THE PROBLEM OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE POLITICS OF UJAMAA VIJIJINI IN HANDENI

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A. The Colonial Heritage of the Peasants

Agriculture and industry are interactions between man and nature for the benefit of man. Man's ability to satisfy his needs in this interaction depends not only on the tools, skills and social organisation but also on the natural environment he has to deal with. Both the capacity of man to deal with his natural environment and the characteristics of this environment itself, are, however, the product of human history. Marx's dictum in his critique of Feuerbach, that nature untouched by man no longer exists except maybe on a few Australian coral islands comes immediately to mind when one considers an area like Handeni where large stretches of wilderness and the apparent inability of the peasants to get a reasonable standard of living out of nature are a manifestation of man's failure to tame nature.

Handeni comprises some 13,260 square kilometres and was in 1967 inhabited by about 133,000 people. In adapting to the environment on the one hand and the colonial economy on the other, most farmers in the district grow as much maize as they can, supplemented by a bit of cassava, some cooking bananas, and a bit of sorghum. Better-off people usually own some cattle. Exceptions to this general pattern are the Masai in the western part of the district who rely exclusively on cattle ; the people living around the Nguru Mountains who grow coffee; a minority of farmers in eastern and central Handeni who have been persuaded to grow cotton; and some farmers towards the northeast who have cashewnu+ trees.

Most peasants in Handeni cultivate only about three acres of land per year because the cultivation season is usually too short to do much more. In most parts of the district the rains are unreliable. Sometimes they do not fall at all, often they fall at times when they are not yet or no longer expected; and often they come in form of few heavy downpours which stop before the peasants have been able to assure sufficient harvest. The average rainfall in about two-thirds of the district varies between 600 and 1,000 mm in most years but the irregular distribution of these rains over the seasons makes agriculture even more precarious than these figures would suggest. Ground water and the three main rivers that run through the district are salty and thus offer few opportunities for irrigation.

Apart from the rains, peasants in the area have to struggle with numerous wildpigs, baboons and birds which destroy their crops. Most parts of the district are also tse-tse infested.

When the German traveller Oscar Baumann passed through Uzigua in the eighties of the last century, he was struck by the prosperity and industriousness of the people in that area. He found large fields where cereals were grown, sorghum during the big rains,

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maize during the short rains. Harvests were obviously big enough to satisfy local demand and left a surplus for export to the coast from where clothes and a variety of small consumer items were imported. The people lived in villages comprising 10-200 round houses and most of these houses were spacious and well-built, (Oscar Bauman, "Usambara und seine Nachbargebiete", Berlin, 1891, p. 265ff.).

A traveller passing through roughly the same area today would say that Baumann's observations apply only to minorities. A minority of people look strong and healthy, most others are slim and of light build. Eye diseases, fevers and signs of malnutrition are frequent; particularly among the children. Some people in Eastern Handeni complain that their children are smaller than they used to be. Some houses, either square or round, are big and well built; many others are small and decrepid. A few people have comparatively big fields; many others cultivate only small plots. A few people also can afford various consumer items, most others have nothing but the bare minimum.

Until quite recently most people lived scattered in the bush with as little contact with the tax-collector as possible and with very few social services like schools or dispensaries, particularly in eastern Handeni.

Group discussions in two ujamaa villages in eastern Handeni indicate that the discrepancy between actual incomes and people's demand for things was much greater in this part of the region than along the coast. People reckoned that even in a normal year small farmers earn only about half of what they would define as minimum cash needs, and during years of drought they have almost no financial reserves. In June 1971, after two seasons of harvest failures in 1970, people could be heard complaining loudly in shops and in the queues waiting for famine relief about the difficulties they were in. The assumption that people in eastern Handeni are satisfied with the conditions of under-development in which they find themselves is nothing but a myth.

Although it is always difficult to prove that a people was better off sixty years ago, it appears likely that the Zigua, the main ethnic group in the district, have suffered not only a relative but an absolute deterioration of their living conditions as a result of colonialism. The cause of the decline seems to have been the destruction of the traditional agricultural system under the Germans and the introduction of maize as the major cash-and-food crop in the 1920s.

