

- Salaam, Decentralization Research Project, 1975, p. 24-5.
 49. *Ibid*, p. 11-2; Hyden 1976, *op cit*, p. 12-3, 33.
 50. Hyden 1976, *op cit*, p. 21, 36, 46-55.
 51. *Ibid*, p. 47, 55.
 52. Samuel Mushi, "Decentralization and Popular Participation in Tanzania: The Question of Devolution of Decision-making Powers," Dar es Salaam, Decentralization Research Project, 1979, p. 7-12.
 53. Hicks, *op cit*, p. 6.

A Theory of Incorporation: An Explanation for Superpowers' Strategy in Africa*

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The February 1980 agreement reached between President Carter and the Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, that would permit the United States the use of port and military facilities in Kenya, and a similar agreement between the US and Somalia five months later,¹ are significant for several reasons. First, they reflect the intensification of superpower strategic rivalries in the Indian Ocean, and hence, the absurdity of the notions of 'demilitarization'² and 'zone of peace'³ in the ocean. Second, they mark the beginning of an active collaboration between African states and a superpower in the pursuit of the power's strategic interests.⁴ Third, the future security of Africa may be imperilled because the agreements make the continent a possible target of Soviet strike in the event of a confrontation between the two superpowers. The agreements also have the potential for promoting an arms race among countries in the area with possible consequences of armed conflict.⁵ These factors not only reflect possible implications for the future security and stability of Africa, but they also manifest strategic relationships between the strong and the weak in international relations. It will be theorized that military agreements of this kind constitute a special kind of relationship called "incorporation."

Power and Dependency

In international relations dominant powers manipulate and use weaker states for their own objectives and benefits. State power has always been expressed through the ability to influence other nations in desired directions. States tend to utilize their power either consciously or unconsciously to advance their interests. In the course of advancing their interests, the dominant powers influence the weaker states. If the interest is economic an unequal economic relationship is created; military (strategic) interest brings about an unequal military relationship. The more unequal the relationship, the more dependent the weaker state tends to become. The assumption is that unequal relations between nations are primarily the result of unequal power capabilities. In other words, power is an important factor in the creation of dependencies in international relations.

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Our concept of power here follows closely Robert Dahl's definition. It is the ability of A to get B to do something that B would otherwise not do, at a relatively high cost to B and low cost to A. The power of A may be the capability or potential to influence or the actual exercise of that influence. Power, as the capability or potential to influence, focuses on the resources available to A, e.g., military resources, economic resources, and relational resources derived from allies and resources flow, hence, the attributional resources of A. On the other hand, power as an actual exercise of influence focuses on the "overt behavioral activity" of A. There is, however, mutual complementarity between the potential and the actual exercise of influence; the ability to exercise influence will derive from the potentials or attributes available.

Yet, as James Caporaso and Michael Ward⁶ have argued, **attributional power by itself is of no use to one country bargaining with another.** As they illustrate, "Country B will see no reason to be moved by consideration of A's GNP unless A is willing to utilize some of it in exchanges with B (or unless A uses some of it to back a military effort **against B**)." Therefore, we should consider power more in terms of capabilities that are "tied up with interactions rather than possessions." This is what Caporaso and Ward call "relational capabilities" — power "flowing from the structure of exchanges among countries." While it may be rightly argued that exchange relations between two countries may create inter-dependencies (for example, in exchanging arms for strategic locations, the US may become dependent on Somalia for its strategic needs just as Somalia may become dependent on the US for arms), the capabilities of the two countries tied into their interaction will seem to imbalance the independencies, even though the relations may be mutual. The sources of power, potential (attributional) or actual (behavioural) may tend to impinge on the interaction between the two countries. We may thus hypothesize that the wider the power lag between A and B, the greater the imbalance, and the greater the imbalance, the higher the degree of dependencies in the exchange relationship. Thus, for example, if the U.S. enters into an exchange relationship with Kenya, there is a higher probability for Kenya becoming dependent on the US rather than vice-versa.

To assess such dependencies we have to consider the 'ingredients' of the exchange relationship, what has been called "the basic conceptual components of the calculus of dependence."⁷ Three main ingredients are important: (1) the size or magnitude of A's dependence on B and vice-versa, (2) the *importance* of the goods or values to the actors or policy-making institutions in the exchange relationship, and, (3) "the structure of available suppliers or substitutes." The last two components are contingent upon the first. That is to say, if B has little or no value for what A has to offer, or it can readily acquire alternative suppliers or substitutes, then B is less likely to become dependent on A in their relationship. In the same breath, if B attaches great importance to the goods or value offered

by A and has little or no alternative suppliers to substitute, then B is more likely to become dependent on A. Our consideration of superpower interaction with the weak states of Africa is within the conceptual framework thus illustrated.

Theories of Dependency and Imperialism

In recent years two main theories have been used to explain unequal relationships between dominant powers (usually developed countries) and weak states (less developed countries). One is the theory of dependency which has been popularized by writers like Tony Smith,⁸ Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto,⁹ and James Caporaso.¹⁰ Dependency theory focuses mainly on the structure and function of economic relations between the DCs and the LDCs. Susanne Bodenheimer, another dependency theorist, has defined the theory as:

a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others, and limits the development possibilities of the (subordinate) economies. ...¹¹

The theory of imperialism is the other theory that has been used to explain unequal relationships between DCs and LDCs. This theory has a longer history. As early as 1902, J.A. Hobson published his celebrated *Imperialism*. In 1917 V.I. Lenin radicalized the theory in his *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Within the last decade or two writings on imperialism proliferated. Among the well-known writers of this late period are Harry Magdoff (*The Age of Imperialism*, 1969), and Johan Galtung. In his modern analysis of the theory, Galtung¹² has defined imperialism as "a relation between a Center and Periphery nation...." in which "the center nation has power over the periphery nation. ..." The basic idea in the theory, as Galtung explains, is that "the center in the Center nation has a bridge head in the Periphery nation, and a well-chosen one: the center in the **Periphery nation**." Samir Amin's *Unequal Development*¹³ highlights imperialism as the principal cause of the unequal development between the DCs and the LDCs in terms of unequal trade and exchange.

