

also emanate from that knowledge which he makes available to decision-makers about the ideas, assumptions and principles that underlie or should underlie public life.

However, we have sadly discovered that in practice this potential has not been exploited adequately either by the African political scientist or by the political system within which he lives. The circumstances have been such that they have not encouraged him to furnish that empirical knowledge that should provide the light to dispel ignorance over public decision-making. As to ideas, assumptions and principles pertaining to public life, the African political scientist, though living in a situation like those which in earlier times helped to lift men to lofty heights of philosophical reflection on the condition of their political existence, has followed too readily the trend that started in the West and which disparages original work in political philosophy. Thereby, he has deprived himself of an important opportunity to influence public decision-making.

## The Zambian Foreign Service 1964-1972

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This article discusses how a new State handles the many issues involved in its relations with other States which may be more experienced and more powerful. Zambia is fortunate in having at its disposal financial resources with which to solve some of the problems which arise from the legacy of underdevelopment and from an attempt by the new State to come to terms with an international order whose values and procedures may conflict with its aspirations.

However clearly formulated the principles on which a foreign policy rests may be, and however well-endowed a State may be in material resources, the effectiveness of the resultant policy ultimately depends on the calibre of the personnel which is charged with its daily implementation and, indirectly, with its formulation.<sup>1</sup> This article will examine the Zambian Foreign service in terms of its structure, the educational and social background of its manpower, and their conditions of service and professional training; for these constitute important indicators of the quality of the Foreign Service and of its potential role in foreign policy.

At this stage it is important to point out that the African States, like others, tend to follow one of two approaches in appointing members of the Foreign Service, especially Heads of Missions and their deputies: they make political or career appointments. The advantage of the former is that the appointee is trusted by and loyal to the Head of Government. He can thus be expected to take the initiative without fear of being reproved by the careerists for adventurism or lack of caution. Moreover, he can pursue a foreign policy in strict conformity with the Government line. However, serious disadvantages attach to political appointments. The appointees may not be professionally equipped with the result that they may prove ineffective through incompetence. Secondly, such people may be difficult to discipline because they may have their own domestic sources of political support. Finally, political appointments at the level of Head of Mission may discourage recruits from entering the Foreign Service because of limited prospects of rising to the top. Yet it must be remembered that career appointments have

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<sup>1</sup> K. J. Holsti stresses this role of diplomats as policy-makers because they provide "a large portion of the information upon which policy is based". But, as he correctly points out, a diplomat's influence in this respect depends on a number of factors. Cf. *International Politics, A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 222-223.

their own difficulties, the main one being that diplomats can be overcautious for fear of making mistakes which may jeopardize their chances of promotion.

Zambia's Foreign Service is, of course, relatively young and inexperienced. With the approach of independence the UNIP Government and the British authorities began to lay the foundations of a Ministry that would conduct Zambia's relations with other States.<sup>2</sup> A year before independence, the Legislative Council started to show an active interest in the future Foreign Service, particularly in the question of recruitment and training of future diplomats. On 22 August 1963, Mr. H. J. E. Stanley asked the Chief Secretary what form of training was being contemplated for diplomats. He suggested that a start be made by attaching Northern Rhodesians "of the requisite educational calibre" to British Embassies and High Commissions because, in his view, "good diplomats are not turned out at a moment's notice." They required "a considerable knowledge of protocol and all other things which make up a good diplomat."<sup>3</sup> In short, Stanley was concerned that diplomats should be recruited from people with "a very high educational qualification". Although he did not elaborate on this point, it seems that he meant candidates with a post-secondary education, probably a university degree. Since at independence Zambia had a total of only 109 African graduates,<sup>4</sup> this was an extremely high entrance requirement which, if accepted, would have had the effect of staffing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a substantial number of Europeans. Of the 109 graduates, 33 qualified in 1964 but could not all be recruited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They had to be shared with other Ministries and with the private sector. The implications of Stanley's proposal were examined in a later debate when another European member Mr. H. J. Roberts, asked "whether it is Government's policy to train persons of all races for the country's future Foreign Service."<sup>5</sup> The Prime Minister, Kenneth Kaunda, answered in the affirmative, but added that candidates had to be citizens. However, he noted that since there were difficulties concerning citizenship, his Government had decided to train only those who were "protected persons in the country".<sup>6</sup> He concluded that "as soon as . . . the question of citizenship is determined . . . we intend to pursue our policy of non-racialism all round."

