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Public administration is generally construed as laying emphasis on the functional processes of rule formulation and rule application; in essence, the maintenance of law and order. This is especially necessary when the state legitimacy is held in suspicion. This preoccupation is usually characteristic of a colonial administration<sup>1</sup>. Although there can be said to be public administration, even in apost-independence era, the emphasis tends to shift towards a dynamic process of the state's concern with defining and redefining new goals, mobilising scarce resources for both quantitative change in the new society and all these aimed at the improvement of the standards of living for the majority of the people. This is what is usually called development administration as contrasted to the administration of law and order.

Tanzania is a country which can be discussed in the context of the latter conception, but the concern of this paper is to give the background to the problems which have necessitated recurrent planned changes. Particularly, it will throw light on the major policies, briefly discuss their planned implementation and the results which have tended to necessitate further 'planned' change. It is an attempt to see why the independence government had to adopt one policy after another and still continues to do so. It is argued that the problem lies with the very process of policy formulation.

**Background to the Critical Problems at Independence**

The economy cultivated by the colonial administration had the express aims of catering mainly for the export of raw materials needed in industrialised Europe. Most manufactured goods had to be imported from Europe, especially from the colonial power, Great Britain. Thus Tanzania had firstly to produce goods demanded abroad and secondly what was needed at home. The modern sector of the economy (mining, cash crop production, trade, banking, transportation, etc) was appended to the economic interests of the colonialising power and its allies in Western Europe.

Within the country itself the modern sector was in the hands of a relatively few individuals. Most exports crops were produced on states owned by expatriate settlers from Greece, Britain, South Africa, India, etc. The land that was alienated by these settlers was about one per cent. This minute percentage of land produced about 40 per cent of the country's export earnings. It should be noted, however, that these estates were in the most fertile areas and that they had the advantages of expertise and other extension services from the Department of Agriculture.

At this juncture two inherent problems should be pointed out. One, at independence policies would of necessity attempt to re-orientate the external dependency and try to cultivate an internal, integrated market economy. Secondly, the fact that a minute portion of land and population were mobilised to the level of high productivity indicated the need to transform the subsistence economy of the hitherto neglected peasants into a modern economy that would mobilise as much of the rural work force as possible, and as much of the land resources as possible.

TABLE I: LAND USE CATEGORIES IN 1962

Category	Land Use in Hectares	Percentage
Small-holder cultivation	4,024,546	4.59
Large Scale Cultivation	610,544	0.69
Roughgrazing land	44,113,773	50.33
High altitude forests	384,375	0.44
Other woods and forests	37,319,647	42.53
Other use: urban, swamps, rocky etc.	1,185,025	1.35

Source: Leonard and Berry "Land Use in Tanzania by District" 1969 Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning UDSM.

In fact, the land use pattern at independence shows that the small-holder cultivation was only 5 percent and the large-scale cultivation only 0.7 percent of total land (see Table 1).

Table I shows that Tanzania had, and still has, a great agricultural potential. Only 5 percent of land had been used to support 97 percent of the population residing in the rural areas. This suggests that there is room for expansion given proper organisation and other agricultural inputs. With the present population density of 19.8 people per square kilometre<sup>2</sup>, one can argue that given some proper institutional arrangements and production incentives most of the workforce in rural areas can be mobilised to make use of the expansive lands in Tanzania.

The problem of mobilisation of the rural population cannot be dismissed; even the World Bank experts giving an appraisal of the state of affairs in 1960 argued that the major stumbling block was the bulk of rural people and their relationship to land use. Their report points out that the economic stagnation in Tanganyika had been caused by *inter alia*:

- a) "primitive" methods coupled with conservatism to change (on the part of the peasants);
- b) "primitive" and inadequate equipment in the major sector of the economy, namely agriculture;
- c) limited economic incentives to the majority of the direct producers;
- d) limitations owing to the customary land tenure — which did not entice potential users to develop the land; and
- e) the lack of managerial ability.<sup>3</sup>

What the above summary of problems suggests is that the problem of irresponsiveness on the part of the peasantry could be tackled by institutional means such as mass education structures extension education and distribution of the means which assist production and a change in land owning patterns and regulations. The low level of rural entrepreneurship created a vacuum till requiring to be filled by governmental institutions. Except for cooperatives, there were very few mass-based institutions. Thus the World Bank report observed that:

... in an economy like that of Tanganyika dominated by peasant agriculture, the government and its administrative machinery had a vital part to play in promoting and shaping development.<sup>4</sup>

This is an indication of how removed the bulk of the population was from the mainstream of the territory's modern sector.

