

Africa and the Environment: the Political Economy of Resources

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The environment and resources have always been central to the political economy of Africa.¹ The weather and the distribution of natural goods have played major parts in determining the rise and fall of pre-colonial kingdoms; famine and resource depletion are not new issues in African politics. Africa's resources were one attraction that brought merchant venturers, colonial powers and settlers to the continent, leading ultimately to the progressive "integration" of Africa as the periphery of the imperial system.²

Africa's role in both world politics and economics has not changed greatly in the post-colonial era; its environment continues to be disturbed and its resources continue to be exported to maintain the economic growth and political dominance of the industrial states. Nevertheless, the contemporary period of economic and political change and instability in the international system offers new prospects as well as problems for Africa. In this essay we seek to describe and explain the dilemmas and opportunities posed by the emerging world order for the political economy of Africa; we conclude by examining trends and predictions about Africa's future in the world system.

The question of Africa's response to the uneven impact of new data about and attitudes to the environment and to energy has to be posed in the context of Africa's place in the global political economy. The characteristic dependence of African states informs and constrains their reaction to new international inequalities and opportunities. They are simultaneously supportive of efforts to enhance the developmental prospects of the Third World through collective action while being critical of any unfavourable effects of such action on their particular interests. In other words, ideological and rhetorical unity versus the rich states does not exclude economic and political disagreements with the non-aligned movement over the distribution of any gains.³ Africa's ambivalence is heightened as the continent becomes more clearly divided into resource-rich and - poor countries. The emergence of Fourth World members and dilemmas in Africa undermines its tenuous unity and produces diverse responses to the new imperatives of ecology and energy. We turn first to an overview of the environmental issue in world politics before examining its impact on the continent.

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THE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE IN WORLD POLITICS

The environmental issue is part of the contemporary crisis in world politics and reflects growing awareness and concern among the industrialised states about the impact of their overdevelopment on the global ecological system.⁴ Continued economic growth, technological change and social progress are now in question because of environmental pollution, resource depletion and social conflict. Some governments and international organisations, under pressure from new sub-cultures and environmental pressure groups, have responded positively to critical analyses of continued industrial expansion. In particular, the intensification of international inequalities and the trauma of the oil crisis have forced a substantial re-evaluation of the role and direction of change in the industrialised states which was already in progress because of environmental deterioration, resource depletion and the alienation inherent in technological society. The impact of environmental pressures has had a profound impact on the two major contemporary axes (East-West and North-South)⁵ in world politics.

The present international system is characterised by two central cleavages — the economic and ideological differences between capitalist and socialist states, and the economic and racial tensions between rich and poor countries. The continuing confrontation between the Third and Fourth worlds on the one hand and the First and Second worlds on the other has been superimposed over *Cold War* divisions, encouraging *detente* between *democratic* and *authoritarian* regimes. In this world of emerging multiple coalitions, the disintegration of geopolitical and ideological bipolarity, the rise of non-military issues, and the diversification of coalition and adversary relationships seem to be the dominant tendencies.⁶ Richard Falk suggests that from the contemporary juxtaposition of *Cold War* and *North-South* confrontations will emerge the dominance of issues arising from international stratification and dependence: "present trends suggest major shifts in the next decade from East-West geopolitical conflict to North-South and intra-West patterns of geo-economic conflict."⁷ It is such conflicts which inform Africa's attitudes toward questions of the environment and its impact on their development prospects.

Africa is a *late-comer* in terms of contemporary economic growth and technological change: it is suspicious that concern for the environment is the latest strategy devised by the rich states either to prevent its industrialisation or to export old technology, leaving only acceptable, modern and clean plants in the rich states. Moreover, Africans have long perceived concern among the rich states over population problems to be a way of limiting their own growth and power potential; likewise, they see the recent rise of the ecological issue to be merely another way of perpetuating their subordination.

Environmental and economic issues are inseparable everywhere, in

Africa the economic impact is peculiarly salient because of Africa's inheritance of under-development and the elusiveness of economic growth to date. Some ecological pressures have already retarded Africa's development prospects. Accelerated population growth, the continued rate of urbanisation, the depletion of some resources and intensified exploitation of mineral and agricultural exports, soil erosion and the unforeseen by-products of hydro-electric projects all controvert easy and optimistic predictions of Africa's development potential.

Moreover, because of the growth of inequalities within Africa, new relations are emerging which cut across the rich-poor gap. The development of working classes in Africa may complicate the role of the new elites, but the activities of multi-corporations and aid agencies provide structures for inter-elite solidarity rather than struggle. These new transnational relations⁸ are likely to increase the ambivalence of Africa's leaders and offer the possibility of a more stable, if less than equal, world order:

Such a complex system of world politics, involving many cross-cutting coalitions between and within countries and lacking a dominant worldwide axis of conflict, might appear to be much safer than either the cold war system organized around two hostile blocs or previous balance-of-systems.⁹ This mode of analysis and prediction is motivated by different concerns from those which predict a global *class* conflict to overthrow the *feudal* power structure in which tentacles of a global *octopus* reach into each set of states to extract the surplus.¹⁰

* As poor people in all nations realize that they are poor because others are rich, realize that development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin, they will also realize that there is no solution to their predicament until the system that produced it and maintains it is destroyed.¹¹

In contrast again to such predictions of a world-wide *class* war, Miller suggests that because of the varieties of inequalities and levels of interaction, because of the coexistence of both cooperation and conflict, complexities in international politics have led to new networks of cross-cutting ties. He indicates that cross-cleavages, "conflicting interests on which there are overlapping constituencies of support"¹² serve to contain conflict and limit cooperation. But despite such alternative claims and constituencies, Falk still maintains that:

Confrontation will be more likely, as a result of increasing links and rising awareness among the elites representing the interests of poorer societies — despite the fact that these elites are themselves often in tacit alliance with rich foreign interests, and therefore represent vested interests which are at odds with the welfare of their own societies.¹³

As we suggest in the next section, the development of inequalities in Africa has increased ambivalence over environmental issues. Moreover, because of the wide variety of ecological systems in Africa, no single continental prescription is possible.