Clearly, this statement was meant to convey the view that until difficulties pertaining to citizenship were resolved, only Africans would be recruited. Kaunda explained that this step was determined by the fact that the whole of Central Africa had dealt with the question of British citizenship for some time. He pointed out that when the Federation ended, some British citizens chose not to stay in Northern Rhodesia with the result that "we have nothing

2 Before independence Northern Rhodesia had some form of diplomatic contact with other countries. Like Rhodesia, it had its own representative, called a Commissioner, operating in London with the approval of the British Government which, constitutionally, was responsible for the Foreign relations of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

3 Northern Rhodesia, *Legislative Council Debates*, 22 August 1963, col. 1653.

4 Zambia, Cabinet Office, *Manpower Report, 1965-66*, p. 2, Table 1-1.

5 Northern Rhodesia, *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 18 March 1964, col. 217.

6 Kaunda, *ibid.*, col. 218.

to go by to help us determine whether, in fact, those who at the moment carry British citizenship will decide to remain in Zambia when the country changes its status."<sup>7</sup> Not satisfied, Roberts later remarked that Northern Rhodesia had British-protected persons not born in the territory. He then asked whether the training would be restricted to British-protected persons of Northern Rhodesia origin. Kaunda's reply was that British-protected persons not born in the territory would be considered "as aliens as any other people".<sup>8</sup> The implication of this statement was that Africans not born in Northern Rhodesia would be excluded from the Foreign Service even if they were British-protected persons like their counterparts native to the territory. Why the accident of the location of one's birth should count so much when a resolution on boundaries adopted by the African Peoples' Conference in December 1958 adumbrated different sentiments of a Pan-African nature, can only be guessed in terms of the concern for the national interest—in this case jobs for native Zambians—as independence approached.

From the start, the nature of the Foreign Service aroused comment—one view being that it should be a professional service, the other being that it should be political. Stanley insisted that it be "a career service as opposed to a political service . . ."<sup>9</sup> because a diplomat "is after all representing his entire country, and he should not be there at the whim of the Government".<sup>10</sup> This view was rejected by Kaunda on behalf of the UNIP Government. He argued that "the whole job is political . . ."<sup>11</sup> and added ". . . we would be advised to train our people as diplomats who would be politically wise, otherwise they would be completely ineffective on the international level."<sup>12</sup> Thus the Zambian Foreign Service emerged as a politically rather than professionally determined establishment. Indeed, up to the present day political considerations have affected it at all levels—from the Head of Mission to the new recruit.

In the choice between the political and the professional criteria for recruitment into the Foreign Service, Zambia initially adopted an eclectic attitude. The first trainees were chosen in 1963 and early in 1964 by the UNIP Government. Parliament showed an immediate interest in the criteria of their recruitment. In March 1964 the ANC member for Mazabuka asked for the minimum qualifications for entry. Kaunda replied that education alone was not enough. "It is not a question of education only, but it is a question of being accepted by the Government and the country."<sup>13</sup> In other words, recruits were selected not only on the strength of educational qualifications but also—and it seems primarily—on their being found to have political views acceptable to the UNIP Government. Nevertheless,

7 Kaunda, *ibid.*, cols. 218-219.

8 Kaunda, *ibid.*, col. 219.

9 Northern Rhodesia, *Legislative Council Debates*, 22 August 1963, col. 1655.

10 *Ibid.*, col. 1657.

11 Kaunda, *ibid.*, col. 1655.

12 *Ibid.*, col. 1656.

13 Northern Rhodesia, *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 18 March 1964, col. 219.

Mr. M. Mumbuna, *ibid.*

their educational qualifications led Government to expect that they could quite easily acquire the new professional expertise required for diplomacy. Twenty-seven were selected for training—the majority being senior civil servants,<sup>14</sup> especially in the teaching profession. Teachers and education officers of various grades were chosen on account of their relatively high qualifications. In the colonial era, Zambians with a higher education, including university degrees, found employment mostly in the teaching service—a Government enterprise. In general, this choice of civil servants indicates that the UNIP Government preferred to entrust the conduct of external relations to individuals of proven loyalty and competence. The table below reveals their educational qualifications, occupations before undergoing diplomatic training and the posts which they filled thereafter.

Four points are worth noting here. First of all, whether by design or by accident they came from various parts of Zambia, thus giving nearly all the eight provinces representation in the Foreign Service. Charges of domination by one province or tribe could, therefore, not be levelled at the Government. Secondly, only one woman, Miss Gwendoline Konie, had undergone training up to the end of 1971.<sup>15</sup> This merely reflects the fact that at independence very few women had received much education. According to Zambia's manpower report of 1965-66, the first Zambian women to attain university degrees qualified in 1963—two as against nineteen men. In 1964 their numbers rose to three as against thirty men.<sup>16</sup>

The third point is that the vast majority received their diplomatic training not in the centres of learning of Britain, the metropolitan power, but in the United States. Interviews revealed that even as early as 1963 the Zambian Government wanted to diversify its dependency relationships, especially its sources of foreign aid. With this in mind, it entered into an agreement with the US Agency for International Development (AID), which was asked to train Zambians in fields not available in Zambia. In the view of Arthur L. Howard, the AID Affairs Officer in Lusaka in 1967, the aim of this participant training was to "meet the specific requirements of positions in national development."<sup>17</sup> By 1966, 10 had received their theoretical training at the American university in Washington, D.C.; 4 at Columbia University in New York City; and one at Colgate University in upstate New York. Among the American university participants were Matoka, Mwemba, Konie, Soko, Mwanza and Mwamba—to mention those listed in the table.<sup>18</sup> Chona, and Zambia's first Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. F. M. Mulikita, went to Columbia.

