

19. Ma Mishi raised other children whom she did not herself bear; e.g. Jabu later on in the text.
20. Salim Muhamad Muhashamy was Liwali for the Coast.
21. Halima was stricken with polio.
22. A multi-ethnic neighbourhood of Swahili and up-country people on Mombasa Island that was settled in the 1920s or 1930s.
23. Ma Mishi's paternalistic assumptions about the husband's role are mirrored in the wifely obedience admonished to the upper-class wife of the nineteenth century in Werner A. and W. Hichens (eds.) 1934 *Utendi wa Mwana Kupona (Advice of Mwana Kupona Upon the Wifely Duty)*. The Azanian Classics Vol 2 Azania Press: Medstead.
24. As part of her own initiation, Nyakanga is removed from daily life and goes into the middle of the forest. Such transition into a liminal state is common to rituals. See various works of Victor Turner.
25. People indigenous to Mombasa did not celebrate female puberty collectively with such rituals before slaves came from East and Central Africa. The story here confirms the slave origins of these rituals - the Ngindo, Makua and Yao were groups from whom slaves were taken.
26. In part of the ritual, the initiate is carried on the *kungwi's* back.
27. Mashea, the most senior member of Ma Mishi's group of *makungwi*, died between 1973 and 1975. She had been active in *lelemama* also.
28. Maiko is Ma Mishi's sister; Mashea was their classificatory, not biological, mother.
29. *Vuga* is the name of wedding rituals of freeborn Swahili, described by the late Liwali Mbarak bin Ali Hinawiy, 1964 "Some Notes on Customs in Mombasa" *Swahili* 34 pt 1 pp 17—35. *Vugo* was denied anyone who was not freeborn. The *makungwi* developed dances out of their own tradition parallel to those of the freeborn. Nowadays, both kinds of dances are found at the same wedding. See, Strobel 1979 *op cit* Chapter 1.
30. In the *bendera* (flag) dance, the *makungwi* wear red sashes.
31. In the *usufi* (kapok, cotton) dance, the *makungwi* stuff pillows.
32. The Old Town *makungwi* are rivals with *makungwi* in Majengo, a newer area of Mombasa.
33. The *makungwi* are exhibiting the tendency of Swahili communities to divide into factions and rival groups. For examples, see, Lienhardt, P. (ed and trans) 1968 Hasani bin Ismail *The Medicine Man, Swifa ya Nguvumali* Oxford University Press: London. Bakari 1981 *op cit* pp 83—84, 94—97, and notes Abdul Hamid el-Zein 1974 *The Sacred Meadows: A Structural Analysis of Religious Symbolism in an East African Town* Northwestern University Press: Evanston *passim*. Ranger, T.O. 1975 *Dance and Society in Eastern Africa: The Beni Ngoma* University of California Press: Berkeley *passim*.
34. In her first marriage she lived in more strict purdah.
35. Fatma Mwaita, Dogo's *somo*, was queen of Banu Saada.
36. *Lelemama* dance associations also functioned as mutual aid societies. For more on *lelemama*, see, Strobel 1979 *op cit* Chapter 6.
37. Ibinaal Watan was Banu Saada's special rival association.
38. Despite Ma Mishi's identification of Arabs with slavery and the slave trade, she expresses affection towards the Arab woman who in part raised her, Bi Aziza Jeneby.

REVIEW ARTICLE

The Poor Women's Energy Crisis*

A. Armstrong & M. Garry* *

Fuelwood scarcity is perhaps the most explosive budding natural disaster in Tanzania which will be hatched by the mid 1990's if immediate concerted efforts are not taken to curb and contain the pace of deforestation.

Nkonoki 1983 p 26

The late 20th century's second major, largely unheralded, energy crisis is only now generating widespread concern. This slow realisation and low priority so far accorded to serious forest depletion is almost certainly due to the fact that its wide ranging impact has as yet directly affected only women—mainly peasant women who remain almost exclusively responsible for fuel gathering in the rural areas (Nkonoki p 72). Furthermore, the exclusion of women from village decision-making and the rural development process means that the immediate remedial action necessary is unlikely to receive the requisite priority. For, as Mascarenhas et al state: "The availability or otherwise of woodfuel influences the time budget for women" so the issue "cannot be discussed in isolation but in the context of the whole question of rural development" (Mascarenhas et al p 1).

