NOTES

1. Description of agricultural patterns derived from group discussions with village elders in Kisaza, Mumbwi and Kwamkono in August 1970, in Kitumbi Tumbili and Segera in May 1971 and information from Mr. J.B.Kasidi, Dar es Salaam.

2. From Tanga Provincial Book, quoted in C.R.Ingle From Village to State in Tanzania, Ithaca and London, 1972, p. 87.

3. Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports, Tanga Province, John Iliffe drew the author's attention to this circularity.

4. David Brokensha, "Handeni Revisted" in African Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 279, April 1970, p.159ff.

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AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES: SOME LESSONS FROM TANZANIA

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This paper discusses the relationship between agricultural co-operation and the development of the productive forces. We take Tanzania's policy of ujamaa villages (agricultural producer co-operatives) as a case in point for our analysis. The argument presented is that to begin with co-operation in agriculture is essential for the overall development of the productive forces in African economies. But it is not a sufficient condition for this development in so far as the development of local industry—particularly that which manufactures instruments of labour—is either negligible or totally absent. And finally that for these conditions to exist, that is for co-operation to act genuinely as a lever for the sustained development of the productive forces (hence within a specific form of industrialization) there must be a definite political framework whose social base is the class/classes with objective interest in revolution.

I

The agricultural sector in central capitalist social formations has been penetrated by the capitalist mode of production in a manner characteristic of the

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uneven development of capitalism itself. Samir Amin[1] for instance, distinguishes three phases: the first, one in which the role of agriculture is to supply the nascent capitalist sector with manpower and raw materials to help realize primitive capitalist accumulation; the second, in which agriculture is left out of the rapid growth of productive forces in the industrial sector; and the third, when agriculture itself becomes not only the supplier of raw materials for industry but also the recipient of various industrial products which will serve as inputs for the transformation of the mode of production in agriculture itself. In a similar manner, P.P. Rey[2] mentions three stages of the articulation of capitalism with "the modes of production in which agriculture and petty craftsmanship are closely associated". His stages coincide rather well with Amin's, but put more emphasis on the role of landed property in the articulation process.

It is only during the latest stage then that the development of technology transforms agriculture in any meaningful manner as testified by the rapid growth of productivity in this sector experienced by most capitalist societies at the centre (although to be sure, many underdeveloped areas remain in the countryside of those societies, where peasant relations of production still resist capitalist pentration). In the social formation of the periphery on the other hand, stage three has not generally been reached (except marginally and in a distorted way as in India's so-called Green Revolution) due to the particular nature

of the articulation between the capitalist and pre-capitalist modes in those societies. The necessities of accumulation on a world scale and the complex nature of the totality formed by the central and peripheric social formations make it both difficult and unnecessary for capitalism to transform the rural societies at the same rhythm it did in Western Europe (or North America in altogether different conditions). These limits, both economic and political, inherent to the capitalist mode of production in the age of imperialism will probably not allow most of the periphery social formation to reach stage three at all and a socialist revolution is thus necessary to achieve any significant improvement in the harmonious development of the productive forces.

In Africa this problem of the productive forces in agriculture multiplies a hundredfold. Not only is agriculture here the overwhelming economic sector in terms of the populations' involvement—hence the socio-economic transformation presenting itself essentially as a transformation of rural life—but the tools and skills available in this sector are extremely primitive in relation to the historical epoch in which they happen to be involved. The era of colonialism has at best stultified the productive forces found in Africa at the initial period and at worst has actually caused them to degenerate by eliminating vital skills and various industrial activities already achieved in Africa by the time of colonialism.[3]

In an economy such as Tanzania's where the general development of the productive forces is agriculture does

not exceed the level of the "2 acres and a hoe" described in the agricultural literature, co-operation is the only way of introducing a higher form of division of labour. This is done through increasing the surface of cultivated land, developing skills through specialization, pooling resources to acquire machinery, implements and inputs in general that would be above the capacity of any one small producer, planning the total manpower resources by allocating them over extended periods so as to reduce and eventually do away with under-utilized labour at slack periods so typical of peasant agriculture. This, of course, can only be eliminated once and for all by the widening of employment opportunities outside agriculture itself. Furthermore, since the development of the productive forces specifically includes the development of the general abilities of the producers themselves, co-operation—if successful—should enable progressive ideas to take root more firmly in all aspects of peasant life; and through co-operative self-management and decision-making it should make the direct producers control more firmly the state apparatus at the local level, thus enhancing their participation in running the economy at national level. Obstacles on this road are of course numerous, since the very underdevelopment of the productive forces and their being scattered over the countryside create a considerable degree of opacity between the decisions and their results which will not be eliminated until production is socialized in the real sense of the term.[4]

But co-operation as such does not have a clear-cut class character. It takes on its class characterists from the general strategy of development in which it is inserted, which is in turn an expression of the interests the ruling class (or alliance of classes) in each particular social formation. It should be needless to point out that only the domination of the proletariat in alliance with the toiling peasantry (and progressive elements from other classes) can determine the overall socialist character of agricultural co-operation (the same would be true of nationalizations in industry). It is a well-known fact that many governments in Africa and the Third World in general (even back in the colonial period) have favoured agricultural co-operation in order to (1) increase their political control of the rural producers, (2) increase the surplus extracted from them at least cost. The mere existence of agricultural co-operation is thus by no means proof of a truly socialist strategy.

The historical experience of the Chinese revolution has shown that the harmonious solving of the contradictions existing inter alia between agriculture and industry have a vital bearing on the expanded growth of the productive forces in both sectors. "Walking on two legs" is then just as basic an element of a socialist strategy as "self-reliance" is, and the absence of the former all but nullifies the latter in fact. Either the existence of an industrial base leads to the stagnation of productive forces in agriculture or—more often—to a heavy

de facto reliance on imported technology and expertise which reinforces the links with imperialism.

