

28. Some of the officers who participated in the January 1966 coup have just begun to provide the public with their versions of how the coup was planned, why it was planned and why it failed. See for example, Adewale Adegboyega, *Why We Struck: The Story of the first Nigerian Coup*, Ibadan: Evans Brothers Nigeira Limited; 1981 and Ben Gbulie, *Nigeria's Five Majors: Coup D'etat of 15th January 1966 First Inside Account*, Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers, 1981.
29. Cited in John De St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972 p. 38. See also A.H.M. Kirk-Green, *Conflict in Nigeria*, Oxford University Press, 1971 p. 71.
30. Cited in Billy Dudley, *op cit.* p. 103.
31. *Ibid.* p. 107.
32. Denis Brutus has argued that to "explain the Nigerian conflict in terms of tribal rivalries and antagonisms is one level of superficiality, but to say as (Wole) Soyinka says that it was more than that, it was the collapse of humanity, of human beings behaving in some atavistic fashion, seems to be merely another level of superficiality. Any failure to take into account the rivalries, the economies rivarlies of multinational corporations, of the oil interests, of Western powers cause one to end up with superficial interpretations" (p. 155) "Cultural Liberation and the African Revolution", in Immanuel Wallerstein (ed), *World Inequality*, Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975.
33. General Murtala Mohammed, *Daily Times*, (Lagos), (31 July, 1975).
34. *Ibid.*
35. Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*
36. See St. John de Jorre, *op. cit.* pp. 71-72.
37. Roger Murray, "Militarism in Africa", *op cit.* p. 44.
38. See Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Resource Availability and Foreign Policy Change: The Impact of Oil on Nigeria's Foreign Policy Since Independence", (Forthcoming), *Africa Spectrum* (1982) and also "Foreign Policy of Dependent States: Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy 1962-1982", *Indian Political Science Review*, January 1984. Other symbols adopted by the Nigerian state and bourgeoisie include a new national anthem and pledge to a song recited by school children every day, selection of national heroes, and the introduction of national merit awards. The same governments rendered these symbols valueless by concentrating the awards on members of the bourgeois class many of whom had been publicly disgraced for corruption and abuse of office, and the frequent use of force to solve minor problems. Examples include the violent suppression of the Agbekoya Farmers revolt in 1969, the killing of students in 1978 (now almost an annual affair) and the massacre of farmers at Bakolori in 1980. For more on the class structure in Nigeria, the politics of idiosyncrasy and accumulation, the class war on the Nigerian masses and the response or challenges to state power see Julius O. Ihonvbere, "The Political Economy of the Rentier State: Oil and Class Struggles in Nigeria", paper at the 12th Annual Conference of the Canadian Association of African Studies, University of Toronto, May 1982.
39. See Bade Onimode, "Imperialism and Multinational Corporations: A Case Study of Nigeira" in Aguibu Yansane (ed), *Decolonisation and Dependency — Problems of Development in African Societies*, Greenwood Press, 1980, and his "A Critique of Planning Concepts and Methodology in Nigeria", *Review of Black Political Economy*, Vol. 7 (3) (Spring 1977). See also Claude Ake, *Revolutionary Pressures in Africa*, London: Zed Press, 1978; Ola Oni, "A Critique of Development Planning in Nigeria", *Review of African Political Economy*, (4) (November 1975); Ikenna Nzimiro, "The Political and Social Implications of Multinational Corporations in Nigeria" in Carl Widstrand (ed), *Multinational Firms in Africa*, Uppsala, 1975 and Otonti Nduka, "The Rationality of the Rich in Nigeria", in Peter Waterman and Peter Gutkind (eds), *African Social Studies*, *op. cit.*
40. It is important not to overlook the linkages between the civilian power elite and the military officers before and after every coup d'etat. In the Nigerian case a careful analysis has revealed that in several instances, the two factions (of the same class) had similar social backgrounds, belonged to the same open and secret clubs and had absorbed the same world views. This explains to some extent why military intervention in Nigeria has always been on behalf of the ruling class. The military, because the coups are planned 'secretly' (some members of the ruling class have been known to have encouraged the officers), often come to power without any plan. This creates a heavy reliance on the bureaucracy, the super permanent secretaries, the intellectuals of the 'overthrown class' and foreign advisers usually the American or British Ambassadors and High Commissioners. The bottom line is that the class alliance between the military and the 'overthrown class' and the

Foreign Experts in Planning: Recent Experiences of Aid Assisted Regional Planning in Tanzania

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INTRODUCTION

One singular feature of the 1960s throughout the Third World — the UN designated First Development Decade — was the proliferation of national development plans making the runway of economic growth and eventual development take-off. The Second Development Decade of the 1970s saw no diminution of planning fervour and indeed, partly as a result of earlier inadequacies, witnessed its spread into the field of regional or decentralised planning.

The attraction of foreign aid was a dominant motivating force prompting the first generation of national plans and, through the input of technical assistance, a major contributor to their preparation. Both aspects again featured prominently in the refocussing of development planning at the sub-national scale which has occurred during the last decade.

Among African nations, Tanzania has been a leading participant in these planning exercises and a major recipient of foreign assistance for implementing their proposals¹. This paper examines certain procedural aspects of expert-produced, foreign-aided regional plans undertaken in the post-Arusha period and, in particular the reason for their generally accepted failure.

Foreign-aided, expert-produced plans come under the broader heading of technical assistance — the transfer of experts and expertise from developed to developing countries. Relatively little attention has been devoted to the technical assistance component of foreign aid.

Yet already by 1973, Gardenker noted that Tanzania had become one of the most important African consumers of internationally-sponsored technical assistance, by 1980, technical assistance, all in grant form, accounted for 15% (\$ 70 m) of Tanzania's substantial total aid².

Significant in absolute terms, technical assistance often exerts a disproportionate influence on the overall development process owing to its crucial foundation-laying and controlling function. Indeed, Green believes technical assistance to be far more potent influencing policy than capital aid while Dubey suggests it is intrinsically difficult to separate technical from capital aid. For this reason, the volume of technical assistance and the presence of foreign experts is normally viewed as one significant index of economic dependency³. By any measure, the continuing and increasing role of foreign experts in Tanzania is symptomatic of growing rather than declining dependence. By the mid-1970s 5,000 experts were operating in Tanzania on a variety of aid schemes with an additional 2,000 - 3,500 required by the early 1980s. Thus the 'vanishing role' of the expatriate planning adviser at national level noted by Lemelle⁴ a decade ago, has been more than compensated by their rapidly increasing involvement at region and project level.

The recent competition (in 1983) of a round of Regional Water Master Plans (RWMPs) by foreing donor representatives or expatriate consultant teams

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maintains the trend of foreign-aided, expert-produced regional plans popularised since 1967. Master plans for various urban centres, river basin plans, regional integrated development plans (RIDEPs), zonal plans, regional feeder road studies and agricultural potential studies all fall within the category of planning exercises at sub-national level, not only financed by foreign aid, but carried out by foreign experts either directly employed by donor agencies or as consultants contracted for the task (See Table 1).

