

# NYERERE'S CRISIS, MWINYI'S DILEMMA: TANZANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-ARUSHA DECLARATION PERIOD

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## Introduction

The foreign policy of Tanzania since independence has gone through cycles — that of consolidating political independence, that of African liberation and unity, and that of national development. The three strategies that have been adopted are those of co-operation, non-alignment, and self-reliance. A quarter century after independence it looks as if we are back to square one, consolidating our independence. But this appearance can be misleading.

In the mid-1980s, the views from which foreign policy problems are being discussed in Tanzania suggest three possible responses to these problems: ideological, traditional and pragmatic. An ideological response attempts to find remedies in ritualistic ideas. But in this endeavour, deviation from the pattern of belief (ideas repeated constantly with an air of certainty about their truthfulness) is seen as problematic. A traditional response seeks remedies in old traditions: mythical means that worked before, in the golden age of the past. A pragmatic response, on the other hand, directs its efforts towards summoning available resources to deal with the challenges imaginatively. The first two responses provide answers to problems and tend to give assurance that they will solve them. In this, they make people feel better. However, they rest on the refusal to accept that a radically new situation has to be encountered and, therefore, new strategies have to be invented.

The greatest misfortune which can befall an underdeveloped African country is for it to become a battleground on which forces struggle for supremacy. The Arusha Declaration may have precisely done that. Indeed, the essence of the Arusha Declaration of 1967 lies precisely in the recognition of the triple responses and, further, in an acceptance of economic power as a factor both in domestic and external relations. With political independence, it became clear that the conduct of foreign policy was going to be effective only if the domestic agenda was tackled imaginatively.

## The Emergence of the Arusha Declaration

The most significant facts in Tanzania's history, in a world perspective, are slavery and colonisation. The slave trade, carried out by both Arabs and Europeans, caused the psychological destruction of Africans in the social and economic relationships among peoples. The resulting cultural values have been ascribed to a negative status to such an extent that Africans seem to be unable to resist any domination.

The colonisation of the country provided the groundwork for Tanzania's exploitation and integration with European-centred economies, and formalised the state of dependency that the country finds itself in now.

In 1961, Tanganyika achieved independence. Two years later, under the leadership of J.K. Nyerere, it became a founding member of the Organization of African Unity. In 1964, Tanganyika united with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Six years after Tanganyika's independence, the National Executive Committee of Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) met in Arusha, in February 1967, to define a national development strategy — hence, the birth of the Arusha Declaration.

On 14 December 1961, Nyerere addressed the United Nations General Assembly. Apart from declaring that Tanganyika recognised the fundamental importance of the UN, Nyerere expressed his admiration of the equality of nations in the General Assembly. It was from here that the belief in the UN as a vehicle for achieving world peace was anchored in the mind of Tanzania's body politic. A major consequence of this belief was the policy on non-alignment.

Yet, the practice of this policy was not quite clear in terms of domestic performance. The first national development plan (1961-64), for instance, intended to capture foreign aid from the West — mainly from Great Britain, West Germany, USA and Israel. The Rhodesia crisis of 1965 and the West Germany crisis of 1964 may have been the first graduate courses in international relations which demonstrated that it was unrealistic to base national plans on promises of foreign donors.

Prior to 1967, perhaps, three views could be discerned. First, the country was backward, economically weak and underdeveloped, and these conditions seemingly could be explained by colonialism and imperialism. Secondly, the principle of non-alignment in foreign relations could not address the total set of issues facing the state. And thirdly, dependence was a threat to independence. The Arusha Declaration was anchored on the premise that, in the contemporary world, a modern state is a key vehicle for development to the extent that the major components of international transactions between countries are determined by economic power. With the proclamation of the Arusha Declaration state power became critical and custodian of foreign relations.

Eight months after the Arusha Declaration Nyerere, addressing the TANU National Conference, argued that the fundamental principles of foreign policy had not changed since independence. What the Arusha Declaration had done was to reaffirm the objectives as far as international relations were concerned.

