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Political succession in Kenya: The Transition From Kenyatta to Moi

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INTRODUCTION

The central position in Kenyan politics occupied by Jomo Kenyatta, first President of Kenya, suggested to many people in the early seventies that his death would usher in a period of acute instability. Nevertheless, and despite such forebodings, when Kenyatta died in August 1978, the succession moved with remarkably little difficulty. Daniel arap Moi, Vice-President, immediately assumed the Presidency as the constitution provided and three months later — also as required by the constitution — successfully stood for Presidential election. Kenya's reputation for political stability appeared to be ensured.

Kenya, which has been independent for more than two decades, was until 1982 one of the few countries in sub-saharan Africa which had not experienced a coup d'etat or even a serious military coup attempt.¹ This is a striking feature of its political history given the country's fragile ethnic and class divisions. Politics in Kenya were thought to be exempt from the political unrest characteristic of most Third World countries. This untarnished image has been rent by the assassination of key political figures. The attempted coup against the regime in 1982 suggested that the smooth succession had obscured a more troubled inheritance. This paper therefore looks more closely at the succession and succeeding events, in an attempt to identify the underlying political constraints that have faced the new regime.

Succession is an intricate process which not only involves the change of faces and factions but also represents an opportunity for the emergence of a new style of politics following the demise of a "founding father". Inevitably, new demands and the needs of the society require new policies and ideas in order to make change meaningful. Aaron Wildausky and Naomi Caiden assert that budgeting and planning constraints in "poor and uncertain nations" does not allow the top decision makers in these countries to direct policy,² given the priorities which emerge based upon budgetary constraints. Our analysis, however, suggests otherwise. President Moi's difficulties in legitimizing and consolidating his rule were not simply the result of budgetary constraints but also the product of an ongoing succession crisis which began prior to Kenyatta's death. By permitting the succession struggle during his lifetime, Kenyatta ensured a peaceful transition at the time of his death primarily because the balance of power between the factions involved in the struggle had already gravitated to Moi. However, the volatile nature of Kenyan politics and the persistence of ethnic divisions subsequently presented Moi with serious difficulties at a time of growing economic crisis.

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The process of political succession to a new ruler or a new government is immediately activated at the time of the political or physical demise of a country's top decision-making leader. The "succession crisis" causes concern regardless of whether it occurs in institutionalised regimes or non-institutionalised political systems. The succession crisis usually revolves around the rivalry of those individuals who aspire to inherit power. The quest for power stimulates the formation of "factions in the top leadership according to shifting calculations of personal interest and political principle".³ The outcome of this struggle depends upon the strength of each faction and its ability to control the major political institutions within the country.

Central to the concept of political succession is the issue of legitimacy — by what right does the new leader rule. All regimes face this critical dilemma. However, the problem for most Third World political systems has been the absence of an institutionalised transfer of power; hence, the pattern of coups and counter-coups which continually undermine political stability. The end of colonial rule in Africa represented the beginning of a new era where power was assumed by the dominant personality, however symbolic within the nationalist movement, who almost by default became the "founding father" of the nation. Moreover, the succession is especially difficult given the close identification of the very essence of the nation state with a particular personality. The challenge to colonial authority, the definition of national being, the transition to political independence and beyond focus attention on the charismatic leader. Such an individual attains mythical status, symbolising at the same time both the struggle for freedom and the continuation of the independent state. The association between leader and nation approximates unity.

Africa has produced many such "founding fathers": Nkrumah in Ghana, Toure in Guinea, Senghor in Senegal, Nyerere in Tanzania, Kaunda in Zambia, Banda in Malawi, and Kenyatta in Kenya. All these "founding fathers" have seemed to be the embodiment of the nation-state. Thus, it is not surprising the succession in some of these states has been violent, as exemplified by Nkrumah's Ghana in 1966.

In a study of succession and regime change in forty African countries, from the time of independence to 1972, Ladun Anise found that there had been 114 such transitions, of which thirty-six were the result of coups d'état and assassinations. Of the fifty-three changes that followed constitutional procedures, thirty-one involved intra-regime succession, mostly in one-party states with little indication of fair elections.⁴

There have been few rigorous studies of political succession in the Third World. As Valerie Bunce has lamented:

We have endless studies of elections, coup d'état, and succession process in socialist and bourgeois democratic states, but almost all focus on the process by which power is transferred. In those rare cases where the impact of succession is considered, and hence the importance of leaders, the dependent variable is invariably system stability linking succession to public policy and generalizing from that to the role of political leadership are tasks that still await vigorous study.⁵

Such studies as have been made, moreover, have concentrated on the role of the military, policy, stratification, or on a rudimentary analysis of the party. They have largely ignored the "founding father" phenomenon. Hence the importance of the Kenyan case.

The Kenyan constitution provides a procedure for the succession of its highest elective office in the event of death, incapacitation or invalidation. On August 22, 1978, following Kenyatta's death the constitutional stipulations as established in Chapter II of the Constitution applied.