Peasant historians in Uzigua still recall the days when their people used to live in clan-villages. They say that in those days each village would usually cultivate a "communal" field belonging to the clan head who would distribute the harvet in times of want. Besides this, each family would have its own farm usually in a kind of block-farm system together with others. The major staple was sorghum and it was customary to remove the outer layers of the grains before they were cooked. These skins were kept as a

famine reserve. Cattle were herded communally and are reported to have been much more numerous than today.

People claim that in those days Handeni was well suited for cattle raising and that this had been the major reason why they had moved into the area several centuries before the arrival of the Germans. Many of the places which are today overgrown with tse-tse infested bush are reported to have been savannah-like grazing grounds with only a few trees while cattle and men kept the bush from growing. Livestock and sorghum were suited to the ecology of the area and gave peasants a reliable food base and some (surplus for trading in most year—hence the prosperity which the early) German intruders noticed.[1] The disruption of this pattern and the loss of control over the environment began with the catastrophes which hit a large part of Tanzania at the beginning of the colonial period. (See H. Kjekshus, "Ecology Control and Economic Development", unpublished mimeo, Dar es Salaam 1975).

The German wars of colonial conquest destroyed people, crops and cattle in parts of Uzigua in 1889 and 1890. By that time the rinderpest which had been introduced to Africa during the Italian campaigns in Ethiopia reached the country and in a decade of epidemics destroyed most of the livestock of many peoples in the country including the Wazigua. Famines, excerbated by the loss of livestock, smallpox and jigger-epidemics followed and the old settlements broke up as people fled to the bush to hunt for food and to escape epidemics

and the obligations to feed starving kin. Those who remained, found themselves exposed to German coercion to pay taxes and raise cotton and many decided to retreat to less accessible places because of that.

As bush grew in areas previously reserved for man, his crops and his livestock and as men and stock moved into the realm of the wild animals, the tse-tse fly began to spread and became a carrier of disease deadly to livestock and man thus preventing the recovery from the earlier catastrophes. The Zigua are reported to have responded to the loss of livestock caused by the fly by turning to sacrificial infanticide "until the Germans hanged so many that they gave up the custom".[2]

After that most of the Zigua had to learn to live as agriculturalists without cattle in an environment which is only marginally suited to agriculture.

The fact that people had to live in small hamlets, scattered in the bush, each household fighting separately for its own survival, increased the difficulties of coping with the environment. Sorghum became more difficult to grow because the bird problem became less manageable on the small plots, where families could no longer share the labour of scaring away the birds. At least in eastern Handeni permanent cultivation had also become impossible. Although fields in that part of Handeni are believed to retain sufficient fertility for about ten years of cultivation, there is a certain weed which makes cultivation difficult between the third and the fifth year. Instead of struggling

against this weed people got used to shifting their fields every second or third year. On the abandoned fields regrowth of bush favoured the further multiplication of tse-tse flies.

In the 1920s, maize which was easier to protect from birds, easier to harvest, higher priced, but also more susceptible to drought, became the major crop. From 1929 onwards existing records indicate recurrent famines in the area which followed a somewhat cyclical pattern: a series of good years followed by a series of bad years and so on.

The years 1929, 1930, 1933 and 1934 are reported as years of severe drought leading to famine from 1930 onwards; 1935-38 are described as very good years. The second world war period is not very well covered by agricultural records but there are reports of inadequate food supply in Handeni in 1945. 1948 is mentioned as a year of record production and in 1949 Handeni is praised as the "granary" of the region. 1950 is mentioned as a less favourable year, 1952-54 are again years of drought and shortages.[4] Rainfall patterns alone would not suffice to explain the prolonged periods of famine since 1930. The cause was maize farming and its consequences. Maize could fail more easily than sorghum and the soft variety grown in the district was very susceptible to weevil attacks and hence difficult to store. So people would not keep more than the seed for the next season and supplies for long period of months. The rest would be sold. When the next harvest failed, maize flour and seed were difficult to get on the market,

even for those who had saved some of their money; and the maize that could be bought for planting was often of inferior quality. Lack of food would also diminish the farmers physical capacity to cultivate. Agricultural advice which promoted maize when a few harvests had been good and reminded the farmer again of sorghum after a few failures must have reinforced the cycle of famine and abundance.

