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THE MANUAL LABOURER IN THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF ARISTOTLE AND MARX: PREDICAMENT AND POTENTIAL FOR SELF-REALISATION

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The political theories of Aristotle and Marx are slightly more than two thousand years apart, and so are the social systems in the context of which these theories were conceived, developed and propounded. There is, however, one constant: both in the Greek city state and the industrialised West-European state, the manual labourer's productivity supported the society. Yet, despite this vital importance of manual labourers in these societies, they were everywhere despised and deprived of the right to enjoy the fruit of their labour. In the case of slaves, they were not even considered part of society, but thinking household tools for putting their fellow (but inanimate) tools to productive use, for the benefit of the master.

In many respects Aristotle and Marx have differing views and attitudes towards the predicament of the manual labourer. For Aristotle, the predicament seems to be a deserved curse about which nothing can be done; a social status produced by some past lack in virtue, for whatever reason, which, in turn, inhibits attainment of virtue. Unless some extraordinary force intervenes, the predicament reproduces itself in some form of vicious circle because the offspring of the manual labourer enters society with the disadvantages of low birth, lack of property and lack of virtue. For Marx, however, the predicament is a Society-made phenomenon; labour is not a curse but a means to self-realisation. The predicament of the manual labourer is far from being a terminal condition and will be put to an end by the collective revolutionary action of the proletariat.

In order to undertake a comparative analysis of Aristotle's and Marx's views and attitudes towards the manual labourer in their respective societies, it is proper to look into what I would call, in the loosest sense of the term, their "class analysis" of society.

In what Aristotle calls the "parts of the state", he identifies the following social groups which he differentiates according to their respective occupations: (a) the bulk of the people concerned with food production, called tillers of the soil; (b) the part called mechanical, by which he means people who follow those skills which are indispensable to the running of a state (these skills are further divided into the absolutely essential and those who minister to luxury or the good life); (c) the commercial, by which he means that section which spends its time on buying and selling, merchant commerce and retail trade; (d) the section comprising hired labourers; (e) the element which will defend in

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times of war.¹ To these groups, Aristotle adds the "well-to-do" and those connected with the administration of justice and the deliberative element which represents political wisdom: the officials, judges and deliberators.²

Of the above Aristotelian "parts of the state", the tillers of the soil, the mechanical part and the hired labourers constitute clearly the category of "manual labourers" which this paper is intended to address. One conspicuous omission in Aristotle's analysis is the slaves, but the omission is not accidental. For him, as pointed out earlier, they were just tools, exogenous to the human organic composition of the city state.

Aristotle's dehumanisation of the labouring slave is total. For him, "a slave is a sort of living piece of property; and like any other servant is a tool in charge of other tools".³ Aristotle posits that slaves are so by nature, due to the fact that their conditions are such that their function is the use of their bodies and nothing better can be expected of them:

the "slave" by nature is he that can and therefore does belong to another, and he that participates in reason so far as to recognize it but not so as to possess it.⁴

Thus, the basic difference between a slave and animals is that the slave can obey reason while animals obey not reason but emotions.

Aristotle more or less equates the use made of slaves with that made of tame animals. According to him,

they both help with their bodies to supply our essential needs. It is then part of nature's intention to make the bodies of free men to differ from those of slaves, the latter strong enough to be used for necessary tasks, the former erect and useless for that kind of work, but well suited for the life of a citizen of a state.⁵

I would like to point out that Aristotle's reasoning on the definition of a slave and his characteristics is rather muddled. For example, while he asserts that nature bestows upon natural slaves a distinct bodily physique suitable for their necessary tasks, he hastens to add that there are free men "who have the right soul but not the body", meaning that their physique is as strong as that of slaves. Elsewhere, the application of the term "slave" is limitlessly loose. For example, he argues that it is proper that Greeks should rule non-Greeks, the implication being that non-Greek and slave are by nature identical.⁶ One last example could be cited to illustrate Aristotle's inconsistency in his conceptual definition of a slave. As pointed out above, one of the parts of a state is, according to Aristotle, the tillers of the soil. However, this point is clearly negated when, at a later stage, he suggests that "the agricultural workers must be slaves, or non-Greeks dwelling in the country roundabout".⁷ This also applies to the mechanical element, of which he says it "has no part in the state nor has any other class that is not productive of virtue".⁸

