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Regional Planning in Tanzania 1961—1972

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INTRODUCTION

Tanzania has taken a series of steps since the late 1960s to strengthen the regional planning component in the national planning system. This paper argues that this evolution of regional planning reflects political moves by the central government toward three objectives: to suppress modes of popular participation based on local autonomy; to channel participation into a mode controllable from above; and to strengthen the institutional foundation of the central government in the rural areas.

This interpretation of history stems from two observations about the Tanzanian central leadership. The first concerns the basis of the government's legitimacy. At independence TANU central leadership assumed authority from the British and became the government of Tanganyika, since the party had been the overwhelming victor in the elections leading up to the end of colonial rule. TANU had a peculiar character as a nationalist political party, though, in that its regional branches had often played a more forceful role in the anti-colonialist struggles than had the TANU center.[1] With that had come a certain degree of regional party autonomy, and weak central control over local party affairs. Furthermore the local elites who had been TANU leaders during the independence struggle now began to resist further demands for change from the center and to entrench themselves in the rural *status quo*.

The second observation regards the economic development model to which the central state leadership eventually committed itself. The TANU government did not at first have an economic program for development. It had organized the nationalist movement based on the call for *uhuru* (freedom), and upon gaining power had little idea about how to promote development except through appealing for hard work from everyone — *Uhuru na Kazi*.[2] The First Five Year Plan 1974—69 provided the first outline of the development strategy which would take shape more firmly after the Arusha Declaration. It called for the rapid expansion of modern industry and modern sector employment, greater importation of capital goods, higher investment, a large public sector role, the modernization of agriculture and higher agricultural export levels.[3] The last two items were the means to pay for the rest. The development strategy represented a

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plan for increasing the extraction of surplus from agriculture and its investment in the rapid growth of the non-agricultural sectors. Subsequent plans and policies further defined and pushed forward the strategy.

Together these observations lead to the conclusion that central political leadership had decided to follow a course of action inimical in the short-run to the interests of the peasantry as a class, as well as to the private interests of certain local elites. It would therefore require imposition from the top, and undermining local structures and organizations which enhanced local autonomy. The chosen development model implied the need to restructure the linkages between center and locality in order to make the process of rural development more susceptible to central control.

The attempt of the central leadership to change to structure of center-local relationships has been continuous since the 1960s and manifested itself in four trends. One has been the abolishment of local organizations which were under community rather than central control, e.g. primary cooperatives and district councils. The second move has been to expand the role in local affairs of institutions controlled from the center, i.e. a strengthened political party with a single ideology, and a politically submissive bureaucracy charged with planning and implementation of party policy decisions. Third the government has disrupted indigenous social structures through villagization. Fourth the government has promised massive levels of rural social service investment in education, health, and water hoping these benefits will entice the local communities to accept the other changes.

This larger objective and strategy of the national leadership in regard to central — local structures has been the dynamic behind the increasing attention paid to local planning and planning institutions in Tanzania. The emergence of regional planning has been a fundamentally political phenomenon. "Unplanned" development means peasant communities rely on their own resources and preferences in striving for economic growth and betterment. "Planned" development means the government can enforce its own criteria of resource allocation, with a strong preference for productive investments which increase surplus extraction from peasant agriculture to other sectors of the national economy.

Not suprisingly the peasantry has resisted the institutionalization of planning, given that the parameters reflect and serve a policy of structual transformation in which they carry the biggest burden. The reaction of the government to its failure to capture the peasantry* has been varied, of which one aspect has been a search for new organizational forms of planning. The latest effort has been decentralized regional planning.

*** This conceptualization comes from Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa - Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry,"* London, Heinemann, 1980.**

The following sections of this paper try to substantiate this argument for the reader.