14 Kaunda, *ibid.*, col. 220. In establishing its Foreign Service, Ghana made a similar selection. See W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1961; Diplomacy, Ideology and the New State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 19.

15 *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 17 October 1971; *Who's Who in Zambia*, 1967-68, p. 43.

16 *Manpower Report, a Report and Statistical Handbook on Manpower, Education, Training and Zambianization, 1965-66* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), Table 1-1, p. 2.

17 Introduction to *Participant Directory, Zambia-U.S. A.I.D. jointly sponsored training, 1964-67* (Lusaka: U.S. Embassy, 1967).

18 See entries under their own names in *Who's Who in Zambia*, 1967-68.

Table 1. QUALIFICATIONS AND OCCUPATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER TRAINING OF ZAMBIA'S FIRST DIPLOMATS

Name	Education	Place of Birth	Occupation before Training		Place of Training	Occupation after Training	
			Occupation before Training	Place of Training		Diplomatic	Non-Diplomatic
Chipimo, E.	B.A.	Northern Province	Teacher	Australian Embassy, The Hague	High Commissioner London; Permanent Secretary, MFA (1967-1969)	Executive Director, Standard Bank (1969)	
Chona, M.	B.A.	Southern Province	Civil Servant	USA Columbia U.	Permanent Secretary, MFA (1965-1968)	Special Assistant (Political) to President Kaunda since 1969.	
Kaunda, M.	B.A.	Malawi	Teacher	USA American U.	None	Civil Servant; Director of Correspondence Studies UNZA since 1969.	
Konie, G.	University Diploma	Central Province	Social Worker	USA American U.	Zambian Mission to UN; Assistant Secretary, MFA	None	
Lusaka, P.	M.A.	Central Province	Civil Servant	Canadian Embassy, Washington D.C. and Mission to UN	Second Secretary and Deputy High Commissioner, London (1964-1968). Ambassador to USSR since 1968	None	
Matoka, P.	B.A.	North-Western Province	Civil Servant	USA American U.	High Commissioner, London (1970-1971)	Member of Parliament and Cabinet Minister since 1964.	
Mulikita, F.	M.A.	Western Province	Teacher	USA Columbia U.	Permanent Representative to UN (1964-66). Permanent Secretary, MFA (1966)	Member of Parliament and Cabinet Minister since 1968.	
Musakanya, V.	B.A.	Northern Province	Civil Servant	British Consulate, Lubumbashi	None	Civil Servant, Member of Parliament; Governor of the Bank of Zambia since 1964.	
Mwamba, P.	University Diploma	Northern Province	Civil Servant	USA American U.	Consul General, Lubumbashi (1964-1971)	Permanent Secretary Ministry of Works. Deceased 1968.	
Mwanza, L.	B.A.	Eastern Province	Civil Servant	USA American U.	None	Commissioner for Vocational and Technical Education; Secretary National Provident Fund.	
Mwemba, J.	B.A.	Southern Province	Teacher	USA American U.	Permanent Representative to UN (1966-68)	Postmaster General (1965-1971).	
Nsomi, V.	B.A.	Eastern Province	Teacher	USA American U.	None	Chairman National Coal Board (1969).	
Soko, H.	University Diploma	Eastern Province	Community Services Officer,	USA American U.	Ambassador USA, USSR, Kenya (1964-1969)		

The training extended over one academic year (eight months) and consisted of courses in International Relations, International Law, International Economics and Diplomacy. These were of a high academic standard, as can be concluded from the textbooks used, for example, Satow's *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*; Inis Claude's *Swords into Plowshares*; Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*. Participants wrote term-papers, sat an examination at the end, and received a diploma if successful. None of them failed. Other trainees attended courses in England at Oxford and at the London School of Economics. Africa also provided training, namely, in Dar es Salaam.

