

Our review also indicated that the history of West African cocoa industry is part of the historical development of capitalism in West Africa. A major consequence of this development includes the transformation of the traditional economy into a capitalist prototype with its manifest concentration of property in a few hands through ownership and control of production and distribution processes. The ensuing decapitalization of the cocoa producing areas arising from the prevailing clientelistic system directly militates against capital formation and development in this region.

Rural capitalism presumably discovered by Hill is a misnomer. Capitalism in the modern sense is capitalism, whether white, black, rural, urban or metropolitan. Because capitalism is essentially exploitative and predatory, rural capitalists are merely local compradores operating as intermediaries in the exploitative chain. Basic African development must, therefore, take the African historical and structural realities into serious consideration. Within these contexts, development policy must seek to sever existing links between Africa and the exploitative capitalist hegemony.

In the 1970-80 decade and beyond, African social science must decide to chart a course and to play an intellectual vanguard role in this freedom movement or lose its relevance. The critical question is, therefore, whether African social science must continue refurbishing the Capitalist Leviathan with new robes, in the manner of the Africanists, or whether it has conscience enough to reminisce on the enormity of African lives within the continent and in the Diaspora - that have been destroyed in the name of this Leviathan, and be courageous enough to abandon it. This is the question! If the first alternative is preferred, this author strongly believes that the role of the African intellectual is rather superfluous; white liberal social science tradition is doing that job better. If the second alternative is preferred, and it ought to be preferred, African social scientists have an awesome task of (1) 'searching and destroying' those ensnaring 'development' theories and models either from the West or East that have trapped the African for too long; (2) disabusing themselves of their 'colonial mentality,' and (3) rigorously conceptualizing and reconceptualizing true meanings of African development, and clearly specifying its underlying philosophies, assumptions, values, models, approaches and strategies. African social scientists may not begin with a finished programme, but let them start somehow. The essence of history making is learning from participating in history making. This is the praxis!

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND IMPERIALISM

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It will be argued in this paper that Public Administration, as it is presently conceived, taught and practised both in the 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' parts of the world is both theoretically and empirically an impossible tool for bringing about development in the 'third' world. Public Administration has never been a tool for development anywhere. In the third world, it can only serve — indeed it has only served — the interest of imperialism. Little wonder, therefore, that the search for development-oriented bureaucracy has yet to yield any positive results.

For clarity, let us define some of the terms used here. Imperialism is that process by which capital, owned by persons or agencies in country A, is deployed in a foreign country B, where it yields profit; this profit is then either reinvested in B for the continued advantage of its owners in A, or is repatriated back to A. The other side of the coin of imperialism is economic exploitation. Imperialism can lead to colonialism, but both phenomena are distinct. In Africa, for example, imperialism preceded colonialism and set the stage for the latter. And although colonialism has come to a formal end in many parts of that continent, imperialism continues unabated in these same parts.¹ By development, we have in mind

a change process characterized by increased productivity, equalization in the distribution of the social product, and the emergence of indigenous institutions whose relations with the outside world, and particularly with the developed centres of international economy, are characterized by equality rather than dependence or subordination.²

We shall understand by underdevelopment, a situation in which the institutions of a country in the periphery of international capital maintains a dependence relationship with one or several countries at the centre of international economy. It is not the absence of growth. But it is characterized by unequal distribution, slow growth, and the subordination of internal economic and political institutions to influences from the centre and, therefore, loss of real autonomy.

Public Administration as it is being used here does not lend itself to easy definition. Being subsumed under it are such other concepts as 'bureaucracy',

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1 Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1972, pp. 148—160; Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, New York, International Publishers, 1966.

2 E.A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change 1919—1939*, New York, NOK Publishers, Ltd., 1973, p. 18.

'development administration' and 'administrative development'. They can all be used interchangeably without doing harm to the subject of this paper. Implicit in all of them is the idea of administration. It is on *administration* that we place our emphasis. To talk of administration is to talk of organization (bureaucracy is a particular kind of organization with full-time staff, clear areas of jurisdiction for each staff member, a hierarchical ordering of the staff, an ethos which emphasizes objectivity, and expertise)³ and implementation of decision or policy.

Having, we hope, elucidated the major terms used in this paper, we can proceed to show why public administration cannot serve the purpose of development in the 'third world.' To do this, we shall examine the theoretical premises of public administration and its historical evolution and practice in the third world.