1961—1969

Self-Help

As discussed above, TANU assumed state power without an economic agenda. The leadership needed to find a means to increase popular identity with the new government and to create the feeling that "something was happening" now that TANU had replaced the colonialists. Yet it had no concrete and substantive economic program to offer. The Three Year Plan 1971—4 merely amalgamated government departmental budgets and gave little avenue for mobilizing popular involvement.[4]

The government took two immediate steps in response to this situation. One, the government in 1962 made the posts of Regional and Areas Commissioners into political appointments. Thus it could quickly Africanize the top position of the rural administration in each area despite the lack of qualified Tanzanian administrators to fill most posts.[5] Second, the government began to exhort the people to participate energetically in self-help schemes.

Nyerere after his resignation as Prime Minister did much to elevate self-help, initially the only economic development program his government had to offer. The newspapers constantly featured pictures of government leaders with shovels and wheel-barrows participating in projects to build the nation. The Regional Commissioners were told to start and encourage projects in which people could participate without government assistance.[6] The self-help movement made some small contribution to national capital formation, but in general it was never clear exactly how all this activity would add up to development.[7]

Spontaneous self-help activities in East Africa have two political characteristics. First they encourage the investment of government resources in some regions and areas at the expense of others. This stems from **the nature of self-help as "pre-emptive competition."[8] Each community realizes that it is in competition with other communities in receiving government assistance, and the community which takes initiative on a project makes it difficult for the government to refuse completing and maintaining it. For instance, one community's half-built classroom will more readily attract government funds for *mabati* and teachers than another community's proposal to begin a new one. A selfhelp movement ends in a domestic version of Emmanuel's law of unequal exchange: the more a community consumes, the wealthier it becomes. The more self-help schools Kilimanjaro villages start, the greater number of ones completed with government assistance the region receives.**

Second, self-help strengthens the position of local leaders and institutions based on popular election. Local leaders through organizing self-help are able to attract government resources to the community, and consolidate their own position on this basis. The ability of local leaders to do this, though, depends on the structure of leadership accountability. Peasants will organize themselves as a community if they perceive their initiative will have an obvious and concrete impact, for instance enabling a District Council or Member of Parliament to wean more resources from the center in pork barrel fashion. Locally elected institutions and a patronage structure of links between center and local constituency are necessary ingredients in the spontaneous self-help movement.[9]

The Tanzanian national leadership reacted against self-help participation because of these characteristics. First, the government wanted to channel peasant participation into directly productive forms of capital investment, so agriculture would generate a larger surplus for national development. Self-help investments tended to be unproductive because projects were often not completed or maintained; also peasants prefered special service over directly productive projects. Second, the national leadership wished to take power from autonomous regional and district elites in order to centralize it in the state. Third, the government wanted to mitigate rural inequality stemming from regional and area discrepancies in living standards (as well as from class-based ones). The more developed regions had an advantage over the less developed ones in self-help competition for government resources.

This reaction to self-help on the part of the Tanzanian political elite can be traced to its historical relationship to the other main economic classes in the society. The contrast between Kenya and Tanzania illustrates how this variable affects the political elite's response.

The political economy of Kenya was much different from Tanzania's at independence. In Kenya, portions of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors were relatively advanced before independence due to the privileges accorded to white settlers. The British government made arrangements with the Kenyan political leaders and economic elite in the pre-independence era to transfer the management of this structure undisturbed. The Kenyan political class presided over and participated in the transition to neocolonialism.[10]

Thus Kenya's development strategy became the Africanization of the economy and its growth along old lines — i.e. emphasis on agriculture and exports and no increased relative priority for manufacturing, processing, construction, or public services. A hierarchy of patronage linking the national and local elites developed with Kenyatta as the *Mzee* patron. Popular participation through self-help initiative both spurs and requires the emergence of Kenya — style patronage politics, hence the growth and endurance of the *harambee* movement. The Kenyan local constituencies assist their MPs to pull strings in the central Ministries and Cabinet for more resources, by starting the construction and collection of the local contribution.[11]

In Tanzania the political leadership had little interest to preserve the old economic structure since it had brought little development and benefitted primarily an Asian class. The national leaders instead wished to transform the economy to bring rapid growth, and racially to nationalize the leading non-agricultural sectors. It put itself in the latter role as leading investor in the modern sector.[12] This strategy however produced a conflict of interest between a central leadership calling for transformation, and local elites and regions which benefitted from the *status quo* process. The differences in interest led the central leadership to oppose a structure of center — local ties based on a strong element of local autonomy, and to pre-empt further structural evolution in this direction.