One remarkable feature is that not all future diplomats in the first group received this academic or theoretical training before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the majority did, a few were immediately attached to foreign missions without it. Such missions belonged to independent countries which wanted to help Zambia with practical training. For example, Elias M. Chipimo joined the Australian Embassy in the Hague; Valentine Musakanya, the British Consulate in Elizabethville (later Lubumbashi) in Congo Kinshasa; Paul Lusaka, the Canadian Mission to the United Nations; and Martin Kaunda, the New Zealand Embassy in Washington, D.C. Others in later groups were attached to missions in Lagos and Khartoum. It is worth noting here that while the first group received an academic training, no attempt was made to have them learn foreign languages apart from English. In reply to a suggestion by H. J. E. Stanley that future diplomats be fluent in other languages, since using interpreters caused difficulties, Kaunda merely expressed the hope that newly appointed Ambassadors would try to learn local languages.<sup>19</sup> In suggesting fluency in these languages as a requirement, Stanley obviously revealed his ignorance of practices in other countries. An ambassador need not know the language used in the country in which he is posted, but it seems desirable that a national on his staff be fluent so as to obviate the need for interpreters. In his reply, Kaunda did not cover this point.

The final point concerning the table above deals with the jobs which the diplomats in training eventually filled. Arthur Howard, the AID Affairs Officer, expressed the view that participant training in USA could speed up Zambianization "only if training is used in work for which it was designed."<sup>20</sup> In one respect he was right in expressing satisfaction with this programme,<sup>21</sup> for the participants came back to serve their country as civil servants. Indeed, 70% of those on his list, which includes A. N. Chimuka, returned to work in the Foreign Service either as representatives abroad or as officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But a survey conducted after 1967 reveals a completely different picture. Eight of the ten had left the diplomatic field. People who had attained high

<sup>19</sup> Northern Rhodesia, *Hansard No. 3*, 11 August 1964, col. 1143.

<sup>20</sup> Introduction to *Participant Directory*, *op cit*.

<sup>21</sup> Howard went on: "This report reveals an extremely high degree of such utilization—indeed, one of the highest in my experience with development programmes. Both the Government of Zambia and the individuals involved are to be warmly commended." *ibid*.

rank—for example, Head of Mission and Permanent Secretary—no longer used their training and experience to help formulate and execute Zambia's foreign policy. Death, politics, transfers to other Ministries and the attractions of parastatal organizations like the National Coal Board accounted for this loss to the Foreign Service. Instead of expertise being accumulated and imparted to others—thus ensuring continuity and efficiency—the Foreign Service was marked by a fairly constant and unpredictable turnover. Of the first group of trainees, only P. F. J. Lusaka and Miss G. Konie maintained an unbroken record of service until mid-1971. Generally, there was a high rate of transfers from MFA and even of departure from the Civil Service, with the result that Zambia found itself in a situation "in which our Foreign Service is manned by a good number of officers who, through no fault of their own, lack the basic tools of their trade."<sup>22</sup>

A number of factors account for this high mobility rate. Above all it must be noted that with regard to foreign policy, and, indeed, overall Government policy, power is concentrated in the President. He appoints not only the Foreign Minister but also the Heads of Missions and their deputies. In making these appointments, which can also involve transfers, he tries to satisfy various interest groups—such as party stalwarts, the trade unionists and regional elements—all of whom compete for posts in the Foreign Service on account of the prestige and emoluments attached to it. Their competition has made the Zambian Government adopt the practice of constantly shifting the top three officials in its diplomatic missions—namely, the Ambassador or High Commissioner, who is head of the Mission; the Deputy; and the Counsellor or First Secretary, where there is no Counsellor. The constant shifts indicate that no high post abroad is the preserve of any particular interest group.

One aspect of this competition is reflected in the implicit conflict between the Party stalwarts and the new elite. The latter are educated Zambians, who tend to be non-partisan or to be politically inactive. On account of their wealth and professional standing, they have a high social status. The former tend to be poorly educated UNIP activists who fought for independence and did not have the chance to acquire a professional skill. Nevertheless, they expect to be rewarded for their loyalty and sacrifices by being given important Government jobs and assignments. These would indicate to everybody that, as the Party slogan puts it, "It pays to belong to UNIP", and that UNIP is omnipotent. To meet their demands, the Government has appointed some of them to high diplomatic posts and has entrusted important diplomatic assignments to others. In this regard it is worth noting that (a) the Zambian delegation to the annual sessions of the United Nations General Assembly invariably includes Party officials such as District Governors; and that (b) the delegation to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Lusaka in 1970, included two trade unionists. Three consequences

<sup>22</sup> R. C. Kamanga, Minister of Rural Development and Acting Foreign Minister, Address on the opening of the first foreign service course, 20th January 1971, NIPA (mimeographed), p. 1.