- (1) If the office of the President becomes vacant by reason of the death or resignation of the President, an election of a President shall be held within the period of ninety days immediately following the occurrence of that vacancy....
- (2) While the office of President is vacant as aforesaid, the functions of that office shall be executed — by the Vice-President....⁶

Each presidential candidate must be nominated by a political party and be chosen from amongst elected members of the National Assembly.⁷ At the time of Kenyatta's death, Kenya was a *de-facto* one party state. Thus, only a leadership convention of the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) had to be convened in order to elect a new party President, who would in turn assume the Presidency of the Republic. This meant that a Presidential election would have to take place by November 21, 1978. The then Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo, said: "I am hoping the process will be quick and smooth."⁸

Immediately after Daniel arap Moi was sworn in as Acting President⁹ a number of events occurred with a precision that suggested a well thought-out strategy. After Kenyatta's massive state funeral, Shariff Nassir, the M.P. for Mombasa central, issued a statement urging the KANU delegates to elect Moi unopposed as party President. Within a few days most political groups, pressure groups, and leaders issued statements of support and pledged allegiance to Moi¹⁰ urging continuity and stability. This massive support prevented the expression of any opposition.

On October 6, 1978, Moi was unanimously elected party President and on October 10th, after he presented his nomination papers at the Attorney-General's office, was declared elected as the second President of the Republic of Kenya. On October 14 he was sworn into his new office. This represented an anti-climactical end to perhaps the most important event in the political history of Kenya. Moi, who had until that time been constrained by the constitution, was now free to choose his own cabinet. His task was to create a team that would allow him to shape the political environment. In fact, although he shuffled the various portfolios, Moi retained the entire Kenyatta cabinet. Mwai Kibaki, who became the new Vice-President, retained the Finance Portfolio. The Economic Planning section was merged with Community Affairs and no Minister of State was appointed. The once powerful Mbiyu Koinange, Kenyatta's alter ego, was relegated to the Ministry of Natural Resources, while Stanley Oloitipiti became the Minister for Home Affairs (see Appendix I).

Kenya appeared ready to embark upon a new era of leadership by consensus given the President's populist approach to politics and desire to make extensive policy changes. At the same time Moi vowed that he would be guided by Kenyatta's policies and proclaimed a new philosophy of "Nyayoism".¹¹

THE EARLY YEARS OF MOI'S RULE: THE POPULIST PRESIDENCY

Moi's early decisions rapidly portrayed him as "responding to the mood of the nation, worried about the cares and concerns of the little man, the peasant, the disadvantaged, and often cut through or ignored entirely the ramifications of bureaucracy and procedures"¹² Moi's first executive decision as Acting President

was to suspend all allocations of plots of land. This was a particularly explosive issue since, as he put it, "there are too many people with too much land who are still trying to get more when most Kenyans have none".¹³ Moi seemed to be suggesting to Kenyans that he was determined to inscribe his own stamp on fundamental issues of national importance.

The President ordered a thorough review of the police and armed forces, which resulted in the firing or retiring of any senior officer whose loyalty was questionable. The most popular Presidential directive was Moi's decision to release all political detainees at the Independence Day celebrations on December 12, 1978. A period of political reconciliation was underway, implying that Moi did not need to resort to political detention to consolidate his position.¹⁴ These decisions suggested a populist and innovative approach. They allowed Moi to mark his distance from Kenyatta without appearing to be disloyal. In Kenyatta's time land allocation and corruption had become major problems and by trying to control these two sensitive areas Moi gained support from the mass of the population.

Thus, in his first year as President, Moi embarked upon a campaign to obtain legitimacy for his rule by the announcement of a number of popular measures and tendencies. He emphasised a change in national politics, giving the appearance of a period of major policy innovation and a fundamental change in national priorities aimed at curtailing corruption. His first proclamations were directed at the poor. Presidential directives such as the suspension of land allocation, free milk for school children, and the release of all political detainees resulted in making Moi a powerful and popular leader.¹⁵ In fact, in an unprecedented demonstration of support, students of the University of Nairobi took to the streets in favour of Moi's measures.

THE 1979 ELECTIONS

The 1979 elections must necessarily be seen as part of the succession struggle. In spite of the apparent ease of succession to office, Moi nevertheless faced potential challenges from four other sources: — Kenyatta's family; the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA);¹⁶ the defunct opposition party, the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), led by the former Vice-President; and the armed forces.

First, the challenge to Moi as successor began in 1976 when a number of aspirants and influential Kenyan political leaders, primarily focussed on the GEMA-Family alliance, tried unsuccessfully to persuade Kenyatta to amend the constitutional procedures established to direct events following his death. Partly due to his vanity and his enormous reputation for invincibility, which banned open political discussion of the succession, and partly due to the influence of the then Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo, who intervened at the last moment to insist that the constitutional procedures remain unaltered, Kenyatta repudiated the demands of the "change-the-constitution-group".

From September 1976 onward, the group had suffered a continual erosion of its political legitimacy. In addition, during the struggle for institutional control, the GEMA-Family alliance recognised that they would not emerge victorious and consequently, the 1977 KANU elections were aborted by the then Acting Secretary-General, Robert Matano.¹⁷ By openly seeking a major constitutional revision, the "change-the-constitution-group", when they failed, had isolated themselves from determinative influence at the time of Kenyatta's death. This helps to explain staunch statements of support by the leaders of the "change-the-constitution-group", during the transition period following Kenyatta's demise.