Nyerere during the 1960s therefore took action to undermine local organizations which provided for a degree of autonomous development initiative in the rural areas, and to replace these local institutions with institutions in the rural areas controlled from the center. Thus spontaneous self-help, district councils, and primary cooperatives gave way to a bureaucratized political party and a politisized bureaucracy. Villages planning for their own development gave way to the rural government administration planning for village development.

These moves on the part of the Tanzanian leadership implied that it would work to establish the formal planning process and local planning institutions as the mode and structure for rural participation. "Unplanned" development through spontaneous self-help and autonomous local leadership affected the process of surplus extraction, through its demands for government investment in the rural sector, in a manner incompatible with the national leadership's political - economic strategy of rapid modernization and transformation. "Planned" development by contrast meant that the government would institutionalize its own criteria of resource allocation in place of local preferences.[13]

Since the institutions and popular acceptance of participation — through-planning did not initially exist, the government had to try and establish them. It encountered peasant passive resistance in turning the process of surplus extraction heavily against them. The struggle was not a conscious class action; but just as potatoes in a sack form a sackful of potatoes, so did individual non-participation add up to the refusal of a class to accept "planned" development. The government responded with organizational, allocative, ideological, and ultimately coercive tactics. These responses included measures such as modifications in the national planning exercise, the allocation of additional planning resources to the regions and districts, and local institutional changes. Thus the central — local contradiction produced a political dynamic which powered a series of changes in Tanzania's planning system. The earliest of these was the creation of Village Development Committee.

Village Development Committees

Village Development Committees (VDC's) were launched in May 1962 with the intention that they would form the bottom link in a planning structure hierarchy extending through the districts and regions to the ministerial level. They were supposed to plan local development projects which required minimal government assistance.

The "villages" represented by the committees were purely administrative units, specifically the area covered by the Village Executive Officer (VEO) of the District Councils. Thus a VDC could have a constituency of between 160 and 1,800 households and upwards of twelve villages. The VDC comprised villagers elected in mass open meetings and the VEO, functional field staff and teachers within the area as non-voting members. The District Rural Development Officer had the responsibility to supervise the VDCs use of allocated **self-help funds.**[14]

The VDCs were under the nominal authority of the Area Commissioner and later, in 1966, under the District Development and Planning Committees. These committees were joint district, district administration groups, which passed project proposals up to the Regional Development Committees. The latter were advisory bodies between the districts and the Ministry of Local Government which reviewed and gave final approval to local projects.[15]

The VDCs participated widely in self-help activities during the first years, but without the impact for which the government had hoped. As the Prime Minister complained in July 1962:

> ... most of the Village Development projects being carried out are not within the Village Development Plans. They are spontaneous or they were before the idea of planning was decided.[16]

In other words, rural communities continued to invest in social services rather than directly productive projects, and demand government resources for their completion and maintenance.[17]

As the government tried to exercise more control over the direction of village investments, and as the level of government self-help funds declined, popular interest in the VDC's diminished. Finucane found in Geita District that less than half the reported number of VDCs were actually in existence. He also found their functions had become largely penetrative — i.e. the committees were used for collection of taxes and TANU dues, political exhortation, and the transmission of information downward from the center (e.g. campaigns). The Ward Development Committees which replaced the VDCs in July 1969 differed little in this respect.[18]

The institutionalization of effective local planning faced other problems as well. For one, the administrative capacity of the rural government bureaucracy was low due to a shortage of skilled staff and institutional fragmentation among the different central agency departments. Also individual persuasion, for instance from the Regional Commissioner to decisive groups, influenced the selection of project proposals.