have followed from the use of the Foreign Service as a means of meeting the exigencies of domestic politics. First of all, there has been a lack of accumulated expertise which has manifested itself in the shortcomings of some officers abroad. Secondly, among those with a professional training in diplomacy there has reportedly been frustration on account of lack of co-operation from their politically-appointed but professionally unqualified colleagues and superiors. Finally, President Kaunda has shown a penchant for bypassing the regular Foreign Service establishment when extremely delicate missions have to be undertaken. For this purpose he has used special envoys who may be Cabinet Ministers other than the Foreign Minister or members of his own staff at State House. For example, in December 1965 he sent four members of his Cabinet—two to the USA and the other two to the Soviet Union—to solicit aid for combating the effects of UDI on Zambia. In 1968, he dispatched his Special Assistant, Mark Chona, to Lisbon to negotiate with the Portuguese Government. This tendency to bypass and thus under-use the diplomats has been critically commented upon in the Zambian Parliament where a Junior Minister in the UNIP Government argued in January 1971 that the missions abroad ought to be used more frequently for negotiations, contracts, agreements and recruiting overseas in order to reduce the number of delegations travelling abroad on duty. In 1971, MFA expected to spend about K10 million on official travel.<sup>23</sup> The three factors discussed above can adversely affect the morale of the Foreign Service with the result that its overall effectiveness is impaired.

In order to make the Foreign Service an effective instrument of foreign policy, States usually train their own diplomats at home; but the new States initially train their diplomats abroad owing to the shortage of financial and manpower resources. Zambia is no exception. In 1964 it lacked the manpower qualified to run a Foreign Service course, but the Government still felt the need for giving its own diplomats an African political orientation in addition to the training which they received abroad. Consequently, on the eve of independence, it invited the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation in Sweden to sponsor a Foreign Service Seminar in Lusaka's Staff Training College—later named the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA). Held from 14 September to 10 October, 1964, the seminar had Professor C. L. Goodwin as director and Michael H. Banks as his deputy. Both were staff members of the international relations programme of the London School of Economics.

In their provisional programme for the seminar Goodwin and Banks stressed its African nature by including topics like the diplomacy of African States, the economic needs of these States, the work of the Economic Commission for Africa, the Great Powers and Africa, and Africa in international institutions. In addition, the President-to-be, Dr. Kaunda, was invited

23 N. S. Mulenga, UNIP member, *Hansard No. 25*, 25 January 1971, col. 1065.

to deliver the opening address and to participate in the seminar.<sup>24</sup> When interviewed in 1969-70, some of the Zambian participants said that they had hoped that such a seminar—and preferably the whole political training of diplomats—would be at home where the Zambian and pan-African aspects would be treated as integral parts of diplomatic training. But this aspiration proved immature because Zambia soon found itself confronted with the question of UDI and its various implications. The idea was shelved but not forgotten. One of the effects of UDI was to compel Zambia to launch a large-scale and sustained diplomatic offensive. This necessitated the establishment of new divisions at headquarters, of missions abroad and their rapid staffing. The trained corps proved too small for this purpose. As a result, untrained people were recruited to fill posts at various levels. Late in 1970 the opinion was expressed in MFA that the problems of Southern Africa were intractable and would involve a protracted struggle for which Zambia had to be equipped in various spheres. Since the diplomatic level could be one of Zambia's strongest points, it was felt that the officers serving in the missions and at headquarters should be professionally trained. One of the effects of Zambia's attitude towards the South was to provide the stimulus for the training of its Foreign Service through the mobilization of its own resources, thereby increasing its viability and independence in this important area.

How did Zambia's post-independence training programme take shape? Given the fact that the officers were manning important posts, it was decided that they be recalled in stages and in groups for a course to be held early in 1971. Two problems immediately confronted the planners in MFA—firstly, what form the course was to take and secondly, where qualified lecturers were to be found. The problem of organization and overall responsibility for it was handed to NIPA because of its 1964 experience of sharing in the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation's Seminar. Moreover, as the Government's main centre of in-service training for civil servants in general, NIPA had other facilities, for example, accommodation for the participants. The only difficulty was that for a new course like this, NIPA did not have the qualified teaching staff. At first, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) was asked for assistance because the UN had already gathered much experience in courses of this nature.<sup>25</sup> Former Ugandan Ambassador to the UN, Apollo Kironde, contacted the Zambian Government and seems to have advised that Zambian trainees be sent to Makerere University College which had a long-established Foreign Service course. Zambia's preference being clearly for training within the country, MFA then began considering domestic resources. The University of Zambia was called upon to provide lecturers. Inevitably, the department of Political Science and Economics and

24 Goodwin and Banks, "Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Foreign Service Seminar, Lusaka, Provisional Program," (London), 10 July 1964, pp. 1-3 (mimeographed). I am grateful to Dr. Sven Hamrell, Executive Director of the Foundation, for sending me this programme and a description of the seminar.