1970 was again a year of drought and the maize which most farmers in eastern Handeni had tried to grow both on private and communal farms failed almost completely in both rainy seasons. By the beginning of 1971 the whole area was on famine relief and some of the old mechanisms were at work again. In spite of the good road system, there was little maize flour in the shops for those who were able to buy it and there was almost no seed on the market. For the communal fields, seed was given freed but for the private farms there was not enough available, even for cash. In order to make the most of the rainy season, ambitious farmers usually start planting a few weeks before the rains have really set in, risking a loss of their seed if the rains are much later than expected. Since seed was scarce in early 1971 and the rains came late, farmers either took the risk of planting early and then ran out of seed when they had to replant or they were cautious and planted only when they were sure of the rains which in effect meant planting too late for a really good harvest since the rains did not last very long. In either case the necessity to economize on seeds reduced the opportunity to recover from the drought of 1970.

The colonial policy towards the maize-and-famine problem was mainly one of forcing people to grow cotton, cassava and a bit of sorghum. The government also used to store part of the marketed maize within the district to sell it back to the peasants in case of shortages. In the last instance, when all these measures failed, famine relief was distributed usually tied to some kind of work such as participation in road construction or block farming.

Although enforcement campaigns kept on repeating themselves throughout the colonial period, particularily after each famine, they never managed to get the majority of the people to grow sufficient cotton, cassava or sorghum. The main obstacle was the short planting season which forced people to choose whether they would rick growing so much maize that they would have sufficient maize to sell and eat if the rains lasted or whether they would use the time for crops which might be a bit more drought-resistant but gave them lower returns in good years. Growing too much cotton meant having too little food in the end in any case since it would have been expensive and often even impossible to buy food on the market if the peasant had not grown it himself. Another obstacle was cotton pests which could not be prevented if droughts before the harvest made spraying impossible. Concentrating on cassava meant poor nutrition since peasants in Handeni could not afford to garnish the cassava with meat, fish or coconut milk. For peasants in Handeni it was already a state of famine if they had nothing to eat but cassava; and they were thus unwilling to consider this crop as an alternative to famine relief.

The main impact of the enforcement campaigns on the one hand and the famine relief on the other was to create a particular kind of unstable relationship between the administration and the peasants. In years following good harvests peasants would retreat into the bush to escape tax-collectors and crop inspections and to grow what they wanted. After a period of drought peasants would come back again to stay near the administrative centres and to do whatever they were told in order to get the famine relief. In times of need it was easy to push the peasants in the district around which provided good opportunities for ambitious officials who wanted to prove that they could cut through the Gordian knot and provide some permanent solution to the problems of the area. In some cases a bumper crop of cotton or big increase in cassava cultivation resulted from these activities but in the end the lives of the peasants never changed.

Although the peasants were forced into submissiveness towards the administration they would not allow the administration to "deliver" them from their plight. Most of the administrative projects to help the peasants were in any case short-sighted and of little use but even the few suggestions that were sound went unheeded simply because they came from outside. Peasants in Handeni had lost control over their environment, over their future, even over their survival. They could only regain it by their own initiative which was preempted by the paternalism of the administration.

A colonial officer who had worked in Handeni from 1952-54 and came back seven years after independence was

was surprised to see how little agricultural policy in Handeni had changed in these fourteen years.[4] He noted that the administration was still busy promoting cotton and cassava, the only difference being now that peasants were asked to grow two acres of cassava instead of only one as they were expected to during colonial days. Despite this, cotton production was still erratic and the cassava not enough to prevent famines. If Brokensha had come again in 1976 he would have found the major crop maize, and that the administration still thought it should promote cotton and cassava to back up the unreliable maize production. There are also plans to try sorghum again although in practice this crop has been neglected over the last few years.