Second, the impact of the failure of the GEMA-Family alliance to disassociate themselves from the murder of the popular Nyandarua M.P., J. M. Kariuki, in March 1975 left three central political actors who were not part of the alliance to dominate the centerstage — Charles Njonjo, Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki. However, J.M. Kariuki's death continued to haunt Kenyatta and his political allies. These allies, who were considered pillars of the Kenyatta regime and deemed, therefore, to be instrumental to the succession could not escape henceforth the cloud of the Kariuki affair.¹⁸

Third, the alliance between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin¹⁹ built up in the late sixties was in jeopardy because of the possible succession of a non-Kikuyu. More importantly, the Kikuyu were suffering from internal rifts following J.M. Kariuki's murder and the only other powerful ethnic group, the Luo, were fragmented between pro- and anti-Odinga forces. Thus, Moi emerged as a possible alternative.

Fourth, Moi's cleansing of the military, paramilitary and the police ensured that he would not meet immediate opposition from the armed forces.²⁰ A further reinforcing factor which helps to explain Moi's success is that, in the period after March 1975, Moi had increasingly assumed the functions of the populist political leader which Kenyatta for reasons of health and insecurity had shunned. Moi travelled widely throughout Kenya and abroad, filling in for the increasingly reclusive Kenyatta. In the popular mind, particularly through the use of Harambee, Moi gradually came to represent the authority of the President.²¹

The 1979 elections presented Moi with a critical challenge. As Hilary Ngweni, editor of *The Weekly Review*, said

.....elections are the supreme test of a Peoples participation in their country's political system — to the extent that they are free, fair and genuine, that participation is meaningful. It is therefore incumbent upon all candidates and the whole political machinery in the country to ensure that through their conduct the forcoming campaign period this year's general election in Kenya becomes the meaningful symbol of popular participation it ought to be.²²

The first major challenge to Moi's attempt to consolidate power occurred at the KANU National executive elections in October 1978, which were seen as a means to gauge Moi's support. Moi needed to revive the moribund party, to give him the much-needed leverage to attack many of Kenyatta's appointees to the various institutions he had established during his rule. At the Party elections Moi's supporters scored a substantial victory electing a candidate from each province to the KANU executive.²³ This momentum was carried over to the general elections, which Moi used further to isolate his opponents.

The GEMA-Family alliance was placed on the defensive following an investigation which revealed problems of tax evasion, effectively tarnishing their image.²⁴ Kihika Kimani, the self-proclaimed leader of the 'change-the-constitution movement' was the next person to be taken to task by the new administration. Kimani and his supporters had amassed considerable power within the Nakuru area with the help of the Ngwataniro Farmers Company,²⁵ which had achieved a great deal of success in the resettlement and distribution of land. The powerful Ngwataniro, a model of the national business co-operative movement, rapidly became divided once the mismanagement of over Kshs. 7 million had been established by the provincial administration. Kimani recognised that, despite his subsequent pledge of support for the President, his attempt to block Moi's succession remained salient. Thus, he refused to seek re-election as a director of Ngwataniro.

As in previous elections, former KPU members were denied clearance by the new administration to contest the elections. The government's rationale for this decision was that until the outcome of a pending court case, in which five prominent ex-KPU members had sued the party's Secretary-General for unconstitutional electoral practices, was known they could not be cleared. This effectively barred the former KPU members from the elections. In addition, George Anyona, a former political detainee, was also barred from standing for the elections after the Kisii district KANU branch executive ousted him from the party and the national executive upheld the decision.²⁶

After an intense, three-week long campaign²⁷, on polling day, the electorate, in a voter turnout of 68% rejected 72 of the 158 incumbent members of parliament. However, the most striking feature of the election was the rejection of seven senior cabinet ministers and a large number of assistant ministers who were closely associated with the Kenyatta regime.²⁸ The high voter turnout and the election of large proportion of pro-Moi candidates was indicative of the popular support Moi had amassed. However, despite Moi's campaigning efforts on behalf of specific candidates²⁹, a number of GEMA-Family alliance members were re-elected.

POST-ELECTIONS: LEADERSHIP WRANGLES AND ECONOMIC CRISES

The new situation provided Moi with greater freedom of choice for his new cabinet. While Moi now made a number of changes, he maintained continuity by retaining every cabinet minister who had been re-elected. It seems that his central concern in appointing the cabinet was to ensure a regional and ethnic balance while accommodating the diverse political realities of the day³⁰ (see Appendix II). In addition, by appointing more than half the MPs to the government, Moi also hoped to check dissent in parliament.

Early in 1980, Moi began to tackle a problem which had been largely ignored by the Kenyatta regime — that of accommodating the opposition KPU party into the defacto one-party state³¹. He co-opted a number of the opposition party members, most notably its leader Odinga Odinga, by offering them positions with parastatal bodies. Odinga himself was appointed chairman of the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board.³² By mid-year the President had ordered an end to public harping about the KPU issue. Next, the President signed Odinga's KANU Life membership certificate indicating that Odinga would be returning to politics. Hezekiah Ongo Ochieng resigned his seat in parliament to pave the way for Odinga's return in a by-election. Odinga, however, dug his own political grave at a meeting in Mombasa when he called Kenyatta a land grabber, with the result that he was banned from the election. Kenyatta remained part of the political psyche of the country and Moi still had to utilise Kenyatta's mystique in the Nyayo era to consolidate his rule.