Development, as defined above, is a political, not an administrative process. This will become clearer below. On this basis therefore it is illogical to expect to bring about development by buttressing the administrative capabilities of a country. This process can only result, as has been ably demonstrated by Loveman, in what he called "antidevelopment".⁴ Loveman's focus is on the ideological basis of the US-based Comparative Administration Group's approach to development. Here, we should explore the relationship between politics and administration, politics and development, and administration and development. It will be seen that the relationship between administration and development is very far-fetched.

We adopt here Mannheim's distinction between politics and administration. One is dealing with administration when "current business is disposed of in accordance with existing rules and regulations..." On the other hand.

We are in the realm of politics when envoys to foreign countries conclude treaties which were never made before; when parliamentary representatives carry through new measures of taxation; when an election campaign is wedged; when certain opposition groups prepare a revolt or organize strikes — or when these are suppressed.⁵

Administration is "rationalized and ordered;" it is the realm of certitude—the contours of the land are already known and only need to be traced to locate a particular spot. Politics is the realm of "irrational forces"; it is a process the outcome of which cannot be determined until it comes to an end.⁶ While behaviour in administration is regularized, behaviour in politics cannot be regularized to the same degree. One should, in politics, expect the unexpected: not so in administration.

3 H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 196 ff.

4. Brian Loveman, "The Comparative Administration Group, Development Administration and Antidevelopment," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 36, No. 6, 1976, pp. 616—621.

5. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. 1936, p. 113.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 115

Of course the distinction between administration and politics is not clear-cut. Some aspect of politics is regularized, and administration is itself not totally devoid of elements that may be political. Perhaps it is best to look at the two as being different points on a continuum. But to recognise the flexibility of this distinction is not to dismiss it; the distinction is very important both conceptually and for ideological purposes.

A community's decisions are made through the political process. Participating in this process are social classes or fractions of classes.⁷ The process is characterised by struggle which is sometimes acute and very violent. Each class or fraction wants to gain ascendancy over the others. Where one has gained complete hegemony over others and is able to hold this position, the political process becomes largely administration. The ascendent class or fraction simply proceeds to implement its programme. So the degree to which any ruling class alters what programme it wishes to implement would be a reflection of the strength of forces reigned against it.

The substance of politics is not to be determined by the number of political parties involved. For example, where the fundamental issues in a society are already settled or thought to be settled, a multiparty or two-party system does not change the nature of politics in that society. We may point to the United States as a concrete example. To some extent too, Britain and Canada represent such a phenomenon. The demise of the British Liberal Party after World War I came because it was ideologically indistinguishable from the Conservative Party. There too, the Labour Party has progressively come to see as settled the fundamental issues in the society. And so in both the United States, Canada and Britain, fundamental issues of society no longer feature prominently as issues of politics. The prevailing system is accepted by most people — or at any rate the leaders of major political parties — and only the minor adjustments that may be required to keep it in equilibrium become bones of contention periodically.

The absence of debates or disagreements over fundamental issues can be explained in terms of the complete hegemony in Canada, United States and Britain of the bourgeoisie. Their major parties are controlled by this class. The class' ideological hegemony militates against the formation of a truly proletarian party. Family and school socialization processes guarantee the continued ideological dominance of the bourgeoisie.

Consequently in these societies, politics is seen not as an irrational process whose outcome cannot be known before hand but as administration. Politics has become a truly 'dirty' word; politicians do not even see themselves as such.⁸ This development has its academic counterpart. Thus we find in

7 For definitions and the sense in which these are being used here see Nicos Poulantzas, "On Social Classes" *New Left Review* No. 78, March — April 1973, pp. 27—54.

8 After the 1976 US Congressional elections, it was reported by Roger Mudd of CBS news that the newly elected Democrats said they were not going to play politics! It makes you wonder what they think they are going to do!

Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture*⁹ that politics is sacrificed in the interest of stability. In an exhaustive and thorough examination of some American intellectuals' works, Professor Claude Ake makes the point that they reduce politics to administration. He writes that

the study of politics for developmentalists (as well as all those who use the Eastonian system analysis) is the study of how government might maintain and enhance its power to regulate behaviour. The emphasis is on outputs, what the government or those who allocate values authoritatively do to control their environment. Both Easton and the developmentalists take government for granted... The theory of political development... avoids politics altogether by concentrating on governmental regulation of behaviour.¹⁰

It is also this emphasis on increasing the government's capabilities that Loveman finds to be the focus of American academic literature on development administration¹¹.