25 For example, the UN held a course in Barbados in 1963. See *United Nations Foreign Service Training Course, Pine, Barbados, 4 November to 12 December 1963* (New York: United Nations, 1964), ST/TAO/SER C169.

the School of Law became involved. With Gwen Konie as co-ordinator, NIPA and UNZA devised a course basically similar in structure to those taught overseas with this one exception that Africa and Zambia were to receive special attention. There were to be lecturers in African Affairs and on the national philosophy of Zambian Humanism. Spread over three months, the course was to be both theoretical and practical. The theoretical or academic side consisted of International Relations, International Organisation, International Law and International Economics, in addition to African Affairs and Humanism. The practical or administrative aspect dealt with diplomatic practice, report-writing and the organization and management of diplomatic missions. Though routine and sometimes tedious, efficient administration of a mission is of central importance; a country's reputation can suffer serious damage through the incompetence of the representatives in its missions.

By the middle of 1970, when the course was still in its planning stage, a number of Zambia's former diplomats had found other employment in Lusaka. MFA and NIPA asked them to make their services available as guest speakers on academic or theoretical topics. In this way their earlier training and experience could still be useful. The bringing in of former diplomats coincided with a suggestion to this end by a Junior Minister in the UNIP Government in February 1971. Fines Bulawayo, himself a former diplomat (he served as Consul in Lubumbashi just after independence), proposed that on their return home these diplomats should "be put in some of these colleges to help in teaching our young ones foreign policy".<sup>26</sup> In other words, the country should benefit from their training and experience. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Elijah Mudenda, noted the suggestion. In fact, it was implemented at NIPA. Chipimo addressed the first course on non-alignment (March 1971). Mwemba spoke on the United Nations and the policies of African Governments (April 1971), while Mark Chona spoke on the concept of national purpose in world affairs (March 1971). Other former diplomats who participated in the course were S. C. Katilungu, Zambia's first High Commissioner to Britain, and R. B. Banda, sometime Ambassador to Egypt and the USA.

Another aspect of the course structure which followed at the suggestion of Bulawayo pertained to study trips. On 12 February, 1971, Bulawayo had urged that practising diplomats be well informed on the latest developments in Zambia. This could be achieved by their visiting areas like the Copperbelt and the rural parts of the country "so that they will be seeing things as they change".<sup>27</sup> In reply, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Elijah Mudenda, stated that this point was already being met through a course at NIPA.<sup>28</sup> He was alluding to the first Foreign Service Course for diplomats who were required to go on tours to various parts of the country to acquaint themselves with developments. Trips were organized to the Southern Province

26 *Hansard* No. 25, 12 February 1971, col. 1072.

27 *Ibid.*, col. 1079.

28 *Ibid.*, col. 1079.

for agricultural projects. Participants also spent about three days on the Copperbelt studying various aspects of the copper-mining industry which is the backbone of Zambia's economy. The Yugoslav-constructed Kafue Hydro-Electric Project, designed to boost the supply of electricity in the country, was also visited.

A word of criticism of the course is appropriate here. In terms of structure, the course does meet the needs of MFA. However, in terms of syllabus it attempts to do too much in too short a time.<sup>29</sup> Three months is not enough for teaching material to people who have no previous knowledge of the subject. In such a short time they can acquire nothing more than basic information and concepts. One would hope that the participants would have follow-up or refresher courses later on.

The syllabus covers far too much ground in order to acquaint the participants with various aspects of international affairs. As a result, the work day is so full that participants have little time for reading in the NIPA library or the National Archives. Seven hours are devoted to instruction every day except Saturday and Sunday: 08.15-12.45 and 14.00-16.30 hours. The library closes at 5 p.m., and does not open in the evening. This lack of opportunity to become familiar with the literature became evident in the final examination for the first group, and was commented upon by the lecturer and examiner in International Organization.<sup>30</sup>

Obviously, the library hours have to be changed to allow for reading in the evening. The heavy course load could be eased by reorganizing the syllabus. Some degree of overlap is unavoidable and indeed useful in fields like International Law, International Relations and International Organization. However, unnecessary duplication of effort adds to the load. The International Relations section covered in part exactly the same ground as the one on International Organization. For example, the examination paper for the first course included questions on collective security and the League of Nations and the UN; border disputes in Africa and regional groupings in Africa. These are dealt with in the International Organization section as well. Steps have now been taken to avoid this duplication.

Another criticism pertains to participants who have already done parts of the course. For example, in their studies at the University of Zambia some participants did courses in International Relations and International Organization. At NIPA they repeated these for no sound reason. In my view, they should be exempted from them, and instead be required to do something else, for instance, a foreign language. In three months they could easily acquire a working knowledge which could be useful for conversation purposes. To do this NIPA and MFA would have to install a language laboratory and hire instructors. Alternatively, they could come to some arrangement with UNZA where facilities already exist.

