

78. Regionald Herbold Green, "The Lome Convention: Updated Dependence or Departure Toward Collective Self-Reliance?" in *The African Review*, Vol. 6 No. 1, 1976, p. 47.
79. Bishop, W.W., *International Law: Cases and Materials*, Little, Brown & Co., 2nd edn. 1962, p. 58
80. Marx Sorensen, *Manual of Public International Law*, Macmillan, New York, 1968, p. 682.
81. W. Alexander, "L'Association entre la C.E.E. et la Grece," in *Revue Hellenique de Droit International*, January-June 1982, pp. 10-50; Dionyssios Paulantzas, "Une Disposition Malencontreuse de l'Accord d'Association de la Grece a la C.E.E." in *Revue Hellenique de Droit International*, January-June 1962, pp. 10-50; Dionyssios Paulantzas, "Une Disposition Malencontreuse de l'Accord d'Association de la Grece a la C.E.E." in *Revue Hellenique de Droit International*, July-December 1963, pp. 246-257.
82. The expression "AASM" (after the French abbreviation EAMS) is used only for convenience of language; for unlike EAC the AASM were never juridically constituted, of R.J. Dupuy, "Du Caractere unitaire de la C.E.E. dans ses relations exterieures," in *A.F.D.I.*, 1963, p. 487.
83. Arusha Agreement, Article 35 para 2.
84. P. Pescatore, *La Clause de la Nation la Plus Favourisee*, op cit. p. 73 (para 76).
85. See Richard Bailey for simplified account, *The European Community in the World*, Hutschinson & Co., London, 1973.
86. There is consensus that the international legal and economic framework into which were born the newly independent States were too narrow to contain their aspirations. Before then, in 1948, there had been hope in the Havana Charter which would have established an International Trade Organisation. The ITO never entered into force as the USA, a major trading nation, failed to ratify it. Since then such endeavours in GATT, UNCTAD etc... have confronted the task only piece-meal and at the initiative and pressure of poor states when the major trading nations have remained aloof or even actively against them. After the Arusha Agreement, the EEC association system has now turned against its creators to become one of these centres of demands. It is such *travail de termites* that it is hoped to gnaw the lumber and erect new lulwarks! But, when will the task be accomplished? See Pierre Vellas, *Droit International Economique et Social*, Sirey, Paris, 1966; W. Friedman, *The Changing Structure of International Law*, Columbia University Press, 1964; and S. Prakash Sinha, *New Nations and the Law of Nations*, W.A.W. Sijthoff Leyden, 1967 and bibliography therein.
87. Torrelli, op.cit., p. 30, especially footnote no. 31; also J.Costinis, op. cit. p. 229 and footnote no. 49.

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Canada and Scandinavian Countries have often times seemed to take a 'neutral' position in world 'power politics' and they have appeared to have some sympathy with the oppressed masses of the world. Presumably, this was instrumental in organizing the International Seminar on apartheid as a token service to the UN's declared International Apartheid Year of 1978. This book comprises of some of the papers presented to the conference reflecting divergencies which exist in interpretation of the problem of Apartheid; the relationship which exists between South Africa and Canada/Scandinavian countries; the gap which exists between foreign policy objectives and implementation of the objectives with regard to Southern African problem; the role which Canada/Scandinavian Countries ought to pursue, and a critique of previous policies. A summary of the general observations is given by T. Shaw in the concluding chapter.

In analyzing the economic links between Canada and South Africa, Steven Longdon suggests that economic ties that exist is a result of the relationship which exists between Canadian economy with the powerful imperialist countries; a relationship instrumental in creating structural problems within Canadian domestic economy. Implicitly, Canada/Southern African economic ties cannot fundamentally be altered before resolving such contradictions. This same analysis seems to be the main thesis advanced by Robert Mathews and Cranfort Pratt in Chapter IV when they trace the evolution of Canadian policy towards Southern Africa. Mathews and Pratt have argued that while Canada is interested in painting a liberal image internationally by verbally supporting progressive forces that condemn the racist regime, Canada is more sensitive to its traditional allies i.e. U.S.A. and Britain. This explains why Canada has been rather reluctant to intervene to prevent trade and investment linkages and also why Canadian policy has basically remained persuasive and moralistic, lacking any concrete policies.

The implementation of arms Embargo by Canada and Scandinavia is greatly influenced by military ties with major Western powers. This is illustrated by Mitiny's paper.

Saul J. dismisses the notion of isolating Canada and Scandinavia from the capitalist allies. He analyzes how the Canadian Banks are intrinsically linked with the Multinational firms of the European — American Banking Corporation all of which have since 1970 been involved in direct loans to Southern African governments and agencies.

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Though this sounds pessimistic, he shows some optimism when he commends non-governmental organization in publicizing the Bank's activities and pressurizing the banks from such activities. Accordingly this could have some deterrent effect.

Linder Freeman on the other hand focuses on aid relationship between Canada and the Frontline States. Aid, according to Linda, has furthered both political and commercial interests of Canada in this region, hence perpetuated "metropolitan — periphery relations." In terms of actual amount, it is observed that aid is very insignificant, and this amount has not been directed to alleviate the problems of the rural poor. However, Linda commends that portion of aid which has been directed to the infrastructural projects and technical assistance.

While Paul Ladouceur is critical about Canadian past aid policy, he observes evolution towards a more pragmatic approach in aid giving from mid 1970's. The changing policy is attributed to domestic pressure groups and pressure from outstanding African leaders namely J.K. Nyerere of Tanzania and K.K. Kaunda of Zambia.

Although most of the discussants had taken a more critical view on Canada vis-a-vis Southern Africa, the discussants on Scandinavian relationship vis-a-vis Southern Africa seemed to take a less critical approach. Of all the discussants, Roger Lays' Paper is the most critical. He raises the main contradictions between aid objectives and actual results. He attempted to relate such contradictions with the key features in the Political economy of the countries under discussion i.e. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS). However Leys argues that such contradictions are part and parcel of the contradictions governing aid giving and aid receiving and are not a particularly peculiar phenomena of Scandinavian aid to these countries.

Stoltemberg on the other hand conceptualizes apartheid as the main problem threatening International Security. He is convinced that Scandinavian countries can play two main roles in resolving the problem of Apartheid: first by providing an alternative model to be followed by other interested parties. Given the strategic position of Scandinavian countries as "middle range" powers, they can act as a 'safety valve' between Western Capitalist Countries and the rest of the International Community in handling this particular problem (Ironically, this could mean providing stronger ties between the two for the advantage of the former).

Thunberg is convinced that Nordic countries have a capability to play a positive role in resolving the Southern African problem. Given the fact that, Nordic countries have historical link, share some similar values in foreign policy objectives and in this particular instance do "share identical basic views" inspite of the fact that they have not jointly identified common strategy; they can jointly devise a strategy for common policy. The main emphasis should be non-military aid aiming at democratic changes in Southern Africa.

All the discussants in general do see a problem existing in Southern

Africa, but they do not seem to agree on the nature of the problem nor do they agree on the strategy to be used. While a few can see a causal relationship between imperialism and the apartheid system, the majority seem to ignore this causal relationship. The majority are thus in favour of a reformist strategy, preferably a non-military one that would lead to a peaceful solution of the problem of Apartheid which would ensure creation of "prosperous and democratic" state in Southern Africa. Given the contradictions which prevail in Southern Africa, such proposals seem highly idealistic.