The lack of industrial sectors in African economies has often grounded many attempts at bringing about "rural development" including the rarer attempt at producer co-operatives. Reliance on imported tools and technology has time and again caused the failure of many projects, as the supply of such tools and technology has failed to be sustained over time for various reasons, or the tools have proved unsuitable for the local physical conditions, and many other complications that have been discussed many times.

The model of development adopted by People's China for the combined and integrated growth of the agricultural and industrial sectors—and to which an amazing number of "development strategists", both in Western and Third World countries, pay lip service without in the least intending to emulate it—stresses the decentralization of projects and their management at the lowest possible level, thus promoting the diffusion of modern technology in the countryside and furthering the masses' control over it and subsequently their creative contribution to it. The indispensable frame for the successful application of this strategy has of course been the collectivization process which led from individual family farming through mutual aid teams and producer co-operatives to the creation of people's communes. The different stages of the transition have always been marked by an increased participation of the

masses in the class struggle, both against renascent differentiation in the countryside and the threat presented by the entrenchment of a state bureaucracy. The process of collectivization is thus not a formal or "organizational" solution to the problems of the peasantry but a manifestation of the ever-present class contradictions in the society and the necessary way to solve them. It is first and foremost of a political process.

We are far from the "solutions" proposed by experts such as those of the World Bank, who at various times in the early years of Tanzania's independence recommended several types of "rural development" policies which failed in unison. Perhaps it is appropriate here to remind ourselves of these experiences if only to show the technical aspect of these failures. Through the "transformation approach" recommended by a World Bank mission,[5] Tanzania soon after independence in 1961 started some twenty-three "settlement schemes" on which were settled more than 3,400 rural families.[6] These were very capital-intensive projects, the total cost after the two years during which they lasted before they were abandoned for failure, was more than 18 million shillings, without taking into account the vast administrative and other expenses incurred outside the individual schemes themselves.[7]

The capital inputs just could not be justified by the productivity that finally resulted from this investment. Above all, however, the machinery imported was quite often dorminant—due to the lack

of either spare parts and various other technical ingredients or the skill for proper application or repair. Thus the lack of an indigenous technical foundation made it difficult for production to rise and for the imported machinery to have a multiplier effect on the production process as a whole.

Another attempt by the government to create "block farms" with the assistance of Israel and other aid donors soon met the same fate. The idea was to acquire tractors which would plough large areas of land which would also be sprayed aerially if necessary, but which would then be divided into small plots to be taken care of by individual peasants.[8] This mechanization again could not be maintained for long and its results were anything but impressive.

All these deficiencies are of course in addition to the inappropriateness of the social organization for the projects—for although at the technical level resources had been pulled together, the production process was actually individual in character. There thus never developed the social organization that is essential if the technical innovation is to bear any long-term fruits.[9]

We shall therefore go on to examine Tanzania's attempt to create producer co-operatives and how they relate to the question of the development of the productive forces.

II

The policy of "Ujamaa Vijijini" (Socialism and Rural Development) launched by President Nyerere after

the adoption of the "Arusha Declaration" by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1967 has received considerable attention from scholars and commentators from various parts of the world, and no more than a sketch of its theoretical and ideological background will be given here.[10] As developed by the party leadership and most elaborately by President Nyerere, the policy of ujamaa aims at organizing the Tanzanian peasantry in self-reliant productive units where the major means of production would be held in common and the returns shared according to every member's contribution in labour. The model approximates rather closely the classical definition of an agricultural producer co-operative although in the official ideology, the roots of the policy are said to be found in the traditional practices of co-operation among members of extended families, clans or traditional village units in Africa.[11]

It should be noted that there is a strong "villagisation" component in this policy, i.e. it is considered desirable to organise the peasants into village units of a substantial size, contrary to the settlement patterns prevailing over most areas of Tanzania. This component has tended to become more and more dominant in recent years, culminating in the present villagisation drive aimed at regrouping the entire Tanzanian peasantry into large size villages by 1976. At times this villagisation component has been a much more prominent factor in the implementation of ujamaa villages than the organisation of collective production, local officials being satisfied with the

mere re-grouping of peasants in one village after having stuck the ujamaa label onto it.[12]

The policy recognises three stages in ujamaa development: Stage One (the formative period) represents the grouping of villagers in one place with communal production non-existant or minimal; Stage Two should be reached when the village constitutes a viable economic unit and the villagers have learnt to live and work together; in Stage Three the village is to be registered as a "producer and marketing co-operative society", meaning in principle that most of the production is now carried out on a collective basis and organisation is sufficiently advanced for the unit to have legal recognition. In fact, as pointed out by several authors[13] the attribution of villages to these three categories is quite haphazard and some villages can be officially classified as belonging to Stage Three when there is hardly any communal production at all.[14]

The progression of ujamaa villages (whatever the reality covered by this designation) has been very uneven in the country's regions. In some regions the overwhelming majority of the population has "gone ujamaa" whereas in others the proportion is between one and two per cent. The present villagisation policy, started in 1971 in Dodoma, 1972 in Kigoma and extended to the whole country in September 1973 has added to the ambiguity. For instance, it is not clear whether the new "development villages" (the official designation for the villages formed by regrouping the

population) are supposed to emphasise or not the collective aspect in production. In Dodoma district where the move started earlier and where practically the whole population has been grouped in large villages—at times as large as 5,000 people—all these units have been labelled "ujamaa villages". Actually, the development of collective farming seems to be just as varied in these planned villages as in the earlier more sporadic forms, and it is probably too early to make a comprehensive statement at this stage.[15]

Another element needing emphasis is the steady trend away from participation and initiative at grassroot level and the ever greater concentration of power in the hands of the bureaucracy. Although the official policy stresses the need for the initiative to start, an ujamaa village to be entirely in the hands of the peasants concerned, authoritarian decisions from above have by no means been rare, or at any rate many varied pressures combining threats with promises have often been at the basis of the decision to form ujamaa villages. Another factor not to be underestimated has been the competition between various groups of peasants for government aid.