While these theories — dependency and imperialism — may seem to explain the new phenomena of unequal relations between powers and weak states in the strategic realm, they have some drawbacks. First, these theories have been long associated with economic relations, their units of analysis having most often been factors like trade and exchange, multinational corporations, raw materials, investments, etc. Second, the dynamics of the theories require strong internal and external class linkages. As Galtung points out, the relationship that is established should be "such that the Periphery center is tied to the Center center with the best possible tie: the tie of harmony of interest."¹⁴ Caporaso has also

emphasized the internal-external class linkage in dependency theory.¹⁵ In dependency analysis, there are two unequal states (unequal in development status, growth rates, industrial base, resources for exchange, etc.). These attributional inequalities somehow find their way into behavioural inequalities, where it can be demonstrated empirically that the inequality is continued through behavioral trading or exchange patterns. In other words, if a state is the *have* category, it will be topdog in its trade relationship (economic relationship) with a *have not* state. Moreover, dependency theorists seem to view relationships between the *have* and the *have not* as always to the detriment or disadvantage of the *have not*.

In the strategic realm, economic considerations are secondary and limited to strategic raw materials. Strategic relations are determined more by geo-physical conditions than by anything else. Our analysis of **power — weak state interaction in the strategic realm will also reveal** that relationships so created are more of the *dependence* type than *dependency*,¹⁶ and hence, there seems to be little if any detrimental effect on the weak partner. We therefore need different units of analysis beyond those of the classic theories of economic imperialism for the explanation of the phenomena in question.

A theory of incorporation is proposed. Although it may border on dependency and imperialism theories, the theory of incorporation deals strictly with the pursuit of strategic interests by the superpowers and how this fosters close military relationships with weak countries regarded as strategically significant. The theory will be illustrated with US-Soviet interactions with the states of the East African littoral. The main states in this connection are Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa. The geopolitical significance of these areas has become more salient in view of the continuing importance of the Indian Ocean in the superpowers' strategic calculations.

The strategical objectives of the superpowers in the ocean region are two-fold: to protect their economic and political interests, and, to gain advantage and/or parity with each other in their strategic relationships. The ocean serves as the main outlet for the passage of oil from the Persian Gulf and the main oil routes from the Gulf to Europe, Japan and America run along the African coast. The United States imports about half the oil it uses, and about half its imports come from the Middle East. The ocean also provides a superb location for the pre-positioning of tactical weapons in the strategic relationships of the superpowers.¹⁷ For the Soviets, the ocean has added importance: it provides an ice-free link between Russian Black Sea ports and the Soviet Far East. The importance of Africa and the motivations for American strategy in the region have been emphasized by the US Defence Department. In its 1981 annual report to Congress, the Department states among other things:

In view of events in the Persian Gulf area, our programs in Africa have taken on increased significance ... we anticipate increased US security assistance programs in the years ahead.¹⁸

The theory of incorporation attempts to offer an explanation for how the superpowers seek to protect their interests in the Indian Ocean by using the East African littoral. But, first, we examine the forms and structures of the theory.

THE THEORY OF INCORPORATION

We define incorporation as the systematic inclusion of some units, nations or sectors into a larger system of unequal strategic relationships. The "incorporation" is systematic because it is initiated and sustained through planned and well calculated policies of the dominant units. It is neither random nor happening by chance. The relationship is unequal because of the power asymmetries between the dominant units and the weak units. The dominant units utilize the smaller and weak units for their objectives. The "incorporated" unit is weak and it services the system while the system-benefits accrue largely to the dominant unit. While the weak unit may enjoy some benefits, such benefits are largely by-products of the system or rather *bribes* paid by the dominant unit. We call such benefits by-products or bribes because they serve only as inducements to the weak unit to allow itself to be incorporated; also, they may be pre-paid rewards.

Several elements are used by the dominant units in incorporating the weak units. Notable among these are arms supplies, technological control, commercial control, political influence, military bases and security agreements. For strategic purposes, our consideration here will focus on arms supply (in the form of either sale or transfer), military or security agreements, military bases and the use of military facilities in the weak unit by the dominant unit. We shall explain briefly each of these three elements.

The steady progression of arms supplies leading to more and more sophisticated weaponry represents an important element of incorporation. The proposition here is that the greater and more sophisticated the arms transferred, the higher the military dependence relationship created, and the higher the dependence the deeper the incorporation of the recipient into the supplier's security networks. Three main sub-propositions are implicit here. First, the sale of arms demands a continuous reliance of the recipient on the supplier for spare parts. Second, when the sale intensifies into more sophisticated weapons, it is accompanied by military advisors or technicians of the supplier to service and/or operate the weapons. Third, as the sophisticated arms and advisors become more entrenched, the recipient may be called upon to play a security role on behalf of the power supplier.¹⁹

Military agreement, as an element of incorporation, assumes two main forms: collective security arrangement between the dominant unit and the weak unit, and, direct military assistance from the dominant unit


to the weak. Such agreements specify the extent of commitments and rules governing the relationships.

The last element for our consideration is military bases and the use of local military facilities. The stationing of troops in the weak unit may be the consequence of the use of local military facilities by the dominant unit, or the transfer of sophisticated weaponry. Such weaponry might require advisors and technicians from the supplier. Stationing troops is quite different from maintaining a military base even though both represent the physical presence of the power's force. Troops stationed are mostly technicians, advisors or a special task force, while a military base represents the combat readiness of the power against outside threats to its interests. The proposition here is that the stationing of troops in the weak state deepens the military dependence relations and thus intensifies incorporation. Whatever function the stationed troops perform for the weak state implies the deprivation of indigenous personnel and the enhancement of the dependence relationship.