Although the environmental imperative is not so strong in Africa as in North America or Europe, global interdependence means inevitably that Africa is affected by ecological awareness and problems. Richard

Falk identifies the war system, population pressure, the insufficiency of resources, and environmental overload as central world order problems.¹⁴ Of course, it must be remembered that problems for the current world order may paradoxically be more real for those actors who gain both wealth and influence from the established system than for those who are clearly disadvantaged by it. An apparently global concern may in fact mask insensitivity to the political interests of the South and to its special problems. Falk, however, has speculated on several ecological pressures which are critical factors in Africa — population, technology, energy, food, weather and information — and has particularly emphasised environmental disasters, cumulative deterioration, ultrahazardous activities and ecological catastrophe as major issues.¹⁵ He identifies four salient emerging characteristics of the planet, all of which are crucial for Africa's developmental and ecological prospects:

1. Global interdependence of significant and diverse variety.
2. The disappearance of unused capacity in the oceans and the atmosphere.
3. An increasing variety of ultratoxic substances and ultrahazardous activities in the world environment.
4. Growing areas of potential and actual incompatibility among various uses of oceans and between land use and ocean quality.¹⁶

Falk also points to the imperative of new international institutions and relationships to escape from the destructive logic of the state system. His plea for new transnational and supranational structures, however, may be unrealistic and certainly unappealing to a continent still dominated by nationalism. Moreover, his critique of established international organisations is relevant to the OAU as well as to the UN system:

Agreement on limited forms of supranational treatment in the areas of arms control, conservation and development of ocean resources, economic cooperation, environmental management and human rights may decelerate certain trends toward deterioration and collapse of the present world system in the years ahead. But these effects on international life would be system-maintaining, and would not be inconsistent with the persistence of warfare, economic and social injustice, racial discrimination, and pollution.¹⁷

Given African elites' preoccupation with the maintenance of power and control, ecological dangers receive little attention except when they result in natural disasters¹⁸ or lead to political challenges.¹⁹ However, it is clear that many of Africa's disasters, as well as the acceleration of ecological decay and malnutrition, are caused by its historical place in the global economy.²⁰ Some of Africa's leaders recognise the close interrelations between the environment and political economy:

As regards natural resources, they stress that soil exhaustion, erosion and degradation results not only from ecological processes but also from

economic processes such as under-remuneration, by the industrialised countries, from agricultural and animal produce.²¹

Recent changes in the world economy have contributed to the uneven incidence of both ecological disasters and environmental decay. The relocation of environmentally damaging production processes to the South shows that "development" carries a heavy price which may be still willing to pay.²²

THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND INEQUALITIES IN AFRICA

Because Africa is still dependent on the rich, industrialised countries, the continuing crisis in the global economy — which contains elements of inflation, recession and uncertainty — has had a profound impact on the uneven incidence of economic growth and social change on the continent. In a world characterised by "interdependence" and scarcities,²³ those African states which contain valuable mineral or energy resources and those most amenable to the interests of multinational corporations have achieved the highest growth rates in the last decade.²⁴ Distinctions between civilian and military regimes or among multi-, one- or no-party governments have become less important in Africa's second decade of regained independence. We would suggest that the crucial criteria now by which to categorise the political economy of African states is whether they possess oil, uranium, copper, diamonds, gold and phosphates or whether their ideology is state capitalist or state socialist.²⁵ Of course a few African states have both strategic commodities and accept transnational enterprises; their role as "sub-imperial" actors in Africa²⁶ may be expected to grow with special implications.

The relationship of African states to the world economy is a major determinant of the scale and character of internal inequalities. In general, those regimes that export minerals and those that encourage foreign investment by multinational corporations have the greatest internal inequalities. This generalisation does not mean that the poorest African countries are the most egalitarian (because (according to orthodox development literature) in general, the higher the GNP per capita, the lower the inequalities), but that in a growing economy it is much harder to resist pressures from the new elites and labour aristocracy for substantial increases in income. Moreover, those states which export oil or minerals to the rich countries and which encourage branch plants also tend to import considerable amounts of consumer as well as capital goods and tend to imitate foreign tastes and consumption patterns. Not only is there less control over consumption in such African countries, but transnational relations between African and foreign elites erode sensitivities about inequalities in the continent.²⁷ A positive balance of trade or the inflow of foreign capital serve to reduce the identification of indigenous elites with the problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Their domestic constituency becomes less important as external associations

provide alternative sources of status, capital and values.²⁸ However, transnational class ties are not always stable in a global system characterised by economic nationalism. Rather, some indigenous entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and politicians may, especially if their state controls a particularly valuable or strategic resource, challenge such forms of cooperation.²⁹ There is often a tension between state and corporation which at a lower level exists between ruling class and external associates. But the prospects for continued collaboration in an unequal world political economy still look higher than an increase in confrontation.³⁰

This externally-oriented and dependent mode of growth does not advance national or continental development. Indeed, increases in both internal and international inequalities have produced disunity and conflict. As Basil Davidson laments, "the attempt to achieve an all-round national development by means of this 'middle-class solution,' a solution of 'private enterprise' buttressed by state enterprise, has written a record of bitter failure."³¹ He points to the unlikelihood of autonomous national capitalist development in any of the states of Africa because of the "periphery's" continued dependence on the "centre." Capitalism in Africa has not led to the creation of national economies but to more diversified and stratified economies and societies still dependent on the centre. As Davidson insists, this "partnership between dominant foreign interests and convenient local elites, both enclosed within international structures and relationships whose foundations were built in the nineteenth century" does not produce "an independent bourgeoisie because they cannot do so. They remain the junior partners of an external system upon which, at all decisive points, they must continue to depend."³² This dependence may have profound implications for both the level of control over the deployment of resources and for the environmental decay which accompanies intergration into the capitalist, industrialised economy.

Political independence in Africa has not brought economic independence or development to the continent; rather, it has intensified the inheritance of economic dependence. African states, as an influential faction within Third World groupings, have insisted on new patterns of exchange with the rich countries to enhance their prospects for growth and development. However, new relations of confrontation and cooperation combined with recent changes in the world economy have had an uneven impact on Africa. Indeed, the problems of African unity have been exacerbated by the growth of inequalities on the continent resulting from the recent economic crisis. The rise of pre-colonial African kingdoms was partially a result of the distribution of iron, water, cattle and other resources. Today, African states with oil, uranium, phosphates and other minerals have enhanced economic prospects, at least in the medium term.³³ Also in the contemporary *realpolitik* of Africa, states with large populations and militaries, and those most amenable to the interests of the multinational corporation have come to dominate continental decision-making. On the other hand, Africa now contains more least-

developed most seriously affected, and land-locked states than any other region. The continent includes 19 of the 29 least-developed countries and 26 out of the 42 most seriously affected nations. Africa is a region of increasing inequalities; "the future Pax Africana will consist of a new continental hierarchy of increasingly unequal factors rather than a mythical pan-Africanism of equal states."³⁴

The complex relationship between political and economic independence is revealed particularly in the activities of *sub-imperial* states. These intermediary or "go-between" countries are at the centre of the periphery: they are subordinate in world politics but exert a regional hegemony themselves over a part of the continent. Such sub-imperial states would include Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Kenya, Zaire, Zambia and South Africa within the *capitalist* system and Algeria, Tanzania, Angola and perhaps Mozambique and Somali in the *socialist* sphere.³⁵ In general, these countries have greater opportunities for both growth and influence through their external connections than other peripheral, Fourth World actors — especially the least developed, most seriously affected and 'land-locked' countries. Their ruling classes are able to perpetuate their internal power and international influence through association with one or several of the centre countries in a multipolar international system.