There again the villagisation programme accentuates these features and starting a village is no longer seen as an autonomous decision emerging when given groups of peasants have reached a certain level of consciousness, but as the implementation of a decision taken at national level and put into practice by the regional and district authorities according to a rhythm of their

own. The somewhat specious argument that villagisation is compulsory for "nation-building" purposes whereas collective production can be decided only by the villagers themselves is belied by the example of Dodoma, where in the drought-stricken areas villagers can have access to famine relief only if they can justify of a certain number of work days in the collective field. A recent statement by the President (18 February, 1975) that members in ujamaa villages should be carefully scrutinized and their commitment evaluated before being allowed to join, may not be realizeable in the circumstances described above.

A very important consequence of the growing commandist trend in the bureaucratic implementation of the ujamaa policy has been that democratic decision-making about production targets, division of labour and sharing of the returns which should all be included in the village plan, have been too often removed from the villagers themselves and entrusted to "experts" from district or regional headquarters. The wealth of knowledge of, and adaptation to, the local environmental conditions which lie dormant among the peasantry cannot be drawn upon and the foreseeable result is that unrealistic decisions are taken and imposed (through persuasion or compulsion) upon the peasants, with negative or even catastrophic results in production output. This in turn increases the passivity of the peasants who feel that they are working "for the government" and put minimum effort in their communal production saving all their energies for their individual plots.[17]

This situation, of course, is by no means unknown in other countries, including the "socialist ones", and finds its roots in the class structure of the society in question. As far as Tanzania is concerned we cannot go into a further analysis of this class structure,[18] but we must point out certain characteristics of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the peasantry. The power of the bureaucracy is largely justified ideologically by the fact that they are the possessors of a type of "knowledge"—i.e. Western technocratic—from which the peasants are radically estranged. They are "experts". The constant display of this "knowledge" is thus a necessity for the reproduction of this relation of commandism and subservience. Trying to engage into a dialogue with the peasants would considerably weaken the position of the bureaucracy, for it would more often than not disclose the purely ideological nature of this "knowledge" and its irrelevance to concrete development task.[19]

The introduction of modern technology in the villages will thus be faced with the consequences of this situation. New agricultural practices, new implements, etc. are presented from above to the "ignorant" peasants, as steps which are progressive in themselves, without hardly any prior study of local conditions. Tractors for instance, are the object of a bureaucratic display of "modern agricultural techniques" and sent to villages which have for one reason or another met the favour of the district officials or appear to them as being particularly

deserving (a notorious example is what happens to the village lucky enough to have an M.P. or some other high official among its members).[20] Very often, costs are not taken into consideration, returns are very low due either to the nature of the crop or to the lack of other inputs which would be necessary to achieve higher yields (weeding and harvesting are very frequent bottlenecks) and the only result of their introduction is to have increased the leisure of the villagers during the cultivation period.

This use of means of production as "prizes" or "rewards" to villages which the bureaucracy favours can have as its only result the further estrangement of the villagers from modern technology—always received from above—and planning, since information on costs and productivity are never made available to them beforehand.[21] For instance a village which has been given, say, ox-ploughs will find itself penalised in comparison with its neighbours who will have "enjoyed" the benefit of having a tractor at their disposal, even if the use of the tractor brings a loss in financial terms. This attitude is emphasised by the bureaucracy who often look down upon "primitive" implements such as ox-ploughs and consider mechanisation as a conspicuous sign of progress. On the other hand, villages which have earned the displeasure of the bureaucracy will find themselves with neither inputs nor technical assistance and will not be able to make full use of resources which might be just as promising.

This vertical relationship always placing the peasants at the receiving end in passive dependence must be considered as the major obstacle to any rural development strategy in Tanzania, much more so than environmental constraints or low ideological level of the peasant masses. It is fairly obvious that with limited capital resources at the country's disposal, labour must be relied upon as the major productive force in the Tanzanian countryside and its better organisation is the key to any further success. Only the villagers themselves can be in a position to assess their manpower resources and democratically direct them into the most valuable activities. It is necessary to put the planning process into their own hands and let them have access to the information vital for this process. It should be the role of the local cadres to provide this information to them and help them reach viable targets instead of bossing them around. It is only within this democratic framework that the development of productive forces, making best use of the scarce capital resources, can be set in motion.

There is some doubt as to whether this can actually be achieved in the present Tanzanian class context without revolutionary change.

III

In order to assess the difficulties to be overcome in the process of developing the productive forces in Tanzania's countryside, it is necessary to focus

on meaningful units of analysis. We will make the district our main focus. Districts are generally fairly homogeneous geographically and socially and their importance has been all the more enhanced with the decentralisation process embarked upon in 1973. Since it is obviously impossible to give a description of all the districts of mainland Tanzania, we will deal with two on account of both variety of environments that they represent and the availability of data on ujamaa villages.*

B. (a) Lushoto District

Lushoto district (Tanga Region) represents a fairly typical example of the over-crowded highlands of North Eastern Tanzania—including also Moshi, Rombo and Pare districts in Kilimanjaro region, as well as part of Morogoro district in Morogoro Region. Its highland part consists of the mountain block of West Usambara which is an "island" of high rainfall in an otherwise dry plain environment. Apart from a dry area in the north eastern corner—mainly Mlola division—rainfall is generally sufficient to permit two grain crops per year and even three in the most humid zones (Bumbuli and Soni divisions). The mountains, once selected by the Germans for their very promising agricultural potential have been faced with increased erosion. Furthermore, the soils are not very favourable for coffee—the main cash crop—compared with the rich volcanic

*Analysis of a third district in this regard is contained in the paper on Handeni district included in this issue of the Review.

soils of Kilimanjaro for instance, and after the coffee boom of the early fifties, returns have decreased almost to insignificance.