Implicit in the country's rural development strategy is an ideal definition of development that has sought to include such elements as involvement in programmes by as many people as possible; redistribution of public services from the minority to the majority; putting more land and other resources to more productive use; and, perhaps as a result of the above, the general acceptance that each problem has to be resolved through the of, or the reform of, institutions. This last element seems to have been the major pre-occupation of the government resulting in the frequent institutional build-ups and reforms that are so characteristic of Tanzania's development administration.

In trying to replace the presumably neutral, colonial administration after independence most posts were decided upon politically. Sensitive leadership positions were filled by political appointees. The heads of ministries (ministers) were politicians. The colonial provincial commissioners were in 1962/63 replaced by TANU<sup>5</sup> appointees and referred to as Regional Commissioners. The District Commissioners were replaced by political appointees as Area Commissioners. The Regional and the Area Commissioners were at the same time TANU secretaries at their respective levels. This was to ensure that the Party's policies would be implemented. There was also the assumption that the bureaucracy could be politicised to make it more responsive to the Party's popular policies.

At the sub-district level the traditional chiefs were abolished in 1963 and replaced by the Party-appointed Divisional, and Ward Executive Officers, later the Divisional and Ward Secretaries, respectively. This was an attempt to politicise the administration at the sub-district level as well as to enable the Party to penetrate and mobilise the mass of the rural population.

Commitment at the level of the individual villagers was cultivated by various development-promising campaigns, such as *Uhuru ni Kazi* (independence means hard work), *Uhuru na Kujitegemea* (independence and self-reliance).

The above general description to the problems and political intentions provides the background for a brief look into what was inherited and the means for transforming the economy.

#### *The Problem of Mobilising Administrative Agencies for Development Administration.*

Making certain sections of the administration committed to the post-independence development goals of mobilising resources for the majority was one only one requirement. More critical was the creation and transformation of new and existing institutions, still an important problem, the crux of which is two-fold. Firstly, that most of the structures and the individuals who served the colonial system were groomed for goals sometimes contradictory to the goals of the post-independence government. Secondly, that the colonial administration had developed the administrative units on a bimodal basis.

The colonial government, with its express aims of extracting as much raw material for export as possible at the most minimal costs, capitalised the best resources. It developed communication and transportation lines to the most productive areas of cash crops and minerals; it paid secondary attention to the periphery peasant economy, a mainly subsistence concern, except for a few small-holders who grew cash crops.

The problem at independence, with this bimodal approach was either to let those favoured by the colonial administration to continue enjoying their share of the public extension services and relegating, as it were, the majority peasantry to secondary attention. Alternatively, to expect the government to cater for both the hitherto provided and the hitherto neglected. Yet a third approach was to pay less attention to the privileged and concentrate on the majority of the peasant farmers who had not previously received primary government attention.

In public policy circles this third alternative of extending services to the majority was the obvious option, as promised by the Party to its supporters in the independence struggle. But in practice it was proved that mere declaration of intent is not in itself sufficient. The government bureaucracy and its institutions had been conditioned to cultivate the rural elites sometimes forming and furthering class alliances.<sup>6</sup>

In trying not to neglect either side, the government, on advice from the 1960 World Bank mission decided to take a two-pronged approach to rural development. The problem of (primitive) agricultural practices taking advantage of the presumed tracts of uncultivated lands was to be solved by the well-documented (transformation approach).<sup>7</sup> Under this, settlers were recruited from the densely populated areas such as Kilimanjaro to settle areas such as Mwase (Mpanda). They were given the necessary social and economic infrastructure by the state. In addition they were provided with an administrative cadre of thirty personnel (paid by the government) to help organise and manage each settlement scheme. The government assistance included loans, other extension services and even food rations at the initial stages. The primary aim was to transform the settlers' production methods from the traditional (sic) 'primitive' to 'modern' (sic) western capital-intensive methods.

