to overthrow the racist Government of Prime Minister Ian Smith. The war has gradually been escalating, and today the political situation in Rhodesia is in a state of flux. The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the impending complete transfer of power (by June 1975) in Mozambique which borders Rhodesia on the east, has suddenly quickened the pace of political events and has brought much nearer the day of the downfall of minority rule in Rhodesia.

Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom explains how the confrontation between whites and blacks came about. It all began in 1890 when a handful of armed white settlers, seeking mineral fortunes, occupied the country. From the very beginning, Dr. Kapungu tells us, coexistence between the settlers and the Africans was impossible because of the ruthless acquisitiveness of the former. By 1900 the settlers had sequestered African land which was their (African) economic mainstay. Africans were forced to live in reserves, mostly poor land exclusively set aside for them. The Europeans forced Africans to work for them for unbelievably low wages. To regain their independence the Africans fought two wars in 1893 and 1896-7. The uprisings were crushed with such brutality that Africans for a long time afterwards, were persuaded not to use violence as a means to regain their lost dignity and freedom.

From 1890 until 1923 the country was administered by a Chartered Company, the British South Africa Company. Without consulting the 800,000 blacks, the British Government in 1923, granted self-government to 30,000 whites. Between 1898 and 1962 no African sat in the Rhodesian legislature. The franchise laws were so manipulated that the African majority could never assume political power and other discriminatory laws were passed

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