Inequalities within and between African states, then, have tended either to persist or even to increase.³⁶ Economic growth both within and between countries has become more uneven this decade, with the Sahel states having negative growth. In general, the poorer African states have been the least able to redistribute resources, reflecting the global pattern of the least inequality tending to be present in the richest states. Africa's continued economic dependence is the result not of inadequate resources so much as the maldistribution of its riches. Clearly, Africa, as a continent, has economic potential, but this depends on an end to its Balkanisation and the establishment of a continental economy. Africa, for instance, exports twice as much food as it imports³⁷ and yet there has been famine and starvation throughout the Sahel.³⁸

Likewise, Africa produces more than sufficient oil for its own consumption, yet it has been more affected than most regions by the high price and unreliable supply of oil through the multinationals' distribution network.³⁹ Africa could be self-reliant in petroleum products and insulate itself from some of the impact of the high cost of energy if it was a more integrated continental economy.⁴⁰ It consumes only one-sixth of its present oil output and by itself would have sufficient resources to last beyond the year 2000,⁴¹ but its potential for self-reliance is eroded by dependence on foreign markets, technology and capital. Different abilities to buy energy and fertilizer between Third and Fourth World African states will increase inequalities over time which aid alone is unlikely to counteract. If energy consumption is one indicator of growth and potential then Africa is already a very divided continent.⁴² Demands for Pan

African control over production, processing and distribution of oil cannot be realised until the continent's political economy undergoes structural change; meanwhile, another continental institution has been created, the African Petroleum Organisation.⁴³

The vulnerability of Africa is also indicated in another related high-technology energy source of which the continent has plentiful supplies — uranium. Africa has sufficient uranium ores to supply all its conceivable needs for energy, but it is rapidly exporting these resources to the rich states which can exploit their energy power now.⁴⁴ The imperative of immediate economic return has increased in Africa since independence with the need for new regimes to produce 'visible' economic growth. However, until Africa can develop its own technology and skills to use its resources they will continue to export their resources to the long-term detriment of the continent. This would be less so for one indigenous form of energy which can hardly be exported — solar power — but again the importing of technology and capital to use the sun may induce a further form of dependence.⁴⁵

Africa's continued dependence is in part caused by its fragmentation into more than 50 states. The very success of African nationalism produced disinterest in Pan Africanism except as rhetoric and distant goal. Despite Africa's recognition of the economic and political advantages of unity, the processes of nation-building and embourgeoisement of the ruling elites have diverted interest away from continental union. Moreover, the balkanisation of Africa reflects and advances the interests of the extra-continental centre:

The Africa of a century ago consisted of several hundred independent states ... Today, by contrast, these several hundred states have become compressed into about forty units which are spoken of as nations, and whose policies are predicated on that basis. This condensation was not altogether irrational. But its rationality, in so far as any existed, derived not from African but from European ideas and interests.⁴⁶

The rational exploitation and control of Africa's environment and resources demands continental integration but nationalism and new elite interests limit any advance to Pan Africanism.⁴⁷

Moreover, regional integration has produced no instant panaceas. The elusiveness of regional development, the production of inequalities within a region, and the association of regional engineering with the emergence of a few dominant middle powers have increased scepticism of regionalism as a development strategy. Clearly, functional and economic integration is imperative for Africa both to avoid interstate conflict and to encourage the rational development of its environment and resources.⁴⁸ But such integration must lead also to a more equal distribution of the gains and should not deter continental cooperation; rather a fluid set of overlapping structures must be established to maximise the continent's control over its biological resources. Africa will remain underdeveloped and environmentally vulnerable until its development strategy responds to the imperatives of both unity and ecology.

THE ENVIRONMENT AND AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

The role and direction of development in Africa is constrained by the physical as well as political environment. Clearly the incidence of tsetse and malaria, the distribution of soils and vegetation, distance from Europe and the coast, and natural communications routes and obstacles all exert a profound influence on the development prospects and choices of African states. More recently other factors have had a significant effect on the uneven incidence of growth and change on the continent; in particular, the discovery of metals and energy sources, the encouragement of peasant or settler agriculture, and the new state's inheritance of educational, medical and communications infrastructure have produced new problems as well as potentials.

Few students of Africa's political economy have examined the fundamental limits and opportunities presented by the continental environment. The definitive work on the related problems of environmental factors, economic change and class formation remains Rene Dumont's seminal *False Start in Africa*.⁴⁹ His treatise on the causes of underdevelopment in Africa emphasises the neglect of agriculture in the colonial period and the perpetuation of this neglect under independent governments. He calls for relevant agricultural technology and education, infrastructure and organisation. Dumont cautions against a superficial and slavish conversion to socialism and advocates a careful adoption of appropriate values and methods drawn from both indigenous and international experience.⁵⁰ He is very critical of the growth of inequalities within African states and between them and the rich nations. Dumont asserts that given a suitable plan for economic development which emphasises saving and agriculture, Africa could rapidly escape its underdevelopment, especially if it was united. But he also cautions that "There is no magical solution, including socialism, that will relieve Africa of the hard work necessary to pull herself out of underdevelopment."⁵¹

In intergovernmental organisations and the debate over a New International Economic Order, Africa has demanded greater returns for its exports of mineral and other resources. It has also called for the adoption of relevant technology and greater technological transfer and training, especially advocating "the contribution of science and technology to food and agriculture, to industrial technology, natural resources development, rural development and indigenous scientific and technological capacity."⁵² On the tenth anniversary of the OAU, the African states called for "rational utilisation and joint exploitation" of their resources and for "multinational exploitation" by groups of African countries rather than through transnational business enterprises. They vowed to "Defend vigorously, continually and jointly, the African countries' inalienable sovereign rights and control over their natural resources."⁵³

Individually, however, African states emphasise the desirability of accelerated resource exploitation rather than opposing the rapid depletion of their non-renewable resources; they advocate improved terms of trade

rather than a reduction of exchange. They continue to call for regional and continental integration to permit the imitation of northern productive techniques rather than engaging in a critical examination of other modes of development. Despite the overdevelopment of the rich states and the related problems of ecological decay, they still seek industrialisation as a prerequisite for progress.