The one development which Brokensha noted as progress compared to the colonial days was the increase of agricultural officers although the figures he gives prove the opposite. Whereas there were about 2,140 people to one agricultural officer in 1954, the ratio was 2,830 people to one agricultural officer in 1969. By 1975 the ratio was about 4,300 people to an agricultural officer. Whether that made much difference is open to question since the advisors did not have anything new to recommend.

Brokensha also remarked that the style of communicating with the people had not changed since colonial days. "I was again vividly reminded of the countless similar meetings when I had harangued unreceptive rural audiences about new projects, and was relieved that

I was no longer on the platform." (ibid. p. 167). He felt his impressions confirmed when he met a policeman who invited the former district officer with the following words: "Haya, ni nchi yako. Ninye mmetangulia, sisi tumefuata." (Loc. cit., p. 168.) (So then, its your country, you have led the way, we have been following.)

The colonial period and the decade that followed it still left the majority of the peasants in Handeni destitute and fatalistic. What made their position worse was the neighbourhood of estates and the coastal areas where people apparently had cash to spend and access to consumer goods which the ordinary peasant in Handeni found very desirable. Some Zigua went to work on the estates or in towns, a much large number moved to Pangani and parts of Tanga to seek more favourable conditions for agriculture but the majority remained behind and buried themselves in their "traditional" culture. Elaborate rituals of passage from birth to adulthood and to death, ancestor worship, rituals for all problems from illness to court cases, spirit exorcisms and dances for mere entertainment were preserved and elaborated and kept people's minds diverted from their daily worries. The preservation of culture also helped to give people a feeling of unity with their clan and neighbourhood which in reality no longer existed since each family household was fighting individually for survival, working alone and eating alone the fruits of their work.

Under the veil of ethnic unity, a certain amount of social differentiaton had also taken place. While

the clan or lineage was no longer able to act as a unit and to reconquer the environment collectively, some individuals had managed to get out of poverty.

For those who had some capital and market connections, Handeni was not a bad place since local wages were low and a variety of market crops could be grown by those who knew how to market them and were no longer tied to maize for the sake of their own consumption. The risks of the unreliable weather could be spread by having farms in several places or by running a small shop or bar or by buying a herd of cattle and sending it to one of the few places in the district where tse-tse was not a menace.

Few people in Handeni managed to get the necessary starting capital for such enterprises from agriculture but chiefs who had had a salary as native authorities, rainmakers, witchdoctors and employees in the modern sector could manage to save sufficient money. For those who had at least something to start with there were, in the 1950s and 1960s, also credits which allowed them to expand.

While the ordinary peasant in Handeni had two to three acres mainly under maize cultivation, these bigger farmers had fifteen, twenty or more acres cultivated by hired labour and grew tobacco, bananas, citrus, cashewnuts, coconuts, sunflower, castor, groundnuts, cotton, rice and a variety of other crops. For most of these crops, except cotton and cashewnuts, the problem was marketing and so these kulaks either had to be traders themselves or have

good connections with traders in order to find regular outlets for their crops.

The common peasants watched the rise of this stratum with ambivalence. Since they were poor and dissatisfied with their poverty, their immediate reaction to the growing wealth of others was intense jealousy which could express itself in various forms of "witchcraft" ranging from psychological intimidation to poisoning. Kulaks who did not know how to deal with this problem were forced to leave the area. Those who remained, wrapped themselves into a cloak of paternalism by building up a clientele of people who depended on them for small favours and assistance. The people who worked for them would not simply be treated as labourers but as poor relatives whom they readily helped in times of famine and who did a bit of work for their benefactors as they would have done for the clan heads in the old days. Other people in the neighbourhood could count on the rich man as a sponsor of rituals, as a mediator between them and the administration, as an advisor, and as someone they could borrow a bit of food from if the year's harvest was very bad. As a representative of his followers, the kulak could in turn make contacts with the administration which made it easier for him to get credits, licenses, advice and exemption from various enforcement campaigns.

In order to market their crops and to get goods and customers for their shops and bars, kulaks needed to be close to readily accessible roads.