## The Global Context

A major reason why Tanzania has opted for non-alignment as one of the strategies in its external relations is its poverty and the economic strength of the big powers. A poor country is always in trouble. There is no doubt of this in Nyerere's view:

The real urgent threat to independence of almost all non-aligned states thus comes not from the military, but from the economic power of the big states. It is poverty which constitutes our greatest danger, and to a greater or less extent we are all poor.

The post-Arusha Declaration foreign policy initiatives have mainly been a reaction to imperialism and to those structures created to continue the links and perpetuate the relationship: for international relations are largely economic relations and all other relations are dependent on the economic order (or disorder). By and large, differences in state power have determined relations between the core and

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periphery. Significantly, due to their weak position, the peripheral nations could neither determine nor influence the outcomes of their relations with core nations. A critical dimension of these relations is that changes that spring from the core countries have systematic consequences for the periphery.<sup>5</sup> That is why Tanzania's international relations cannot be understood outside their temporal and historical context.

Accepting the historical trend that Tanzania's economy has been integrated in the international capitalist economy, what actions can be taken to maintain Tanzania's independence? Was the Arusha Declaration confronting this legacy? As it stands now, there seems to be no immediate possibility of a reduction of international inequality whether it is discussed in the North-South forum, multilateral organisations or some combination of other forums. Indeed, as has been the case for the past two decades, the core countries are becoming increasingly reluctant in easing the disparity. The idea that the solution to a basically economic problem can be assisted by international action is becoming undermined by a collection of disappointments.

If Tanzania is to stand up to the Arusha Declaration principles on foreign relations, that is, a continuation of liberation support in Africa, fight for African Unity, non-alignment, support of the United Nations and a self-reliance development strategy, then the following major actors in world politics have to be faced.

## The USA Power in Global Politics

At the centre of world politics is the USA and Tanzania cannot escape its influence. In general, USA policy on Africa has been built in the context of super-power competition and the American belief that there is total antagonism between freedom and communism.

Since African political independence, in the early 1960s, the successive American administrations have never accepted the view that Africa should be understood on its own. Irrespective of the party in power, American foreign policy has been based on confronting USSR expansion of business interest and opposing armed liberation struggle.<sup>6</sup>

The most recent explicit formulation of USA policy has been supplied by the Reagan administration whereby militarisation of the world is seen as part of US national security. For example, this policy holds that the relations with South Africa should be built on the basis of its global confrontation policy with the USSR, and South Africa is to be relied upon as a regional power to protect western interests.

The US policy of 'constructive engagement' was offered by Chester A. Crocker in 1980 shortly before Reagan took office nominating Crocker to become assistant secretary of State for African Affairs. A major aspect of this policy was a criticism of the previous US policy of exerting pressure on the South African regime and making promises to blacks in South Africa that could not be delivered. The message is, in Crocker's own words:

A tone of empathy is required not only for suffering and injustice caused to blacks in a racist system, but also for the awesome political dilemma in which Africaners and other whites find themselves ... American powder should be kept dry for genuine opportunities to exert influence. As in other foreign policy agendas for the 1980s, the motto should be: underpromise and overdeliver — for a change.

But the fact of the matter is that there is nothing new about this 'new' policy.<sup>8</sup>

The American policy is not shaped by chance or by mistakes of one administration or another. The nature of their policies should be understood in the context of two realities emerging in the post-colonial global politics. First, the American power has declined; the reverse of this has been the growth of the USSR as a global power. This in itself has led to 'sphere of influence' competition. Secondly, in the post-colonial period the emerging nations have become articulate and are mobilising forces to support their interests. In this endeavour they frustrate and even make it difficult for the superpowers to claim a right of decision in their affairs. This trend is certainly worrisome to American policy makers.