The debate in the North over the desirability of growth and the automatic equation of industrialisation with development is generally discounted by African leaders as a luxury they cannot afford.⁵⁴ This is a position that is welcomed by those transnational corporations coming under increasing pressure from stricter pollution standards in the north. The creation of pollution havens in the south comprises another form of exploitation by the north — that of the transfer of indirect social costs. A GATT report, concerned with averting a restriction of international trade through increased production costs associated with pollution control, questions

whether the developing countries, having not yet generally obtained critical pollution levels and expecting technological progress to reduce pollution costs in the future, need to adopt the same pollution control norms as the more advanced countries.⁵⁵

These suggestions have generally won acceptance among African leaders. The imposition of environmental standards that retard growth is unacceptable. For instance, at the nonaligned nations' summit in Algiers in September 1973, the Third World insisted firstly, that any additional costs of environmental protection programmes should not retard growth in the developing countries and secondly, that environmental aid should be in addition to regular economic assistance. They expressed concern that the industrialised states' new preoccupation with the environment might disturb the established flows of aid and trade.

In contrast, Africa has irreplaceable game parks, beaches and other natural habitats and, despite the pressures for land, it does have a history of relatively enlightened protection for some of its territory and species. However, colonial policies and the activities of foreign tourists⁵⁶ are insufficient reasons for the continuation of such enlightened attitudes; the benefits of the protection of the African environment need to go to Africa rather than to rich visitors from the industrial world. The African states have declared their readiness to "Take all necessary measures for the protection of nature and the environment which constitute one of Africa's irreplaceable resources..."⁵⁷ However, they also insist that ecological concerns should not be separate from the problems of development; so they want to

Ensure that the problems of environmental protection are seen within the context of the economic and social development of the African countries whose development policies should accordingly pay greater attention to questions of natural resource conservation and management...⁵⁸

The close interrelationship of the environment and development was recognised less equivocally in the African regional preparatory conference for Habitat, the UN Conference on Human Settlements (Vancouver, June 1976) at which

There (was) widespread agreement that problems of uncontrolled population growth, rural stagnation, migration, the inability of urban centres to cope with present rates of population increase and environmental deterioration demand corrective action at both the national and international levels...⁵⁹

However, it was also recognised that ecological problems in Africa are different from those in the rich states:

... the differences in human settlement problems between developed and developing countries ... (especially) the problems of the latter were a reflection of over-all underdevelopment. In this regard, the specific issues of poverty, population growth, lack of governmental resources, unemployment and under-employment were mentioned ... conditions of inequality were tending to increase and that the models of the industrialized world were not applicable to developing countries.⁶⁰

However, despite the different nature of environmental problems in the two worlds,⁶¹ the African states recommended that "the rich nations of the world should agree to give an adequate portion of their aid to African countries for the realization of human settlement programmes."⁶² Many of the states of Africa have yet to appreciate fully that their underdevelopment and environmental problems are both related to their role in the world economy and that they can escape neither without a fundamental change in their position in relation to the industrialised countries.⁶³ Moreover, only a few leaders pay due attention to environmental pressures;⁶⁴ most perpetuate the myth of Africa as an underpopulated continent with inexhaustible resources.

THE POLITICS OF RESOURCES: INTERDEPENDENCE OF DEPENDENCE?

Africa's resources have been exploited primarily in the interests of the rich states; only a few countries or elites in Africa have benefited from Africa's relationship with the industrialised nations. The overall pattern of dependence between Africa and the world economy continues because of established patterns of exchange and because some Africans are able to exploit the relationship. Africa's scarce resources still flow to the industrialised economies because of a lack of choice and because of the opportunities afforded to the ruling elites by such exchange and association.

Basil Davidson suggests that this contemporary relationship is essentially similar to the colonial one: "The development of the industrialized countries to imply the stagnation - now, even, the regression - of the nonindustrialized. The strong continue to feed upon the weak; and the weak continue to grow weaker."⁶⁵ However, independence did at least create the potential for an interjection of African interests and the transformation of centre-periphery relations. In an earlier, more optimistic

period, Basil Davidson asked the question *Which Way Africa?* rather than *Can Africa Survive?* In that review of alternative societies for Africa he observed that "Independence created an opportunity, but little more than that."⁶⁶ Now in his more pessimistic, deterministic and polemical response he presents arguments against growth without development. Clearly, the fifteen years of Africa's reinstated independence have not significantly advanced its control over its own environment or resources.

The stagnation of Africa's economy, which has led to drought, economic regression and a decline in food production⁶⁷ in some states, is related to the perpetuation of its subordination in world trade. Since 1960 Africa has produced a constant 0.6% of the world's output of manufactures.⁶⁸ Moreover, there is increasing concentration of manufacturing in Africa in a few leading states, especially in those most amenable to the multinationals. Egypt and Nigeria are the major centres and with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, Kenya, Zaire and Zambia produce three-quarters of Africa's manufactures.⁶⁹ This trend towards concentration is not limited to the manufacturing sector:

Developing Africa's overall balance, and balances with main trading areas, conceal a very wide spectrum of national trade situations. Generally speaking there has been a relative concentration of Africa's exports in a few countries.⁷⁰

Africa's leading trade powers (in terms of both imports and exports) include two of its major producers of manufacturers — Nigeria and Algeria — and another oil producer — Libya. Africa's top five exporters now account for 50% in 1960. Only a quarter of Africa's states had positive trade balances even before the oil crisis.⁷¹ Africa contributes a declining percentage of total world trade and has suffered from deteriorating terms of trade due mainly to a very low rise in the price of its exports compared to a steady increase in the costs of imports. Africa has had to export more resources to stay still in an increasingly unfair world system.

Another dimension of Africa's continued dependence is revealed in the absence of any significant increase in the percentage of total trade taking place within the continent.⁷² Moreover, since 1970, exports of minerals have overtaken exports of primary agricultural produce, and most African states remain dependent on the export of only one crop or metal. Further, the prospects of effective cartels operating for most of Africa's resources are limited by African's control over only a small proportion of the global output.⁷³ Indeed, given unstable prices for most of its commodities, Africa's overall trade balance depends on the high price of oil; but continental liquidity does not help the intense exchange problems facing most individual African governments.

