

universities are at the same time more interested in using experts from similar institutions abroad in preference to those at home. At the end of the day, the staff of the local institutions execute the jobs for the foreign consultant, but at a small fraction of the actual costs to governments.

(6) Finally, other sources of revenue need to be explored while better management of existing sources be evolved. In particular, a system where the rich can be made to bear a relatively higher burden is advocated. Therefore, attention should be paid to the self-employed, businessmen and professionals, many of who do not pay any taxes. Many contracts which are awarded by governments are not subject to taxation. Here, a withholding tax ranging between 5% and 10% is suggested. In addition, there are avenues of generating incomes at state and local government levels. These include sales and property taxes, among others. These should be vigorously explored.

FOOTNOTES

1. See A. Iwayemi, "The Revenue Implications of Recent Development in the World Oil Market for the Nigeria Economy in the Medium Term" paper presented at the National Conference on Alternative Sources of Government Revenue, NISER, Ibadan, 1983.
2. Ibid.
3. O. Knudsen and Parnes A., *Trade Instability and Economic Development*, Lexington Books, London, 1972.
4. Iwayemi, *ibid.*
5. I.I. Ihimodu, "The Impact of Government Taxation and Control of the Marketing of Five Major Agricultural Exports of Nigeria", an unpublished Ph.D. Thesis submitted to the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1977.
6. Central Bank of Nigeria, *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts*.

THE 1983 NYAYO ELECTIONS IN KENYA: A QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY.

*Davinder Pal Singh Ahluwalia**

INTRODUCTION

The significance and role of elections in single-party systems has been the subject of a contentious debate among academics. Many assert that such elections provide little meaningful change and thus the study of such elections is only peripheral to the mainstream of politics in a particular country.¹ However, it is our view that the 1983 elections in Kenya, popularly known as the Nyayo elections, are highly significant in determining the general direction of politics Kenya constitutionally became a *de jure* one party state in July 1982. The elections mark the beginning of a new era in the evolution of politics in that country.

In September 1983, Kenya held its fifth national election since the granting of independence by Britain on December 12, 1963. The first four were held in 1963, 1969, 1974 and 1979. Also in 1966, following a critical KANU (Kenya African National Union) delegates conference at Limuru where Tom Mboya and the conservative elements of the party isolated the then Vice-President Oginga Odinga and the radicals, a Little General Election was called. A new mandate was required for all those who had defected to Odinga's political party, the KPU (Kenya Peoples Union).²

Kenya's political institutions have been radically altered since independence when, as in the case of former British colonies, the newly-independent Kenyatta regime inherited the Westminster model of government. On the legislative side, this included an elected parliament with a cabinet drawn from among its members by the leader heading the dominant political party.

It was expected that a competitive political process would be maintained featuring party competition, political debate and the formation of new political associations. However, this representative and responsible system of government was a strikingly recent phenomenon for indigenous people who had been governed under a colonial system of rule. Importantly, there was another dimension to the colonial inheritance which tended to be ignored at independence. The striking features of the colonial political world were its non-participatory character and its untrammelled executive authority. The highly centralised, hierarchical and authoritarian state had a long historical grounding in the colonial experience. At independence, then, the new political leadership were the beneficiaries of two diverse and competing political traditions — the one, democratic and the other, authoritarian. One should not have been too sur-

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prised when the independent Kenyatta regime found it difficult to adhere to an imposed participatory framework.

A competitive political process characterised by a two-party system only survived for two brief periods. For a year following independence, KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) was the opposition party. In order to fulfill Kenyatta's quest for a one-party state, KADU was persuaded by the ruling party to dissolve itself in 1964. Hence, Kenya became a *de facto* one-party state. However, in 1966, Oginga Odinga formed the KPU as an alternative political party. This in turn was banned in 1969, when Kenya once again became a one-party state.³

During the Kenyatta era, the role of parliament changed drastically from its heyday immediately following independence to being subordinate to the will and authority of the President. Although, outwardly, parliament and its working created an illusion of democracy in action, in effect the nation was increasingly ruled by Presidential decree. Kenyatta, a shrewd and able politician, utilised parliament to communicate his policies to the people. By total domination of the national scene he forced parliamentarians to focus their attention on local constituency issues over national issues. Thus, Harambee (self-help) fund raising meetings became the focal point of constituency politics. A candidate's chances of election to parliament became integrally tied to the level of development that the candidate could bring to the area.

The most important role which both parliament and elections fulfill is that of legitimisation. In Kenya, this is accomplished by permitting the electorate to cast a ballot every five years for a candidate of their own choice. However, the electoral process subjects the candidates to a rigorous clearing process designed to ensure that dissidents and opposition are prevented from posing a threat to the regime from the floor of the National Assembly.⁴

Kenya, independent for almost two decades, was until August 1982 one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa which had not experienced a coup d'etat or even a serious military coup attempt.⁵ This is a striking feature of its political history because of its fragile ethnic and class divisions. One the surface, politics in Kenya are seen to be exempt from the political unrest characteristic of most third world countries. Yet the untarnished image has been rent by the problem of the assassination of key political figures.⁶ The attempted coup against the regime suggested that the smooth succession had been a troubled inheritance.⁷

Our analysis suggests that the failure of institutional change through the political process both in the case of succession and in the attempted formation of a new political party by Odinga in 1982⁸ is indicative of the lack of legitimisation. In order to survive for an extended period, Moi had to engage in yet another campaign to consolidate his power and more importantly to establish his legitimacy. However, the critical dilemma facing Moi following the abortive coup was how to permit a more open political process in order to re-establish political legitimacy, being aware at the same time that this would release forces anxious to challenge his rule.