In a world of rivalries and competing interests between two dominant powers, each power would like to situate itself strategically in such a way that it could respond quickly and effectively to perceived threats. The incorporation of the strategically significant weak unit provides the power with such security measures. Incorporation may thus be seen as part of the grand strategy of the dominant power to safeguard its security interests. Three main models of incorporation are identifiable: 1) Direct or Complete, 2) Surrogate, and 3) Peripheral. We shall demonstrate each of these three models.

Direct or Complete Incorporation

Direct or complete incorporation is when the weak state is fully integrated into the strategy of one power against the other power. It represents the highest form of incorporation. The security of the weak state becomes directly dependent upon the strategies of the powers. In event of a confrontation between the powers, the weak state becomes a possible battle-ground. Consequently, actions and calculations of the power are taken in consultation with the weak state. To some extent, therefore, both the power and the weak state collaborate in decision-making. An important factor in this form of incorporation is that both the power and the weak state perceive a common enemy — the other power — and have a common desire to contain it. In terms of the elements of incorporation, this model is realized primarily through collective security agreements. It is characterized by the establishment of permanent military bases and integrated military strategy. The power sustains this integrated relationship through transfer of arms and support for arms development in the weak state, and regular joint military exercises. Thus, direct incorporation embodies all the elements we are concerned with: security agreements, arms supply and military bases. This model may be represented graphically as:




The above diagram illustrates the complete incorporation of W^1 and W^2 into P^1 and P^2 's strategic relationship. W^1 is 'encircled' by P^1 to signify its complete incorporation. Similarly, W^2 is directly incorporated by P^2 .

There are some implications for both P and W in this model. W , while it retains its sovereignty, becomes fully dependent on P for its national security. In terms of national security W would benefit immensely; P supplies the troops, equipment, etc. that W would otherwise not acquire, and it pays relatively little for it. The commitment in political terms is however great, for W must publicly ally itself with P 's policies, thereby limiting its own political choices.

Surrogate Incorporation Model

In this model of incorporation the weak-state is extensively armed by the power to act as a 'policeman' on its behalf. The weak-state's policing is directed towards 'minor threats' to the interests of the power. It thus becomes a surrogate and may take action against such threats with the direct or indirect support of the power. Such support may be in the form of additional arms supply and 'technical' advisors, and these constitute the major elements in this model of incorporation. In order for the weak-state to play the surrogate role effectively, the power plays an active role in the training of its forces. Unlike the direct model, the surrogate model may not occasion security agreements and the establishment of military bases, even though thousands of the power's troops may be stationed in the weak-state. The power and the weak-state are bound together more by ideological ties than by a true perception of a common enemy.




($mt^{1,2,3}$, are minor threats to P^1 's interests)

In the direct strategic relationships between P^1 and P^2 , P^1 has incorporated W^1 to play the surrogate role against minor threats 1, 2, 3 to P^1 's interests. These interests may be economic political or ideological. P^1 exercises control over W^1 through the presence of its 'technical' officers

and the economic aid it provides. The supply of sophisticated weapons also permits the power to exercise control over the strategy and the conduct of W's surrogate role. While W may have its own objectives in **playing that role — for example, developing its forces and enhancing its international status — such objectives are very much subordinated to those of the power:**

Peripheral Incorporation Model

In this model the weak-state (W) is indirectly situated in the strategic relationship between the powers (P¹ and P²). The main role of W is to provide facilities for the pre-positioning of logistics of the incorporating power. The logistics may include troops, arms, and refueling privileges. W is peripheral because it does not play any active role in the strategic relationship and it does not act on behalf of the power in any form. **The power can take independent and direct actions in its strategy. The weak-state has no control or say over what the power does with its logistics; P has full control over its logistics. This model may be graphically represented thus:**



In return for providing local facilities for the pre-positioning of the power's logistics, the weak-state is assured aid — in the form of economic assistance or arms supply. The weak-state may maintain control over its political decisions and reserve the right to end the incorporation relationship.

Incorporation as a Process

Each of the models may represent a level of incorporation, the highest level being the direct/complete model, and the lowest, the peripheral model. One level may be constituted by one or more of the elements: security agreements, arms supply and use of local facilities. Yet, each level may represent an *incorporation* in its own right for two main reasons. First, the weak-state may be useful to the power's strategy only a particular level. Second, in spite of its weakness, the weak-state may successfully resist 'promotion' from a lower to a higher level; it may prefer not to become closely linked to the strategies of the powers. The elements of incorporation may thus reflect the process rather than the actuality of incorporation.

However, there are some conditions under which transition from the peripheral to the surrogate level becomes likely. A steady progression of arms supply and 'technical' officers by P may tend to make W more

dependent upon P. If this 'security dependency' is accompanied by 'economic dependency' and increasing identical political and ideological objectives, then W is likely to accept 'promotion' to the surrogate level. Transition from surrogate to the direct/complete level may also be conditioned by a greater perception by P and W of a common threat and a mutual desire to contain it, especially when W perceives the threat as a challenge to its existence. This may result in a security agreement which may bound P and W together for common defense and offense. In this way, and by virtue of power asymmetry between P and W, W would be directly incorporated by P.

INCORPORATION AND THE SUPERPOWERS' STRATEGY IN AFRICA

We may now relate the theory of incorporation to the United States and Soviet Union strategic behavior in Africa, and by allusion, to the Middle East. We shall use the three main elements of the theory in this regard.