The energy crisis of 1973 produced a further concentration of economic power in Africa and severely retarded both the growth and development prospects of most African states. In 1974 African countries without oil had to pay \$1,300m for a volume which cost \$500 m in the

previous year, some 15% of total imports compared with 6% in 1973.⁷⁴ The export boom of 1972/73 has been followed by world recession which has hit many African states more severely. The high cost of oil has not only reduced Africa's capacity to import capital goods and drastically reduced demand for its raw materials, but it has also increased the cost of manufactured goods, fertiliser and communications, thus adding to inflationary pressures and reducing the number of tourists. Finally, as Robert Gardiner warned, because of the critical decline in the frequency of rainfall in the Sahel "Africa may be faced with a situation of ecological change north of the 12th parallel."⁷⁵

Africa has had to export more to maintain a constant flow of imports. This has led to the further neglect of food production within the continent and produced greater dependence on imports of foreign wheat and rice. Despite its great potential for food production,⁷⁶ along with a low population density, Africa's concentration on the export of primary products has thus far led to both malnutrition and dependence:

... a systematic effort to enhance food production in the continent would depend primarily on the adoption by Governments of progressive policies favouring food production as a basis for sustained development and economic growth. The past unbalanced emphasis on traditional export crops, based on the unrealistic concept of an 'international division of labour' and further advocated in recent years on the grounds of deteriorating terms of trade for these products, should be expeditiously corrected by adopting more inward-looking strategies entailing a radical but planned transformation of the economic bases.⁷⁷

However, the successful implementation of an African Food Development Plan would require a fundamental restructuring of the continental political economy. Such a shift would not only preserve Africa's resources but also enhance the quality of its environment.

PROSPECTS FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT IN A NEW WORLD ORDER

Africa's place in the world order has changed little in the decades of recaptured independence; its continued economic dependence has operated to reduce its impact on world affairs. The quest by its leaders for access and power in international organisations, when coupled with the need to maintain levels of growth, has tended toward ambiguity over the central and interrelated issues of development and environmental decay. Thus Africa continues to demand a new world order,⁷⁸ or rather modifications to the existing one, but still scrambles for foreign investment and assistance. Although concerned with the conservation of resources and protection of its ecology, it has not been able to halt the accelerated exploitation of mineral reserves or the deterioration of the environment in many regions.

Given these consequences of the pursuit of growth, one rational long-

term policy for African states would be to reduce oil and mineral exports and to postpone industrialisation. As we have seen, however, such a strategy is unlikely to emerge for three main reasons: i) there are powerful pressures on Africa for the north to maintain or increase flows of resources;⁷⁹ ii) the maintainance of political control is an imperative for economic growth; and iii) the propensity which may ruling elites have revealed for conspicuous consumption demonstrates the internalisation of economic patterns of the north.

It is in this context that one should view African participation in the demands of the growing "Group of 77" for a "New International Economic Order,"⁸⁰ particularly in the development of producer cartels to increase and stabilise commodity prices. Ironically, the continent itself contains both producers and consumers of some raw materials,⁸¹ yet these have tended to trade via transnational corporations or metropolitan countries. The implementation of strategy of collective self-reliance would ameliorate some obstacles to African development, but individual interests of African states (and leaders) are presently quite firmly aligned on established transnational and international links with the north.

The prospect for solutions to the problems of achieving ecologically balanced development is further retarded by the attention which decision-makers must pay to political, economic or ecological crises.⁸² In addition to major problems like drought, Africa is beset by an apparently relentless increase in its population. Despite an unusually high mortality rate, due to poor environmental and nutritional conditions, Africa has a very high birth rate, particularly in countries like Kenya and Nigeria where population growth is occurring at more than 3% per annum. By the year 1985 Africa's population of 357,810,000 (1970) is projected to grow by over 60% to 552,695,000. By 1985 Nigeria's population alone may be over 100 million, while Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa, Sudan, Zaire, Morocco, Algeria and Tanzania are all estimated to have populations greater than 20 million. This population explosion will be concentrated in the urban areas whose population will likely have more than doubled in the fifteen years from 1965 to 1980, from 48 to 103 millions, particularly in Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa.⁸³

However, the extrapolation of trends, which is the usual method of estimating population growth, may not prove to be particularly reliable. Hauser asserts that "No one can actually predict future population and anyone who claims he can is either a fool or a charlatan."⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the various macro-studies of the future, such as those prepared for the Club of Rome and the UN, all base their pessimistic projections for Africa's future on this population estimation. The latest quantitative UN study on "old" and "new" world orders is that of Leontiev *The Future of the World Economy*.⁸⁵ Essentially a growth-oriented survey concerned with the mid-term future up to the year 2000, this study draws up scenarios for the patterns of manufacturing and international trade subject to some qualification from consideration of resource availability and

population abatement activity. Africa, along with the rest of the developing world, is predicted to share in a shift of heavy industrial activity from the north. Like many other projections, however, this study tends to beg many questions. The heavy industry needed for industrialisation will according to Leontiev, open "vast horizons for cooperation and specialization between developing countries."⁸⁶ The political and ecological considerations emphasised earlier in this paper are thus neatly glossed over in terms of functional necessity in the pursuit of a goal which is by no means universally agreed on.

The succeeding volume to *Limits to Growth* in the Club of Rome series — *Mankind at the Turning Point*⁸⁷ — is concerned partly with demonstrating the adverse effects on levels of poverty in the south which will result from delays in forming realistic aid programmes. Thus, although the volume aims to question the imperative of economic growth, the alternatives which are proposed for the less-developed regions are seen as being dependent on the mobilisation of resources for assistance in the developed world. This orthodox perspective is questioned in a recent IDRC - sponsored study by a group of Latin American scholars.⁸⁸ Their model stresses societal rather than "scientific" reasons for the present threat of ecological disaster and scarce resources.

The model tries to describe a society that is, in principal, compatible with its environment. (one that) produces those basic and cultural goods that human beings really need, and that thus avoids the destructive use of resources... For the countries of the Third World, the problem consists in finding new paths of development that avoid the dangers currently facing the developed nations.⁸⁹

Broadly then, they argue that both Latin America and Africa can satisfy the "basic needs" of their populations given global redistribution, and ecologically appropriate goals, ideologies and technologies. They predict that Latin America would obtain this level by the early 1990's and Africa in the early 2000's if their prescriptions were followed.⁹⁰

It is at least clear from these and other forecasts that the prospects for African growth and/or development in any new world order depend partly on a radical restructuring of goals and values which our analysis of dependent elites suggests is an unlikely contingency. If it were more widely recognised that the orthodox economic growth strategy brings problems with it and that affluence for all states and peoples is now an ecological as well as economic impossibility, then Africa's underdevelopment might be perceived as a positive rather than negative attribute. However, we do not intend to condemn Africa, in a paternalistic way, to continued poverty. Rather, given present environmental and international conditions, it is suggested that Africa can turn its apparent disadvantages to good purpose.⁹¹ In particular, the continent could begin to design new development strategies other than those based on external models and demands. With care and greater autonomy, Africa could create a situation in which "basic needs" are met and environmental decay is avoided. But this requires foresight, persistence and stability; and

Africa's ruling elites are unlikely to see such modest (long-term) development as in their best (short-term) interests.