Just as the equivalent national plans of the 1960s had begun to attract growing criticism before that decade end, disillusionment regarding these more recent plans was already forming by the late 1970s crystallising into an ultimate assessment regarding them, if not outright failures, then only as partial and insubstantial achievements. From the recipients' point-of-view, a growing consensus is emerging that foreign-assisted planning has performed poorly, failed to justify its aims and may have led to a distortion of the development process.⁵ On the donor's side dissatisfaction with planning and a growing realisation that "the infusion of technical expert assistance frequently creates more problems than it solves"⁶ has probably been one contributory factor in the onset of 'aidfatigue' and the search for alternative avenues of assistance.

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE GROWTH OF AID-ASSISTED EXPERT PRODUCED REGIONAL PLANS

Explicit Reason: Refocussing of Development policy

Two major explicit reasons apparently account for the rapid increase in aid assisted, expert-produced regional plans in the post Arusha period.

On the Tanzania side, the late 60s and early 70s saw a series of measure reorienting the framework and substance of development policy in favour of the rural and regional sectors. These innovations not only focussed development policy from national-level, centralised to regional level, decentralised planning but also, inevitably, given the shortage of trained planners and the reliance on foreign aid to implement these programmes, relied on importing expertise to carry these out.

On the donors' side, the absolute increase in the volume of aid the involvement of a wider spectrum of donor agencies meant, given the widespread currency of the sponsored project approach, a steadily expanding presence of aid personnel from a remarkable variety of metropolitan nations. Accompanying this, a change in donor thinking caused them to promulgate a modified development model which laid more emphasis on growth. Donor's advocacy of basic needs and integrated rural development therefore coincided with the reorienting to Tanzania domestic policy towards the regions and, in particular, the rural sector.

Implicitly: Reasons Planning as Ritual

Closer examination, however, reveals a range of additional, often implicit, reasons for the growth of aid-assisted regional plans, many of which reflect the experience in national plan-making of barely a decade earlier.

Why planning? Significant among these implicit motives is the international

gamesmanship of planning; a phenomenon observable throughout Africa in the 1950s and 60s when it was almost an unwritten law that "the necessity of prepare a (national) plan and publish a planning document has for some time been required as a precondition for receiving aid".⁷ Both the growing clamour for funds among equally deserving post-independent nations and the rigorous groundwork demanded by donors for the successful processing of aid applications acted as powerful stimuli for many Third World nations to establish, formalise and routinise national planning in order to compete successfully for available funds. Since the plan document was itself apparently sufficient *prima facie* evidence to convince donors that "the developing country knows what it wants and is making serious efforts to obtain it"⁸ many newly independent nations were hurriedly cobbling together lists of development projects in the guise of national recipients.

This gamesmanship of planning encouraged anomalies, distortions and abuses. On the one hand, various governments cynically exploited planning to obtain aid without being at all committed to the or substance of the planning process. On the other hand, a paradoxical situation arose whereby donor nations such as the US or West Germany, in whose domestic economies' planning was little developed or even ideologies unacceptable, were nevertheless eager to stipulate the production of a national plan as a gauge of the recipient's credibility.

A customary ritual of planning was thus initiated to which neither donor nor recipients were necessarily committed but in which both felt obliged to participate. The perpetuation and indeed extension of this ritual can be seen as a further rationale for the growth of regional planning in Tanzania. Worldwide, the practice is as pronounced as ever with projects and development programmes requiring to be, above all, effectively packed in order to obtain a sponsor.⁹ One, perhaps major, aim of Tanzania's RIDEPs, therefore was not primarily to plan more effectively but an attempt to spread the aid not more widely. Specifically by inviting donors in to finance and carry out the planning function (phase I), the barely disguised intention was that they would proceed to finance projects thus identified (in phase II and III), or, failing that, the plan could be used to attract interested potential donors. More recent RIDEPs, such as one for Mtwara for example, explicitly describe their primary function that of attracting funds "a portfolio compiled to interest promising donors to invest". The ritual, therefore, is perpetuated at regional level in full recognition of the fact that virtually the only place plans are taken seriously is the aid arena "where donors still insist on them for their own managerial purposes".¹⁰

Within Tanzania, a planning ritual similar to donor-recipient encounters, is repeated in region-centre relations. Successful competitions for scarce government development funds (including aid) among the 20 regions is partly dependent on the production of a convincing plan document. A regional plan is not, therefore primarily intended to act as a rational guide to investment but rather, in the eyes of regional officials, as "something which is made in order to impress other superior authorities and in order to get as large as a financial allocation as possible".¹¹ Indeed, the whole RIDEP programme has been characterised as an embodiment of "the conflict of relations between ministries and regions that inevitably followed decentrali-

sation in which the RIDEPS were promoted as a major vehicle for reducing the imbalance between ministries and regions as far as the channelling of development funds was concerned¹².

A third ritualistic function of planning performed in the context of Tanzania domestic politics is as an exercise in public relations advertising the government's goods intentions and by mapping out a future of greater prosperity. Just as Tanzania's First Five Year Plan fulfilled a largely symbolic purpose, acting as "a major, albeit incomplete, substitute for the goods promised explicitly or implicitly, during the struggle for independence", so later regional plans promised similar prospects of widespread material advancement in the wake of Arusha Declaration rhetoric. Thus, Anderson et al highlight the consciousness-raising intention underlying early RWMPs and their political purpose in stressing that provision of clean water for the people was a development goal³.

Shortage of Manpower and the Legitimising Role of Planning Experts.

Firstly, as in the 1960s, the severe shortage of indigenous economic planners meant that "the adoption of planning simultaneously implied a need to import planning advisory assistance"¹⁴, so the inflated demands for professional planners created by the inception of decentralised planning after 1967 also far exceeded local supply. With experiences the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, Tanzania experiences "a critical shortage of skilled staff capable of drawing up essential plans, project appraisals and pre-investment studies and this explains why so many projects continue to be developed by donor representatives and consultants"¹⁵.

Given that local staff are often over-stretched in performing even routine functions, when strategic planning becomes essential, the options available to government may be restricted to either "an ad-hoc task force (of civil servants) galvanised into action by some impossible deadline or, given that local consultancy capacity is often little developed, the engagement of foreign consultants at vast expense", while the latter course is the norm, the occasional adoptions of either of the first two options has, in the Tanzanian case, still nevertheless meant importing foreign expert assistance.¹⁶

Even if local capacity does exist, a second justification for engaging overseas experts lies in, "the penchant in LDCs for legitimising development projects by associating some experts with them even if they have no initial knowledge of local conditions"¹⁷. This legitimising function operates in at least two ways. Firstly, donors "apparently believe only their own agents are capable of constructing (the plan) ... thus the need to extend part of overall aid in technical assistance"¹⁸. The second broader legitimising function is the stamp of (supposedly independent) professional or technical authority which only acknowledged international experts can succeed in imprinting on their plans, giving them an imagined emphasis which local consultants would seemingly fail to lend.

The quest for the automatic prestige which foreign experts impart has in Tanzania extended beyond donor-recipient relations to taint domestic budgetary bargaining procedures. Young observers that the competitive rivalry for aid funding means that each region or ministry adopt expert

assistance for project planning in order to lend credibility to pet projects and hopefully enlist donors' financial support, against the demand of other ministries or regions.¹⁹

Why aid? outwith the much broader issue of aid as imperialism, the specific self-interested motives of donors help to explain the growth of aid funds to planning.