The second strategy was the improvement approach. This was basically the traditional extension network geared to the improvement of agriculture. What was not noted in policy implications was the fact that the extension infrastructure was established to serve rural elites including the so-called (progressive) farmers. While about seventy settlement schemes for the First Five-Year Plan were envisaged, only twenty or so were actually implemented. This meant that the majority of the farming population was relegated to the improvement approach. Implicitly, the management of rural development continued to be a bimodal approach operated similar to the 'progressive' farmer-bureaucratic alliance as during the colonial era.

In practice, the transformation approach focused on a few areas and individuals, but it consumed 53.5 percent of 'rural' investment budget during the years 1964-1966.<sup>8</sup> The improvement approach focused on the well-to-do farmers because that was what the ordinary extension services were meant for during the colonial administration. Most attention had been directed at the ambitious (transformation) village settlements.

The problem, therefore, became one of creating agencies on double standards - some so special as to receive most of the scarce resources, yet their viability was in great doubts.<sup>9</sup> Some are left to champion status quo programmes. This bimodal policy approach can also be seen in the implementation of the ujamaa villages programmes. Since local (regional and district) political appointees were implicitly evaluated in terms of the number of ujamaa/ordinary 'planned' villages established they solicited, and sometimes ordered, resources to be invested in the ujamaa village campaigns.<sup>10</sup> Yet there were regions which were not significantly affected by the ujamaa village programmes as, for example, of Kagera, Kilimanjaro,

Arusha, Iringa and Tanga regions. This bimodal approach to development administration raises several questions. Such questions centre on the capability of the state to create and sustain programmes; acceptance of such programmes by the prospective settlers; and the possible dangers of a government misconstrued as a sole and benovolent provider.

The settlement schemes in particular failed in their initial stage of planning when the sources of capital had to depend almost entirely on the government; and the government almost entirely depended on external aid.<sup>11</sup> Another element of failure in the settlement schemes was to treat the village settlers as special providing them with food, some services, generous loan facilities and capital, which sometimes displaced the presumably ample underutilised and unemployed labour.

Since only about twenty of the planned seventy settlements were implemented it can be concluded that the programme had little opportunity to make a significant impact on the rural population. All-in-all, the settlement schemes were dropped in 1966 because they were judged to be too expensive, with little or no return. This implies that the old system of agricultural extension system which operated double standards, giving a more distributive bias to the rural elites than to the majority of poor peasant farmers was the one that fostered rural development during the 1964 to 1967 period. It also implies that the 'transformation' strategy did not transform the agricultural sector as planned. The inherited structures and policies continued to be depended upon, but the new structures and policies did not take off to transform the standards of production in Tanzania. The structures and the policies which were inherited as well as those created can be seen to have been one source of the problem.

#### *The Problem of Organisational Adaptability*

The village settlement were created in anticipation of foreign aid and created when the 'modernisation' movement of the 1950s and 1960s was seen to be a panacea to most problems in the Third World. At that time, modern (equated to western) institutions were missing in underdeveloped areas, thus the need to create (modern) administrative structures in areas which lacked them. But the question arises whether the short-lived village-settlement structures had time to mature and adapt to the environment. Moreover, they were imposed on the environment as a result of ministerial and expatriate technocrats who had little or no experience about where such villages should be established.<sup>12</sup>

In contrast, the introduction of such structures in the rural setting carried certain implications to the prospective settlers. One of them was suspicion as to why the government had decided to penetrate the peasant economy with machines and bureaucrats. Another implication was derived from the difficulty of obtaining recruits. Peasants had to be promised a better life in the new settlements which meant that the government had to promise free social services and other necessary supports for subsistence. The end result of these two implications was a situation in which the government-created institutions which were misinterpreted by the prospective users as mere distribution agencies as opposed to their actual role of production-enhancing institutions.