Military/Security Agreements

Perhaps the best indicator of the theory is a security agreement between the power and the weak-state. An example of this indicator is NATO and the Warsaw Pact (WTO) agreements. They directly incorporate Western Europe and Eastern Europe into American and Soviet strategies respectively. They thus represent the direct/complete incorporation model. While NATO and WTO are collective security arrangements, other agreements may call only for direct assistance from the power to the weak-state. Such agreements specify the extent of commitments and rules governing the relationships. However, the secrecy with which such agreements are kept (especially in the case of African countries) does not permit close study by outsiders. Consequently, we can only speculate on the basis of what is said in public and observable activities in connection with such agreements. For instance, in the case of WTO one can surmise that it is not necessary for a member-state to be attacked from outside before the collective security agreement is invoked. The Soviets can intervene militarily in a member's local crisis if it is perceived that the crisis is harmful to Soviet interests. This aspect of the WTO has been demonstrated by Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 was, however, not an invocation of the WTO agreement since Afghanistan does not belong to the group. However, the Soviets had signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Afghanist which permitted Soviet "assistance" in an ambiguous manner and it was upon this that the Soviets intervened.

In the case of Africa one surmises that there have been no collective agreements of the magnitude of NATO or WTO. Known agreements with countries with which we are concerned include: A US bilateral security assistance agreement with Kenya²⁰ and its 1980 agreements with Somalia

and Kenya. The fact that the US had to sign a new agreement with Kenya in spite of their earlier security agreement indicates that the earlier **agreement did not provide for the needs of American strategic interests** in the area. The agreements with Somalia and Kenya will be discussed in the section dealing with the use of local military facilities.

The Soviet Union signed the Treaties of Friendship with Somalia in July 1974 (it is not clear whether this has been formally abrogated), with Mozambique in March 1977 and with Ethiopia in November 1978. These are significant in view of the Afghanistan experience and the usual **sending of Soviet "technicians"** to the friendly country after the treaty is signed. Let us consider the Ethiopian case. In the first week of April 1978, Ethiopian leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, visited Moscow. The two countries signed a Declaration on Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation and agreed to:

expand contacts and ties between state and public organizations and institutions in both countries, to create an inter-governmental Soviet-Ethiopian commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and trade and also to hold regular consultations on international issues.²¹

What is most significant about this agreement is that even though there is no explicit military clause, a month after it was signed Ethiopia received 224 Soviet MiGs (see *Strategic Survey 1978*, IISS, London, p. 136). We know that this was the time the Ethiopians were fighting the Somalis over Ogaden. But what is important here is that although the agreement did not specify and military aid, the Soviets sent an unprecedented quantity of arms and soon followed it with military advisers (technicians) and Cuban surrogates to fight for Ethiopia. Thus nobody could tell whether such Soviet agreements would lead to greater military cooperation, which in turn would intensify the process of incorporation. Soviet arms and officers were also sent to Somalia and Mozambique only after these countries had signed friendship and cooperation treaties. One can therefore surmise that agreements of that nature with the Soviet Union provide for the sending of Soviet arms **and technicians**. The implications of arms transfers and the stationing of troops in the theory of incorporation are fully discussed in the next sections.

As already stated, our concern here is not the actuality of incorporation but the beginning of its process. Subsequently, we may consider some security ideas expressed by the powers in relation to Africa and the powers' direct or indirect collaboration with African countries in security measures as good indicators marking the incorporation process.

While it is too early to assess the success or failure of US-Soviet effort at incorporating the African countries, it seems that the US and its western allies sense the inadequacy of incorporation in its present form for their strategy in the Indian Ocean. First, the African states are unpredictable as to when and how they would revoke their agreements with the powers. Somalia unilaterally broke off its strategic relations with the Soviet Union in late 1978. Ethiopia did a similar thing with the US after the overthrow of the emperor in 1977. Secondly, it seems that the in-

corporation of African countries based on the peripheral model does not satisfy US strategic needs. What seems satisfying is incorporation of the direct/complete type. Hence, the bizarre idea calling for the extension of NATO to the South Atlantic — for the development of SATO (South Atlantic Treaty Organization).²² Proponents of SATO envisage South Africa, Australia and South America as constituting the organization. While the idea of SATO extends and perpetuates the American Cold War strategy of halting international communism, the predominant consideration seems to be the preservation of the strategically significant South Africa and the Cape Sea route. The transfer of major weapons systems from western countries to South Africa and the use of communication facilities there for observing the entire Indian Ocean and Southern Atlantic reflect the significance of the country in US strategic calculations.²³ There seems to be an agreement between the South African government and NATO member-states on the importance of the area and in bolstering the armaments of South Africa as a trusted friend of the West. US and western cooperation with South Africa is already substantial though it has been curtailed by the pressure of world opinion. The defiance by the US and other western countries of the 1963 UN Arms Ban and the 1977 UN mandatory embargo against South Africa would seem to underscore their determination to build up South Africa towards the idea of SATO.²⁴ If US and its allies commitment to South Africa deepens, (and there is every indication that it is deepening) then it would be reasonable to assume that South Africa's incorporation into US strategy would lead towards the direct/complete model. In order not to leave their flank open, the US and allies are likely to prop up South Africa to become the West's defender in the Indian Ocean even if the idea of SATO becomes stillborn. The incorporation of South Africa into the West's strategic calculations, be it direct, peripheral or surrogate incorporation, is therefore not a moot question.

Apparently, the WTO has no comparable strategic design in Africa. **There have been no coordinated efforts by member-states to bolster any** African countries to play the role of the 'defender of the East' on the continent as NATO member-states are attempting to do with South Africa. However, since the WTO is centralized in Moscow, we may look at Soviet behavior as reflective of the general desires of the group. The Soviet approach to its strategy in Africa has been self-centered. That is to say, the Soviets have not appeared to be interested in direct/complete incorporation. They rather seem to prefer the peripheral model. Their engagements in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Somalia (before the break of relations in 1978) have been limited to the use of local facilities for their personnel.

