

## NEW DIRECTIONS FOR AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA

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This is a highly propitious time to re-examine American relations with Southern Africa. It is also a very ominous time. American Government officials have fallen into an adversary relationship with the majority of African movements, from SWAPO to FRELIMO, who in turn, regard U.S. policy as a major buttress of white settler regimes. Moreover, with the expansion of racial warfare, there is the danger that we may soon find American global power hopelessly committed to the side of the whites in the name of capitalism, western security, and peaceful change.

If the basic false assumptions remain, and the old mistaken policies merely given greater importance, the results can be as disastrous as those the United States experienced in Vietnam.

### NEW DIRECTIONS

Change in American policy and relationships is coming simply because the Southern African area is tied to the U.S. as a dependency system, and we are vitally affected, economically and politically, by the character of developments there. The eruptive pattern of revolution is spreading from Mozambique and Angola into Namibia, Zimbabwe and even South Africa. The United States is not an independent by-stander in this arena, able to mediate and pass moral judgement without suffering the consequences of what happens. As a major power actor whose economic, strategic, and cultural links have become an important part of the white minority-rule system of Southern Africa, the U.S. will be increasingly driven to choose

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between supporting the settlers in the final battle with the so-called "Communist menace" and disengaging from the white minority rule to strengthen the liberation and majority rule forces, which have now abandoned earlier efforts to achieve negotiated and peaceful methods of transition to self-rule.<sup>1</sup>

Facing such a decision will not be easy for American policy-makers, for it means re-examining previous programmes based largely on misconceptions of the realities of the struggles in Southern Africa. Moreover, they are subjected to increasing pressure from two almost diametrically opposed views current within the United States and throughout the western world. Both views are supported by powerful transnational forces which operate independently of government policy, yet constantly seek support and endorsement of official policy-makers and agencies. These transnational forces are, in many respects, more important in setting the nature of the American relationship with Southern Africans than is official government policy.

These forces are grouped, on the one hand, around the American-based multinational corporations (MNCs) and, on the other hand, the anti-apartheid non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Both groups have been growing in scope and involvement in Southern Africa, as two recent, detailed studies (on American corporations in Southern Africa, by Barbara Rogers, and on the anti-apartheid transnational movement, by the author) demonstrate.<sup>2</sup> Both studies show that the American MNCs are closely tied in with the settler system, in interests and in belief as well. While most corporate managers do not subscribe to apartheid or to white rule in Rhodesia, they have a nearly religious belief (the thesis) in the process of peaceful change and progress which industrialization creates. In common with many South African whites, they argue that they must have time to produce and effect gradual change in the employment, political, and racial structures of Southern African societies. They are inclined to accept with regret the "necessity" of the separate development policy and the homelands, to rationalize the continuation of South African leadership in Namibia, and to oppose cutting off economic and communications links with the white Rhodesians. Several of these MNCs, through their subsidiaries

(as we shall note later), actually break the sanctions regulations on Rhodesia to pursue not only profits, but the stabilization of settler rule. This gradualist, "peaceful change" approach to the conflicts of Southern Africa finds echoes in the academic world and in official circles, especially among the security-conscious, who believe that western civilization and democracy are threatened by liberation leaders and their supporters in the socialist states. The Angola crisis appeared to this group to be a clear example of the inroads of communist penetration and the collapse of capitalist growth and advance.

The NGO camp is clustered around a number of major anti-apartheid, pro-Africanist groups closely linked to the ecumenical churches and the black-civil rights movement. Their primary concern is expanding human freedom and they see apartheid as a modern form of slavery. Many originally pacifist-oriented groups, as well as liberal organizations, have developed close transnational links with the liberation movements, providing moral support and humanitarian assistance. Powerless, at first, as representatives of a small protest movement, the anti-apartheid coalitions (especially in the U.S., the U.K. the Scandinavian countries, and the Netherlands) have grown into powerful pressure groups with significant strength at home and have channelled millions of dollars in aid to liberation movements. More recently, sharp differences arose between gradualists and abolitionists over strategy, but there remain a number of major issues concerning the arms embargo, international sanctions, and liberation legitimization on which they unite against white rule in Southern Africa.

In Europe, as in the United States, the transnational anti-apartheid force has expanded rapidly in the last decade and has increasingly centred around the U.N. programme of support for liberation movements, sports and cultural exchange boycotts, bank boycotts, and anti-investment campaigns. Winnie Mandela, the courageous wife of Nelson Mandela, who was recently re-arrested in Soweto, said:

"I can tell you that, from my own personal experience over the past fifteen years, when I was confined and restricted. I

got my inspiration from the very knowledge that the struggle is an international struggle for the dignity of man and that you are a part of this family of man - this alone sustains you".(3)

In the contention of the two transnational forces for the support of governments, the NGOs have been most successful in Scandinavia and the Netherlands because the power ration appears more equal there, while in the U.S. and the U.K., where the MNCs have a multi-billion dollar stake, the "peaceful change" and gradualist forces of international capitalism hold a commanding position.

Still, the circle of anti-apartheid is clearly widening in the western world and in the United States. It represents the wave of the future, just as the abolition of slavery movement did in the last century, though the world may well undergo a tragic racial war, comparable in its impact to the American civil war, before this is fully apparent.