Moi faced a number of acute problems. First, a national food crisis³³, primarily brought about by mismanagement of food distribution and a drought, led to food queues. Second, following Charles Njonjo's entry into parliament, as an elected M.P. in 1980, a press battle between Njonjo and Kibaki erupted. George Gethi, Kenyatta's one-time secretary, and the then Editor of the *Standard*, continually criticised Kibaki's handling of the economy, and at the same time provided Njonjo with much favourable reporting.³⁴

It was against this background, at a hastily convened leadership conference at the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA), that Moi warned individual leaders that they were not indispensable and that he might be forced to re-introduce detention

without trial. This was an elaboration of an earlier statement which stressed his awareness of the power struggle among certain politicians who aspired to high office. One of the most important resolutions passed at the Conference called for the disbanding of tribal organisations in the interest of preserving national unity — forcing attention on the whole question of GEMA's political role.³⁵

Moi's first two years in office can be characterised as the politics of transition and consolidation. His dilemma was apparent. He was concerned to sustain support, yet he had to put a personal stamp on major governmental policy. In addition, he had to contend with opposition in the government. This concern was not limited to the political level but also encompassed security considerations.³⁶ However, the country's economic problems increased and for the first time Kenyans suffered shortages of basic commodities.

Moi's troubles were further compounded early in 1982 as the country's economy deteriorated and inflation remained at an all-time high. Tensions heightened at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit at Nairobi, when Odinga dwelt on the country's worsening economic situation, and Moi challenged Odinga and a "few disgruntled politicians and civil servants who were waging a slanderous campaign to make him unpopular with the people"³⁷ It is necessary, therefore, to briefly examine the state of economic affairs in Kenya.

The main occupation and source of income for most Kenyans is agriculture. Approximately 85% of the Kenyan population live in rural areas. However, the service and manufacturing sectors have attained substantially more importance in the post-independence period. The cumulative annual growth rate of the economy until the mid 1970s was close to 6% in real terms, while the industrial sector grew at 10% during the same period. In 1975, however, the growth rate fell to 1.2% when the economy was adversely affected by the world-wide recession and rising oil prices.³⁸

At the same time Kenya had not fully recovered from the oil 'crisis'. The annual inflation rate jumped from 2.3% to 15% in 1973 and 18% in 1974. Although the economy subsequently improved slightly, following the tea and coffee boom,³⁹ inflation remained at double-digit levels while the terms of trade declined, leading to a serious balance of payments problem. In addition, urban unemployment and rural underemployment posed serious problems for the country, particularly in light of a population growth rate of 3.6% per annum, among the highest in the world.⁴⁰ Thus, Moi inherited the Presidency in 1978, when export prices were falling and import prices rapidly escalating within the framework of a global economic recession.

In 1982 the economic picture remained bleak. Kenya's foreign debt stood at \$US1,000 million, while inflation continued to increase at dramatic rate. In addition, charges of inept management and corruption were now made against the Moi administration.⁴¹ This was particularly evident in the co-operative movement where the Commissioner of Co-operatives, Alfirck Birgen, denounced prominent members of the administration for misuse of the co-operative movement.⁴²

Moi blamed the economic woes of the country on the Asian community, bitterly denouncing them for being "involved in almost all social evils in the country".⁴³ Asians were accused of hoarding and smuggling essential commodities and were threatened with deportation regardless of whether or not they were citizens. This was exacerbated by the policies of the Moi regime which failed to respond to voices within the country demanding an equitable distribution of economic growth.

In a major effort to deal with both the stagnating economy and the intense Njonjo-Kibaki rivalry which seemed to have masked the country's serious economic problems, Moi reshuffled his cabinet in February 1982. In a scathing speech,

Moi once again warned members of his government and administration that no one was indispensable.

As you all know, since I have become President of our beloved Republic, I have frequently emphasized the importance of maintaining the highest degree of efficiency in the management of all our affairs... However, in order to ensure that the machinery of government is efficient — so that it remains ahead of the various economic and social problems instead of merely responding to them, and that it enables our country to seize economic opportunities as they arise — it is necessary to review its efficiency from time to time... In the kind of review I am talking about emphasis is given to such important matters as clear assignment of responsibility, avoidance of duplication of responsibility, avoidance of duplication of responsibility, and proper allocation of government work... This is why I shall not hesitate to dismiss any public servant who proves unable to do his or her job properly and effectively. And in that connection, I want to repeat what I have said many times before — that nobody should consider himself indispensable.⁴⁴

The most important changes as a result of the reshuffle were that Kibaki lost the powerful Finance portfolio but gained the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was stripped of all state security matters.⁴⁵ Njonjo retained the Constitutional Affairs portfolio, while the relatively unknown Arthur Magugu became the new Finance Minister. Two new Departments were created; the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Physical planning and a Ministry of Regional Development Science and Technology, for which the two former Ministers of State, G.G. Kariuki and Nicholas Biwott became the respective ministers, leaving only James Gichuru as the Minister for State in the President's office (see Appendix III).

In May, tensions heightened when Odinga returned from Britain, where he had sought support to establish a new party, The Kenya Socialist party. While in London, Odinga had fiercely criticised the government for preventing opposition parties to function, claiming that African leaders in order to consolidate power:

proceed to stampede opposition parties out of existence through constant harassment and detention of opposition leaders... sooner rather than later these one-party systems become non-party systems. The President's arrogate to themselves the role of law-maker and law-giver. They rule by undeclared decree. They set up cohorts of sycophants around themselves, and run court cabals which are united on only one intention: the exploitation of broad masses... For the common man, African governments are evidently more ruthless than the colonial régimes we struggled so hard against.⁴⁶

Odinga's main ally in the bid to formulate a second party in Kenya was another detainee, George Anyona.