However, Soviet strategy in Africa has assumed **a peculiar character** in recent years. The Soviets have resorted to the use of surrogates in pursuing their interests in Angola and Ethiopia. With massive arms supplies and military advisors, they have sponsored Cuban troops to fight in support of Marxist governments in these countries.²⁵ Soviet use of proxy or


surrogate by itself is not new. As a study by R.E. Bissell²⁶ shows, the Soviets have used as proxies North Vietnam in Southeast Asia, Algeria and Libya in North and West Africa, Cuba in Latin America and South Yemen on the Persian peninsula. But the innovation in proxy usage has been its participation in actual combat. Cuba deployed some 16,000 troops in Ethiopia and between 18,000 and 20,000 in Angola in 1979²⁷ with the support of the Soviet Union. Three main reasons may account for Soviet use of proxy: 1) a desire not to appear to be an expansionist power, 2) apparent Soviet unwillingness to commit itself to regimes not firmly in power and on the socialist path, and, 3) the seemingly greater acceptability of proxy forces as compared to Soviet forces on the part of the host country. The Cubans might have their own independent reasons for their involvement in Africa,²⁸ nevertheless, for some reasons of identification with Soviet goals, they were willing to accept guidance and aid from the Soviet Union. Thus the peripheral incorporation of Ethiopia into Soviet strategy has been accomplished through a third party actor, Cuba, serving as Soviet surrogate.

The Transfer/Sale of Arms

There has been a continuous progression of arms transfers to Africa over the past decade. The bulk of these transfers has gone to countries either on or close to the Indian Ocean coastline. Of the \$2915 million worth of arms transferred in 1977 alone, these countries received \$1690 million (Libya \$950m, Ethiopia \$430m, Somalia \$80m, Kenya \$10, Tanzania \$70m, Mozambique \$20m, South Africa \$130m),²⁹ that is, 58 percent of the total dollar value of the transfers.

In 1968 the dollar value of arms to Africa amounted to \$135 million. The 1977 value of \$2915 million is about twenty-two times that of 1968. This tremendous increase and the steady progression over the years are shown in the graph below:

Africa: value of arms transferred, 1968-77



Source: Figures for the graph were taken from *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1968-77*, US ACDA, Publication 100, Oct. 1979.

Between the years 1973 and 1977 a total of \$7738 million worth of weapons was transferred to Africa. Of this amount the United States transferred \$473 million (representing 6.1 percent) and the Soviet Union \$3645 million (representing 47.1 percent).³⁰ US-Soviet supplies to the Indian Ocean littoral states for the period are shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: US-Soviet Arms transferred, 1973-77, (in US \$ million)

	Total	US	USSR
Ethiopia	537	107	300
Kenya	49	4	—
Mozambique	60	—	40
Somalia	300	—	260
South Africa	622	12	—

Source: Figures compiled from US ACDA, Pub. 100, Oct. 1979.

It is obvious from Table 1 that between 1973 and 1977 Mozambique, Ethiopia and Somalia were heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for arms. The Soviets supplied about 66 percent of Ethiopian needs, 66 percent of Mozambique's, and 87 percent of Somalia's. During this period of high dependency on Soviet arms, these countries provided the Soviets with the use of local military facilities. In Somalia the Soviets developed the naval port at Berbera into a first class facility. In Mozambique they secured access to the use of the port of Nova Sofala. Before the break of Ethiopia-US relations in April 1977, the US had been the principal supplier of arms to Ethiopia and had established military communication facilities there. Upon these factors we may speculate that in return for the transfer of arms to these countries, the superpowers obtained the use of local military facilities for their strategies in the Indian Ocean. The relationships so created were thus based on the peripheral incorporation model.

The 1970s also saw the sale of sophisticated weaponry to Africa unprecedented in its history. For the first time submarine and major surface combatants were introduced. The superpowers, especially the Soviet Union, were the dominant suppliers of these weapon systems, and a bulk of them went to the Indian Ocean littoral states and Libya. Table 2 shows the number of major weapon type delivered by the superpowers cumulative 1973-77

Table 2: Number of major weapon type delivered, commulative 1973-77 by US and USSR

Equipment Type	Total	US	USSR
Land Armanents			
Tanks and self-propelled			
Guns	2016	71	1730
Artillery (a)	1392	81	880
Armored Pers. carried & cars	2676	86	1950
Naval Craft			
Major surface combatants (b)	2	—	—
Minor surface combatants (c)	100	—	20
Submarines	1	—	1
Guided missile patrol boats	11	1	11
Aircraft			
Combat aircraft, supersonic	578	8	460
Combat aircraft, subsonic	95	—	80
Other aircraft (d)	259	9	30
Helicopters	249	9	70
Missiles			
Surface-to-air missiles	7740	—	7300

a) Artillery includes mobile rocket launchers, mortars and recoilers rifles over 100 mm.

b) Includes aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and frigates.

c) Includes motor torpedo, boats, subchasers and minesweepers.

d) Includes reconnaissance aircraft, trainers, transports and utility crafts.

Source: *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1968-1977*, US ACDA, Publication 100, Oct. 1979

From Tables 1 and 2 it is clear that the Soviet Union has been the most dominant supplier of arms to Africa. With regard to the sophisticated weaponry (Table 2) the Soviets supplied nearly 86 percent of tanks and self-propelled guns while the US supplied a mere 3.5 percent. Of the total of 578 supersonic aircrafts the Soviets delivered 79 percent while the US delivered 1.4 percent. Ninety-four percent of the surface-to-air missiles was from the Soviet Union; the US delivered none. All of the 11 guided missile patrol boats and the only submarine transferred to Africa between 1973-77 were supplied by the Soviet Union. In terms of dollar value, the Soviet arms represented 47.1 percent and the US only 6.1 percent of the total value of \$7738 million for the period.