Firstly, the issue of tying. Szentes has highlighted the "enormous sums paid out in management fees, allowances and consultances which are part of the regular income drain" from Tanzania.²⁰ Technical assistance is one obvious and reasonably lucrative form of aid tying since, with the exception of multinational agencies, every donor-sponsored region plan in Tanzania has been carried out either by directly employed representatives of that donor's government (i.e. its own nationals) or by consultants drawn from that donor country. Even for donors such as Sweden, consistently characterised as pursuing the most progressive aid policies and imposing the most liberal tying restrictions, it is no accident that Swedish consultants monopolise Swedish technical aid programmes. Indeed, Tschannerl points out that these technical assistance programmes often represent perhaps the only direct return to Sweden from its substantial aid 'investment'.²¹

Furthermore, technical assistance tying may lead to tying of capital aid. For example, the Finnish consultants who drew up the Mtwara and Lindi RWMPs also acted as agents in purchasing of equipment and supplies needed for installing water systems, thus placing them in the privileged position of deciding the allocation of the water investment budget for both regions.²²

A second, less easily defined aspect of donor motivation is their interest in advancing the development of certain preferred sectors and using plan precaution and implementation to provide a testing ground for experimentation with ideas of wider applicability. A definite sectoral pattern of donor preferences operated, with Canadians investing in wheat, Norwegians in shipping and forestry, and so on. The reason for furthering donor preferences may be explained, not only by the donors's established comparative advantage of expertise in particular fields but also by ulterior commercial motives — the Canadians, for example, seeking wheat development in Tanzania to encourage a market for Canadian agricultural machinery. Extending this, it can be argued that Tanzania, like other Third World countries, also offers something akin to a laboratory allowing various international interests an opportunity for experimentation with new ideas and techniques. Thus, the UNDP team prepared its Iringa RIDEP as "an experimental phase, in which a diversity of approaches are adopted (for different regions), has value in illuminating their relative strengths and weaknesses even if this causes difficulty in coordinating proposals into a consistent national plan",²³ in effect admitting a greater interest in testing than in immediate practical utility. Certain donor's choice of region can be broadly characterised in terms of a wish to duplicate equivalent areas of their domestic environment. For example, the Australian RWMP team in Singida has been pioneering groundwater and shallow well techniques and developed the use of windmills — advances which could be readily applicable to Australia's drought-threatened interior.

A third, implicit reason for extension of aid for regional planning exercises

in Tanzania and elsewhere reflects the sensitivity of aid as a political issue within donor countries. Since the late 1960s, directly funded and managed projects, rather than reliance on recipients' domestic institutions, has been the preferred vehicle of aid investments, a choice partly aimed at protecting aid agencies from stringent and persistent accusations of wastage and corruption with which they were confronted. A further element is that by extending technical assistance donors have sought to accommodate continuing commercial and trade union pressures to extend tying. A more recent dimension is the vulnerability of aid programmes amid widespread cutbacks in public spending now rampant in many Western economies. Lipton detects a trend by donors, beset by the mounting failures of capital-aided projects, to turn to rely more on advice than implementation. With the spread of aid fatigue among donors, withdrawal from implementation while continuing to fulfil an advisory role (i.e. planning) represents one method of reducing outlays while appearing ostensibly active and still retaining a relatively influential role on recipient nation's development²⁴. The changing emphasis to project-directed aid and subsequently to project formulation (rather than investment) can, therefore, partly be explained in terms of the domestic politics of the main Western donors.

The preceding arguments provide a fuller, if by no means comprehensive, explanation of the real reasons underlying the growth of regional planning activity in Tanzania and the role of experts and donors. To acknowledge these implicit motivations as accurate is to agree that the decentralised planning bandwagon of the 1970s, like the earlier vogue of national planning, occurred not because of the objective or intrinsic desirability of regional planning in itself, but because it helped fulfil a range of sometimes quite unrelated ulterior motives of both donor and recipient alike.

ARGUMENTS IN MITIGATIONS OF AID ASSISTED EXPERT PLANNING

Some Positive Contributions

Much of the debate surrounding aid stresses its negative implications with often deliberate unwillingness to entertain certain positive contributions. Yet, given that Tanzania is pursuing regionally equitable development, the importation of foreign experts on technical assistance fulfils various useful functions which, even in a critique, deserve some mention.

Certainly at the outset of regional planning in Tanzania in the early 1970s, several studies identified a serious shortage of trained personnel capable of carrying out the necessary planning functions a deficiency only slightly alleviated to date.²⁵ Moreover, there occur marked disparities in the quotas of planning staff among the regions with certain unfavoured regions such as Lindi and Mtwara severely understaffed and quick to lose new personnel posted there. Despite ongoing training programmes at national level, overcoming this manpower constraint may take 5-20 years while importing expert advice on an aid basis offers a more or less immediate solution to plugging the gap. Plans can be completed in months rather than years and therefore used to accelerate the development of a region. Furthermore, since technical assistance often carries a counterpart training component, it can also

enable speedier attainment of local manpower targets. Indeed some donors, notably the US in Arusha, saw not only counterpart training but the wider issue of local capacity and institution-building as the central function of their RIDEP contribution. Many later RWMPs, particularly Scandinavian and Dutch sponsored, have laid heavy emphasis on local and counterpart training.

Almost by definition, drafting in experts should allow a higher quality input into the planning process than may be available locally, through the recruitment of staff with greater expertise and more fully developed specialisms. This capability has been further encouraged by the recent trend favouring consultants' consortiums whereby the relevant expert is slotted into a planning programme according to needs, replacing an earlier emphasis on 'generalist' planning experts expected to turn their hand to any field as required.²⁶ This benefit is not universal, however. Hayuma complains of the relative youthfulness of many urban planning experts, lacking even practical experience of planning in their own countries.²⁷ International specialists can also bring two further advantages. Ascroft highlights the catalytic role of experts in development, "infusing projects with missionary zeal, systematising, organising, rationalising and even proselytising with commendable energy and enthusiasm". Moreover, it might be reasonably expected that their work, given their backgrounds and experience, benefits not only from a greater cross-fertilisation of ideas but is also imbued with a greater degree of realism and practicality.²⁸

Other advantages may accrue from their relative objectivity and independence vis-a-vis the local bureaucracy; they may be freer than Tanzanian officials to highlight vested interests, corruption and administrative inefficiency. Mushi analyses the timidity of Tanzanian technical staff before their bureaucratic and political masters leading to their oversight of glaring faults and the preparation of reports designed to win approval.²⁹ Evidence of this bold objectivity of experts in recent planning studies is limited, for reasons discussed later; and American consultants compiling the Arusha Master Plan, however, concluded "that the government is pursuing an urban strategy that is too costly, too cumbersome to administer and yet too narrow in scope".³⁰ Moreover, it is not accurate to label foreign experts as automatically recommending capital intensive, high-cost, export-oriented strategies although this is a general failing. The Tanga RIDEP, for example laid considerable stress on local processing of raw materials and labour intensive development.