As a result of all these factors, local projects were poorly evaluated with little or no economic justification. Local decision-making and action did not submit to economic planning criteria.[19]

Effective local planning also suffered from the inability of the central administration to devise appropriate rural development policies. The regional investment programs in the First Plan 1964-9 contained ludicrous assumptions about regional conditions, thus making them untenable guides to actual decisions. The Plan's strategy for a "transformation" of agriculture through resettlement schemes quickly proved a complete failure.[20]

By the end of the First Plan, the central leadership had still failed to impose planning as a mode of popular participation and administrative behaviour on the peasantry and the bureaucracy. During the Second Plan period the government took three types of steps in a renewed effort to achieve this: addition of a "regional perspective" to the national plan; strengthening the regional tier of the government bureaucracy; and ideological mobilization.

Inter-Regional Policies in the National Plan

The Second Plan 1969-74 presented a number of specific policies and decisions intended to improve the quality of regional investment decisions and integrate them with national objectives. The Second Plan, by contrast with the First Plan, had identifiable regional policies, central features in the government's attempt to create a national framework for regional decision-making. The most obvious change was the government's adoption of a regional growth pole strategy. Future industrial investment would be located outside Dar es Salaam, distributed among nine regional towns in order to promote "even" development throughout the country.[21] But the growth pole strategy was a non-starter for several reasons.

The whole notion of growth pole and growth center policies are based on two questionable assumptions, that facilities are less costly when producers tie into shared infrastructure and that economic growth will spread to the surrounding areas. In the context of Tanzania one could also question the idea that urban-led growth is the appropriate model, rather than one which places emphasis first on reginal agricultural potential.[22] In other words, the premises of the strategy and its relevance to Tanzania were not indisputably sound.

Yet even granting benefit of the doubt on this point, the government clearly did not think through implementation. It didn't assess actual linkages among industries, or with the agricultural hinterland,* seeming to assume external linkages automatically follow geographic location. Moreover there was no strong machinery to enforce the location of industry outside Dar es Salaam; it continued as always to expand in the city.[23]

* Why locate the tobacco factory in Morogoro when the region doesn't grow tobacco?

The Second Plan also outlined district crop priorities, a second policy with largely regional implications. But these were essentially lists of everything which grew in the given district, based on questionnaires filled in by district agricultural officers. The priorities do not give a guide e.g. to the percentage of effort to devote to a crop based on its relative rate of return. More importantly, the plan did not make inter-regional decisions about markets and the concentration of marketing infrastructure, e.g. tarmac roads. Yet Kilimo regional surveys showed that markets and marketing organization, not supply, were the limiting factor in agriculture.[24]

The regional investment programs of the Second Plan had as little impact as the regional policies. The volume of the Plan containing them appeared in 1970, one year after the implementation period of the Second Plan had begun. The ministries, which would have had to alter their programs in order to accomodate regional proposals, had already prepared their plans before they got the regional ones. Cooperation from the region was variable, both in the detail of the plans and how they were planned. The Ministries in any case tended to ignore them.[25]

One main factor, in addition to all of the above, made national planning of regional development ineffective. The national development budget could not finance the regional plans. After paying recurrent and top priority development costs, the government had nothing left to give the regions. The mistakes in national policy and decisions about regional development made less difference in the end because planning never led to project implementation.[26]

Finally, national planning failed to give the central leadership direct control over rural development because they themselves so often ignored it as a mode of policy-making. Even during the First Plan, ministers had made decisions affecting economic policy and implementation outside the formal planning process, acting with personal authority and automony. Nyerere encouraged the informal structure to develop by making important decisions through private consultation with his trusted advisors.[27]

During the Second Plan the trend continued. The Arusha Declaration, villagization, and decentralization are obvious examples of decisions with major impact on national development essentially taken privately. As one observor has noted:

> A reasonable rule of thumb is that most national policy is made by an elite group of party and government officials primarily responsive to the president whose formal positions are essentially irrelevant by a process not subject to public discussion or accountability.[28]

For all these reasons — poor policy, poor administration, little finance, and no political commitment to planned decision-making — the central government did not succeed in using national planning as a tool to reach its development objectives. The government however had experienced these same problems during the First Plan and took another

type of step in the Second Plan trying to mitigate them. This step involved increasing the planning capacity at the regional level of the bureaucracy through the provision of additional resources.