The overwhelming transfer of arms by the Soviets may account for the presence of Soviet military officers and technicians in Somalia, Mozambique and Libya during the period. While none of these countries behaved as surrogates for the Soviets, one may surmise that the Soviets acquired the use of military facilities mainly by influencing the countries

through the supply of arms. In fact, after a major arms agreement between the Soviets and Ethiopia in late 1978, amounting to an estimated one billion dollars, the Soviets sent 1400 military technicians to Ethiopia.³¹

We notice that the US has not been as active as the Soviet Union in terms of arms transfers. For a long time the US had recognized Africa as the domain of its western allies and had apparently avoided competing with them. Moreover, the Middle East has traditionally provided facilities for American strategy in the Gulf area and the Indian Ocean. In fact, US relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia have been of the surrogate type, and with Oman, peripheral. However, with instability in the Middle East — the revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, Afghanistan, etc., — and the continuing importance of the Indian Ocean for American strategic needs, one would expect that the US would seek alternatives in East Africa. The agreements with Kenya and Somalia in 1980 may signify the beginning of the search for alternatives. Earlier on in March 1979, and as a prelude to Kenya's incorporation, the US signed an agreement with Kenya for the supply of 2100 TOW ATGW (anti-tank guided weapons) and 32 Hughes Defender helicopters.³² The approval of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 7 October, 1980, for the sale of \$40 million of arms to Somalia may be another indicator of American resolve.

The use of local military facilities and stationing of Troops

Superpower use of local military facilities in Africa in a formalized manner began in the 1950s when the US signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) with Ethiopia in 1953. In a separate agreement signed the same year, American use of the Kagnev Station communication facility was regularized. In 1955 the US expanded its communications facility into a major military radio and TV transmitters facility. A US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in Ethiopia the same year the MDAA was signed. The Kagnev Station, because of its location in the high northern plateau near Asmara, offered particularly effective communication capabilities for the US forces in the Indian Ocean. It also served as a base for strategic communications links on a wider Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean regional basis. The US honeymoon with Ethiopia turned sour when a new government took over from the emperor in 1975. On April 23, 1977 Ethiopia ordered out the entire US MAAG. The Kagnev Station was also closed down and the American personnel expelled. On May 8, 1977 the US terminated military assistance to Ethiopia when the latter abrogated the 1953 MDAA.

In the mid-1960s the Soviet Union began military excursions to Somalia. By 1977 the Soviets had successfully acquired full access to the use of port and naval facilities in the country. The port of Berbera was developed into a first class naval port and thousands of Soviet military personnel were sent to Somalia. The outbreak of the Somali-Ethiopia war

over Ogaden in 1978 and the Soviet opportunistic support for the Ethiopians brought to an abrupt end the Somali-Soviet military relationship.

With this historical evidence it becomes clear that the superpowers have made efforts to gain proximity advantage in the Indian Ocean by acquiring the use of military facilities in the littoral states. According to the peripheral model of the theory of incorporation the power uses the facilities for its own strategic enhancement. The weak state may have its own interest in the relationship but that is very much subordinated to the interests of the power. It is significant to note that the use of local military facilities is normally accompanied by the transfer of arms by the power to the weak-state. As we have noticed from the preceding section, the sale of arms leads to heightened incorporation. Past experiences of superpower use of local military facilities have demonstrated that almost invariably the weak-state depends solely on the power for military wares. For example, before Somalia developed ties with the Soviet Union by mid-1960, all its arms were supplied by Italy. After 1964 when the Soviet relationship gained roots, about 98 percent of Somalia arms supplies were delivered by the Soviets until 1978 when relationships were broken. (see *The Arms Trade Registers*, SIPRI, 1975, pp. 85-86). In the case of Ethiopia the US supplied nearly all of its naval vessels and armoured fighting vehicles and dominated the supply of aircrafts until relations were terminated in 1977 (see *The Arms Trade Register*, SIPRI, 1975, pp. 74-75). It has been estimated that up till 1976 ninety percent of Ethiopian military equipment was supplied by the US.

The renewed efforts of the superpowers to acquire local military facilities have great significance for the process of incorporation. US efforts are geared toward the realization of the doctrine of Rapid Development Force (RDF) which has become salient as a result of a perceived Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The basic concept of the RDF, as Michael T. Klare³³ quotes, is:

a minimal overseas military presence coupled with the demonstrated ability to move appropriate ground and air forces rapidly to actual or potential contingency areas. The strategy is based on the premise that the capability for rapid deployment forces is part of our deterrent posture and can provide an effective response to aggression and that an early response in strength can minimize the intensity of conflict.

In its original form the RDF had three components: strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and instant airpower also known as instant air base which would "enable the Air-force to convert an unimproved or abandoned airstrip anywhere in the world into a fully equipped fighter base in a matter of hours."

The Carter Administration's revival of the doctrine has, however, been directed toward the protection of US strategic interests in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. And, it is in pursuance of this that the US sought agreements with Kenya and Somalia in 1980. These two coun-

tries have agreed to provide facilities for the pre-positioning of US military logistics and to permit increased use of port and naval facilities at Mombasa in Kenya and Berbera in Somalia. As was already explained, such arrangements are normally accompanied by the transfer of arms. The US negotiations with Somalia were protracted because of Somali demands for \$200 million worth of arms in exchange for the facilities. And as noted earlier, the US Senate Committee approved part of the sale on October 7, 1980.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has gained full access to the use of naval facilities in Ethiopia and Soviet ships also call in Mozambique. By all indications the Soviets seem to attach greater importance to their position in Ethiopia which possesses superior strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean region. The Soviets have thus supported Cuban forces and have continued to supply arms, training and advice to the Ethiopians. The Soviet presence in Ethiopia has led to an unprecedented transfer of arms, which in turn might lead to a closer military relationship. The more unequal this relationship becomes, the greater the dependency of the Ethiopians on Soviet support. Thus the process of incorporation will become more profound.