The picture that emerges so far is that, for Aristotle, slaves are unquestionably living objects for which possession or potential attainment of virtue is out of the question. However, a careful study of various parts of the text indicates that the line separating the agricultural and mechanical worker or, indeed, the non-Greek from the slave is extremely thin. Writing about the state with the finest constitution, Aristotle shows his real mind concerning the agricultural and mechanical labourers:

in the state with the finest constitution, which possesses just men who are just absolutely and not relatively to the assumed situation, the citizens must not live a

mechanical or commercial life. Such a life is not noble, and it militates against virtue. Nor must those who are to be citizens be agricultural workers, for they must have leisure to develop their virtue, and for the activities of a citizen.⁹

Elsewhere, Aristotle states that "a skilled mechanic is in a restricted sense in a condition of slavery".¹⁰ Thus, the foregoing suggests that Aristotle has a very low opinion of the manual labourer, even though, generally speaking, he concedes the citizenship right to those manual labourers who are not outright slaves. At a later stage, I will address his skeptical outlook concerning these people's potential for virtue, ability to rule, and self-realisation.

Karl Marx, on the other hand, made a class analysis of the western industrialised society of his day. From his analysis, the peasantry and the proletariat are the two social classes most relevant to this paper because they entirely consist of manual labourers. Members of the lower middle class, such as the artisans, also fit into this category. The lumpen proletariat also occasionally fits in the category of manual labourers, although very often members of this class live a parasitic type of life which does not involve productive manual labour. A look into Marx's view of these labouring classes might be a useful starting point for comparing him with Aristotle.

What one immediately notices in Marx's works is that, unlike Aristotle, he does not say much about slaves. This is understandable, since slavery had long ceased to be the dominant mode of production in nineteenth century western Europe, in which setting Marx was writing. The context in which Marx mentions slaves is when he makes the analogy between a modern worker and an ancient slave. Thus, to him, the modern wage-earners are less than ancient slaves. Though they are legally the free owners of their working power and legally equal to the owner of the means of production, and though they do not sell themselves in totality but only their working power for a limited time, they are nevertheless completely a commodity on the modern labour market because their working power is their only true property which they are forced to alienate in order to live by it. To Marx, the "free" slave labourer incorporates the whole problem of modern society; the Greek slaves, by contrast, stood outside the society of their free fellowmen, and their personal fates had no bearing on it. Clearly, then, even when he refers to the modern slave, the analogy is a very loose one.

Marx considers the proletariat's predicament to be at least as bad as that of ancient slaves, if not much worse. This feeling is vividly voiced in the *Communist Manifesto*, thus:

Masses of laborers, crowded into the factory, are organized like soldiers.... Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois state; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the foreman, and above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself.¹¹

Marx's attitude towards the self-liberating potential of the proletariat is extremely positive, and on this score he significantly differs from Aristotle who, as I pointed out earlier, had a very low opinion of the labouring masses in that potential. Marx attributes this potential, among other things, to the clear one-to-one antagonism between the polarised bourgeoisie and proletariat. He considers this clear polarisation to be a new development in human history:

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; and in almost all of these particular classes, again, other subordinate gradations.... Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, shows, however, this distinctive feature: --- society is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: bourgeoisie and proletariat¹²

Marx sees in this great proletarian camp the hope for liberation, not only of the oppressed proletarian class itself, but of everyone:

the proletariat is a sphere which cannot become emancipated without emancipating itself from all the remaining spheres of society, thereby in turn emancipating them; it (the proletariat) is in a word the complete loss of man and therefore can regain itself only by completely regaining man¹³

This unequivocal assertion that the proletariat commands the ability to realise itself and, indeed, engineer the self-realisation of humanity, marks the fundamental difference between Aristotle's and Marx's view of the manual labourers' potential for self-realisation. I will discuss the philosophic basis of this difference later in the paper.

