

- University Press, 1976). See also Soedjatmoko "Reflections on nonalignment in the 1970's" in Erb & Kallab (eds) *Beyond Dependency* 28-37. Cf. Robert Rothstein "Foreign policy and development policy: from nonalignment to international class war" *International Affairs* 52(4), October 1976, 598-616.
81. See "Dakar Declaration on Raw Materials" in *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 8, 1975-1976* C155-C157. Cf. Guy F. Erb "The developing world's 'challenge' in perspective" in Erb & Kallab (eds) *Beyond Dependency* 135-156 and John W. Sewell "The United States and world development, 1977" in his collection on *The United States and World Development: agenda 1977* (New York: 1977) 1-20.
82. On the elusiveness of sophisticated decision-making responses in a situation of dependence see Percy Selwyn "Introduction: room for manoeuvre?" in his collection on *Development Policy in Small Countries* (London: Croom Helm for IDS, 1975) 8-24.
83. See UN and ECA data in "Population" *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 8, 1975-1976* C120-C126. For more on high fertility, mortality and population growth rates in Africa, especially on an unfavourable age structure and on prospects for development see S.K. Gaisie "Demographic prospects for tropical Africa for the next thirty years" and G.A. Saxton "The price of death control without birth control in Africa over the next thirty years" in Ali A. Mazrui and Hasu H. Patel (eds) *Africa in World Affairs: the next thirty years* (New York: Third Press, 1973) 135-172.
84. Cited on Quentin H. Stanford *The World's Population: Problem of Growth* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972) 23.
85. Wassily Leontiev et al. *The Future of the World Economy: a United Nations study* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).
86. *Ibid.* 8.
87. Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pastel *Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome* (New York: Signet, 1976) especially 56-82.
88. *Catastrophe or New Society: A Latin-American World Model* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1976).
89. *Ibid.* 36-37.
90. *Ibid.* 87-93. On Africa's aggregate unpromising future in terms of "basic needs" and development see the Statistical Annexes in the annual ODC publication on *US and World Development*, 1973 to 1977. See also I. William Zartman "Introduction to socio-political trends in Africa" *Council on Foreign Relations 1980s Project* New York, 1976.
91. Mazrui suggests this as a generalisable form of "counter-penetration" because of "the conversion of Third World resources from their old role as sources of dependency to a new role as sources of power" (*A World Federation of Cultures* 441). See also Robert O. Matthews "The Third World: powerful or powerless?" in Alkis Kontos (ed) *Domination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) 69-87.
92. Cf. the rather optimistic and simplistic analysis of I. William Zartman "Europe and Africa: decolonization or dependence?" *Foreign Affairs* 54(2), January 1976, 325-342. For more critical and sophisticated inquiries into the EurAfrican relationship as a case of north-south asymmetries see Johan Galtung "The Lome Convention and neo-capitalism" and Reginald H. Green "The Lome Convention: updated dependence or departure toward collective self-reliance?" *African Review* 6(1), 1976, 33-54 and Michael B. Dolan "The Lome Convention and Europe's relationship with the Third World: a critical analysis" *International Studies Association*, St. Louis, March 1977.

Review Article

Crisis of Marxist Theory of Imperialism and Underdevelopment

A.B. Zack-Williams

The authors in this review represent three shades of Marxist opinion on the question of imperialism and under-development. Offiong* represents the "Third World Nationalist position, Hayter* epitomises what Warren* has labelled the "populist leftist" line (p. 112), and Warren's position for lack of a better word could be called the "revisionist Marxist" line. These labels will soon become clear.

Both Offiong and Hayter share a common epistemological position: underdevelopment and world poverty are the results of capitalist exploitation. By contrast, Warren, who claims allegiance to Marx, rather than Lenin (more about this later), sees capitalism as providing the basis for the growth in material welfare which the third world is now experiencing. Since Warren's work represents the deviation from the accepted line in contemporary Marxist analysis on the question of World poverty, his would be the yardstick by which the other two works will be judged. We shall not be concerned with the relative importance of these works; but we shall, instead, look at the issues raised by the three authors.

IMPERIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Both Offiong and Hayter reject the conventional (modernisation) explanations for poverty. Hayter notes: "... the explanations, if given at all, are inadequate. For a start, the question addressed is not usually the question of why the international distribution of income is so unequal. Explanations are attempts to show why the peoples of underdeveloped countries are 'poor' but the existence of their poverty is not related to the wealth accumulated elsewhere... (The explanations) tend to be based on what might tactfully be called a Eurocentric view of the world, which is itself a product of historical circumstances, and of colonial mythology in particular..." (p. 18-19).

For both Hayter and Offiong, the current state of poverty and un-

*Daniel O. Offiong, *Imperialism and Dependency: Obstacles to African Development*, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980, pp. 304, N6. 50; T. Hayter *The Creation of World Poverty: An Alternative View to the Brandt Report*, Pluto Press, 1981, pp. 128, £2.50, Bill Warren, *Imperialism Pioneer of Capitalism* Verso, 1980, pp. 274, £3.95/\$8.50.

argued that it was not possible for European technology to be borrowed by Africans. The racist stereotype of Africans by Europeans is contrasted with Japan which was never colonised or enslaved. Even when Africans were prepared to forget the past and "demand technology relevant to our development," this appeal fell on deaf ears.

Hayter, writing on a perspective wider than Offiong's, noted that the Navigation Acts had laid the foundation whereby "colonies were prohibited by law from turning to any industry which might compete with the industry of the mother country." While the destruction of the Indian textile industry is usually emphasised, Hayter notes:

"In Africa, Europeans already undermined much of the local textile industry by bringing in textile from India, thus adding to the destruction of African commerce, mining and industry already wrought by the slave wars. These Indian textiles, in Africa and also in America, then began to be replaced by textiles from Britain" p. 48).

Colonial powers like Britain used "an elaborate network of restrictions and prohibitive duties," and imposed "free trade" when it suited them. Thus the British declared war on China to force the latter to import opium. The net effect of these strategies was not only the loss of their "Previously self-sufficiency in manufacturing, but also, increasingly, their ability to feed themselves." (Hayter P. 53).

For Warren, the effects of colonialism should not be measured primarily in terms of "economic development," but in terms of "material welfare" or "cultural transfer." Thus he offers the following caveat:

"To divorce economic development, however, from the material welfare of the population or from the intellectual and cultural foundations of the advanced technology, organization, and characteristic psychological traits on which it rests is to register only surface phenomena. Marxists have tended to do just that, to minimise improvements in material welfare on the one hand and to ignore (or even denounce) cultural transfer on the other, focusing on aspects of colonial economic development considered negative on the basis of an unhistorical ideas type" (pp. 128-29).

Warren goes on to argue that if the three components of material welfare are analysed (i.e. health education, and provision of new types of consumer goods), it is clear "that the colonial era, far from initiating a reinforcing process of underdevelopment, launched almost from its inception a process of development" (p. 29). Warren examines the "three interwoven processes" alleged to be symptomatic of underdevelopment:-

- (a) drain of surplus from periphery to centre,
- (b) the establishment of an adverse international division of labour which is self-reinforcing.
- (c) the conservation of pre-capitalist modes of production which retard the development of productive forces.

In the case of drain of surplus, he argues that for this to retard economic development, it must be an absolute drain, and since investment is generally value creating, or profitable, then a net gain is

realised. With regards to the question of adverse international division of labour, the line of the under-development theorists is valid only if specialising in primary products made it impossible for an export-led growth to occur, and also if it imposed serious impediments to industrialisation, in his view, the developmental experiences of Australasia and the U.S. which he holds were "initiated by primary commodity exports" shows the inadequacy of the position of the underdevelopment theorists.

The question of the preservation of archaic modes is dismissed by Warren as anti-Marxist, for "Marx himself had no doubt that the destructive force of capitalism would outweigh any conserving tendencies." (p. 153) In his view, what is seen as preservation of archaic forms is either transitory or is the result of the uneven development of capitalism," in which the temporary stagnation of one sector may be the condition for the rapid advance of another." (p. 154). The problem is how temporary is temporary, for it could be recalled that it is part of Laclau's argument (which Warren strongly criticises) that the archaic forms serve a role which is functional to capitalist accumulation.