Most peasants have coffee plants in their banana plots but devote very little attention to them outside the harvesting season. Tea and vegetables have been introduced as substitute cash crops but they are only suitable for certain areas—especially the former—and the main problem remains that of competition between land requirements for cash and food crops. Holdings per family are around four acres and do not allow more than subsistence production; furthermore, the habit of dividing land equally among all male children has led to extreme fragmentation. In part, this pressure on the land has been resolved temporarily through constant emigration particularly of the youth to towns and perhaps more substantially to the less fertile plains. As a whole then, the tendency has not been towards the accumulation and concentration of land resources; such accumulation as there has been, locally, has taken the form of merchant capital—and already one finds a fairly wealthy trading class concentrated in the "trading centres".

The creation of ujamaa villages has been rather slow in the district due mainly to the fact that the villagisation component of the policy does not apply. Contrary to the pattern prevailing over most of Tanzania, the Shambaa live mainly in clustered villages, often built on steep slopes, so as to leave flatter land for cultivation.[22] Land scarcity is such

that in certain areas practically no sizeable collective field can be created without alienating land from individuals. The following are a few examples of villages in the district:

(i) Mayo (Bumbuli Division): created in 1969 had in 1973 two acres of vegetables for 120 members. There were two working mornings per week, but since it is obviously impossible for all the members to be in the field at the same time, a working day actually represented not more than 80-100 manhours at most. The product for the field between 1 January and 30 April 1973 was shs. 1,605/12. If we assume that these four months total 32 working days, the produce per working day is only about shs. 50/=, i.e. less than fifty per cent per member.

(ii) Kwa Nguluwe (Bumbuli Division): created in 1972 with 71 adult members had selected the collective shamba a large tract of uncultivated and unproductive waste land. They cultivated a quarter of an acre of onions in 1972 and nothing at all in 1973, devoting their time to non-agricultural activities.

(iii) Malibwi (Mlola Division): created in 1970 had in 1973 a ten-acre maize shamba for 500 registered members (this number includes children also, that for productive members can be estimated at around 130). In 1971 they produced 4 sacks of maize—valued at shs 160/= and in 1972 ten sacks—shs 400/=. In 1973 the harvest was nill "because of drought".

It can easily be seen that these figures are much too low to encourage the existing members, not

to speak of attracting the potential ones. Taking into account the environmental conditions, i.e. the mountaneous nature of the district, tractorisation is hardly applicable there—except maybe in a few rare instances of flat valley lands. Development of the productive forces has thus to be seen initially as consisting mainly in the intensification of labour, improvement of skills and the use of various ingredients in the labour process (fertilisation, chemicalisation, irrigation, quality control of seed, soil conservation, etc). Such steps cannot bear substantial results in the existing socio-economic framework which makes for drastic fragmentation of land resources, chronic unemployment/underemployment, concentration of efforts on export crops and close domination of the producers by the parasitic traders and bureaucrats who, as in the case of the "marketing co-operatives" and "marketing boards", tend to be one and the same. In other words, therefore, the very lack of such policies and the very limited possibility of success should they ever be attempted are defined in the last instance by the political economy not of Usambara as such but of the country as a whole.

The role ujamaa villages can play in this regard within the present context is obvious: by providing the opportunity to combine the labour force of relatively large numbers of people they can introduce an increased division of labour, specialisation and all that goes with them. At the moment, however, one sees very little division of labour in the villages—partly because nearly all of them have too little

co-operative resources and partly because their production as such can hardly be considered sufficiently organised for development. In most cases, ujamaa work consists simply of the juxtaposition of individual efforts which, moreover, are insignificant even as far as the individual peasant is concerned. For instance, in Mayo ujamaa village, each member is allocated a given task on the small plot (e.g. cultivating a ridge of about six square metres) and he can do it at a time of his choice. Once the task is accomplished, his name is entered in the register by the secretary.

Following the emphasis laid by the leadership generally, the villages understandably concentrate on producing export crops—even when, as in this case, natural conditions are favourable for other crops. Lushoto district has ample potential for vegetables, fruits and dairy products. Looked at from internal economic needs, these would probably be more appropriate than coffee—but as well-known, export promotion makes for a very irrational pattern of production. In any case, as long as the ujamaa shamba remains so ridiculously small, communal production will remain nothing but symbolic.

The question of land conservation is, of course, very vital. In the colonial period the authorities tried to enforce conservation measures through compulsion; peasant resistance was strong and the measures could not be implemented. It is unlikely that the present bureaucracy can do better

given the same socio-economic conditions, and, in fact some parts of the district (e.g. Mlola division) have almost reached a point of no return as far as erosion is concerned. The success of anti-erosion measures can only be based upon the general level of agricultural skills which were quite developed traditionally—irrigation, manuring, mulching, etc.—and particularly upon the transformation of the mode of production. It is in such a transformation that the problem of unemployment/underemployment would also be tackled—the placing of agricultural production on a scientific footing would be the basis of the development of non-agricultural activities, which nevertheless would be integral to agriculture. At present one sees in the village a few haphazard activities; Malibwi, for instance, has a metal working unit which produces watering cans, most of which are sold in Lushoto town since their unitary price is beyond the reach of most peasants. In general at the moment the reservoir of traditional skills is not only stimulated and developed, but is in most cases not utilised at all—thus one finds many unemployed masons, bricklayers, carpenters, tailors, etc. in a situation where the natural resources are plentiful and the need for their products, judging from the poverty of the mass of the people, is definitely there.