The American foreign policy establishment apparently operates on the hypothesis - which is derived from a series of false assumptions - that South Africa performs a vital function as a proxy state for western interests in Africa. "Domestic jurisdiction" is one of the major false assumptions used by the western powers to protect South Africa's racist policies from the attacks of the United Nations. Given the internationalization of the conflict and South Africa's central role in Angola, Namibia, and Rhodesia, apartheid is clearly no longer defensible (if it ever was) on the ground of "domestic jurisdiction". Nevertheless, when Senator Harry Byrd (Democrat, Vancouver), speaking in the Foreign Relations Committee, accused Mr Kissinger of being hypocritical in condemning Rhodesia, but not South Africa, the Secretary of State replied that he "did not support the racial policy in South Africa, but this was that country's internal affair"<sup>4</sup> South Africa not only has interfered in Rhodesia by breaking sanctions, but is engaged in a racial separation policy of turning "homelands" into so-called independent states. The homelands policy is rejected by the leading nationalist organizations of Africans, both inside and outside of South Africa, by a vast majority of urbanized Africans, and, quite possibly, by a majority in the homelands, including the Transkei.<sup>5</sup>

For new directions to fully emerge in American policy as well as in NGO relations, a much clearer understanding of the international conflict and the revolutionary situation in Southern Africa, together with greater agreement on whether human freedom or corporate strategic interests will have priority, is essential.

### THE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION

An African revolutionary situation, as Amilcar Cabral defined it, is essentially a nationalist struggle which has developed into an armed liberation struggle against imperialism. Cabral did not regard his own Guinea revolution as a class revolution. He spoke, rather, of leaving the native history when imperialism arrived in Guinea and entering another history where the class struggle did not apply. "Obviously we agree", he said, "that the class struggle has continued but it has continued in a different way: our whole people is struggling against the ruling class of the imperialist countries".<sup>6</sup> The revolution develops under the aegis of what Cabral calls the "revolutionary wing of the petty bourgeoisie", but he stresses its appeal to a broad front of urban and peasant groups. The class revolution, he maintained, must take place only when the people return to their own history, after the defeat of the occupying power. A sense of cultural identity and its relation to control over one's own means of production he believed essential to the liberation struggle. Cabral, who was the intellectual mentor of the entire liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism, was joined in this view by Agostino Neto of MPLA and Eduardo Mondlane, the first President of FRELIMO. A revolutionary situation, then, is one in which a high level of cultural consciousness and commitment to the liberation struggle is achieved by a populace under the leadership of a progressive elite (the anti-imperialist petty bourgeoisie).

The success of these revolutions in the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola has given tremendous impetus to the liberation movements in the rest of Southern Africa and has galvanized the entire revolutionary situation. While none of the movements in the other settler states had developed the extensive military struggle of those fighting the Portuguese, they all had, by the dramatic turning point in 1974, developed guerrilla strategies. The tendency of many western observers to discount

their significance and to raise doubts about their prospects was echoed in official thinking in the famous NSSM Document 39, which stated:

"... the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists".(7)

The failure of western social science, also, to correctly assess the capability of liberation movements only underlines its biased cultural perspective and its stability orientation, for which it has been properly taken to task by African social scientists Bernard Magubane and others, as well as such scholars as John Marcum and Basil Davidson, whose findings have been far more accurate than those of the National Security Council and the intelligence agencies of the government.

#### THE 1976 UPRISING IN SOUTH AFRICA

Nowhere has the failure to understand the revolutionary situation been greater than in relation to South Africa. Until township uprisings, beginning in Soweto in June of 1976, clearly demonstrated militant opposition to apartheid, most observers had written off the strength of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). Massive arrests, a legion of informers, imprisonment without trial, and torture had, it was thought, broken the back of the movements which had rallied hundreds of thousands in the early 1960s. While the spark of resistance in the township uprisings that have claimed hundreds of lives appeared localized, the later campaigns in most major urban areas, climaxed by the three-day strike in Soweto, appear to have been strong components of the old mass movements of the ANC and the PAC.<sup>8</sup>

South Africa has not been able to crush this resistance with a single massacre, as it did at Sharpeville in 1960. The backlog of grievances has piled too high. Fierce repression has been employed, along with such minor concession as the easing of language requirements in the schools and permanent housing rights for the "petty bourgeoisie" who will cooperate, but the fundamentals of separate development are not

being reconsidered. despite the pleas of several very powerful groups for extensive change. The Transvaal Chamber of Industries has called for the removal of job barriers restricting six million black workers to unskilled jobs, for example.<sup>9</sup>

The right-wing has blamed American black power ideology for the uprisings, and reports of white vigilant groups killing Africans during the riots indicate the white racist backlash.<sup>10</sup> The weakness and division of South African liberation movements abroad has often been cited to play down the importance of the anti-apartheid movement, of which they have been an important component. The notion that a revolution is dependent wholly upon armies in the field is a narrow perspective, lacking both a sociological understanding and an adequate consideration of the history of national revolutions in most of Asia and Africa.