A final benefit of technical assistance in planning, though by no means in all cases, is that implementation proceeds following or, as in a number of RWMPs, in tandem with, the preparation of the plan.

Some Procedural Problems

Before considering the failings of expert-aided regional planning in Tanzania, a fuller understanding can be achieved by examining some of the procedural difficulties which they face, apparently fairly commonly confronted by planning experts throughout the Third World.³¹

First and foremost, planning experts are often required to work to unclearly specified remits so that they may be increasingly poorly briefed, have to work to the vaguest terms of reference and receive little co-operation or direction. In the case of RIDEPs, Belshaw notes that "guidance was missing (or even

misleading) on the procedures for integration of the sectoral plans into a multi-sectoral regional plan with spatially differentiated development strategies".³² One CIDA team complained it had access only to the original broad terms of reference and further guidance was not forthcoming; to another DANIDA team, it "soon became clear that the guidelines were very often vague or in conflict and that objectives were not quantified or made without knowledge of the available budget".³³ For the series of RWMPs, neither the terms of reference nor their interpretation was uniform. This confusion may extend (as in the case of the Morogoro RWMP and Kilimanjaro roads study) to disagreement over the actual geographical area to be planned and also to the mistiming of planning work. RIDEPs and some feeder road studies, intended to feed information into the formulation of the national Third Five Year Plan, were started either too late or without full knowledge or requirements with the result that this input either failed to materialise or that "it was not possible to coordinate implementation of the various programmes with appropriate budgets or priorities".³⁴ This lack of guidance and the resultant free hand allowed to donors almost inevitably meant, as in RWMPs, the use of different methods, different departure points and, more seriously, ultimate non-comparability of results or, as in the RIDEPs, a range of different end products which rested very heavily on individual donor decision and assumptions.³⁵

Secondly, local co-operation and assistance in gathering information was frequently not forthcoming, particularly damaging in those exercises carried out under severe time constraints. One CIDA team complained of "the lack of co-operation from local officials who were so heavily involved in routine and crisis management that they were unable or unwilling to make time available";³⁶ Another river basic study team, in order to make up for information that should have been provided by the Tanzanian government had to rely on data collected from the available literature". Similarly, a West Lake RIDEPs team "learned more of the activities of Ministries and parastatals from newspaper accounts than through formal sources".³⁷ A further commonly cited obstacle was that information was not only lacking or conflicting but that its accuracy and reliability was severely questioned.³⁸

A third problem facing consultants relates to "the complex logistics of mounting a large planning operation with personnel participating (sometimes) on a part-time basis and drawn from a wide variety of parent organisations".³⁹ Difficulties with filling certain posts or setbacks due to illness are occasionally identified or were further complicated by the exigencies of very tight time schedules allowing "very few months for field work and even less for report writing" or exacerbated by obligations to carry out tasks additional to those originally prescribed".⁴⁰

This brief outline of the benefits of expert-led planning and the procedural problems it encounters is not intended to offer excuse but simply an attempt to provide a fairer context within which their failure and ultimate damage can be assessed.

ARGUMENT AGAINST AID-ASSISTED EXPERT PLANNING

Technical Failings of the Plans

By the simplest yardstick, Tanzania's expert-formulated regional plans have

often been judged to be poor plans. The typical failings of consultant-produced plans in the Third World — plans as policy documents (rather than action guidelines), tendencies to formulate only inventories of resources, to recommend additional studies, to propose unrealistic projects — are all readily identifiable among the Tanzanian collections tending to confirm Green's judgement of a decade ago that "the number of valueless or counterproductive teams, individuals and studies is appallingly high".⁴¹

In the case of RIDEPs, a recent overview noted that these "regional plans and the local development efforts associated with them have often varied hugely in quality".⁴² A zonal plan further observed both the RIDEP's neglect of vital physical planning aspects and their unsatisfactory contribution toward an integrated national development plan noting their "overall results are fragmentary and it is difficult to trace their impact on the final (Third Five Year) plan".⁴³ Belshaw concluded of the RIDEPs that "in terms of plan quality, several donor teams' proposals were not acceptable to the regional planning authorities and several that were accepted and little or nothing to existing knowledge".⁴⁴ Similar failings are discernible in the other regional planning exercises. Not only did RWMPs widely vary in quality, content and approach but many of the early ones were so fundamentally inadequate that they "were hard to interpret for implementation".⁴⁵ With river basin studies, expert-produced studies of Kagera, for example, were simply of insufficient scope and content. Regional transport studies are no exception; a recent appraisal of the proposed Arusha-Musoma railway study noted much of the basis and necessary data was lacking to the extent that the report "fell far short of providing an adequate basis for key decisions such as actual construction". Technical deficiencies of plans may even extend to flows in basic communication — the Japanese consultancy-produced study for the Southern Coastal Road occasionally lapses into language little better than pidgin English.⁴⁶

While a minority of the plans' authors are honest about the shortcomings of their contribution, few of the polished international consultants would admit, like one Indian RIDEP team, to "the many inadequacies and gaps particularly related to (the major sectors of) communications, credit and marketing" or like a CIDA team, that the results of their investigations to be both "modest and limited".⁴⁷ Yet only in isolated instances was the plan declared unacceptable by either the Tanzanian Government or the regional authorities.

Technical deficiencies can be observed in other respects. While some carried insufficient basic information on which proposals were based, others, like the Coast RWMP or Singida RIDEP, appeared to be straight forward compilations or reworkings of available data without necessarily adding new or even up-dated material. Elsewhere, the widespread tendency to recommend additional studies appears to reflect the experts' failure to fulfil their remit: one RIDEP "identified a need for further work by a successor to complete a comprehensive Integrated Rural Plan" which was apparently its original specifications.⁴⁸

The proliferation of different expert teams, their regional concentration and varying approaches, to planning, almost inevitably led to a lack of inter-regional integration and meant that they were of little use in providing an

The 'documentism' which the plans often embody often appears to have encouraged the futility of 'planning without implementation' — the ultimate technical deficiency. With implementation only partial or even wholly lacking, plans quickly become outdated and, to all intents, virtually useless. Many of the 1970s exercises are already exhibiting decay, as the effectiveness of their development programmes remains or becomes insignificant because of an undue lag between communication and execution. One example is a Master Plan for Morogoro Town produced by an UN team in 1966 which, unimplemented and facing radical changes in circumstances in the intervening years, necessitated the rerun of the whole exercise by Ministry of Lands staff in 1975. More recently, even with the relatively successful Tanga RIDEPS, planning work was criticised because it never received the necessary follow-up to overcome original shortcomings and because the information it contained was already, four years later, becoming less and less useful, while the one characteristic common to the RWMPs is, unfortunately, that "most are collecting dust".⁵⁰

These various failings have not only severely limited the usefulness of many plans, they have necessitated further remedial or salvage work in order to permit some practical application of their proposals. For the RWMPs, substantial Norwegian aid has recently been secured for an exercise to standardise the existing RIDEPS and thus prevent the virtual total loss of the substantial investment which they represent (\$27m). Similar deficiencies among RIDEPS has also "led to an urgent need to start a new planning exercise which would outline the major perspectives for regional development and the role which (the RIDEPS) ... would play in the process".⁵¹

Problems Arising from the Role of Experts

Tanzania's 1970s regional plans suffer from a further set of problems arising primarily from the particular role of the experts themselves — generally alien, peripatetic, privileged individuals drafted in for brief, pressurised periods of plan production, the results of which may have far-reaching consequences for development.