In 1962 the Chalinze-Korogwe Road was built through eastern Handeni and it was bitumenized in 1968. Among the first people to come and settle along the road and along the Korogwe-Tanga Road were the bigger farmers, the shop-keepers and bar owners and some of their relatives and followers. Around them small villages started growing.

After the abolition of local rate in 1969 those who had remained behind in the bush for fear of the tax collector began to join relatives and friends who had already moved to the road. A slow process of villagization was thus already underway when district and regional authorities decided to start ujamaa in the district.

B. The Formation of Ujamaa Villages In Handeni

On 3 June 1968, government and party leaders met in Handeni to discuss the implementation of ujamaa in that district. It was decided that the district should eventually have 67 ujamaa villages and that in the first year twelve should be started. Most of those villages were planned to be in eastern Handeni and particular emphasis was to be given to Mazingara-Kwamsisi Division. The official argument for concentrating on the most underdeveloped part of the district was that paople there who had not had any help or advice before would feel the benefits of ujamaa most. Some of the regional technical staff however, complain up to the present day that this was a wrong argument and that one should only spend aid where the outlook for quick development is brighter as far as the ecological

conditions are concerned. Another likely reason for concentrating on eastern Handeni was that people in this part were least articulate and least skilled to muster any protest or resistance and that whatever their reactions would be, it would not make any economic difference since the people concerned were only marginally involved in the economy of the district and the region. Leaders also decided that they wanted a few big villages instead of many smaller ones, partly because it was easier to provide services to big villages and partly because a few would be easier to control from outside than many. All villages were to be along the road to make them more accessible.

The next step was to call the Village Development Committee (VDC's) to agree to the tentative location of the ujamaa village, to send a land surveyor to demarcate in a hasty exercise (without consulting the people) the area and to urge ten-cell leaders of the vicinity to collect their people to come and build the village. Whereas in meetings ten-cell leaders would pretend to agree, wild rumours against the new policy started circulating in the affected areas.

While it is difficult to trace the origin of these rumours in detail, it may not be an accident that they were most prevalent in those nucleated settlements that were at a distance from the main road and moreover, the rumours were more directed against ujamaa than against forming villages. According to the rumours, all private property including the women was going to be communalised, the crops grown on the communal farm

were going to be taken by the government and the people who were in the villages were going to be recruited to go to war. Government leaders countered these rumours by holding meetings in which they explained that private property would remain untouched, that private farms and private shops would be allowed in the new villages and that ujamaa was not meant to victimise any particular class. After that the kulaks who had apparently been the source of many of these rumours were more prepared to turn into leaders supporting the move to the villages.

In some area, however, people continued to resist the move mainly because they were afraid to lose fertile and more humid land and ready access to wells if they moved to more arid places without water along the road. Eventually such resistance was countered with threats and outright coercion.

The most directly concerned were people already residing along the road—mainly kulaks and their followers. Official policy proposed to start the villages in places where some kind of nucleus had already emerged but also stressed that only one village would exist within a radius of 5-10 miles. Once those who lived by the road realized that they would have to join an ujamaa village if they wanted to live in peace—and that a larger settlement might even be advantageous to those who were running any kind of business—the struggle centred around the question of where the villages were to be located. Arguments based on traditional taboos such as clan-

boundaries, ancestor-sites and haunted areas were brought forward to rally local support for any particular site if there were several groups in an area wanting the village in different places, they tried to canvass support at the divisional, district, regional or even national level.

Towards the end of 1968, while those at the road still disputed over the sites that had been chosen and those further away from it resisted the idea of moving to the villages at all, a halt was called from Dar es Salaam to the use of coercion and before the middle of 1969 most of those who were responsible for its application were transferred. Up to that time coercion had produced only very limited visible results. At least in eastern Handeni few villages had more than twenty new settlers (with the exception of one place where urban unemployeed had been dumped) and communal farming had hardly started anywhere.

Outright coercion ceased after that and some villages which were further away from administrative centres began to disintegrate almost immediately as most of the people who had been forced to join moved back into the bush.