It is suggested that Tanzania's relations with the USA since the Arusha Declaration have had the character of resistance: defence of its independence and sovereignty. And, following the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania increased its assertiveness in various global issues which confronted American interests. The Tanzanian struggle for national and social emancipation is going to encounter fundamental problems and is certain to clash with American foreign policy. Indeed, there is a possibility that USA aid to Tanzania (characterised even now by a reduced number of staff working in the country) is going to decline further—partly because of the increasing mistrust of multilateral institutions (e.g. UN) which hitherto were the means through which aid was channeled, partly because of the conservative trend that is sweeping industrialised countries and partly because of attitudes which Washington may consider to be in conflict with America's interest. Other areas of conflict or potential conflict include South Africa, Namibia, the proliferation of war machinery in the Indian Ocean, America's role in international organisations, extension of the East-West conflict to Africa and the continuing inequality between the North and South. To assert that the USA is interested in a divided, unstable Africa is not missing the point.

Besides African liberation, the dialogue with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has occupied Tanzanian foreign policy, particularly in the post-Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM, the national party) period. By some people the dealings with the IMF have been viewed as a negation of the Arusha Declaration principles. But, in any case, the year of the birth of CCM (1977) and the collapse of the East African Community is also the year in which serious consultations with the IMF began. These have been temporarily resolved with the election of a new president in Tanzania.

Tanzania, like other African countries, viewed membership as a ticket to the treasures of the World Bank and, in particular, to the International Development Agency. Both the World Bank and IMF were established (in 1944 and 1947 respectively) to promote capitalism and facilitate expansion and growth of international trade. In order that the USA could monitor what was happening it demanded and succeeded in getting the headquarters to be located in Washington. Therefore, any discussion with the IMF means, in fact, dealing with the USA.

The USA, with the largest share of votes in IMF (just under 20%), enjoys unparalleled influence over IMF decision-making. Cohen has observed that the Fund has been viewed as serving US policy interests more effectively rather than attempting to deal with countries on direct, bilateral basis and at a lower political cost.<sup>9</sup> Since the USA is the biggest single aid donor in dollar terms, the decision to put the IMF at the centre of the global economy means that the USA controls the creation and disbursement of resources and, for countries like Tanzania, the dramatic effect is felt in debt service payment, increases in the cost of new loans, a general dis-

ruption of the capacity to import capital goods needed for furthering a socialist and self-reliant development strategy.

## Socialist Development and Socialist Encounter

The major thrust of Soviet foreign policy has been based on the theory that international relations are a struggle between two competing camps. In the early years, their relations were hostile but, in the early seventies, detente was the general expression guiding their relations with the West.

The Soviet relations with the Third World have been based on the premise that not the USSR as a state but the West bears responsibility for the colonial structures that are prevalent. Part of this belief is Marxist in orientation and posits that capitalism usually follows feudalism and the Third World is in the western development path. Consequently, the Soviet policy in the Third World has been one of selective emphasis on certain strategically important dependent capitalist Third World countries. Further, where necessary, competition with the USA for converts all over the world has continued on the ideological plane.

The argument that the Soviet Union supports peoples' liberation also applies to the immediate past two decades. With the exception of South Africa and Namibia, with their apartheid regime, Africa has achieved political independence. The controlling influence in international relations, however, is primarily economics and not ideology. During the last phase of African liberation struggle the USSR offered arms and other support to various liberation movements. But what Africa needs now is economic aid and not military hardware. The posture of help that is sometimes displayed by USSR should go further: the concept of detente as registered in a number of agreements since 1972 by the super-powers should have been extended to place some limits on how much, for example, African countries should spend on arms.

In a study of Tanzanian gains from trade with socialist countries, Bienefeld concluded that with the exception of trade with the People's Republic of China, Tanzania did not derive any special benefits. He went on to argue that this could only change if Tanzania was willing to forego its commitment to non-alignment as its major principle in foreign policy.<sup>10</sup> But the fact is that economic aid has never been a central aspect of Soviet policy towards Tanzania, partly because the USSR considers the country to be ideologically polluted and aid, therefore, would be extremely unfavourable.<sup>11</sup> But even if Soviet aid were forthcoming could it ever be without strings attached? Or are socialist countries not integrated in the world international capitalist economy where capitalist principles are in operation?