Regional Access to Planning Resources

Under British colonialism, the regional tier of the government administration had been weak in terms of its responsibilities and its role of linking the district and national levels of administration.[29] The independent state inherited this structure but during the second plan period took several measures to strengthen that capacity with regard to the flow and processing of information. Before 1972 this effort consisted of providing some additional funds and more access to planning expertise.

The Regional Development Fund (RDF) was established in November 1967, and put completely under Regional Development Committee control in 1968. The Second Plan allocated it Tsh. 222 million — i.e. Tsh. 6.5 million per mainland region, Tsh. 10 million for Zanzibar, and a Tshs. 5 million reserve. From 1967-71 it was dispersed in equal shares to all the regions, from 1972 on a *per capita* basis. In the early years the money went mostly to transport and infrastructure projects, and to filling district council revenue gaps. Later it was used for projects in voluntary *ujamaa* villages. In the end it became just another additional source of funds for the technical officers, one which strengthened the regional officers' had *vis-a-vis* the district level.[30]

The RDF showed up the low capacity of the district and regional administrations to perform the planning tasks asked of them. Project proposals were not processed, resources were wasted or misappropriated, projects were left uncompleted or not working. Also the field agencies displayed an inability to coordinate their work and act together toward an objective.[31]

Providing the regions with additional personnel and access to expertise also failed to raise administrative capacity. Paul Bomani had promised at a 1968 Regional Commissioners conference to appoint Regional Economic Secretaries to each region, and that Dev. Plan officers would visit the regions. Dev. Plan had set up a Regional Planning Division and the Economic Secretaries would act locally on its behalf in the same way as other regional officers represented their Ministries. The Economic Secretaries were supposed to coordinate plans, check their economic viability, and collect the data necessary for both the preceding tasks. Basically the task was too much for one person. They also faced the obstacle that ministerial, parastatal, and private investment planning for the region were not within the secretaries' domain, nor were they given clear spatial objectives from Dev. Plan. Finally, the impact of creating the post never amounted to much because so few regions actually had secretaries assigned to them.[32]

Dev. Plan did send visiting teams to three regions, and BRALUP and some foreign teams did plans elsewhere. Some of the resulting reports were unimplementable but even good documents "gathered dust." The problem in the later case was again that planning could not lead to implementation in the face of low administrative capacity, nor finance, and a severe shortage of skilled personnel.[33]

The two steps discussed so far, inter-regional policy formulation and regional resource allocation, had tried to strengthen government capacity to direct rural affairs through changes at the national and regional levels respectively. The third step aimed at raising district planning and implementation capacity.

Ideology

An obvious problem for public sector planning and management capacity at the district level lay in its institutional fragmentation. This had two aspects: lack of integration between functional departments; and rivalry between the district administration and councils.[34] Like the weakness of the regional tier, the fragmented structure of district administration was a colonial product. The British district commissioner had played a jack-of-all-trades role in his rural post, often the sole colonial agent serving in the area. From World War II this began to change as an increasing number of technical officers began to serve with him. However a change in district administrative structure did not accompany the growth of specialists. As a result, the Tanzanian Area Commissioner (AC) who replaced his or her British predecessor had inadequate formal machinery with which to coordinate and manage **agency project. The AC in her/his role as head of the district government bureaucracy had only an administrative secretary under direct line of command, and the latter lacked any authority over the technical officers' activities. Instead, the central ministries directly controlled their local field staff. This made concreted action difficult if not impossible to organize among the different functional departments within the local administration.**[35]

The problem was perhaps more pronounced with regard to the coordination of district council and district administration plans. The district council was the relic of the British policy of indirect rule. Whereas the French had used central government agents alone for the administration of local affairs, the British had set up a system whereby a chief, group of elders, or village headman had authority to deal with local issues, especially court cases. In the 1950s the British introduced informal elections for the Native Authority Councils. In 1962 the Native authority chiefs lost all their official powers, but native authority councils were re-established as District Councils and the colonial Department of Native Affairs become the Ministry of **Local Government.**[36]