It can be recalled that after independence the country was to engage in development administration: i.e. that aspect of public administering public agencies in such a way as to stimulate and facilitate defined programmes of social and economic progress.<sup>14</sup> In addition, it was the intention of the new government to give priority in allocations to the majority of the population. Developments in 1964-1966 and later appear to deviate from this orientation. The programmes which had to be attractive in order to encourage settlers were not so designed, but filled with heavy capital and uncommitted farmers. The tying of the programmes to the central government and, worse still, to international aid complicated the situation.<sup>15</sup> Neither the settlers nor the government itself could guarantee the life-span of the programmes. Organisational adaptation cannot be expected in a situation in which the structures established - the administrative personnel, capital and technology - are wholesale imports from a culturally and economically different environment.<sup>16</sup>

The creation of a dependency syndrome at the local (village) level continued even after the Arusha Declaration.<sup>17</sup> While the main driving force was self-reliant (egalitarian) villages was successful. Two things had to be done. One was to promise prospective villagers that on joining the ujamaa villages they would get some free services such as water, medicine but there was also the implicit promise for maintenance by the government. This aspect obviously did not enhance self-reliant producers but cultivated a dependent population in the rural areas.

The second course of action when the peasants could not be convinced to join the ujamaa villages was coercion. This latter option was most rampant during the specific regional operations and during operation sogeza.<sup>18</sup> Both courses of action created a dependency mentality as settlers reasoned that if the government was forcing them, it should also know how to feed them. It was also probable that structures established so haphazardly did not only have the problem of being accepted by the prospective users, but also that these would then not participate fully in developing institutions of their own - a problem of organisational adaptation.

#### *The Problem of Enhancing Organisation Participation*

With time, the leadership realized that non-involvement of the intended clients in the decision making process was one of the reasons why implementation has been difficult. In most works of public administration the advocates of decentralisation have given three major reasons. Why should the majority at the local level be involved in planning? Getting the local people to participate in programme formulation enables the system to better identify, mobilise and utilise the local resources. Decentralisation reduces delays in the approval process of programme formulation. In addition decentralisation enables new programmes to adapt to local conditions as well as evoking the locals people's commitment for the programmes' successful implementation.<sup>19</sup>

The government took several steps in trying to decentralise development administration. Between 1967 and 1972—the post—Arusha Declaration days—the government had taken various steps which both centralised as well as decentralised decision-making in various dimensions.

In order to have equitable distribution and development of some basic resources, the government took over from the district councils their duty to finance education, health services, district roads, etc. It also abolished the districts' major source of development finance, namely the local direct personal tax and local produce tax. These measures were centralising rather than decentralising the decision-making process.

Another measure taken during the period was the creation of a Regional Planning Division in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in order to develop a systematic planning process at the regional and district levels. At the regional level, the Division's personnel included the Regional Economic Secretaries and the District Economic Assistants. These experts were supposed to co-ordinate and advise on planning at their levels as well as serving as the Regional Commissioner's (essentially a political office) 'inner cabinet' advising on programme planning and implementation.

While still centralising, a form of financial decentralisation began in 1967—the Regional Development Fund (RDF) (Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1967); a Fund meant to be at the disposal of the commissioners to assist in financing the mushrooming self-help and other locally initiated programmes. The Fund's committees were chaired by politicians; a move to enable the Party to intervene directly in the administration of development resources. Other Presidential Circulars (No 1 of 1968 and 1 of 1969) referred to the Fund's role in giving priority to self-help and communal projects. The circulars reiterated the need for further decentralisation. This decentralisation move was, however, insignificant because between 1967 and 1972 RDF accounted for only 3-4 percent of the national development budget.<sup>20</sup>

#### *Problem of Decentralisation*

Government decentralisation in Tanzania (1972) was envisaged as means of sending the government resources, especially trained personnel and their expertise, to the local planning units. It was further intended to have popular participatory structures to enable the general population to identify their priorities and to make their contribution towards solving some of the problems at the planning stages.<sup>21</sup> To this end, participatory structures were created and there are people's representatives in Ward Development Committees, District/Regional Development and Planning Committees, District/Regional Development Councils, etc.