Just before the outbreak in Soweto, the Dean of Johannesburg, Desmond Tutu, spiritual leader of white and black Anglicans, wrote to Prime Minister Vorster, pleading for change:

"How long can a people, do you think, bear such blatant injustice and suffering?...I am writing to you, Sir, because I have a growing nightmarish fear that unless something drastic is done very soon, then bloodshed and violence are going to happen in South Africa almost inevitably".<sup>11</sup>

Some still think that Vorster could have altered history's course at the last moment. He has not, and such media as the Guardian (U.K.), which urged him to "follow the Kissinger plan to the letter, speeding internal reform...after a hundred lay dead in Soweto", should have known by mid-1976 that white South Africa had long since plunged into the dark night.<sup>12</sup>

While the South Africans may be able to put down this latest uprising through repression and guile, the martyrs of Soweto, Capetown, Port Elizabeth and Pretoria - especially the courageous students - have laid to rest the notion that South Africa is not revolutionary. The conclusion of Herbert Adam, that gradual class change and step-by-step concessions to a westernized African elite is the pattern of the future, is less perceptive than Ben Magubane's recent observation:

"Despite years of propaganda that African insurgent movements will never succeed, the white settler regimes are today confronted with the reality of imminent defeat".(13)

The future is certain to bring a continuation and an intensification of strikes, riots, and urban guerrilla attacks, together with growing insurgency pressures along the Caprivi Strip and the Mozambique border, that will extend white manpower beyond its limits. South African forces are powerful, but the Achilles heel is a vulnerable industry dependent upon external investment, technology, and labour supply.

### DEPENDENCY IN THE ATLANTIC SYSTEM

The extent to which Southern Africa white-ruled systems have been a part of the Atlantic community and, as such, dependencies of the United States and the western powers has not been fully recognized. This has added to the misconceptions and failures of policy.

Afrikaners have a self-inflated notion of the strength and independence of their economy, as well as a boastful confidence in their ability to provide for their own defense, even after the fiasco in Angola. Under recent Nationalist governments, Afrikaners have become internationalized and developed the "outward policy", "detente", and an investment campaign. They have become convinced that they are a regional power through whom the western powers can work in developing and protecting their interests in, first, a Southern African community and, second, new relations with independent Africa to the north. This notion has had a strong appeal in the United States because of official interest in "proxy states" in the African region. Multinational corporations who have always needed an industrial base from which their subsidiaries could move into the riches of the mineral belt of central Africa, have invested heavily. South Africa's position as a base to protect shipping lines which transit the Cape to the energy deposits in the Persian Gulf on which the west is dependent, has added to her strategic "proxy" value, in the view of the NATO powers.

The dependency relationship is most definitive in the arms field, where South Africa doubled its expenditure in 1974-1975 and increased to \$1,327 million in 1975-1976.<sup>14</sup> Her armed forces provide a variety



of their own weapons through an Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR). Nevertheless, they are dependent upon western powers for the supply of sophisticated weaponry and technology. In the Angola fiasco, South Africa's dependency upon certain types of weapons, especially missiles and aircraft, became clear.<sup>15</sup> France is the most important supplier, though other western countries contribute. In addition, since South Africa has no internal oil sources, the armed forces are totally dependent on the outside world for energy supply. Vulnerability to a boycott in this quarter is extremely high.<sup>16</sup>

This dependency in arms, energy, and technology is most dramatically revealed by the recent debates over the sale of two nuclear reactors to South Africa, and over the U.S. sale of enriched uranium and the technology for its use. The United States has an agreement with South Africa to supply enriched uranium and to assist in the creation of South Africa's own enrichment processes.<sup>17</sup> The close relationship between nuclear power for commercial use and military weapons is well known. Many people fear that South Africa will use the plutonium (a by-product of nuclear energy production) for atomic weapons.<sup>18</sup> In the light of the Indian example and what is known about Israel's use of similar peaceful power resources to advance her weapons technology, there is cause for alarm.

Dutch opposition to supply South Africa with atomic power nearly split the coalition government and this, together with American congressional criticism, induced South Africa to turn to the French group for a billion dollar contract. The U.S. MNC, General Electric, had previously been the front runner for the contract.<sup>19</sup>

However, the dependency relationship is all we want to demonstrate at this point. The implications for U.S. policy and the United Nations' arms embargo will be left for later comment. South Africa is highly dependent upon imported technology and resources from the west, as she does not have this capacity herself. The use of this aid therefore, related directly to the policy questions facing the United States and other western powers currently providing apartheid with the capacity to harness the fearful atom.

There are, of course, other important technological military aid relationships that have been outlined extensively in hearings before the Clark Committee by Jennifer Davis of the American Committee on Africa and Edgar Lockwood of the Washington Office on Africa. The ACOA has long criticized U.S. failure to implement the spirit of the arms embargo by ruling out para-military and technological sales that can be used for military purposes. The U.S. for example, permits light aircraft to be sold in South Africa and the Nixon Administration, under NSSM 39, is said to have fostered expansion of so-called "grey areas". The supply of Lockheed Hercules C-130 transport planes, widely used by the South African air force, appears to be in direct violation of the embargo and, as Ms. Davis has pointed out, the South African defence journal, Paratus, regards the C-130s as invaluable and praises the reconnaissance value of the Cessna.<sup>20</sup> It is also ironic that, after all the struggle and change there, Portugal is still supplying South Africa with the designs for naval vessels.