However, Marx does not indiscriminately associate the self-realisation potential with all categories of labouring people. In fact, as I will indicate below, he had a low opinion of the peasantry, the lumpen proletariat and the lower strata of the middle class, for various reasons. But, since he saw all these classes gravitating towards the proletariat, he considered their self-realisation ultimately to be part and parcel of that of the proletariat.

Situating the west-European peasantry of the nineteenth century in the dynamics of the political economic life of his time, Marx often considered it to be reactionary, due to its petty property consciousness, its opportunism, its narrowly parochial interests, its imperviousness to political mobilisation by its fellow exploited class (the proletariat) which it mistrusted, and its unwillingness to fight against the bourgeoisie. Marx's low opinion of the peasantry is clearly discernible in his description of the December 10, 1848 peasant insurrection in France:

December 10, 1848, was the day of the peasant insurrection. Only from this day does the February of the French peasants date. The symbol that expressed their entry into the revolutionary movement, clumsily cunning, knavishly naive, doltishly sublime, a calculated superstition, a pathetic burlesque, a cleverly stupid anachronism, a world of historic piece of buffoonery and an undecipherable hieroglyphic for the understanding of the civilised -- this symbol bore the unmistakable features of the class that represents barbarism within civilization¹⁴

With regard to the members of the lower stratum of the middle class who, more often than not, engage in manual labour and who, with the passage of time, sink gradually into the proletariat, Marx has a negative attitude, too.

The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as factions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. What is more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history¹⁵

As for the lumpen proletariat, Marx shows not only contempt, but outright aversion. The following description of this class testifies to this fact:

the lumpen proletariat, in all big towns form a mass strictly differentiated from the industrial proletariat, a recruiting ground for thieves and criminals of all kinds, living on the crumbs of society, people without a definite trade, vagabonds, "gens sans feu et sans aveu", varying according to the degree of civilization of the nation to which they belong, but never renouncing their "lazzaroni" character...¹⁶

In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx assesses the lumpen proletariat's potential for revolution thus:

The "dangerous class", the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.¹⁷

The foregoing shows that the contempts for the labouring masses, noted in Aristotle earlier, is not totally absent in Marx, especially in his feelings about the peasantry, the lower middle class and the lumpen proletariat. There is, however, a difference between the two men. Whereas for Aristotle the handicap of the labouring masses is more or less absolute and eternal, for Marx it is relative and temporary. With the help of the most enlightened and revolutionary class, the proletariat, all these other classes will overcome their handicap and become active forces in building a better world, where the faculties of each individual will have the opportunity of unfettered development. The other basic difference is that, whereas Aristotle attributes the handicap of the labouring masses to nature, Marx clearly attributes it to societal, and therefore remediable causes.

One of his inconsistencies, Aristotle comes close to what is basic to Marx's line of thinking but he does not develop that theoretical foundation: "... Man is born with weapons which he can use in the service of practical wisdom and virtue."¹⁸ Instead, he takes a deterministic/ascriptive line which leads to the conclusion that the ability to attain virtue is by nature the exclusive monopoly of some individuals only. According to Aristotle, one of the forms of the individual's self-realisation is to rule. This comes as a result of the attainment of superiority in virtue, but this superiority can only be found in a small number of specific individuals:

clearly it is unavoidable that the same persons should always rule; for that divine "golden" element in the soul does not vary in its incidence but is present always in the same people.¹⁹

Aristotle stresses that the ruler must have moral virtue in its entirety; for his function is in its fullest sense that of a master-craftsman.