Tanzania's decision to adopt the policy of socialism and self-reliance meant that friendship was sought with all nations. However, there was a noted emphasis on learning from socialist countries, particularly the People's Republic of China. As early as 1965, President Nyerere made a state visit to Beijing, in the midst of the Cultural Revolution and observed:

I must say that if you found it necessary to begin a cultural revolution, in order to make sure that the new generation would carry forward the banner of your revolution, then certainly we need one. We have seen in Tanzania how easy it is to pay lip service to the importance of socialism and the people, while in fact we behave like capitalists and petty dictators.

Two years later the Arusha Declaration was born and five months after that the Chinese gave Tanzania and Zambia one of the biggest loans in the Third World to

build a railway line from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi. The liberation struggle towards lessening dependence on South Africa was putting its hopes on this Uhuru railway as it is doing once again now for freeing SADCC countries.

There is no question that Chinese friendship was accepted as a strategy to lessen dependency upon western powers. It was also critical in demonstrating the claim that Tanzania was non-aligned in its foreign policy. That, of course, is not all. The continuing interaction with China reflected the expression of human equality and the sovereignty of all independent states as evidenced by Tanzania's vigorous campaign for the Peoples Republic's admission to the UN. Tanzania was building a future relationship with China which counted a billion people and was gradually coming out of its isolation.

In 1978, Deng Xiaoping called for policy changes and mounted a campaign to adopt pragmatism instead of ideological dogma. He called for the Chinese Communist Party to attach the highest priority to economic development. What was actually being called for was not all that different from the changes being called for in the third decade of the Arusha Declaration in Tanzania. This would point to continuing good relations with China.

## The European Economic Community

Since its formation, the European Economic Community has been building an image of its own as a global geopolitical actor with logically constructed regional policies towards the Third World, as different from the USA, the USSR and, lately, China and Japan. To a degree, the EEC members are becoming increasingly reluctant to accept USA leadership in the manner they had done in the period following the Second World War.

One of the reasons for this trend is that some of the core members in the EEC (e.g. West Germany) have rebuilt their economies and have become competitors in international relations, particularly trade, not so much with the intent to eliminate the US as to share in the gains of North South relations. This is partly a quest to restructure international relations in the world away from a theatre of Soviet-American rivalry for world dominance, and to create new economic centres. The US and USSR are not going to be militarily less powerful; what this may lead to is the emergence of a multicentric world economy.

Tanzania's participation in the EEC/ACP conventions — the Lome's — is partly a recognition of this, partly a continuation of trade links that have been established over the years. The continuation of links with EEC is a plus if one accepts the view that mult centrality could be of benefit to the South. It is fairly self-evident that some EEC members are relatively dependent on African markets and African raw materials. Indeed, it should be clear that EEC's foreign policy is one of securing raw materials and markets for their processed goods which are sometimes disguised as technical assistance.

Two decades after the Arusha Declaration, the direction and production of the economy is still EEC-oriented with only a small volume of trade with African or Third World countries. In a way, attempts to strengthen regional economic co-operation within Africa have negated the thrust of unity that Tanzania has been projecting in international relations. This can only be explained by historical links with European powers, particularly the former colonial power of Britain. Through trade links, Commonwealth, EEC and Britain are still in a position to take advantage of every factor to influence Tanzania.

## Towards Regional Co-operation within Africa

To a certain extent, discussion about African unity has centred around regional co-operation, particularly economic integration. Regional co-operation is viewed as a strategy for building an economic foundation which leads to self-sufficiency, integrated economies and an overall reduction of dependence from inherited colonial structures. Since the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania has aspired towards regional co-operation as a step in the direction of African unity within the Organisation of African Unity framework. The emphasis on regional co-operation was due to a recognition that not many African states could achieve economic development without joining efforts.

By 1965, all hopes of forming the East African Federation had died. Thus, it was perhaps in the spirit of regional co-operation that in December 1967 Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda formed what became the East African Community. The aim was regional development as a step towards African unity. However, the birth of the EAC, after the Arusha Declaration, was not a blessing. After a decade of struggle for existence, the death certificate for the EAC was signed in 1977. In reviewing ten years of Arusha Declaration, Nyerere had the following remarks:

In the fight for economic independence, cooperation with other Third World Countries has increased since February 1967, although difficulties have not been absent... Cooperation in East Africa is needed by the whole continent; it has been, and can again be a valuable weapon in the fight for greater economic development and freedom. But, I must confess with very great sadness, that the hope of reviving the East African Community is now a very slight one. We tried; but it appears that we shall be defeated. Our colleagues neither had, nor have, the desire for real cooperation. There is still a long way to travel before Africa is liberated.<sup>15</sup>

This is not the place to argue why the East African Community collapsed.<sup>14</sup> But it must be said that the collapse of the East African Community led to a whole series of questions on whether Tanzania was ready for regional co-operation, what should be the nature of the co-operation and the degree of political commitment.