In the first instance, beyond the ideological impossibility of separating values and technology, donors and consultants must be seen as pursuing a range of narrowly focussed political and commercial interests. The objectivity of experts identified, earlier, therefore is unlikely to be freely exercised if it jeopardises either the reputation or goodwill of consultants on the future attainment of consultancy contracts and may be sacrificed to the similar ingratiating dishonesty to which locally produced plans are supposedly vulnerable. With RWMPs, "commercial consultants and international agencies are not geared to generate new methods and techniques ... subjects are seldom dealt with critically and there seems to be a fear of being innovative".⁵² The case of the Swedish study which recommended an unsuitable location for a fertiliser plant (in Tanga), also reveals that the Tanzanian government in turn — the supposed 'client' — may be willing to accept misconceived or inaccurate expert advice through fear of upsetting future aid flows.⁵³

Secondly, consultants' lack of knowledge and familiarity with local conditions may be further exposed by the strict time limits within which they are expected to produce their reports. The World Bank recently acknowledged that because of the inadequate data base and related problems good project

overall framework for national development. With RWMPs, Schonberg was dismayed by the "substantial divergences and differences in format and presentation"; RIDEPS similarly suffered from an unfortunate lack of uniformity with little or no co-ordination between different RIDEPS programmes and little progress made towards harmonising either the project mix of various RIDEPS or implementation cannot be developed quickly within the standard 3 - 9 month period allocated by visiting teams of specialised experts.⁵⁴ Yet many of the regional plans reviewed here were completed well within this minimum stipulated period and probably reflect an unhappy compromise between accuracy and comprehensiveness on one hand and speed of reporting on the other. More fundamentally, Hyden believes the majority of westerners are ill-equipped to work as consultants or advisers in Africa since they have no personal experience of the operating principle of the societies in which they work. Frequently the failure of experts to speak Kiswahili, or sometimes even English, creates a further barrier to understanding.⁵⁵ Perceptions inevitably diverge; Loft and Oldvelt point out that "a district development officer, government official in Dodoma and a World Bank agriculturalist preparing a first visit to Tanzania will not be asking questions and comprehending answers in the same way".⁵⁶ The outcome of the experts' relative ignorance or lack of local experience is their tendency either to impose goals or to work only to 'know goals'. They are more likely to accept apparent structures and procedures at face value and fail to focus on the complexity of the problems with which they are dealing. Goulet also identifies the 'dangers of overabstraction' to which experts are prone while Kanyeihama, assessing the specific Tanzania experience, discerns a similar tendency for consultants to "overgeneralise about the problems of Africa development indicators (A vital step in assessing the planning status of regions) which were "clearly in ignorance of the reliability or existence of information at the lowest level".⁵⁸ With the RIDEPS, Van den Berg lays some of the blame for their failure on the formation of strategies to tackle only what the consultants themselves perceived as 'the problems', while Kleemeir has more fully analysed the full consequences played by the donors' teams' lack of knowledge, shortsightedness and even naivety. A similarly blinkered approach is demonstrated in the RWMPs where "the causes of (water) scheme failure identified by consultants are all of a technical aspect of water provision and corresponding fail to understand or plan for the often more crucial non-technical aspects".⁵⁹

A third area of concern surrounds the attitudes of experts engaged in planning. Consultant practitioners in Tanzania appear to be no less vulnerable than their counterparts elsewhere to assuming 'the illusion of their own omniscience' of aid representatives; "its experts have always known better even when their first need was for the most elementary data which an impartial observer might have supposed to be a precondition for forming any views of what was correct".⁶⁰ In regional development, the literature abounds with examples of experts formulating proposals against the advice of local people with the expectedly disastrous consequences eventuating. This tendency toward elitism and arrogance is not only a function of the privileged and deferential status extended to experts but also to the remarkable freedom from critical scrutiny which their own work enjoys noted as a particular and recurrent failing in a number of aid programmes.⁶¹

THE FUNDAMENTAL FAILINGS: EXPERT PLANNING AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENT

EXPERT-LOCAL DUALISM AND THE COMMUNICATION GAP

To the two types of problem identified, a third more fundamental difficult of expert-formulated planning exercises must be added — a series of problems which lead to these plans distorting or possibly even retarding the wider development process which they are expected to advance.

The first distorting feature arises owing to the nature of the expert's task — an ad hoc, short term and external impact — which almost inevitably forces them apart from local planning structures. Thus, despite the initial intention of the Prime Minister's Office to utilise foreign technical assistance teams to supplement existing capacity, in fact the majority ended up functioning as separate and independent operations. Indeed, several opted for an autonomous role when a closer working relationship with existing regional planning authorities was possible⁶². A variety of reasons may account for this tendency — failure of local expert dialogue, or superior attitudes. The frequent end result, in Tanzania and in other comparable situations, is that "the planning project is taken into protective custody" (of the expatriate experts) and "an elitist project administration develops".⁶³

The consequences of this segregation are invariably detrimental. The tendency for local administration to be by-passed may create a situation, reported for Tabora, whereby there effectively functioned two regional development plans for the region (RIDEP and RDD plan). The failure to involve or consult local RDD staff in the preparation of the RIDEP meant that a number RDD planner were unaware of the RIDEPs existence. The communication gap between consultant and local official characteristic of many Third World planning contents means that foreign expert teams "run the risk of being too remote from the irrelevant to the actual processes involved".⁶⁴ Freed from the debilitating routine of ongoing planning work and protected from arbitrary outside influence (ranging from political meddling to shortage of transport), these experts operate in a privileged and artificially cocooned environment. The greater scope enjoyed is shown by the aggressive manner in which short team consultants from abroad hunt down documents, by the free access which they may enjoy to confidential files which mean that outside consultants, like permanent aid staff, "are often better organised to assemble information necessary for new projects than the government".⁶⁵

The expert-local official dualism thus created means that the planning system "assumes the nature of being a closed circuit involving exclusively consultant firms, aid agencies and government officials", and even the inclusion of the latter may be in doubt.⁶⁶ As a result, it has been claimed that information on Tanzania is more readily gathered from a few strategic phone calls around European cognoscenti than from sources within the country. The simplest illustration of this is demonstrated by the fact that "too many planning documents prepared by outside consultants fail to find their way into local institutions or public libraries" and that some documents which open books in Washington and Rome are restricted in access within Tanzania; for the RWMPs, Schonberg believes one important deficiency reducing local capability to use water-related information relates to the fact that a sizeable

data base is held in places like Toronto, Copenhagen and Stockholm.⁶⁷ The relative isolation of foreign experts from local planning structures means that expertise is often not shared while they operate here and may be subsequently lost when the particular consultant departs or the project ceases.