A question which arises at this juncture is whether or not, in Aristotle's view, manual labourers are totally condemned to lack of virtue and can therefore never realise themselves by becoming rulers. Here, Aristotle admits that, in fact, both ruler and ruled must have a share in virtue, but that there are differences in virtue in each case. Thus, skilled workers need at least virtue to keep them from the intemperance which often interferes with their work. The special qualification set for a ruler is practical wisdom. All other virtues must be possessed, so it seems, both by rulers and by ruled. The virtue of a person being ruled is not practical wisdom but correct opinion.

There is nothing that suggests that manual labourers cannot acquire practical wisdom except if slaves, because in that case they would be lacking the deliberative faculty in their souls. Here, the problem arises when one recalls that sometimes Aristotle equates tillers of the soil and mechanics with slaves. The contradiction in Aristotle's way of viewing the leadership potential of the manual labourers becomes obvious when one compares the following argument concerning the mass of the citizens' political participation with his earlier assertion that even they possess virtue:

We must remember that they (the mass of citizens) are not men of wealth, and have no claim to virtue in anything. To let them share in the highest offices is a risk: inevitably, their unjust standards will cause them to commit injustice, and their lack of judgement will lead them into error. On the other hand there is a risk in not giving them a share, and in their non-participation, for when there are many who have no property and no honours they inevitably constitute a huge hostile element in the state. But it can still remain open to them to participate in deliberating and judging. It was for this reason that both Solon and some of the other lawgivers gave to the people power to elect officials and to demand an account from them at the end of their tenure, but no right individually to hold such offices. This was on the principle that the whole body acting together has the necessary perception, even though each is individually only partly qualified to judge. By thus mixing with the better sort, they render good service in their states, in something like the way that a combination of coarse foods with refined renders the whole diet more nutritious than a small amount of the latter.²⁰

Here, one notices that in his unresolved internal conflict as to whether or not the labouring masses do have virtue at all, or enough of it to rule or at least participate actively in political life, Aristotle conjures up the idea of limited collective participation. He rationalises this idea in the following manner:

Provided the mass of the people is not too slave-like, each individual will indeed be a worse judge than the experts, but collectively they will be better, or at any rate not worse..... Where there are many people, each has some share of virtue and practical wisdom; and when they are brought together, just as in the mass they become as it were one man with many pairs of feet and hands and many senses, so also do they become one in regard to character and intelligence.²¹

According to Aristotle, this collective leadership and rule by the poor is what democracy is all about. There is, however, one instance where Aristotle admits that a single individual from the labouring masses can rule. The tyrant, as an individual, "springs from the people, from the populace, and directs his efforts against the notables, to the end that the people may not be wronged by them... it is fairly generally true to say that the tyrants have mostly begun as demagogues, being trusted because they abused the notables"²²

The message that emerges from Aristotle's self-contradicting positions on the labouring masses' ability for self-realisation through virtue and rule is very confusing. At some places he says the potential is there, and elsewhere he rules out that potential. An attempt to balance these various contradictory positions leads to the conclusion that the balance tilts more to the negative side. His skepticism by far outweighs the advantage of doubt he is willing to concede to the manual labourer.

Marx, for his part, does not share this dilemma with Aristotle. His confidence in

the power and ability of the proletariat for self-realisation is high. What the proletariat requires to take over state power is ideological and class consciousness, and proper organisation. In his works, the abstract Aristotelian category of "virtue" does not assume any position of conceptual prominence. Consciousness is, for Marx, the key to the workers' self-realisation:

To be successful in their revolution, the workers must first become conscious of themselves as a class. The mass of workers becomes united and constitutes itself as a class for itself.²³

He is optimistic about the proletariat's ability to found a new society because they alone have the potential to build a universal association, have no special interest to defend and therefore are wholly social.