Their mixed responses to date towards both the mechanisms of the new world economic order and to the environmental considerations associated with challenges to the growth imperative have resulted in failure to check the trend towards increasing north-south and continental inequalities.⁹² A few regimes and elites enjoy relative affluence, while the price and availability of some commodities remain favourable and while they are prepared to facilitate transnational corporate activity. Meanwhile, in most African states, export-oriented growth accompanies mass malnutrition and serious ecological deterioration. The acceleration of both economic and environmental inequalities on the continent demands a new definition of development; one that sees industrialization as but a means to an end, and which recognises that under contemporary conditions the end of improved African welfare is not served by dependent growth.

FOOTNOTES

1. For an overview of the international politics of Africa in both pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times see Timothy M. Shaw "The actors in African international politics" in Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard (eds) *Politics of Africa: development and dependence* (London: Longman and Dalhousie University Press, 1977).
2. For a lucid introduction to the history and structures of African dependence see Irving Leonard Markovitz *Power and Class in Africa* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977).
3. On tensions within the Third World over the New International Economic Order debate see Helen C. Low and James W. Howe "Focus on the fourth world" and James W. Howe and John W. Sewell "Triage and other challenges to helping the poor countries develop" in James W. Howe (ed) *The United States and World Development: agenda for action, 1975* (New York: Praeger, 1975) 35-71; and Timothy M. Shaw "The Third World and the new international order: implications for analysis and policy" *Inter-University Seminar on International Relations*, Ottawa, December 1976.
4. On "maldeveloped" states and the prospects for disengagement and self-reliance see K.J. Holsti "Underdevelopment and the 'gap' theory of international conflict" *American Political Science Review* 69 (3), September 1975, 327-839 and "Re-structuring foreign policy: a neglected phenomenon in the theory of international relations" *International Studies Association*, St. Louis, March 1977.
5. For useful analyses of these two axes and their interrelatedness see Seyom Brown *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington: Brookings, 1974) and Joan Spero Edelman *The Politics of International Economic Relations* (New York: St. Martins, 1977).
6. Brown *New Forces in World Politics* 118.
7. Richard A. Falk *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press, 1975) 85. Cf. Tony Smith "Changing configurations of power in North-South relations

- since 1945" *International Organization* 31 (1), Winter 1977, 1-27; he argues that Southern demands for a new international economic order have served the North well by providing an imperative for its coordination.
8. On the participation of Africa's ruling class in transnational elite networks and on the impact of such links on class formation and development strategies see Timothy M. Shaw and Malcolm J. Grieve "Dependence or development: a review article on international and internal inequalities in Africa" *Development and Change* 8 (3), July 1977 and Martin Godfrey & Steven Langdon "Partners in underdevelopment - the transnationalisation thesis in a Kenyan context" *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 14 (1), March 1976, 42-63.
 9. Brown *New Forces in World Politics* 189.
 10. See Robin Jenkins *Exploitation: the world power structure and the inequality of nations* (London: McGibbon & Kee, 1970) especially 89 and 159.
 11. *Ibid.* 161.
 12. A.J. Miller "Cross-cleavage in international politics" *Canadian Political Science Association*, Edmonton, June 1975, .3. *
 13. Falk *A Study of Future Worlds* 85.
 14. See Richard A. Falk *This Endangered Planet: prospects and proposals for human survival* (New York: Vintage, 1972) 93-213.
 15. See Falk *A Study of Future Worlds* 103-106, especially 107-108.
 16. *Ibid.*, 109.
 17. *Ibid.*, 73.
 18. See Claude Meillasoux "Development or Exploitation: is the Sahel famine good business?" *Review of African Political Economy* 1, August-December 1974, 27-33 and Paul Spencer "Drought and the Commitment to growth" *African Affairs* 73 (293), October 1974, 419-427.
 19. See Lionel Cliffe "Feudalism, capitalism and famine in Ethiopia" *Review of African Political Economy* 1, August-November 1974, 134-40. Cf. five articles on drought in *African Affairs* 73 (291), April 1974, 137-177.
 20. See, for instance, Susan George *How the Other Half Dies: the real reasons for world hunger* (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1976).
 21. "A joint African stand at UN Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, June 1972" *Africa Contemporary Record Volume 5, 1972-1973* C218.
 22. On Brazil see Cynthia Enloe *The Politics of Pollution in a Comparative Perspective* (New York: McKay, 1975) 137-138.
 23. See Roger D. Hanse "The 'crisis of interdependence: where do we go from here?" in his collection on *The U.S. and World Development: agenda for action, 1976* (New York: Praeger for Overseas Development Council, 1976) 41-66 and Guy F. Erb "'North-South' negotiations: counterweight to dependence?" *International Studies Association*, St. Louis, March 1977. Cf. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye *Power and Interdependence: world politics in transition* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977) and Edward L. Morse *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York: Free Press, 1976).
 24. See Timothy M. Shaw "Discontinuities and inequalities in African international politics" *International Journal* 30(3), Summer 1975, 369-390, especially 376-377 and 385-389 and, with M. Catharine Newbury, "Dependence or interdependence? Africa in the global political economy" in Mark W. DeLancey (ed) *African International Relations* (New York: Africana, forthcoming).
 25. See Norman Girvan "Economic nationalists v. multinational corporations: revolutionary or evolutionary change? and G. Massiah "Multinational corporations and a strategy for national independence" in Carl Widstrand (ed)