DEPENDENCY THEORISTS AND THE MYTH OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

In his analysis of the dependency theory, Warren argues that it reflects not the "interests of the working classes," but "the nationalist sentiments of the intellectual groups." It is implicit in Warren's work that the dependency theorists with the emphasis on backward capitalism are the inheritors of Lenin's "revisionist" position. Warren's task is to show the falsity of this approach. Among the criticisms he levels against this approach are that:-

- (i) It is a static and superficial phenomenon lacking any depth of analysis,
- (ii) It fails to look at the effect which the periphery may have on the core countries which are now tending towards inter-dependent development and not dependency.
- (iii) It suffers from vulgar economic determinism; in particular, it fails to look at the growing power of the national state over the benign multinational corporations. Furthermore, it fails to look at the wide range of options opened to the undeveloped societies, and the way different societies have adapted to the world market.

In order to reject the arguments of the underdevelopment theorist, Warren tries to show that a number of their conclusions do not comply with empirical reality. Thus he argues that the postwar record (measured in GNP per capita) of the third world has been outstandingly successful. Furthermore using fragmentary and rather shaky evidence (he himself claims they are "scanty and unreliable" p. 200), Warren argues that higher growth rates in the post-war years have not generated greater

inequality.

On the question of marginalisation of the masses in the third world, Warren holds that this is a misleading impression. On the question of third world unemployment Warren rejects what he calls evidence based on "employment-exchange statistics." By contrast evidence based on census and sample survey data gives a less gloomy picture, with rates "often comparable to rates in the Developed Market Economies." Warren also rejects what could be called the 'Amin thesis' that "the volume of goods and services available in the Third World since the second World War is not oriented towards the 'basic needs' of the majority of the population." (See A. Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale*). He warns that: "changes in various basic individual indicators of welfare in recent years are also consistent with the view that there has been considerable progress in material welfare for the populations as a whole and not simply for the privileged few." (p. 231).

Warren was quite unequivocal with regards to the question of industrialisation and the spread of capitalism. He observes: "despite assertions and predictions to the contrary, the underdeveloped world as a whole has made considerable progress in industrialisation during the post-war period" (p. 241).

Using aggregate figures for the Third World, Warren argues that manufacturing output has risen faster in the underdeveloped world than in the developed capitalist countries. This has tended to increase the farmers contribution to world manufacturing output. Furthermore, in a number of large to medium sized underdeveloped countries manufacturing as a percentage to GDP has risen significantly.

CONCLUSION

In this review, we have looked at three authors who have tried to analyse imperialism and underdevelopment. We have seen that while the approaches of Offiong and Hayter seem to merge in places by contrast, Warren's position is very much different. Though he claims adherence to Marx, yet Warren's approach (in particular his handling of secondary materials) seem to have more in common with bourgeois economics than with Marxism.

At first, it seems as if the controversy is simply between the effects of capitalism in its early (competitive) stage and the effect of monopoly capitalism on third world social formations. The issue at stake, as we have seen, is deeper than that. Warren believes that the contemporary third world is thoroughly capitalist and that the effect of capitalism is similar to that in the developed world. It is for this reason that he rejects the idea of capitalism preserving pre-capitalist modes to serve its (capitalist) accumulation need.

What is beyond dispute is that third world social formations are

dominated by capitalist relations of production, but this is not the same thing as saying that these formations are capitalist. Indeed, the crucial difference between capitalism at the centre and peripheral capitalism could be found in the way in which the third world became integrated into the world capitalist system. There was no attempt to create an indigenous, bourgeois class (at least in Africa in the colonial period), and little or no attempt was made to revolutionise productive forces. In the case of Africa, no attempt was made (until recently) to establish a manufacturing base that could act as a leading sector to autocentric growth. Indeed, as Claude Ake (in *The Political Economy of Africa*, Longmans 1981) has observed, the effects of decades of imperialist penetration has meant "That the objective conditions of African Socio-economic formations do not favour capitalism."