Apart from the smallness of each ujamaa village—as far as the production process is concerned—the lack of a political programme to bring social transformation in the country as a whole

precludes the possibility of integrated activities and plans across a number of villages in the district. Thus resources and skills are fragmented to the extreme and individual efforts to end exploitation or irrational forms of organisation at the local level cannot but be immediately frustrated. The very nature of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the peasantry leads to competition between villages rather than co-operation—each village trying to get more favours for itself, the ultimate result being invariably that the peasantry cannot be an immediate force vis-a-vis the bureaucracy and is, therefore, incapable of extracting resources from the bureaucracy apart from those it itself unevenly and haphazardly dishes out.

The critical issue, therefore, is that the ujamaa villages at the moment cannot escape from the general socio-economic web which militates against the development of the productive forces. As we have seen the ujamaa units are infinitesimal in the Usambara economy. Their organisation and planning are too backward to warrant a process of development in the villages different from non-ujamaa activities. In fact, it might even be argued that the introduction of symbolic production activities simply detracts valuable time and material resources from desired and useful activities and as such is a hindrance the development of the productive forces.

(b) Sukumaland

Sukumaland is the large cotton belt covering

some six districts[24] immediately to the south of Lake Victoria. It is generally a flat terrain, interrupted only sporadically by small hills. Natural vegetation has largely been destroyed by extensive cultivation and cattle rearing, and one finds long stretches of land totally devoid of even the smallest shrubs. In part this is a result of the large concentration of cattle in the area—for there are more cattle per unit of land in Sukumaland than in any other area in Tanzania. But, perhaps a more important reason for this is the gigantic expansion of the area under cultivation that has been going on in Sukumaland in the last three decades.

Soils are relatively good and rains are also average—conditions which have given the area a considerable capacity to support both animal and crop husbandry on a scale hardly equalled by any other area in the country[25] and thus providing for a relatively high population density.[26]

Since the colonial days, Sukumaland has assumed greater and greater importance to the economy of the country as a whole as cotton has come to take an ever greater proportion of export earnings.[27] Cotton production, as a smallholder crop, was introduced in the area by the German administration at the turn of the century. After the second world war, the British laid great emphasis on cotton cultivation in Sukumaland and tried a series of "development" projects aimed at raising productivity.

For historical reasons pertaining to the political

status of the colony, and because of the meticulous attention required in cotton production, the colonial government never attempted any of the large scale projects requiring large investments in this area despite the pressing need for cotton by British industry. Instead, efforts were channelled almost exclusively at improving the productivity of the smallholder farmer. Above all, efforts have been concentrated on expanding the total land area under cotton cultivation.

The immediate consequence of these efforts has been the rapid expansion of the average proportion of land under cotton per household. At the end of the war there was less than an acre of cotton per household on the average, now the figure is about three and a half acres—just over a third of the total cropped area on the average. This expansion has of course been at the expense of food crops grown in the area, particularly since cotton, unlike coffee, for instance, is never interplanted with other crops. Nevertheless, a further consequence has been the even more rapid expansion of Sukumaland as such - because of this incursion by cotton into subsistence production and the need to maintain large tracts of land for the huge cattle herds, the population in the area has been consistently shifting into neighbouring areas which are less densely populated. This shifting was in fact at first consciously induced by the colonial government in the fifties through a "resettlement" plan which moved a large proportion of the people from the more densely populated districts of

Mwanza and Kwimba into the neighbouring districts, chiefly Geita. Since then, "Sukumaland" has gradually expanded as both cotton and cattle have moved with the population into the neighbouring regions of Tabora, Kigoma, Mara, etc.

The overall results of this has been a tenfold increase in cotton production. But this increase has resulted solely from the expansion of acreage under cotton, the peasants' productivity has by and large remained stagnant,[28] despite the concerted efforts to exhort them to plant and harvest early, to weed and burn stocks properly, to use insecticides and fertilisers, etc. Although the area has received by far the highest concentration of field assistants from the various technical ministries, and although various official projects have been attempted there, cotton husbandry has not improved appreciably and productivity has by and large remained stagnant.[29]

A crucial aspect to this failure to improve productivity has been the negligible impact which the rapid commercialisation of production in the area has had on the instruments of labour. The local beneficiaries of this commercialisation have been essentially those engaged in intermediary activities—chiefly transporting and trading of all sorts. Such surpluses as have been appropriated by these elements have not found their way back in agricultural production but—where they have not been wasted in conspicuous or bureaucratic consumption—have been invested in the urban areas in non-productive spheres such as houses for letting, shops, petrol stations, etc.

Furthermore, as far as the producers themselves are concerned, this commercialisation has not led to a rapid process of social differentiation as has been the case elsewhere. There definitely has not emerged a substantial kulak class with a firm base in land and cotton production, instead one has a fairly strong class of both Asian and African traders who are very wealthy and expanding their activities everywhere else except in production.

Cotton cultivation has therefore remained a peasant crop, and most work is done by household labour using essentially hand tools. Increasingly, however, ploughs and tractors have been playing a bigger and bigger role—but again this has resulted from attempts by the traders to maximise their profits through having a firmer grip over those who produce the wealth. Tractor hiring has become a very lucrative business for tractor owners.[30] The productive forces thus continue to be at a very low level because of this social structure. Fertilisers and insecticides are things on which the authorities have emphasised a great deal, but again without much success since the resources of the actual producer are limited by his exploitation by the trader—not to speak of the unequal exchange between his product and the industrial goods on the international market.

We have already referred to the "block farms" that were started by the independent government in the sixties in Sukumaland with a view to creating farm sizes that would allow mechanisation and in some

cases aerial spraying. Since in actual fact production in these farms continued to be individual in character, there could not develop the social organisation necessary if the technical organisation was to bear long-term fruits; and in any case, as we have seen, this technical capacity in a situation of underdevelopment was bound to be extremely limited both in the long and short run.