Unlike Aristotle, Marx does not capitalise on "leisure" being the *sine qua non* of acquiring virtue and, therefore, being able to rule. Aristotle categorically states that "it should be those who are best able to find spare time that should hold office"²⁴. He argues, however, that to take time off is not possible without revenue. For him, it is most essential that provision be made for the best people to have leisure and not to depart in any way from standards of propriety, not only while in office but even as private citizens. Elsewhere, he goes so far as to say that the virtue of a citizen can only be ascribed to those who are in fact relieved of necessary tasks. Such tasks are supposed to be discharged for the citizen by slaves, mechanics and hired labourers. Even when Aristotle concedes that the poor can rule under democracy, he makes leisure central to that possibility:

The fourth type of democracy is one whereby even the poor, *being able to have time off*, take part in the administration of the constitution, receiving pay for doing so. In fact, the mass of the poor take the most time off: they have no encumbrances, while the wealthy, who have private affairs to look after, often do not take part in the Assembly and courts of law.²⁵

Aristotle also attributes the development of one's mental faculties and other skills to the availability of leisure time, which the manual labourers do not have. Marx clearly differs from Aristotle on this point, on the ground that being a manual worker and having leisure time are not necessarily two mutually exclusive things. The manual worker's lack of leisure time is only a feature of an exploitative world. He argues that in a classless society "each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes", without being forced into a sphere of activity "which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him"; "I can hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, raise cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind."²⁶

One major difference between Aristotle's and Marx's view of the manual labourers' predicament and potential for self-realisation lies in their different philosophical concepts of labour. Whereas *work* is the central reference point of Marx's philosophy, for Aristotle the central idea is *act* and *potency*.²⁷

For Marx, "the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the begetting of man through human labour"²⁸. Work or labour, then, is the very heart of history, it is that which makes history "tick", it is the central reference point that makes people and history intelligible. Work is what humanises people. To reach a higher level of human

existence, one that enables them to develop their potentials, people need their fellow men as workers. To humanise the world, and thereby themselves, people must be co-workers, work not only side-by-side but also for one another. Thus, for all practical purposes, self-realisation is encompassed by self-realisation through material work, productive labour.

From the above observations, it is very clear that Marx's respect for labour, both the manual type and the intellectual type, is unquestionable. This implies that he invests with dignity those who perform productive work because, in the logic of his philosophy, they are the architects of world history.

Marx explains adequately how capitalism works against history by depriving work of its humanising essence. He describes capitalism as a system which has introduced working conditions that reduce people spiritually and physically to the condition of a machine, which makes it impossible for them to see work as a meaningful way of living. These conditions are inhuman because they prevent the worker from being authentically human. Thus, the in-authentic, self-estranged person is a creation of this system.

For Marx, people's self-expression lies in their being at work in the world, in the production of an available world. People are not estranged from their self-expression because their minds cannot recognise themselves in it, but because they are in a material way prevented from being themselves in their work and deprived of the product of their self-expression: the capitalistic order of society, which forces people to work for wages, takes this self-expression away from them. To overcome this self-estrangement, then, work must be humanised and the product of their labour must be restored to people.

The wage worker's self-estrangement, which is a characteristic of the capitalist system, manifests itself in the very act of working. First of all, in their work, people do not affirm themselves, they do not develop freely their physical and mental energy. The workers, therefore, only feel themselves outside their work, and in their work they feel outside themselves. They are "at home" when not working, and when working are not "at home." Their labour, therefore, is not voluntary but coerced. Instead of being an expression of themselves, it becomes a burden which they are forced to assume in order to keep alive. As soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague. The more people work, the less human they become. As a result, they only feel at home in the mere animal functions of eating, drinking and procreating. The very labour which was to liberate their humanity reduces them to animals.

To the above depiction of the central position of labour in Marx's philosophy, it is necessary to add that Marx attached equal importance to manual and intellectual labour:

Whether one performs intellectual work or physical labour makes no difference in this respect: the important point is that one contributes to society according to one's abilities.²⁹

In this regard, his position differs significantly from that of Aristotle. For Aristotle, intellectual work is superior and physical work is base. He makes the distinction quite clearly, thus:

The element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler and by nature master, while that which has the bodily strength to do the actual work is by nature a slave, one of those who are ruled³⁰

Physical or manual labour is referred to as "natural productive labour" in Aristotle's terminology:

Among human beings there are many varieties of life: first there are the nomads who get nutriment from domestic animals tilling as it were a living soil. Others live from hunting, others fishermen, others live off birds and wild animals. The third and largest class lives off the earth and its cultivated crops. These are the main ways of living by natural productive labour!³¹

It seems that, for Aristotle, intellectual work is situated in the realm of occupations said to require most skill because there is the smallest element of chance in them. He distinguishes these from "the most mechanical" ones which are those which cause most deterioration to the bodies of the workers. He further distinguishes them from "the most slavish" ones which are those in which most use is made of the body, and the "most ignoble" ones which are those in which there is least need to exercise virtue. In the realm of intellectual work, Aristotle ranks certain occupations very highly, namely: statesmanship, priesthood and the philosopher's career. These are elitist positions which are reserved for men of virtue, and which therefore symbolise the self-realisation of those individuals who successfully make their way up there. In his own words:

Both in earlier and modern times men most ambitious for virtue seem generally to have preferred these two kinds of lives, the statesman's or the philosopher's...³²

Marx does not subscribe to this Aristotelian elitism in its various manifestations. For example, Marx does not approve of the type of philosophy the mastery of which Aristotle considers to be a high degree of self-realisation, i.e. philosophy of the abstract mental labour type. In fact, Marx considers this type of philosophy as a form of estrangement and he points out that it remains alienated as long as the thinker indulges in "abstractions" and "regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuine human attitude"³³ For Marx, the authentic philosophy has recourse to praxis in order to disclose the truth, that is, the reality of the philosopher's thinking. The authentic philosopher does not indulge in mysticism but finds the rational solution of all "mysteries" in human praxis and in understanding this praxis. The classical philosophers, in Marx's view, are prevented, by the idea that are current in society, from disclosing the world as it really is — estranged and disorderly. They turn away from the real world, therefore, and take refuge in the realm of abstract ideas. There, they are able to build beautiful systems, full of order and harmony, but this order and harmony are alien to life. Instead of enlightening us about people and their world, these alienated philosophers spin metaphysical fantasies:

Real humanism has no more dangerous enemy in Germany than spiritualism or speculative idealism, which substitutes self-consciousness or the spirit for the real individual man!³⁴

Marx aptly dismisses as nonsense the metaphysical abstraction of classical philosophy by pointing out that the mass-minded, communist workers, employed, for instance, in the Manchester or Lyons workshops do not believe that by "pure thinking" they will be able

to argue away their industrial masters and their own practical debasement. They are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labour and the like are not figments of the brain but realistic and objective products of their self-estrangement and that therefore they must be abolished in a practical, objective way for people to become persons, not only in thinking, in consciousness, but in mass being, in life.³⁵

Rather than considering mastery of classical philosophy as a characteristic of the self-realised person, Marx seeks the dissolution of this form of philosophy and suggests that estranged metaphysical abstractions can be dissolved only "by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug".³⁶ After this overthrow, philosophy, then, will not be idle metaphysical speculation but an expression of reality. As such, it will be a positive science and no longer philosophy in the traditional sense of the term: "where speculation ends -- in real life -- positive science begins when reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of activity loses its medium of experience".³⁷

Thus philosophy becomes "practical" in a new way: it grasps the significance of revolutionary activity and realizes that its task is not to interpret the world but to change it.³⁸

Seen in this new light, philosophy becomes accessible to the manual labourers, in their very act of interacting with the real world. For Marx, people are beings in and "at" the world. They are beings in the world because they are "living in a real objective world and determined by that world". In everything they are and do they are utterly dependent upon the world and forced to make use of it. The usable world, the available world makes people be people. Whether we eat or drink, sleep or work, play or study, travel or relax, we can never escape our dependence upon the world. People who are one of nature's own forces can also oppose themselves to nature: by setting into motion the natural forces of their body, they can appropriate nature's production in a form adapted to their own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, they at the same time change their own nature. This is how the labouring person realises himself, and since human history is the story of people's progressive self-realisation, this is how the labouring person does it.