Three recent reports compiled by (male) members of staff at the University of Dar es Salaam provide a timely and detailed survey of the emergent crisis as well as some practical suggestions for policy makers. The report by Mwandosya and Luhango is essentially a nationwide, scientific assessment of Tanzania's energy budget which complements the detailed rural household energy surveys of Nkonoki and Mascarenhas et al.

*Department of Geography and Political Science University of Dar es Salaam.

Both Nkonoki and Mascarenhas et al are social science studies, the former examining all forms of energy and types of ecological zones; the latter concentrates on the semi-arid regions of Tanzania which are the worst affected areas of deforestation.

Compared with other African countries, Tanzania has a very high rate of fuelwood consumption, both in absolute volume (second only to Nigeria) and in per capita consumption (at 2.5m³ per person, second only to Benin (Nkonoki p. 26). These high rates of consumption can be related to the very low proportion of total energy needs for which commercial energy (coal, oil and hydro-power) accounts: only 15 compared with around 50 for Kenya and Mozambique.¹ Since commercial energy is monopolised by the modern-urban industrial sector, this effectively means that 90 percent of Tanzanians rely for their domestic fuel requirements on fuelwood and charcoal with a total of 97 percent of Tanzania's

*Nkonoki S.R. 1983 *The Poor Man's Energy Crisis*. Chr. Mechelson Inst. Bergen
Mascarenhas A., I Kikula and P. Nilson 1983 *Support to Village Afforestation in Tanzania IRA/UDSM*

Mwandosya M.J. and M.L.P. Luhango 1983 *Energy Resources Plans and End Uses in Tanzania* Faculty of Science UDSM.

domestic energy coming from woodfuel (Mascarenhas et al p 8). Fuelwood in other words, is overwhelmingly a basic needs issue affecting ordinary households of the mass of rural peasantry - an issue now being taken up by the international agencies.²

In the face of accelerating demand, Tanzania has been cushioned from forest depletion by its relatively favourable endowment of forest resources (5 ha per capital covering 45 percent of the country). However, much of its 43 m ha of woodland is located far from existing population concentrations and is not easily exploitable (Mascarenhas et al p 9). Mwandonya and Luhango show that the rate of consumption is exceeding the safe yield of forest products and that forest resources are declining in absolute terms. There is an annual deficiency of 18 - 20 m cu metres; about twice the rate of natural forest regeneration (Mwandonya & Luhango p 15). Each village requires a consolidated forest reserve of 75 ha if annual fuelwood is to be replenished, yet Nkonoki estimates that nearly 75 percent of Tanzanians 8,630 villages possess not even one-third of this minimum requirement (Nkonoki p 27). Deforestation and associated fuelwood shortages is most seriously advanced in the semiarid zone of north central Tanzania (20 percent of the country) which extends over eight regions. Here it has become a central contributory cause in the advance of desertification and its related problems of soil erosion, land and vegetation loss, flooding risk and longer term water and moisture retention (as cited by Mascarenhas et al as the reason for confining their area of study). The rapid depletion of fuelwood in these regions has occurred despite the fact that these areas are the sites of the greatest degree of afforestation (Mwandonya & Luhango p 23). Moreover, the effects of deforestation are cumulative. Once scarcity causes more land to be stripped, the emergence of Sahelian conditions becomes an ominous possibility.

Each of the reports highlights the causes of deforestation, outlined as, firstly, growing population and livestock numbers exacerbated by urbanisation and villagisation (Mascarenhas et al p 5) and corresponding changes in the structure of fuel demand and intensified localised clearing; secondly, progressive encroachment on forest land for non-fuel uses such as agriculture and the associated danger of uncontrolled burning, and as a source of building material unaccompanied by conservation or replenishment measures (Mwandonya & Luhango p 31); and, finally, the fuel-hungry demands of rural industries, particularly tobacco and tanning (which may account for as much as 40 percent of total woodfuel consumption) but also fish smoking, beer brewing, pottery and burnt brick making (Nkonoki pp 29-39).

On fundamental underlying theme which emerges from the three reports is the exploitative relations governing fuelwood collection and consumption and their serious social implications. The first is urban parasitism. Except where villagisation has disrupted local ecological balance, "rural subsistence households do not, broadly speaking, cause deforestation". Yet it is these households, however, which suffer most from the depletion of nearby resources to supply inflated urban domestic and rural industry markets. The latter suffer only rising prices and intermittent non-availability (Mwandonya & Luhango p 25).