Most of the village remained, however, because resident kulaks were able to convince those who had come to join them that they might be in trouble again at some later date if they did not stay. In villages nearer to the administrative centres a variety of subtle pressures were used to get more people to join and to persuade those who had joined the villages or were

living in the neighbourhood to take up communal farming. Among the methods used by the administration were the collection of tax arrears outside ujamaa villages and the granting of permanent land rights to ujamaa members combined with the threat that outsiders had to regard themselves henceforce as squatters. Such pressures were increasingly coupled by aid (or aid promises) like water supplies, the training of village medical helpers, dispensaries or schools. The most effective combination of compulsion and aid proved to be the distribution of famine relief in 1971 to ujamaa villages only, forcing outsiders to work on other people's communal fields or to start their own.

Times of famine in Handeni had always been times when people did whatever the administration wanted and so the membership of ujamaa villages increased rapidly in 1971 and 1972.

In order to apply administrative pressures, to keep the newcomers in the villages and get some minimum of communal activities going, the administration needed some support and assistance from within the villages. Without allies from among the peasants, pressure from outside would not have worked.

One source of support for the administration were the kulaks who happened to live at the chosen sites or were persuaded to move there. They had an interest in seeing the new villages grow in order to increase their customers and to make sure that the administration would not shift everybody again to a neighbouring place which grew more rapidly. They

were also keen on keeping good relations with the administration and, therefore, mobilised their followers to engage themselves in communal cultivation even if they themselves were too busy with their own enterprises to do any manual work. Some of these kulaks also had political ambitions and hoped that if they managed to build up the reputation of their village, it would help them to get elected to various political posts.

Whether they had political ambitions or not, communal activities meant to these kulaks nothing but a gesture to please the administration. They did not believe any progress would or should come from communalisation and were careful to limit its scope to activities which did not interfere with their own. They had no wish to undermine the stratum from which they came.

At the other end of the social scale were groups of young farmers and returned migrants who were not keen on the prospects which farming offered and were therefore ready to seize any opportunity to gain income and status by other means. In return for TYL uniforms and some daily rations, they moved around to push other peasants into villages and hoped that they would be rewarded by being allowed to join the national service, or by becoming some sort of professional ujamaa organisers or by being elected to some political posts.

Not all of the young and poor who became active supporters of the ujamaa movement were mere opportunists. At least one or two political activists or proto-cadres

could be found in every village who supported ujamaa because of what they had heard the President say over the radio and because they believed that the problem of the poor could only be solved by cooperation.

The political structure, the social climate and the practical achievements in different villages can be interpreted as a result of the relative strength of the groups which were prepared to implement the policy of ujamaa at the village level: kulaks, the political opportunists and the proto-cadres.

The ordinary villager who had joined as a fellow-traveller because his patron had told him so, or because his relatives had gone there or because he wanted famine relief and some social services, relied on others to define for him what ujamaa was going to mean. He did have an idea that ujamaa should mean decent behaviour and that people in ujamaa villages should help each other in times of need. He was not sure whether there was any particular benefit in working together but was prepared to do so conscientiously for limited periods provided his private farm did not suffer. It was up to others to convince him of the benefits of co-operation. If he was bullied into communal work, he would obey for a while but sooner or later he would rebel or resist.

In the short run the character and success of any village depended on the leadership it had and on the way different leaders interacted with each other. In the long run, of course, only economic success could have convinced the ordinary members to continue and expand communal production.

One initially very successful village, for instance, was run by a politically ambitious kulak who was supported and directed by the Divisional Executive Officer (DEO), the son of the local chief. With the help of the Youth League, these two leaders managed to bully the rest of the village into about one acre of communal cultivation per every active member in the first year of ujamaa farming, plus house-building and self-help activities. The leader himself never touched a hoe and was sometimes already on his way to his private shamba when communal work was still going on. In the second year, the leader managed to squeeze the same amount of labour out of those who came from outside for famine relief while insiders mainly worked on two construction projects, one of them quite impressive. The first leadership crisis occurred when the leader of the Youth League competed with the village leader for Diwani-ship and won. In the year that followed, the DEO died and the villagers deposed their previous chairman. Communal production was discontinued and has not been resumed since.