In the case of Namibia, the military dependency relationship is clearly one of South African support to the apparently soon-to-be constituted "interim" government, which will be hard-pressed by the SWAPO forces. Any military support for South Africa entrenches and prolongs the Namibian agony. Northern Ovambo has been occupied by South African armed forces and a 320-mile-long "free fire zone" has been created since the Angola war in early 1976.<sup>21</sup> The population has been evacuated, with many being moved to military enclaves. Namibia (under an interim government) has no armed forces other than a police contingent of its own and the struggle will be completely fought between South African forces and SWAPO and her allies to the north. The immediate "threat" of a Cuban extension of the Angola intervention into Namibia has been averted, but if South Africa continues to refuse to hand over the transition to the UN, intervention by communist powers will grow.

The military dependency relationship of Rhodesia on the United States, Western Europe, and South Africa is indirect, but nonetheless real. Rhodesian armed forces would have run out of fuel long ago, if it

were not for the support given the Rhodesian economy and armed forces by South Africa, despite sanction bans. South Africa's complicity is clear in allowing trade to take place, now that Mozambique is closed to Rhodesia. The western MNCs have operated through South Africa to maintain military support, as well as economic productivity. The case of Mobil Oil was revealed by the Centre for Social Action of the United Church of Christ, with the help of a covert radical Christian research group, "Okhela", in South Africa. They produced documentation of a deliberate paper cover-up by Mobil of its supply of nearly all of Rhodesia's petroleum and turbine fuel.<sup>23</sup> Mobil is by no means the only offender and it is obvious that the Rhodesian helicopters, trucks, half-tracks, jeeps, and other weaponry needed to carry on a protracted anti-insurgency operation could not continue without substantial help from outside sources. South Africa has loaned Rhodesia helicopters, which she herself obtained from the British (Wasps) and the French (Alouettes). American Beechcraft airplanes, used for reconnaissance, have been exported to South Africa as "non-military" equipment and have found their way to Rhodesia. A land-locked country without its own arms industry, like Rhodesia, is totally dependent on external support and this is coming through American and European MNCs who operate from South Africa. In addition, the role of mercenaries in Rhodesia is growing. Most of these come from Europe, but the British have cracked down, whereas the Americans have not, and the Rhodesians are looking increasingly to the U.S. for a supply of unemployed veterans of Vietnam.<sup>24</sup> Estimates are that several scores of Americans are already fighting as mercenaries in Rhodesia. Despite requests for action from NGOs and the State Department, the Justice Department has yet to prosecute a single case.<sup>25</sup> Vorster may not even be able to deliver on his commitments to the American and British governments regarding limiting direct South African aid to the Smith regime, but unless the restrictions are expanded to include prohibitions on the South African subsidiaries allowed to do business with Rhodesia, the scope of international and American non-official military support for the Rhodesian racists will rapidly escalate. Taken as a whole, the military dependency of settler white rule systems on the supports of western corporations, and on the

willingness of the French, West Germans, Italians, Israelis, and Jordanians to flout the U.N. on arms trade and of the Iranians to ignore the OPEC and OAU efforts to impose an arms embargo, demonstrates the international dimension of the growing wars and revolutions in Africa.

The economic dependency of the Southern African systems on the U.S. and the western world has been a subject of intensive research and debate. By dependency, the writer means the inability of the economic systems of Southern Africa to sustain themselves or to develop without major external technological assistance, investment, and trade. There is a reverse dependency in the sense of scarce strategic minerals (such as chrome and uranium) and important markets for western countries, but nothing comparable to the dependency that South Africa and the two other white-ruled areas have on the U.S., Japan and Western Europe. The communist world, Asia, and Latin America could provide no adequate alternative, should they lose this western alliance.

South Africa's growth is highly dependent on external capital, especially in new industry, which increased from 24.4 per cent in 1956 to 33.7 per cent in 1970. Internal savings are likely to be insufficient for years to come, according to the South African Reserve Bank.<sup>26</sup> When a country's basic infrastructure is owned externally in this fashion, it is extremely vulnerable to the whims of the western financial trusts.<sup>27</sup> In addition, John Suckling has calculated that because foreign investment is a significant conduit of sophisticated technology from Europe and North America, 60 per cent of South Africa's GNP is described to exogenous technological change between 1957 to 1972.<sup>28</sup> It should be noted that a high percentage of this investment flow is in unremitted earnings from both the U.S. and the U.K. subsidiaries of MNCs operating in South Africa. Some dispute exists as to the mobility of such investments or remittances, but up to this date, foreign MNCs clearly regard it as advantageous to continue their reinvestment policies. As a result of the racial and labour upheavals in mid-1976, this pattern may be considerably altered. Certainly South Africa will restrict any rapid capital flight. However, any such restrictive policy will have an effect on new investment and related western government policies. The

Export-Import Bank of United States has hesitated to under-write extensive loans to South Africa because of the Soweto rioting and its effect on political attitudes. Neil Leighton notes that under the government's Economic Development plan for 1974-1979, the amount of investment capital required (\$40 billion), is three times the combined assets of all South Africa's banks building societies and insurance companies.<sup>29</sup>

Because of the balance of payments deficit, the South African economy is also heavily dependent on external loans and the western gold market. The current policy of gold sales by the IMF and western governments is depressing the price of gold at great expense to South Africa, despite her protests.<sup>30</sup>

The continued dependency of South African industry on external energy supplies - present supplies come from western surrogates, principally Iran, or western MNCs - is a source of great anxiety. There would be no easy alternative supply sources available to South Africa in the event of another oil boycott. The Angola source, theoretically available under Portuguese rule, is now gone, and even the U.S. might be reluctant to divert supplies to South Africa in the light of her own growing dependence on OPEC sources. A crash programme to convert coal to oil is therefore underway, with the help of western (principally American) technology and processing.