Secondly, class divisions within the rural area mean that the burden of woodfuel shortage is shifted onto the shoulders of the poorer households, since it is the better-off and salaried groups (5-15 percent) which monopolise alternative modern fuels or can afford to pay for woodfuel. As a free good, the benefits of meeting commercial supply of fuelwood are restricted to a smaller group of village/urban traders who have moved into charcoal or by the operators of rural industries which use wood or charcoal (Nkonoki p 111).

Thirdly, and of most relevance to this review, is the system of patriarchal relations and customary sexual division of labour which prevails in peasant households. Thus, while it is men who take the decisions on choice of energy source, the responsibility for collecting, and using, is rotated among the women members. "Wood is the poor man's oil", but women are the "hewers of wood and drawers of water".⁴ Virtually no farmer buys fuelwood because it is his wives and daughters who are responsible for ensuring that enough fuel is available for cooking and other domestic purposes. Fuel collection, as with water gathering, therefore, is one of the many tasks straddling productive and domestic labour in which female labour is expropriated by the male head of households; women are not free to distribute their labour product as they wish, but rather are compelled to provide food and cash needs.⁵ The causes of the emergent fuelwood crisis go beyond the conventional scientific assessments of economic and ecological imbalance noted in the three reports, but are rooted in the social relations - a fact only briefly mentioned by Nkonoki and Mascarenhas et al. Treatment of the issue is also seriously obstructed by the fact that, while it is women who go for and utilise firewood, the village governments are composed primarily of men who do not perceive it as a major issue and it is men who are responsible for tree planting. Mascarenhas et al ponder the question of the lack of success of tree planting schemes by villages and Forestry Division, but fail to find the connection with the absence of participation and control by those primarily concerned, namely women (Mascarenhas et al p 7). It is largely this social relation which explains why fuel wood depletion has such a major and damaging effect in the rural areas.

The impact of fuelwood shortage is revealed by the studies in the semi-arid villages where the situation is most advanced (Mascarenhas et al). Villagers (i.e. women) complain today of having to walk 10 km to their nearest supply of fuelwood, whereas twenty years ago, the traditional source of energy was within easy walking distance of the homestead and rarely more than one kilometre away.⁶ Furthermore, the survey by Mascarenhas et al shows 70 percent of all households are aware that both time and distance to fuelwood has increased over the past five years (Mascarenhas et al p 44).

Since collection of fuelwood is done about three times per week, women must now walk 30 km on average to service a family's needs. The studies show the time demands of fuelwood collection to be around six hours per person per week, although in worst affected areas it may be nearly twice this. Spread over a year, the studies also show that fuel gathering requires '300 man-hours' (sic) of labour per year or between 12 percent for small families and 30 percent for large families of total work time (Nkonoki p 43). These longer hours and distances, in some places now equaling the time needed to be spent on water collection, and

the usual method of carrying fuelwood by headloads (average load a daunting 14—30 kg!) represents serious erosion of peasant women's time and energy.

Adaptions enforced by shortages include the lowering quality of fuelwood collected which means greenwood and roots are now used. There is also a growing but still limited use of the supplementary and lower efficiency energy sources of cowdung and crop residue - a pattern dependent on seasonal availability, cattle ownership and other factors. One study now notes the extensions of market relations on this sector with signs of a new cash enterprises developing in the fuelwood trade (Nkonoki p 111). In Kigoma, for example, the paradox of using scarce modern diesel fuel to collect fuelwood found beyond walking distance by lorry has been noted.⁷

Since the increased time and energy demands of fuelwood shortage fall almost exclusively on rural women, this carries serious implications for their productive contribution. Labour time studies have documented the fact that the length of working day for women is $1\frac{1}{2}$ — 2 times that of men, contributing to more than 48 percent of agricultural production, primarily food crops,⁸ and nearly all the labour time input into the reproductive system of basic maintenance and childcare - the essential back-up to agriculture. Increased fuel gathering time threatens to upset the delicate methodology of balance by which peasant women organise their lives. If they had to carry out all the activities expected of them, they would be required to work a 23.6 hour day.⁹ Since fuel is a basic need, the more time that must be devoted to its collection or paying for its purchase automatically means less time that can be allocated to other tasks. The fuelwood crisis means that women who are responsible for primary food production, water and fuel collection for the household, will enjoy even less room for manoeuvre. Other tasks, most dangerously food production, will suffer.

The extension of the already disproportionate time which women spend on production is also likely to further diminish the time and effort which they can devote to developing themselves through education and leisure and, in particular, to further reduce their already low political participation in village and other affairs. This is a vicious cycle since it is their exclusion from collective decisions which partly explains the low importance still attached to the development and progress of village afforestation programmes (Mascarenhas et al p 91), reflecting the attitude of village leaders (mostly men) to activities undertaken mainly by women. Their political exclusion, therefore, exacerbates the danger of a fuelwood shortage by avoiding or delaying action necessary in response to the growing problem.