The division of authority and function between the local councils and the district administration was ambiguous, and a certain rivalry between

them developed. This fragmentation of authority, like that within the district administration itself, created problems for government initiative in rural development. For instance, the District Development and Planning Committee contained both local council and district field staff members. But the central government staff had no executive authority over these projects once begun, nor were the technical officers subject to local council direction. The poor quality of district council staff and administration plus the growing deficit in council finances exacerbated **the** problem in the relationship between the two separate district **institutions.**[37]

The Area and Regional Commissioners in principle performed the task of overcoming the dissipation of public sector initiative through virtue of their dual position as both head of the local administration and TANU district secretary. In practice they lacked an informal network of persuasion within the local communities, tended to squash local initiative and push through projects over local opinion and without economic justification. Moreover they also had no Party Secretariat and only the weak office of the Administrative Secretary to assist them in their role. Attempts to increase Party control of the councils (e.g. the TANU district chairperson became the council chairperson, presidential appointment of up to ten council members) did not succeed in bringing the necessary coordination. District Councils continued to invest wildly in social services contrary to the national government's plan for development.[38]

Supposedly the declaration of a national ideology in 1967 was to transform this situation. The policy of *Ujamaa* and self-reliance would provide coherent guidelines for each agency to develop programs and a basis on which to coordinate inter-agency activities. Secondly the Arusha Declaration signalled that TANU would have the leading role in forging this unity. The district party with its new ideological foundation would instigate and organize a "district development front," — i.e. all institutions would act together in making a frontal assault on the problems of rural development. With sufficient political education the peasants would learn to support the government initiative with their participation.[39]

It didn't quite work out that way. First, in regard to a unified district front, *ujamaa* philosophy did not contain enough detail about implementation effectively to guide district efforts toward a development objective, as the experience with voluntary villagization exemplifies. As part of the new policy, Nyerere had said that district staff and party officials were to encourage peasants to throw over the existing local division of labour and mode of production, come together in villages and begin communal production. Yet nothing spelt out the specific means and agents to this end. Left only with the general injunction to build *ujamaa,* local bureaucrats used an ill-thought out carrot and stick approach of enticing peasants into villages with promises of government assistance, and moving them forceably when the former failed. The method was unsuccessful in that only a trickle of such **villages** were started, many of these failed when government assistance did not materialize, and genuine local initiative in self-reliance was obstructed.[40]

Second, ideology did not strengthen the management procedures which most senior officers adopted by default within their departments. They tended to rely on a "hub-and-wheel" pattern of communications whereby the senior officer takes responsibility for doing everything and hands out small discrete tasks to subordinates. Also officers in charge pooled resources (e.g. transport, finance) and used them in response to demands rather than their designated functional use. The declaration of *ujamaa* did nothing to alter the circumstances producing such reactions — e.g. severe and constant shortages of resources, difficult tasks given to lower administrative levels with inadequate staff to perform the assignments, no explicit attention to management.[41] If anything, the adoption of an ideology worked to worsen these problems by transforming the policy making style into one which placed unrealistic expectations on the bureaucrats, sought once-for-all solutions to chronic problems, and imbued issues with an overriding sense of urgency.[42]

By the end of the 1960s the central government had still not succeeded in amending central-local linkages into a structure controllable from the top. Three types of limited reform affecting respectively national planning, planning at the regional tier, and district institutional behaviour had not accomplished their ultimate end — i.e. the government was not able to mobilize peasant participation along the lines dictated by a strategy of rapid growth in the non-agricultural sectors.

The next attempt to achieve the same purpose would be to attack the formal institutional structure of center-local linkage. The first move in this direction was to abolish in 1969 the right of District Councils to collect local taxes and produce cess. The central government administration also assumed many of the Council's functions such as the maintenance of clinics, water supply, roads, and to some extent teachers' salaries. This effectively wiped out the council and transfered their responsibilities to the district administration.[43]

Although the District Councils had been in gross financial and administrative difficulties, their abolishment greatly increased the need for planning and implementation capacity in the very administrative institutions already proved lacking in this respect. The government had in effect exacerbated a problem it would now try to remedy through the creation of new formal institutions and a major reorganization of old ones.