In an attempt to compensate for the failure of the EAC, Tanzania reoriented its co-operation efforts to its southern neighbours. Following a number of preliminary meetings in 1979 and 1980, Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was formally constituted in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1980.

Under SADCC, nine countries agreed to work for a reduction of dependence, particularly on the Republic of South Africa, the creation of an integrated economy, mobilisation of resources for regional development and undertaking joint action to secure international support for the SADCC strategy. The obvious threat to this regional organisation is South Africa's regional politics and military policies.

If one wants to appraise Tanzania's role in SADCC, questions of economics and politics become of paramount importance. Essential is the realisation that SADCC is for liberation. Indeed, six of the nine states (Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Botswana and Mozambique) constitute the Frontline State of which Tanzania has been chairman till the election of a new president in the country. The relevance of Tanzania's participation in both SADCC and the Frontline States has to be understood in the context of African liberation struggle and African unity which were affirmed in the Arusha Declaration.

In addition to participation in SADCC, in 1985 Tanzania became a member of the Preferential Trade Area grouping 18 states in the East, Central and Southern African subregion and has for some years been a participant in the Kagera Basin Organisation. These participations reflect the realisation that African liberation must be supported by economic co-operation.

## Mwinyi's Presidency: Perspectives and Trends

For Tanzania, the central event in 1985 was the election of Ali Hassan Mwinyi as the second president of the United Republic. To a considerable degree, Tanzania's foreign policy had, so far, been more or less a function of the views, character and style of the former president. That Julius K. Nyerere left a stamp on Tanzania's foreign policy is beyond question. From 1961 to 1972, Nyerere was his own Foreign Minister, assisted by Ministers of state. And it is at this crucial period that most of the principles and objectives to guide Tanzania's action in international relations were outlined. It was not until 1972 that a full minister, not the President, headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

All politics is a dilemma which, as the dictionary informs us, is defined as a perplexing or awkward situation, a choice between risky alternatives, both unfavourable and disagreeable to some degree. The dilemma that President Mwinyi is facing is part of the dilemma facing the Third World countries; in some respects, it is connected with Tanzania's objectives as proclaimed in the Arusha Declaration: Tanzania's initiatives in international relations were revolutionary, demanding radical changes, but its domestic stand was one of gradualist conservatism. The Arusha Declaration demanded choices to overcome the traumatic legacies of slavery, colonialism and poverty. The crisis that resulted in the course of implementing the policies is still going on.

Leadership is a key factor in any political system. President Mwinyi has certainly brought enough experience to the office: an ambassador to Egypt, a minister in the Zanzibar government, a minister in the United Republic, President of Zanzibar and Vice-Chairman of CCM. He also has a reputation of honesty. And in his first year in the presidency he has proved himself to be dedicated and committed to economic performance rather than appealing to charisma.

Although President Mwinyi never took part in the major political events in the country, including the formulation of the Arusha Declaration, it is quite safe to say that his presidency stands for African liberation, non-alignment, African unity and co-operation, opposition to apartheid and support for the UN and a peaceful world and, as such, it is essentially compatible with the policies of the Arusha Declaration. However, the question remains to what extent these goals can be pursued in this dangerous world and to what extent they can be brought into harmony with the principles set out in the Arusha Declaration and reaffirmed in MWONGOZO of 1971. For example, how should Tanzania react to the increasing global inequality? Should it continue to place hope on North-South or South-South dialogue? Should Tanzania lessen the degree of integration in the international capitalist economy? How can this be achieved, with the IMF as a partner in socialist development?