In another village with about $\frac{1}{4}$ of an acre per active member (excluding outsiders' work) there was a more bizarre configuration. The biggest proto-kulak with no interest in ujamaa whatsoever was the authoritarian leader of the village while one of his wives was a proto-cadre. While he had a rule passed by the village exempting him (and by tacit agreement his wives also) from communal work "so that he may always look neat and ready to receive visitors" this one wife was

out in the field trying to give an example of hard work. While he ordered the villagers to work in his shamba for shs 1/= per day for communal fund-raising, she used her savings to buy writing materials for the village. She was also helping other villagers by acting as a dresser, a mid-wife and as a voluntary Mama Maendeleo, teaching the women pottery and mat weaving and trying to get the people to dig pit latrines. She trained one man in the village to do secretarial work and he started to support her views which she could not voice in a society where women do not speak in meetings or public gatherings. She had, however, no chance to beat her husband who blocked any communal progress.

In a neighbouring village with the same acreage but more interplanting and more careful weeding, the only important kulak, the duka-owner, remained in the background and assumed a benevolent attitude towards ujamaa, provided he was exempted from communal work in return for a nominal fee and provided the village did not start a communal shop. (He advised the village against this on the grounds that he himself was already unable to make any profits.) When they held elections he admonished the villagers: "Don't elect someone because he is rich, elect someone who wants to work hard." The official leaders in that village were, in terms of their original motivation, fellow-travellers but some were gradually taking a more active interest in the success of their ujamaa farm. An exceptional Bwana Shamba and a committed TAPA member and adult education teacher -- were quietly

helping the villagers to increase their involvement in communal activities. Although the communal farm was comparatively small, it was a major innovation since it was established on previously cultivated land from which farmers had shifted to escape the weeds and it was trying to prove that permanent cultivation was possible. There were more signs that common members felt responsible for their communal farm than in many other villages.

When we visited the village in 1973, it was still practicing some communal cultivation and had plans to continue.

C. Stability and Progress of the Ujamaa Village

Most of those who stayed in ujamaa villages in 1971 seemed to have settled down to their daily routines, preserving old social relations and establishing new ones. They praised life in the village as more interesting and more secure because of government assistance. Since many of the village had neither food nor water, the government was supplying them with both. Villagers knew that these were only temporary solutions and that the government intended them to rely on themselves in the future.

Only a minority of villagers had already established more permanent economic ties to the new village. Most villagers had kept their old fields which were often five or more miles away from the village and spent many days (and because of wild pigs even nights) away from the village looking after their plots. In some

cases they did this because the land around the village was not as good as in their former place, in some cases they had some permanent crops and in some few cases traditional ties with the old area also played a role. A few of the more recent arrivals in some villages did not have any private farming at all but considered the period of famine as the time for a break expecting Government to look after them in return for a bit of communal work. They were, however, not many. The normal thing was still to have a few acres of private farming and to regard ujamaa work as an additional task to what one was used to doing. A few men had some employment outside the village and returned there only at night, at weekends or during their vacations, leaving wives and children behind in the village. Still others could not be found because they had decided to spend a period with their in-laws or other relatives-expecting to come back at a later date. For some of the members the ujamaa village was just one possible place or residence, a place which they found acceptable even if they were brought there by coercion, but not necessarily one to stay in indefinitely.

The main reason why people easily accepted the order to stay in a place where the government wanted them to be was that their ties to any particular locality within the same clan territory were rather loose since people had earlier on responded to famines by frequent shifts of residence. Although most of them started farms near the new villages in the years that followed,

this did not mean they had to stay for good since they rarely cultivated any land for longer than four years.