- Multinational Firms in Africa* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1975) 26-56 and 386-425 and Timothy M. Shaw "Towards an international political economy of Africa" *Issue* 5(4), Winter 1976, 29-38.
26. See Timothy M. Shaw "International stratification in Africa: sub-imperialism in eastern and southern Africa" *Journal of Southern African Affairs* 2 (2), April 1977.
 27. See Giovanni Arrighi "International corporations, labour aristocracies and economic development in tropical Africa" in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York: Monthly Review, 1973) 105-151, John S. Saul "The 'labour aristocracy' thesis reconsidered" in Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen (eds) *The Development of an African Working Class: studies in class formation and action* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) 303-310 and Shaw and Grieve "Dependence or development."
 28. On the case of Zambia see Timothy M. Shaw *Dependence and Underdevelopment: the foreign policies of Zambia* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 1976. African Studies Series Number 280 and "Zambia: dependence and underdevelopment" *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 10(1), 1976, 3-22.
 29. On the prospects for confrontation, especially if the state controls raw materials like oil, see Norman Girvan "Economic nationalism" in Raymond Vernon (ed) *The Oil Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1976) 145-158, especially 151, and Marian Radetzki "The potential for monopolistic commodity pricing by developing countries" in G.K. Helleiner (ed) *A World Divided: the less developed countries in the international economy* (Cambridge: University Press, 1976) 53-76.
 30. On the attractions of counter-dependence as a "mature" form of interdependence see Ali A. Mazrui "The new interdependence" in Guy F. Erb & Valeriana Kallab (eds) *Beyond Dependence: the developing world speaks out* (Washington, Overseas Development Council, 1975) 35-54 and *A World Federation of Cultures: an African perspective* (New York: Free Press, 1976) 307-328 and 437-472.
 31. Basil Davidson *Can Africa Survive? Arguments against growth without development* (Boston: Little Brown, 1974) 71.
 32. *Ibid.* 85. For a similar perspective on the inevitability of "dependent" capitalism and the desirability of indigenous socialism see Julius K. Nyerere "The rational choice" in his *Freedom and Development: uhuru na maendeleo* (Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1973) 379-390.
 33. See Henry L. Bretton *Power and Politics in Africa* (Chicago: Aldine, 1973) and Markovitz *Power and Class in Africa*.
 34. Shaw "Discontinuities and inequalities in African international politics" 390.
 35. See Timothy M. Shaw "Kenya and South Africa: sub-imperialist states in Africa" *Orbis* 21 (2), Summer 1977.
 36. See *1974 Report on the World Social Situation* (New York: United Nations, 1975. E.75.IV.6) 56-76, especially 60 and 64.
 37. See *Review of International Trade and Development, 1973* (New York: UNCTAD, 1973.E.74.II.D.14) 40.
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 39. See Reginald Herbold Green "Petroleum prices and African development: retrenchment or reassessment?" *International Journal* 30(3), Summer 1975, 391-405.
 40. See "Africa's oil resources" *Africa* 49, September 1975, 35-38.
 41. See "Impact of energy crisis on African economies" in Colin Legum (ed)

- Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 7, 1974-1975* (London: Rex Collings, 1975) C185-C188.
42. See table on "Africa: the energy crisis" *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 8, 1975-1976* C145.
 43. See "Recommendations of the First African Conference on the Petroleum Industry" *Ibid.* C188-C190. On the dilemmas posed by only partial African control see Timothy M. Shaw "Oil, Israel and the OAU: an introduction to the political economy of energy in southern Africa" *Africa Today* 23(1), January/March 1976, 15-26.
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 45. "The use of solar energy in Africa" *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 8, 1975-1976* C144.
 46. Davidson *Can Africa Survive?* 37.
 47. For an early advocacy of continentalism which still remains relevant see Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidaman *Unity or Poverty? The economics of Pan-Africanism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968).
 48. See David Hilling "Alternative energy sources for Africa: potential and prospects" *African Affairs* 75(300), July 1976, 358-371. Africa relies heavily on oil and its energy potential is unevenly distributed - coal in the south, uranium in South Africa, Niger and Gabon, solar energy in Sahara and hydro-electric power in the centre, especially Zaire and parts of eastern Africa.
 49. London: Sphere and Andre Deutsch, 1968.
 50. See Rene Dumont *Socialisms and Development* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1973).
 51. Dumont *False Start in Africa* 205.
 52. "Africa's Strategy for Development in the 1970's - ECA Second Conference of Ministers, February 1973" *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 6, 1973-1974* C34. For an earlier statement see "Africa's strategy for development in the 1970's - ECA Conference of Ministers, February 1971" *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 4, 1971-1972* C259-C270. Cf. Samuel L. Parmar "Self-reliant development in an 'interdependent' world" in Erb & Kallab (eds) *Beyond Dependency* 3-27.
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 57. "OAU-ECA Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence" C214.
 58. *Ibid.* C214.
 59. *Report of the Regional Preparatory Conference for Africa, Cairo, June 1975* (New York: United Nations - Habitat, July 1975. A/CONF.70/RPC/11) 10.
 60. *Ibid.* 6.
 61. For a review of water, energy and soil in the Third World see "Third World Environment" *New Internationalist* 40, June 1976, 6-7.
 62. *Regional Preparatory Conference for Africa, June 1975*, 11.
 63. For a call for more, but redesigned cooperation between rich and poor see

- Robert S. Jordan and John P. Renninger "The new environment of nation-building" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 13(2), June 1975, 187-207.
64. For a comprehensive review of the environmental obstacles to development in Africa, focusing particularly on tropical weather, soils, pests and health and the need for intensive indigenous research on these see Andrew M. Kamarck *The Tropics and Economic Development: a provocative inquiry into the poverty of nations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins for World Bank, 1976).
 65. Davidson *Can Africa Survive?* 29. See also Markovitz *Power and Class in Africa*, and Richard Harris (ed) *The Political Economy of Africa* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1975) and Peter G.W. Gutkind & Immanuel Wallerstein (eds) *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976).
 66. Basil Davidson *Which Way Africa? The search for a new society* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967) 181. For a somewhat comparable change of perception see Gerald K. Helleiner "Standing up to the world: the new mood in the less-developed countries" *Development Dialogue* 2, 1974, 25-31 and "The least-developed in the New International Economic Order: devil take the handmost?" *Cooperation Canada* 25, 1976, 3-13.
 67. On the failure of African agriculture to keep up with population growth and new demands for wheat products in the cities see *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 8, 1975-1976* C132-C139.
 68. *Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1973. Part One* (New York: United Nations, 1974. E.75.II.K.1) 3.
 69. *Ibid.* 3-4.
 70. "Restructuring of Africa's trade: ECA note for ECA/OAU Joint Meeting on Trade and Development, August 1971" *Africa Contemporary Record Volume 4, 1971-1972* C338. For a revised and updated version of this document see "Restructuring of Africa's foreign trade: UNCTAD, Santiago, March 1972" *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 5, 1972-1973* C242-C249.
 71. On the impact of oil and inflation see "ECA and the impact of the world crisis on African development" *African Target* (Addis Ababa) 7(1), September 1974, 6-10 and 26-30.
 72. Cf. Mazrui's advocacy of "inter-penetration" within the Third World as an alternative to disengagement and dependence in his *A World Federation of Cultures* 427-472.
 73. For a comprehensive overview of the contribution of African states to the output of global resources see "Primary commodities of Africa" *Africa South of the Sahara, 1975* (London: Europa, 1975. Fifth edition) 1108-1125.
 74. See "The Economic and Social Situation in Africa, 1973/74: a statement by Robert K.A. Gardiner, Executive Secretary of the ECA, July 1974" *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 7, 1974-1975* C126.
 75. *Ibid.* C128.
 76. In this regard the potential of the Sudan may further enhance its role as an intermediary between Africa and the Middle East.
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 78. See John P. Renninger "After the Seventh Special Assembly Session: Africa and the emerging world order" *African Studies Review* 19(2), September, 1976, 35-48.
 79. See William Schneider *Food, Foreign Policy and Raw Materials Cartels* (New York: Crane, Russak, for National Strategy Information Center, 1976) for a proposal for the use of food as a weapon to obtain regular resource flows. See also Emma Rothschild "Food politics" *Foreign Affairs* 54(2) January 1976, 285-307 and Nasir Islam "Politics of world food scarcity" *International Perspectives* November/December 1976, 18-22.
 80. For a sustained "Third World" perspective on this debate see Mahbub ul Haq *The Poverty Curtain: choices for the Third World* (New York: Columbia