There are several structural implications in a decentralisation policy. First of all, the need for technical and other resources at the lower levels implies a dual process of centralising and decentralising. This is because the villages had a weak tax base—the government had also abolished local direct taxation—so that the local (village, district, etc) authorities had to depend on the central government resources for most investment needs. Sending experts to the lower levels while retaining recruitment, training and promotion at the centre was itself a centralising element in the re-organisation move, despite the fact that the decentralised personnel reported directly to the District or Regional Development Directors. Most people still regard it as promotional move when one is transferred from the district to the region and to the national headquarters.<sup>22</sup>

Another structural implication of the decentralisation policy is that, for the system to be adaptive and participative, there was a need to decentralise substantial powers that might lead (in some extreme cases) to 'regionalism'.<sup>23</sup> However, the government has explicitly desired a unimodal approach to development. Along with this commitment is the fact that to guide and "guard" development trans-nationally necessitates some degree of centralisation of certain areas of policy formulation and resource distribution.

### *Re-Organisation for Development Administration*

The primary objectives and *raison d'être* for re-organising for development (as mentioned at the beginning) were to reduce the country's external dependency; to redress institutional focus from favouring the well-to-do so as to mobilise and involve the hitherto ignored majority of the people in meaningful economic activities; and to attain ideal internal institutional inter-linkages to increase efficiency and effectiveness in planning and implementation of development programmes. To what extent have these objectives been attained in Tanzania's development administration?

### *The External Dependency Element*

The concept of external dependency is here used to include not only the government depending on foreign aid, but also villagers losing confidence in their own development, and waiting on the government to 'develop' them. At the national level the extent which the development process depends on the external stimuli can be explained in terms of the economic infrastructure inherited at independence and the economic planning process after independence.

The structural dependency factors include the pattern of transport and communication, the market pattern and behaviour (production for external demands), and the bimodal approach in the main sector, agriculture, as inherited at independence.<sup>24</sup>

In terms of the administration of economic planning the major point is the legacy on the part of the planners to heavily depend on external aid in capital formation. The First Five-Year Plan targets suggested that 78 per cent of the budget would be externally financed. This suggestion under-rated several problematic situations. One was the impact of donors' interests in distorting recipients' programmes. Donors have political and economic motives which may frustrate recipients. The donors' interests may not necessarily favour the government's popular programmes. Moreover, aid is often tied to the importation of certain amount of commodities from the donors.<sup>25</sup>

The above problems were not unreal in the Tanzanian situation when the First Five Year Plan had to be financed to the tune of 60 per cent from domestic sources. The anticipated aid could not be secured due to strained political interests of Tanzania vis-a-vis those of the major donors.<sup>26</sup> External dependence by the Tanzania planners appears not to have changed despite various stumbling blocks external financing to the extent of US\$306 between 1969 and 1975.<sup>27</sup> The Third Five Year Plan (1976:81) expected 62 per cent from foreign aid.

One cause of this legacy, which has received little attention, is a tendency amongst the planners and heads of institutions in suggesting (to the government) the prospective sources of investment finance for projects they propose. In most

cases, they suggest external aid, having at the re-planning stage liaised with embassies and other agency contacts. In a situation of extreme scarcity of resources when heads of institutions suggest projects requiring resources which will not directly use the small government budget, their projects are more likely to be approved than those claiming a share from the over-divided government budget.

The above tendency has culminated in a situation which international governments and donor agencies have been requested to sponsor development programmes under the so-called integrated development planning - USA sponsors Arusha; Japan, Kilimanjaro; West Germany, Tanga. It cannot be presumed that such developments in the administration of development will lead towards self-reliance or Tanzania's higher priorities. After all, the donors ostensibly prefer large projects which may not necessarily assist in reaching the majority of the people in the short run.