Marx entrusts the achievement of people's complete self-realisation on a global scale to the proletariat. Through a revolution, the proletariat will "succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew".³⁹ The transcendence of private property resulting from the revolution will bring about the complete emancipation of all human senses and attributes, the highest form of human self-realisation.

The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that, on the average, Aristotle's attitude towards the manual labourer is one of contempt. He takes the latter's predicament as something quite natural and he is indifferent about it. Moreover, he does not seem to envisage a situation whereby the manual labourer might pull himself out of his plight through a process of self-realisation. The few times he suggests that this is possible are overwhelmingly negated by several categorical statements about the manual

labourer's deficiency in virtue, so that, on balance, his appraisal of the labourer's potential for self-realisation is negative. Marx, on the other hand, exhibits respect for the manual labourer. The compassion with which he treats the latter's predicament is very compelling and the faith he has in the labourer's ability for self-realisation is tremendous.

This difference in outlook is not easy to explain, but at least two suggestions can be made. The first is that the two thousand years which separate the two philosophers are enough to create a significant difference in outlook, and much more so when the spatial settings of their social inquiry are different. The second factor that might explain the said difference in outlook lies in the fundamental difference between the two theorists' respective philosophies, which is itself, at least in part, a function of their difference in time and space.

FOOTNOTES

1. Aristotle, *The Politics*, Penguin Classics, Revised Edition, pp. 246—7.
2. Id., pp. 247—8.
3. Id., p. 65.
4. Id., p. 69.
5. Ibid.
6. Id., p. 57.
7. Id., p. 416.
8. Id., p. 415.
9. Ibid.
10. Id., p. 96.
11. Marx, Karl, *The Communist Manifesto* (Washington Square Press, Inc., N.Y., 1965), p. 70.
12. Id., pp. 58—9.
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18. Aristotle, op. cit., p. 61.
19. Id., p. 119.
20. Id., p. 204.
21. Id., pp. 202—5.
22. Id., p. 334.
23. Marx, Karl, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow.
24. Aristotle, op. cit., p. 157.
25. Id., p. 254.
26. Marx, K. and Engels, F., *The German Ideology*, p. 22.
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THE PROBLEM OF INCORPORATING "THE WESTMINSTER MODEL" IN A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE EXPERIENCE OF WESTERN NIGERIA 1962—64 AND SUBSEQUENT REACTIONS

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THE "WESTMINSTER MODEL" CONSTITUTION

The long association between Nigeria and Britain meant that in the transition from colonial status to independence, the pattern of government would be built on the main outlines of "the Westminster Model" — resulting in a system, *mutatis mutandis* similar to that operative in the United Kingdom. But the United Kingdom Constitution is largely unwritten, while the Constitution by which Nigeria became independent was written. Taking into account this difference, and the fact that their socio-political milieu is not the same, it was not certain whether "the Westminster Model" would work as effectively in Nigeria as it did in Britain. Unfortunately, nobody seems to have considered this aspect of the situation at the time of its drafting. As Mackintosh rightly points out:

in many ways the most remarkable feature of the period during which it was framed, was the lack of discussion of how it was likely to work in practice and how far the structure would be affected by the activities and outlook of the Nigerian parties and their leaders.¹

How the structure would be affected by the activities and outlook of the Nigerian parties and their leaders, would soon become clear. Within two years of independence, both the nation and the Constitution were shaken by what is now commonly known as the Western Nigeria crisis of 1962.

THE WESTERN NIGERIA CRISIS 1962

When Nigeria became independent in 1960, the constitutional structures of the regions then making up the Federation were similar, and each a replica of the central government. In the Western Region, at the top of the hierarchy was the governor in whom the executive power of the region was vested. The governor, however, in the exercise of his powers acted on the advice of his ministers, who constituted the second tier of the hierarchy. The Council of Ministers was appointed by the Governor acting on his own initiative.² The Western Region Constitution also held the following provision (Section 33) in respect of the power of the Governor to dismiss the prime minister:

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