The communal economy never made sufficient progress to persuade people that they might gain from ujamaa. Communal farms were small, yields from these farms were poor and the distribution of the returns was often obscured by embezzlements. One of the reasons for the poor communal performance was the kulaks' leadership around which most of the villages had been created. Another reason was the absence of any coherent plan to change the pattern of agricultural production. The crops and techniques that were advocated for the communal farms were the same which people had on their private holdings except for the introduction of fertilizer which was not particularily useful in Handeni. No serious attempt was made to mechanise the communal farms or to introduce communal ranching which would have been the obvious answers to the age-old problems of the area. Communal farms in Handeni were at best enlarged copies of poor peasants' farms and people were already asking themselves mockingly in 1971 how this was supposed to bring any "development" which they had not had before. The years that followed brought nothing that would have helped them to overcome their scepticism.

District and divisional officials were convinced that the villagers had not yet really settled down and feared that villagers might either just pack up and go or turn the ujamaa village into a traditional village when the officials were no longer able to attract them

by famine relief. The official's solution was to bind the villagers to communal investments and they were, therefore, starting before the harvest to urge villagers to invest their incomes in communal shops; a dangerous course given the absence of financial control in the villages and the ability of the kulaks to prevent the communal shops from succeeding.

The one real attraction the officials could offer was the promise of social services to the villages. Although such services would not necessarily make people continue with communal production, they would give people a motive to stay in the villages. The problem was how to fulfil this promise with the limited resources available. Most of the new villages had neither schools nor water supplies nor a dispensary. If the district was able to complete about fifteen social infrastructure projects per year, the majority of villages were bound to remain unattended in any particular year and were likely to grow impatient. If the administration managed to keep people in the villages for a decade or two, they would eventually be able to provide them with all the basic infrastructure they needed, but this alone would not make the peasants richer, better nourished and more satisfied with their condition.

D. Villagization

By 1973 tha policies of the administration in Handeni had changed away from the aim of communalising agriculture. Blockfarms rather than communal farms were advocated in new villages. Old villages which

had any kind of organisational problem were advised to break up the communal plot into individual farms—a proposal which the kulak leaders implemented with great satisfaction. The previous demarcation between communal work and government aid was also dissolved. Villages were no longer expected to prepare production plans and the Ward Development Committee would consider the requests for government projects independent of the performance of the villagers. All the people in the villages had to do was to stay where they were and to remain on good terms with the new Ward Secretaries.

In 1974 and 1975 villagization campaigns were carried out all over the district which were, in essence, a repetition of the events in 1968, except that communal cultivation was no longer mentioned as one of the aims. Again the existing settlements and their kulak leaders were the local points around which the newcomers were to assemble. Instead of the youth league there was now a militia which included those previously engaged in such campaigns but also junior employees of the government and some civil servants. What was absent this time was the participation of political activists who had hoped for a new mode of production and a new way of life. Neither they nor the newcomers shivering in uncompleted houses through cold nights had any idea of what the future would bring.

NOTES

1. Description of agricultural patterns derived from group discussions with village elders in Kisaza, Mumbwi and Kwamkono in August 1970, in Kitumbi Tumbili and Segera in May 1971 and information from Mr. J.B.Kasidi, Dar es Salaam.

2. From Tanga Provincial Book, quoted in C.R.Ingle From Village to State in Tanzania, Ithaca and London, 1972, p. 87.

3. Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports, Tanga Province, John Iliffe drew the author's attention to this circularity.

4. David Brokensha, "Handeni Revisted" in African Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 279, April 1970, p.159ff.

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AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES: SOME LESSONS FROM TANZANIA

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This paper discusses the relationship between agricultural co-operation and the development of the productive forces. We take Tanzania's policy of ujamaa villages (agricultural producer co-operatives) as a case in point for our analysis. The argument presented is that to begin with co-operation in agriculture is essential for the overall development of the productive forces in African economies. But it is not a sufficient condition for this development in so far as the development of local industry—particularly that which manufactures instruments of labour—is either negligible or totally absent. And finally that for these conditions to exist, that is for co-operation to act genuinely as a lever for the sustained development of the productive forces (hence within a specific form of industrialization) there must be a definite political framework whose social base is the class/classes with objective interest in revolution.

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The agricultural sector in central capitalist social formations has been penetrated by the capitalist mode of production in a manner characteristic of the

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