Dependency at the sub-national level, especially on the part of the majority of the poor peasants, have developed as a result of the way the organisation of programme implementation has been conducted. One characteristic tendency has been the centralisation of decision making which makes the government a benevolent provider of every essential item in certain areas. Under the Decentralisation policy, for example, villagers identify projects which are skimmed upwards through various approving bodies. What is finally approved - to be funded by the Treasury - is what is passed down for implementation. Under the same Decentralisation system, 40 per cent of the development budget is supposed to be devolved to the regions. Since 1972, 20 per cent has been released to the regions.<sup>28</sup>

Certain actions by the government and the Party have in one way or another contributed to the development of dependency at the local level. The campaigns for resettlements which the government agents and other resources have established and managed are cases in point. The settlement villages (of the First Five Year Plan) with the government providing most of the investment capital and subsistence finance and ration, in addition to about 30 civil servants under a settlement manager, made villagers believe that their government had the resources and the will to 'develop' them.

Under the villagisation campaigns of 1970-1976 the 'operation' - a situation in which most available resources in various departments were committed to the establishment of some villages with social amenities and some initial general personnel maintenance provided by the government - had two implications. Firstly, the people were resettled, in most cases, in unsurveyed unproductive areas unable to support the village population for any significant length of time.<sup>29</sup> Secondly, the use of coercion and luring the would-be villagers by promises of better government-administered social and economic life helped to cultivate the dependency mentality on the part of the settlers.<sup>30</sup> This is because when people are forced into an environment they know little of, maintenance is expected from the initiators. The question arises, therefore, of the length of time the government can support such settlers, but this does not appear to have received serious attention.

Therefore, the objective of development administration to reduce dependency at these two levels in Tanzania has not been achieved. External dependency has been one of the factors which have made the government unable to create those organisations which would have economic activities and lead to self-reliance at the village, and eventually at national, level.

A further issue is the nature of organisations that would most effectively mobilise and involve the majority of the people in meaningful economic activities. The crux of the matter can be seen to lie with the consultants' and government's failures in coming to grips with (a) determining, in the context of the programme area, whether the problem is the scarcity of agencies or not; (b) the implications of creating or re-organising agencies at one level or in one location while leaving the other levels and localities untouched; and (c) whether the new agencies created to implement a programme are, in effect, alternative organisations to those in existence.

The organisation of government ministries along lines of functional specialisation makes it possible for various departmental heads to suggest, unco-ordinatedly, what they can contribute towards the implementation of a broad Party or government policy. The pith of their claims and promises suggest (to the committees/councils which allocate resources) that if they are given such and such resources they could achieve the policy goals. What they usually recommend is the creation of a new organisation or department as if the problem is the scarcity of organisations and administrative posts. For example, the posts of regional/district financial controllers and personnel officers have now been scrapped from the Decentralisation structure as redundant, having been justified as 'exploiting' the farmers — and their duties taken over by village governments at the primary level and crop authorities (parastatals) at the secondary level. Did it not become easy for a head of the agricultural ministry to request funds and other resources to establish crop authorities for the major crops? But now the co-operatives are to be fully reinstated. What happens to the crop authority structures? They are likely to remain intact.

The second problem concerning the choice of which organisations to establish concerns level and locational aspects. Are programmes in one chosen level and location for 'pilot' purposes or are they serious programmes? If they can be regarded as experiments it is high time it was realised that they are too expensive for a poor nation like Tanzania.

Since the priority in Tanzania has been on rural development, it has all along been taken for granted that development administration is the administration of rural development. This assumption created a tendency to consider those organisations which are dealing with rural development. This, in effect, has led decision makers to believe that re-organisation has to deal with only those agencies which focus on the particular policy, disregarding the fact that such agencies are interwoven into other agencies' structures and programmes. The Folk Development Colleges under the Ministry of National Education are, for example, involved in training farmers and artisans who invariably fall under the extension services of the Ministries of Industries, Commerce and Agriculture. Yet the colleges were initially established with aid from the Swedish International Development Agency with an apparent autonomy from other ministries such as Agriculture. The Small-scale Industries Development Organization (SIDO) enjoys aid from SIDA and other donor agencies to undertake training tasks similar to the Folk Development Colleges. Obviously greater co-ordination of the two programmes would conserve resources and lead to some integrated development.