The point is *not* that American writers have failed to distinguish between politics and administration. It is rather that they have frequently compromised politics in search of stability and order.¹² Consequently, they have mistaken the functions of politics for those of administration. As Worthley points out, the focus of public administration studies in the United States has very much been on the executive, with little attention paid to the legislative process.¹³ Simon, Smithburg and Thompson define public administration chiefly as "the activities of the executive branches of national, state and local government..." and they recognise that it is "a part of the political process".¹⁴ Nevertheless, they treat public administration as if it took precedence over politics. From our point of view, the reverse should be the case. Indeed, the reverse *is* the case; it is the ideological position of the writers referred to that seems to create contrary impression. In tending to subordinate politics to administration, some writers rationalise their approach by the belief that administration and the role of the state are compatible, and that in fact public administration helps toward maximization of the ideals of democracy.¹⁵

This belief is, to say the least, highly debatable. But to pursue it in detail would take us away from the immediate aims of this paper. Suffice it only to point out that this approach to politics, if accepted, leads to isolating from

9 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963. See in particular, Chapter 15, pp. 473—505.

10 Claude Ake, *Politics as Imperialism*, forthcoming, Chapter III.

11 Loveman, *op. cit.*, p. 617

12 See M. Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology," *World Politics* 1, 26, 1973, pp. 139—154.

13 John A. Worthley, "Public Administration and Legislatures: Past Neglect, Present Probes," *Public Administration Review*, 35, 5, 1975, pp. 468—490.

14 Herbert Simon, D. W. Smithburg and V. A. Thompson, *Public Administration*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), pp. 7 and 314.

15 See Fritz M. Marx, "The Social Function of Public Administration", in Marx, ed., *Elements of Public Administration*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959, pp. 93—98.

democratic control some areas of decision-making that affect the public.¹⁶ Administration, as it is generally understood, is not amenable to democratic control. Issues of administration are not necessarily those of politics.

Reduced to its simplest form, the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the 1960s was carried out over the question of 'red versus expert'; in other words, politics versus administration.¹⁷ If the Chinese accepted that politics was subordinate to administration or that the latter in any way enhanced politics, it is very unlikely that there would have been a cultural revolution. And looking at their achievements since 1949 it cannot be said that the Chinese know nothing or little about the relationship between development and administration or politics.

Politics, like development and unlike administration, is based on struggle. Politics is based on struggle between social classes. Development occurs when individuals or societies confront their problems and attempt to solve them and to become able to control their environment. This element of struggle is very important. Through it, some social classes gain ascendancy over others. Without it, individuals or societies cannot adequately respond to their environment; without it, they cannot solve their social, economic and political problems. A society or individual that cannot adequately respond to its environment is undeveloped to the extent of the inadequacy in response. If forces external to the individual or society are the cause of the inadequacy in response, we shall say that such external forces caused underdevelopment. Development occurs in the attempt to resolve conflict between social classes or between a society and its environment. Politics is the process of resolving this conflict. We can now say that politics and development are inseparable.

If the foregoing is accepted, it can be seen why it would be futile to expect to bring about development by using public bureaucracy. The bureaucratic process, aside from isolating decision-making from popular participation, emphasises regularity in behaviour and stability. It can hardly innovate. Development calls for innovation. Bureaucracy, both as a concept and a concrete entity is largely static; it is slow to move. Development calls for quick response; it is a process of continuous change. Issues of development in a society call for the participation of all those in the society. Few persons will deny this. It is impossible to involve a wide range of members of a society in the bureaucracy. But they can certainly be involved in politics.

16 Michael Hill has argued that this is the consequence of completely separating politics and administration. See his *The Society of Public Administration*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972, p. 197.

17 Some excellent sources on the Cultural Revolution are William Hinton's *Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University* New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972 and his *Turning Point in China: An Essay on The Cultural Revolution*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972. On Chinese Rural Development in brief but comprehensive outline, see John G. Gurley, "Rural Development in China 1949—72, and the Lessons to be Learned from it" in *World Development*, Vol. 3 No. 7 and 8, 1975 pp. 455—471. In fact this entire issue of *World Development* focused on China's efforts at development; however, the contribution by Gurley seems to us very good.