29 A similar criticism has been levelled at the Brazilian Foreign Service Course. See H. Jon Rosenbaum, "A Critique of the Brazilian Foreign Service," *Journal of Developing Areas*, II, No. 3 (April 1968), p. 385.

30 B. V. Mtshali, Letter to F. D. Tumeo, Course Manager, 14 April 1971.

Although never explicitly and officially designated as such, this course obviously could be the eventual foundation of a career in the Foreign Service. Participants who fail the final examination could be dismissed from the Service in order to create a corps of specialists who should have a permanent career in diplomacy. A hint to this effect was given by Mr. Mudenda, Minister of Foreign Affairs, when opening NIPA's second Foreign Service course. To the new participants he said: "Your performance during the three months you will be here will certainly have a bearing on your future, and I am thus confident that you will all take the course seriously."<sup>31</sup> Such career of permanent officers should not be subject, as in the past, to transfer outside MFA. Transfer from missions to headquarters and vice versa falls into a different category—certainly in terms of British practice. The British Foreign Service consists of personnel who are interchangeable but constitute a body of career officers. Judiciously done, transfers from missions to headquarters can deepen an officer's knowledge of a particular area or problem so that when next he goes abroad he is better prepared. MFA may move in the direction of the British model or some variation of it if for no other reason than the overall scarcity of skilled manpower in the country. But the mere possibility of a career in the Foreign Service created anxiety in a large section of the first group of participants.

Before they arrived, MFA had to take stock of its manpower resources and decided which officers needed training most. An examination of the staff lists and establishment registers in April-May 1970 reveals that at its headquarters MFA had 40 officers of various ranks. Of these about 12 had university degrees, 5 had university diplomas and 10 had reached the high school "O" level. This makes a total of 27 or 67.5% of the officers who could be regarded as having a fair basic education. From another angle, a different picture emerges. Not more than 5 or 12.5% of these officers had received diplomatic training of any sort. In short, the vast majority were generalists in need of training.

The functions which these officers are called upon to perform make the need for training obvious. Except for one short period when President Kaunda himself acted as his own Foreign Minister, from late 1969-1970, Zambia has always had a Cabinet Minister in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, as Head of the Government, the President has a close control through an inter-Ministerial committee known as the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs. In it the Foreign Minister has a seat. It is this committee which takes the final decisions on foreign policy. But the basic information and the alternative courses of action open are presented to it by the officers, in the MFA.

Organizationally, MFA consists of the Cabinet Minister, assisted by a Minister of State—both of them being Members of Parliament. Below them are the various ranks of civil servants ranging in descending order from the Permanent Secretary, to the Under and Assistant Sec-

31 Mr. E. H. K. Mudenda, Speech on the occasion of the opening of the second foreign service course, 19th May 1971, NIPA (mimeographed), p. 1.

retaries, Principals, Senior Executive Officers and finally the Executive Officers at the bottom. The Ministry consists of two divisions: geographical and functional. The former deals with various parts of the world grouped into regions, each with an Assistant Secretary as head. For example, in 1966, Gwen Konie served on the African Desk or division which deals with African issues including the OAU.<sup>32</sup> The functional division consists of sections like Protocol Conferences, Treaties, Library and Documentation. Yet to be staffed, though provided for in the budget, is a research unit whose task is the constant study and evaluation of situations before they assume the proportion of pressing problems. Until the middle of 1971, desk officers did their own research. For non-specialists with many other countries to cover, this overtaxed their ability. For this reason, the University of Zambia was asked to write the papers which the Zambian delegation presented—with some slight modifications—to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Lusaka in September 1970.

Regarding the missions abroad, an even more remarkable situation existed in the period examined. Being political appointees in terms of the Constitution, Ambassadors and High Commissioners were excluded from our calculations. The rest made a total of 65 officers graded as follows:

Rank	Total
Deputy Ambassador or High Commissioner ... ..	3
Counsellor ... ..	8
Consul General ... ..	1
Vice Consul ... ..	1
First Secretary ... ..	15
Second Secretary ... ..	23
Third Secretary ... ..	6
Accounting Officers ... ..	8
	—
	65

In terms of educational qualifications, 6 had degrees; another 6 university diplomas; and 15 had high school certificates at "O" level. This constitutes 27 or 41.5% who are fairly well educated. Clearly, the majority needed to improve themselves. Although in concrete figures the headquarters and the missions had an equal number of officers with an education ranging from "O" level upward, comparatively, the missions were worse off on account of their higher total, 65 as against 40. In other words, the mission posts—some extremely sensitive—were manned by poorly educated people.