In creating agencies for some programmes there are alternatives to consider. One is increasing the existing institutional capability by training, departmentalisation, increased allocation of various resources, etc. But there has to be a delicate balance between an aggressive thrust of allowing those agencies proposed by various departments ministries to be established, and carefully allowing only those most qualified to give augmenting services or capabilities to the existing institutions. The first side of the balance, if unchecked, leads to unprecedented bureaucratic build-ups, unnecessary compartmentalisation and the creation of an impression that every problem requires new structures, funds and other resources. The second side of the balance, though conservative, is functional in holding down the bureaucratic expansion which seems to be a current anathema in Tanzania.

The second alternative is to create new institutions for a programme, independent of the existing agencies, but locally initiated and managed. The problems with this approach are several but with two major ones. New agencies have been created before examining whether the existing agencies have failed to perform the same roles. The other is that if the existing agencies fail to implement a policy, are the alternatives built on new principles and foundations? If the answer is nay, then it is likely that the new agencies will continue to champion status quo development.

If the main objective in Tanzania's policy-making has been to reach and involve the majority of the people in development, the "alternative" systems such as the settlement schemes and the RDF (and even the post-decentralisation programmes) agencies have not been alternative organisations. Old inequality tendencies persist, extension services continue to serve the minority in the farming areas, the dependency tendencies at the local and national levels continue.

In conclusion, one should note the difference between form and content. Form is composed of structures such as the ministerial bureaucratic establishment and the social and economic infrastructure. Content means that which flows through and within the structures. This includes the people (bureaucrats) and their values and attitudes, including class predisposition, which influence, and in most cases determine, the outcome of policy making. In the content should also be included the clients' value system and expectations cultivated over a long period of time. One should not expect the new policies built upon old structures to be revolutionary, nor should bureaucrats and clients be expected to simply and positively respond to a new policy pronouncement. This is because they have different calculations to make, calculations which are a result of the system to which they had hitherto been used.

Much has been going on in Tanzania's development policy-making and implementation. But the objectives of allowing the majority to increase their own standards of living have not attained the expectations. From the development administration's point-of-view there are problems in mobilising both the land and human resources; the system's reliance on external stimuli rather than internal exigencies has not changed significantly. There have been various problems related to the choice of organisational mode that would most effectively implement the stated popular policies. Those agencies created as remedial organisations have been inadequate. The poor performances derive from, inter alia, the building of

new structures on the old foundation, treating national agencies on bimodal standards, putting such organisations through changes that make them difficult to adapt and creating agencies without accommodating factors deriving from both the bureaucrats 'and clients' risk calculations.

## NOTES

1. See, Rodney, W; 1974; Cliffe 1972, pp 17-24.
2. United Republic of Tanzania 1979, Table 4.
3. IBRD 1961 p. 101; The term primitive is IBRD's and not the author's conception of the peasant.
4. *Ibid*, p. 10.
5. TANU means "Tanganyika African National Union," the *de facto* ( and now *de jure*) sole plitical party.
6. Von Freyhold 1976 pp. 54-59; Saul 1979.
7. McHenry 1979; Mushi 1978; Munishi 1982; Pratt, C, 1976.
8. Munishi, G; (1982) p. 68.
9. Though there were organisational structures (The Village Settlement Commission and The Village Settlement Agency) these were not adequately manned to execute their duties efficiently. See, McHenry 1979.
10. Mwapachu, B; 1976.
11. These schemes were financed by the First Five Year Plan (1964-1969). The Plan itself depended on external financing to the tune of 78%. See United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar 1964.
12. The village settlement schemes were designed with assistance from Israel expatriates.
13. It can be recalled that the agricultural instructors and inspectors used coercion when propagating "modern" agricultural information. See, Cliffe 1972, pp. 17-23.
14. Gant, G, 1966, pp. 199-200.
15. Hyden, G; 1980; McHenry, D, 1979.
16. The administrative team for a settlement village included 30 civil servants (paid for by central government) under a government-appointed manager.
17. The Arusha Declaration was TANU's policy of "Socialism and Self-reliance"; a policy move to correct the mistakes of 1964—1966, when most of the First Five Year Plan had been grounded. The policy became the basis for creating new organisations and development programmes. TANU 1967
18. Specific regional "operations" refer to a situation in which a specific region considered the movement of people into villages to be necessary and almost all resources were diverted to implement this decision; e.g. Rufiji, Kigoma and Dodoma, "sogeza" took place between 1973 and 1976 when all rural people were required to move into "planned villages". See, Mwapachu 1976
19. Nyerere, J.K; 1972; McKinsey, 1971; Rweyemamu and Mwansasu 1974.
20. Munishi, G, 1982 pp. 79-81.
21. McKinsey 1971; Nyerere, J. 1972.