We now begin to see why the concepts of 'development administration' (or administrative development) and 'development-oriented bureaucracy' may be said to be absurd. If members of the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) and others who have used these terms do not see their inherent contradictions, it is because their ideological disposition makes it unlikely, if not impossible, that public administration will help bring about development. (The public administration approach to development tends to mask the real issues of development in the third world). To illustrate the confusion in the public administration approach to development, we cite Adamolekun's "Towards Development-Oriented Bureaucracies in Africa".¹⁸ It is not easy to understand why Dr. Adamolekun insists on talking about development-oriented bureaucracy when he favourably mentions, among others, China and Tanzania, and when it is obvious that the most important of his three variables — (a) strong political will; (b) committed bureaucracy and (c) permanent administrative reform machinery — is the political. Given his emphasis on the political variable (which we agree with) it is strange that he still talks of 'development-oriented bureaucracy'.

The foregoing argument can be summarized as showing that the public administration approach to development is intrinsically misconceived because it takes a vital part of the process out of the picture. We shall now attempt to show why this approach is, and can only be, the tool of imperialism. To do this, we shall concentrate on the historical development of public administration in the third world. Here we have in mind the history and consequence of colonialism in the third world. It is becoming increasingly recognized that only through the historical approach, and the analysis of colonialism in particular, can one begin to understand the issues of development in the underdeveloped parts of the world.¹⁹ Although we cannot here delve deeply into the history of the colonial period, we should take a glimpse of the historical context in which the Western idea of bureaucracy was introduced in the third world.

The public administration approach to development in the third world conspicuously ignores historical factors. Thus when its users look at the constraints to development, they come up with a catalogue of phenomena that themselves need to be explained. Not infrequently one reads that political instability, corruption, lack of trained personnel, chronic lack of data or the unreliability of what data there is and lack of institutionalized administrative process are the major obstacles to development. Each of these things needs to be explained, but they never are. One learns from Caiden and Wildavsky that the major problem with countries of the third world is that

they lack 'redundancy.'²⁰ And when one unravels Riggs' 'Bazaar — Canteen Model,' 'Poly—Normativism' and 'Prismatic Sala,' one finds that he is only describing what 'is,' ever faithful to the behavioural revolution which was sweeping the United States when he wrote.²¹ None of these writers seems aware that what they describe grew out of what was, just as what will be must be fundamentally affected by what is. It is important to make these points so as to underscore the historical approach.

Bureaucracy, as the term is commonly used today, was introduced into the third world under colonialism. Colonialism by its very nature was essentially an administrative process. In Africa, for example, the blacks were seen as too immature to participate in the complicated affairs of politics. Therefore, their affairs were looked after through "essentially administrative apparatus."²² Any local political institutions were for white settlers or local representatives of European trading firms. In all cases, whether of direct or indirect rule, political power lay with the District Officer or Commissioner. In effect, 'civilization' was to be administered to the colonized.

No conflict was seen or allowed to develop between the economy of the colonial territory and that of the metropole. By this token, one of the fundamental issues in any society was settled for the colonized by the colonizer. From the latter's point of view, all parties stood to gain. The colonizer would gain access to raw material and cheap labour. The colonized would gain economic 'development' and 'civilization'. Hence when administrative structures were created, they were simply to facilitate maintenance of law and order, and for collecting taxes and generally service the economy.²³ They facilitated the business of the foreign firms. Because colonialism was a historical agent of imperialism, we can say that the administrative structures established in the colonies were tools of imperialism and they served its purpose. The economic exploitation of colonies had the establishment of administrative structures in these territories as one of its *sine qua non*.

Aside from their obvious role as mechanism for domination and exploitation, the administrative institutions served another important purpose. They were the apparatus through which the ideology of the colonizer was transferred to the colonized. Brett has argued that in Britain, ideology exists and operates in institutions.²⁴ So does it in every society, including the colonial societies. In all cases, policy and action are taken in response to "a set of general normative assumptions about the basis of general authority and the nature of social goals."²⁵ The colonized who made their way into

20 *Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1974.

21 *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964.

22 E. A. Brett, *op. cit.*; p. 66.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 43 and 54. See also Richard Taub, *Bureaucrats Under Stress*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969 p. 191.

24 Brett, *op. cit.* p. 38.

25 *Ibid.*

18 In *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, XLII, 3, 1976, pp. 257—265.

19 This is the basic approach by Rodney, *op. cit.*; Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974; and T. Szentes, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*, Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1971. Many more examples could be cited from the works of Samir Amin, A.G. Frank, etc.

these institutions were thus indoctrinated into the world view of the colonial master. They came to accept the status quo.