It is correct to state that President Mwinyi's primary problem is the economy, for economic performance is the foundation of any nation's foreign policy. The problem of Tanzania's economy is its backwardness and this threatens its ability to play an

effective role in world politics. To begin with, it completely undermines the ideological claim as pronounced in the Arusha Declaration that it is only socialism which is capable of advancing the country. Second, because of poor performance in the economy certain aspects of Tanzania's foreign policy have been undermined. In the aftermath of the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania was seen as a model to be emulated in the Third World. But the poor performance has led to a belief that Tanzania's model has been ineffective or, to use Mazrui's words, a 'heroic failure'.<sup>15</sup> If Tanzania had a properly functioning economy, its role in Africa would have been greater and political lines of influence would have followed the economic ones.

Without doubt, President Mwinyi understands all of this. A secure and economically prosperous country is in a position of strength to participate in international relations. Perhaps, this is why President Mwinyi has put so much emphasis on domestic accountability in the economy. This emphasis is an attempt to reinforce the idea that domestic performance is a determinant of external performance.

A key word that President Mwinyi used when he named his cabinet was 'continuity'. President Mwinyi has, indeed, confirmed a continuity in Tanzania's foreign relations. In broad terms, the emphasis has continued to be on regional co-operation, African unity, South Africa's liberation struggle, non-alignment and a peaceful world. This may explain the fact that, after assuming the presidency, all his foreign trips were within Africa.

The recent political developments in Tanzania whereby the constitution limits the presidents' term to a maximum period of ten years have an effect on presidential leadership which will try to carve a name in history. There is a strong possibility that Mwinyi will let the foreign ministry continue to conduct the public diplomacy of his predecessor. As a beginning, he has selected a career diplomat, Paul Rupia, as Principal Secretary to the President's Office.

However, there is a need for him to involve the foreign ministry more in policy formulation and planning. Clearly, it seems that in the past the ministry, despite its strategic position around the world, has not been active in the search for ideas; wherever an issue has emerged it has done nothing more than repeating either the traditional or the ideological response. This has resulted in the ministry being viewed as a post office receiving and delivering messages.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, the establishment of the Ministry of Regional Cooperation has added to the unclear position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The need to involve the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emerges from the realisation that international relations in the 20th century encompass a diversity of activities which require skills and knowledge. The search for new ideas should be entrusted more to the Foreign Ministry which has a better understanding of the complex issues. Having the right information at the right time can be essential.

In an interdependent complex world, it makes a difference whether one is armed with information hardware or not. A major weakness of the South in various encounters with the North is the overexposure of the North to various data that the South lacks. This has led the North to build a 'new information empire'. Having acquired this power, the North once again dominates, leaving the South with an enormous amount of rhetoric jockeying for status and ideological eminence which obliterates meaningful discussion.

Another important foreign policy issue that Tanzania has been concerned with is the arms race. The theory here is that a reduction in the arms race may lead to world peace and development. However, this is beginning to obscure the reality of

the real issues. Despite the fact that the causes of global inequality have been on the agenda in different international forums – OAU, Lagos Plan of Action, UNCTAD, UN, North-South, among others – no serious strategies to solve them are on the table. With respect to arms control, the militarised societies of the North (including USSR) have not reduced expenditure on warfare machinery. But even if these countries were to reduce military expenditure it is unlikely that these resources would then become available to the Third World as disarmament enthusiasts seem to suggest.

One may want to dispute the view, commonly pronounced by leaders and also shared by academics, that the arms race constitutes a serious bottleneck to global negotiations. However, the tendency in Tanzania to dwell on this view has resulted neither in gains for the development efforts nor in favourable aid from these arms producers. This excessive concern becomes itself a self-imposed limitation on Tanzania in terms of national capability to explore other avenues in the international system.