The MDAA signed between the US and Ethiopia in 1953 and the MAAG that was thereafter established permitted the stationing of American military personnel in Ethiopia. In November 1975 there were 96 US officers in Ethiopia. Since the severance of relations between the two countries in 1977, the US has not stationed troops officers anywhere in Africa. But with the recent deals with Somalia and Kenya one would expect that sooner or later American personnel would be sent to these areas.

The Soviet Union, however, appears to be utilizing the stationing of troops in **furtherance** of its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. While the Soviets have military personnel in countries of no strategic significance at all like Mali and Guinea, their greatest concentration of personnel are found in countries close to or directly sharing the Indian Ocean coastline. Table 3 below shows the number of Soviet military personnel in African countries in 1978.

Table 3: Soviet military technicians in Africa, 1978

Algeria	1000
Libya	1750
Morocco	10
Angola	1300
Equatorial Guinea	40
Ethiopia	1400
Guinea	100
Guinea-Bissau	65
Mali	180
Mozambique	230
Other	500
	6575

Source: US DoD Annual Report, FY 1981, p. 58

Soviet use of Cuba as surrogate in Africa makes the presence of Cuban forces significant in the overall Soviet strategy on the continent. It may reasonably be assumed that in the event of a crisis of the Soviet Union would utilize the Cubans in Ethiopia for the protection of its interests in the ocean region. We may therefore have to take into account the number of Cuban troops. Table 4 below shows Cuban military presence in Ethiopia from 1977 to 1980.

Table 4: Cuban military presence in Ethiopia 1977-80

Year	Number of Troops & Military Advisors
1977	400
1978	16,000-17,000
1979	16,000
1980	12,000-15,000

Source: William LeoGrande, *Cuba's Policy in Africa 1959-1980*, p. 40

CONCLUSION

I have attempted to explain the superpowers' relationships with the states of the East African littoral. These states are being used by the powers to enhance their strategic posture in the Indian Ocean region, and hence, the relationships created are of a strategic nature. While theories like dependency and imperialism may explain such relationships, I found them inadequate because strategic relationships do possess their own unique characteristics and therefore have different dynamics and forms. Consequently, I have expounded the theory of incorporation as an alternative explanation for the powers' strategic relations with the weak-states.

The security assistance program extended to Kenya and Somalia by the U.S. as part of the 1980 agreements, and the Soviet treaty of **friendship and cooperation with Ethiopia and Mozambique do not directly** incorporate these countries into the powers' strategies. They only facilitate some limited forms of cooperation between the powers and these countries. These African countries have not become surrogates of the superpowers. They have not developed the capacity to *police* the region on behalf of the powers; neither has any of them utilized the support and assistance of the powers to pursue identical external goals. So clearly, the littoral states' strategic relationships with the superpowers are that of the peripheral model. Their role in the relationships has so far been limited to the provision of facilities for pre-positioning of logistics of the incorporating power. It is apparent that the superpowers' over-riding concern is the preservation of their interests in the Indian Ocean, hence, their relationships with the African states are meant to secure those interests.

The African states peripheral strategic relations with the superpowers have some implications for the continent's international relations and its future security. These relationships identify the states with the superpowers' strategic interests, and thus, their claimed neutrality in superpower rivalries (as expounded in their no-alignment policies) may no longer hold. The states may have to compromise their foreign policies under certain circumstances to accommodate their incorporating powers. By so doing, they may undermine the capacity of the Organization of African Unity to take unified actions in its international relations.

The relationships also have the corollary of arms transfers to these states and this may promote arms races in the region. Considering the volatility of the Horn of Africa and the uneasy relations in the region as a whole, an arms race may trigger an armed conflict. A buildup of arms in Kenya, for example, may compel Tanzania, Somalia and Uganda to replenish their armories for fear of possible Kenyan domination. It is clear that the Soviet arms support for Ethiopia has led to Somalia's frantic research for arms. Mozambique may continue to seek Soviet arms to protect itself against possible raids from its southern neighbour, South Africa. Such arms races may destabilize the region by facilitating arm conflicts.³⁴ The continent's scarce energy and resources may thus be unnecessarily expended on conflicts and conflict resolutions.

Instability due to conflicts would undermine the development processes in the region. For example, when Ethiopia was faced with enemy attack from Somalia, it had to interrupt its self-reliance development strategy to mobilize its manpower and material resources towards the war effort. Ethiopia's development program thus became vulnerable due to security problems.

These implications, in a capsule, indicate one important trend: the long and hard struggle of Africa to win and maintain its political and economic independence will be severely undermined. As a study by Richard Vengroff³⁵ has shown, there is a high correlation between military, political and economic dependence. Hence, the African states' military/security dependence on the superpowers intensifies their economic and political dependence. If the states' security dependence is concomitantly intensified with identical political and ideological objectives of the superpowers, then there is the likelihood of their peripheral incorporation moving to the higher level of incorporation: the surrogate model, with its attendant implications.

However, as the experience of peripheral incorporation has show, the incorporated states are able to maintain their freedom to end such relationships whenever they so desire. For example, Egypt abrogated its strategic relationships with the Soviet Union and expelled about 17,000 Soviet military advisors by 1973 even though the Soviet Union was Egypt's main source of arms supply and economic support. Ethiopia's dependence on the United States was also unilaterally abrogated in 1977 by the Ethiopian regime. We can, therefore, at least hope that the super-

powers' incorporation of the African states will not remain a permanent feature, and that these weak states would have the capacity to manipulate their relationships to their benefit. But considering the overall implications of such relationships, we may say that Africa's security and development would be the casualty in the long run.