The President responded to the Odinga Challenge at a large rally at Lari in Kiambu district: Odinga has cleared himself out of KANU, those who sympathise with him can follow.⁴⁷ Following Odinga's expulsion from the party, two outspoken critics and their lawyer were detained without trial.⁴⁸ As the crackdown continued, the university witnessed the detention of a number of lecturers and students throughout June and July, for "promoting foreign ideologies". Finally, on June 3, 1982, the government announced that a Bill to amend the National Constitution, effectively making Kenya a one-party state, would be tabled in parliament. The Bill, which made Kenya a *de-jure* one party state, was unanimously passed in the National Assembly on June 9, and received Presidential assent on June 25.

The February 1982 reshuffle indicated that the consensus on which the Moi government had been based in 1978 had been greatly weakened, if not destroyed. The re-introduction of detention without trial soon after, and the decision to introduce a one-party state, suggested the difficulties of control that now faced the

regime. The changes occurred at a time of growing economic malaise which inhibited Moi's room for manoeuvre so far as policy was concerned. Continuing high-level corruption combined with inept management meant that redistribution and basic needs measures⁴⁹, basic premises of Moi's political platform following Kenyatta's death, suffered setbacks. Critically, one-half of the population lived below the official government poverty line,⁵⁰ and income inequalities between and within urban and rural areas continued to widen. This was exacerbated by a rapidly growing population and high unemployment.

The Njonjo-Kibaki rivalry restored the traditional intra-Kikuyu rivalry to the centre stage.⁵¹ More importantly, it led Moi to turn further to his own Kalenjin supporters — whereas previously he had tried to keep a broadly based cabinet — and to centralise power in the office of the President. Thus, despite Moi's populist policies, little developmental success had been achieved. The Nyayo slogan had been elevated to a philosophy of love, peace and unity but for the common man abstract philosophy was not adequate. It would appear that the contradictions within the system were beginning to surface. As David Goldsworthy observed in 1982:

for years now critics have perceived Kenya as on the brink, and have argued that the contradictions of the society cannot be contained much longer. In 1979 Moi brought the system a new lease of life. But enough time has now passed for it to become clear that little has changed in the old structures of privilege, decision making and social control. In what is probably a situation of deepening economic malaise for the majority of Kenyans, these structures have failed to adapt, let alone cope, and must increasingly appear to be part of the problem. Thus the second half of Moi's first term may prove to be a much stormier political passage than the first half was.⁵²

CONCLUSION

This analysis suggests that Moi's problems were deeply rooted in the society itself, primarily because of fundamental economic and political grievances which remained to undermine his rule. This dilemma was heightened by the high popular expectations associated with a regime change and, more importantly, by Moi's own emphasis in statements and speeches designed to build a populist Presidency. Moi's difficulties can be attributed to his inability to operate as a "founding father" President. He had to permit "a shift from the President to the Presidency, from Kenyatta to the elaborate power structure which had been built up around him"⁵³ This led to a crisis of expectations which not only undermined Moi's credibility but, more importantly, shook the very foundations of a system of rule which had been established under the Kenyatta tradition.

The "change-the-constitution" group's campaign had been effectively sidetracked to assure Moi's accession to power, primarily because the two factions engaged in the power struggle essentially came from the same elite which wished to maintain its economic and political position through a continuation of policies established during the Kenyatta era. As Tamarkin aptly put it:

the struggle for succession was essentially an intra-elite one, the two factions striving to control the regime rather than to subvert it. Once the succession was decided, the elite, and the bourgeoisie as a whole, had an overriding common interest in stabilizing the regime on which they thrived.⁵⁴

Moi, assisted by Njonjo and Kibaki, was not able, however, to build a sufficient basis of support to undermine challengers — particularly disaffected Kikuyu, past political ghosts — Odinga and Kariuki — and left wing critics. The situation worsened as the triumvirate's unity eroded and the division between Njonjo and Kibaki became public. The Njonjo-Kibaki power struggle heightened the tense intra-Kikuyu splits — Kiambu as opposed to Nyeri — which had come to the forefront at the time of the Kariuki murder. This underscored a general dissatisfaction that the Presidency had been lost to a non-Kikuyu.

The abortive coup of August 1, 1982 further challenged Moi's Presidency. He now had to contend with a resurgence of Kikuyu politics. In addition, the army became part of the political equation and Moi's room for manoeuvre was reduced. The dilemma facing Moi was how to permit a more open political process in order to re-establish political legitimacy without releasing forces anxious to challenge the regime.⁵⁵

From our analysis, it is clear that the future direction of politics in Kenya is clouded with uncertainty. However, certain observations can be made. First, political succession in Kenya, viewed in a narrow time frame, was indeed stable, following the institutionalised procedures as established in the constitution. Second, the orderly and stable succession masked a crisis of legitimacy for the Moi inheritance. His authoritarian pattern of rule, combined with the challenge of major policy issues illustrated the difficulty facing the new President in marking a distance from the past. In fact, Moi's ideological programme had been indicative of this dilemma. Third, the transformation of the inner ruling circle reflected the significance of ethnic alignments. Ethnicity acted to define the major political actors at the centre of power. The ethnic variable, however, has been further complicated by the emergence of division within the political struggle for the leadership of the Kikuyu and remains a major element for defining the future direction of political events.