The political independence of Tanzania as emphasised in the Arusha Declaration is not threatened because the North is spending more and more on arms; rather it is hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance – in short: non-fulfilment of the minimum needs for the people – that is a threat. The value of opinion in Tanzania favouring arms reduction is purely symbolic and could be due to some foreign friends who may be interested in promoting their own interests.<sup>18</sup>

The questions of Namibia's independence, dismantling of apartheid and the general instability in the region are going to continue to be areas of focus for Tanzania's foreign policy. Development, peace and stability of Tanzania would be difficult to achieve if pursued in isolation from the southern Africa region. The death of President Samora on 19th October 1986 has to be understood in the context of the war in southern Africa.

In May 1986, South Africa attacked Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe – member Frontline states. This action coincided with the presence of the Eminent Persons Group of the Commonwealth in South Africa who were exploring ways to reach a peaceful change.<sup>19</sup> The significance of the raid is that South Africa is determined to pursue policies of destabilisation and instability in the whole region.

Given the world-wide demand for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, South Africa is likely to increase its instability policies. Certainly, there are good reasons why Tanzania should be concerned with the situation in southern Africa. It is, therefore, necessary that the Frontline states increase pressure on South Africa by supporting the liberation movements and mobilising world opinion to support their struggle.

The battle to further the exploring and cementing of South-South co-operation has now proceeded with the formation of the South-South Commission, with former President Nyerere of Tanzania as its chairman. This could suggest that the North-South dialogue is thought to be evading a solution. But since each represents an effort to reduce global inequality, Tanzania must continue to be a participant although the process of disengagement will be a rough one.<sup>20</sup> It is in the context of South-South co-operation that Tanzania should continue to have relations with other large and important nations in global issues such as India and China or even middle powers like Brazil. Some of these countries are poor and, hence, part of the Third World seeking a more equitable distribution of income and wealth. This Third

World argument should also be used to penetrate nations like the USA which have a third world in their midst. A cementing of relations with Afro-Americans, for example, is a good strategy in lobbying politics in the USA. The role of American Jews in the USA/Israel relations is an indication of a trend that can take place if Afro-Americans are economically liberated.

The post-Arusha Declaration period has witnessed a worsening food position as evidenced by declining self-sufficiency food rations, rising food imports and increase in famine and malnutrition. Essential is the fact that the process of liberating Africa has to include the ability to feed the people and to achieve a higher level of food production. The first government budget speech after the Arusha Declaration had the following remarks in respect of food production:

I should like to call attention to the fact that the Food and Agricultural Organisation and the Economic Commission for Africa statistics show that Tanzania is the only African state which has consistently maintained a growth trend in food production higher than that of population during the entire period 1954-66. This record is a high tribute indeed to the energy and initiative of the Tanzania farmer.

Increasingly, Tanzania's position in global politics is being weakened because the country cannot feed itself. It is high time we stop thinking that drought, famine, floods are natural problems. To view these as social problems implies that society has the capacity to attack these problems. Hence, just as it has been suggested that political independence cannot be achieved without economic emancipation, it should be emphasised that the future global struggle will not be on energy but on food. And who is to dominate this struggle? Given the behaviour of the North in other issues, the marginal position that Tanzania will find itself in would be suicidal.

### Concluding Remarks

Historians are interpreters of the past. They study the past on the basis of newly found evidence or by looking at the facts from a different perspective or by using a new methodology. The Arusha Declaration is not only concerned with the past and present. It is also concerned with the future. Mwinyi's presidency will be evaluated by future historians not only on how he inherited crises but also on how he manipulated domestic constraints and external pressures to achieve national goals. Certainly, a President must arouse popular enthusiasm for national programmes. In a way, this may not require a mastery of legislative skills, but the capacity to make themes compelling to the public.

In 1979, Tanzania waged - successfully - its first foreign war and removed tyrant Amin from power despite widespread poverty. The determination to do so challenged OAU principles but a major respect for Tanzania was recorded in history. What should be learned from this action is that where there is determination success is inevitable. With political consciousness, determination and unity, the foreign policy of Tanzania in the third decade of the Arusha Declaration should pursue with greater vigour self-reliance within and co-operation among developing countries. Any decline in economic power would find the country reduced to irrelevancy even in African politics.