Following the August 1 coup attempt, Moi became suspicious of a number of his ministers and he increasingly began to rule without consulting his cabinet.⁹ In his quest for political legitimacy, President Moi resorted to his earlier populist style. In ad-

dition, in December, he announced that a massive recruitment drive for the ruling party was to take place at the grassroots level. This exercise was seen as the precursor to the impending National Party elections and ultimately to a general election.

As in the run up to previous party elections, candidates engaged in a heated campaign. Since Kenya is a one-party state, such activity manifested itself in the emergence of factions between various members of the Party along pro- and anti-Nyayo lines. In the Kenyatta tradition, Moi stepped into the limelight:

Now that KANU elections are approaching there is bound to be a lot of loose talk and political bickering — some even touching on the person of the president of the Republic of Kenya. Already such loose talk has been reported in various parts of the country and is beginning to cause concern to all peace-loving and law-abiding citizens of the country.¹⁰

The party elections were primarily called by President Moi for two reasons. First, Moi hoped that the elections would serve a legitimising function and restore confidence in a severely weakened presidency following the abortive coup. Second, the elections were utilised to focus public attention away from the serious economic problems which the country faced.¹¹ However, the anticipated party elections added fuel to the intense Njonjo-Kibaki rivalry. This was further heightened by the expectation that Njonjo would capture the crucial and powerful chairmanship of the Kiambu branch of KANU in order to challenge Vice-President Kibaki and to utilise his position to oust Kibaki in order to become a potential successor to Moi.¹² As a commentator for the *Weekly Review* said:

... There is even speculation that Njonjo might challenge Kibaki for the post of KANU vice-president. Indeed, the most interesting aspect of the forthcoming party elections is what impact they would have on rivalry between the so called Kibaki and Njonjo groupings.¹³

Moi precipitated a national crisis to forestall the KANU national elections and thus halt Njonjo's political ambitions. In April, at a Harambee meeting in Butere constituency, Martin Shikuku, the M.P. for the area, announced that certain forces within the government were anxious to sabotage the rule of the President. A few days later at a press conference, the then Minister of Wildlife and Tourism, Elijah Mwangale, reiterated the Shikuku statement that fellow ministers in the cabinet were dissatisfied with the President's leadership and wished to see his downfall.

In response to these claims, G.G. Kariuki, a former Nairobi Mayor and the then Minister of Lands Settlement and Physical Planning, attacked the proponents of the Shikuku view for inciting instability. However, when Charled Rubia, M.P., claimed that such talk was directed at the Kikuyu, he was condemned in Parliament for contradicting the President.¹⁴

It became apparent that Shikuku was executing a plan aimed at destroying a political foe of the President. The whole issue of a foreign power grooming an individual to take over the presidency was sparked off by Moi at a rally in Kisii on May 8.¹⁵ This plunged the nation into a major crisis. Moi, however, moved out of the limelight leaving other parliamentarians to destroy an alleged traitor. Instead, Moi announced that Kenyans would go to the polls in order to elect a new set of leaders more supportive of his policies.

While Kenyans focussed their attention on the traitor issue, most politicians utilised the issue as a rallying point to further their political ambitions. This resulted in accusations and counter-accusations increasing the intensity of political debate. On May 17, when the KANU governing council met in Nairobi, the streets around the parliamentary buildings were lined with thousands of people awaiting to be told the identity of the traitor. However, following the meeting, Moi announced:

... It is absurd that some of the people I have appointed to senior positions have outwardly pretended to be loyal to me, and yet, behind the scenes, they have been using their positions to promote their selfish ambitions. They have ignored the fact that the Government has adequate machinery to maintain vigilance on their clandestine activities. I wish therefore, to confirm that I stand by what I said at the Kisumu rally on May 8, 1983, regarding activities of some people who are seeking assistance from their foreign masters to promote their excessive ambitions. I find it difficult to believe that such evil manoeuvres are being played by people who regard themselves as Kenyans.

The patience I have maintained since I took over as Head of State of this Republic has now been exhausted. I can no longer, therefore, tolerate working with such people and, from now on, any leader or public officer who conducts himself in a suspicious manner will not only be required to resign or be dismissed, but will also face appropriate disciplinary action.

I am determined to rectify the weaknesses, which we have been witnessing in the Government because of the conduct of these evil-minded people. In order to clean the system, I have, therefore, decided that all elected leaders, including myself will seek fresh mandate from the electorate. The revision of registers will start immediately and the General elections will take place in September, 1983....¹⁶

Charles Njonjo was finally named, in June, as the traitor in the National Assembly by Elijah Mwangale. The announcement was followed by a special debate on the 'Njonjo affair' at which time Njonjo was urged to resign. Martin Shikuku presented evidence before the House that Njonjo had foreign support and therefore was the traitor as alleged by the President. Shikuku revealed information about bank accounts, the amounts deposited, and withdrawals to establish Njonjo's foreign contacts. He also alleged that Njonjo had investments in racist South Africa, a country with which Kenya has no diplomatic ties.¹⁷ Shikuku warned those who had supported Njonjo to also resign as they had 'doubted the boss':