Probably a reflection on their education, efficiency and probity can be found in the reports of the Auditor-General. In 1967 he noted that an improvement had taken place in the financial and accounting functions of the Foreign Service, yet he recorded some disquieting cases of wasteful and nugatory expenditure. Two of these concerned the Embassy in Addis

32 G. Konie, *Sunday Times of Zambia*, 17 October 1971.

Ababa. In the first case, the Ambassador's residence which had been obtained on a three-year lease was abandoned because of economic and security reasons. The Auditor-General remarked: "The premature surrender of the lease in respect of the old residence resulted in Government having to pay redecoration expenses, legal fees and negotiated compensation totalling £971."<sup>33</sup> In the second case, an officer at the Embassy who had been recalled, failed to obtain a bill of lading for his personal effects. When it was eventually found it was sent to the Embassy where "due to insufficient knowledge concerning mercantile processes, it was filed away."<sup>34</sup> The officer's personal effects could not be cleared quickly and the resulting delay cost the Government £64 4s. 5d.

Two years later, the Auditor-General still found cases of this nature. For example, four officers received K2,030 from Government for the transport of their motor cars from Dar es Salaam to Zambia. The Auditor-General reported:

The payment comprised K800 apparently for repairs of the vehicles before the journey K230 subsistence allowance and K1,000 for the transportation. . . . I have been informed by the Controlling Officer that no documents in support of the payments are available, that more economic methods of transporting the cars were obviously feasible and that he did not consider the cost of repairs a proper charge to public funds.<sup>35</sup>

Such cases of irregularity are not unique to the Foreign Service—as the reports of the Auditor-General clearly show. But those pertaining to the Foreign Service assume a graver significance because MFA and the missions are charged with promoting and protecting the national interest abroad.

Cases of financial irresponsibility and general misconduct have not gone unpunished. Through the Public Service Commission the Government has tried to maintain discipline throughout the Civil Service, including MFA. Between 1965 and 1970 the Public Service Commission reprimanded four officers, dismissed one and had one retire on grounds of public interest.<sup>36</sup>

From the above analysis the Foreign Service emerges as an establishment which is still engaged in finding its own feet. It has encountered many problems some of which have yet to be solved. A hopeful sign is that their existence has been recognized and that various solutions have been tried. At the time of writing, it is difficult to assess the contribution of the Foreign Service Establishment to the formulation and implementation of Zambian Foreign Policy. The dynamics of this policy have to be explained largely in terms of other variables.

33 *First Report of the Auditor-General on the Public Accounts for the Financial Year ended 31st December 1967* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1968), par. 58(a).

34 *Ibid.*, par. 58(c).

35 *Report of the Auditor-General, 1969*, par. 48.

36 See the reports of the Public Service Commission, 1965 to 1970.

## Generalized Schemes of Preferences in World Trade

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### INTRODUCTION

Generalized Schemes of Preferences (GSP) have been hailed as a significant "breakthrough" for UNCTAD in its ten-year's effort to get the advanced capitalist powers to accept them.<sup>1</sup> Seen from this formal standpoint such acceptance and part implementation of some of the schemes is indeed a point of departure because such acceptance amounts to an acknowledgement and admission by the monopoly capitalist groups that 'free trade' does not bring about development in the underdeveloped peripheries. It also amounts to an admission that the hitherto blind-faith in the so-called principles of comparative advantage, as propounded particularly by David Ricardo in the early nineteenth century, and as later brushed-up by his neo-classical followers, has no validity in the modern international trade scene. Further, it removes the veil over the official "most favoured-nation" principle which seeks to treat all trading nations as equals.<sup>2</sup> Of course this does not mean that the ideologists of the exploiters will find no theory on the matter. On the contrary, they will find a way of explaining this apparent contradiction in the form of a 'new' theory. But the point being made here is that the facts behind GSP have stood in challenge to the principle, in particular as it is spelt out in Article I of GATT. Some people will, therefore, be jubilant.

However, seen from the standpoint of the real world such jubiliations must be shortlived. The imperialist system in its trade practices exists precisely because it is inherently based on exploitation not only within its borders but more importantly in all its dealings in all parts of the world. This has been its record to date, and unless we would wish to delude ourselves in thinking at this rather late stage that imperialism has changed its nature and no longer relies on exploitation for survival, it is as well for us to regard the GSP as a new method of make-believe dished out by imperialism to the Third World in an effort to earn it more time to scheme out new tactics. As we will show, this is a necessity for imperialism to extend its life which is in crisis.

To be sure, schemes of preferences are not new to the Third World. These existed, albeit in different forms, as Commonwealth Imperial Preferences, the Benelux Union of Preferences, US Preferences with the Philippines,

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1 Sydney Dell, "An Appraisal of UNCTAD II," *World Development*, Volume I, No. 5, p. 11.

2 John Pincus, *Trade, Aid and Development* (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1967).