FOOTNOTES

1. The meeting between President Carter and Daniel Arap Moi took place in Washington on Thursday 21 February, 1980, see *The Washington Post*, 2/22/80, p. A23. Also for details of US-Somali negotiations, see *The Washington Post*, 5/24/80, pp. A1 and A9.
2. See George Shepherd, "War and Demilitarization in the Indian Ocean," in *Global Politics in the Indian Ocean*, (forthcoming).
3. The notion of making the Ocean a "Zone of Peace" was proposed by the littoral states themselves. It materialized in the UN General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XVII) of December 16, 1971. For a detailed analysis of this notion in relation to East African countries, see Raymond W. Copson, "East Africa and the Indian Ocean — A 'Zone of Peace'?", *African Affairs*, London, Vol. 76, No. 304, July 1977, pp. 339-358.
4. I say "active collaboration" to differentiate the American agreements from earlier and similar agreements between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia and Somalia. Soviet agreements are signed as Friendship and Cooperation treaties with no explicit military dimensions. But the Soviets end up with acquiring privileges for the use of local military facilities.
5. The consideration here is not whether arms races lead to war. It is rather the volatility of the region in relation to an arms race.
6. James Caporaso and Michael Ward, "The United States in an Interdependent World: The Emergence of Economic Power," mimeo. Appeared in a collection edited by Charles Kegley and Pat McGowan, *Challenges to American Foreign Policy*, 1979.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory," *World Politics*, XXXI, 2, January 1979.
9. Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, Berkeley, Calif., Univ. of Calif., 1978.
10. For a critical review of dependency theory see James A. Caporaso, "Dependency Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities. ..." *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 4, Autumn 1980, pp. 605-628.
11. Susanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism" in K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds., *Readings in US Imperialism*, Boston, Mass.: F. Porter Sargent, 1971, pp. 155-182. This definition however belongs originally to Theotonis dos Santos in his "The Structure of Dependence," *American Economic Review*, Vol. LX, No. 2, May 1970, pp. 231-236.
12. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 8, 1971, pp. 81-117. For empirical tests of the theory see Steven Rosen and James Kurth, eds., *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism*, Lexington, D.C. Heath & Co., 1974.
13. Samir Amin, *Unequal Development*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.
14. Johan Galtung, *op. cit.*
15. James Caporaso, *op. cit.*
16. "Dependence" is defined as the reliance on an external actor, while "dependency" is the process of incorporating underdeveloped countries into the international capitalist system. This distinction has been made in the Special

Issue of *International Organization*.

17. For a discussion on the importance of the Indian Ocean to the superpowers, see Raymond Copson, *op. cit.*
18. US *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981*, p. 228.
19. An example of the role of arms transfer in the theory of incorporation is demonstrated by US-Saudi Arabia military relationship. When the US perceived a threat to its interests in the Persian Gulf due to the Iraq-Irani war, it sent the highly sophisticated AWACS (air-borne warning and control system) planes to Saudi Arabia and utilized Saudi defense networks for the protection of those interests.
20. Other African countries with which the US has similar agreements are Ghana (1972), Liberia (1972), Senegal (1962), Mali (1972), Niger (1972), and Zaire (1972). See *The Military Balance 1980-81*, IISS, London, p. 51.
21. *Pravda*, April 7, 1978 — Adapted from *Current Digest of Soviet Press*, No. 14, May 3, 1978.
22. See "NATO Stretches its Wings," in *New Africa*, No. 131, July 1978.
23. The US and UK have not used the Simonstown bases for major naval ships since the late 1960s but the extensive **Advocat Communications Facility** at Silvermine surveys shipping in the Indian Ocean for NATO. See G.W. Shepherd, *Anti-Apartheid*, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1977, pp. 91-93.
24. The scope of Western and US weapons supply to South Africa, despite the UN bans and embargoes is outlined in Sean Gervasi, "The United States and the Arms Embargo Against South Africa: Evidence, Denial and Refutation," *Southern Africa Pamphlets*, No. 2, Brandel Center, (SUNY), Binghamton, 1978.
25. Cuba's involvement in Angola and Ethiopia is fully dealt with in William M. LeoGrande's *Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980*, Berkely, Calif., 11S, 1980.
26. R.E. Bissell, "Soviet Use of Proxies in the Third World: The Case of Yemen," *Soviet Studies*; Vol. 30, No. 1, January 1978, pp. 87-106.
27. These figures were taken from William LeoGrade, *op. cit.*, pp. 20 and 40.
28. There are some good reasons to believe that Cuba's involvement in Africa was in consonance with its own foreign policy objectives. For discussions on this issue see William LeoGrande, *op. cit.*, p. 3-8.
29. Figures were taken from *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1968-1977*, US ACDA, Publication 100, October 1979.
30. France ranked second behind the Soviet Union as the highest supplier of arms to Africa. It transferred \$1155 million (14.9 percent) and all other suppliers \$2465 million (31.8 percent). Figures were taken from the US ACDA Publication 100, *op. cit.*
31. The estimated value of the arms agreement was taken from the *Military Balance 1979-80*, p. 105, while the number of Soviet technicians has been provided by the US *DoD Annual Report, FY 1981*, p. 58.
32. *The Military Balance 1979-80*, p. 105.
33. Michael T. Klare, *War Without End*, 1972, Chapter 6.
34. It is germane here to mention Libya's arms **buildup** and its military and political ambitions and adventures on the continent.
35. Richard Vengroff, "Dependency and Underdevelopment in Black Africa: An Empirical Test," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 15, 4, 1977, pp. 613-630.