THE 1978 MOI CABINET

MINISTRY	MINISTER	ETHNIC GROUP
President	D.T. Arap Moi	Kalenjin
Vice-President and Finance	M. Kibaki	Kikuyu
Agriculture	J. Nyagah	Embu
Attorney-General	C. Njonjo	Kikuyu
Commerce and Industry	E. Mwamnga	Taita
Community Affairs & Economic Planning	R. Oho	Luo
Co-operative Development	P. Ngei	Kamba
Defence	J. Gichuru	Kikuyu
Education	T. Toweett	Kalenjin
Foreign Affairs	M. Waiyaki	Kikuyu
Health	J. Osogo	Luhya
Home Affairs	S. Oloitipitip	Masai
Housing & Social Affairs	Z. Onyonka	Kisii
Information & Broadcasting	D. Mutinda	Kamba
Labour	J. Nyamweya	Kisii
Lands & Settlement	J. Angaine	Meru
Local Government	R. Matano	Digo
Natural Resources	M. Koinage	Kikuyu
Power & Communications	O. Okero	Luo
Tourism & Wildlife	M. Ogutu	Luo
Water Development	J.G. Kiano	Kikuyu
Works	N. Munoko	Luhya

Source: *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, October 13, 1978

THE 1979 MOI CABINET FOLLOWING THE ELECTION

MINISTRY	MINISTER	ETHNIC GROUP
President	D. Moi	Kalenjin
Vice-President & Finance	M. Kibaki	Kikuyu
Agriculture	J. Osogo	Luhya
Attorney-General	C. Njonjo	Kikuyu
Basic Education	M. Mudavadi	Luhya
Commerce	S. Okwanyo	Luo
Co-operative Development	M. Ogotu	Luso
Economic Planning	Z. Onyonka	Kisii
Energy	M. Waiyaki	Kikuyu
Foreign Affairs	R. Ouko	Luo
Health	A. Magugu	Kikuyu
Higher Education	J. Komotho	Kikuyu
Home Affairs	S. Oloitipitip	Masai
Industry	E.T. Mwamunga	Taita
Information & Broadcasting	D. Mutinda	Kamba
Labour	E. Mwangale	Luhya
Livestock Development	J. Nyagah	Embu
Local Government & Urban Development	C. Rubia	Kikuyu
Natural Resources & Environment	A. Omanga	Kisii
Social Services & Housing	R. Matano	Digo
State	J. Gichuru	Kikuyu
State	G.G. Kariuki	Kikuyu
State	N.K. N. Biwott	Kalenjin
Tourism	G.M. Mbijiwe	Meru
Transport & Communication	N.K. Kosgey	Kalenjin
Water Development	J.K. Ngeno	Kalenjin
Works	H.J. Ngei	Kamba

THE 1982 MOI CABINET FOLLOWING THE FEBRUARY
RESHUFFLE

MINISTRY	MINISTER	ETHNIC GROUP
President	D. Moi	Kalenjin
Vice President & Home Affairs	M. Kibaki	Kikuyu
Agriculture	Dr. M. Waiyaki	Kikuyu
Attorney-General	J. Kamere	Kikuyu
Basic Education	J. arap Ngeno	Kalenjin
Commerce	J. Okwanyo	Luo
Constitutional Affairs	C. Njonjo	Kikuyu
Culture & Social Services	M. Mudavadi	Luhya
Co-operative Development	R. Matano	Digo
Economic Planning & Development	Dr. Z. Onyonka	Kisii
Energy	K. M'Mbijewe	Meru
Finance	A. Magugu	Kikuyu
Foreign Affairs	Dr. R. Ouko	Luo
Health	M. Mango	Luhya
Higher Education	J. Komotho	Kikuyu
Industry	A. Omanga	Kisii
Information & Broadcasting	E. Mwamunga	Taita
Labour	Titus Mbatia	Kamba
Lands, Settlement & Physical Planning	G.G. Kariuki	Kikuyu
Livestock Development	Paul Ngei	Kamba
Local Government	S. Oloitipitip	Masai
Regional Develop. Science & Technology	N. Biwott	Kalenjin
Tourism & Wildlife	E. Mwangale	Luhya
Transportation & Communications	H. Kosgey	Kalenjin
Water Development	J. Nyagah	Embu
Works & Housing	Mr. C. Rubia	Kikuyu
State	J. Gichuru	Kikuyu
Natural Resources & Environment	P. Aloo Aringo	Luo

Source: *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, November 30, 1979Source: *The Standard*, Nairobi, February 26, 1982, p. 1-2