The expert-local official communication gap is not the only artificially created divide. The manner in which Tanzania regions has been allocated among different donor agencies and planning teams has exerted a further partitioning effect. In RWMPs, the delegation of one or more regions as the almost exclusive concern of one donor and the consultancy team has left them a free hand to pursue approaches dictated by their own interests and preferences. With RIDEPS, Kleemir describes how the concentration of different expert teams in each region led them to carry out their work in virtual isolation with, apart from superficial study tours, little idea of what had already been attempted in other regions. Even for the few regions where more than one agency was involved, each concentrating on certain sectors, the evidence from Tabora shows the degree of liaison and interchange of information between different teams to be extremely limited.⁶⁸

Given the existence of dualism and the communication gaps even at professional level, it is hardly suprisingly that the relationship of experts (planners) to local people (planned) was little developed. Participation has been generally poor or non-existent. Yet, in the aims was supposedly the creation of a problem-solving planning 1970's fashion of integrated rural development, one of the principal process which would involve the majority of the people in planning from below. Recognition of this principle was one reason for the belated significance attached to the socio-economic analyses now obligatory for most RWMPs; representing an attempt to fill a gap in earlier RWMPs which both failed to identify or offer solutions to non-technical problems although these were a significant cause of low levels of services provided by existing water supply schemes.

Thus, one recent review of RIDEPS concluded that in the majority of cases, "little involvement or consideration of the effected in populations occurred in the planning or implementation process". Many simply concentrated on sectoral programmes to be implemented by government or external bodies and carried "no mention of possible physical projects which the people could implement on their own initiative".⁶⁹ Despite the Iringa RIDEP's efforts to involve local people and leaders, Kleemeier documents how, by turning implementation into a purely engineering exercise, any hope of participatory or continuous involvement by the planned was negated, a similar alienation District.⁷⁰ Similarly, a review of the Stiegler's Gorge Project noted the exclusion of interested locals from planning to the extent that the affected target group was "hardly asked to voice opinion".⁷¹

The communication gap between planner and planned has probably been widened rather than bridged by the involvement of foreign experts. Planning in Tanzania therefore, by expert of local planner "still takes form in the centre even if it is a regional centre and sometimes on a scale not relevant to local need".⁷²

Foreign-aided, expert-produced planning and the isolation of foreign planners from local implementators and planned has created division and dualism at the bureaucratic level and communication barriers among different

interests. Expert planning appears increasingly in Tanzania an echo of Goulet's description of the "esteric art of an elite whose values are incomprehensible when not hostile to the local population". But, as Freeman notes in other areas of technology transfer, the alienation of local planners and the by-passing of peasants almost necessarily ensures the plans' ultimate failure while building in future dependencies.⁷³

Inherent Problems of Counterpart Training and Institution Building.

One major claim for technical assistance is its institution building role — the training of local counterpart planners to fulfil the experts' functions on their departure. In 1973, Tandon observed that counterpart training schemes had been widely tried throughout East Africa and had universally failed, a trend which shows no signs of reversal in recent years. The apparent failure of foreign-aided expert teams to produce a cadre of local successors arises owing to a variety of particular and general failings to which counterpart training is susceptible.

The first procedural difficulties arise from the simple fact that many contracts engaging planning consultants do not specify counterpart training or, even if this is included, the time and manpower demands of plan production allow little scope for fulfilling the training obligation.

By contrast, a second problem arises from the difficulties of recipients in providing counterparts, often exacerbated by the often ridiculous pressure by donor countries to include them in programmes which may be inappropriate. This may explain the complaints of one German RIDEP team that "local counterparts were either not available, badly selected or subject to frequent transfers" a problem also encountered in, for example, a Finnish RWMP team which lamented "the almost constant shortage of counterpart personnel with many not of the required standard".⁷⁵

A third obstacle arises from experts attitudes toward their counterpart charges. Hyden has already pointed out the particular problems created by the elevated and privileged status accorded the expert which may operate to undermine established relations and create rivalries and tensions within planning organisations and in other local institutions with which they are in contact. Some experts may simply be unskilled in social relations, particularly training, others may be lacking guidelines to follow while others may evince an elitist outlook. One counterpart planner complained of the running of personal relations between experts and local planners owing to the formers' "erroneous assumption that all counterpart staff were at best passengers incapable of making any significant contribution".⁷⁶

A fourth, indirectly negative, outcome of counterpart training is the undesirable demonstration and socialisation effects that the expert can exert. Experts may enjoy salary differentials ten times or more that of local staff. Their privileged status, affluent working and personal life-styles may prove rather provocative and, through role-visualisation and ambition-forming effects, inculcate undesirable values in counterparts, particularly unhelpful for Tanzania's pursuit of a society developing on egalitarian principles. A more tangible and immediate impact is discernable in, for example, the inflationary push which external organisations may exert on local salaries and possible creaming-off of the most capable staff in local organisations — thus performing

a directly contradictory, almost parasitic, role compared with the intention of technical assistance. Their influence extends even to the local property market their presence tends to bid up property prices and house rents.⁷⁷

Actual and opportunity costs

As Waide observes, "all planning work represents a heavy demand on other scarce resources".⁷⁸ The engagement of foreign experts to produce plans must be considered not only in terms of the expensive absolute outlay incurred (which can reach \$150,000 per year per individual consultant) and thus alternative investment opportunities foregone, but also in terms of the additional expenses in time, costs and other resources require to service the expert. Engagement of consultants, even if entirely aid-sponsored, frequently binds Tanzania in a commitment to meet various counterpart and recurrent costs which average around 10-20% of total project costs.⁷⁹ Technical assistance has been one element of "past donor practice to concentrate aid in specific projects requiring both counterpart investments and recurring foreign exchange inputs which have stretched Tanzania's capability to use efficiently capacity already put in place".⁸⁰ In all RWMPs, Tanzania has been required to contribute local expense (around 20% of project costs) which has been one factor in certain enlightened donor's refusal to undertake RWMPs, arguing that this make them both expensive and not particularly cost-effective from Tanzania's view.⁸¹ Furthermore, although the planning exercise may incur relatively moderate costs, further incidental demands it may exerts in terms of housing and transport may be critical in diverting these from other more productive purposes.

Foreign consultants also tend to impose heavy time and administrative demands on an already overburdened bureaucracy. The excessive information needs of donors and consultants is almost legendary at national level, it is reportedly not unusual for senior Tanzania Ministry staff to devote up to half their time to briefing foreign consultants.⁸² The emphasis on decentralised planning seems to have extended these obligations down to regional and district level. Excessive expert demands, allied to their heavy dependence on available documentation seen in Tanzania regional planning tends to confirm the popular definition of a consultant as 'someone who saves time by wasting others'.