Villagization and decentralization established by *fiat* a new formal structure of central-local linkage to replace the previous one built on a foundation of local autonomy.

The central leadership bet that planning brought down to the regions and districts would became an acceptable mode of participation to the peasantry. A fundamentally political move on the part of the central leadership to secure more power again manifested itself in the further evolution of regional planning.

1972 DECENTRALIZATION ACT

Tanzanian decentralization actually represented a *centralization* of power based on the expanded role of the central government bureaucracy in the rural areas. Stripping district councils of their functions and revenue — raising capacity had been a transitional step in this direction in that it abolished the institutional basis for independent community action. Villagization further suppressed the opportunity for local autonomy by disrupting pre-existing social and production relations. The Village Assemblies fit strictly in to the party and administrative hierarchies headed by the central leadership.

To make the transition to greater central power successful, however, required the lower tiers of the government bureaucracy to play a more responsible role in gathering, processing, and acting upon information from the local areas. The decentralization reform contained several aspects intended to accomplish this. First, functional officers were placed under the direction of generalist staff at the district and regional levels. After some modifications in the original design for decentralization, this administrative layer comprised a director, a planning officer, and staff. Second, more functional officers were sent out to the regions and districts from the central ministries. Third, the regions were made into accounting units able to handle national budget development expenditures. The idea was that this deconcentration of staff and responsibility within the bureaucracy would lead to behavioural changes, that is, that local officers would act as responsible local development managers and not just administrators.[44]

The sense in which decentralization actually represents centralization stands out clearly when contrasted with the alternative. For instance one analyst in the late 1960s suggested the abolition of regional administration as a solution to organizational problems, exactly the opposite solution to the one taken through decentralization.[45] The government itself commissioned a study of decentralization reforms from a committee headed by Cranford Pratt.[46] The report however was suppressed by State House, remor has it because the committee recommended the devolution of real autonomy to the regions.

Clearly the central leadership was not prepared to move in this direction. The government instead hired an American consulting firm, McKinnsey, with experience in corporate management, — i.e. structures where central directors retain total control while deconcentrating certain responsibilities to lower level managers. The McKinnsey design for Tanzanian decentralization reflected this type of hierarchical arrangement. Presumably the McKinnsey structure indicated the central leadership's wishes since the National Executive Committee had participated in its formation and judging by the speed with which implementation proceeded.[47]

Once in operation, decentralization began to reveal its flaws. Some of these can be blamed on poor workmanship by the McKinnsey Company. For instance, the reporting system required data which was unobtainable, and produced a semi-annual flow of paper which was useless for purposes of effective monitoring, supervision, and evaluation.[48] Other problems however stemmed from the inability of mere organizational change to alter established patterns of central - regional relationships and the administrative culture operative within the bureaucracy. For example, the newly created Prime Minister's Office (PMO) was not able to exert its given role as "super ministry" to coordinate affairs among regions and with other ministries. Not only did the PMO provide regions with little guidance in their new responsibilities, it failed to protect collective and individual regional interests. McKinnsey had anticipated the regions would handle 40% of the government budget, when in fact by 1975/76 this amounted to only 14%. In other words, central ministries continued to control the funds. Moreover among regions, the more developed ones received larger allocations of ministry and parastatal investment and of government staff.[49]

Within the regions, management did not improve under the new procedures. First, the assumptions underlying the management system were at odds with conditions in the Tanzania civil service. Regional officers proved unwilling to delegate authority to the districts since the former felt responsibility for all actions taken under them. The emphasis on programmed decision-making did not recognize that the party makes the ultimate decisions and is not willing to subject its autonomy to the rules and formula of programming. Moreover the Development Directors are often required to assist the Regional and Area Commissioners, which lowers the amount of time and attention the former can give to management. They tend to use the planning officers as deputy directors, so in turn planning capacity falls. The programming approach also did not take into account the high turnover rate among senior staff which makes any kind of continous management difficult.[50] Second, the regional officers, especially the technical officers, did not feel that issues of management *per se* required their attention, prefering to concentrate on tangible outputs and projects. Better management was not really perceived as a objective.[51]

In summary, decentralization expanded the role which the agents of the central government leadership, i.e. civil servants and appointed party officials, played in the planning and design of development projects while the role of villagers and their local representatives declined.* A change in formal structure could increase the responsibilities shouldered by the lower tiers of the bureaucracy, but it could not force popular participation into the centrally - controlled mold.