With the launching of the policy of ujamaa villages in 1967, several of these units began to emerge in Sukumaland more or less spontaneously. As elsewhere in the country, these units were very varied in nature—some had very substantial degrees of communality while others performed co-operative activities more or less in a symbolic manner, some were reasonably well organised while others were in total disarray, etc. We shall now concentrate on Mwanza district as a case in point. The following table summarises the growth of these units in the units in the district.[31]

Ujamaa Villages in Mwanza District

	Villages	House-holds	Men	Women	Children	Total
1969/70	16	822	1,027	769	1,548	3,344
1970/71	42	1,493	1,689	1,367	4,171	7,227
1971/72	76	3,053	3,043	2,164	7,088	12,295
1972/73	75	3,343	3,519	2,387	7,973	13,879

With the policy of "ujamaa villages", naturally official attention increasingly focused on the established

villages. The units began to receive topmost priority in the allocation of government resources, field assistants increasingly were stationed in ujamaa villages and in some cases came to be seconded entirely to individual villages. The tractors that had been used in the previous attempt to establis "block farms" were in some cases handed to individual ujamaa villages but in most cases were retained by the authorities to be loaned gratis to villages in succession during the cultivation season. The immediate problem that arose with this "tractorisation" was once again that of break-downs. Often tractors were grounded just at the time when they were needed most, and the reason for this often would be the lack of a simple spare part which had to be ordered abroad. At times, however, even when such spare parts were readily available, the skills and experience required were not at that grass-root level—as usual no plans had been made to train at least a few peasants in the rudiments of tractor maintenance. Hence, the physical presence of tractors in any ujamaa village did not necessarily mean that the production process was mechanised.

Nevertheless, another issue that cropped up as far as mechanisation was concerned was the correlation between the tractor's capacity to cultivate land and the labour force required to carry out the other productive processes on that land not touched by the tractor. For, in this case, the tractor could only plough the land and make ridges but weeding, applying fertilisers and insecticides and above all

picking and grading the cotton continued to be done manually.[32] Thus where mechanisation expanded the area under cotton cultivation, these processes became unbearable for many small and average size ujamaa villages. The average size of ujamaa villages in the district is 45 households with limits of seven and 263 households.

Because of the emphasis on cotton on the part of the authorities, most villages naturally have tended to put more of their land under cotton, thus extremely exhausting their capacity to mobilise their labour resources. We encountered a village of less than twenty thousand acres which, with the generous assistance of the government tractors, had cultivated so many acres of cotton that no even five times their number would have been able to weed the field sufficiently and harvest the crop. In the end more than half of the crop had to be left in the field rotting.[33] This problem was, of course, multiplied by the very little organisational ability of these units to effectively mobilise their labour resources for co-operative activities at this early stage when the benefits of such activities are as yet unclear to the participants. Based on a sample of nine villages in Mwanza region, it was found in 1969/70 that the annual proportion of utilised to available labour on co-operative activities was 52.9 for males and 56.6 for females (with the lowest turn-up for some months being 32.4 and 24.9 per cent for males and females respectively).[34]

Indeed, the problem of production in the ujamaa villages has been an issue at national level, for in

most cases it has been found that while fields cultivated by these villages singly assume a very large size, in actual fact they are insignificant in terms of the labour force available to them. This, however, is not simply a question of the peasants being deceived by the apparently large size of their collective endeavours, but essentially it is a question of the extent to which the peasant can depend on the co-operative farm when, invariably, its organisation is most uncertain and experience has taught him that "development" projects initiated by the authorities always fail and it is he who suffers most from the failure. His caution is, therefore, quite understandable.

In a sample of 24 villages in the district, it was found in 1973 that 42 per cent of the villages did communal work for three days in the week, 21 per cent for four days, 8 per cent for five days, and only 4 per cent for six days per week.[35] Needless to add, the length and intensity of the working day are equally varied. In the 75 villages in the district a total of 7072 acres of communal plots was cultivated in the 1971/72 season, which means on an average there were 45.2 acres per village and 0.9 acres per person who took part in ujamaa work[36]—an average that is definitely much below the average production in the area even when one takes into account the fact that villagers in nearly all cases had substantial private plots also.[37]

As far as the application of fertilizers and insecticides is concerned, the formation of ujamaa

villages has had some positive effect. This is because the authorities have been enabled to enforce more effectively their instructions to the peasantry, these chemicals are delivered to the villagers as a matter of course (the villagers compelled to pay for them when they market their produce), and the presence of government staff right in some of the villages has the effect of making sure that instructions are followed—particularly if the villagers, as is always the case, are expecting other forms of government assistance (e.g. education, health, water supply, famine relief, etc.). Yet definitely it cannot be claimed that productivity in these units has increased in any substantial manner—at least if the present inability of the villages to attract many new members is anything to go by.

Thus, once again we see that it is the social structure that is the basic cause of both the low level of the productive force and particularly the lack of any significant progress. The ujamaa villages as production units within this structure cannot be expected to avoid this general problem. Undoubtedly, the extent to which ujamaa organisation and production has gone cannot be put at the same level as the Lushoto case. The efforts to increase cotton production on the part of the authorities have meant that ujamaa must be implemented more seriously here. Yet the ultimate results cannot be much different from those encountered in Lushoto. So far as the approach of the bureaucracy is that of issuing

technical assistance, in as much as this bureaucracy is essentially parasitic on the production process and in as much as the producers are closely dominated and exploited by a commercial class with no interests in the production process itself, the development of the productive forces cannot but be minimal despite the enthusiasm on the part of the official and, in some cases, the population as such to implement the new policy of ujamaa.

IV

Much has been written regarding the innumerable problems that Tanzania's ujamaa villages as institutions face. The issues that have been discussed most often are those concerning the almost complete lack of economic planning and organisation, the shortage of (and where it is available haphazard nature of) government technical assistance, the dire need for political guidance, etc. (see Part II above). From a national point of view, however, the most crucial question has been the apparent failure of the ujamaa policy to make any positive impact on rural production.