Furthermore, the attachment of an expert team to particular regional authorities has occasionally created administrative complications and may explain how sour expert-local relations have sometimes arisen. In the case of the RIDEPs, the expatriate teams were drafted in at a time when a reorganised planning administration was settling down to the new decentralised structure laid down by McKinsey. As such it was hardly surprising that "the foreign supported regional development programme was likely to be considered by regional officials as another unknown factor in a new institutional environment which complicated work rather than offered help".⁸³

A further cost imposed by importation of exports is the erosion of local initiative. Although one of the generally accepted fundamental principles is the non-displacement of local trained staff this appears to have been effectively disregarded in the majority of cases examined here. The need to provide counterparts had to be met in many cases from available staff in the already understaffed planning departments. Alternatively, with RIDEPs, displacement occurred through the creation of a new division of labour in which "rather than being co-opted as counterparts, the few trained Tanzanian planners were pushed back into purely administrative positions, providing the consultants with statistics, compiling annual and five year lists of project in districts and assessing their financial implications".⁸⁴ For Tanzanians planners, regional planning has become little more than routine regional accounting, in which the more intellectually challenging tasks have been usurped by outside experts. Displacement in another sense is apparent in the seeming reluctance to patronise local consultancy organisations which are increasingly used in other sectors. Only three plans utilised indigenous capacity, the Rukwa RIDEP (compiled largely by an expatriate-staffed BRALUP team), Dodoma RWMPs and some regional towns master plans — all of which had at least a limited expatriate input. The inferior role assigned to local trained personnel cannot only create frustration and duplication, it can undermine officials' willingness and confidence to carry out this function. The dependent and initiative-sapping attitude has been noted in Tanzanian planning when "as soon an expert is known to be coming all the difficult decisions connected with an enquiry tend to be postponed".⁸⁵ The negative outcome is that experts by design (imposing their own solutions) or by default are allowed to exert a controlling influence over important planning decisions.

In assessing the real costs of engaging foreign-aided consultant teams, therefore, the full range of actual and opportunity costs needs to be borne in mind. The promising tool that RWMPs seem to offer for regional development nevertheless causes considerable administrative difficulties and demands a high level of planning and economic expertise which may make them inappropriate for many poor countries.⁸⁶ In other words, the type of expert-led decentralised plans produced in Tanzania may be counterproductive since they have been successfully accomplished by making other planning efforts, both immediate and longer term, less effective.

Planning without implementation

A plan is not an end in itself. The production of RWMPs for example, represents simply the first step in the process of rural water supply in which the plans are put. Many of Tanzania's impressive consultant designed plans must be deemed failures by this criterion, suffering the "ineffectiveness which is too often the experts' lot".⁸⁷

Yet many fit the recommended stereotype, possessing all the required features — "bulging documents of formidable technicality containing the vaulted plan of operation proposing a complex framework for undertaking development on an intensified scale" their programme "designed by a leading Western consultancy firm policies laudable in extent and sensible in details... and yet the anticipated results did not materialise".⁸⁸ Most RIDEPs, for example are bulky, comprehensive documents assembling large quantities or

regional statistics and other background data "tend to be extremely useful but almost impossible to use at the same time".⁸⁴

Several reasons account for the poor record of actual versus planned achievement. Firstly, while donors were prepared to contribute to plan production (Phase I), few were willing to provide the necessary funds to carry these recommendations through to the implementation stage (Phase II and III).⁹⁰ Since the Tanzanian development budget is heavily dependent on foreign assistance, poor implementation is partly attributable to the fickleness and unpredictability of donors in providing funds even for projects identified by their own experts. One of the most confusing aspects of development planning for African policy makers must be "the ever changing priorities that seem to come and go depending upon the view points of financial institutions or donors" creating, in Tanzania, the hazards of planning in a situation in which implementation is "mainly based on financing by donor countries which pop up rather unexpectedly".⁹¹ The paradox noted earlier is apparent, in which aid agencies which extend planning assistance are themselves beset by inefficiency and bureaucratic inadequacy which slows the process of implementation.

A second basic deficiency of many expert planning efforts is that many are inappropriately or inadequately operationalised, a failing which may reflect the bias of consultants and their failure to fully appreciate local reality. Indeed, reviewing recent Third World planning, Anonsen cites the preparation of Tanzania's Third Five Year Plan, which relied heavily on the RIDEP input as "an extreme example of how far the planning process can become detached from the country's own administrative infrastructure and lost in sophisticated models without giving a thought to practical realities".⁹² Certainly, most of the RIDEPs were remarkably silent on the question of implementation. Proposals for implementation suffer from overgeneralisation and commonly stipulate over ambitious targets which often exceed local resources available for their implementation. The Canadian creators of Dodoma offer some explanation for this failing admitting that planners "accustomed to living in a capitalist industrialised milieu could not entirely appreciate the social and economic constraints involved in a plan for an African socialist environment", while the American planners for Arusha also acknowledged that consultants frequently "prepare a physical (town) plan without regard for capital resources and administration, often idealistic and which cannot be implemented".⁹³ RWMPs have also "not proved the effective final tool for planning it was hoped to be" partly because the input required to ensure that the best the safest (water supply) solutions are implemented is much larger than Tanzania's regional or national capabilities.⁹⁴ Plans seem to assume rather optimistic future availability of resources which, like the need for future recurrent costs, may simply not materialize thereby jeopardising many of the plans' proposals. Taking Mtwara as an example, many of the RIDEP proposals are based on the assumption that "regional and district departments will be brought up to establishment staffing levels" — something which has proved impossible to achieve in the past and unlikely in the near future; similarly Mtwara RWMP proposals for water supply schemes were marred by the warning that "if it is not possible to provide relevant staff and funds when the waterworks and wells are completed, there is a risk that their usability quickly decreases, due

to lack of operational staff, servicing and maintenance".⁹⁵

In both cases, the future funding and manpower constraints may well render both sets of consultants proposal in operative. If the proposals are inappropriate or unrealistic, then their planning must be similarly criticised. In view of the essentially non-integrated nature of the planning process in Tanzania, a related problem concerns the much-vaunted 'integrated' nature of many Tanzanian regional plans which unrealistically postulate self-contained development programmes which are implicitly dependent on other enabling development. A major drawback of the comprehensive or integrated project approach to planning is that, while some of the recommendations may be carried out is isolation, many depend on the execution of one or several related investments, creating problems of phasing and coordination for which no single regional plan can adequately provide. This feature of RIDEPS may explain why, following the production of the plan, many donors proceeded to select particular preferred projects to fund, thereby 'disintegrating' implementation. These various constraints on implementation have led Schwemer to conclude that the basic concept of integrated rural development planning in Tanzania was "just too ambitious since the challenge of meeting the country's needs with limited resources does not allow of a comprehensive development strategy at present".⁹⁶

A third explanation of poor implementation arises as a consequences of the dualism created between experts and local planners. Regional plans which are almost exclusively a product of expatriates with little direct input from local officials are understandably less easily accepted by regional authorities. The plan's basic concepts, its intended direction and underlying rationale may be unclear or unsatisfactory to Tanzanian planners and administrators seeking to translate its proposals into action. Their initial lack of involvement means that the plan almost inevitably fails to stimulate the favour and commitment of the implementing authorities. Implementation and monitoring left in the hands of local people or, indeed, other experts who have little experience or who were never actual involved in planning creates a sequence of difficulties; these people may, therefore, "not be aware of the concept and overall logic of the respective plans. They cannot explain the bases on which priorities were set and the proposals for action made. They are simply unable to defend the plans before national authorities responsible for the allocation of funds and manpower"⁹⁷ Even more negatively, where the planning expert's role has aroused resentment, the final plan may easily become "a source of annoyance and envy to the indigenous administration" and may, through either neglect or rape of aid assets after the expert's departure, render the initial project useless.⁹⁸