The mineral-rich Namibian economy is more than 50 per cent owned by American and western enterprise and is tied closely to South Africa.<sup>31</sup> American MNCs have continued to expand in this area, despite the recent disengagement of several U.S. oil firms engaged in off-shore exploration. Many American and British firms in Rhodesia continue to operate through subsidiaries based in South Africa. Barbara Rogers has published a list of these American firms.<sup>32</sup> It conflicts with the U.S. State Department's testimony to the Congress that no American firms operate in that country.<sup>33</sup> Considerable U.S. tourism also continues with Rhodesia and is a substantial source of revenue, in violation of sanctions, according to Edgar Lockwood's information.<sup>34</sup> The dependency of the three white-ruled African societies then, on U.S. and western

defense, capital, finance, technology, skilled labour, and trade is the basis from which policy should start.

### POLICY IMPLICATIONS

An accurate understanding of the revolutionary conditions in settler societies of South Africa and a recognition of the dependency of these regimes upon the United States and the western world should lead to a recognition of the grave consequences of not introducing new policies at the official level through transnational NGO actors. The U.S. together with Western Europe, is deeply involved in the conflicts of this area and will take positive steps to institute justice and peace, or see itself engulfed in the racial conflagration.

Opinion is divided over desirable policy directions, not only between the two major camps of the MNCs and the NGOs, but also within these groups. The MNC general disposition to attempt to maintain white rule for the "foreseeable future" as proposed through NSSM 39's famous "Option two" can now be generally rejected. NSSM 39 was based upon using the whites for corporate security interests of the U.S. and the west, and is not a viable or morally defensible policy. The "communication with all factions" option has meant, in practice, the exclusion of liberation movements. The investment, development, and social change option is an illusion in the minds of entrepreneurs, verlichtes, and a few sociologists. The new majority rule proposal apparently does not extend to South Africa. The disengagement thesis is meaningful only if it is linked to liberation movements. Therefore, some variation in the sanctions-liberation policy appears to be the best alternative. The revolutionary situation is such in all three white-ruled areas that liberation movements must now be taken as live options to existing regimes.

It is also time to recognize that the old policies still supported by many are, in fact, "anti-revolutionary", to use Sam Nolutshungu's phrase, or aimed at the destabilization of the new regimes and liberation movements.<sup>35</sup> An understanding of the extent to which the U.S. and other western governments have been and are tied into sustaining the status quo is necessary if we are to move away from such a policy. To

simply state that the U.S. favours majority rule, with safeguards for minorities, or that the U.S. favours "communication" with all "elements" is meaningless outside of this wider context.

### THE SOUTH AFRICAN LINCHPIN

The unrealistic and schizophrenic character of American policy in terms of South Africa has been pointed out. This is revealed by the increasing tendency to utilize South Africa's so-called self-interest as seen by Prime Minister Vorster as the means of resolving the lesser problems of Zimbabwe and Namibia. This confidence in the integrity or self-interest or capacity of South Africa to produce change in these two areas cannot be justified, even in terms of a U.S. proxy state. The South Africans have a concept of change for themselves which they term "eliminating petty apartheid". This includes no intention of dismantling the fundamentals of separate development and white dominance. This general token reformism they extend to Namibia and Zimbabwe as well. They are quite prepared to assist handpicked, moderate "multi-racial" governments friendly to MNCs and themselves to come to power, but they are deadly afraid of the liberation movements, whom they persistently label "communist stooges" of the Soviet Union.

Any hopeful new course in Southern Africa has to begin with the premise that South Africa must abolish her apartheid system and the entire policy of separate development and move toward a democratic system of equality. The farce of the bantustans cannot be maintained. This is not simply the view of the outside world about besieged South Africa. It is the demand of a majority of South Africans as well, when all races are considered. The two major white opposition parties, the United Party and the Progressive Reform Party, are both highly critical of the bantustan approach for different reasons. In so far as the African voice has been able to express itself inside South Africa, through the Black Peoples Convention, the Black Renaissance Convention, SASO, the churches, and the Bantustan leaders, it has unanimously deplored the separate development policy. Except for Kaiser Matanzima of the Transkei, the homelands' leaders seem to agree with Chief Buthelezi, who said in Soweto in 1976 before the riots:

"The majority of black people do not want to abandon their birthright. They have toiled for generations to create the wealth of South Africa. They intend to participate in the wealth of the land". (36)

If one adds to these voices the ANC and PAC and other South Africans abroad, there is a tremendous chorus opposed to the so-called separate development solution. SPRO-CAS, in its recent report, outlined the clearest picture of an alternative South Africa which would allow for plural representation, while at the same time uniting the country in a single movement in which all people have a voice and vote.<sup>37</sup>