With the coming of independence, many third world countries established public administration programmes. Neither in Kenya nor in Pakistan do we find any substantial change from the administrative structure of the colonial days. We do not consider as substantial change the fact that the training of bureaucrats at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College (PASC) changed in 1958 from being very British to being very American.²⁶ In the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA), large involvement by the private sector (which is largely foreign) was represented in the activities there by the Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE). Just before independence, Kenyans were trained here so that the national administrative structure could be maintained "intact by replacing its expatriate personnel with Kenyans who, as far as possible, had the same values and competence".²⁷ Nor did the change of name of the Indian bureaucracy from the (colonial) Indian Civil Service to the (post-colonial) Indian Administrative Service constitute any fundamental change.²⁸

The former colonial lords, now joined by the United States, have continued to show active interest in administrative training in the third world. Not only have they helped training programmes in these countries; they have trained personnel from there in their countries.²⁹ One begins to see these training programmes in their proper perspective when one finds them embodying little change from colonial times. They are, essentially, status quo-oriented. We have said above that bureaucratic and administrative structures were introduced in the third world to serve the interest of imperialism. Given the absence of fundamental change in the administrative institutions of most third world countries, and given that the United States and former colonial lords are playing largely reinforcing roles (in these administrative structures), it is logical to conclude that the administrative approach to development is a service indeed for imperialism; at best it is an illusion.

Public administration approach to development sees lack of manpower and proper administrative institutionalization as the most important constraints to development in the third world. This presumes, just as under colonialism, that capitalism offers the best context for development. Solution

26 See M. B. A. Abbas, "Public Administration Training in Pakistan: A Critical Approach" *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 36, 3, 1970, pp. 256—270.

27 Colin Leys, "Administrative Training in Kenya" in Bernard Schaffer, ed., *Administrative Training and Development: A comparative Study of East Africa, Pakistan and India*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974, p. 165.

28 Richard Taub, *op. cit.*, pp. 191—192.

29 See W. J. Siffin, "Development Administration in the Programme of the United States Agency for International Development"; Jacques Boutes, "Les perspectives de l'aide Bilaterale de la France en matière d'administration Publique" and "Future Policy in Public Administration of the British Ministry of Overseas Development" all can be found in *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1971, pp. 250—261.

is seen in transference of skill and tools from the developed centres of capitalism to the periphery. In the transference process, multinational corporations — the very tentacles of imperialism — have had roles to play.

The historical conditions in which the administrative approach to development gained ascendancy must be constantly borne in mind. To keep communism away from the third world states was the battle cry in the Western world when development administration came into vogue. Thus the marriage between administration in 'developing' countries and American foreign policy³⁰ is understandable. Emphasis was on supporting status quo in the third world. Besides this, everything else was secondary, *even* the development as such of the newly-independent states. In fact, few of those who used the concept were sure what they meant by development administration. As Weidner has noted:

there was confusion as to its proper meaning: Some have confused it with administrative development, or the changes and growth that take place in public administration in any country. Others have taken on the philosophy of the White Man's Burden, and believe development administration to refer to the problems of public administration in the less-developed countries of the world.³¹

Members of the American Comparative Administration Group who popularized the concept used it with particular reference to the third world. It comes as something of surprise to hear Dwight Waldo who is said to have "recommended" 'development' as an interest to the CAG³², confess that: "I don't know what I mean by 'development'."³³ Waldo also pointed out that development administration remained vague.³⁴ Perhaps because of this vagueness, but certainly because of historical conditions in which it gained prominence, development administration translated simply into activities of 'nation-building' in the 'third' world.³⁵ Put in another way, development administration was serving to preserve and enhance the interest of international capital. It is this that accounts for the support it received from the Ford Foundation and USAID, to mention only a few³⁶.

30 Loveman, *op. cit.*, Siffin, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

31 Edward W. Weidner, "Development Administration: A new Focus for Research" in Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes, eds., *Papers in Comparative Administration*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, The University of Michigan Institute of Public Administration, 1962, p. 97.

32 Lynton K. Caldwell, "Conjectures on Comparative Public Administration" in Roscoe C. Martin, ed., *Public Administration and Democracy: Essays in Honor of Paul H. Appleby*, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1965, p. 233.

33 Dwight Waldo, "Scope of the Theory of Public Administration" in James C. Charlesworth, ed., *Theory and Practice Administration: Scope, Objectives, and Methods*, Philadelphia, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1968, Monograph 8, p. 23.