FOOTNOTES

1. In 1964, however, several contingents of the Kenyan forces mutinied and were disarmed by British troops at the request of the Kenyan government. Also, in 1971, a coup plot was undermined by the Kenyan intelligence network.
2. See Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden, *Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries*, (New York: Wiley, 1974)
3. Myron Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 84. Also see B.D. Graham, "The Succession of Factional Systems in the Uttar Pradesh Congress party, 1937-1966", in March Swartz, (ed.), *Local Level Politics*, (Chicago, 1968).
4. Ladun Anise, "Trends in leadership succession and regime changes in African politics since Independence", *African Studies Review*, 17, No. 3, (December 1978), pp. 507-524.
5. Valerie Bunce, *Do new leaders make a difference: Executive succession and Public Policy under capitalism and socialism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 6.
6. See Republic of Kenya, *The Constitution of Kenya*, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1969).
7. This is outlined in Section 3 of the Constitution. Refer to The Constitution of Kenya, *op.cit.*, p. 5.
8. Refer to *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, August 25, 1978.
9. The Acting President has certain powers in accordance with a resolution of the cabinet. See Republic of Kenya, *The Constitution of Kenya*, p. 7.
10. It should be noted that soon after Moi was sworn in as Acting President Njonjo instructed the press to refer to him as President. Thus all pledges of support were made not to the Acting President but to the President. The psychological impact was highly significant.
11. Nyayo is a Kiswahili word meaning "following in the footsteps".
12. *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, January 12, 1979.
13. *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, September 22, 1979, p. 6.
14. Among the political detainees released were Ngugi wa Thiongo, George Anyona, John Seroney and Martin Shikuku, in all, 26 detainees were released. For a detailed description of detention see Ngugi's *Detained*, (London: Heineman, 1981).
15. Presidential directives were often vague and ignored ramifications of bureaucratic procedures. An interesting case in point is the free milk directive from President Moi. Implementation for such a directive was extremely difficult and it was not clear what the President meant. For example, it was not clear up to what level free milk was to be provided. Inevitably the bureaucracy kept referring to the President and delayed implementation.
16. GEMA, a cultural and welfare organisation, was formed in 1970, in order to bring together the peoples of the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru areas for their mutual social advancement. From its inception, GEMA's leadership was predominantly drawn from the political sphere.
17. In 1977, the change-the-constitution group planned to use the KANU National elections to mount a challenge to Moi's Vice-Presidency. However, once it was recognised that Moi could not be dislodged from his position the elections were aborted and general elections urged, primarily because none of the potential successors were in a strong position to challenge Moi during a transition period.
18. For details of the Kariuki affair, see the *Weekly Review* for that period. Also see the report of the parliamentary inquiry into his death which implicated a number of senior government officials and police officers.
19. The Kikuyu-Kalenjin alliance was primarily a result of the decline of the Kikuyu-Luo alliance following the critical Limuru conference in 1966 which isolated Odinga and the Luo from the ruling party. See Cherry Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya*, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970).
20. A few days after Kenyatta's death a number of senior politicians privately expressed concern about some 'leaders' trying to manipulate the armed forces for political purposes. Some members of the GEMA-family alliance had been known to offer shares in their enterprises in order to woo middle-ranking officers. See *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 19, No. 17, August 25, 1978, p. 1. In this context the Ngoroko Affair is significant — see Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng, *The Kenyatta Succession*, (Nairobi: Trans Africa, 1980) especially pp. 158-195.
21. As Cherry Gertzel has aptly stated, Harambee, the self help movement, "was first emphasized by Kenyatta in the immediate post-independence years as a symbol of unity, it developed its own momentum, and emerged as a critical and peculiarly Kenyan response to the imperatives of development". See her "Factions in Kenyan Politics: An Overview", paper presented at the Australian National University, November 1979. Also see *The Weekly Review*, which provides a detailed account of the President's role at Harambee meetings during this period.
22. *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, October 19, 1979.
23. A major factor in the election of the Moi faction's candidates was a pink card which was distributed prior to the election with the following inscription: "Kenya has decided that the following leaders should be elected today 28/10/78:
 1. Kibaki - Central
 2. Okero - Nyanza
 3. Matano - Coast
 4. Tipis - Rift Valley
 5. Munoko - Western
 6. Wanjai - Nairobi
 7. Matunga - Eastern
 8. Odgile - North Eastern
 See *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, November 3, 1978.
24. In order to tarnish the image of GEMA, the government charged eight of its directors for failing to file annual tax returns of the company for the financial years 1976 and 1977.
25. In 1974 every candidate except for Mark Mwithaga, who was elected in the Nakuru area, was heavily supported by Ngwantaniro.
26. See *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, September 21, 1979. Anyona, an outspoken M.P., had taken the radical stance once Jean Marie Seroney and Martin Shikuku had been detained in October 1975. He was detained in 1978 after exposing irregularities in the granting of contracts by the National Railway Company.
27. The requirement that the campaign period be limited to three weeks is a little misleading because in May, Kibaki had announced that those civil servants wishing to contest the election had to resign by May 15. Thus, those who resigned began their campaign at that time, much to the chagrin of sitting M.P.'s. This also caused a great deal of controversy when on August 8th Njonjo tabled a bill in parliament intended to limit maximum expenditures by parliamentary candidates to Shs. 20,000. After strong lobbying, the bill was passed but the limit was doubled. For the election results, see *The Weekly Review*, November 16, 1979. For an analysis of the 1979 elections. Vincent Khapoya's, "Kenya under Moi: Continuity or change? *Africa Today*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1980, pp. 17-32.
28. The seven defeated ministers were: Mbiyu Koinange, Isaac Omolo Okero, Taaitta Toweett, Gikonyo Kaino, James Nyamweya, Nathan Munoko, and Jackson Angaine.
29. An example of such intervention was evident when Moi addressed a rally in Laikipia and praised G.G. Kariuki; Moi said that he did not think that there was anyone else who would dare oppose Kariuki in the elections.
30. However, it should be noted that the Kalenjin, one of the smallest ethnic groups, gained cabinet positions at the expense of larger ethnic groups.
31. Accommodation of the KPU prevented the renewal of the old alliance between the