- University Press, 1976). See also Soedjatmoko "Reflections on nonalignment in the 1970's" in Erb & Kallab (eds) *Beyond Dependency* 28-37. Cf. Robert Rothstein "Foreign policy and development policy: from nonalignment to international class war" *International Affairs* 52(4), October 1976, 598-616.
81. See "Dakar Declaration on Raw Materials" in *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 8, 1975-1976* C155-C157. Cf. Guy F. Erb "The developing world's 'challenge' in perspective" in Erb & Kallab (eds) *Beyond Dependency* 135-156 and John W. Sewell "The United States and world development, 1977" in his collection on *The United States and World Development: agenda 1977* (New York: 1977) 1-20.
82. On the elusiveness of sophisticated decision-making responses in a situation of dependence see Percy Selwyn "Introduction: room for manoeuvre?" in his collection on *Development Policy in Small Countries* (London: Croom Helm for IDS, 1975) 8-24.
83. See UN and ECA data in "Population" *Africa Contemporary Record, Volume 8, 1975-1976* C120-C126. For more on high fertility, mortality and population growth rates in Africa, especially on an unfavourable age structure and on prospects for development see S.K. Gaisie "Demographic prospects for tropical Africa for the next thirty years" and G.A. Saxton "The price of death control without birth control in Africa over the next thirty years" in Ali A. Mazrui and Hasu H. Patel (eds) *Africa in World Affairs: the next thirty years* (New York: Third Press, 1973) 135-172.
84. Cited on Quentin H. Stanford *The World's Population: Problem of Growth* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972) 23.
85. Wassily Leontiev *et al. The Future of the World Economy: a United Nations study* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).
86. *Ibid.* 8.
87. Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pastel *Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome* (New York: Signet, 1976) especially 56-82.
88. *Catastrophe or New Society: A Latin-American World Model* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1976).
89. *Ibid.* 36-37.
90. *Ibid.* 87-93. On Africa's aggregate unpromising future in terms of "basic needs" and development see the Statistical Annexes in the annual ODC publication on *US and World Development*, 1973 to 1977. See also I. William Zartman "Introduction to socio-political trends in Africa" *Council on Foreign Relations 1980s Project* New York, 1976.
91. Mazrui suggests this as a generalisable form of "counter-penetration" because of "the conversion of Third World resources from their old role as sources of dependency to a new role as sources of power" (*A World Federation of Cultures* 441). See also Robert O. Matthews "The Third World: powerful or powerless?" in Alkis Kontos (ed) *Domination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) 69-87.
92. Cf. the rather optimistic and simplistic analysis of I. William Zartman "Europe and Africa: decolonization or dependence?" *Foreign Affairs* 54(2), January 1976, 325-342. For more critical and sophisticated inquiries into the EurAfrican relationship as a case of north-south asymmetries see Johan Galtung "The Lome Convention and neo-capitalism" and Reginald H. Green "The Lome Convention: updated dependence or departure toward collective self-reliance?" *African Review* 6(1), 1976, 33-54 and Michael B. Dolan "The Lome Convention and Europe's relationship with the Third World: a critical analysis" *International Studies Association*, St. Louis, March 1977.

Review Article

Crisis of Marxist Theory of Imperialism and Underdevelopment

A.B. Zack-Williams

The authors in this review represent three shades of Marxist opinion on the question of imperialism and under-development. Offiong* represents the "Third World Nationalist position, Hayter* epitomises what Warren* has labelled the "populist leftist" line (p. 112), and Warren's position for lack of a better word could be called the "revisionist Marxist" line. These labels will soon become clear.

Both Offiong and Hayter share a common epistemological position: underdevelopment and world poverty are the results of capitalist exploitation. By contrast, Warren, who claims allegiance to Marx, rather than Lenin (more about this later), sees capitalism as providing the basis for the growth in material welfare which the third world is now experiencing. Since Warren's work represents the deviation from the accepted line in contemporary Marxist analysis on the question of World poverty, his would be the yardstick by which the other two works will be judged. We shall not be concerned with the relative importance of these works; but we shall, instead, look at the issues raised by the three authors.

IMPERIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Both Offiong and Hayter reject the conventional (modernisation) explanations for poverty. Hayter notes: "... the explanations, if given at all, are inadequate. For a start, the question addressed is not usually the question of why the international distribution of income is so unequal. Explanations are attempts to show why the peoples of underdeveloped countries are 'poor' but the existence of their poverty is not related to the wealth accumulated elsewhere... (The explanations) tend to be based on what might tactfully be called a Eurocentric view of the world, which is itself a product of historical circumstances, and of colonial mythology in particular..." (p. 18-19).

For both Hayter and Offiong, the current state of poverty and un-

*Daniel O. Offiong, *Imperialism and Dependency: Obstacles to African Development*, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980, pp. 304, N6. 50; T. Hayter *The Creation of World Poverty: An Alternative View to the Brandt Report*, Pluto Press, 1981, pp. 128, £2.50, Bill Warren, *Imperialism Pioneer of Capitalism* Verso, 1980, pp. 274, £3.95/\$8.50.