... There are many others, but the problem is that there is no time to talk about them. But let it go down here that the secretary-general of KANU, Hon. Oloitipiti, Hon. Kamotho, Hon. G. G. Kariuki, Hon. Rubia and others who gave statements to show — they should know that we are not sleeping.... They should swallow the bitter pill; they should resign because they are doubting the boss!¹⁸

In an effort to consolidate their own position Njonjo's closest allies viciously attacked the Minister in order to gain political ground. Arthur Magugu demonstrated how Njonjo had become a liability to his associates:

... the president himself immediately after telling the KANU governing council that the elections will be held in September, what did he do? He removed the office of the supervisor of elections from the ministry of constitutional affairs and placed it under the office of the attorney-general. That gave the indication that the president did not have faith in the minister for constitutional affairs....¹⁹

Once parliamentarians had established the identity of the alleged traitor, Njonjo rapidly fell from power. First, he resigned from his Kikuyu parliamentary seat and relinquished his position as the chairman of Kikuyu KANU sub-branch. Second, the President set up a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate charges levelled by parliamentarians. Third, at a KANU national governing council meeting presided over by Moi, Njonjo was suspended from the ruling party.²⁰

THE 1983 NYAYO ELECTIONS

The supervisor of elections, Z.M. Nyarango, announced that nomination day would be August 24, 1983 for Presidential elections and August 29, for Parliamentary elections. Under Kenya's electoral laws, elections cannot be scheduled for a period of less than twenty-one days following nomination day. The intervening period between nomination day and election day effectively becomes the 'official campaign' period. This period is highly significant as candidates are expected to account for monies spent and submit electoral expenses returns.²¹ However, this is a little misleading because most aspirants to parliament launch their campaigns prior to the 'official campaign' period.

In order to be eligible for the National Assembly, a nominee must:

- be a citizen of Kenya who has attained the age of 21 years;
- be registered in some constituency as a voter in elections to the National Assembly;
- be able to speak and, unless incapacitated by blindness or other physical cause, to read the Swahili and English languages well enough to take an active part in the proceedings of the National Assembly; and
- be a member of the Kenya African National Union and be nominated by that party in the manner prescribed by and under an act of parliament.²²

A candidate is disqualified if at the date of nomination the candidate:

- owes allegiance to a foreign state;
- is under sentence of death or is under sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months;
- is adjudged to be of unsound mind;
- is an undischarged bankrupt;
- holds or is active in any office of the public service, in the armed forces, or in a local government authority;
- has been convicted of an election offence or reported guilty of such an offence by a court hearing an election petition. (In such a case, such a person shall not be qualified to be nominated for election for such period, not exceeding five years, following his conviction).²³

In Kenya, each prospective candidate has to undergo two essential procedures prior to contesting an election. First, the candidate is subjected to a rigorous clearing process administered by the ruling party. Each application for the party nomination and clearing process must be accompanied by shs. 1,000²⁴ and each candidate must be a life member of the party. Second, each candidate has to submit nomination papers on nomination day before the returning officer of the constituency in which the candidate is seeking office. In addition, each prospective candidate must have a proposer and a seconder and be supported by at least seven, but not more than eighteen, other registered voters and KANU members of the constituency.

During previous elections, clearance has been a contentious issue. It has been used as an effective means to prevent opponents of the ruling elite from participating in national elections. In 1974, Odinga and other ex-KPU members were disallowed from contesting KANU primaries despite their efforts to rejoin the party. In 1979, the then new Moi regime had to once again contend with KPU dissidents led by Odinga, who were, as in previous electoral years, denied clearance. Personalities play a central role in the issue of clearance. No set party policy has been established to ensure that favouritism would not be the criterion for obtaining clearance.

At first sight, it appeared that the Nyayo elections would be similar to previous elections as various branches of KANU attempted to prevent prospective candidates from contesting the elections. However, the final decision on clearance rested with the delegates conference of the ruling party, chaired by the President. When KANU delegates met in Nairobi, they cleared a record number of aspirants, rejecting only four out of 995 prospective candidates. The rejection of the four candidates indicated that they were not blatantly denied clearance as the KPU were in previous national elections.²⁵ Significantly, the KPU affair was forgotten and ex-KPU members were permitted to participate.²⁶ In addition, no-one was denied clearance for being either pro- or anti-Njonjo. Moi, in his determination to attain legitimacy, appeared to leave the clearing exercise to the electorate.

Despite the fairest clearance exercises in Kenyan history, not all candidates who had been cleared were nominated. First, some did not have proper documentation. Second, certain candidates simply did not bother turning up and third, a number of candidates were time barred.²⁷

However, a number of candidates were re-instated after it was discovered that they were disqualified because of errors made by the returning officer. One such case was that of Okuka Bala from Nyando constituency who was permitted to contest the election after a clerical error was discovered. In addition, a number of candidates who were ineligible to contest the elections were granted a Presidential Pardon²⁸ which enabled them to contest the election. The President pardoned James Osogo, a former Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Daniel Mutinda, Bishop Alloys Ondiek and George Mwicigi: all had at one time breached electoral regulations.