There is at least surface agreement among most policy makers in America that this makes sense and South Africa should move toward majority vote. There, however, agreement ends and the question of strategy arises. How should the U.S. and American citizens press this objective? The fundamental difference turns on the types of pressure. The gradualists grouped around the MNCs favour peaceful persuasion, through maintaining contacts, in cultural, economic and political fields. They argue that through "communication" and strengthening the anti-apartheid forces within South Africa gradually, the South Africans will abandon their racial separation as it proves to be impractical. The State Department, when David Newson was Africa Secretary, propounded this view.<sup>38</sup> During the sixties - the beginning of the verlichte reforms in the Afrikaner camp - the defeat of the diehards (Verkramppte) in the Broederbond and in the political arena, the emergence of the black consciousness movement, and the whole detente effort outwardly convinced these officials that a new South Africa was struggling out of its isolation of the past. The Progressive Party (later Progressive Reform Party) appeared to be a ground where the new Afrikaner could come together with the English-speaking liberals and provide a democratic alternative, if only they were given time and the democratic system for whites allowed to work, without forcing them into a corner where their cause became illegitimized by external pressure in support of extremism.

The abolitionist NGO's, however, maintained that South Africa is not a democracy, even for whites, and that effective opposition by the anti-apartheid movement has been destroyed by the restrictive political



laws, censorship, treason trials, communist witch hunts, imprisonments, and brutal suppression of even peaceful movements of opposition. They have viewed external pressure as the only effective means of weakening the Afrikaner economic system, limiting its military capability, and undermining its self-confidence so that the internal and external groups could develop the revolutionary situation in a way that would either provide an initial opportunity for the white opposition to come to power resulting in the entire overthrow of the system.

The events of 1976, beginning with the South African defeat in Angola and the final collapse of talks in Rhodesia, have borne out the case of the abolitionists. The uprisings throughout South African townships and reserves are based upon an African recognition of the basic fallacies of separate development. The youth have touched off the resistance by their objection to the language requirements and other fundamental inequalities in education, but it goes far beyond this to the middle class concern over falling living standards, onerous restrictions, and working class hatred of the pass laws. In the suppression which followed, the "Black Renaissance" has been gutted, many moderate African leaders have been arrested, liberals and progressives have been silenced. Voices from the Afrikaner camp asking now for fundamental reform are ignored and the brutal repression and killings continue and Sharpeville has grown pale by comparison. It is difficult for informed observers to see what prospect for reform or gradual change might be left.

U.S. South Africa policy should now be developed, as the NGO spokesmen, such as Goler Butcher, George Houser and Sean MacBride have suggested, with a firm anti-bantustan emphasis and with clear support for majority rule through sanctions and liberation legitimization. The U.S. in this framework, would refuse to establish diplomatic relations, oppose the independence of the Transkei and any other homelands, and urge other nations to take the same course. Separate development programmes should not be considered for aid, whether in Bantustans which have proclaimed independence or in those still under the Republic government. There would be no Export-Import Bank assistance to companies seeking to invest in these territories and a total rejection of any sea port develop-

ment in Transkei which might be designed to provide Naval facilities for the United States.<sup>39</sup> Corporations, churches and foundations should be warned against assistance programmes which, though humanitarian in appearance, might give encouragement to the South Africans in the development of the Transkei and other Bantustans as independent states.<sup>40</sup>

Support should be given instead to the concept of a federal and democratic South African solution, long advocated by the anti-apartheid movement. This would mean recognition and support of opposition groups who propose this alternative to separate development both inside and outside South Africa. The ANC and the PAC should be given quasi-official status, as they have at the United Nations, in all primary dealings between the U.S. and South Africa. An active legitimization and education support programme should be undertaken. This would include fellowships and scholarships through the United Nations Fund for Southern Africa and the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) and other international non-governmental organizations with experience in this field.

The interests and views of the South African anti-apartheid opposition would be taken into account by implementing such steps as: (a) an end to all plans to assist South Africa in developing a nuclear capacity; (b) compulsory support of U.N. arms embargo extending to para-military equipment of use in counter-insurgency activities; (c) an end to U.S. participation in ADVOKAAT at Silvermine and closure of U.S. Air Force and NASA tracking stations; (d) U.S. prohibitions against further investment or reinvestment in military related industries, including technology, communications, and energy supply, as suggested by the United Nations Association of the U.S.A.; and, (e) passage of legislation covering working conditions and human rights, of which a bill introduced by Congressman Charles Diggs is a useful example, setting certain limitation on U.S. subsidiaries, based on the American concept of justice.<sup>41</sup> The effect would be to put considerable pressure on South Africa to abandon the separate development policy. While she might sustain the system for a time, with help from other Western countries, the dependency relationship would make her extremely vulnerable.

While these basic steps must be taken at the government level, pressure to move U.S. policy in this direction will have to come from the

NGOs, effectively supplemented by activities within the private sector that can reinforce such policies. These include the expansion of international cultural and sporting boycotts, pressures on banks and other lending institutions to curb lending and investment - an area in which some significant successes have already been achieved - and the continuation and extension of campaigns for corporate disengagement. Once a basic re-orientation of U.S. policy has been achieved, the area for NGO governmental cooperation will be significantly widened. All of this needs to be coordinated as closely as possible with U.N. efforts towards international sanctions.