* These are the findings of a sample survey on participation in the project selection process before and after decentralization.[52] The sample percentages for participation by different groups were reported without giving the standard deviations, which apparantly were quite high. Depending on the size of the sample variation relative to sample size (s.d./$\sqrt{N}$), the preceding conclusion about the relative roles of different actors might be unsubstantiated or even false. Therefore the statement should be treated with some caution.

CONCLUSION

The preceeding historical narrative suggests the following conclusions:

1. Up to the mid-1970s, efforts to institutionalize regional planning in Tanzania had not been successful due to low levels of participation, administrative capacity, and finance, in that order of importance.
2. The first two factors, participation and administrative capacity, represented the primary constraints. Without solving them, Tanzania's capacity to make productive use of investment capital would be extremely low.
3. The inability of field officers to manage their staff or to act together as a team stemmed from deeply ingrained characteristics of the policy-making style and structure of the administrative bureaucracy. This was a more severe problem for administrative capacity than the shortage of skilled personnel.
4. Participation declined following the abolishment of the institutions which promoted peasant preferences and interests in development. Participation in rural development has a number of dimensions, — i.e. popular involvement in decision-making, implementation, and the distribution of benefits. All these aspects seem to require the presence of local organizations, i.e. institutions primarily controlled by and accountable to the community. The Tanzanian leadership had substituted a planning system for local organization, and participation had dropped.
5. Low levels of participation suggest peasant resistance to a national development model emphasizing rapid modern sector expansion. In theory, participation through local organizations represents one element in a self-reliant rural development strategy. As one commentator described the district council form of a local government:

> ... it is an attempt to give people their own socialism, not to rely upon a central government socialism, which must seem to be (and would no doubt for sometime have to be) imposed from outside.[53]

After the councils were abolished peasants became apathetic. Powerless to affect development policy formulation, the peasantry unconsciously acted as a class to sabotage its implementation.

FOOTNOTES

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A Theory of Incorporation: An Explanation for Superpowers' Strategy in Africa*

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The February 1980 agreement reached between President Carter and the Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, that would permit the United States the use of port and military facilities in Kenya, and a similar agreement between the US and Somalia five months later,[1] are significant for several reasons. First, they reflect the intensification of superpower strategic rivalries in the Indian Ocean, and hence, the absurdity of the notions of 'demilitarization'[2] and 'zone of peace'[3] in the ocean. Second, they mark the beginning of an active collaboration between African states and a superpower in the pursuit of the power's strategic interests.[4] Third, the future security of Africa may be imperilled because the agreements make the continent a possible target of Soviet strike in the event of a confrontation between the two superpowers. The agreements also have the potential for promoting an arms race among countries in the area with possible consequences of armed conflict.[5] These factors not only reflect possible implications for the future security and stability of Africa, but they also manifest strategic relationships between the strong and the weak in international relations. It will be theorized that military agreements of this kind constitute a special kind of relationship called "incorporation."

Power and Dependency

In international relations dominant powers manipulate and use weaker states for their own objectives and benefits. State power has always been expressed through the ability to influence other nations in desired directions. States tend to utilize their power either consciously or unconsciously to advance their interests. In the course of advancing their interests, the dominant powers influence the weaker states. If the interest is economic an unequal economic relationship is created; military (strategic) interest brings about an unequal military relationship. The more unequal the relationship, the more dependent the weaker state tends to become. The assumption is that unequal relations between nations are primarily the result of unequal power capabilities. In other words, power is an important factor in the creation of dependencies in international relations.

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