In the 1983 elections the number of candidates elected unopposed were fewer than in the 1979 elections primarily because in 1979 Moi had openly campaigned and identified himself with several candidates. In certain cases he even made personal appearances at the candidates' campaign meetings. This no doubt influenced the outcome of the election.²⁹ In 1979, Moi's justification for campaigning for certain candidates, within the single party, was that it was his duty to inform the electorate as to who was the best candidate. An example of such intervention was evident when Moi addressed a rally in Laikipia and praised the area's M.P., G.G. Kariuki, saying that he did not think that there was anyone else who would dare oppose him (Kariuki) during the forthcoming elections.³⁰ However, in 1983, the President was essentially concerned with re-establishing his legitimacy and restoring his populist appeal. Thus, he could not appear to be undermining the electoral process by favouring any particular candidate.

Prior to the general election, KANU published a party manifesto. The manifesto

TABLE 1
NUMBER OF CANDIDATES RETURNED UNOPPOSED
IN THE 1979 AND 1983 ELECTIONS

1979	
CANDIDATE	CONSTITUENCY
1. Daniel arap Moi	Baringo Central
2. Mwai Kibaki	Othaya
3. Gituwa Kahengari	Juja
4. Nicolas Biwott	Kerio South
5. Peter Ejore	Turkana West
6. Justus ole Tipis	Narok North
7. Sampson Katurkana	Baringo East
8. Francis B. Tuyua	Malindi South

1983	
CANDIDATE	CONSTITUENCY
1. Daniel arap Moi	Baringo Central
2. Mwai Kibaki	Othaya
3. Justus ole Tipis	Narok North
4. Peter Ejore	Turkana West
5. Sampson Katurkana	Baringo East

was published to acquaint the public with the programme which the party would follow after receiving a new mandate. The 1983 manifesto emphasised the enormous strides the government had made in terms of development, yet admitted that a great deal remained to be done. The principal message of the manifesto was that of the plan to implement a new district-based development strategy. The KANU strategy was stated in the following principles which were to guide the party in order to serve the electorate:

1. involvement of all people in all districts in the planning and plan implementation process;
2. government to do more of what it does well and less of what past experience suggests others can do better;
3. government to share financial responsibility for its services more extensively with the beneficiaries of those services;
4. government to help Kenyans to help themselves;
5. ensure more efficient utilization of the existing productive capacity as well as greater attention to repair and maintenance of that capacity;
6. government and society should establish and enforce a code of conduct that shall guide all those in positions of responsibility;
7. government to ensure that all Kenyans share in the benefits of development.³¹

As with previous election manifestos these principles did not proposed concrete solutions to the developmental problems faced by a peasant-dominated society. A major function of the KANU manifesto was to provide parliamentary candidates with an officially sanctioned document which they could utilise in their campaigns. In fact, can-

didates were well advised by the Attorney- General to confine themselves to, and not deviate from, the essence of the manifesto during their campaign meetings. As the Attorney-General said: "anyone who ran wild and did not respect the manifesto would be stopped from addressing his meeting".³²

It was probably because of this stipulation that less than twenty candidates published their own manifestos. Those, who did print their own manifesto to explain why they were contesting a seat, did not in any way propose or initiate a policy which would be viewed as contradictory to the party platform. The manifesto effectively barred candidates from debating issues of national importance. Instead, campaigning was delegated to the local level. In particular, contests were based upon the developmental record of an incumbent as compared to the potential development a challenger could provide for a constituency. In short, most campaigns centred around the fundamental issue of who could do what for a constituency.

Certain campaign rules which had evolved in Kenya by the time of the Nyayo elections prevailed. Candidates were permitted to utilise the Harambee forum to gain support at the local level. However, techniques such as witchcraft and violence were formally disallowed.

In spite of precautions such as the placing of a ban on all night clubs and bans from operating after 11 p.m., the election campaign was marred by a series of violent outbreaks in a number of constituencies.³³ The essential reason for the eruption of campaign violence can be attributed to the practice of holding joint meetings for all the candidates in a constituency. Originally, the concept was aimed at providing the electorate with an opportunity to judge all the candidates at the same time.³⁴ However, in reality, joint meetings coupled with the practice of utilising youth wingers and the distribution of 'money' and 'alcohol' only had the effect of charging emotions which inevitably resulted in violent clashes. Critically, it permitted the administration to monitor candidates' meetings at the same time.

In contrast, inter-constituency violence among candidates was a result of the competition between powerful candidates from a particular region who had cabinet aspirations. As cabinet positions are usually based on a regional-tribal balance, candidates were trying for ministerial positions.

Despite the formal disallowance of traditional methods of coercing votes, isolated cases of oathing and witchcraft were reported by the Kenyan press. The most prominent case was in Mathira constituency, where a candidate had employed both a male and a female witchdoctor to administer an oath binding a potential voter from casting his ballot for any other candidate. "Should I defect from you and fail to vote for you I deserve total condemnation".³⁵

In response to the escalating violence, oathing and claims that witchcraft was being employed in the campaign, President Moi said:

... some candidates have already deviated from the letter and spirit of the manifesto and are levelling unwarranted personal attacks, while others, have resorted to dirty campaign tricks..... This is shameful, and reflects on what such people, if elected are capable of doing instead of leading the wannaichi towards greater social, economic and political heights.³⁶

THE RESULTS

After a period of intense campaigning, the general elections were held on Monday, September 26, 1983. The electorate had been charged with the responsibility of providing the President with a new team with whom he could work more effectively. As Moi said: "... I have been concerned and very disappointed with the performance of some of the people who I appointed to senior positions as ministers...."³⁷ However, the election results suggested that the electorate was rather lenient with incumbent M.P.s when compared to past elections.