Clearly, any significant tightening and widening of international sanctions will need official U.S. support and participation, at least comparable to steps already taken by the Scandinavian nations, Australia and the Netherlands. The premise of such a strategy should not be that it will quickly depress the South African economy or produce change in government. MNCs, through their own transnational mechanisms and with the assistance of non-cooperating governments, will almost certainly be able to blunt the economic impact for some time. However, the psychological impact - weakening perceptions of legitimacy now accorded to the settler system and strengthening those of the opposition, particularly liberation movements - can be significant. The precedent of the Rhodesian sanctions programme, now well into its tenth year, demonstrates the long-range impact of this approach, as it now leaves the settlers in a position where they face a revolutionary situation almost alone. Despite its greater power and wealth, South Africa under a reasonably effective sanctions programme will inevitably move in the

### ZIMBABWE

As we have suggested, the primary test of a policy of sanctions and liberation support will be its role in the final defeat of the white minority government in Rhodesia. The closing of the Mozambique border, denying access to the ports of Beira and Maputo, has greatly strengthened this effort. U.S. repeal of the Byrd amendment and a crackdown on those American MNCs identified by Strack and Rogers as major sanctions-

busters would be valuable additional steps.<sup>42</sup> Japan might take up the slack in chrome purchases, and South Africa will not enhance its own vulnerability by supporting the sanctions effort, but a ripple effect throughout the field of international finance would certainly follow these steps, and the resulting decline in MNC involvement would further weaken the resolve and capacity to resist.

The current State Department proposal to provide relocation subsidies to settlers would have questionable effect, and the South African proposal for assurance against losses "in place" might even be counter-productive, increasing settler determination to stay. Both Machel and Nyerere have been clear in their opposition to special concessions to settlers at this late date.

With the rising levels of insurgency by the Zimbabwe Peoples' Army increasing popular support, despite, and in part because of, government pressure, the situation has changed rapidly. The Zimbabwe leaders believe they have the means to collapse the Rhodesian Front themselves, with the current levels of arms aid and humanitarian assistance. Direct intervention by communist powers, as in Angola, is therefore unlikely. Increased levels of U.S. humanitarian aid, by the government and NGOs, channelled through the U.N. and international NGOs, can hasten the collapse of white minority rule in Rhodesia.

The danger that Rhodesians and South Africans will be content with nothing less than an intransigent and bloody final struggle, of course, remains. The advantage of precipitating the collapse of the existing regimes as soon as possible is the preservation of the possibility of the emergence of a significant white leadership and a following willing to cooperate in stabilizing the economy under majority rule. Robert Good has pointed out that the presence of a colonial power willing to undertake negotiations long before the settlers were willing to concede has been a stabilizing factor in other transitions which is absent in these cases. The U.S. and other core powers need to try to fill this gap by utilizing their levels of control to persuade the settlers to transfer power before they are wiped out.

NAMIBIA

Even more clearly than in Rhodesia, an opportunity to exercise this kind of control is present in Namibia, where the basis for core power action is even stronger. The U.S. and Western powers have enormous economic bargaining power. The threat of more radical intervention through Angola is near and real. SWAPO and its allies in the National Convention provide a viable alternative to the projected interim government backed by South Africa. Firm insistence on UN jurisdiction over the transition, and on SWAPO participation, together with non-recognition of any South African imposed interim government, must be the cornerstone of U.S. policy. Active NGO support of SWAPO and of the UN-sponsored Namibian Institute in Lusaka, training leaders for a United Namibia, is helping to move the United States in this direction.

CONCLUSION

It seems doubtful, however, that the U.S. will move very far in the new directions outlined here, even under the Carter administration, and there is real danger that the perceived self-interests of U.S. MNCs and the military will move policy in the opposite direction. Great power (including U.S.) intervention on behalf of the whites, to protect mineral resources and the so-called Cape route, cannot be ruled out.

To prevent such a turn to the right or, at best, the continuation of present policies, a strong pro-African constituency, appealing to the conscience and sense of justice of ordinary Americans and the kinship ties of black citizens is needed to give support to the transnational anti-apartheid movement, and increased humanitarian support for the liberation movements through the U.N. and the NGOs. Action programme and political pressure and persuasion are needed, with the ultimate goal of a clear shift of the western governments to a strong anti-apartheid position.

Black Africa will almost certainly achieve majority rule in Southern Africa, with or without the support of the United States. But an active anti-apartheid thrust can hasten that day and, more important, move all of us in the direction of expanded human freedom.

## NOTES

- 1 For elaboration, see author's "Comment" in Frederick Arkhurst, ed., U.S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 38-56.
- 2 See Barbara Rogers, White Wealth and Black Poverty: American Investments in Southern Africa, 1976, and George W. Shepherd, Jr., "Anti-Apartheid: A Transnational Revolution" in Studies in Human Rights No. 2 and 3, CIRP, University of Denver (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press).
- 3 SANA (Southern African News Agency), Capetown, February-March 1976, pp. 10-11.
- 4 The New York Times, 14 May 1976.
- 5 See Barbara Roger, Divide and Rule: South Africa's Bantustans (London: Defence and Aid Fund, 1976), pp. 12-15. She reports that a survey of Soweto opinion in January 1975 showed a two-thirds rejection of the bantustan policy and an even higher percentage of commitment to Soweto as the home of the respondents.
- 6 Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea (Surrey: Love and Malcolmson Ltd., 1969), p. 56.
- 7 J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice (New York: Knopf, 1971), is one example of the scholarship on which NSSM 39 was based, but even Richard Gibson's more sympathetic and sophisticated African Liberation Movements (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), seriously underestimates the potential of the movements which actually won their way to victory.  
  