- Kikuyu and the Luo, which had successfully defeated the opposition party KADU — the Kenyan African Democratic Party at independence, of which Moi had been a leader. For a detailed analysis of the key personalities and political parties forming alliances at independence see Cherry Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya*, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970). It is known that following Kenyatta's death a number of key individuals were trying to forge an alliance between the Kikuyu and the Luo. See *Africa Confidential* for that period and also see Godfrey Muriuki, "Central Kenya in the Nyayo Era", *Africa Today*, Vol. 26, (1979) No. 3.
32. See *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, May 16, 1980. Another ex-KPU, Achieng Oneko, was appointed to the Chairmanship of the Kenya film corporation. Mr. Tom Okello Odongo, another former KPU member, was supported by the government in a bid to be secretary-general of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Nations Secretariat.
 33. See *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, July 4, 1980 for a detailed account of the food shortages. The government's strategy to combat the food crisis is contained in Republic of Kenya, *Sessional Paper No. 4, of 1981, on National Food Policy*, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1981).
 34. See *The Weekly Review*, Nairobi, October 10, 1980. Njonjo entered parliament as an elected member following Amos Ng'ang'a's resignation from the Kikuyu seat. Njonjo's unopposed election was seen as the beginning of a power struggle with Kibaki. Rumours were rife that Njonjo would try to capture the vice-presidency and eventually challenge Moi. See David Goldworthy, "Kenya Since Kenyatta," *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 36, No. 1, April, 1982, pp. 27-31.
 35. Following the leadership conference, the GEMA leadership made a number of contradictory statements about disbanding the organisation. For details of the conference proceedings refer to Republic of Kenya, *The KIA leadership conference*, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1980).
 36. For a detailed account of the Ngoroko affair, see Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng, *The Kenyatta Succession*, (Nairobi: TransAfrica, 1980).
 37. *The Standard*, Nairobi 19th February, 1982, p. 1.
 38. For a detailed analysis of the economy see Arthur Hazelwood, *The Economy of Kenya: The Kenyatta Era*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). and his *The Economy of Kenya: the Post Kenyatta Era*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). Also refer to Republic of Kenya, *Statistical Abstract 1982*, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1982).
 39. In 1977 and 1978 the price of Kenyan coffee was substantially increased because of the Brazilian crop failure.
 40. See Hazelwood, *op. cit.*, also see Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo Colonialism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), and his "Development Strategies in Kenya, since 1971", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1-2, 1979. See also Cherry Gertzel, "Development in the Dependent State: The Kenya Case", *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 32, No. 1, April 1978, pp.84-100.
 41. An example is the scandal in which the Attorney-General, the Minister for Labour, a deputy Public Prosecutor and a CID official were involved in corrupt dealings with the Bank of Baroda. See *The Weekly Review*, April 1982 issues for details.
 42. *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 23, No.8, April 14, 1982, p. 1. Also see issues of *The Weekly Review* for the month of April and "Kenya: the end of an illusion", *Race and Class* xxiv, 3, (1983).
 43. See *Africa Report*, March-April 1982, p. 36.
 44. *The Standard*, Nairobi, February 26, 1982, pp. 1-2.
 45. Prior to the reshuffle, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) had been under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and thus effectively under Njonjo. However, Moi transferred all state security services to his own office.
 46. *The Standard*, Nairobi; May 21, 1982, p. 4.
 47. *ibid.* p. 1.
 48. The first three to be detained were George Anyona, Mwangi Muriithi, and John Khaminwa. For details of their detention see "The Politics of Justice in Kenya", *Race and Class*, XXIV, 3, 1983, pp. 245-258. Also see D.P. Ahluwalia and Jeff Steeves, "Political power, political opposition and state coercion: The Kenya Case", forthcoming.
 49. Redistribution and basic needs are the cardinal objectives of Kenya's development strategies. See Republic of Kenya, *Development Plan 1979-83*, (Nairobi: Government Printer 1979). Also see Godfrey, M., Ghai, D., and Lisk, F., *Planning for Basic needs in Kenya: Performance, Policies and Prospects*, (Geneva, ILO, 1979).
 50. See "Kenya: the end of an illusion", *Race and Class*, XXIV, 3, (1981) p. 222, which reports that one-half of the population lives below the government's poverty line of 200 pounds per year per household. Also see *Independent Kenya*, (London: Zed Press, 1982), The ILO report, *Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya*, (Geneva: ILO 1972), Arne Bigsten, *Regional Inequality in Kenya*, Institute of Development Studies, Nairobi, Working Paper No. 330 November 1977, and Judith Heyer, *et al.*, *Agricultural Development in Kenya, an Economic Assessment*, (Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1971).
 51. The intra-Kikuyu rivalry is manifested between the Kiambu and Nyeri Kikuyu. The best example of division between the two Kikuyu groups was evident at the time of J.M. Kariuki's murder. The Kiambu Kikuyu, it is said, took an oath "Mumu wa Mai Chainia na Mai Mahiu", representing a pledge of loyalty to the idea that the presidential motorcade should never cross the rivers Chainia and Mahiu which form the dividing line between Kiambu and Nyeri.
 52. David Goldworthy *op. cit.*, p. 31.
 53. M. Tamarkin, "From Kenyatta to Moi — The Anatomy of peaceful Transition to power", *Africa Today*, Vol. 26, No. 3, (1979) p. 21.
 54. *Ibid.*, p.33
 55. For a detailed analysis of such forces, see my forthcoming, "The 1983 Nyayo Elections: A quest for Legitimacy".