- 22 Mushi 1978
- 23 Substantial regional autonomy that might look like federalism was contrary to the country's efforts for national integration.
24. Thomas; 1974; Rweyemamu; 1974; Siedman; 1972.
25. van Arkadie; 1972.
26. The Rhodesian UDI in 1965, for example, created differences between Tanzania and Britain so that Tanzania was denied \$7.5 million of British aid. See van Arkadie; 1973 pp. 31-32; also Pratt, 1976 p. 149.
27. A. Coulson; 1982, p. 303.
28. A., Coulson; 1976; G, Hyden; 1980.
29. G, Hyden; 1980.
- 30 This issue definitely requires a detailed study that may entail survey research work. But simple logic suggests that, if people were promised a "good life", they would expect it to be provided unless they were clearly told the work implications of a "good life".
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## Depo Provera — A Choice Or An Imposition On the African Woman: A Case Study of Depo Provera Usage in Maiduguri.

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While the controversy over the use of *Depo Provera* (a long-acting injectable contraceptive) goes on unabated, millions of women in Africa, and in Nigeria in particular, are being subjected to it. The perplexing question remains whether these women choose to have depo-provera or whether it is imposed on them. A sequel to this question is whether the African woman user is in any position to be able make a fully considered choice with regard to the family planning technique she adopts. How many of the numerous health hazards of the drugs are made known to her at the outset?

In the light of these concerns it argued that, since women bear the brunt of childbearing and raising, it is their basic human right to be able to decide on the family planning methods they wish to adopt. Furthermore, that the introduction and the use of depo provera on African women is a violation of this right. Consequently, it can be posited that it is morally objectionable that a drug banned in its country of manufacture finds a ready, profitable and quite often unsuspecting market in Nigeria and the Third World in general. Can it be that the profit interests of multi-national corporations (in this case Upjohn) is placed high above the health considerations of Third World women?

The primary purpose of this study is to establish the extent of the use of depo provera in Maiduguri. A second aim is to draw the attention of policy makers, implementers and drug-procuring officers in Nigeria and elsewhere to the unresolved controversial status of depo provera.

### The Drug and Its History

Depo-provera (medroxyprogesterone acetate) is a synthetic steroid, used as a long-acting, injectable contraceptive. Minkin points out that "depending on the dose, each shot of the drug can cause sterility from three to six months"<sup>1</sup>.

At its inception in 1960, depo provera was approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration (F.D.A.) as "safe for endometriosis".<sup>2</sup> This approval was withdrawn in 1962 when the 'efficacy' had not been demonstrated as required by the 1962 Drug Amendment Act. In 1972, it again received F.D.A.'s approval for palliative treatment of certain kinds of inoperable cancer of the uterus. It had also been used for the treatment of breast cancer, threatened abortion, idiopathic precocious puberty, and psychiatric disorders<sup>3</sup> In 1974, F.D.A. delayed its final approval of the drug while waiting for further assessment of the findings about an association said to exist between depo provera and cervical cancer. In 1978, following continued reviews, the F.D.A. eventually refused the approval of the drug as an injectable contraceptive for use in the United States.

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