The Arusha Declaration emphasised the need for a realisation of our own weakness:

The struggle (against poverty and oppression) is aimed to moving the people of Tanzania and the people of Africa as a whole from a state of poverty to a state of prosperity. We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. We now intend to bring about a revolution of these things. 22

In sum, the Arusha Declaration acknowledged that the African people have the capacity to manage their own affairs without pressures or interferences from outside against their dignity, freedom and independence. That is the message which the Arusha Declaration is still conveying today.

## Footnotes

1. Tanganyika African National Union, *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self Reliance*, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1967.
2. These crises are documented in Cranford Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania: 1945-1968*. Cambridge University Press, 1976. See also J.K. Nyerere, "Principles and Development", in *Freedom and Development*. Oxford University Press, 1968.
3. Julius K. Nyerere, "Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs", Address to the TANU National Conference, 16 October 1967, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
4. Julius K. Nyerere, *Non Alignment in the 1970s*, Opening address delivered on 13 April 1970, at the preparatory meeting of the Non-aligned States in Dar es Salaam, p. 1.
5. Wanakayi K. Omoka, "Hegemonic Dominance in World Political Economy: An Essay on its Characteristics and Trends", *African Journal of Sociology* Vol. 11, No. 2, November 1982.
6. See, for example, David Anderson, "America in Africa", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 60, No. 3 1982, pp. 658-685.
7. Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 2, 1980.
8. The US Congress vote for limited sanctions against South Africa in October 1986 is a tacit admission that Reagan's policy of constructive engagement has failed. Furthermore, constructive disengagement, that is, withdrawal of investment by USA multinationals, is supportive of the failure of USA policy in South Africa.
9. See Benjamin J. Cohen, "International Debt and Linkage Strategies; Some Foreign Policy Implications for the United States", *International Organisation* Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn 1985. This indirect view as a strategy for dealing with nations was also shared by Carter and the potential of having the Peoples Republic of China as a friend was due to the "ability to quietly way some Third World countries with who it was very difficult for us to communicate. Most revolutionary governments did not naturally turn to the United States... We saw our cooperation with China as a means to promote peace and better understanding between the USA and those countries". See Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith*, New York, Bantam Books, 1982.
10. M.A. Bienefeld, "Special Gains from Trade with Socialist Countries: The Case of Tanzania", *World Development*, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 1975, pp. 247 - 271.
11. Cranford Pratt, op. cit., p. 160.
12. Quoted in George T. Yu, *China and Tanzania: A study in Comparative Interaction*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p.99.
13. Julius K. Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration: Ten Years After", *The African Review*, Vol.7, No. 2, 1977, p. 17.
14. See the special issue of *the African Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 & 2, 1978.
15. See *Africa Events*, Vol. 2, June 1986.
16. In the domain of accountability in the domestic arena also government ministries such as Treasury should be urged to spend more time on domestic economic matters rather than paying unnecessary attention to low key foreign missions. An example is that the data used in the Programme for Economic Recovery were taken from the files of the World Bank and the IMF. See Horace Campbell, "The IMF Debate and the Politics of Demobilisation in Tanzania", *Paper presented at the Second Triennial Congress of OSSREA*. Eldoret, Kenya, July 1986.
17. Lack of involving the ministry was also expressed by the former president. See *Five Years of CCM government*, a key note address by the Chairman of CCM, 20th October, 1982.
18. On 8.11.85 Gorbachev, for example, answered leaders of Sweden, India, Greece, Mexico, Argentina and Tanzania that the USSR was ready to continue a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests beyond the 1985 deadline if the Americans were ready to join the test ban. The USSR has since extended the moratorium to January 1987. See Christian Schmidt Haver, *Gorbachev: The Path to Power*, London: Pan Books, 1986.
20. For some suggestions on how to disengage see Ali A. Mazrui, "Exit Visa from the World System: Dilemmas of Cultural and Economic Disengagement", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Jan. 1981.

21. See *United Republic of Tanzania*, Budget speech 1967/68, p. 6. Indeed, since the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania has been a net importer of food. See R. R. Matango, "Agricultural Policy and Food Production in Tanzania", in C.K. Omari, (ed.), *Towards Rural Development in Tanzania*, Arusha: East African Publications, 1984.
22. TANU op. cit., p. 4.