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 23—24.

35 Cf Donald C. Stone, "Public Administration and Nation-Building" in Roscoe C. Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 251—253.

36 Caldwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 239—240; Loveman, *op. cit.*, p. 620.

Historical experience would teach us that whatever serves the interest of international capital in the third world cannot equally serve the purpose of development there.³⁷ Now since the public administration approach hardly seeks to disentangle countries of the third world from the tentacles of international capital, it must be concluded that it is unsuitable for their development.

Before we conclude, let us briefly look at the approach to development in two countries, Kenya and Tanzania. Experience in these countries shows that the greater the reliance on the administrative approach to development, the greater will be the failure of development. Kenya's administrative system has hardly changed. But Tanzania, especially since the Arusha Declaration in 1967, has attempted to reorganize its administrative system.³⁸ In its attempt to develop, it has sought to get the whole population *involved* in the process. The lesson is being learned in Tanzania, it seems, that the administrative system introduced by colonialism was not designed "to generate economic and social development".³⁹

The Tanzanian *ujamaa* approach to development "was intended to be implemented *politically*; that is through education and mobilization of peasants". What drawback it has had is due to "adoption of *bureaucratic style* by political leaders".⁴⁰ While Tanzania's problems with development are not to be overlooked, it can at least be said that it has greater potential for development than Kenya. Kenya's much-written about Special Rural Development Plan (SRDP) lacked any notion of politically involving the masses. As a reading of Chamber's analysis of the SRDP shows, its emphasis was on providing the personnel who manage or administer rural development with the requisite skills of administration, that is, on improving management.⁴¹ Given one of the major strands of our argument — that development cannot be brought about by bureaucratic means — it can be said that SRDP, as a *development* project, was doomed to failure. Other explanations for its failure⁴² — a failure more conspicuous because the SRDP was proclaimed with fanfare and had the backing of various international agencies — can be said to have been misdirected.

37 Cf Rodney, *op. cit.*

38 Diana Conyers, "Organization for Development: The Tanzanian Experience" *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1974, p. 447.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 438.

40 P. L. Raikes, "Ujamaa and Socialism", *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 3, 1975, p. 39. (Emphasis mine.) Unlike Shivji, Raikes does not suggest that *Ujamaa* policy serves interests of the petty-bourgeoisie. See Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1976. Raikes (*op. cit.*, p. 51) thinks a view such as Shivji's is "oversimplified and invalid".

41 Robert Chambers, *Managing Rural Development: Ideas and Experience from East Africa*, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974. See also Ian Livingstone, "Rural Development in Kenya: The SRDP Revisited", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. XV, No. 2, 1976, pp. 133—140.

42 Livingstone puts part of the blame on "a scarcity of ideas for useful innovation and ex-

In fact, Kenya and Tanzania and other African countries are underdeveloping themselves because of reliance on methods of the public administration process packaged in Western countries. In Kenya, it has produced an African management class that is merely a conveyor belt for international capital.⁴³ Ghana has not escaped the same fate. As Judith Marshall reports, members of Ghana's "technocratic elite" who were American trained were "anti-communist... highly suspicious of popular mobilization and ideology and convinced of technocratic solutions, ideal intermediaries for international capitalism".⁴⁴ And of Tanzania, Saul and Loxley warn that "the wholesale importations of Western capitalist management systems... should be viewed with concern".⁴⁵

There is greater hope that Tanzania will develop than there is for Kenya, however. This is because of the apparent realization in Tanzania that the development process is a political process. True, there are still serious problems and it would be utterly naive to overlook them. But some of these problems have the potential to enhance development rather than retard it. Tanzania will develop if it recognizes these problems and struggles against them. To illustrate, let us look at the Village (later, in 1969, restructured into Ward) Development Committees (VDC/WDC). They were meant as mechanism through which TANU could involve the villagers in development. According to Finucane who closely studied this process in the Mwanza Region, problems developed at the VUD level because people had only foggy ideas of what development really entailed, and villagers showed more interest in "services (e.g. schools, clinics)" than in "productive projects".⁴⁶ Interest seemed veered toward "the continuation of present norms and arrangements" rather than development as such.⁴⁷

Now in a development process, this kind of attitude on the part of the local people poses a problem. But the point is that it is in struggling against such problems that development happens. In other words, such problems can be

periment" and on the upper levels of the rulership in Kenya (*ibid.*, p. 135). Nellis also points to lack of enthusiasm for rural development on the part of the government but seems to emphasize that "The Kenyan bureaucracy... has yet to demonstrate that it is a truly effective mechanism for the implementation of development plans and programmes..." See J. R. Nellis, "The Administration of Rural Development in Kenya", *East Africa Journal*, 9, 3, 1972, p. 10, also emphasis added. See also J. Heyer, "Choice in the Rural Planning Process" in *ibid.*, p. 4.