Elections in Kenya inculcate a great fear among cabinet ministers and assistant ministers primarily because of the large turnover in this highly visible group. Moi's call for the election of a new team and the Njonjo affair was expected to provide startling results. However, the most striking feature of the elections was the rejection of five cabinet ministers. The five ministers who were ousted were: J. J. Kamotho, the Minister of Higher Education who was defeated by John Michuki in Kangema; Dr. Waiyaki, the Minister of Agriculture who lost to the popular former Mayor of Nairobi Andrew Ngumba in the hotly contested seat of Mathare; G. G. Kariuki, the one time confidant of Moi and close associate of Njonjo who went down in defeat to Joseph Mathenge in Laikipia West; the Minister of Labour, Titus Mbathi who lost his Kitui central seat to his arch-rival, Joseph Mutinda; and John Okwanyo, the Minister of Commerce who lost to a new-comer, Gor S. Misiani in Migori. In addition, nine assistant ministers were defeated.³⁸

TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF CABINET MINISTERS DEFEATED
AT THE GENERAL ELECTIONS

	1974	1979	1983
Cabinet Size	22	22	26
No. of Defeated Ministers	4	7	5
% of Defeated Ministers	18.8%	31.8%	19.23%

Source: *The Weekly Review*, October 7, 1983.

TABLE III
NUMBER OF M.P.s WHO LOST THEIR SEATS

	1974	1979	1983
No. of Seats	158	158	158
No. of M.P.s who lost	88	72	56
%	55.69	45.56	35.44

Source: *The Weekly Review*, September 30, 1983.

TABLE IV

VOTER TURNOUT BY PROVINCES

PROVINCE	SEATS	1979	1983	% DIFFERENCE
Nairobi	8	59.35	29.99	29.36
Coast	18	76.77	40.28	36.49
North Eastern	8	56.04	37.54	18.50
Eastern	27	68.66	50.20	18.46
Central	21	76.72	59.54	17.18
Rift Valley	37	73.44	52.96	20.48
Western	16	69.81	47.52	22.29
Nyanza	23	58.59	43.07	15.52
TOTAL	158	67.85 Average	47.85 Average	20.00 Average

Source: *The Weekly Review*, Election Handbook, September 2, 1983
The Weekly Review, September 30, 1983

Once again a large number of parliamentarians failed to retain their seats. Surprisingly, the turnover was not as heavy as it has been in previous elections; slightly over 35% as compared to 45% in 1979. There was also an immense difference between 1979 and 1983 in voter turnout. A number of different factors influenced the level of voter turnout from province to province. These included the size of constituency, the number of constituencies in a province, geographical reasons, communications facilities and political efficacy. The low turnout in every province can also be attributed to the financial limits imposed by electoral laws, the depressed state of the economy and mere apathy. In addition, many Kenyans expected polling day to be the date when they would witness another coup attempt.³⁹

In 1979, the polling day was declared a national holiday to enable everyone to vote. In 1983, no such directive was issued but employers were instructed to give employees time off work to vote. However, in many cases the distance between work and the appropriate polling booth was too great to warrant a trip simply to cast a vote. More important, low turnout particularly in urban areas suggested that the elections would not provide a new beginning as had been promised by the ruling elite but merely a continuation of past policies as had been demonstrated by the Moi administration following the 1979 election. This inevitably placed the Moi regime on tenuous ground. In short, the electorate did not appear willing to give Moi the much needed legitimacy that he required to survive in the long run.

THE 1983 NYAYO CABINET

In an attempt to demonstrate a sense of urgency in conducting the affairs of the nation, Moi announced the new cabinet within a week following the elections. The defeat of five cabinet ministers and nine assistant ministers favoured Moi in that it provided him with greater flexibility in choosing a new cabinet. While choosing the cabinet, Moi made a number of sweeping changes, yet he maintained continuity, re-appointing most of the members who were part of the last cabinet. A number of ministries were consolidated in the interest of greater efficiency and budgetary con-

siderations. Moi appointed a 23 man cabinet, dropping three ministers and introducing five new faces into a 20 ministries government. The three ministers who were dropped were Zachary Ouyonka, Stanley Oloitipitip and Charles Rubia, all of whom were exceptionally close to Njonjo.⁴⁰ In addition, Moi dropped six assistant ministers who had been re-elected. However, in most cases he appointed anyone who had defeated an assistant minister to the same position. In a conciliatory effort, it appears that the Luo gained in the appointments of assistant ministers.

On appointing a new cabinet the President said:

... while considering appointments of ministers, assistant ministers and other public officers to constitutional offices, I have seriously taken cognizance of the fact that we have heavy responsibility ahead of us, which must be tackled skillfully and with dedication in order to meet the aspirations of all Kenyans... I wish therefore to make it quite clear that the criteria for appointment to such demanding positions must be seen to be above tribal or ethnic sentiments. In other words, efficiency and service to the nation must take precedence.⁴¹

However, Moi's central concern in choosing the cabinet was to ensure that a regional and ethnic balance existed (see Table V below).