Each of the studies outline the action necessary to deal with the emergent crisis. Firstly, immediate conservation measures must carry a high priority. For rural householders, the introduction of more efficient stoves, now being developed to replace the highly wasteful open fire, would be of immediate benefit. However, they are unlikely to assist with deforestation since they rely on charcoal rather than woodfuel. Secondly, the measures suggested to curb forest exploitation by industry, by paying an economic price and compelling them to develop their own woodlots, can only assist in reducing the problem for rural

domestic users, women. Thirdly, expanding and improving tree planting efforts by the Forestry Division and the villagers themselves. For each solution, and particularly the last, some recognition and probable adaption of the role of peasant women is likely to be crucial to the success or failure of all three approaches.

While these studies provide much needed information on the advance of fuelwood and forest depletion, their concentration on the scientific/social scientific 'factual dimensions, has led them to neglect the crucial role of social relations governing fuelwood consumption and, in particular, the central role of women. The effect of this is only suggested in passing. The wider impact of fuelwood shortage on both agricultural production and women's development is almost wholly lacking. In this respect, these studies unfortunately fall into the situation described where "Most works conceive of the peasant as a male and use the male gender. They also deal largely with issues affecting male peasant ... Even such important questions which affect women most poignantly, are analysed in relation to male peasants".¹⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. Bhagavan, M.R. 1984 "The Woodfuel Crisis in the SADCC Countries" *Ámbio* 13(1) pp 25—27.
2. International Labour Organisation 1982 *Basic Needs in Danger* JASPA: Addis Ababa.
3. Bhagavan 1984 *op cit*
4. See Nkonoki p 25 and compare with the *Holy Bible* Joshua 9:22 "Now therefore you are cursed and some of you shall always be slaves, hewers of wood and drawers of water".
5. Mascarenhas, O. and M. Mbilinyi 1983 *Women in Tanzania: An Analytical Bibliography* SIAS: Uppsala.
6. Fergus, M. 19 "Firewood or Hydro-power: A Case Study of Rural Energy
7. *Ibid*
8. Due, J. and Anandayasekeram P. 1982 "Women and Productivity in Two Contrasting Farming Areas of Tanzania" Illinois Agricultural Economics Paper
9. Mascarenhas O 1984 quoted in *Afrique Asia* April
10. Mutemba

BOOK REVIEW

BEYOND UJAMAA IN TANZANIA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND UNCAPTURED PEASANTRY*

Kathleen Staudt**

Does it make any difference how one conceives the economic and political participation of peasants in their countries' development processes? This is generally described, abstractly, in terms of their 'integration' into economic markets and into the political system. Goran Hyden argues, provocatively, that it is better understood in terms of 'capture'. He suggests that other social classes have not yet captured African peasants, and in particular Tanzanian peasants, who are the focus of his book.

Peasants are producers who experience labour rather than land scarcity and remain independent due to reliance on subsistence production, having a limited integration into the cash crop economy. Most important, they exist in a pre-capitalist mode in what Hyden calls an 'economy of affection', where familial and communal ties affect their behaviour more than considerations of economic rationality.

Peasants resist incorporation into the state and into capitalist economies, valuing their independence and fearing the changes and subordination which 'capture' brings. Neither the state nor capitalist structures are good at penetrating the peasant sector, having very different conceptions of the reality which peasants live within. Yet they must bring peasants into new political and economic exchange relations, according to Hyden, if development is to proceed.

Motivational and administrative techniques common to capitalistic societies, such as price incentives, administrative reform and political education, are not powerful enough to influence the peasantry very much from outside. Hyden is vague as to whether the state should acquire sufficient power to influence the peasantry through the use of force and control over land, if this is the only way to spur peasants' incorporation.

This is an unpleasant subject for all but the most committed 'modernisers'. Should peasants' independent subsistence production be rendered obsolete, or should peasants be left to decide eventually to transform themselves in response to their new opportunities and their motivating social and economic desires? These are 'macro-participation' questions, transcending any particular project or programme. By posing them, even if not answering them to everyone's satisfaction, Hyden adds a valuable, and value-laden, angle to the participation debate.

One major limitation of Hyden's discussion is that, although claiming to

Hyden, G. 1980 *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* Heinemann: Nairobi,
Department of Political Science, University of Texas.