The passage from NSSM 39 is quoted from "The Secret U.S. Plan for Southern Africa", The Black Scholar, December 1974.
- 8 ANC pamphlets advocating the recent three-day general strike by blacks were widely circulated in Soweto. Denver Post, 24 August 1976.
- 9 The New York Times, 20 August 1976.
- 10 Africa News, 28 June 1976, p. 5, reports that the U.N. Committee Against Apartheid has information that as many as 1,000 persons died in the early stages of the current disturbances, many from .22 calibre bullets - a gun size not used by the South African police.
- 11 The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 27 June 1976.
12. Ibid.

- 13 Herbert Adam, "Internal Constellations and Potentials for Change" in Thompson and Beck, eds., Change in Contemporary South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 325. See also Bernard Magubane, The Continuing Class Struggle in South Africa, CIRR, University of Denver, Studies in Race and Nations, Vol. 6, Nos. 3-4, 1974-1975, p. 42.
- 14 Jennifer Davis, Testimony, Hearings of The Sub-committee on African Affairs, op. cit., p. 376.
- 15 South Africa has contracted with France for local production of Mirage III and FI fighter aircraft and to purchase Daphne-type submarines. See J.E. Spence, The Political and Military Framework, London, Study Project on External Investment in South Africa, African Publications Trust, 1975, pp. 56-57.
- 16 Barbara Rogers, "Southern Africa and the Oil Embargo", Africa Today, Vol. 21, No. 2, Spring 1974, pp. 3-8.
- 17 United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1957.
- 18 See Ronald Walters, "Apartheid and the Atom: The United States and South Africa's Military Potential", Africa Today, Vol. 23, No. 3, July-September 1976. The implications of this issue are discussed. He reports that Senator Clark and many witnesses before recent hearings of his sub-committee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of this agreement.
- John Spence has done the most detailed study of the relationship between atomic power and military strategy in South Africa.
- 19 Africa Report, July-August 1976, p. 29.
- 20 Jennifer Davis, Hearings, op. cit. p. 273.
- 21 Africa News, 6 August 1976.
- 22 The New York Times, 2 August 1976.
- 23 Akbarali Thobhani, "The Mercenary Menace", Africa Today vol. 23, No. 3, July-September 1976.
- 24 David Anabel, "The Return of the Mercenaries", Africa Report, November-December 1975.
- 25 Rogers, White Wealth and Black Poverty, p. 97.
- 26 Ibid. The Third Report of South Africa's Fromzen Commission shows external interests in control of 40 per cent of South Africa's industry.

- 27 John Suckling, The Nature and Role of Foreign Investment in Southern Africa, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, 1974, p. 23.
- 28 Neil Leighton, "A Perspective on Fundamental Change in Southern Africa", Africa Today, vol. 23, No. 3, July-September 1976.
- 29 The New York Times, 12 July 1976.
- 30 See Roger Murray et al., The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia (Uppsala: African Publications Trust, 1975), pp. 30-33.
- 31 Rogers, White Wealth and Black Poverty, Appendix 3. In an unpublished paper, Harry R. Strack notes that 38 per cent of Rhodesia's national income is derived from foreign exports.
- 32 "There are no U.S. companies now operating...", statement supplied to the U.S. Department of State and the Hearings of the Sub-Committee on African Affairs, Rogers, White Wealth and Black Poverty, p. 204. Specific information is limited and the contrary findings of Rogers, Strack, and the Centre for Social Action of the United Church of Christ are not refuted, except in these general terms.
- 33 Statement of Edgar Lockwood, Director of the Washington Office on Africa, Hearings of the Sub-committee on Africa Affairs, Rogers, White Wealth and Black Poverty, p. 204.
- 34 The July-September issue of Africa Today, vol. 23, No. 3, develops this interpretation of current policy, as against claims that a genuinely new "majority rule" policy has replaced NSSM 39.
- 35 Christian Science Monitor, 15 March 1976, p. 5.
- 36 Peter Randall, A Taste of Power (Johannesburg: Spro-cas, 1973), pp. 94-106.
- 37 "Isolation can breed rigid resistance to change. Open doors can accelerate it. We understand the impatience which leads to demand for the use of force. Nevertheless, we see little prospect of its effective use in bringing change in Southern Africa, and we cannot favour its use". Department of State Bulletin, 11 October 1971, pp. 6-7.
- 38 Major Wesley A. Groesbeck, U.S. Army, "The Transkei Key to U.S. Naval Strategy on the Indian Ocean", Military Review, 1976
- 39 A State Department review committee recommended investment in the Bantustans border industries for humanitarian reasons.
- 40 On U.S. prohibitions of further investment in South Africa, see Cyrus Vance, Southern Africa: Proposals for Americans (New York: UNA-USA, 1971).



Diggs's resolution on limitations on subsidiaries, H.J. Res, 522, 93rd Congress, 1st Session. "To protect United States domestic and foreign policy interests by making fair employment practices in South African enterprises of United States firms a criterion for eligibility for government contracts".

41. See Note 40.