TABLE V
THE 1983 KENYAN CABINET

MINISTRY	MINISTER	TRIBAL OR ETHNIC GROUP
1. President	D. Moi	Kalenjin
2. Vice President and Home Affairs	M. Kibaki	Kikuyu
3. Agriculture and Livestock Development	W. Odongo Omamo	Luo
4. Attorney-General	Mathew Guy Muli	Kamba
5. Education, Science & Technology	Johnathan N'geno	Kalenjin
6. Commerce and Industry	A.J. Omanga	Kisii
7. Culture and Social Services	Kenneth Matiba	Kikuyu
8. Co-operative Development	M. Mango	Luhya
9. Energy	N. Biwott	Kalenjin
10. Finance and Planning	G. Saitoti	Masai
11. Foreign Affairs	E. Mwangale	Luhya
12. Health	K. M'Mbijewe	Kalenjin
13. Information and Broadcasting	R. Matano	Digo
14. Labour	R. J. Ouko	Luo
15. Lands and Settlement	P. Ngei	Kamba
16. Local Government	M. Mudavadi	Luhya
17. Environment & Natural Resources	E. Mwamunga	Taita
18. Tourism and Wildlife	M. Wanjigi	Kikuyu
19. Transport and Communication	H. Kosgey	Kalenjin
20. Works, Housing & Physical Planning	A. Magugu	Kikuyu
21. Water Development	J. Nyagah	Embu
22. State	Justus Tipis	Masai
	P. Nyakiamo	Luo
	H.M. Mohammed	Somali

Source: *The Weekly Review*, October 7, 1983.

Two appointments to the cabinet were rather striking. First, the appointment of George Saitoti as Minister of Finance and second, Hussein Maalim Mohammed's appointment as Minister of State Saitoti, a mathematics professor at the University of Nairobi, was the first nominated member to be appointed to the Finance portfolio, and in fact only the second nominated member to be appointed to the cabinet.⁴² Saitoti was brought in to stave off a critical crisis in the economy. As a nominated M.P., it was expected that he would be above constituency matters and could totally devote his energy to the recovery of the economy. Mohammed, on the other hand, was the first minister to be appointed from the North Eastern province and also became the first Moslem in the cabinet. His appointment reflects the increasing influence of General Mohammed who led the attack against the 'Rebels' during the attempted coup.⁴³ Hussein Mohammed is General Mohammed's younger brother.

CONCLUSION

The 1983 Nyayo elections were called by Moi a year early to dissipate a crisis which had emerged following the naming of Charles Njonjo as a traitor and his dismissal from cabinet and the party. More important, the elections represented an opportunity to resolve a critical political situation which had culminated in the coup attempt of August 1, 1982. The crisis resulted primarily because of a number of factors. First, failing economic advance, particularly among the rural and urban poor, had resulted in a crisis of expectations. Despite Moi's assurance, the less fortunate found themselves in a worse position than before. The public had also become highly sceptical as to Moi's ability to rule and maintain that sense of stability which had made Kenya unique among African countries. The purpose of calling the election was to engage in yet another campaign to consolidate his power and to re-establish legitimacy.

The most salient institutional change in the 1983 elections was the emergence of a *de jure* one-party state. However, this important legal change did not result in a significant departure from past practices. The ruling party, KANU, despite its claim of being a mass party, remained inactive until election time and even then only played a role in candidate recruitment and qualification. There were no procedural differences, though the party clearing exercises were the fairest that the country had ever seen. There were no major differences in the election as compared to previous elections in terms of the electoral procedure, or even in the manner in which the campaign was conducted. The general elections essentially provided a forum for public scrutiny of a number of complaints and frustrations of the electorate at the local level.

Also, the elections were held at a time of acute economic difficulty. This inevitably affected the campaign and was a contributing factor in the low voter turnout. The authoritarian tendencies and practices of the Moi regime caused the issues in the campaign to be highly localized. The results of the election were highly indicative of the apathy which characterised the mood of the electorate. A new parliament and a new cabinet no longer represent a solution to the problems which resulted in an attempted coup and prompted the calling of the election. In fact, the electoral results show that there are relatively few new M.P.s. This clearly does not augur well for Moi's con-

tinued existence on the Kenyan political scene, particularly at a time when he needs to demonstrate a significant departure from past practices and policies.

For the first time in four years there will be fewer members on the frontbenches of the National Assembly than on the backbenches. In 1979, Moi appointed more than half the M.P.s to the government, hoping that dissent in parliament would be overcome. Apparently, the President has learned that merely appointing someone to the government does not ensure control over his opposition and dissent.

Moi's reliance upon new sources of support is abundantly clear from the composition of the new cabinet. A shift in power has occurred away from the Kikuyu who had traditionally dominated both political and economic activity. The new cabinet has further eroded the power and influence of the Kikuyu, a process which has been evolving since Moi's accession to power. Kikuyu representation was reduced, compared to the previous cabinet, from eight to four. Critically, the Kiambu Kikuyu have been drastically affected.

The centre of power has moved from the Kikuyu to areas other than Kikuyu land. Moi has improved his position following the elections by establishing linkages and support in all the regions and with most tribal groups in the country. Significantly, the trend is to shift power away from the Kikuyu to the minority tribes which had formulated the KADU/APP alliance in the early sixties in order to challenge Kenyatta and KANU.⁴⁴ The minority tribes have gained in the new cabinet, particularly the Kalenjin and Rift Valley politicians. This may help Moi regain the national and populist appeal characteristic of his earlier rule. However, it is now an open question how long the Kikuyu will be prepared to accept a secondary role in the control and distribution of power which comes from commanding the presidency. The departure of Njonjo may very well mean that the tense intra-Kikuyu split will take second place to a desire of the Kikuyu to secure the presidency which has been lost to a non-Kikuyu.⁴⁵ In addition, Moi has to be extremely careful because his leadership is deeply divided and operates from a fragile base. This could force the military to political intervention. The potential for change beyond the established regime is defined, on the one hand, by the army intervening to rule directly along conservative lines and on the other by the neglected constituency — the rural and the urban poor, the landless and the unemployed, those on the margin — becoming an active political force.