A similarly unsatisfactory outcome arises from the failure to involve the affected population themselves in the planning exercise. Ascorft observes how "incredibly, development projects so fastidiously detailed in technical planning fail utterly ... because the target groups are willing or unable to tell the experts of their shortcomings". One major reason why not many RWMPs have been successfully implemented is because they "have been solely an activity for experts carried out above the heads of the target group".⁹⁹

The poor ultimate results of Tanzania's prestigious foreign-aided regional planning effort are only now becoming apparent. A postmortem in one region

concluded that "it is now painfully evident that the RIDEP served its originally intended purpose only to a limited extent. Though it initially provided the rationale for RIDEP projects themselves, it was hardly if ever used to derive the priorities for the Regional Development Plan as once envisaged. Furthermore, the planning work carried out was never continued or followed up although this would have been a very necessary exercise in view of certain recognised shortcomings". Kleemeir concludes that financing these unused plans was, in the majority of instances, simply a wasted investment.¹⁰⁰ The wide gulf between drawing up plans and implementing them noted in the 1960s was not bridged in the 1970s round of decentralised efforts where planning has often gone on much longer than necessary while no goods have been forthcoming.

Some conclusions

The failure of Tanzania's expert-led regional planning effort of the 1970s has been shown as an almost predetermined outcome of the fundamental flaws involved in the concept and practice of engaging outside experts and relying aid. To criticise the conduct and contribution of these plans is not to condemn foreign aid *per se* nor to indict the experts simply because they are either expert or expatriates.

To broaden the perspective, these planning exercises can be seen in the wider development context as simply replicating many of the already acknowledge failures of other aid-financed capital projects. Planning by experts represents an already discredited capital projects. Planning by experts represents an already discredited technocratic view of development, engineering progress through investment and the application of sophisticated, usually western, software, rather than through, for example, mobilisation and participation. The observation, that projects rather than people are increasingly the centre-place of the development process in Tanzania, with technique rather the politics the guiding force, applies to planning as well as capital aid.¹⁰¹

A related problem is that transfer of expertise and fashionable development models runs the risk, like transfers of technology, of being simply inappropriate.¹⁰² The success of water provision schemes will be primarily determined by the country's organisational structure, administrative capacity and the participation of the community, not by the articulation of grandiose or even progressive designs, even if they are supported by aids funds. Imported experts can hardly be expected to understand real local need, strengths and weaknesses let alone be able to influence these factors entirely outwit their control.¹⁰³ In any situations where technology is not the major input (as it may be in, for example, dam construction), the whole concept of international expertise is entirely misconceived and reflects a resolutely false universalism regarding the similarity of problems and the unity of their solution.

Yet even by the criterion of current development thought, the format of many Tanzania's expert-aided regional plans can be considered outmoded or unsatisfactory. The procedure of intensive, short-term expert activity to produce a final, instant plan seems more akin to an unacceptable 'blueprint' form of 'master planning' long since superseded by a more appropriate concept of planning as an ongoing, social learning process. As speedily produced

blueprints whose authors have no subsequent commitment to their final outcome they fail to heed Nyerere's warning that the plan must not become a fetish — "figures on paper are one thing, tonnes of maize, rice and cotton ... the construction of roads, schools and buildings are quite another".¹⁰⁴

Tanzania's expert-led development also adheres to a top-down rather than bottom-up planning approach, even if the centre is now the regional capital. Their lack of popular involvement of almost any type has led Hyden to criticise their 'fictional' character and the fact that they are "irrelevant to the vast majority of producers". The use of outside experts and foreign sponsors also contradicts the fundamental purpose and aim of Tanzania planning, once defined "a promise to give people opportunities to take key decisions related to the future pattern and pace of their development and, to that extent, it gives them the hope of having the destiny of their country *in their own hands*".¹⁰⁵ Manifestly few of the plans reviewed here have remotely approached this.

The format of donor annexation of regions to plan runs the risk of subverting national investment priorities. At the most detailed level in the RWMPs, Anderson warns that if Tanzania persists in letting each individual donor conduct its regional planning in accordance with their own ideas, difficulties will occur due to lack of standardisation of equipment design criteria and selection. More broadly, Katrs cautioned that these "consultants reports should not pre-empt choices to be made by Tanzanians as to how, where and when their critical water resource development should take place".¹⁰⁶ Anonsen similarly concluded that each RIDEP primarily "reflected the different background of the different teams and the different views they had on regional planning in a developed country".¹⁰⁷

Mushi agrees that "planning with external funds and expertise has tended to thrust aside the transformation aspects of Tanzanian development", tending towards the disjointed incrementation which eventuates from a multiplicity of donors and adherence to standard western planning models.¹⁰⁸

The conclusion must be that Tanzania's regional planning experience of the 1970s is, as Moris summarised the national development efforts of the 1960s, "self-defeating and ultimately self-destroying".¹⁰⁹ The lessons of the 1960s have not been learned and many of their failings simply reproduced.

As one Tanzanian regional planner complained, "over the past few years, administrators and politicians have quietly watched various overseas missions investigating the revealing numbers projects within their countries. They have produced numerous reports ... very few of which have been implemented. The overseas consultants who conducted the investigation completed their assignment and let. The donor countries that provided assistance were partially satisfied because they had at least taken initiatives to aid a developing country. The recipient country has project reports which cannot be used and have become impatient. They wish to see some practical use of the mountains of reports currently in their Libraries and soon to be in their national archives. They are tired of review missions which do not produce any tangible results."

Though some projects ... have had up to two feasibility studies and reviewed three or four times with recommendations for collection of further data, recipient countries, owing to lack of trained personnel have been unable to improve it. The vicious circle must be broken".¹¹⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. Africa in turn, has relied for more heavily upon official technical assistance to man the public sector and other expatriate personnel than the governments of any Third World region. Moreover, with the apparent contractions of the private sector during the 1970's whereas the demand has been increasing, it appears that Tanzania will have to go outside its border for much of this assistance in the short and medium term; World Bank, 1980. "Poverty and the Development of Human Resources, Regional Perspectives", *Staff Working Paper* No. 400.
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13. Anderson, L, et al, 1983. *Domestic Water Supplies in Tanzania: A Bibliography*, IRA Research Paper 1; Rweyemamu 1965.
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16. Porter, P. and de Souza, A. 1974, "The Underdevelopment and Modernization of the Third World", Association of American Geographers, Resource Paper 28, Washington D.C.P. 18; For Example, in preparation for the regional into the Second Five Year Plan a number of ad hoc teams comprising of the UNDP regional planning team in DEVPLAN, Regional Economic Secretaries and Members of ERB (all of whom included a large complement of expatriates) made brief two week visits to every Region in Tanzania in mid 1968.
17. Tandon, Y. (ed). 1973; *Technical Assistance Administration in East Africa*, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, P. 17.
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