Obviously, the low level of production and of the rate of progress in rural Tanzania cannot be explained outside an analysis of the existing social structure and of the manner in which the economy is linked to the international capitalist economy. Hence the fact that this particular policy has not proved to be a substantial basis upon which improvement in rural production could have been generated arises from the failure of the policy to address itself to

the fundamental problems of social structure and economic integration. In essence, therefore, the issue is really one of policy: to be able to sufficiently mobilise and organise the masses in a manner which would extricate the economy from its domination and exploitation by international capitalism requires a class base and an ideological perspective which hardly a single African government can be credited with at present.

It is, therefore, not at all accidental that the various attempts to bring about "development" have generally failed to accomplish any measurable results. As we write, the policy of ujamaa villages has already begun to lose its official limelight and judging by the measures taken for the rural areas especially since 1974, it is doubtful if the policy is going to last for long in concrete practice. Increasingly, the problems of a dependent and dominated economy have grown to such proportions that drastic measures have had to be resorted to in place of the gradual efforts to create producer co-operatives. By the end of 1973—i.e. just seven years after the policy of ujamaa villages had been launched—the twin issues of declining foreign exchange reserves and shortage of foodstuffs due to the stagnation of the agricultural sector and worsening terms of trade for agricultural produce in the world marked, had become too critical to be contained within existing policies.

What the ujamaa villages policy has tried to do is to raise rural production through political

exhortation and enlargement of peasants' scale of operations. Apart from co-operation, the policy has held constant the amount of technology available in these units, the idea being to simply combine the resources in the hands of the peasants for more rational utilisation. It will be recalled that this policy was formulated in the light of the failure of earlier rural policies—particularly the "settlement scheme" and "block farms" approaches. These earlier policies had followed the line that it is only by rapid capital injection that rapid progress in rural production could be made—forgetting, as we have already seen, both the necessity for appropriate forms of social organisation, and the structural requirements for the continued availability of those capital inputs. The resultant policy went to the other extreme—caring only for co-operative organisation without providing for the technical strength (without which even this form of social organisation cannot be sustained for long).

The experience gained in the attempts to implement the policy so far is that first the units do not show any consistent improvement in production and hence in their members' standard of living, a fact which leads to numerous social conflicts which are, of course, aggravated by the lack of enlightening ideological leadership from the officials. The units, therefore, generally have a high tendency to disintegrate, a fact which obviously makes it more difficult to convince the other peasants to form similar units. Hence, success has been most difficult

whether one looks at implementation from the perspective of individual ujamaa villages or those of implementing the policy towards the entire rural economy.

The official response to this—and particularly to the problems of food shortages and declining foreign exchange reserves—has been to move from this ideological exhortation to physical compulsion. At the beginning of 1974, it was suddenly decided to begin compulsory villagisation—resettlement of the entire rural population into new areas where it is easier for the officials to see to it that the bureaucratic instructions regarding agricultural production are followed by the peasants. Needless to add, the emphasis now is just on "production"—and the concept of co-operation has, therefore, lost much of its earlier prominence.[38]

Judging from past experience, it can hardly be expected that the new approach will solve the existing contradictions and lead to increased economic and social development. If anything, the attempts to increase export crops in the rural areas will only intensify the social contradictions basic to a dependent and dominated economy.

The argument presented here, therefore, is that the development of the productive forces under the system of underdevelopment (as everywhere) is first and foremost a political question. We refrain from offering "solution" regarding the technical organisation of co-operative production. For the failure to maintain tractors in ujamaa villages, the lack

of chemicals and better seeds, the failure to provide the peasants with political and technical guidance, etc. are all structural problems arising both from the nature of the economy and the social basis of political power, and as such they cannot be solved by any suggested improvement of "techniques".

As far as mechanisation is concerned, for instance, the process is bound to continue to be one-sided and thus fail to bring any genuine overall development of the productive forces until an indigenous industrial base is constructed in these countries. For developing the agricultural sector of the economy necessarily means strengthening the industrial base at the same time and as rapidly as possible since time is vital that respect, and beginning to make full use of the country's resources both in the industrial and agricultural sectors. This process will definitely bring upheavals in the social structure for it will be indispensable to mobilise the large masses of the people instead of leaving the decision-making process in the hands of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie—and this is a feat that the ruling-classes in Africa have not yet accomplished.

Recognizing the problems that often arise when mechanised production is introduced in rural Africa, some observers have concluded that mechanisation per se is inappropriate in Africa, "the governments of developing countries must realise that the continuance of hard labour in agriculture is not shameful but a rational response to the prevailing

circumstances".[39] This is nothing but a defense and rationalisation of those "prevailing circumstances", for the masses of Africa definitely need mechanisation so as to increase their cultivatable area, increase yields, reduce fatigue, etc.—only that the political organisation for this is at the moment absent.

Others have urged for more "cautious" mechanisation. Dumont has for instance suggested that the tractor should come only by stages—first steps being directed at increasing the quality of work with hand tools and improvement of these hand tools themselves, then attempts should be made to introduce insecticides and fungicides, manures and fertilisers; "When the spread of these new means of production has allowed a fairly significant yield level to be reached, and when the knowledge of husbandry and mechanical knowledge are raising it more quickly, then one can think of the tractor".[40] These reformist approaches have been tried both by the colonial governments and their successors without any measurable success.

The underlying assumption of these "solutions" is the idea that Africa is still at an early socio-economic level long traversed by the developed countries. Analysing the failure of the colonial government to institute mechanised farming of groundnuts in Tanganyika, one author asked: "Is it possible for Africa to go direct from the Middle Ages to the twenty-first century? Can you cut the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, which was its aftermath?"[41] The fact is

NOTES

1. S. Amin et K. Vergopoulous, La question paysanne et le capitalisme, Paris, 1974.

2. P.P.Rey, Les alliances de classes, Paris, 1973.

3. W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Dar es Salaam, 1972.

4. Cf. (Bettelheim, La transition vers l'economie socialiste, Paris, 1968 and Calcul economique et formes de propriete, Paris, 1970.

5. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Tanganyika, Baltimore, 1961.

6. J.R.Nellis, A Theory of Ideology: the Tanzanian Example, Nairobi, 1972.

7. The story of these schemes has been retold many times, see for instance, A.O.Ellman, "The Introduction of Agricultural Innovations through Co-operative Farming", East African Journal of Rural Development, vol. 3, no. 2, 1971; L. Cliffe and G.L. Cunningham, "Ideology, Organisation and the Settlement Experience" in L. Cliffe and J. Saul (eds.) Socialism in Tanzania, vol. 2, Dar es Salaam, 1973; and N. Newinger, "Village Settlement Schemes" in H. Rutherberg (ed.) Smallholder Farming and and Smallholder Development in Tanzania, Munich, 1968.

8. J.D.Heijnen, "The Mechanised Block Cultivation Schemes in Mwanza Region, 1964-69" Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, Research Report no. 9, Dar es Salaam, 1969.

9. For case studies of settlement schemes in Tropical Africa, see R. Chambers, Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa, London, 1969.

10. The policy document, "Socialism and Rural Development" by President Nyerere is reprinted in his Freedom and Socialism, Dar es Salaam, 1968.

11. Cf. L. Cliffe, "Traditional Ujamaa and Modern Producer Co-operatives in Tanzania" in C.G. Widstrand (ed) Co-operation and Rural Development in East Africa, Upsalla, 1970; and H. Mapolu, "Tradition and the Quest for Socialism", Taamuli, 1973.

12. C.f. P. Raikes, "Ujamaa Vijijini and Rural Socialist Development" East African Universities Social Science Conference, 1973; H. Mapolu, "The Social and Economic Organisation of Ujamaa Villages", M.A. Thesis (mimeo).

13. Cf. the case of Ikwiriri ujamaa village in H. Mapolu, ibid.

14. Cf. unpublished research papers by Sociology students in Dodoma district.

15. Cf. P. Raikes, op.cit. and M. von Freyhold, "Rural Development through Ujamaa", Dar es Salaam 1972, for all the problems cited.

16. Cf. P. Raikes, "Village Planning for Ujamaa", Taamuli, 1972.

17. Ibid.

18. Cf. the various studies by I. Shivji, Tanzania: the Silent Class Struggle, Dar es Salaam, 1973, and Class Struggles in Tanzania, Dar es-Salaam, 1976.

19. For a smilar view of the role of the bureaucracy in another African country, see G. Althabe, Oppression et liberation dans l'imaginaire, Paris, 1969.

20. For instance, the case of Butiama ujamaa village in Mara region, has been studied by J. Bugengo "Ujamaa in Mara", East African Universities' Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, 1973 (mimeo).

21. Cf. Raikes, op.cit.

22. On the general problems of development in Lushoto district, see. M. Attems, in H.Ruthenberg (ed.), op.cit.; and L. Cliffe, W. Lutrell and J. Moore, "The Development Crisis in the Western Ujsambaras" in L. Cliffe et al. (eds.) Rural Co-operation in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 1975.

23. Cf. L. Cliffe, "Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period" in L. Cliffe and J. Saul (eds.), op. cit.

24. The districts are Mwanza, Geita, Kwimba and Magu in Mwanza Region and Shinyanga and Maswa in Shinyanga region.

25. Cf. D. Conyers et al. "Agro-economic zones of Sukumaland", BRALUP Research Report, no. 16 Dar es Salaam, 1970.

26. The density is 63 persons per km^2 for Mwanza region (the highest among Tanzania's regions) and 21 persons for Shinyanga region.

27. Cotton now contributes about 30 per cent of all agricultural export earnings, and Mwanza and Shinyanga regions contribute about 75 per cent of the country's cotton produce.

28. Cf. BRALUP, "Preliminary Report of the Sukumaland Interdisciplinary Research Project".

29. Cotton yields in Tanzania for 1971/72 are 205 pounds per acre, compared to an average of 241 for Africa as a whole, 243 for Asia, 296 for E. Europe, 479 for North America, and 645 for W. Europe: Cotton World Statistics, July 1972.

30. Ox-ploughs are not very popular since their ability to cultivate the land well enough for cotton is limited.

31. Mapolu, "The Social...", op.cit. p.68.

32. According to the Tanzania Cotton Growing Handbook prepared by the Lint and Seed Marketing Board and the Ministry of Agriculture, the labour requirements for an acre of cotton in Sukumaland are: 8 man-days to "sessa", 11 man-days to ridge, 2 man-days to sow, 4 man-days to tie-ridge, 4-6 man-days to weed per weeding,

2 man-days to apply fertiliser, half a man-day to spray.

33. This was quite common particularly in 1968-70 all over Tanzania.

34. R.D. Sharma "Manpower Utilisation in Ujamaa Villages", Ukiriguru Research and Training Institute Report.

35. H. Mapolu, op.cit., p. 85.

36. Ibid, p. 70.

37. According to R.D. Sharma "Studies in the Economics of Farm Management in Sukumaland and West Lake Region" the average farm size in Sukumaland is about 4 ha. with limits of 1.81 and 6.13.

38. Cf. A.C. Coulson, "The Evolution of Rural Policies in Tanzania", ERB paper 1975.

39. M. Hall, "Mechanisation in East African Agriculture" in G. Helleiner (ed.) Agricultural Planning in East Africa, Nairobi 1968, p. 109.

40. R. Dumont, Tanzania's Agriculture after the Arusha Declaration, Dar es Salaam, 1968.

41. A. Wood, The Groundnut Affair, London, 1950, p. 245.

42. Cf. A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, 1967.