The elections held in Kenya, a one-party state, have demonstrated that, despite engaging in another campaign to consolidate his rule, Moi has failed to obtain the legitimacy he requires to survive for an extended period. Thus, the study of such an election is highly significant in determining the general direction of politics in a one-party state like Kenya.

Moi is bound to discover that the exercise of power is fraught with problems. Internal divisions and issues will continue to keep the President pre-occupied with solving an acute economic/food crisis while the problems associated with ethnicity will remain a salient feature of Kenyan politics.

FOOTNOTES

1. Leading proponents of this view include Goran Hyden and Colin Leys. See their "Elections and politics in single-party systems: the case of Kenya and Tanzania", *British Journal of Political Science*, 1972, pp. 389—420. For insight into the formative bases of one-party systems see Ralph Premdas, "Towards A One-Party System in Papua New Guinea: Some Problems and Prospects", *Australian Outlook*, Vol.29, No. 2, August 1975, pp. 161—179.
2. For an excellent analysis of this period see Cherry Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya 1963—8*. (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970).
3. For an account of the KPU's decline see Oginga Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).
4. Kenyatta's survival on the political scene was the result of his ability to allow parliament to operate as a safety-valve for dissent. This was evident in 1975 when the popular M.P., J.M. Kariuki, was murdered and a number of senior government officials were implicated. Since parliament expressed its discontent with the handling of the Kariuki affair, Kenyatta did not intervene, immediately assuring the populace that parliament was examining the matter.
5. In 1964, however, several contingents of the Kenyan forces mutinied and were disarmed by British troops at the request of the Kenyan government. Also, in 1971 and 1981 coup plots were undermined by the Kenya Intelligence network.
6. Two of the most prominent politicians who have been assassinated were Tom Mboya and J.M. Kariuki.
7. See my "Political Succession in Kenya: The Transition from Kenyatta to Moi", Paper presented to the African Studies Association of Australia and the Pacific Annual Conference, Melbourne, 1984.
8. In May 1982, Oginga Odinga and George Anyona announced their intention to establish a socialist party in Kenya; see *The Standard*, May 21, 1982, p.4.
9. The President was distancing himself from his closest advisers in the cabinet. The press in Kenya no longer provided coverage of cabinet ministers who accompanied the President as it had in the past. For a detailed description see *The Weekly Review*, May 20, 1983.
10. Refer to *Drum*, March 1983, Nairobi: Drum Publications Ltd., 1983, p.10.
11. For an analysis of the Kenyan economy, see *Race and Class*, XXIV, 3, 1983
12. Private interview, September 1983. See also *The Weekly Review*, July 17, 1983.
13. *The Weekly Review*, November 5, 1982, p.9.
14. *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, May 14, 1983.
15. For a text of the speech see *The Weekly Review*, May 13, 1983, p.4.
16. *Drum, op.cit.*, June, 1983, p.7.
17. For a detailed account of the 'Njonjo Debate' see *The Weekly Review*, July 1, 1983 and July 8, 1983.
Shikuku produced clippings from a South African magazine implicating Njonjo. However, this was proven false by Arnold Raphael, a *Standard* correspondent, who showed the magazine was a front for the South African state security agency, Boss. See *The Weekly Review*, July 8, 1983, p.8.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Id.*, p.21.
20. Suspended together with Njonjo was Richard Litunya, a former M.P. for Butere, who sent Njonjo a telegram to disassociate himself from criticism of Njonjo.
21. This was in line with a bill passed in parliament in 1979, intended to limit maximum expenditures by parliamentary candidates to Shs. 40,000. It should be pointed out that in 1979 no candidate was disqualified for overspending or incorrectly filing election expenses returns.
22. Republic of Kenya, *The Constitution of Kenya* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1983), p.200.
23. *Id.*, pp. 20—21. Also, the President may waive the 5-year ban on those convicted of electoral offences.
24. This lends credence to the contention that election is for the rich. A life membership cost Shs. 1,000, whereas an annual party membership cost Shs. 2.