43 Cf. Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, *op. cit.*; Steven Langdon, "Multinational Corporations, Taste Transfer and Underdevelopment: A Case Study from Kenya", *Review of African Political Economy*, 2, 1975, pp. 12—35.

44 Judith Marshall, "The State of Ambivalence: Right and Left Options in Ghana", *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 5, 1976, p. 54.

45 John Loxley and John S. Saul, "Multinationals, Workers and Parastatals in Tanzania", *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 2, 1975, p. 72.

46 James R. Finucane, *Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania: The Case of Mwanza Region*, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974, p. 89.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 95.

turned into opportunities. They offer the opportunity for the leaders to bring to the awareness of the people what are the national problems, how these are related to local ones, and why their participation in finding the solutions is important. This presumes, of course, that the leaders recognize this opportunity and do not see it only as a problem. For in the development process, every problem is an opportunity and every opportunity may be a problem. A problem becomes an opportunity because it allows for people to apply their skills and knowledge, and to develop new ones in the search for solution. Such skill and knowledge becomes accumulated as experience and available for application in other instances. Like capital, it can be reinvested and it will yield further capital. The opportunity may become a problem if it is misused, or is not even recognized. In this latter case, little progress is made or an impasse is reached; no development takes place. The most important factor — and this cannot be overemphasized—on whether an opportunity is utilized or misused is the existence of a political ideology which recognizes the intrinsic value of relentlessly involving the masses in their own development.

To summarize, development is a political process. It cannot be brought about through bureaucratic or administrative means. Public administration cannot replace politics and therefore it is an unsuitable tool for development. The public administration approach to development in the third world only serves to reinforce the *status quo ante* independence. Because this status quo was created by imperialism; because public administration in the third world was specifically introduced during colonialism for the service of imperialism; because imperialism only results in exploitation; because exploitation is the antithesis of development; and because the third world was *not* developing under colonialism, the public administration approach to development is misinformed.

THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL MARX

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In Africa, other developing countries, and even inside developed Europe and America, there exist very distorted ideas about Marx and his teachings. Some reasons for this are not hard to find. The developing nations have been the battle field of propaganda between the West and the East; between the Right and the Left. In their bid to win the emerging nations to their side, the Western colonial powers launched serious propaganda aimed at discouraging the Third World from embracing communism. It was portrayed as destructive of religion, freedom of speech, private property even to the extent of advocating community of wives and children. People were instructed to keep contact with Marxists very limited and to suspect any humanistic move they made as a device to get into the system of government and of the church in order to overthrow them. Marx was branded as being materialistic. "Marx is supposed to have believed that the paramount psychological motive in man is his wish for monetary gain and comfort and that this striving for maximum profit constitutes the main incentive in his personal life and in the life of the human race. Marx's criticism of religion was held to be identical with the denial of all spiritual values... that he had neither respect nor understanding for the spiritual needs of man, and that his "ideal" was the well-fed and well-clad but "soulless person."

Perhaps the Western powers in Africa were right in their propaganda against communism. Perhaps in Russia, freedom of speech was curbed to some extent; that families broke up on account of the State's intervention in determining who did what job to maintain the communist system; that children belonged first and foremost to the State and secondarily to their parents; that the church was persecuted. These were alleged proofs of the demerits of communism and the inhuman treatment inflicted on the people under the communist regime.

Whatever the truth of these statements, one point is clear as a result of a research on Marxism - namely, that the man Marx and the communism he preached were quite different from what they were said to be by the West. Eric Fromm defends Marx: "Suffice it to say at the outset that this popular picture of Marx's "Materialism", his anti-spiritual tendency, his wish for uniformity and subordination - is utterly false. Marx's aim was that of a spiritual emancipation of man, of his liberation from the chains of economic determination, of restituting him in his human wholeness, of enabling him to find unity and harmony with his fellow man and with nature. Marx's

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1 Eric Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1966, p. 2.