25. Those not cleared were Warioukha Ali from Marsabit North, who had deserted the Army; Stanley Nyagah from Embu North, for killing his wife; a third candidate had absconded to a foreign nation and the fourth had divulged government secrets.
26. Cleared were such prominent members of the KPU as Achieng Oneko and Luke Obok. Odinga Odinga, however, was under house arrest.
27. *Daily Nation*, August 30, 1983, p.1.
28. The presidential pardon was designed for Kenyatta, especially following Paul Ngei's ban in a special bill which was passed unanimously in the National Assembly.
29. In contrast, Kenyatta had never resorted to showing his preference for a particular candidate.
30. *The Weekly Review*, January 9, 1979.
31. *Drum, op. cit.*, October 1983, p.10.
32. *The Standard*, September 13, 1983, p.16.
33. In previous elections, night-clubs and bars had been the scene of much violence. For a detailed description of campaign violence, see *Daily Nation*, August 31, 1983; September 5, 1983 and September 15, 1983. Also, see *The Standard*, September 12, 1983 and *The Weekly Review*, September 9, 1983, pp. 4—5.
34. Joint meetings are a contentious subject among candidates. Powerful politicians object to joint meetings because the crowd usually comes to listen to them, yet their lesser known opponents are given exposure at their expense.
35. For a detailed description refer to the *Kenya Times*, Nairobi, September 12, 1983, p. 1. Also, refer to the *Daily Nation* and *The Weekly Review* September 16, 1983, p. 9.
36. *The Standard*, September 13, 1983, p. 1.
37. *Daily Nation*, September 26, 1983, p.6.
38. These were Henry Wariithi, Kamwitini Munyi, Mark Mwithaga, Munene Kariuki, James Njiru, Otieno Ambula, John Keen, Vincent arap Ioo, and Kassam Mwamzandi.
39. Private interview, September, 1983.
40. Onvonka was dropped from the cabinet because he was in jail facing a murder charge. He had ordered his body guard to shoot into a crowd during the campaign. Rubia and Oloitipitip were close associates of Njonjo.
41. *The Sunday Times*, Nairobi, October 2, 1983, p. 24.
42. The only other nominated M.P. who was a cabinet minister was Bruce McKenzie.
43. *African Confidential*, February 2, 1983, Vol. 24, No. 3. This issue provided an excellent analysis of the increasing influence of General Mohammed.
44. In an attempt to gain Luo support, Odinga was released from house arrest. The Luo are more likely to support Moi because an earlier alliance with the Kikuyu did not prove to be fruitful.
45. See my *op.cit.* paper.

APPENDIX I

MINISTRY	MINISTER	TRIBAL OR ETHNIC GROUP
President	D. Moi	Kalenjin
Vice-President and Home Affairs	M. Kibaki	Kikuyu
Agriculture	Dr. M. Waiyaki	Kikuyu
Attorney-General	J. Kamere	Kikuyu
Basic Education	J. arap Ngeno	Kalenjin
Commerce	J. Okwanyo	Luo
Constitution Affairs	C. Njonjo	Kikuyu
Culture and Social Services	M. Mudavadi	Luhya
Co-operative Development	R. Matano	Digo
Econ. Planning and Development	Dr. Z. Onyong	Kisii
Energy	K. M'Mbijewe	Kalenjin
Finance	A. Magugu	Kikuyu
Foreign Affairs	Dr. R. Ouko	Luo
Health	M. Mango	Luhya
Higher Education	J. Komotho	Kikuyu
Industry		
Information and Broadcasting	E. Mwamunga	Taita
Labour		
Lands, Settlement and Physical Planning	G.G. Kariuki	Kikuyu
Livestock Development	Paul Ngei	Kamba
Regional Development, Science and Technology	N. Biwott	Kalenjin
Tourism and Wildlife	E. Mwangale	Luhya
Transport and Communications	H. Kosgey	Kalenjin
Water Development	J. Nyangah	Embu
Works and Housing	Mr. C. Rubia	Kikuyu
State	J. Gichuru	Kikuyu
State	J. Gichuru	Kikuyu
Natural Resources and Environment	P. Aloo Aringo	Luo

Source: *The Standard*, February 26, 1982, pp.1—2.

SOVIET PROP TO IDI AMIN'S REGIME: AN ASSESSMENT

James Mulira*

INTRODUCTION

While external factors contributed, to a certain extent, to the coup of 1971, its inherent causes lay in the existing contradictions in the complex Ugandan society, which for generations had been beset by ethnic, religious, and class differences. In an attempt to eliminate such divisive elements, by forming a national egalitarian society in Uganda which had not been achieved during the colonial era, Obote antagonised and alienated several groups that preferred to retain the *status quo*. By 1966, Obote resorted to forceful measures to achieve national unity, but these methods were interpreted by his antagonists as machiavellian, to say the least. Amin, by design and sometimes by chance utilised the anti-Obote groups to oust Obote and to win the political support that was crucial for the consolidation of his power, at least for the first years of his regime.¹

The domestic and foreign policies of Idi Amin cannot be fully understood without a discussion of his background and personality. Much has already been written about his regime from various aspects. This essay intends to focus on his relations with the Soviet bloc which, in the author's opinion, played a major role in sustaining his unpopular regime in power. Soviet economic and, particularly, military aid helped Amin to terrorise and destroy his internal and external "enemies", both real and imaginary. It propped up his confidence so that he dared to antagonise his neighbours, Kenya and Tanzania in particular, and to lash his critics at will. In short, support gave him the confidence that enabled him to ignore the international isolation of his regime, and save it from a much earlier collapse. Other factors which also sustained his regime included religious and ethnic cleavages as well as political ineptitude and class antagonism in the Ugandan society.

AMIN'S EARLY LIFE

Amin's origin is somewhat obscure. While he claimed to be a Kakwa from Northern Uganda born around 1926, other sources reveal that he is a Nubian from southern Sudan born in 1925. The Kakwa, who are found in northern Uganda, West Zaire and southern Sudan are closely related to the Bari of southern Sudan.² He is a descendant of a Nubian community created by the isolation of Equatoria region of the Egyptian Sudan which emanated from the uprising of the followers of Ah Mad al Mahdi (1882—1885) in the Sudan. Emir Pasha's troops, who fought the rebels, included the Nubians who

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